

**SOCIAL CHANGE
AND NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY
UKRAINE**

BOHDAN KRAWCHENKO

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NATIONAL
CONSCIOUSNESS IN
TWENTIETH-CENTURY
UKRAINE

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*In memory of my mother
Antonina Matviivna Zinova
1914–80*

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Preface

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Edmonton, Canada

BOHDAN KRAWCHENKO

Technical Note


A simplified Library of Congress system of transliteration, omitting all diacritics, will be used. Geographical names within the current boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR are transliterated from the Ukrainian following contemporary Soviet orthography: Kiev Dnieper, the Crimea, Odessa, Donbass and Transcarpathia are exceptions. Towns are identified in the various chapters by the name current in the period under study with their contemporary equivalents, where applicable, given in brackets the first time they are mentioned. Proper names of Ukrainians will be transliterated from the Ukrainian. Names of prominent figures (such as Trotsky, Mazeppa) will be written in their customary English form. Dates, unless otherwise specified, refer to the new calendar. All measurements, unless otherwise indicated, refer to the metric system.

Glossary

CC	Central Committee
<i>chinovnik</i>	official or functionary in pre-revolutionary Russia
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CPU	Communist Party of Ukraine
<i>dvoriane</i>	nobility
DVU	<i>Derzhavne vydavnytstvo Ukrainy</i> ; State Publishing House of Ukraine
<i>edinonachalie</i>	one-man management
Gosplan	<i>Gosudarstvennaia planovaia komissii</i> ; State Planning Commission
<i>guberniia</i>	province
<i>intelligent</i>	member of the intelligentsia
<i>komnezamy</i>	<i>Komitety nezamozhnykh selian</i> ; Committees of Poor Peasants
<i>kustar'</i>	peasant engaged in domestic or cottage industry
<i>likpunkt</i>	<i>Punkt likvidatsii nepys'mennosti</i> ; Centre for the Elimination of Illiteracy
<i>miasteczko</i>	small town in the Polish Commonwealth
<i>mishchany</i>	townsmen
<i>Narkomos</i>	<i>Narodnii komisariat osvity</i> ; People's Commissariat of Education
NEP	<i>Novaia ekonomicheskaiia politika</i> ; New Economic Policy

NKVD	<i>Narodnyi komissariat vnutrennikh del;</i> People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
<i>obkom</i>	<i>oblastnoi komitet;</i> party <i>oblast'</i> committee
<i>obrok</i>	quit-rent
<i>okruh</i>	region (similar to <i>departement</i>)
ONR	<i>Orhanizovanyi nabir robitnykiv;</i> Organized Recruitment of Labour
Orgburo	Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee
OUN	<i>Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv;</i> Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists
Politburo	Political Bureau of the Central Committee
<i>prodnalog</i>	<i>prodovol'stvennyi nalog;</i> tax in kind
<i>prodrazverstka</i>	<i>prodovol'stvennaia razverstka;</i> requisitioning of farm produce
<i>profshkoly</i>	<i>profesiini shkoly;</i> professional schools
<i>reviziia</i>	review or census of population prior to 1897 general population census
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
<i>samvydav; samizdat</i>	self-publishing; unofficial private reproduction and circulation of uncensored written materials
<i>sovnarkhoz</i>	<i>Sovet narodnogo khoziaistva;</i> Council of National Economy
<i>starshyna</i>	officers in Ukrainian Cossack army
<i>szlachta</i>	nobility in the Polish Commonwealth
<i>tekhnikum</i>	technical institute

TSOZ	<i>Tovarystvo po suspil'nomu obrobittku zemli</i> ; Association for the Common Cultivation of Land
<i>ukaz</i>	edict, decree
UPA	<i>Ukrains'ka povstans'ka armiiia</i> ; Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Utsentroprof	<i>Ukrains'ka tsentral'na rada profspilok</i> ; Ukrainian Central Trade Union Council
<i>votchina</i>	hereditary estate
VRNH	<i>Verkhovna rada narodn'oho hospodarstva</i> ; Supreme Council of the National Economy
VTsVK	<i>Vseukrains'kyi tsentral'nyi vykonavchyi komitet</i> ; All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee
<i>vydvizhentsy</i>	workers promoted to an administrative post
<i>vuz</i>	<i>vyshchyi uchbovyi zaklad</i> ; institution of higher learning



Introduction

Soviet leaders are constantly alert to the dangers of unrest among the nations comprising the Soviet Union. Whether national discontent will pose a serious challenge to the unity of the USSR will largely depend on developments in Ukraine. Among the fifteen republics comprising the Soviet Union, Ukraine is second only to Russia in population and in economic and political importance. But rapid social change, integration into the Soviet Union, and the experience of Russification policies have surely affected the national awareness of Ukrainians. Is mobilisation around national demands therefore unlikely? In seeking an answer to that question, this work examines the effects of social and political change on the national consciousness of Ukrainian workers, peasants, the intelligentsia and political elite.

Throughout this study we will use terms such as 'people', 'nation', 'national consciousness', 'national identity' and 'nationhood'. While there is little consensus in the literature on the national question as to how these concepts should be employed, we need working definitions in order to distinguish between the various stages in the development of a people. A people, then, is a collectivity distinguishable in terms of objective criteria (language, dress, rituals and the like) and one which is large enough to contain, in theory if not in practice, the elements for a complete division of labour. What differentiates a people from other ethnic categories is that its members attach little significance to cultural markers in pursuit of their social, economic and political demands.¹ The transition from a people to a nationality (or, in other words, the acquisition of a national consciousness or national identity) is a further step in the growth of a people's internal solidarity. This occurs when cultural distinctiveness becomes an important factor in a people's social, economic and political demands. At this stage of development a nationality must acquire a measure of 'effective control over the behaviour of its members' in order to strengthen and elaborate the alignments that 'make up the social fabric of nationality'.² This control can be organised either through informal social arrangements or, more effectively, through

formal social or political organisation. Once a nationality has added this power to compel to its earlier cohesiveness and attachment to group symbols, it often considers itself a nation and is recognised as such by others, even though it may not yet control a state of its own. If the nation acquires the right to govern itself in a separate or sovereign unit, we may say that a nation-state has come into being.

The development of national identity is therefore a dynamic process. A preponderant factor determining the strength of national consciousness is the specific behaviour of elites. National identity is not a natural condition of humanity but a new alignment in society that occurs when 'elites consciously choose to elect ethnic symbols as the basis for mobilisation in competition with other elites either for control over a local society or for equal or privileged access to the opportunities and resources that arise during the process of modernisation'.³ But not all elites choose to behave in this manner. Some may co-operate with external authorities and be assimilated into an alien culture. Unless the elites demand the corporate recognition of the group as a whole, a people, while maintaining its cultural distinctiveness, cannot develop a strong sense of national identity.

Elite competition serves as the catalyst for the mobilisation of people around particularistic national demands. But this requires effective communication, and presupposes the existence of organisations that allow members of the group to engage in collective action, as well as a press and schools.⁴ The existence of these infrastructures of collective life, in turn, depends on the tolerance of dissent culture and political organisation by the central state. Another precondition for group activity is a socially-mobilised population to whom the new message may be communicated and out of which a new political movement can be forged.

Social mobilisation in this study refers to the processes of social change and social modernisation (and does not imply an acceptance of the model of national development presented by Karl Deutsch which is often associated with the concept of 'social mobilisation'). Social mobilisation is the name given to an 'overall process of change which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life'.⁵ It refers to the growth of industry and trade, cities, the spread of literacy and of education – developments which create a new way of life that predisposes the population towards the new allegiances represented by nationality and creates the community resources that allow for effective organisation in pursuit of new demands. Members of the

mobilised public are more likely to be urban than rural dwellers, literate rather than illiterate, non-agricultural rather than peasant, and educated rather than unschooled.

The active intervention of indigenous elites, the existence of a mobilised population and of infrastructures of national life tolerated by the central state are, in our view, among the most important elements facilitating the emergence of a national consciousness. These are the elements that will be highlighted in our analysis of society in Ukraine. Our study omits Western Ukraine, the historical development of which was markedly different from that of so-called Greater or Eastern Ukraine. Formerly part of the Austro-Hungarian empire, the West Ukrainian territories were divided among three states in the interwar period: Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Only in 1945 were all these territories incorporated into the USSR. Our discussion of developments prior to 1945 will be confined to those areas of Ukraine that were part of the Russian Empire and, subsequently, the USSR. Western Ukraine will be included in our final chapter which deals with society after the Second World War. The period under study is from the turn of the twentieth century to 1972, the latter marking the fall of P. Iu. Shelest as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine.

1 Ukrainian Society on the Eve of the Revolution

POPULATION

On the eve of the First World War and the Revolution, Ukrainians were a people who had not yet developed a crystallised national consciousness and whose emergence to the stature of nationhood seemed like a distant goal. Indicative of their predicament under tsarism is that one must begin a discussion of Ukrainian society with some remarks about the territories that constituted Ukraine. A stable framework of geographical identity is a precondition for a stable sense of nationality.¹ But Ukraine in the nineteenth century was a conglomerate of several geographical territories – the Left Bank, the Right Bank and the Steppe – each with its own unique past. With the abolition of the Hetmanate by Catherine II in 1762 the last remnants of a distinctive administrative entity vanished. Since 1782, the date the Russian *guberniia* or provincial system was introduced, Ukrainian provinces were governed directly from St Petersburg like any other provinces of ethnic Russia. Because Ukraine did not exist in fact, the emerging national movement of the nineteenth century had to affirm it as an ideal. The question arose, what is Ukraine? The answer was not self-evident.²

It was only with the rise of populism and of the intelligentsia as a leading force within the Ukrainophile movement that the ethnic principle in the delineation of political boundaries took root in Ukrainian political thought. In 1878 Mykhailo Drahomanov put the new conception rather bluntly: ‘Ukrainian lands are those where live the same kind of moujiks as in former Cossack Ukraine along the Dnieper.’³ The national government which came into being during the revolution, the Central Rada, in its Third Universal, proclaimed in November 1917, lay claim to nine provinces: Volyn’, Podillia, Kiev, Chernihiv, Poltava, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson and Tavria (without the Crimea), and hoped that a referendum would settle

the inclusion in an autonomous Ukraine of the districts of surrounding Russian provinces where Ukrainians represented a majority. When the Bolsheviks proclaimed their government of Ukraine in December 1917, they too defined Ukraine in terms similar to those of the Central Rada. Ukraine in this chapter will be defined as consisting of the above mentioned nine provinces plus the Crimea – since the latter was administratively part of Tavria province and was added to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954.⁴

By the end of the eighteenth century, Russia's economic and political domination of Ukraine had been firmly established. An important factor contributing to Russia's capacity to hold on to Ukraine lay in the fact that colonisation followed its political absorption. Throughout the century, especially after the destruction of the Zaporiz'ka Sich in 1775, massive tracts of land were handed out by the tsars to reward their servitors. The Russian nobility brought with them their families, and in some cases their serfs, and numerous bands of bureaucrats and merchants trailed in their wake. The preferential tariff of 1775 sparked a boom by attracting thousands of merchants and speculators from central Russia to the southern regions of Ukraine. To the fertile and sparsely populated steppes came Russian peasant settlers, as well as colonists from beyond the boundaries of the Russian Empire. The development of industry in the Donet's basin in the post-reform decades spurred further immigration. The extent of colonisation can be gauged by comparing demographic data of the late eighteenth century with those of the late nineteenth century. According to the fifth *reviziia* of 1795, 89 per cent of the (male) population of the nine provinces was Ukrainian. A century later (1897) the Ukrainians' share had dropped to 72 per cent of the total (male) population. Although the steppe provinces were most affected by immigration, other regions did not escape this process either.⁵

National identity is not an innate characteristic of people, but the result of social learning. Ethnically homogeneous populations are more likely to be susceptible to suggestions of their common nationality than populations which lack this characteristic. The numerical preponderance of Ukrainians was their biggest, perhaps only, asset. According to the first general population census of 1897 they formed 73 per cent of the population, and undoubtedly their numbers were higher than the census figures suggest.⁶ The numerical advantage of Ukrainians over the national minorities, however, was unevenly distributed among the various regions of Ukraine (see Table

1.1). The fact that regional variations in the pattern of nationality settlement overlapped with economic geography added to the social weight of the minorities. As a rule Ukrainians were concentrated in the provinces least affected by industrialisation and urban growth. Half the Russian population of Ukraine, on the other hand, lived in the steppe region with its industries, ports and prosperous agriculture, giving them access to a disproportionate share of society's resources.⁷ The steppe was least affected by the national movement developing in central Ukrainian territories. The integration of this region into Ukraine was an enormous problem for the Central Rada during the revolution. In 1917 the Provisional Government refused to cede the provinces to the jurisdiction of the Rada without the permission of the local authorities. The reaction of the *Odessa дума* to the suggestion that they join an autonomous Ukraine was typical for the region. The *дума* demanded that the city and surrounding districts be excluded from Ukraine 'for ethnic reasons'.⁸

With the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian state prior to 1917, the development of the former was made to suit the interests of the latter. The task of redressing this relationship of domination was an important component of the 'Ukrainian question' as it was posed at the turn of this century. However, as a result of large-scale colonisation, Ukrainians were confronted with minorities in their own territory who could be called such only in the formal sense of the word. In terms of the social division of labour, the minorities dominated the strategic centres of social, economic, cultural and political life. Before Ukrainians could launch and sustain a national movement capable of altering the country's relationship with the Russian state, they would first have to establish a secure footing in the socially and politically active sectors of their own society. Thus the other component of the 'Ukrainian question' had to do with adjusting the unequal relationship between Ukrainians and the minorities in Ukraine. The nature of that relationship and the problems it posed for Ukrainians' efforts at national self-assertion are the focal points of the analysis that follows.

THE TOWN

When writing about urban development in the tsarist empire it is customary to draw contrasts with Western Europe. The differences were enormous. In tsarist Russia only a fraction of the population was urban and the town never acted as the hothouse of a bourgeoisie,

TABLE 1.1 *National composition of Ukraine by region, 1897*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>% of total</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>% of total</i>
<i>Right Bank</i>	9 567 010	7 357 543	76.9	413 300	4.3	1 221 569	12.8	574 598	6.0
<i>Left Bank</i>	7 568 321	6 118 616	80.9	1 009 840	13.3	236 789	33.1	203 076	2.7
<i>Steppe</i>	6 295 056	3 529 529	56.0	1 344 812	21.4	477 107	7.6	943 608	6.0
<i>Ukraine</i>	23 430 387	17 005 688	72.6	2 767 952	11.8	1 935 465	8.3	1 721 282	7.3

SOURCE *Perepis' 1897*, Tables XXI and XXII in Vols 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

of representative democracy, of science and industrialisation to the same degree as in the West. Compared with Western Europe, the Russian city was politically and economically impotent. What was true of the city in Russia applied equally to the city in Ukraine.

But the emphasis on the backwardness of urban life in tsarist Russia should not obscure the fact that whatever development did occur in that society took place in the city. Cities were the administrative, cultural and, towards the end of the nineteenth century, economic focal points into which poured the talents, the ambitions, the greeds of the whole society. Compared with the village, 'city air' was emancipating even in Russia. It was because the town represented relative progress that it occupied a contradictory position in Ukrainian society.

The characteristic feature of towns in Ukraine was that with few exceptions they were Russian and Jewish in national composition and in their *Weltanschauung*. The fact that Ukrainians had such a weak urban presence held back their national development in two important ways. To begin with, it meant that the social processes which produce a national movement functioned very weakly. 'The spread (if not the origins) of nationalism as a movement,' writes A. D. Smith, 'is a predominantly urban phenomenon, and its main supporters are not merely inhabitants of the city but are the products of the contrast between city and countryside, a contrast which has only played a large part in the social consciousness in modern times.'⁹ It was the city which provided for social mobility on a significant scale, and the competitive environment that it created for the middle classes, especially in the multi-ethnic towns of Eastern Europe, was a major factor in the rise and, more importantly, the spread of nationalism. Even in agrarian Eastern Europe, the city, not the thatched-roof cottage, was the cradle of modern national movements. Miroslav Hroch, for example, noted that the 'great majority' of Czech 'patriots' between the years 1827 and 1848 lived in towns, a fact 'certainly surprising in view of the agrarian character of the whole society'.¹⁰ The same could be said of the Ukrainian national movement. It was from Kiev, Kharkiv and St Petersburg that the Ukrainian 'patriotic spirit' expanded, not from the countryside to the town. 'The town,' wrote an activist of the Ukrainian movement in 1907, 'having become the laboratory for the Russification of the Ukrainian people, has become at the same time the forge where the first elements of their national consciousness are fashioned.'¹¹ At the heart of the weakness of the modern Ukrainian national consciousness

lay the fact there were too few Ukrainians in the towns subjected to the social pressures that produced that consciousness. Secondly, because the town was non-Ukrainian it meant that the human and institutional resources of the city – the intelligentsia, schools, newspapers – were denied to the Ukrainian national movement, hampering its growth. The town creates both the social situation and the instruments that are essential in bringing about a realignment of loyalties and behaviour that a modern national movement represents. It is for these reasons that urbanisation is such a significant indicator of national development.

