

THE UKRAINE AT THE TURNING POINT*

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The official break with Poland and the end of the policy of autonomy came in the closing months of the year 1653. Khmelnytsky characterized this memorable year, "It is the King's year, but for me and my desires it is just the opposite; it presages fortune of every kind for the Poles."¹ In reality the Hetman's situation was tragic. The Crimean Khan, who had been bribed by the Polish King for a hundred thousand ducats and allowed to take captives from the territory of Lviv and the more remote parts of the Ukraine, betrayed Khmelnytsky near Zhvanets at the most crucial moment. The Poles did not wish to begin new negotiations with the Cossack delegate, Vyhovsky, since the Polish senators again began to consider the Cossacks as their "subjects." Khmelnytsky wrote to the tsar that the Tatars wanted to hand him and Vyhovsky to the King and that they were preparing a full-scale Ukrainian campaign for the beginning of 1654 to subdue the "rebellious" Ukraine once and for all.

What was most important, the Hetman's monarchial and dynastic ideas, which were based on Turkish assistance and on the sultan's protection, tottered with the death of his beloved son and successor, Timothy, killed near Suchava in September 1653. They tottered and finally collapsed after the Tatar's betrayal and the Tatars' fearful devastation in the Ukraine. Everything, it seemed, aimed to make this terrible year truly a "King's year," to humble Khmelnytsky before the "Majesty of the Polish Republic"; and his only solace seemed to be the Cossacks, his loyal subjects. Such a change was not possible for the great Hetman, nor for the organized and sufficiently strong Ukrainian aristocracy. Rather than return to the Polish Republic, the Hetman and his aids conceived a new and daring plan, which would allow them to escape from the hopeless situation in which they found themselves. This was:

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¹ *Arch. Czartoryskich* cdx. 147, p. 168f.: "Krótka narratywa ekspedycji w r. 1653 po świętach przeciwko rebelii kozackiej z potęgą tatarską."

to destroy Poland and the Crimea with the aid of Moscow. Khmelnytsky intended to get rid of the sultan, who was of a different faith, and establish a Cossack state under the aegis of an Orthodox tsar. The Prince of Moldavia, well-versed in Ukrainian affairs, wrote on February 14, 1654 to the Polish King: "These hostile Cossacks envisage nothing less than to join Moscow and invade the state of Your Royal Highness and destroy it. They want to have their own capital in Kiev after the victory."² The authors of the Pereyaslav Treaty visualized the significance and importance of the tsar's protection in this way: "The Tsar's Majesty will confer upon us greater freedom, the rights of dominion and goods than (did) the Polish kings or the old Rus' princes." They said, quoting Hetman Khmelnytsky, "for these freedoms, rights, and goods we shed our blood from grandfather to father, to maintain and preserve them from ruin."³ The constructive spirit of statehood, the steadfastness in relation to the main enemy, at that time, Poland, and the fatality of the plan (either master or death) guaranteed him victory over all other concepts, which were advanced by other politician of that time and which were perhaps more practical, logical, and diplomatic.

We are accustomed to view the Pereyaslav Treaty through the prism of the Pereyaslav legend, a later creation. It is absolutely necessary to distinguish these completely different forms of the same historical fact. The Pereyaslav legend was created during the disintegration of the Cossack sovereignty. It assumed contemporary ideological form only after the Poltava defeat and the final destruction of the independent and sovereign aims of the Cossack aristocracy during the time of Mazepa. In this concept, the Little Russian people, under the leadership of Hetman Khmelnytsky, had liberated themselves from Poland and had voluntarily joined the Muscovite State, since they were of the same faith. This latter idea (of the same faith) is still more recent. At the end of the nineteenth century the idea of "one nationality" replaced it. Thus, the Pereyaslav legend was the basis of the theory, "a reunion of Rus'."

² *Zherela do istoriyi Ukraïny*, XII, 285.

³ *Lyst Khmel'nyts'koho do Tsarya z dnya 17, II, 1654 r.*, " *Akty Yuzh. i Zap. Ros.*, Vol. X.