A striking characteristic of urbanisation in Ukraine was that there was less of it at the turn of the nineteenth century than in the second half of the seventeenth. P. V. Mykhailyna, a contemporary Soviet Ukrainian scholar, noted: 'Some consider that the urban population [in the mid-seventeenth century] represented almost half the total population of Ukraine, and according to O. Baranovych, only 10 per cent. In our view the first figure is considerably inflated, the second somewhat too low.'¹² Baranovych estimated that there were 1.2 million urban inhabitants in that period.¹³ Even taking the lowest estimate – Baranovych's – it is clear that throughout the eighteenth century a process of de-urbanisation occurred, because by the turn of the nineteenth century the towns in Ukraine supported 375 000 inhabitants, or 5 per cent of the total population. It was only with the abolition of serfdom and the development of trade and industry spurred by foreign investment that the urban population began to grow again, surpassing its achievement in the 'feudal period'.¹⁴ By 1897 Ukraine had 3 million urban inhabitants, representing 13.2 per cent of the total population.

That Ukraine had fewer urban inhabitants in the early nineteenth century than in the mid-seventeenth is in part explained by changes in the character of the town. Medieval urban centres in Ukraine, as throughout much of Eastern Europe, were not as sharply differentiated from the village as towns were in the nineteenth century. A major factor in the de-urbanisation of Ukraine, however, were the disastrous socioeconomic policies of Russian and Polish rulers during the eighteenth century (discussed below pp. 11–19).

Although urban development in Ukraine was adversely affected by foreign rulers, nevertheless on the eve of the twentieth century Ukraine as a whole was not under-developed in this respect when compared with other regions of the tsarist Empire. The very rapid development of southern Ukraine, an area which had one of the highest rates of urban growth in the Russian Empire in the latter part

of the nineteenth century, was the main reason why in 1897 Ukraine's rate of urbanisation – 13.2 per cent of the population total – was marginally higher than the average for European Russia – 12.9 per cent. Prior to the south's development, Ukraine lagged behind European Russia in the rate of urbanisation (5.8 per cent as compared with 6.6 per cent in 1811).¹⁵ It was not the comparative under-urbanisation of Ukraine which marked its position as a subordinate as much as the fact that the country's urban development would have been much greater had it not been for tsarist policies, and above all that the development which occurred produced both marked regional imbalances and serious distortions in the ethnic composition of Ukraine's towns.

In his thoughtful work, *Internal Colonialism*, Michael Hechter analyses the predicament of nationally distinct peripheries that have been absorbed into a unified state by a metropolitan core composed of a different nationality. One of the features of an internal colony is the dependent nature of its urban development. Hechter writes:

Since the colony's role is designed to be instrumental . . . [the] colonial economy often specialises in the production of a narrow range of primary products or raw materials for export. Whereas cities arose to fulfil central place functions in societies having had endogenous development, the ecological distribution of cities looks very different in colonies, where they serve as way stations in the trade between colonial hinterlands and metropolitan ports. . .¹⁶

Urbanisation in Ukraine was similar to that described in the 'internal colony model': exogenous forces concerned with the export of raw materials from Ukraine acted as the main stimulus of urbanisation in the nineteenth century.

Ukraine's major urban centre in the pre-revolutionary period, Odessa, was the archetypal city whose main function was that of a 'way station'. Odessa grew from the first half of the nineteenth century because foreign capital turned it into the principal port and commercial centre for the export of Ukrainian cereals. Mercantile fortunes were massed in Odessa, but these were repatriated beyond Ukrainian territory, making no contribution to the economic development of the immediate region, let alone the hinterland.¹⁷ The second wave of foreign investment that spurred urbanisation had little or no relationship to the first. That wave, in the form of British, French and Belgian capital, was attracted by the discovery of mineral deposits in the Donbass area. While the extraction of raw materials gave birth to a belt of industrial towns in that region, it did not

TABLE 1.2 *Urban population of Ukraine by region, 1897*

<i>Region</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Total urban population</i>	<i>% of total</i>
<i>Right Bank</i>	9 567 010	914 970	9.6
<i>Left Bank</i>	7 568 321	851 090	11.2
<i>Steppe</i>	6 295 056	1 319 331	21.0
<i>Ukraine</i>	23 430 387	3 085 391	13.2

SOURCES Table 1.1 and *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXI in Vols 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

generate urban growth based on manufacturing either here or elsewhere in Ukraine. The non-extractive industry in Ukraine remained in a primitive state because foreign capital was not interested in creating a manufacturing base which could eventually compete with its domestic production, and because Russian manufacturers jealously guarded their 'colonial right to Ukraine as a massive consumer of their wares'.¹⁸ The geographical distribution of towns in Ukraine reflected the country's economic predicament. The steppe witnessed urban development because it served the instrumental role allocated to Ukraine; elsewhere, it was a different story (see Table 1.2).

In reality, the regional disparities were more acute than suggested by the 1897 census data. Many villages in the steppe had emerged as important industrial centres. 'Few of these [villages] became official cities, because St Petersburg looked unfavourably on such requests (it opposed all forms of self-management, no matter how limited), and partially because for the entrepreneurs, existence in a legal city meant supplementary taxes with a paucity of added privileges.'¹⁹ Thus a mining centre such a Iuzivka (Donets'k), with a population of 23 076, was considered a village in 1897. On the other hand, many towns in the right and left-bank provinces were little more than villages. This was particularly the case in right-bank Ukraine, where the right of the nobility to establish towns (*miasteczka*) under the Polish Commonwealth was reaffirmed under Russian rule in 1785. The majority of right-bank towns were of the *miasteczko* type whose only distinguishing characteristic from the villages was that it was 'a great village with an area of buildings in the middle which have a town-like character', and which contained a Jewish population.²⁰ Urbanisation in the steppe was quantitatively and qualitatively different from the process in other provinces. Only in the steppe did the growth of industry play a major role in urban development.

The urbanisation of Ukraine which occurred in the nineteenth century proceeded largely without the participation of Ukrainians. As a consequence, with little more than 5 per cent of their numbers living in towns, they were the least urbanised national group in their native land. In terms of this important measure of social and political mobilisation, the minorities had a decisive advantage: 38 per cent of Russians and 45 per cent of Jews living in Ukraine (1897) were urban dwellers.

Ukrainians were a decided minority in the urban environment. According to the 1897 census they constituted less than one-third of the urban population (see Table 1.3). The weak Ukrainian presence in towns, combined with discriminatory policies aimed at the Ukrainian language and culture, meant that the cities provided a milieu for the Russification of the relatively few Ukrainians living there. Another important feature of the Ukrainian urban presence was that their representation declined in direct relationship to the degree of the industrialisation of an area. Thus Ukrainians accounted for 18 per cent of the town population of the steppe provinces. It was only in the left-bank region, the former territory of the Hetmanate, that Ukrainians claimed a majority of the urban population. But even here, Ukrainians were gathered into the small towns that dotted Poltava and Kharkiv provinces. In the major cities of this region, Kharkiv and Kremenchuk, they formed 26 and 30 per cent of the population respectively.

Not all urban residents were provided with the same mobilising environment. The larger cities differed from the smaller in the diversity of their economic, political and cultural functions. When examining the Ukrainian urban population by size of town a very marked trend emerges: the larger the town and the more removed from the village, the fewer the Ukrainian inhabitants. It was only in towns with a population under 10 000 that Ukrainians emerged as a majority, albeit a slim one, of the urban population. But these were, by and large, small, district towns which served as centres of manorial consumption and markets for the peasantry. In the four major cities that were the administrative, military and economic nerve-centres of Ukraine, cities that were to play an important role in deciding the course of the revolutionary struggles in 1917, Ukrainians formed 17 per cent of the population (see Table 1.4).

Why did Ukrainians show such little propensity for urban settlement? The weak Ukrainian urban presence is a phenomenon of such overwhelming social significance that it is surprising the question has

TABLE 1.3 National composition of Ukraine's urban population by region, 1897

Region	Total urban population	Ukrainians	% of total	Russians	% of total	Jews	% of total	Others	% of total
<i>Right Bank</i>	914 970	247 778	27.0	229 894	25.1	363 153	39.6	74 145	8.1
<i>Left Bank</i>	851 090	457 080	53.7	225 277	26.5	146 687	17.2	22 046	2.6
<i>Steppe</i>	1 319 331	231 225	17.5	594 847	45.1	320 619	24.3	172 640	13.1
<i>Ukraine</i>	3 085 391	936 083	30.3	1 050 018	34.0	830 459	27.0	268 831	8.7

SOURCE *Perepis' 1897*, Table xxii in Vols 8, 3, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

TABLE 1.4 *Distribution of Ukrainian urban population according to size of town, 1897^a*

<i>Size of town</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>(%)</i>
2000–10 000	71	378 000	201 000	53
10 000–15 000	30	373 000	184 000	49
15 000–20 000	19	324 000	124 000	38
20 000–50 000	20	570 000	172 000	30
50 000–100 000	8	502 000	99 000	20
100 000 +	4	938 000	156 000	17

^a Figures are rounded off to one thousand

SOURCE *Perepis' 1897*, Table XIII, in Vols 8, 3, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

not been studied. Of course, the fact that Ukrainians were a minority in the towns hardly escaped the notice of contemporaries. But all too often the situation was attributed to the psychological proclivities of the Ukrainian peasant masses, with Ukrainophiles stressing the positive virtues – love of nature and the desire to remain one's 'own boss', and Ukrainophobes the negative – mental sluggishness and lack of initiative. Neither explanation is particularly convincing.

The logical point of departure in an investigation of the issue is to pose the question: was there a time when Ukrainians formed a majority of the urban population? We find that in fact, prior to the 1648 revolution, when Ukraine was still under Polish rule, despite the many discriminatory measures instituted by the Polish authorities against Ukrainian burghers, the 'overwhelming majority' of town dwellers was Ukrainian.²¹ And yet, by the early decades of the nineteenth century, the Ukrainian urban majority had been eclipsed, a situation which persisted despite the growth of towns in the post-emancipation period. How this came about is a complex matter. We will merely highlight the most significant developments.

Since the paths of development in the right and left banks differed in the post 1648 period, it is necessary to discuss these regions separately. The wars, invasions and civil strife that accompanied the return of Polish rule in the late seventeenth century in right-bank Ukraine saw the destruction of many cities and a virtual collapse of economic life. To escape the wrath of the Polish authorities many Ukrainian urban residents (Cossacks and townsmen) migrated to the left bank or Moldavia.²² What greatly accelerated the decline of the Ukrainian urban presence were the Sejm's decisions in 1697 to exclude Cossacks from the ranks of the *szlachta*, and in 1699 to

abolish the Cossack army on the territory of the Polish commonwealth. Contrary to popular image, many Cossacks were hitherto engaged in such non-martial pursuits as trade, manufacturing and even artisan production.²³ The abolition of Cossackdom on the right bank permanently undermined the juridical and economic position of these important urban representatives of the Ukrainian people. It also closed an avenue of social mobility and urban in-migration to peasants, who in the past could enter Cossack armies. In the wake of the Sejm's decision, the *szlachta* initiated a colonisation drive, occupying positions vacated by the dispossessed Cossacks and relegating them to serve as agricultural labourers on the landowner's estates.²⁴

By the first decades of the eighteenth century, the old feudal order was restored in right-bank Ukraine with a vengeance. Serfdom, in its most restrictive and exploitative form, *corvée*, was imposed on the Ukrainian peasant masses. *Corvée* sealed the prospect of peasant movement into towns. By placing heavy claims on the peasants' labour time it blocked the development of cottage industry, and hence, the emergence of a skilled or semi-skilled rural labour force.²⁵ At the same time, unrestrained by central authority, the magnates engulfed the towns, absorbing them into their private ownership. Urban centres lost their former autonomy, and their populations, now the nobility's private citizens, were defenceless in the face of the gentry's fiscal greed.²⁶ Onerous feudal duties were imposed on the urban population, blocking the development of commodity-money relationships, undermining the urban economy. These duties introduced an element of panic among artisans and craftsmen who started moving from place to place in search of better masters, retarding the formation of stable urban populations.²⁷ With religious intolerance at its height Orthodox Ukrainian townsmen, against whom discriminatory measures were intensified, were particularly hard hit by this economic order. Bankrupted townsmen merged with the peasantry, some escaped to the left bank, others joined the Zaporiz'ka Sich, and those who could Polonised themselves. By the time of the second and third partitions of Poland (1793 and 1795), when the right bank became part of the Russian state, Ukrainians formed but a fraction of the urban population.²⁸ The dominant national group were the Jews, who, denied the right to ownership of land, maintained a miserable urban existence as small shopkeepers and artisans, *rentiers* of taverns from the nobility, and intermediaries between the peasants and landowners.²⁹ In the early nineteenth century, towns in right-bank Ukraine experienced a new crisis as the development of factory

production in central Polish and Russian lands ruined its fragile artisan industry. This is why at the turn of the nineteenth century the towns in this region supported a smaller proportion of the population – 5 per cent less – than in the eighteenth century.³⁰

Industrial development, which, by attracting impoverished Ukrainian peasants to the towns could have contributed to the reconstruction of a Ukrainian urban presence, played little or no role in the development of the cities in right-bank Ukraine. This region, even by Ukrainian standards, was an economic backwater. The only industry to speak of was sugar refining, operating mainly in rural areas on a seasonal basis. Ukrainians' lack of prior non-agricultural work experience, a consequence of the ruin of village crafts and the imposition of *corvée*, and their appallingly low level of culture, placed them at a decided disadvantage when it came to seeking employment.³¹ In an area where labour supply exceeded labour needs (in all industries) by a factor of three to one, competition for whatever urban jobs were created during the nineteenth century was intense.³² Tsarist anti-semitic policies contributed towards maintaining urban labour over-supply. The 'Temporary Rules' of 1882 (reinforced by an 1887 law) expelled Jews from the villages of the Pale of Settlement (which encompassed most of the right bank) and cooped up 'millions of human beings within the suffocating confines of the towns and townlets of the Western regions . . . [All] the exits from the overcrowded cities to the villages within the Pale of Settlement [were] tightly closed.'³³

Central to the existence of the right-bank town was its role as the seat of tsarist administration and army garrison. But these positions tended to be filled by Russians who migrated to this region in large numbers following the partition of Poland, and whose presence was reinforced following the Polish uprisings in the nineteenth century.³⁴ In right-bank Ukraine, the Ukrainian urban presence collapsed in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the nineteenth century offered little opportunity for rebuilding it.

In the immediate post-Khmel'nyts'kyi era, the establishment of a new authority in left-bank Ukraine – the Hetmanate – under the watchful eye of the Russian suzerain spared this region the chaos that took place on the right bank. The towns of the left bank were small, tending to merge with the countryside, but evidence suggests they supported a significant artisan, craftsman and merchant population.³⁵ In the period before the Poltava defeat (1709) the towns successfully fended off challenges (from the Ukrainian Cossack officer class – the

starshyna – and the Russian state) to their autonomy and prosperity.³⁶ Economically, the end of the seventeenth century was a time of relative prosperity brought about by a fortuitous conjuncture. After the upheavals of the mid-seventeenth century, Western Europe was starved for Ukrainian raw materials and the Ukrainian market was starved for West European goods. As long as the towns remained autonomous they could set prices and regulate commerce and entry into guilds. By keeping out outside competitors, they preserved their Ukrainian majorities. Serfdom, with its conditions limiting the free geographical and economic movement of peasants, had not yet been introduced, and the towns contained many peasants, partly engaged in agriculture, partly as artisans. Guilds in this period accepted new membership quite readily, which aided peasant mobility into urban occupations. This was facilitated by the overall prosperity, resulting in a growth in the number of artisans and the founding of many new guilds.³⁷ The revitalised economy and the penetration of money laid the basis for a vibrant Ukrainian merchant capitalism, large enough to compete quite successfully with Greek or Russian merchants, and capable of stimulating further economic development. Also, Russian merchants did not enjoy any special monopolies or privileged juridical positions at this time in Ukraine.³⁸ But this entire economic process came to an abrupt halt with the tragedy of 1709 (Battle of Poltava).

Following the Mazeppist catastrophe, Ukraine found itself in a new situation. Just at the time when Russia was entering on the path of aggressive mercantilism, Ukrainian autonomy was reduced to a minimum that left the country economically defenceless. Although at the political level the emphasis throughout the eighteenth century was on integrating the Hetmanate into the Russian state, at the economic level Ukraine was treated as a foreign, even hostile, entity. In the early years of Petrine economic policy a concerted effort was made to capture Ukrainian trade and place it in the hands of Russian state-run commerce. By the mid-eighteenth century the policy was resoundingly successful. In the second period, when ‘manufacturing fever’ gripped the Russian state, the axe fell on Ukrainian manufacturing in an effort to transform Ukraine into a safe market for the new industries established in central Russia. This goal was also realised. The economic well-being of the country and of its towns was further undermined by the numerous new taxes (in money and in kind) that were imposed on the population.³⁹

The effect of these policies on the urban population was profound. First, because important sectors of the urban economy were dam-

aged, the town population registered a drop. Secondly, by undermining the economic position of Ukrainian urban classes, the policies initiated a change in the national composition of the cities. Merchants, the Ukrainian urban economic elite, were the first to be affected. As early as the first decades of the eighteenth century, the contractions of the Ukrainian market and competition from favoured Russian and other foreign merchants forced the indigenous commercial strata (Cossacks and townsmen) to turn their attention to the only form of economic activity open to them: agriculture. Imperial policies restricting the trade and industrial activity of Cossacks contributed to this development.⁴⁰ By the end of the eighteenth century foreign merchants had succeeded in their conquest of trade in central Ukrainian lands – in their march to the south of Ukraine, the question of competition was not even posed.⁴¹

The emergence of Russians as a major component of the population of the lower social orders of the towns took longer to accomplish. The most numerous urban group in Ukraine at the turn of the nineteenth century were *mishchany* (townsmen) – artisans, shopkeepers, workers.⁴² Throughout the eighteenth century while Russian manufacturing was being nurtured in the womb of the Russian state, Ukrainian manufacturing was severely damaged. But small artisan industries survived in towns because they could at least protect their internal markets by imposing their own tariffs on many goods brought in for sale. When in 1775 this right was abolished, Ukrainian townsmen received their first blow in the form of competition from their more developed Russian counterparts. The second came with Peter III's and Catherine's economic reforms (1762, 1775), one effect of which was to facilitate the entry of the gentry into economic life. Although the *votchina* (manorial) and *kustar'* (cottage) industry never developed in Ukraine to the same extent that it did in Russia, the fact remained that many items of everyday use formerly purchased in the towns were now produced on the estate by serfs. This competition further weakened the Ukrainian urban economy.⁴³ The *coup de grâce* to the existence of Ukrainian townsmen was delivered by Catherine's Charter of Towns (1785). Urban centres were now made subject to new imperial regulations in the minutest detail, losing whatever economic prerogatives remained. They no longer controlled entry into guilds, and these institutions, formerly dominated by Ukrainians and used by them to keep out competition, were now integrated into an all-Russian order.⁴⁴ Russian artisans began to migrate to Ukraine in large numbers. Although

Ukrainian townsmen fought a rear-guard action to maintain their former positions, they lost the battle. The Charter of Towns meant that there could be no organised resistance to this new competition. Kiev put up the staunchest opposition, but by 1835, in the light of Nicholas' decision to grant a three-year tax exemption to any artisan and merchant in the empire who would settle in that city, its resistance was broken.⁴⁵ Prior to the 1861 reforms, the towns of Ukraine had already assumed a Russian character and Russian had emerged as the language of commerce. To survive in the towns, Ukrainians had to integrate themselves into that culture.

Thus occurred the death of a generation of Ukrainian townsmen, who had been nurtured by the conditions of the twilight years of the Hetmanate. But why were they not replaced by new Ukrainian arrivals? The answer to this question is to be found in the nature of the agrarian order in Ukraine. The most significant barrier to urbanisation in the nineteenth century was serfdom. In Ukraine this institution, with its conditions limiting the geographical and occupational mobility of peasants, was imposed in the mid-eighteenth century. This occurred shortly before imperial policy opened the door, as already mentioned, to the gentry's economic activity. In connection with this new orientation, merchants were deprived of the right to own serfs and henceforth they could hire only wage labour. The ownership of serfs was restricted to *dvoriane*. In Russia, the beggarly agriculture of peasants could not provide the gentry with high revenues, so they turned to commuting the obligated labour service of the peasants into monetary rents or *obrok*. Serfs, in turn, were thus compelled to seek out new avenues for increasing their cash incomes, and one of the available means was to hire themselves out as wage labourers in industry, manufacture or service, often in the city, or to become artisans or petty traders.⁴⁶ Landowners were only too happy to encourage their peasants in this direction. Experience had taught them that a peasant left to his own devices knew best how to raise revenues. The non-agricultural activity of Russian peasants had become so widespread that only a portion continued to till the land. The expansion of the availability of hired labour through the *obrok* system allowed urban industries to expand. Many more industries, large and small, were found in small towns and villages close to the source of labour supply, resulting in a diffusion of technical skills and know-how into the Russian countryside.⁴⁷ In Ukraine developments took a different turn.

Though *obrok* was practised until the early eighteenth century, by

the end of the century, with the growth of landlordism, *corvée* became universal in Ukraine. The high fertility of the Ukrainian black soil, the proximity of external markets and the lack of other sources of livelihood, made it most profitable for the gentry to exploit the labour of peasants on their manorial fields. The landowners' thirst for a labour force resulted in serfdom being much more widespread in Ukraine than in Russia.⁴⁸ The consequences of this agrarian order cannot be stressed enough.

In the first place, peasants (as an estate) formed a substantially lower proportion of the urban population in Ukraine than in Russia.⁴⁹ The shortage of available labour in the pre-emancipation era placed an additional obstacle to the development of Ukrainian industry in a situation where that industry was already burdened by discriminatory economic policies. It meant also that while Russian peasants were learning valuable industrial and entrepreneurial skills in urban factories and village industries, Ukrainians were not. Of course, some rural industries existed in Ukraine in the pre-emancipation era, but they were limited to regions where agriculture was less profitable (for example, Chernihiv).⁵⁰ Moreover, an examination of the structure of these industries reveals that in contrast with Russia, factory production was either non-existent or paltry, and focused almost exclusively on the processing of food.⁵¹ In his *Zapiski iuzhnoi Rossii* written in the decade before emancipation, Panteleimon Kulish observed that Russians were much more adaptable to industry and city life and were much more willing to travel to other regions to seek out work than Ukrainians.⁵² Indeed, the nature of economic and social relations in Russia nurtured these skills and attitudes. In Ukraine, they blocked their emergence. As S. Pylypenko, a Ukrainian communist, noted in 1923:

Another difference between the Russian and Ukrainian village is that [in Russia] there was much opportunity for seasonal work, poor peasants travelled to cities to earn money and there they become proletarianized. Moreover artisan industries were very widespread even in the villages. But in our country the peasantry knew nothing else apart from agriculture.⁵³

When in the last decades of the nineteenth century the growth of industry in the steppe attracted intensive immigration, the Ukrainian peasantry was largely absent from this process.⁵⁴ Ukrainians missed their only real opportunity prior to the revolution to change the

national and cultural physiognomy of the cities. The extensive immigration of Russians into the towns of the steppe was attributed by Lenin, M. Porsh and others to the stormy development of capitalism in Ukraine.⁵⁵ The reverse is more to the point. Such migration took place because of the lack of adequate skilled manpower in Ukraine due to the absence of capitalist development.⁵⁶ The industries which sprang up on the Ukrainian steppe were not the product of indigenous development. Their emergence was not nurtured by a century of capitalist accumulation, nor by the penetration of capitalist relations into the pores of Ukrainian society. Industry grew because Western capital developed it. Almost overnight, new plants were established. Technicians and engineers arrived from Europe, and the bulk of the labour force was recruited from Russia since suitable labour was in short supply in Ukraine.⁵⁷ The development of industry in Russia, nurtured by the state, and the nature of Russian agrarian relations had prepared an army of skilled labour. This point is graphically illustrated by a study comparing Ukrainian and Russian migrant labour in Ukraine: 93 per cent of the former were unskilled manual workers, whereas half of the latter were skilled or semi-skilled.⁵⁸ If the Ukrainian peasant did not enter the mines and factories it was not because he 'valued his human dignity', as Panas Fedenko claimed.⁵⁹ That dignity stood a much better chance of being enhanced by urban wages, which were the highest in the Empire, than by agrarian incomes, which were among the lowest.⁶⁰ It was the legacy of economic underdevelopment and the burden of a low level of culture that forced the uncompetitive Ukrainian peasant, even in Katerynoslav province, to migrate to Siberia in search of better circumstances rather than travel a dozen or so kilometres to the nearest factory gate.

Industrial development in Ukraine reinforced Russian influence in the towns. That influence had already been firmly established when Catherine's comprehensive administrative reforms made the city the focal point for state control. The town's role as an administrative centre contributed in a major way to its development in the Russian Empire.⁶¹ How were Ukrainians affected by this?

Although some Ukrainian towns (Kiev, Chernihiv, for example) became centres for various provincial and district administrative agencies, the country never developed a capital which could grow into a major city. Lacking a strong political centre of gravity, its urban network was fragmented. Kiev, despite its historic status as the 'mother' city of Rus' was, until the mid-nineteenth century, a small provincial town with less than 50 000 inhabitants. At the time of the

1897 census Ukraine did not have a burgeoning administrative centre. Kiev's population lagged considerably behind Odessa's, a city whose fortunes were built on cereal trade with Europe.

With Catherine's reforms, the bureaucracy in the towns was initially staffed by Ukrainians. The fact that the Ukrainian gentry had access to bureaucratic positions greatly facilitated their acceptance of the loss of Ukrainian autonomy. Because higher education in the earlier part of the eighteenth century was more advanced in Ukraine than in Russia, this offered the Ukrainian gentry better opportunities for higher education and hence easier access to bureaucratic positions than their Russian counterparts. But the situation changed in the nineteenth century. The development of higher education in Russia and government resistance to its further expansion in Ukraine meant that the educational advantage passed to Russians.⁶² The loss of autonomy meant that the allocation of bureaucratic positions was no longer in Ukrainian hands. Towards the end of the eighteenth century it was Russian policy to 'increase the share of Russians in the population of the town, in particular by rotating military, administrative and [other] leading personnel'.⁶³ After the Polish uprisings this tendency was accelerated, so that by the later decades of the nineteenth century Ukrainians lost their distinctive presence in the state apparatus.

There all exhales, diffuses Europe,
all glitters with the South, and brindles
with live variety.
The tongue of golden Italy
resounds along the gay street where
walks the proud Slav,
Frenchman, Spaniard, Armenian,
and Greek, and the heavy Moldavian,
and the son of Egyptian soil,
the retired Corsair, Morali.⁶⁴

These verses from Pushkin's 'Fragments of Onegin's Journey', which refer to the Ukrainian city of Odessa, illustrate the immense cultural chasm that existed between the non-Ukrainian town and the Ukrainian village. 'People living in the cities of Ukraine,' wrote a delegation of the Central Rada to the Provisional Government in May 1917, 'see before them the Russified streets of these cities . . . and completely forget that these cities are only islets in the sea of the whole Ukrainian people.'⁶⁵ The Ukrainian village, on the other hand, viewed the

town with the utmost suspicion and hostility. The Bolshevik V. Skorovstanskii (V. Shakhrai) looking at the city through the eyes of the Ukrainian peasant wrote:

The city rules the village, and 'foreigners' the city. The city drew all the wealth to itself and gave almost nothing to the village in return. The city drew taxes, which almost never returned to the village, in Ukraine. . . In the city one had to pay bribes to officials to avoid mockery and red tape. In the city the landowner squandered all the wealth gathered in the village. In the city the merchant cheated you when he bought and sold. In the city there are lights, there are schools, theatres and music plays. The city is clean . . . dressed as for a holiday, it eats and drinks well, many people promenade. But in the village, apart from poverty, impenetrable darkness and hard work – there is almost nothing. The city is aristocratic, foreign, not ours, not Ukrainian. Russian, Jewish, Polish – only not ours, not Ukrainian.⁶⁶

The urban centres in Ukraine may have been foreign islets in a sea of Ukrainian peasants, but this did not diminish their strategic role in society. Towns concentrated society's critical functions, as well as its most politically creative and active population. 'The town always had some sort of programme: it had great capacities for political organisation. It had cadres for both active revolution and counter-revolution,' wrote M. Shapoval.⁶⁷ Towns were the focal points of the Ukrainian movement as well, but the merciless persecution of organised Ukrainian life and weak Ukrainian urban immigration denied the largest part of the human and institutional resources of the city to that movement. Trying to explain 'out of what clay and with what difficulties one was forced to model a Ukrainian state' in 1917, an anonymous writer in 1924 gave the example of Chernihiv, once a great centre of Ukrainian cultural life. On the eve of the revolution this town had a population of 40 000 with three gymnasias, one *Realschule*, two seminaries. Yet it boasted a Ukrainian movement of forty people: ten from the older generation, thirty from the younger.⁶⁸ Kiev, by all accounts the centre of the national movement in the decades before the revolution, could recruit only 331 members to the *Prosvita* society (a popular enlightenment organisation allowed to exist briefly after the 1905 revolution).⁶⁹

In the course of the revolution and civil war in Ukraine, the fate of the Ukrainian national movement was decided in the towns. In that

period, the national movement struggled to achieve mastery over society, not with the aid of the city, but in the face of its indifference or active opposition. In the Constituent Assembly elections 'Ukrainian nationalists were outvoted in every city by at least one group which was apathetic or antipathetic towards the Ukrainian cause.'⁷⁰ Elections to the city *dumy* produced an even poorer showing for Ukrainian parties.⁷¹ The cities of Ukraine, 'even our Kiev', lamented I. Mazepa, 'gave us no help whatsoever during the revolution.'⁷² As a consequence, the 'policies of the Central Rada existed, to a large extent, in thin air'.⁷³ Without a base in the urban population, the national movement's principal strength would have to be sought in the politically disorganised and ineffective village.

THE PEASANTRY AND THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT

Before the revolution and for decades after, Ukrainian was synonymous with peasant. The term was a fitting description of the Ukrainian population: 93 per cent of all Ukrainians (in the 1897 census) were listed as belonging to the peasant estate and 87 per cent of all Ukrainians earned their livelihood from agriculture.⁷⁴

The economic predicament of the village gave rise to a new set of synonyms: 'Ukrainian and pauper'.⁷⁵ The situation of the peasant was familiar enough. The 1861 reform emancipated the peasant but neglected to provide him with the necessary means to establish himself as an independent farmer. The paltry allotments obtained at the time of the emancipation remained the main form of peasant holdings since the rapid increase in the price of purchase and rent of land prevented most from increasing the amount of land in their use. The fact that the rural population in Ukraine grew twice as rapidly as peasant land holdings compounded the problem of land shortage.⁷⁶ Ukraine's large surplus rural population had nowhere to go: the peasant was uncompetitive when it came to seeking urban employment, and migration to Siberia and Kazakhstan proved to be a disaster, many migrants returning home.⁷⁷ The only form of economic activity open to the peasant, other than tilling his fields, was to hire himself out as an agricultural labourer. But the introduction of machinery on the large estates, together with an over-supply of labour, depressed agricultural wages. So for the average Ukrainian peasant the struggle for existence was a trying experience. The absence of draught animals and implements, primitive agricultural

techniques and the peasants' own cultural backwardness made intensive agriculture impossible. The result was low yields.⁷⁸ The lack of intelligent state policies promoting infrastructures in agriculture (credit facilities, grain elevators, agricultural schools, and so on) compounded the difficulties. Operating at a subsistence level, under Ukraine's climatic conditions, the peasant could expect to experience pangs of hunger every two or three years when the harvest was poor.

The countryside was not a homogenous entity. A decade or so after the 1861 reform a contemporary observed that in the Ukrainian village society the polarities of 'wealth and poverty', 'misery and joy' were common.⁷⁹ Rural stratification increased in the post-reform period. By 1917, of the four million rural households, 57 per cent cultivated less than 3 dessiatines and could be considered the poor peasants. (One dessiatine equals 1.1 hectares.) The middle peasantry with 3 to 10 dessiatines accounted for 30 per cent of households, while the 'rich', those with over 10 dessiatines, formed 12 per cent and their average land use was 32 dessiatines. (In 1881 Iu. Ianson claimed that not less than five dessiatines were needed to make ends meet).⁸⁰ The nobility and gentry representing 0.8 per cent of households owned 30 per cent of the land, and the average size of their estates was 360 dessiatines.⁸¹ The average peasant farm in Ukraine in 1917 was approximately 7 dessiatines (or 7.7 hectares). The landholding of the Ukrainian peasant was actually larger than that of his French, Danish or Belgian counterpart. But while the latter could earn a comfortable living on such a farm, the former could not.

There is no doubt that the landless, the poor, the middle and even the rich peasants wanted the upper classes' land – and they wanted it without payment. As early as 1902, the peasants of Poltava and Kharkiv provinces sacked eighty-two estates. Stolypin called these disturbances the worst since the rebellion of Pugachev.⁸² The unfolding wave of agrarian discontent had the potential of being channelled into a national movement. The peasants' perceived economic antagonist was the nobility, and only a quarter of these were Ukrainian.⁸³ Although the landholding of the nobility slowly decreased because many were incapable of adjusting to modern farming, in 1914 there were still 5000 massive estates with about 1600 dessiatines (1760 hectares) per estate. The latifundia were almost entirely in Russian hands.⁸⁴ Moreover, the Ukrainian peasant, fearful of sharing land and moveable wealth with Russian peasants, could potentially endorse a national economic programme.⁸⁵

There was no shortage of grievances for the Ukrainian peasantry.

But that in itself was no guarantee that they would identify with the articulation of these wrongs along national lines. Peasant responsiveness on this score would presuppose a certain self-awareness of belonging to a unique cultural community, and this awareness never arises spontaneously. It is the product of social learning which occurs over a long period of time. For the peasantry to serve as a base on which to build a national movement, it had to be organised. Out of an ethnic mass, a self-conscious national community had to be forged. In that respect not much progress had been made prior to the revolution.