The Pereyaslav legend and the Lublin legend, the voluntary union of Rus' and Poland, were similar, indeed, one might say, spiritual sisters. The Lublin legend played a major role in the life of the Ukrainian aristocracy in Poland, and the Pereyaslav legend did the same for the Ukrainian Cossack aristocracy in the Russian empire. Both played the same role: the ideological and juridical preservation of the Ukrainian aristocracy, which, after the bankruptcy of their own state, did not become a defeated, subjugated, servile class in a foreign state. These legends provided our aristocracy with all the rights and privileges of the aristocracy of a sovereign state on the condition that this aristocracy would, voluntarily and without compulsion, co-operate with the state. It must be remembered that the legends were created for this purpose at a later date. This is one of the reasons that the sincere desire of historians to find in the Pereyaslav Treaty the essential prerequisites of the Pereyaslav legend, by which the Ukraine voluntarily joined the Muscovite State, did not yield any positive results. One might say that there are as many different opinions in this matter as there are historians.⁴ However, they all agree on one thing: the points of the union were inaccurately drawn up, especially those which were to provide the basis for the forming of the "reunion."

In my opinion, this desire to find the prerequisites of the Pereyaslav legend in the Pereyaslav Treaty is meaningless scholasticism. The great influence which Moscow later exercised on Ukrainian history explains this interest. Had Turkey been in Moscow's position, historiographers of our legitimacy would have sought juridical foundations of our "reunion" with Turkey in Khmelnytsky's agreement with the sultan. Perhaps this would prove more productive, since Turkey played a considerably greater part in the genesis and development of Khmelnytsky's uprising. The historian who seeks a similarity between the Pereyaslav legend and the Pereyaslav Treaty and who sees in the Treaty the legend of a voluntary "reunion of Rus'," must first of all prove that Hetman Khmelnytsky stirred the uprising against Po-

⁴ Professor Sergiyevych sees a personal union; Dyakonov and Popov, who followed him, a real union; Professors Hrushevs'ki, Korkunov, Myakotin, Sokol'ski, Slabchenko, a vassal's dependency; Rozenfel'd, an unequal incorporation; Nol'de, autonomy, and so forth.

land for the purpose of uniting the Ukraine with Moscow, and, then, that the Pereyaslav Treaty only marked the formal conclusion, a final strengthening on paper of an act which had been completed. Naturally, no one could prove that which had not taken place. Since Bohdan Khmelnytsky did not rebel against Poland with the purpose or the intention of uniting the Ukraine with Moscow, it is evident that the Treaty with Moscow in 1654 was an *incidental alliance against Poland, which was concluded to liberate the Ukraine from Poland*. It was similar to all previous alliances with the Crimea, primarily, with Turkey.

The practical purpose of this union was similar to all previous alliances. In the struggle against Poland, the tsar replaced the sultan, and no more. As the protector of the Ukraine, he was obligated to grant military assistance against Poland. In return, he was to receive a fixed annual monetary tribute from the Ukraine, equal to the amount which the sultan had received for his protection in Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. In a similar manner, the treaty with the tsar was made on the basis of previous examples and patterned on the former treaties of the Ukraine which pertained to the sultan's protectorate. The basic points were clearly drawn. Neither signatory omitted anything. The tsar's armies were to advance against Poland in the vicinity of Smolensk, and, in addition to this, the Ukraine was to receive uninterrupted military aid against Poland, and, if necessary, this included aid against the Tatars. Articles seven, eight, and ten of the Pereyaslav Treaty resolved this. In return, the tsar could accept tribute for his treasury (article one). This point occasioned much bargaining on both sides. The Hetman maintained that all expenses for the upkeep of the Cossack army be deducted from the tribute which was to be paid in return for military aid (articles two, three, four, nine, and eleven). The tsar in his resolution (article 9), which is longer than all the others, explains at some length how much his own "Russian, German, and Tatar troops," which he had gathered "for your defense," cost, and why he thought there will "not be any loss" from the Zaporozhians for his aid to them. In his letter of reply, the Hetman again points out that the Turkish sultan, although a Mohammedan, consented to give the Ukraine his protection without any tribute. In addi-

tion to the widely discussed matter of military aid and tribute, in only one article did the Zaporozhian army have plenipotentiary power to negotiate with foreign powers (five). The tsar was to be notified only in those matters which "would be contrary to the Tsar's Majesty." The property rights of the Kievan Metropolitan and clergy were confirmed in one article (which was unavoidable because of that same tribute). With a separate charter, the same property rights of the Ukrainian nobility were confirmed. This was all there was to the Pereyaslav Treaty.