Mass illiteracy was one of the obstacles standing in the way of an effective propaganda effort of the Ukrainian national movement. It is true that in the post-reform period, thanks to the efforts of the *zemstvo* institutions and the intelligentsia's popular enlightenment campaigns, some rudimentary improvement in the level of literacy had been registered. Indeed, the very fact that literacy had made some progress gave the fledgling Ukrainian press an audience, and the national movement a foothold in the village. But overall, prior to 1917, the mobilising potential of literacy was hardly developed. The social and national policies of tsarism had led to a situation, probably unique in European history, where Ukrainians had higher rates of literacy in the mid-eighteenth century than at the turn of the twentieth.⁸⁶ In the light of the 1897 census 18 per cent of Ukraine's population could read, five per cent less than the average for European Russia. Thirteen per cent of Ukrainians were literate. In the villages illiteracy predominated – 91 to 96 per cent, depending on the province. Russians in Ukraine were twice as literate as Ukrainians, and Jews three times. The result was that Ukrainians formed half the literate population of their land.⁸⁷

The literacy rate in Ukraine reflected the state of popular education in the country. Per capita expenditure on education was among the lowest in the world.⁸⁸ The pupil-teacher ratio could reach staggering proportions – 250 pupils per teacher in Podillia, for example.⁸⁹ With no compulsory education, two-thirds of the children of school age in Ukraine (1915) had never set foot inside a classroom, and of those that did only 10 per cent completed the two or three-year primary education programme.⁹⁰ The background to all this was the poverty of the majority of peasants, which impeded the educational achievement of their children. Most peasant families could afford neither the price of school materials, nor school fees, nor for that matter could they readily do without the labour of their children. The towns fared better than the village and the rich better than the

poor when it came to education. Since the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians were both peasant and poor, it was not surprising that studies showed Ukrainian peasant children exhibiting little interest in education: their rate of truancy was higher than that of Russian or Jewish children, they had the lowest rate of school attendance, and hence the lowest marks.⁹¹

The school system throughout Russia was woefully deficient, but in Ukraine things were worse because national discrimination amplified the debilitating effects of general social and educational policies. From Alexander I's educational reform of 1804 until the time of the revolution, Ukrainian was banned from the schools both as a language of instruction and as a subject.⁹² All school activity, including explanations, had to be carried out in Russian. The 1804 law actually permitted the teaching of the non-Russian languages of the Empire. Ukrainian, however, was not considered a language but 'a dialect, or half a dialect, or a mode of speech of the all-Russian language, in one word a *patois*, and being such, does not have the right to an independent existence . . . in schools.'⁹³ The school curriculum had no Ukrainian content: Ukrainian history, literature, culture were not taught and subjects such as geography and the natural sciences made only passing reference to 'Little Russia'. Until the revolution there did not exist a single state-supported Ukrainian-language school. There were some private Ukrainian Sunday schools around the time of the emancipation, but they were closed in 1862. Although Ukrainian patriots such as S. Iefremov called for the founding of private Ukrainian institutions, the record of these few schools was that they were shut down by provincial authorities after several years' existence and they also had to confront the problem of the penury of the Ukrainian masses.⁹⁴

A mass of evidence was produced to show that the Russian school in Ukraine deprived the few Ukrainian children who found their way into a classroom of even the most rudimentary education. Since instruction was carried out in a language they poorly understood, they learnt little and quickly forgot what they had been taught.⁹⁵ The consequence was 'a massive percentage of relapse into illiteracy among the Ukrainian population', as Kharkiv *zemstvo* officials put it.⁹⁶ A Poltava teacher at the turn of this century observed, 'I have seen how almost all, having completed school, in one to three years forgot how to write and read.'⁹⁷ Ukrainian pedagogues claimed the Russian school induced boredom, 'demoralised youth' and led to 'hooliganism'.⁹⁸ These arguments fell on deaf ears. When in the

aftermath of the 1905 revolution some teachers dared to give explanations in Ukrainian if the Russian word was not understood, school inspectors gave stern warning against such seditious behaviour.⁹⁹

The school question, as Otto Bauer noted, is one of the most important of all national questions, for a common national education is one of the strongest bonds of the nation. It is absolutely essential for the transmission of the great overarching traditions which give nations unity.¹⁰⁰ The public school system in the Russian Empire, pitiful as it was, remained one of the most potent agencies of Russian socialisation, a fact of which Russian reaction never lost sight.¹⁰¹ In Ukraine that instrument was dominated by obscurantist Russian clergy.¹⁰² It was an agency of denationalisation and national disinformation. Since those with the means and talent were unable to learn in Ukrainian, they learnt Russian, and having done so, saw little need for the Ukrainian language. This is why in 1862 M. Kostomarov wrote, 'our sense of nationality perishes with education'.¹⁰³ Because Ukrainian was not taught in schools, there were relatively few, even among the village intelligentsia, who knew the literary Ukrainian well or could read it without difficulty. This precluded the formation of an intelligentsia of any consequence and size writing in the Ukrainian language. Because the curriculum contained nothing about Ukrainian history or culture, school children emerged from the school with no knowledge of even the most basic elements of their heritage. Because the language was banned from the school, so much respected in village society, peasants held that language in very low esteem. With so much at stake it was not surprising that the Ukrainian movement placed such great emphasis on the school question. S. N. Shchegolev, a perceptive opponent of 'Little Russian separatism', commented that 'on this [school] question are concentrated today all the efforts of the Ukrainian parties as the single lever capable of becoming the fulcrum for all the future efforts planned by the Ukrainianist movement'.¹⁰⁴ Nothing came of this agitation until the revolution of 1917.

In a situation where state institutions such as schools were denied as agencies of national integration and where peasant organisations were prohibited, the printed word was the only instrument which could facilitate the creation of a national social opinion (standardised by the nation's leadership and subject to its control) and impart a sense of obligation to the membership of the national group.¹⁰⁵ It is for this reason that national movements under authoritarian regimes were fixated on the press and why the Ukrainian in particular spent so much energy on developing one. The tsarist regime was also

acutely aware of the importance of the Ukrainian press and took numerous measures to block its emergence.

The first decree on publishing within the Russian Empire was Peter I's order of 5 October 1720 stipulating that all books in Ukraine should henceforth be examined for content and in order to ensure that they are free of all traces of the local 'dialect'. But censors in the eighteenth century were liberals in comparison with their counterparts a hundred years later, and Peter's *ukaz* was largely overlooked with regard to language. It was really in 1847, following the Cyril-Methodius Brotherhood affair, that censors started persecuting the printed word on the basis of language alone. Ukrainian books still made their appearance, but with great delays and much frustration. In 1863, following the Polish uprising and peasant unrest, the prospect that the nascent Ukrainian movement might ally itself with the peasantry acted as the catalyst for the first edict categorically banning Ukrainian-language books. Books with religious content or those intended for popular education were disallowed: only *belles-lettres* were permitted. In 1876, after Russian authorities became alarmed at the growth of the Ukrainian movement and of its attempts to influence peasant youth, the infamous Ems *ukaz* was promulgated, adding many new restrictions to the 1863 measures. Nothing was spared, neither the theatre nor even music, since libretti could not be written in Ukrainian without the express permission of the Main Administration for Publishing Matters. The Ems *ukaz* and the 1863 measures were exceptional events, even by tsarist standards. The banning of books solely on the basis of language was unique even in Russia. Some of the rules were subsequently relaxed, but this thaw must be seen in relative terms. Between 1900 and 1904, for example, forty five Ukrainian manuscripts were sent to the censors, but only twenty two were allowed to be published. (Potebnia's ABC primer *Bukvar'* was rejected.)¹⁰⁹ The 1905 revolution changed the situation *de facto* but not *de jure*. The revolution witnessed a flurry of Ukrainian publishing activity which the regime counter-attacked with crippling fines and closures. In general in the post-1905 period administrative harassment was less intense when it came to books. Daily and weekly newspapers, especially those intended for peasant audiences were the first to fall victim. When reaction felt itself secure, the whole panoply of petty persecutions resumed. In Kiev in 1907, for example, the medical committee of the province refused to allow cholera epidemic notices to be published in Ukrainian.¹⁰⁷ Ukrainian publishing activity languished until the revolution of 1917

cleared a path for its development. There was a unifying theme in all of the measures taken against the Ukrainian printed word. They were very consciously put into place to deny the leadership of the emerging Ukrainian movement an opportunity to influence the peasant masses.

If the Ukrainian language publishing enterprise suffered, it was not merely because of tsarist censorship policies. The social structure of the Ukrainians was unpropitious for the support of a sustained publishing effort. Ukrainians were not numerous among the upper strata of society, and those who were in privileged social positions were Russified and largely uninterested in supporting a Ukrainian press. Thus publishing efforts, even when permitted, were constantly besieged by financial crises. *Rada*, a Ukrainian daily newspaper which appeared after 1905, could only muster 3000 subscribers.¹⁰⁸ The Ukrainian press did beat a path to the village, there to confront the problem of mass illiteracy and an inferiority complex of such magnitude that it took much convincing to show that the book or periodical written in the 'moujik' language was as good as that published in the 'gentleman's' tongue.¹⁰⁹

The state of Ukrainian language publishing is graphically portrayed by statistics on the number of books and brochures that appeared (in the Russian Empire as a whole) between 1798 and 1916 (inclusive). In that 118-year period 3214 titles saw publication, on the average 27 titles per year for a population of approximately 20 million! Almost two-thirds of that total was published after the 1905 revolution. Censorship laws ensured that Ukrainian language publications would not evolve beyond *belles-lettres*: almost three-quarters of the titles published prior to 1917 fell into that category.¹¹⁰ The serial press in the Ukrainian language did not make its appearance until the second decade of the nineteenth century, over two hundred years after the founding of such a press in Western Europe, a century after its establishment in Russia.¹¹¹ Of the several hundred journals, newspapers and serial publications that appeared, few survived for more than a few years. The first daily newspaper in the Ukrainian language was not founded until 1905. Only one such newspaper, *Rada*, survived until 1914. With the outbreak of the First World War it was closed. Tatars, for the sake of comparison, had twelve newspapers on the eve of the war.¹¹²

Ukrainian national life existed on the margins of society. Reading accounts of that period one gets the impression that theatrical troupes and amateur choirs, the only open form of Ukrainian cultural life readily tolerated, were the main infrastructures of national life. It

is undeniable that some progress was made as Ukraine inched towards the revolutionary conflagration of 1917. The Ukrainian printed word was more widely disseminated than in the past, every village had its nationally conscious peasants, and every other village its school teacher or *zemstvo* official who quietly propagated the national idea. *Prosvita* societies (when they existed), cooperatives, and some *zemstvo* institutions provided small but welcome havens for the efforts of the Ukrainian national movement. But overall, village society remained unorganised. National infrastructures had not been firmly planted in the Ukrainian soil and they did not create a strong sense of national solidarity.

The consequence of this situation was that the overwhelming mass of Ukrainian peasants had a very poorly developed sense of their national identity. The village, of course, preserved its ethnos, but only because it was conservative. The peasant 'stubbornly looked at the world through his ancestors' eyeglasses; he wore his ancestors' clothes, spoke his ancestors' tongue'.¹¹³ This was not the identity of a modern nation, but of a people left behind by the tide of modernisation. S. Goldelman tells us that the national self-identification of the peasants was so low that they were 'hardly aware that the language which they used in their daily life was "Ukrainian"'.¹¹⁴ Iefremov wrote in *Rada*, 'It is well known that on first hearing or reading a Ukrainian book, our peasant often looked at it as a gentleman's invention, and even as something intended to poke fun at the peasant.'¹¹⁵ A *Rada* article entitled 'A voice from the village' characterised the state of national consciousness as follows: 'In our country peasants are only very little conscious when it comes to nationality. They know they are not Muscovites, but Little Russians as they call themselves. But what is a Little Russian? What are his needs and how does he differ from a Muscovite? This they cannot say.'¹¹⁶

But the situation would not remain that way forever. The peasant may not have had much of a national instinct, but his sense of economic grievance was acute. Pursuing his economic inclination he had little choice other than to reflect on the political order. He had to rise to the height of political being. 'This political awakening of the peasantry,' wrote Trotsky, 'could not have taken place otherwise . . . than through their own native language – with all the consequences ensuing in regard to schools, courts, self-administration.'¹¹⁷ The close inter-relationship between the agrarian struggle and the national question was first to be observed during the 1905 revolution. The national factor began to play a role only towards the end of the

agrarian revolt, after the peasantry had participated for months if not years in the struggle for land, after the initial spontaneous outbursts gave way to more organised activity. Forced to consider and formulate their economic grievances, the peasantry became aware of political and national issues. The Poltava peasantry, which rebelled as early as 1902, began to incorporate in its petitions to authorities demands for the 'Ukrainian language school, and the granting of political autonomy for Ukraine' only towards the end of 1905.¹¹⁸ A study of peasant activity throughout the entire 1905 agrarian upheaval arrives at similar conclusions.¹¹⁹ In his pessimistic assessment of peasant national consciousness cited above, Iefremov ended on an optimistic note: he was amazed at how quickly Ukrainian peasant representatives to the Second Duma came to understand the national question. The author of the equally despairing 'A voice from the village' was also impressed that when forced to reflect, peasants would come to an appreciation of national demands. It was the agrarian revolt which roused the peasant masses from their age-old slumber.

THE DILEMMA OF LEADERSHIP

National identity, as we noted in the Introduction to this book, does not exist *in statu naturae*. It is created by leading social groups who elaborate and politicise objective cultural markers. In agrarian societies such as Ukraine, for a very long time the only group capable of leading people towards nationhood was the gentry. The origins of the Ukrainian gentry lay in the social differentiation which occurred in the Cossack armies in the post-1648 period. In a society where land was the main source of wealth, the Cossack officer elite strove and succeeded in constituting itself as a landowning class. Since land without labour was useless, they also found it necessary to place increasingly onerous obligations on the peasantry, though they did not enforce them. The fact that both processes necessarily involved rapacity meant that between the elite and the mass of the rank-and-file Cossacks and peasants there emerged sharp social antagonisms. Well before the Charter of Nobility and serfdom a Ukrainian hereditary landowning class had come into being.¹²⁰

Russian encroachments, culminating in the abolition of the Hetmanate in 1764, placed the Ukrainian *starshyna*-nobility in a discomfiting position. At issue was whether the new regime would recognise

their privileges as an estate. Since the historical example of Poland was fresh in their minds, it was *szlachta*-like status that they demanded for themselves, often couching this request in patriotic discourse regarding their country's 'ancient rights'. When Catherine's Charter of Nobility of 1785 granted the *dvoriane* numerous economic and social privileges, the patriotic (even democratic) discourse subsided. The official sanctioning of serfdom sweetened the pill of integration into the Empire. There were of course problems in obtaining Russian nobility status. The Russian Table of Ranks did not correspond to the Hetmanate's hierarchy. But until Krechetnikov's arrival as Governor-General of Little Russia, imperial policy, prodded by Rumiantsev's intercessions, was downright liberal. The local assembly of the nobility adjudicated applications for ennoblement; the word of twelve nobles of indubitable status (easily purchased) was sufficient for a candidate to be accepted. The latter, one should add, was a uniquely Little Russian provision. Although many Cossacks showed remarkable ingenuity in producing utterly fantastic documents (forged by scribes in the Polish-held right-bank provinces) proving descent from foreign nobles, the majority based their claim on some ancestor having held a position of importance in the Hetman's administration.¹²¹ The results of the 1782 *reviziia* showed that the Little Russian upper classes had been remarkably successful in securing patents of nobility. *Dvoriane* formed a higher proportion of the population of the left bank than of virtually any other part of the Russian Empire.¹²²

The security of the Ukrainian nobility was very much undermined by Krechetnikov, whose report to the Senate was a stinging indictment of irregularities in the ennoblement process. When the Senate endorsed Krechetnikov's position, some 9000 nobles had their status put into question. At issue was not only personal juridical status, but profound economic matters as well – estates, serfs, governmental careers, military service and education. This new development at the turn of the nineteenth century generated a fury of historical research intended to prove the claims of the injured Ukrainian gentry. It also gave rise to a new sense of Little Russian patriotism. The Napoleonic wars, Repin's intercessions and the sympathy of some high tsarist officials were the essential ingredients that resulted in the 1835 settlement when all Hetman civilian and military ranks, except for the lowest, were recognised as bestowing Russian *dvorianstvo* status.¹²³ When this last outstanding issue was resolved, the gentry, having satisfied its estate demands, ceased to exist as a meaningful cohesive social force.

The Ukrainian gentry was never a large social group when one considers the whole of Ukrainian territory. It evolved only on the left bank. The right bank did not give rise to a *starshyna*-nobility since Cossackdom had been destroyed there under the Polish regime. In the south, only a handful of the officers of the Zaporiz'ka Sich were granted patents of nobility when the Sich was liquidated in 1775. The left-bank gentry played no role in the settlement of the south; Russian nobles dominated the agricultural scene there.¹²⁴ The Ukrainian gentry was concentrated in the left bank, in the provinces of Poltava and Chernihiv in particular, where they formed a layer of petty land-holders whose estates did not exceed fifty dessiatines in most cases.¹²⁵

The left-bank gentry forfeited their leadership of the national movement when they became Russified in the process of constituting themselves as a *dvorianstvo* within the all-Russian system. In their case the Russification was largely voluntary. The humble origins of most members of that gentry made Russification an attractive proposition. Like the *nouveaux riches* who ape the manners of established families, the insecure Cossack *starshyna* took to aristocratic culture, first the Polish, then the Russian. They changed their names: the plebeian Vasylenko became the noble-sounding Bazilevskii; Rozum, Razumovskii. It would not do to beat the corridors of heraldic offices without French wigs, German waistcoats, and certainly correct Russian. Above all, the moujik's language was not to be spoken, much less written. The greater the cultural distance from the peasantry, the more convincing the argument for nobility status could be made.¹²⁶

Russian policies greatly facilitated the Russification process. As I. L. Rudnytsky has stressed, tsarist policy towards Ukraine differed markedly from its policies towards other nationalities. Tsarism may have oppressed the Poles, Finns and Georgians, but it did not challenge their claim to recognition as distinct and separate nations. In the case of Ukrainians, according to official dogma, they were the Little Russian offshoot of the triune Russian nation. This policy entailed two consequences. First, individuals of Ukrainian origin of the appropriate estate, willing to renounce their identity and merge into an 'all-Russian' one, were not discriminated against. Secondly, systematic repression was applied to all individuals who upheld a distinct Ukrainian identity 'whether in the political or in the cultural sphere'.¹²⁷ Upward mobility could only be achieved by the acquisition of Russian language and culture. The fact that Russian culture in the latter part of the eighteenth century and throughout the

nineteenth was acquiring western ideas more rapidly than the Ukrainian, made the carrot all the more attractive. The stick of repression needed little elaboration for a gentry which remembered what happened to those who had supported Mazeppa's drive for Ukrainian autonomy. The combination of the carrot and the stick made for a very effective policy.