As a military alliance against Poland and the Tatars, one that is guaranteed by a protectorate, the Treaty is very clear. The future political objectives of both signatories were absolutely different, and, therefore, mutually obscure. This different attitude toward the Treaty is apparent in the course of the negotiation and in all the acts; on the second day after the signing of the Treaty, they also became clear in deed. This was the reason why both sides began to interpret the Pereyaslav Treaty in its own way.

Hetman Khmelnytsky's classical statement to the Pereyaslav council, "We cannot live without the Tsar any longer," is in precise accord with contemporary Ukrainian reality and the political and social circumstances of the time. Only the Hetman, who made the statement, and the tsar's delegates, who heard the statement and related it to the tsar, saw diametrically opposite meanings in it. As a sequel, the Hetman proposed four candidates: the Turkish Emperor, the Crimean Emperor, the Muscovite Tsar, and the Polish King. He chose the Muscovite Tsar, since he believed that of the four "the Tsar of the same faith" would guarantee all "our freedoms." He also wanted this new protector to endow him, the Hetman and actual "absolute ruler of Rus'," with a larger state than had existed in the Ukraine not only in the time of the Polish kings but in the period of the princes of Rus'. The Muscovite Tsar believed and desired that the Zaporozhian Hetman would hand over the absolute rule of the Ukraine to him.

Since the Hetman considered himself the head of the state, he wanted to take the oath alone to preserve the alliance with the tsar, the protector. The officers and the army would not take this oath. Rumors to this effect spread throughout the Ukraine from

the circle of officials surrounding the Hetman.⁵ Therefore, the tsar wanted all new subjects to take a personal oath in his presence, and it was the first diplomatic victory of Moscow when a minor portion of the officers, townspeople, and Cossacks took the oath to the tsar. The Muscovite delegates openly boasted about this, although its truth had not been verified at this time. Nothing was said about it in the Ukraine. The Hetman, in turn, wanted the Muscovite delegates "to take an oath on behalf of the sovereign" to him, *as the tsar's equal*. This pertained to the maintenance of the alliance. Until the death of the Hetman, all Ukrainians were certain that the tsar had taken such an oath. However, the tsar did not want to take this oath before Khmelnytsky, since, as the Muscovite delegates stated, "only subjects take an oath before their sovereign." As a result, this matter was held in abeyance.

The Hetman wanted to pay the tribute directly to the tsar; he would have his officials collect it and he would pay it once a year in a lump sum. However, the tsar wanted to have his governors in all the principle cities collect the levied tribute directly in the Ukraine. Finally, this formal aspect of the disagreement was eliminated by some vague diplomatic statements. However, the Hetman never agreed to any real curtailment of his state or his power. In his lifetime, every Muscovite commander had to be approved by Khmelnytsky; and in his lifetime, the tsar did not receive a single penny in tribute from the Ukraine. The consequences of the tsar's protection will be discussed later; but, in short, the authors of the Pereyaslav Treaty were not the creators of the Pereyaslav legend.

Without taking the immediate causes of the discord into consideration, Khmelnytsky concluded the Pereyaslav Treaty and accepted the tsar's protection. In addition to the need for a military alliance in his hopeless position, there were other, far deeper and more important, social and political reasons which prompted this action. It must not be forgotten that the entire fabric of Ukrainian society at that time was strongly assimilated by Poland

⁵ Cf. for instance, *Relacya Makarego Krynickiego* (a monk of the Pechersk Monastery, who was sent from Kiev by the Metropolitan to the town of Lutsk with a protest against the forced oath to the tsar) — "Chmielnicki samowtór z Wyhowskim w cerkwi sobornej przysięgę oddał i poddaństwo carowi moskiewskiemu, któremu wzajem przysięgli posłowie," *Chteniya moskov. obshch. ist.*, 1861, III.

and was closely tied to Poland by environment. And in addition, the monarchist segment, which had started the revolt and continued it, had a deep-rooted legal pietism for the "King's Majesty," which was marked by the people of the time and which in effect proved damaging to the Ukraine many times during the first period of autonomy. Therefore, the creator of a state, which would be independent of Poland, had to find a form which would correspond to contemporary legal concepts in regard to the break with Poland, and which in its legality would efface the deep Ukrainian legalism toward the Polish Republic. An alliance with a non-Christian monarch, the Turkish Sultan, would not accomplish this. The Ukraine was released from its oath to the Polish King on the grounds that the latter had violated his sworn duties to the Orthodox people of Rus' in the Polish Republic; the co-religionist proclaimed the liberation in Pereyaslav on the grounds that the God-anointed Muscovite Tsar was equal to the Polish King — this was the legal form of the Ukraine's separation from Poland. It made the Pereyaslav Treaty necessary for Hetman Khmelnytsky and the founders of the Ukrainian state.

The second important aspect of the Pereyaslav Treaty was the fact that it was public and official. The Hetman himself demanded that the tsar send his commander to Kiev immediately "that all the neighboring sovereigns would know of their allegiance to the mighty hand of the Tsar's Majesty." If we translate this diplomatic phrase into the language of contemporary political practice, it meant that all the neighboring sovereigns, who negotiated most frequently with the Ukraine as a state, and with whom, according to the Pereyaslav Treaty, the Ukraine had a right to negotiate, should be informed of the break with the Polish King. This concerned her sovereignty with respect to Poland.

The final and legal emancipation from the Polish Republic, created, according to the Ukrainians themselves and the neighboring sovereigns, the complete ideological and juridical idea of statehood of the Pereyaslav Treaty. And in this alone did the Treaty differ from the previous alliances with Turkey. The entire import and significance of the Treaty for the future of the Ukraine rested in this fact. And this was not considered by the authors of the Treaty. That the "rude and unruly" Moscow,

as she was conceived by contemporary Ukrainians, would ever replace the Polish influences (the Jesuits, the European brilliance and culture, the charm of the "heaven of nobles"), would not have entered the mind of a single Ukrainian politician, those who detested Poland but who, nevertheless, were educated in Polish schools.

The Hetman understood this profound political change which had been brought about by the tsar's protection. He resolved to take the step when all other efforts to liberate the Ukraine had failed and when the position of the hetmancy was strong enough to risk carrying out such changes in the mental attitudes. Prior to this time, his policy toward Moscow might be summed up in this way: to sunder at any cost the "eternal peace" which had been concluded between Moscow and Poland and to divide the two monarchs. The Hetman used every possible means. He began by granting the Siveria region, the Lithuanian cities up to the Dnieper, and the Polish throne and ended with threats "to destroy by means of the Tatars" the Muscovite kingdom. Nothing infuriated the Hetman more than the news of the Polish-Muscovite agreement. In the middle of 1651, when the tsar's envoy came to Khmelnytsky with a message that the Hetman should "not wage war against his master (that is, the Polish King), since, in such a case, the tsar would be obliged to send aid and an army to his friend, the King," an eyewitness, the delegate from Prince Janusz Radziwiłł, Mysłowski, related that Khmelnytsky "got angry, arose quickly, and wanted to strike the tsar's envoy in the face. Shumeyko, the Chernihiv colonel, scarcely had time to grab the Hetman."⁶ In the preceding year he had chained the Muscovite envoys to the cannons for the same reason. He also harbored a pretender to the Muscovite throne, Tymoshka Akundinov, in his court at Chyhyryn; he intended to release him in Moscow if the occasion arose.

After much bickering and the pleas and threats of the Hetman, the Moscow *Sobor* finally agreed in 1653 that the tsar would accept Khmelnytsky and his Zaporozhian army as "subjects." At the begin-

⁶ "Relatia p. Mysłowskiego, który był posłem od Xcia JMP Hetmana W. X. Lit. do Chmielnickiego," *Zbiory Rusieckich*, Miscel. 1645-1652, p. 147f.

ning of 1654 the Muscovite boyars came to the Ukraine to receive the oath. The military alliance with Moscow and the tsar's protectorate in the Ukraine became a fact. When the Marshal of the Polish Parliament, Franciszek Dubrawski heard of this, he said in his speech to the king, "The Polish Republic was abandoned merely at Khmelnytsky's discretion."⁷ Subsequently, the Poles too showed respect to the Hetman. Having gathered his strength, he ceased to be a "revolutionary slave" in the opinion of the Poles and the neighboring sovereigns. He became the head of a new great state; the objectives of the Pereyaslav Treaty were achieved in their entirety.