Ukraine's loss of its ruling class in the modern period was one of the many discontinuities in the history of this 'non-historical' nation.¹²⁸ 'The Ukrainian people', wrote an editorialist in *Robotnycha hazeta*, 'had the fortune or misfortune to lose their lordly-bourgeois classes without, obviously, being denied the pleasure of shouldering these classes. Therefore among Ukrainians there were no layers such as we see among the Poles, Georgians or Finns, which harboured national-political traditions.'¹²⁹ While this assessment is by and large correct, it must not obliterate the fact that whatever national consciousness survived into the nineteenth century was due to the gentry. The injured pride of many Little Russian noblemen transformed itself into a local patriotism. Beneath the Russian language and political subservience, in the crevices of an 'all-Russian' (*rossiiskoe* not *russskoe*) identity there still existed a sense of cultural uniqueness in some. It was the gentry who funded journals, academic institutions and books which propagated the Ukrainian idea.¹³⁰ These may have been very modest efforts, but without them the Ukrainian intelligentsia would have been stillborn.

The task of modern nationalism is to mobilise the people and to integrate them into a new national body politic. This could only have been achieved by the democratisation of the social structure and the integration of the lower classes into the nation. This the gentry could never have achieved. Their image of the 'ancient rights' of Little Russia never went beyond aristocratic corporatism. Every stirring of the peasantry drove the gentry deeper and deeper into the camp of political reaction. The Ukrainian movement, wrote Iefremov, had to be 'democratic and popular' or not at all.¹³¹ Thus it was not surprising that at the turn of the twentieth century those among the gentry who identified themselves with the national movement were so few that they stood out like 'white ravens' in their own milieu.¹³² In the first decades of the nineteenth century the gentry bowed out of Ukrainian history, but not before it had planted a seed in another social group. Without that seed the modern Ukrainian national movement would have been inconceivable.

Describing the leadership dynamic of national movements, Karl

Deutsch noted that if the main interests and ties of the established upper class of the moment

lie elsewhere, perhaps outside the country, or if it has accepted alien speech, habits or religion, or if, finally, it has come to care only for its own group interests in quite a narrow manner, then the national and social leadership may devolve upon the next class below it, or still further down to whichever class is sufficiently strong, respected and locally accessible to become in fact the 'leading group of the national movement.'¹³³

In the case of the Ukrainians, one had to travel some distance down the social hierarchy to touch the leadership base of the national movement.

Though early Russian Marxists tried hard to find an indigenous capitalist class substantial enough to fulfil the requirements of the stages theory of revolution – feudalism, capitalism, socialism – even M. Pokrovskii, the most persistent detective, had to give up the search in the end.¹³⁴ Notwithstanding the fact that to find a Ukrainian capitalist one would have had to walk Ukraine like the ancient Diogenes, lantern in hand in search of an honest man in Athens, and come up with the same result, contemporary Soviet historiography persists in this shibboleth. If an indigenous Ukrainian capitalist class did not develop, this had little to do with the democratic national characteristics of that people, but rather with economic underdevelopment and unfavourable tsarist fiscal and investment policies which resulted in little indigenous capital formation.¹³⁵ All the leading sectors of the economy were in West European hands: 80-90 per cent of the metallurgical industry; the mining and the farm implements industry were in similar straits.¹³⁶ O. I. Luhova did a head-count of capitalists in those regions of Ukraine where one would have expected to find some Ukrainian capitalists – Kiev and Kharkiv provinces, for example – and came up with six (all in Kiev province) who between them employed 316 workers.¹³⁷ The closest one can get to a definition of 'capitalist' in the 1897 census is the category referring to people deriving their income from capital or real estate. There were 111 626 individuals in this group, of whom 29 per cent were Ukrainians. The overwhelming majority of the total number of people in this group derived their income from property (estates) rather than factories or enterprises. This is evidenced by the fact that two-thirds of those in the above category inhabited the right and

left-bank provinces where there were few factories to speak of.¹³⁸ There was of course a small (mostly Russian) capitalist class, the most significant sectors of which participated in Western European ventures in Ukraine as minority share-holders.¹³⁹ This group constituted the regional wing of the all-Russian bourgeoisie. They complained about the fact that central fiscal and tariff policies were hurting the growth of south Russian industries.¹⁴⁰ Mykola Stasiuk, having demonstrated that national oppression in Ukraine was both 'territorial' and 'national-cultural', wondered if this may not lead to the mutual support of both currents, but quickly concluded that this was impossible.¹⁴¹ The bourgeoisie in Ukraine as in Russia was timid and conservative, politically impotent and incapable of independent action. The Russian bourgeoisie's contribution to the national question was to struggle against the slogan 'national self-determination'. The south Russian bourgeoisie's contribution was to constitute itself as the more intelligent wing of Russian reaction. The weakness and the national composition of the capitalists in Ukraine meant that the national movement could count on the material support only of the occasional Ukrainian 'bourgeois who rose from the ranks of the people'.¹⁴²

Many peoples in Eastern and Western Europe attained nationhood without having their own national big bourgeoisie. None, however, made it without a petty-bourgeoisie. This is the conclusion of Miroslav Hroch's study of the institutional development in a variety of national movements. Merchants and craftsmen, he concluded, are 'the most important bearers of the nationalism of a fully developed nation . . . and a potential source for its ruling class'.¹⁴³ In our discussion of the city we have described the ruin of the indigenous merchant and trading classes. The 1897 census paid eloquent tribute to the results of that process. Nowhere were Ukrainians more weakly represented than in occupations involving trade and commerce: only 13 per cent were Ukrainian.¹⁴⁴ To analyse the weight of Ukrainians among artisans is much more difficult, since the 1897 census does not distinguish between self-supporting artisans and workers. In general, however, artisan production was extremely weak in Ukraine when compared to Russia.¹⁴⁵ Evidence suggests that, except for the left bank, the majority of artisans in Ukraine were non-Ukrainian.¹⁴⁶ In the left bank this petty bourgeoisie was small, but finding itself in a highly competitive environment – squeezed by Jewish artisans on the one hand and Russian factory and *kustar'* production on the other – it gravitated towards the national movement, forming, as in other

countries of Eastern Europe, the chauvinist wing.¹⁴⁷ Though the agrarian petty-bourgeoisie played a significant role in the national movement, the weakness of the non-agrarian sector was a factor of primary importance in accounting for the inordinate difficulties the Ukrainians had in crossing the threshold into nationhood.

The leadership of the Ukrainian national movement went by default to that amorphous group, the intelligentsia. The Ukrainian intelligentsia marked its political debut with the founding of the Brotherhood of Cyril and Methodius. From the 1840s on, it was the 'numerically small Ukrainian democratic intelligentsia' who took over from the gentry the role of incubator of national-political traditions.¹⁴⁸ Not that in social terms there was a qualitative break between the two groups. The ranks of the first intelligentsia were filled by the sons of the small gentry who, finding no outlet in agriculture and commerce, sought admission into the civil service as petty officials and clerks, junior officers or educators. Every modest step taken in tsarist Russia in the direction of modernity increased the size of the indigenous intelligentsia. The emancipation of the peasantry which hastened its differentiation provided an additional stimulus for the growth of Ukrainian intelligentsia cadres. The richer peasants, like their gentry predecessors, began in the 1870s to push their sons to acquire some education and 'in this way, unconsciously, carried out the national task [of] training the national-cultural leadership of the people'.¹⁴⁹ I. Chopiv'skyi remarked in 1918 that 'to find a Ukrainian who was a second generation *intelligent* was rare. Most had just emerged from the village'.¹⁵⁰

The preponderance of impoverished peasants in the social structure of the Ukrainian people and an educational system which was elitist and Russian-speaking meant that the Ukrainian intelligentsia represented a tiny layer of the population. The 1917 Kiev city census, for example, revealed that 11 per cent of the student population of the city gave Ukrainian as their nationality.¹⁵¹ There were only 27 000 students attending 19 institutions of higher learning and another 7600 enrolled in 61 specialised secondary establishments in 1914 in Ukraine.¹⁵² That in itself was a vast improvement over what had existed in the preceding decades. In the 1897 census there were only 24 000 individuals with some form of higher education and 17 000 with specialised secondary training.¹⁵³ The weakness of the Ukrainian intelligentsia is amply demonstrated by the census data giving their share of those occupations which commonly serve as the activist core of a national movement. Only 16 per cent of lawyers,

less than a quarter of teachers, 10 per cent of writers and artists, belonged to the Ukrainian nationality in 1897. Of the 127 000 people enumerated in the census as having occupations involving mental labour, less than a third were Ukrainian. It was only among those holding positions in *zemstvo* and other local institutions (as clerks, secretaries and the like) that Ukrainians emerged as a majority (57 per cent).¹⁵⁴

There were two other structural aspects of the Ukrainian intelligentsia which weakened their influence in society. The first, as many contemporaries observed, was that Ukrainians were virtually absent from the upper echelons of the intelligentsia, and were to be found mostly among the so-called 'third element', that is, the rural intelligentsia and para-professionals.¹⁵⁵ In 1897, three-quarters of the Ukrainians engaged in occupations involving mental labour were located in rural areas. Secondly, the intelligentsia was disproportionately concentrated in the left bank. For example, the left bank claimed 45 per cent of Ukrainians employed in central and local state institutions, and over 40 per cent of teachers. These facts largely accounted for the important regional differences when it came to the national movement's influence.

The intelligentsia was a social category; those who were educated. Not easily fitted into the Procrustean bed of an estate society, they were the *déclassés*. But above all they represented a critical attitude. In a country with mass illiteracy and ignorance, the several thousand members of the intelligentsia were in a very real sense the 'intelligence' of the people.¹⁵⁶ Of course, not all the members of the intelligentsia were *revoltées*; many were quite satisfied with their lot and, indeed, when compared to the misery around them they had much to be smug about. By no means all identified with the national idea. One need not search far for an explanation of this much dwelled-upon phenomenon. Everything that stood a step above the village – from the government office to schools and factories – in effect all the various manifestations of modern life in the country, were powerful agents of Russification. For the educated too, Russian culture had lustre, while the struggling Ukrainian culture smacked of provincialism. Many with a proclivity to oppositional activity joined Russian organisations which operated in Ukraine, splitting the ranks of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. Moreover in a society where secure employment was scarce, and where police persecuted Ukrainian activists, there were powerful material incentives to remain inactive. The very social origins of the intelligentsia were a drawback. Hroch

makes the point in relationship to the Czech movement that the village intelligentsia, insecure and bewildered, joined that movement only when it had acquired a certain prestige.¹⁵⁷ All these factors induced inertia and indifference among large sectors of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to the national task at hand. The Ukrainian intelligentsia, railed the press of the period, do not donate money to build a Shevchenko monument, they do not subscribe to Ukrainian periodicals, the fate of Ukrainian schools does not interest them, and the litany went on and on.¹⁵⁸ But what was really remarkable in all of this was not so much that the intelligentsia was Russified and less than eager to throw themselves into the uncertain terrain of Ukrainian activity as much as that so many of them did.

It was in the towns that the future intelligentsia activists were formed, but not out of long-standing urban residents. Most who had grown up in the city were permeated by Russian culture and rarely found their way into Ukrainian movement. Their confrontation with the Ukrainian reality was through the occasional book, and, less frequently, the Ukrainian theatre – all of which had a certain curiosity value and little more. But for the young *intelligent* from the village, his confrontation with the Russian town was a wrenching experience. The Russian environment brutally reminded him of the fact that he was different, of peasant origin. The first reaction to this new reality was to blend in with the crowd – to shed as quickly as possible all the outward signs of the village. The internal transformation took a different route. City air allowed thought to flow more freely and broadly. At this point the *intelligent* either lost himself completely in Russian culture or, as often happened, he sought to understand the gnawing questions raised by his ethnic origins. It was on him that the Ukrainian book and the Ukrainian theatre had such profound impact. If in the village the book and theatre were considered almost forms of condescension, in the town they became a ‘source of knowledge and genuine spiritual delight’.¹⁵⁹ It was, paradoxically, through the mechanisms of assimilation that the Ukrainian intelligentsia arrived at a national consciousness.

In this process of conscientisation, the small circle of urban patriarchs of Ukrainian culture had an inordinate influence on the *intelligent* from the village, and through him on village society itself. O. Shums’kyi describes the almost imperceptible, hushed chain of communication which linked the ‘quiet chambers of Kiev professors, doctors, *chinovniki*, lawyers, writers and plain petty gentry’ with the village, mediated by the rural *intelligent* who visited their chambers.

Returning to the village the *intelligent* organised amateur cultural circles. These in turn influenced the better-off peasantry, who secured funds from cooperatives they controlled to pay for further Ukrainian activities.¹⁶⁰ If the Kiev professors gave the Ukrainian movement some status in the eyes of the village intelligentsia, the latter in turn planted the seed of national consciousness in the village. Find a nationally conscious peasant, wrote Chykalenko, and there you see the work of ‘the teacher’ or ‘medic’.¹⁶¹

The nascent Ukrainian intelligentsia also had material reasons for wanting to see their own national institutions. Ukrainian schools, newspapers and a Ukrainised civil service would mean jobs, and would change the rules of the competitive environment in their favour. As the intelligentsia became exposed to modern ideas, expectations raced ahead of material reality itself. They wanted schools, universities, newspapers, factories, parliaments, but they were unable to copy the West in too liberal a sense, for this would have entailed repeating all the painfully slow stages of growth. To achieve their aims they had to mobilise the forces at their disposal — the people, for people was all that they had. ‘The new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history.’¹⁶²

The backwardness of their people placed the Ukrainian intelligentsia in a dilemma described by Ivan Franko in the Galician setting, but applicable to tsarist Ukraine as well:

Young people frequently and vehemently argued the problem: what should we do in our national bad times, and what should we start from? Some said: “Education, book!” But others answered: “But our people are poor and hungry, who wants a book when he wants to eat, even a wise head raves when the body is faint”. The first would retort: “Hungry and poor because uneducated, because they cannot stand up for themselves or get their due and anyone who wants can take advantage of them and oppress them.” Still others reversed this answer: “Uneducated because unable to pay for an education, taken advantage of, because he is helpless in his poverty”.¹⁶³

Socialism promised to circumvent this seemingly inexorable vicious circle. The Russian intelligentsia came to this conclusion as well, though there was little agreement on what kind of socialism it was to be. But at least their socialism had a touch-base in reality – the working class. In Ukraine, the nationally conscious intelligentsia

could extend its 'invitation' to the peasantry. This was not much even when compared to the Russian intelligentsia in Ukraine which could orient towards the proletariat. The Russian intelligentsia in Ukraine jealously guarded their privileged contact with the working class and opposed any introduction of the national factor into the industrial milieu. A socialism without a working class, working-class parties without workers, this made for political confusion, and gave rise to divisions within the nationally conscious Ukrainian intelligentsia. In the decades before the revolution, part of the intelligentsia turned to the peasantry, the other continued to search for a social base larger than themselves without ever really finding one.

THE WORKING CLASS

If in the past peasant revolutions in Russia did not succeed, it was because there were no major urban classes interested in supporting the peasants' settlement of scores with feudalism. In the Russian revolution the working class, with its own accounts to take care of in the factories, provided the decisive lever. The coincidence of the two movements was responsible for the success of that revolution. In Ukraine, by contrast, the two revolutions, the urban and the rural, had difficulty in finding common ground, and the revolution in that country proved to be a complex affair during which everything was tried at least once.

It was not that the working class in Ukraine had no history of activity. Paradoxically, Ukraine could boast an impressive series of 'firsts' in Russian labour history; the first strike where political slogans were raised (1872), the first working-class organisation (1875), the first revolutionary procession (1901), the first general strike (1903); and even the first Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was called at the insistence of the Kiev League of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class. While the working-class movement in Ukraine had proved its mettle in organising in defence of its class interests, politically it never defined its role in terms of Ukraine. The proletariat avoided assuming its responsibility for the Ukrainian revolution. The root of the problem was not so much a matter of bad faith or wrong ideas, as in the social weight, location and national composition of that class.

We owe to Lenin a succinct summary of Ukraine's economic profile: 'As a country Ukraine remains at the level of a natural

economy. It has become for Russia, what Ireland was for England: exploited to the extreme, receiving nothing in return.¹⁶⁴ Using data supplied by Lenin, the Ukrainian Bolshevik H. Petrovs'kyi in his 1913 Duma speech showed that the tsarist state's tax receipts in Ukraine over a nine-year period were 50 per cent greater than the state's expenditures in that country.¹⁶⁵ Moreover, capital investment was concentrated in central Russian lands while Ukraine was starved for its share. According to N. Iasnopol'skii, in 1891–2 Ukraine received 6 per cent of European Russia's capital investment when its population represented 25 per cent.¹⁶⁶ Lenin, in his study of capitalism in Russia, showed that in 1890 Ukraine accounted for only 8 per cent of European Russia's workers employed in enterprises whose product exceeded 2000 rubles.¹⁶⁷

In the second half of the 1890s, and especially in the decades preceding the revolution, huge strides were taken in the industrial development of Ukraine. This growth, however, centred largely in the coal-metallurgical industry in the Donbass and surrounding region. In 1912, for example, half the total industrial labour force of Ukraine was employed in that industrial enclave.¹⁶⁸ It was foreign capital, attracted by fantastic profits and hardly concerned with the 'centralistic great-power ambitions of Russian capitalism,'¹⁶⁹ that opened up the region. Large enterprises with the latest Western machinery employing thousands of workers rose up on the Arcadian steppe. But one must avoid the pitfalls of Soviet-type panegyrics about the 'stormy' development of the Donbass. On an otherwise bleak industrial map, Donbass was indeed impressive. But when compared to its potential, its growth was insignificant.