But the means by which the objectives were achieved soon were exposed with all their dangerous weaknesses. The idea of the protectorate, strengthened by the mutual oath of the tsar and the Hetman, would not have been opposed in the Ukraine because of the circumstances. However, the oath given directly to the tsar met with stubborn opposition everywhere. Old Colonel Bohun, one of the most esteemed and respected of the leaders of the revolt, resolutely refused such an oath. He, naturally, was not the exception among the purely military Cossack officers, almost all of whom had shown hatred toward Poland, were hostile toward Moscow, and had favored Turkey. Moreover, the rank and file Cossacks did not want to take the oath. In the Kropyvna and Poltava regiments, the Cossacks "beat" the Muscovite officials "with sticks." The Uman' and Bratslav regiments, although most dangerously exposed to Poland, did not take the tsar's oath. The townspeople of Chornobyl' "accepted Moscow unwillingly." Those of Pereyaslav had to be driven by force to take the oath. Kiev took the oath "by force, subject to military punishment." And the most significant factor was that the Ukrainian Orthodox clergy refused to take the oath. "The Metropolitan and Crypt Archimandrite stated that they would choose death rather than take an oath before the tsar."⁸ By a special messenger, they sent a protest against compulsory oaths to the Lutsk center and, in view of their behavior, they

⁷ Kubala, *Wojna Moskiewska*, p. 371.

⁸ "Lysty polk. Pavshy do kn. Radzivila, pysani v Lyutim 1654 r. z Mozyrya," *Arch. Czar-torskich* cdx. 143, pp. 83 and 98ff.

were refused the certificate of gratitude from the tsar, which had been prepared for them.

Using the available source materials, it is difficult to state whether this opposition was instigated by the Hetman with his understanding, since it suited his plans and aims, or whether it was a reflection upon the Hetman and his policy. But the very possibility of such a question suggests the weaknesses of that policy at this moment. Khmelnytsky, for all his genius, was dependent upon the Cossack class, which had been reared in the spirit of national inequality. He shook off the hypnotic power of the "majesty of the King," who was of another faith, with considerable difficulty and he did not want to venture a decisive struggle immediately against the majesty of the new tsar, although of the same faith. By degrees the concept of the Cossack hetman as a Russian autocrat grew and developed in the eyes of the Ukrainian people. At any event he was so powerful at the time that all internal opposition, if in reality it existed at all, could not threaten his position. Khmelnytsky brought the Pereyaslav Treaty into being, having resolved all misunderstanding with the tsarist government by using vague diplomatic language and settling the other opposition in one way or another.

Further events soon revealed all the errors of the political agreement, which both parties had understood in their own way. The Muscovite-Ukrainian conflict was inevitable. It began immediately after the ratification of the Pereyaslav Treaty in Byelorussian territory.

Elsewhere,⁹ I spoke of the occupation of Byelorussia by Ukrainian armies and of the institution there of the Cossack government, in the form of a "Cossack judgment." This was with the consent and even at the request of the Byelorussian peasants, townspeople, clergy, and a part of the Byelorussian nobility. This occupation was in line with Bohdan Khmelnytsky's policy of "liberating from Polish slavery," not only the Cossack territory (at that time Ukraine), but all of the so-called "Rus' territory" of the Polish Republic, which had been dependent upon the spiritual authority of the Kievan Metropolitan for a long period. In

⁹ V. Lypynsky, *Z dziejów Ukrainy*.

conjunction with this traditional, ideal, spiritual authority from time immemorial, now would be reborn the old, real political authority under the leadership of the Hetman of the Zaporozhian army. The historical task of this government was to unite in some way or other all these Orthodox territories of Rus', which had fallen under Polish control after the decline of the Kievan state. (In the first period of the revolt, the union was to take place within the framework of the Polish Republic; in the second period of the revolt, these territories were to break away from the Polish Republic.) This task was apparent in the ideology of the Orthodox nobility and clergy of Rus'.

This traditional Kievan policy of Rus' met immediate opposition in the national Muscovite policy. The representatives of the latter wanted the Pereyaslav Treaty to represent a voluntary act of surrender to the Muscovite authority of part of the Polish state with its Orthodox Cossack population "of the same faith" and they imagined the military alliance with the Ukrainian Cossacks in the form of their voluntary military assistance to Moscow, which would aid her in conquering other Polish territories. There is little wonder that a stubborn struggle began between the Ukraine and Moscow over these Byelorussian cities. Evidently, Moscow began to regard them as her own possessions, and she did not recognize, nor even wish to hear of, a hetmancy, a Cossack judgment, or a dependence upon the Kiev Metropolitan. As a result of the Pereyaslav Treaty, the Polish-Muscovite war broke out, and the Muscovite army marched into Byelorussia under the personal leadership of the tsar.