According to geological surveys carried out in the late 1860s, Donbass coal reserves were 19.5 milliard tonnes. This was sufficient to maintain British levels of coal production for two centuries.¹⁷⁰ Donbass had the world's largest reserves of metallurgical coals (anthracite and semi-anthracite). But the geological surveys were hopelessly inadequate: larger reserves were to be found deeper in the ground. D. I. Mendeleev, the famous chemist who was also an ardent Russian economic nationalist, raved at the madness of tsarist policies which instead of building canals and railways to link southern coal deposits with northern industries, instead of locating industry close to the source of energy supply, preferred to spend tens of millions of rubles importing British and German coal through Baltic ports. Indeed, in 1889 Donbass produced as much coal as was imported from abroad, and the practice of fuelling Moscow and Petersburg

industries on imported coal continued right up until the revolution. Mendeleev argued (1892) that 'the Donets' region' with its coal reserves as an economic base could become 'the new England with all kinds of industries being founded there,' and unlike England it would not have to import wheat.¹⁷¹ As things worked out, the Donets' basin never evolved beyond the extraction and elementary processing of raw materials, and even that was in its rudimentary stage of development. The same story could be recounted for the Ukrainian iron-ore and metallurgical industries. Ukraine's rate of participation in the 'industrial life of Russia is weak,' wrote P. Stebnyts'kyi in 1918. 'Its economic strengths are concentrated primarily in the harvesting and processing of food products.'¹⁷²

The working class of Ukraine reflected the country's economic predicament. To begin with, it was a small working class. Non-agricultural labourers supposedly numbered 425 413 in 1897 or 16 per cent of the total for European Russia. (It should be borne in mind that Ukraine's share of the population of the same geographical entity was 25 per cent.) Of course the figure 425 413 is not completely reliable. The gathering of labour statistics was still in its infancy in Europe, and in tsarist Russia errors due to dubious methodologies were amplified by the problems of counting a working class whose umbilical cord to the village economy had not yet been severed. The number, based on a re-working of the 1897 census results under N.A. Troinitskii's direction is, however, indicative of the proportion of the population that resembled a European working class. In the light of that study the working class represented 7 per cent of the employed population of Ukraine. Almost half the working class was concentrated in the steppe provinces where the might of the proletariat – the 65 000 industrial workers in mining and metallurgy – was located.¹⁷³ As Ukraine entered the twentieth century the working class grew, 'although this growth did not have a very intensive character'.¹⁷⁴ In European Russia, workers per thousand inhabitants increased from 15 to 20 between 1860 and 1900. In Ukraine the increase was from 12 to 13.¹⁷⁵ A 1913 study (taken when the sugar industry was operating at its height) revealed 642 308 workers, 45 per cent of whom were concentrated in the mining and metallurgical industry, that is, in the steppe.¹⁷⁶

The working class in the steppe reflected the very uneven development of Ukraine. European capital created factories in its own image. Enterprises in Katerynoslav province were relatively modern, and, utilising much greater horse power per worker than industries in

Russia, employed very large work forces. In 1902, for example, 69 per cent of all workers in Ukraine labouring in factories with over 1000 employees were in that province.¹⁷⁷ The highest paid workers in the Russian Empire (excluding Finland) were to be found in Katerynoslav province. Wages in the right and left bank (except for the city of Kharkiv) were among the lowest in the Empire.¹⁷⁸ This does not mean that the standard of living and especially the work environment of the Katerynoslav proletariat were anything but miserable by European standards. But misery is a relative concept. The peasant who found his way for several months of the year into the sugar refineries of Kiev also had to put up with poor ventilation, long hours and much abuse, but his material reward paled in comparison with the wages of the Donbass proletariat.¹⁷⁹ Moreover, unlike the Donbass worker, he was ineffective when it came to defending his rights. In labour history it has always been the case that the most highly paid sectors of the working class are also the best organised and the most capable of pursuing collective action. A *Hromada* correspondent observed this in 1879: 'Certainly the most suitable element for propaganda and agitation appeared to be factory people. Firstly, because they have the most free time and the most common sense, and also because it is easiest to get to know them as opposed to other workers. Besides, they are for the most part literate people.'¹⁸⁰

Capitalism, as we have argued, had not developed to the extent in Ukraine that it had mobilised large numbers of people for entry into the industrial environment. Census migration data give us some idea of how much of industry's labour needs were met by Russian labour. According to M. Porsh's analysis of those data, 42 per cent of 425 413 workers enumerated in the census were born beyond the borders of Ukraine. Two-thirds of these migrants settled in the industrial environment of the steppe and, more specifically, they gravitated to the large enterprises.¹⁸¹ In 1892, to give a concrete example, 80 per cent of the labour force in the mines and factories of one of Ukraine's burgeoning industrial towns, Iuzivka, had arrived from the Moscow area.¹⁸² Evidence suggests that the rate of the Ukrainians' industrial immigration showed a slight tendency to improve as the economy grew and as mechanised agriculture made them increasingly superfluous as an agricultural labour force. In 1871, 14 per cent of the Donbass miners originated from Ukrainian provinces; by 1900, 25 per cent. During the First World War Russian immigration substantially subsided and almost half the new recruits into the mines were Ukrainian.¹⁸³ But all of this did not occur in time or on a large

enough scale to alter the national composition of the working class. The revolution came too soon for the Ukrainian proletariat.

Unfortunately it is impossible to calculate the national composition of the working class. (Troinitskii's study did not cover the mother-tongue variable). What we have are data for economically self-supporting individuals earning an income as something other than self-supporting farmers. This includes both artisans and white-collar workers. Over a million and a half people were counted under that category, of whom 44 per cent were Ukrainians.¹⁸⁴ According to F.E. Los', a contemporary Soviet scholar, 39 per cent of the working class was Ukrainian.¹⁸⁵ In the industrial heartland of Ukraine, Katerynoslav province, Ukrainians represented a quarter of those employed in the mines, and a third of those in metallurgy. In the largest factory of the country, the Oleksandrivs'kyi metallurgical plant, the national (ethnic not linguistic) composition of workers was two-thirds Russian, one-third Ukrainian.¹⁸⁶

Other evidence points to the fact that Ukrainians never really developed deep roots in the urban industrial environment. Unlike the steppe, where the majority of workers, even according to official statistics, laboured in towns (and as we have noted there was much undeclared urbanisation in that region), 15 per cent of workers in the left bank and 24 per cent in the right bank were located in towns. Since 80 per cent of Ukrainians employed outside of agriculture were located in the latter two regions, they were deprived of the richer mobilising atmosphere that cities had to offer.¹⁸⁷ Finally, Ukraine was characterised by an unusually high proportion of its factory proletariat classified as temporary workers. Studies of this work force in Donbass revealed that almost all were Ukrainian.¹⁸⁸ Thus the number, structure and location of Ukrainian workers made it very difficult for them to be organised as a coherent force.

Denied a place among the urban petty-bourgeoisie and intelligentsia, the Ukrainian movement could not find a place for itself among the working class. The proletariat of the large urban factories was Russian. This was a working class very suited for political and trade union activity. For the small number of Ukrainians who found themselves among the ranks of industrial workers, 'elementary cultural development . . . required for the most part acceptance of Russian culture'.¹⁸⁹ By and large, Ukrainian workers were organised by Russian trade unions and parties. There was a small nationally conscious sector of the working class that appeared on the scene late in the history of tsarism. Its importance was not always understood

TABLE 1.5 *Representation of Ukrainians in occupations, 1897 (in per cent)**

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>Total</i>
1. State administration, courts, police, liberal professions & other intellectual work, income from capital or exchequer	30.8	69.2	100
2. Armed forces	30.5	69.5	100
3. Trade and commerce	13.1	86.9	100
4. Industry, manufacturing, construction and transportation	37.2	62.8	100
5. Day labourers and servants	52.1	47.9	100
6. Agriculture	85.2	14.8	100
7. Other	57.5	42.5	100

* Does not include dependents

SOURCE *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXI in Vols 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48.

by the national movement. Under-development bred not only a lop-sided social structure, it also distorted intellectual development and political thought. As early as 1875, S. Podolyn's'kyi suggested an organisational division of labour with Ukrainians orienting to the village and leaving the working class to 'Russian radicals'.¹⁹⁰ A few individuals tried to change this. Lev Iurkevych, for example, campaigned for a Ukrainian workers' newspaper. The request of 'several hundred' Katerynoslav workers which initiated his efforts met with indifference from the Ukrainian intelligentsia; moreover, the problem of material resources could not be surmounted.¹⁹¹ Prior to the founding of *Robitnycha hazeta* in 1917, there was no workers' newspaper published by the Ukrainian movement. The workers' movement on the other hand published no Ukrainian language newspaper. What existed were two solitudes.

CONCLUSION

The revolution did not wait to present problems by stages, first the national-democratic, then the social. All the contradictions which for

centuries had accumulated under tsarism came to the surface simultaneously. Yet history had not provided Ukrainians with the wherewithal to tackle them. The cry of every General Secretary of the Central Rada, 'For God's sake, we need people!' highlighted the dilemma of the Ukrainian movement during the revolution.¹⁹²

The ability of a people to rise to the stature of nationhood is uneven, and that unevenness lies essentially in the underlying social structures of the various nations. Data on Ukrainians' representation in the occupational structure of Ukraine graphically bears out this point (see Table 1.5). Perhaps if some of the mobilised minorities, Jews in particular, had come to the side of the Ukrainian movement, playing the same role in Ukraine as they did in the 'Young Germany' movement in the 1820s, the situation would have been different. This did not occur, and Ukrainians were thrown on their own resources.¹⁹³ The events of the revolution would have tested the strength of the most developed nation, while the Ukrainian nation was in the spring-time of its development. How could this nation build a state, resolve a complex agrarian question, establish new relationships in industry and commerce, found newspapers and universities, organise an army and fight on three fronts, when it had yet to open an elementary school in its native language? That Ukrainians did not succeed in their first attempt in modern times to control their society was hardly surprising under the circumstances. The truly remarkable fact was that so much was accomplished. Hundreds of thousands of people were drawn into the struggle for national self-assertion. Ukraine would never be the same again.

2 Ukrainian Society in the 1920s

POPULATION

The creation of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (the words were reversed in the 1930s) was a concession to the national movement and diplomatic protocol. Leaving aside for the moment what this meant in terms of real political sovereignty, the fact remains that the Ukrainian people obtained a territorial-administrative framework on which to build their national identity. The republic itself was 12.5 per cent smaller in size than the nine provinces defined as Ukraine in our preceding chapter.¹ In August 1925 the old provinces were replaced by forty-four departments (*okruhy*) which in turn were re-grouped (for planning purposes) into six major economic geographical regions. To ensure that the language and cultural rights of all national minorities were respected, 'national minority districts' (of varying sizes, 1000 in all), as well as a Moldavian Autonomous Republic, were established on Ukrainian soil. Russians in Ukraine had national minority status.

It is estimated that during the First World War and the civil war, much of which were fought on Ukrainian soil, one and a half million of Ukraine's people died.² Ukraine's population had not recovered when famine struck in 1921 (and lasted until the end of 1922). Approximately one million lives were claimed by this event, which in its general outlines proved to be a dress rehearsal for a more ominous famine a decade later.³ Harsh food requisition quotas, rather than drought, was the primary cause of the famine. In an August 1922 speech, Kh. Rakovsky said, 'to the great distress of the Ukrainian provinces which experienced famine, they were not officially declared famine zones until March 1921 and they did not receive international assistance.'⁴ From another source we find that Soviet authorities withheld the proclamation of famine zones in Ukraine until they had collected *prodnalog* — tax in kind. When it became apparent that

not a kilogram more could be gathered, famine zones in Ukraine were announced.⁵ Rakovsky in the same speech reported that despite the catastrophic harvest and the famine, Ukraine delivered to Russia 349 thousand tonnes of grain out of the 492 thousand tonnes promised. S. V. Minaiev estimated that had it not been for the First World War, the civil war and the famine, Ukraine's population would have been 34 million by 1926.⁶ At the time of the 1926 general population census the country had 29 million people.⁷

During the revolution, many assimilated Ukrainians rediscovered their ethnicity. 'The more one studies the various sources,' wrote A. Khomenko, 'the more one is convinced that the change in the national consciousness of Ukrainians had a major influence on the indicators [of nationality] in the 1926 census [results].'⁸ By 1926, 80 per cent of Ukraine's population gave Ukrainian as their nationality, and 9.2 per cent gave Russian. What had not altered, however, was the geographical distribution of Ukraine's nationalities. Russians continued to be concentrated in the industrial south and south-east, posing a major problem in the efforts to Ukrainise the regions (see Table 2.1).

THE TOWN

Every offensive and counter-offensive during the 1917–20 revolution plunged Ukraine's economy deeper and deeper into ruin until there was little left of it. By 1921 industrial production was one-tenth the pre-war (1912) figure. The country's heavy industry had for all intents and purposes ceased to exist. In 1923, metallurgy was producing only 3 per cent of the value of pre-war production.⁹ The collapse of agriculture and the break in exchange relationships with towns added an acute food shortage. By 1920 Ukraine's cities counted 4.2 million inhabitants, one and a half million less than the 1914 figure of 5.6 million.¹⁰ Towns could barely support those that remained in them. Hunger, chronic shortages of fuel and water, rampant inflation and very low wages were the common predicament of the urban population.

The introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP) saved the cities from complete collapse. Now that peasants had incentive to produce, they ensured urban food supply. Light industry began to rebuild itself to satiate the goods famine of the domestic market. Although heavy industry remained in crisis for years to come, by

TABLE 2.1 National composition of Ukraine by region, 1926

Region	Total population	Ukrainians % of total population	Russians % of total population	Jews % of total population	Others % of total population
<i>Polissia^a</i>	2 957 881	80.9	190 332	146 691	228 068
<i>Right Bank</i>	8 997 757	86.0	230 189	682 812	342 811
<i>Left Bank</i>	7 066 909	87.8	605 768	197 425	58 880
<i>Steppe</i>	5 568 233	66.1	798 073	394 179	701 895
<i>Dnipro</i>	2 391 155	82.9	213 653	112 568	81 531
<i>Mining</i>	2 036 252	60.0	639 151	40 716	134 585
<i>Ukraine</i>	29 018 187	80.0	2 677 166	1 574 391	1 547 770

^a Not included in the total population are 1560 individuals from Polissia whose census sheets were lost.

SOURCE *Perepis' 1926*, Table VI in Vols 11, 12, 13.

1924–5, as a result of a large-scale mobilisation of resources, it began to recoup lost production in earnest. By 1926, Ukrainian industry as a whole was producing 95 per cent of the value of pre-war production, and in 1927 it crossed the threshold of real economic growth when for the first time since the revolution investment not only recovered the costs of amortisation, but expanded production as well.¹¹ The impact of this reconstruction process can be seen from the fact that from 4.2 million inhabitants in 1920, cities grew to 5.3 million by 1926 and reached the pre-war total of 5.6 million by 1928.¹²

During the 1920s cities were recouping their population losses; there was little real growth. In evaluating urban population growth it must be borne in mind that Ukrainian cities had a natural rate of increase of population considerably higher than that of their Western European counterparts. Immigration played a major role in urban population growth only in the Mining (Donbass) and Dnipro (Katerynoslav) regions, and a significant role in the case of administrative centres. The vast majority of towns, however, experienced little real growth between 1923 and 1926, and in fact, many decreased in population.¹³ According to Khomenko, between 1923 and 1926, the towns absorbed approximately 200,000 migrants on an annual basis.¹⁴ This was indicative of the severe limitations of Ukrainian cities to attract large fresh contingents from the countryside.

The repopulation of Ukrainian cities during the 1920s did not affect the sharp regional disparities which characterised the republic's urban networks in the past. In fact, the urbanisation process during the 1920s accentuated the inequalities. The weight of urban residents in the total population of Polissia and the right and left banks remained virtually static in that period. Towns in these regions, as we argue in our discussion of the working class, were the victims of the role assigned Ukraine in the all-Union economic division of labour. In the case of the steppe (in the 1926 meaning of the term namely, southern Ukraine excluding the Dnipropetrovs'k-Donbass industrial region), the rate of urbanisation declined. The collapse of cereal trade with the West was the death knell of cities such as Odessa, whose population in 1926 was almost a quarter less than what it had been in 1904. Urban growth was largely concentrated in the Mining (Donbass) region (see Table 2.2).

In view of the absence of opportunities for large-scale urban immigration and the stagnation of towns in regions of high concentration of the Ukrainian population, it was impossible to expect the age-old process which had given Ukraine Russian or Russified towns

TABLE 2.2 *Changes in the rate of urbanisation of Ukraine according to region, 1897–1928^a (in %)*

Region	1897	1926	1928
<i>Polissia</i>	16.4	14.5	14.6
<i>Right Bank</i>	14.9	16.1	16.4
<i>Left Bank</i>	13.1	15.8	15.8
<i>Steppe</i>	22.5	19.1	19.6
<i>Dnipro</i>	15.3	19.4	20.0
<i>Mining</i>	21.1	41.8	44.0
<i>Ukraine</i>	16.4	18.5	19.0

^a Within the 1926 boundaries of Ukraine.

SOURCES *Suchasna statystyka naseleattia Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1929), Table 2, p. 23, Table 8, p. 29; *Perepis' 1926*, Vol. 11, Table 1; *Ukraina. Statystychnyi shchorichnyk 1929* (Kharkiv, 1929), Table 2, p. 20.

to be undone in less than a decade. When the 1926 general population census was taken it recorded Ukrainians, with 11 per cent of their total number inhabiting towns, as the least urbanised national group. By contrast, 50 per cent of Russians and 77 per cent of Jews lived in cities.¹⁵ Ukrainians remained a minority of the urban population (see Table 2.3). This situation limited the success of the Ukrainisation campaign. However, when the 1926 census returns are compared with those of 1920, it is evident that Ukrainians registered a marked improvement in their representation in that short period of time since in 1920 they formed 33.2 per cent of the urban population and in 1926, 47.2 per cent.¹⁶ Moreover, they were gaining not only in small towns, but in the larger cities as well (see Table 2.4). The 1920s was a time of relatively slow economic and urban growth when compared with the late nineteenth century. Ukrainians did not participate in large numbers in the urbanisation process in the latter period. Why, during the 1920s, as contemporaries observed, was 'the urbanisation of Ukrainians occurring rapidly'?¹⁷

Part of the increase in the number of Ukrainians in the towns during the 1920s was a consequence of a change in national self-awareness. There were two aspects to this process. The first was the re-absorption into a Ukrainian identity of assimilated Ukrainians. The second was that Russification, if not halted, was certainly reduced to a minimum. This meant that assimilation did not offset whatever gains Ukrainians made by urban immigration.

TABLE 2.3 National composition of Ukraine's urban population by region, 1926

Region	Total urban population	Ukrainians (%)	Russians (%)	Jews (%)	Others (%)
<i>Polissia</i>	428 982	226 601	66 112	117 686	18 583
<i>Right Bank</i>	1 450 094	709 390	176 789	487 039	76 876
<i>Left Bank</i>	1 117 242	678 175	217 101	187 869	34 097
<i>Steppe</i>	1 061 573	349 180	350 877	294 559	66 957
<i>Dnipro</i>	464 017	228 839	116 544	92 656	25 978
<i>Mining</i>	851 645	344 314	416 266	38 806	52 259
<i>Ukraine</i>	5 373 553	2 536 499	1 343 689	1 218 615	274 750

SOURCE *Perepis' 1926*, Table VI, in Vols 11, 12, 13.

TABLE 2.4 Changes in the national composition of Ukraine's urban population according to size of town, 1897-1926
(within 1926 boundaries, in %)

	100 000 +		50 000-100 000			20 000-50 000			under 20 000			
	1897	1923	1926	1897	1923	1926	1897	1923	1926	1897	1923	1926
Ukrainians	15.9	22.7	33.5	26.2	32.0	44.1	41.4	39.7	55.9	56.5	53.4	69.4
Russians	53.4	39.0	33.3	27.6	32.5	20.1	23.8	26.6	15.8	13.9	20.0	8.7
Jews	21.6	32.0	27.2	40.0	30.5	30.6	29.5	28.7	24.1	26.6	20.0	19.3
Others	9.1	6.3	6.0	6.2	5.0	5.2	5.3	5.0	4.2	3.0	6.6	2.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

SOURCES 'Naselennia v mistakh Ukrainy za danyy vsesoiuznoho mis'koho perepysu 15 bereznia 1923 roku,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, II, no. 77 (1925) Table 6, pp. 106-7.

Suchasna statystyka naselennia Ukrainy (Kharkiv, 1929), Table 2, p. 24.

A strengthening of Ukrainian national self-awareness was a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for the Ukrainisation of cities. Fresh contingents from the countryside were needed to alter the national physiognomy of the cities. In the past, because Ukrainians did not have the necessary social and economic skills, their surplus rural population migrated beyond the Urals or sought work on the estates of the steppe as an alternative to urban immigration. This situation, we argued, was the product of the nature of the agrarian relations that existed in Ukraine. New conditions in the countryside after 1917 led Ukrainians to consider a third option – settlement in the towns.

Only acute land hunger could force the Ukrainian peasantry to make the thousand-mile trek to Siberia in search of land. Land redistribution during the revolution which gave rise to the middle peasant as the norm in the Ukrainian countryside put an end to migration beyond the Urals.¹⁸ In 1924–6 for example, 20 000 people from Ukraine migrated every year, whereas the annual average for the 1910–14 period was 165 276.¹⁹ Despite the state's efforts to revive resettlement, the peasantry refused to budge.²⁰

The abolition of estates ended the demand for agricultural labour. 'Unemployment in the village,' wrote L. Kaganovich, 'is colossal.'²¹ The land-use law introduced following NEP abolished land purchase and restricted land rental, thus preventing the emergence on a large scale of alternatives for supplementary employment in the farming sector. Yet the average Ukrainian peasant, the middle peasant, was in dire need of cash. He had obtained land, but the severe shortage of draught animals and of agricultural implements (aggravated by the devastation during the civil war) prevented him from making effective use of his newly acquired fields. The fact that the rural population was increasing rapidly made the need for additional income all the more urgent.²² Passport regulations restricting freedom of movement were gone. Under the market conditions of NEP, the peasant, as an independent producer, was faced with the choice of either becoming more efficient or moving into new branches of the economy.

The breaking of a peasant's bond with his land has always been a difficult process. This was particularly true in Ukraine, whose peasantry 'knew nothing apart from farming'.²³ The new agrarian conditions forced the Ukrainian peasantry to learn. The goods famine aided the process. Brought on by the disorganisation of the economy during the civil war and the 'scissors crisis' (low agricultural

prices and expensive industrial goods) it stimulated the rapid development of artisan production in the Ukrainian village.²⁴ New skills were being acquired. Since artisan production was still insufficient to satisfy the peasants' need for cash, seasonal work in industry being reconstructed in the towns became widespread. Light industry, especially that connected with processing, experienced the fastest growth and facilitated the peasants' search for additional sources of income.²⁵ Peasants clung to their land, but whenever possible either the male head or someone in the family entered at least partially into the industrial milieu. In the mid-1920s in the Kozel' district of the left-bank, for example, 85 per cent of rural households had a member of their family in industrial employ for at least half the year.²⁶

'Only for a horse, or that cow, just to live a little better . . . Only for a little of that money – and then quickly, back to the village, to the wife, to parents, to wide cheerful open spaces, to the fields and woods.' This is how Borys Antonenko-Davydovych described the thoughts of peasants who were reluctantly trudging off to the mines in Donbass.²⁷ These were sentiments peasants around the world expressed on the road to their proletarianisation. In time, the Ukrainian peasant too would find that he could not live in both worlds. With wages in industry much higher than agrarian incomes and carrying the added advantage of social security and a shorter working day, there was little doubt as to which world the majority of peasants would eventually choose.²⁸ 'We can note a very marked migration from the Ukrainian village to the Ukrainian town,' was a common judgement made during the 1920s.²⁹

Jobs in industry were not the only urban employment available to Ukrainians. The state apparatus was a major employer and despite all efforts to limit its growth, the number of white-collar staff kept growing. In the old tsarist apparatus there were relatively few Ukrainians. The situation after 1923, however, markedly shifted the structure of opportunities in bureaucratic employment in Ukrainians' favour. Firstly, Ukrainisation, at a time of high white-collar unemployment offered unheard-of possibilities for Ukrainian speakers in the course of the implementation of the Ukrainisation of office routine. Secondly, the administrative reform which abolished the old provinces and located the new regional centres much closer to the village offered new possibilities for the geographical and occupational social mobility of the Ukrainian rural intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. The impact of new job opportunities in the growing administrative sector on Ukrainians is well illustrated by data on

migrants to the city of Kiev in 1923–6, when Ukrainians increased their weight in the city's population from 27 to 42 per cent. White-collar staff accounted for 41 per cent of all Ukrainians entering the city for the first time and over half of all incoming white-collar staff were Ukrainian.³⁰

But perhaps the most important new element in increasing Ukrainian urban immigration was the dramatic rise in the expectations of village youth. They had been most affected by the mobilisations during the revolution and the promise of the new ideology of progress. The letter from an Uman' peasant in 1922 expressing amazement of the extent of 'enthusiasm and eagerness' of rural youth for education and better jobs was characteristic of attitudes throughout the republic's countryside.³¹ The Ukrainising educational system also opened new horizons for them. Like Stefan Radchenko, the hero of V. Pidmohyl'nyi's novel *Misto* (The City), village youth wondered, 'Can it be that the village is eternally fated to be a dull and visionless slave . . . ? Probably like Radchenko they had been guerrillas in 1919 and had once carried 'the flag of the autumn steppe and sky' (the yellow and blue national Ukrainian standard). In thousands they came 'to conquer the city.'³²

The fact that the economy was still experiencing difficulties and that the demand for labour inputs was modest, put limits on the size of urban immigration from the countryside. The social dynamic of the 1920s, however, had swung in favour of urban settlement by Ukrainians and it was simply a matter of time before that group emerged as a majority in the city. The 1926 census data on migration showed that almost 60 per cent of urban immigrants had been born in Ukraine.³³ Since the census registered those who had migrated before the revolution as well as those who did so after, it is possible that figures isolating urban immigration only for the 1920s would show a higher percentage for those born in Ukraine. For example, a study of migration into the cities of Odessa, Kiev and Dnipropetrovs'k found that three out of four new residents in the third quarter of 1927 were from Ukraine and of these 77 per cent were from the countryside.³⁴ According to a State Planning Commission (Gosplan) report, influx from the Ukrainian countryside was the motor force of urban growth in 1924–6.³⁵

Migratory trends during the 1920s had not yet time to ensure the Ukrainisation of the republic's cities. In small towns, to be sure, observers commented as early as 1923 how Russian was less and less spoken on the streets, but the Ukrainian countryside had just begun

its march on the large cities.³⁶ The rural areas as always spoke Ukrainian. In the towns, however, as a result of the legacy of linguistic assimilation under tsarism, only three out of four Ukrainians gave Ukrainian as their mother-tongue (1926). Since Ukrainians were a minority of the urban population, the Ukrainian language was used only by a third of urban dwellers.³⁷ Analysing mother tongue retention among urban Ukrainians according to age-groups, however, a 'rebirth' of the language could be observed among youth. In Odessa, the most Russified of Ukraine's large cities, for example, 51 per cent of males aged 35–64 gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue in 1926; in the 20–24 age group the figure was 73 per cent.³⁸

The Ukrainisation of the people of the republic's cities was facilitated by policies aimed at Ukrainising the town's physical appearance. Summarising the state's intentions in this respect V. Zaton's'kyi said, 'We will not forcibly Ukrainise the Russian proletariat in Ukraine, but we will ensure that the Ukrainian . . . when he goes to the city will not be Russified . . . and yes, we will repaint the signs in towns.'³⁹ Signs were changed from Russian to Ukrainian (though the lack of urban Ukrainian cultural traditions meant cities could not agree on what the proper Ukrainian word for restaurant, barber shop or hotel should be). Street names were Ukrainised in form and content since, despite several years of 'Soviet power', main streets still bore the names of 'Peter the Great' and of other luminaries of the Russian imperial past.⁴⁰ Though 'Soviet gentfolk' protested at this capitulation to moujik culture, the Ukrainian communities of the cities were pleased to see that finally cities in the republic were acknowledging the fact of their location on Ukrainian soil.⁴¹ Ukrainians could now recognise something of their own in the city; signs and posters, Ukrainian theatres, concerts, schools and institutions where their language was spoken and even urban Ukrainised churches.

THE VILLAGE

The extent of the self-organisation of village society in 1917 took even seasoned political observers by surprise. By the end of that year, the Ukrainian Peasants' Union (*Selians'ka spilka*) had branches in the villages of most provinces and a membership which ran into millions.⁴² The *Spilka's* newspaper, *Narodnia volia*, had reached an astonishing circulation of 200 000 by May 1917. Scores of new cooperatives were founded. The development of these infrastruc-

tures of national life in turn permitted the national idea to penetrate the masses. The speed with which this happened was to be measured not in months, but in weeks and days. In peasant conferences and meetings the outlines of a national consensus were emerging: land to the peasants, a Ukrainisation of the army, schools and administration, self-government for Ukraine in a loose federation with Russia.⁴³ When the Ukrainian peasant masses gave Ukrainian parties an impressive victory in the Russian Constituent Assembly elections (two months after the October revolution) there could be no doubt that the national movement had secured a popular base.⁴⁴ What is remarkable is that this was achieved in a nation whose unfettered development was all of nine months old.

The rise of national consciousness in the countryside occurred not because the human mind is malleable, but because it is conservative. The masses had always spoken the 'simple language' and sung 'the simple songs'.⁴⁵ Only during the revolution, these age-old facts of their existence became politicised. The rural intelligentsia took the lead in this process. But in and of themselves, they would not have been able to accomplish this enormous task had they not been reinforced by tens of thousands of fresh cadres which the war and the army supplied.

Hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainian peasants – the most dynamic element in the countryside – were placed in uniform where they learnt the effectiveness of organisation. While serving the tsar they also experienced in a thousand different ways (from the taunts and insults of reactionary Russian officers to encounters with nationalistic Poles) the social contrast which is the yeast of national self-awareness. There too they met the heart and soul of the Ukrainian national movement, the village teachers, thousands of whom had been drafted as subalterns, and who became instrumental in transforming the young peasant recruits' new experiences and awareness into a national ideology. In 1917 the national movement as a mass phenomenon began in the barracks, often in urban garrisons, with discussions, concerts, clubs and congresses. The movement developed to such an extent that the 2500 delegates attending the Second Ukrainian Military Congress in Kiev (July 1917) held mandates from over a million and a half troops.⁴⁶

When the soldiers returned (or deserted) home, they greatly expanded the organisational forces of the Ukrainian movement in the village. Soldiers had an immense authority in the eyes of the peasant masses. They had toppled the tsar and they would ensure that the

moujik received his fair share of land. 'Nobody in the village,' wrote V. Vynnychenko, 'was trusted as much, had as much authority as the . . . plain, simple rank-and-file soldier.'⁴⁷

The 'rebirth of the nation' in 1917, or more correctly its birth, can only be understood if it is viewed as the handiwork of millions, led by thousands of nameless individuals who came forward to constitute the natural leadership of the movement at its base. The exuberant and inexperienced youth gathered in the three small rooms of the Pedagogical Museum in Kiev with 'no officials, no clerks, not even a janitor' – the Central Rada – only mirrored the larger drama.⁴⁸ Of course, a major weakness of the national movement lay precisely in the fact that its hands and feet were disproportionately larger than its head. In an economically underdeveloped country whose social structure was dominated by millions of small independent producers, strong central authority was needed for anything to be accomplished. Capable leadership, massive resources, control of the city, as well as time and peace were needed to consolidate the gains. Bolshevik armies invaded Ukraine just as the nation-building process had begun in earnest. But what had transpired in the village during 1917 had sufficiently transformed the countryside to ensure that it would generate difficulties for those who opposed its will in the years to come. If before the revolution most commentators agreed that the peasantry had a weak sense of national identity, after the revolution this evaluation changed. Speaking of the Ukrainian peasantry in 1923, Trotsky noted, 'National ideology for the peasantry . . . is an explosive force of immense proportions.'⁴⁹

The national awakening of the Ukrainian peasantry was tied to the agrarian question. It could not have been otherwise. If the peasantry supported *en masse* the idea of Ukrainian autonomy in 1917, which they understood to mean full equality with Russia, it was because experience had taught them not to trust any agrarian reforms originating from the north.⁵⁰ They were convinced that only a Ukrainian government, 'run by "our people" . . . who know what 'our people' in Ukraine need' would give them the agrarian order they desired.⁵¹ When the peasantry cornered members of the Central Rada and 'pounded' them with the demand to 'take power' immediately, this was an expression of their socio-economic realism.⁵² In the spring of 1917 seizures of land had already begun.⁵³ Peasants needed a guarantee that their title to this land and, more importantly, to all future land that they would take would be backed up by the power of the state, a state from which they could expect a sympathetic hearing. It

is not surprising that peasants were in the forefront of criticism of the Central Rada for its lack of resolve in obtaining autonomy from the Provisional Government. Delegates to the First All-Ukrainian Peasants' Congress (10–15 June 1917) could not understand why the Rada 'requested' autonomy and did not 'demand it'. Many felt that the negotiations should stop and Ukraine be proclaimed independent. In the words of a soldier-peasant representing Cherkasy, 'The moment is great and our children and grandchildren will not forgive us if we waste this opportunity. There is no need to kneel before anybody: let us take what belongs to us!'⁵⁴

When the national leadership could have taken power with the force of the people behind it, it did not. The fact that for months on end the Rada was locked in inconclusive negotiations with Kerensky cost the Rada as much by way of peasant support as its hesitancy on the agrarian front. From the peasants' point of view, both were part of the same problem.