I presented elsewhere an episode in the struggle of the two Rus' for the third Rus' in a biography of one of the eminent followers of Khmelnytsky, Ivan Nechay.¹⁰ This struggle is very interesting, especially if we wish to understand the true character of the so-called "reunion." As with the other, more important phases of our history, this must be studied more fully than has been done. To better understand the events which pertain to the oath of the

¹⁰ The son-in-law of the Hetman, a brother of Danylo, who was glorified in a famous song; "the colonel of White Russia, Mohyliv, Homel', and Chauss," as he spoke of himself in 1656. *Z dziejów Ukrainy*, p. 280f.

nobility in the Pinsk district, I will present one characteristic and typical aspect of the Muscovite-Ukrainian conflict in this period. It is the affair of Kost' Poklonsky.

Kost' Vyacheslav Poklonsky, a Byelorussian nobleman, a native of Mohyliv district, "a brave warrior, an eloquent speaker, an ingenious person, possessing good connections among the Mohyliv nobility," was an old acquaintance and friend of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. His political activities in the primary stages of the revolt are unknown, but we can assume that he belonged to that strata of Orthodox Byelorussian nobility who, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, were extremely hostile toward Poland and who, from the very beginning of the Ukrainian revolt, sought Cossack aid to further their anti-Polish plans. In any case, he must have had good political relations with the Hetman, been on friendly terms with him and under his influence during the preliminary negotiations of the Pereyaslav Treaty. Khmelnytsky and Vyhovsky assured the Muscovite boyars that Mohyliv and the Hetman of the Zaporozhian army would together accept the tsar's protection.

Poklonsky appeared in the camp of Nizhyn Colonel Ivan Zolotarenko, whom the Hetman sent to Byelorussia after the conclusion of the Pereyaslav Treaty for joint action with the Muscovite armies against Poland, and stated that he wanted to proceed to Chyhyryn to take the tsar's oath before the Zaporozhian Hetman. Poklonsky did not travel alone. He was accompanied by a retinue of four hundred townspeople and nobles from Mohyliv. Among the latter the more distinguished were: Les'ko Unchynsky, Stanislav Monvid, Bohdan Ivanovsky, Pavlo Okurevich, Mykhaylo Rudnytsky, Oleksander Kuchynsky, and the two Khomentovskis. Zolotarenko, naturally, despatched Poklonsky to the Hetman immediately, assigning a detachment of Cossacks for his protection. From this a bitter misunderstanding arose between the Cossack colonel and the Muscovite boyars. It immediately deepened and became the first reason for the Muscovite-Ukrainian conflict, although it was confined at this period to the diplomatic level.

The Muscovite boyars, adhering to their strict line of politics, demanded that Poklonsky take an oath to the tsar directly and not through the Hetman; and that Zolotarenko should send him

immediately to the tsar's camp and not to Chyhyryn. However, the Hetman's deputy refused to do this; he "shook off" the boyars and sent Poklonsky to the Hetman. Then, he vigorously began to occupy Byelorussia and organized the entire territory between Homel' and Mohyliv according to the Cossack arrangements. And, on Khmelnytsky's recommendation, he accepted the title of Siveria Hetman.

Moscow abandoned the diplomatic correspondence and adopted a different, but safer, method. Moscow attracted Poklonsky to her side by various promises and by granting him the title of a colonel of Byelorussia. She also demoralized his followers among the Byelorussian nobility by conferring lands upon them (thus, Petro Monkovsky received Samulka; Martsinkevichs received Dobuzh, etc. from the tsar). The nobility of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who were hostile toward the Cossacks for a long time, now, as the Muscovite armies moved in, took an oath directly to the tsar. Thus, they acquired the unusual grace and protection of the tsar. (For example, Christoph Zavisha, the Marshal of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, received the huge estate of Princess Radziwiłł.) In this way Ukrainian political plans were check-mated by her "allies." Mohyliv, which previously had demanded a union with the Ukraine, now acceded to Moscow's request and disregarded the Nizhyn Archpriest's letter, which had been written to the inhabitants of Mohyliv in the name of the Hetman and the Metropolitan, advising them "to rely on the Zaporozhian army and to aid in the defense of the Zaporozhian hetmans and the whole army in order that, God forbid, Moscow would not attempt to establish her laws in your city as is her custom, *but that you should have the freedom which the tsar had given to the Ukraine and the Hetman.*"

This constant effort of the Ukrainian diplomats and politicians to separate the concept of the tsar as an ideal, a protector, from that of a genuinely "rude and unruly" Moscow, did not yield positive results. At this time the "tsar of the same faith" had not yet become the later Petersburg Emperor of all Russia, but was only a Muscovite Tsar. His policy was the national Moscow policy.

Zolotarenko's petition to permit those from the Mohyliv district, who wished to become Cossacks, to enlist in the Zaporozhian army

with the tsar's consent was rejected by the tsar's diplomats. This was not all. Poklonsky and his friends, who were dismayed by the cruelties which Moscow, having consolidated her position in Byelorussia, began to show (segments of the Smolensk and Vitebsk nobility were transported to Muscovy), lost all hope of liberating Byelorussia from the hands of Poland. Having severed their relations with the Ukraine, they returned to the control of the Polish Republic and received a joyous welcome and a full amnesty.¹¹

From this, the Hetman could only conclude that the Muscovite government would not agree to the Ukrainian Cossack judgment and that the wild terror and absolutely different culture of this new ally would provoke a Polonophile reaction in the East Ukrainian Cossack territory and among the Cossack officers who had been educated in the West European culture. The obvious, increasing appetite of the tsar's commanders in Kiev,¹² whose purpose, as the Hetman saw it, was only representative, and the King's demagogical proclamations, calculated on the dissatisfaction with Moscow, to the Ukrainian people, promising not only "all kinds of freedom to the Cossacks," but even "eternal exemption from work and military obligations for the townspeople and the villagers tending their property," strengthened the Hetman's conclusions.

Therefore, the Hetman's attitude toward Moscow began to change radically. The Hetman put a stop to the Muscovite interference in the internal affairs of the Ukraine by punishing without mercy the prototypes of those later "self-denying little Russians," who, behind his back and without his knowledge or permission, negotiated with the tsar's government. He first deemed it necessary to renew the previous alliances with Turkey in order to make himself independent in external affairs.

The disagreements and divisions became fully apparent in the campaign with Moscow against Poland in 1655. The Hetman,

¹¹ *Akty Yuzh. i Zap. Ros.*, Vols. X and XIV. Vol. Legum IV, p. 234. Om. Terlets'ky, *Kozaky na Bili Rusy*. Kubala, *op. cit.*, pp. 268-79.

¹² Cf., for example, the matter of the land which the commanders wanted from Kiev for the Muscovite *streltsi*. Because of this Vyhovsky reminded the Muscovite boyars of the history of Subotov and the "shedding of blood for this unjust insult." *Akt. Yuzh. i Zap. Rossii*, III, 580.

having come to an understanding with a new acquaintance, Sweden, conducted this campaign so as to thwart Moscow whenever possible. He used adequate and decisive means to do this. Near Husyatyn, for example, the Hetman ordered his Cossacks to disperse the tsarist armies, which were storming the town. The reason given to the tsar's representatives for this unusual deed was that there were "many Orthodox people in Husyatyn." Later, during the siege of Lviv, Vyhovsky, with the Hetman's knowledge, secretly warned the inhabitants not to enter into any negotiations with Moscow. A sharp conflict again broke out near Lublin. This occurred between Potemkin, who commanded the Muscovite armies and who tried constantly to receive oaths "on behalf of the tsar," and Colonel Danylo Vyhovsky, who refused to allow this. This campaign ended when the Hetman, unbeknown to his unreliable Muscovite allies, concluded an agreement with the Tatars. He agreed to abandon the Muscovite armies and let them fare as they may. As a result of this, the Tatars surrounded Commander Buturlin, who had to pay a heavy ransom and surrender all his war booty, which he had gained on Ukrainian soil in the war against the Poles.

The strife increased on both sides and a break with Moscow appeared inevitable in such circumstances. The final and direct cause of this break was the peace treaty concluded in Vilno between Muscovy and Poland in September 1656 with the active intermediation of Austria.