In matters concerning land distribution, the Rada tail-ended the peasant movement. Until its Third Universal (general proclamation) of 20 November 1917 it urged peasants to await the resolution of the agrarian question by the Russian Constituent Assembly.⁵⁵ In short, it asked the peasants to have faith in the same central all-Russian institutions which they had grown to suspect. When the Third Universal abolished the private ownership of land by 'non-toiling' elements, the peasantry, organised into local committees (*hromady*), had already seized control of almost a third of all non-peasant lands.⁵⁶ As troops returned from the front to claim their share of the estates, the agrarian movement intensified. But the move towards a more radical solution of the agrarian question did not mean an abandonment of a national platform by the peasantry. Throughout the entire revolutionary era (1917–20) not a single significant political formation or movement based on the peasantry dropped its national demands.⁵⁷ The Rada's agrarian programme and its indecisiveness in organising a national government weakened the national movement, not because the peasantry turned against the national idea, but rather because it accelerated the natural tendency of village society where capitalism had not developed to retreat into its own shell and rely on its own resources.⁵⁸ Unable to count on 'their' state, each Ukrainian village transformed itself into an isolated fortress.⁵⁹ This isolation was perfectly compatible with the newly acquired national consciousness: both tended to produce an acute xenophobia.⁶⁰

Mass movements develop so long as the swing of the movement

does not run into objective obstacles. When it does, there begins a reaction, a fragmentation and retreat. The path of the national movement after 1917 was strewn with many such obstacles. Whatever suspicions the peasantry had of the ineffectiveness of Ukrainian national governments to protect and guarantee their interests were greatly reinforced by their experiences of the Pavlo Skoropads'kyi regime. After the peasants under the leadership of the Directory toppled that regime, the Directory's failure to formulate an adequate agrarian programme cost it much support. But this is only part of the story. Agrarian programmes have an impact on peasants only when they see that there is an agency of some substance to back them up. With Ukrainian political parties in disarray and armies invading on all sides, it is not surprising that the peasantry, unable to see a clear goal which could only be posited by some kind of regular, centralised hierarchy of control, chose to wait out events in their villages. When threatened, these villages would combine to fight their opponents according to the guerrilla methods of their forefathers. Having defeated their enemies, they would return to their homes.⁶¹ 'Even under the most favourable conditions the peasant is unable to convert his overwhelming quantity into a political quality,' observed Trotsky.⁶² What this method of peasant struggle indicated was that Ukrainian society, without a town, resources or foreign assistance, simply did not have the wherewithal to support any other kind of resistance.⁶³

In this fashion the village resisted until 1920, and even later. The village began to emerge from its shell on a significant scale only after 1923, when it was more or less safe to do so. In the language of the Soviet newspapers of the time this phenomenon was called 'the unbelievably brisk tempo of the growth of village activism'.⁶⁴ Kaganovich in 1925 warned that this 'activism' was 'turning away from us,' and only accelerated Ukrainisation could channel this movement from below into the desired direction.⁶⁵ To understand why this 'activism' would 'turn away' from the Bolsheviks, it is necessary to outline the history of the peasantry's encounters with the Bolshevik regime prior to NEP.

To begin with, Bolshevik influence on the Ukrainian peasantry during 1917 was virtually non-existent. The publication of Lenin's *Decree on Land* did not alter this.⁶⁶ The little support the Bolsheviks enjoyed in the village soon evaporated when the Red Army installed the first Soviet government of Ukraine (December 1917–April 1918). From the very start the overriding concern of the Bolsheviks was to secure grain for the hungry Russian cities and armies, without having

any goods to offer in return. Armed detachments were sent to forage the countryside. Preoccupied with this form of plunder, the Bolsheviks had neither the inclination nor the manpower to establish local Soviet organs of power outside the main industrial centres. The only form of local rule the peasantry encountered was the 'bayonet' of the all-powerful commissars who had arrived from Russia with the army, and who, according to V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, were often 'unworthy drunkards and stupid ruffians.'⁶⁷ All of this would have been more tolerable in the eyes of the Ukrainian peasantry had it been tempered with energetic measures aimed at redistributing land. The opposite occurred. During the period of the Rada the peasantry had seized many estates. The first Soviet regime however, opposed the parcelling of estates on the grounds that this lowered production and made the requisitioning of grain more difficult. Consequently, where they could enforce their writ, peasants had to return sequestered real estate and movable property to Bolshevik-appointed land committees. These bodies then either 'sold' the returned property back to the peasants, or allocated them in smaller proportions. At the same time, wherever possible state farms and agricultural 'artels' were established. To enlarge peasant holdings, Bolsheviks turned to expropriating surplus land from the richer peasantry. These policies turned the richer peasantry into implacable enemies of the Soviet government. The practice of restricting the redistribution of estates and especially of reselling them to the peasantry turned the village poor against the Bolsheviks. Collective farms were abhorred by all sectors of the countryside.⁶⁸

The second Soviet government of Ukraine (November 1918–June 1919) merely amplified the mistakes of the first and failed to assimilate anything of the experience with the peasantry in Russia. When Committees of Poor Peasants (*kombedy*) in Russia were being dissolved because practice has shown they were driving the middle peasantry into opposition, in Ukraine these committees (*komnezamy* in Ukrainian) were developed.⁶⁹ In Ukraine, few genuinely poor peasants were to be found in the *komnezamy*. They were composed largely of 'Lumpenproletariat' elements from the city, charged with performing police functions in a fashion reminiscent of the commissars of the previous period.⁷⁰ While in Russia the wave of enthusiasm for collective farms waned because Bolsheviks discovered this was provoking peasant uprisings, in Ukraine, where the traditions of individual peasant ownership were much stronger, the thrust of the government's land-use regulations was to keep 'almost all' of the

estates as state farms.⁷¹ Those who suffered most from this policy were poor and landless peasants, since this greatly diminished the amount of land available for redistribution. State farms were so poorly managed that most of the land in their possession lay fallow. Poor peasants fought the regime for these fields.⁷² Moreover, private trade in foodstuffs was abolished and in February 1919 all grain (above a minimal consumption quota) was seized by armed detachments without pay. With every month, peasant uprisings increased.⁷³ Later, Bolshevik leaders would admit that the village poor formed the majority of those taking part in these rebellions.⁷⁴

Since the regime was one of occupation, there was little question of offering concessions to the socio-economic and political interests of the peasantry. Concessions would have made it difficult to expropriate the countryside with impunity. But at the same time their absence meant that every kilogram of grain extracted entailed hard struggle with an enraged peasantry. From a purely economic point of view, the whole enterprise was catastrophic. According to A. Shlikhter, with the magnificent harvest of 1919, Ukraine ought to have been able to deliver 820 thousand tonnes of grain. Because of peasant resistance, only 139 thousand were requisitioned with each kilogram 'coloured with drops of workers' blood.'⁷⁵ Of the total obtained, only 33 thousand tonnes were sent to Russia. To appreciate what a paltry sum that was, it should be pointed out that in 1919 a single district (*uezd*) of Tula province delivered 38 thousand tonnes of grain to the state.⁷⁶ A single train load of textile goods would have generated more grain for Russia than the entire requisition campaign.⁷⁷

The third Soviet government of Ukraine (December 1919) began its existence under strict orders from the Russian leadership to distribute estates to the peasantry and with the warning that 'severe punishment' would be meted out to party members coercing the peasants into joining collective farms.⁷⁸ Granting the peasantry the land they had fought and longed for since 1917 appears as the positive side of the Bolshevik agrarian programme only by comparison with their other policies for the countryside, which were much worse. The peasantry obtained some twelve million hectares of land. However, the manner in which the land was distributed generated much peasant discontent.⁷⁹ The process was not organised under the democratic control of the peasant masses, but rested entirely in the hands of notorious local *komnezamy* chiefs: bribes, nepotism and other forms of corruption were common practices. In the summer of 1925 it was revealed that *komnezamy* members profited from their unlimited

power in the villages during this period to obtain the choicest land for themselves and their families.⁸⁰ But the main source of peasant opposition was the requisition policy known as *prodrazverstka* which entailed a state monopoly of trade, with most agricultural commodities to be delivered by individual households to the state according to norms established by the local *komnezamy*.⁸¹ *Komnezamy* members in turn became tax farmers keeping 10–25 per cent of all collected foodstuffs for their personal consumption.⁸² Mass peasant uprisings broke out in Ukraine during 1920. As a result, instead of the expected 2624 thousand tonnes of grain, only 159 thousand were extracted by the state.⁸³ The breach between the peasantry and the regime continued to widen. ‘For peasants,’ said D. Manuil’s’kyi in 1920, ‘we have remained a new caste which desires to govern and exploit [them], as [they] used to be exploited by the privileged classes.’⁸⁴ During the Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) (March 1920) many voices demanded an immediate change in agricultural procurement policies, advocating NEP a year before it was introduced.⁸⁵ But powerless to change policies without permission from the Russian leadership, the party in Ukraine watched the disaster in the countryside continue until March 1921 when Lenin, at the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), proclaimed NEP.⁸⁶

NEP did not restore peace to the Ukrainian countryside. It is true that peasants could now sell their surplus on the free market, but because of *prodnalog* (tax in kind) most households had little to spare. *Prodnalog* was a complex tax consisting of thirteen types of payments so onerous as to consume almost half the peasants’ harvest.⁸⁷ ‘Revolutionary tribunals’ were established throughout the countryside to dispense summary justice to peasants who did not pay.⁸⁸ As with most aspects of Bolshevik agrarian policies, *prodnalog* fell heaviest on the poor peasantry, since the tax was regressive. The richer, more socially skilled peasantry found ingenious ways of circumventing the tax, the most common of which was the establishment of tax-exempt ‘model state farms’ or agricultural ‘artels’. They would relinquish only part of their fields for this purpose but gain control of land held by the state. They used the produce for their personal consumption.⁸⁹ The poor viewed collective farms with the utmost hostility, as yet another attempt to cheat them out of land and their harvest.⁹⁰ *Prodnalog* was collected with such zeal that, as was pointed out earlier, it contributed to the outbreak of the famine of 1921. Throughout Ukraine peasant hostility increased, with ‘banditry’

becoming widespread and every harvest season marked by uprisings.⁹¹ M. Frunze, who as head of the military in Ukraine had the task of suppressing peasant unrest, vehemently opposed any further grain requisitions. The troops, he argued, could no longer be relied upon to pacify the countryside.⁹² The village complained that although it was heavily taxed, it was given nothing in return: schools were in ruin, roads in disrepair.⁹³ The press countered with the argument that *prodnalog* was needed 'to feed the Red Army and the cities.'⁹⁴ For the peasantry, this translated into feeding their Russian masters. A newspaper reporting from a village in 1922 wrote: 'There are no newspapers, and finding a book is like looking for a needle in the haystack, but every conceivable counter-revolutionary rumour or fabrication is widespread.' The rumour in question was that Symon Petliura was returning to Ukraine to throw out the Bolsheviks and the hope was expressed that 'the Soviet regime will not last the year'.⁹⁵ The fact that this sentiment was expressed by poor peasants, the group which might have been considered most likely to support the Bolshevik regime, is indicative of the deep antagonism that had developed between the Bolsheviks and the village.

The raising of the national consciousness of the peasantry, which began in 1917, was completed by the peasants' experience of the various Soviet regimes, foreign intervention as well as Denikin's occupation of Ukraine. Having obtained arms from demoralised White and Red Army troops during Denikin's occupation of Ukraine in 1919, the village was capable of offering resistance to the third Soviet government. Soviet policies, even the third time around, boxed all of village society into a corner out of which some form of resistance seemed the only solution. Even extraordinary measures, such as Rakovsky's draconian command of 12 September 1920 ordering the 'complete annihilation' of villages (voluntarily or involuntarily) supplying guerillas, did not end the turmoil.⁹⁶ The national-cultural policies of the regime (discussed below) guaranteed that the rural intelligentsia would seize all opportunities to oppose the Bolsheviks. Bolshevik agrarian policies ensured that the intelligentsia would find many supporters among the peasantry rich and poor: between 1920 and 1921 poor peasants formed a very sizeable proportion of partisan detachments.⁹⁷ Whatever break had developed between the rural intelligentsia and the rank-and-file peasantry during the preceding years was healed in the process. The third Bolshevik government confronted a village characterised by a high degree of internal solidarity.⁹⁸ In the course of the resistance – truly remarkable in its

breadth and scope⁹⁹ – the national movement gained adherents in regions where it had been traditionally weak. From late 1919 on, peasant resistance in the south and south-east corner of Ukraine became pronouncedly ‘chauvinist’ in character, writes the Soviet historian O. O. Kucher.¹⁰⁰ This was the situation in 1923 when the Bolsheviks announced a ‘detente’ with the countryside.

For the Bolsheviks in Ukraine, control of the village seemed to be an insurmountable problem. Unable to win the village from within, they attempted to control it from above, destroying in the process more than they could create. All of the expressions of progress in rural areas – from cooperatives to *Prosvita* societies – were ordered to be shut in 1920.¹⁰¹ They resurfaced in 1922 as pale shadows of their former selves under the control of *komnezamy*. Similarly, the rural intelligentsia (agronomists, veterinarians, medical assistants, teachers and cooperative activists) was as a group suspected of ‘Petliurism’ and its activities curtailed.¹⁰² This policy was carried one step further and applied to the peasantry itself. In 1920 it was decided that the focal point of Soviet rule in the countryside would not be the Soviets (*rady*) but the *komnezamy*, because the party had the power to control the latter but not the former. The peasant masses were disenfranchised.¹⁰³ The economic price of this disorganisation of the village was considerable. But it did preserve political control.

E. H. Carr could not have been further from the truth when he asserted that the *komnezamy* in Ukraine survived ‘long after they had become a memory elsewhere in the Soviet Union’ because of the acute differentiation of the peasantry in Ukraine. Nor for that matter did the *komnezamy* ‘keep alive the traditions of class struggle,’ unless of course, one gives an entirely new meaning to the term.¹⁰⁴ The longevity of the *komnezamy* was rooted in the weakness of the Soviet regime in the countryside. Unable to police the village themselves, the party recruited people to serve as their local agents by offering a wide and enticing range of privileges.¹⁰⁵ The result was the emergence of the ‘*komnezamy* as a caste organisation’.¹⁰⁶ ‘People join the *komnezamy* simply to obtain privileges. *Komnezamy* avoid communist work like the devil avoids incense,’ wrote a peasant.¹⁰⁷ Another summarised the work of this organisation as follows:

Swindling and drunkenness were held in high esteem. An exceptional level of productivity of *samohon* [home-brew] was maintained . . . The *komnezam* destroyed the village, it disorganised the school, the cooperative, the reading house, everywhere its

work had catastrophic results . . . Our local theatre premises, the former house of the landlord, was divided up among *komnezam* members . . . The head of the *komnezam* was 'elected' without a general meeting. The *komnezam* is packed with the sons and daughters of petty speculators.¹⁰⁸

Butsenko observed that the organisation of 'poor peasants' was detested by the village poor.¹⁰⁹ One official was so incensed by the political and economic damage the organisation had done in his district that he insisted '*komnezamy* have to be dispersed and their administration burnt to the ground'.¹¹⁰ As for the membership of the group, Petrovs'kyi wrote in 1923 that the reason why two-thirds of the delegates to the organisation's third congress did not speak Ukrainian, and fewer could read it, was because most *komnezam* members were not peasants 'in the usual meaning of the term': most had lived and worked in cities.¹¹¹

The village was left to cope as best it could while officialdom 'simply folded its arms in the face of the economic and cultural tasks'.¹¹² The succession of economic crises between 1921 and 1923 dictated that something had to be done to raise agricultural productivity. The lack of economic incentive had forced the village to exist at the level of a natural economy. Agricultural stagnation was hampering the recovery of industry. In the spring of 1923 new measures were taken to raise peasant production. *Prodna-log* was abolished, a single tax was introduced, taxes were lightened and peasants were encouraged to enrich themselves.¹¹³ It was not merely a question of giving peasants an incentive to produce according to their age-old methods. Their productivity had to be raised. Inspired by Lenin's article 'On Cooperation', the party in Ukraine now saw the cooperative movement and education as the way to improve the living standards of the masses.¹¹⁴ What was purely an economic task in Russia had a decisive national dimension in Ukraine. The new mood of 'cooperation' implied coming to terms with the forces of the national movement in the countryside and, above all, the rural intelligentsia and the former cooperative movement activists. The party organ in Uman' went even one step further. It argued that since experience had shown the party simply could not lead cultural-economic work in the village, it should relinquish its claims on this front to the rural intelligentsia and its satellite forces.¹¹⁵ It was clear the party needed the national forces in the village for its programme of

economic recovery, but it did not necessarily want their national ideology. Try though it did, it could not have the one without the other.

The post-1923 period saw the rapid reconstitution of national forces in the countryside. Cooperatives, resurrected as one of the main pillars of NEP, played a leading role in this respect. Cooperatives in Ukraine had a distinctive feature not to be found in Russia, 'the principal one being that the Ukrainian cooperative has a strong national character,' according to a 1922 report. The Ukrainian cooperative leader, it was written, 'will organise the wide mass of peasants around the cooperative in order to turn them against Soviet power at a later date'.¹¹⁶ But having no alternative, the party let the cooperatives do their work in developing the economy. By the second half of the 1920s cooperatives had managed to organise three-quarters of the peasantry.¹¹⁷ Their contribution to the economic well-being of the republic was considerable. As a force strengthening the national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses the cooperatives equalled the school. It was not just a question of their wide-ranging cultural work.¹¹⁸ As one of the few institutions in the country whose leadership was almost entirely in Ukrainian hands, they were in the forefront of voicing the village's complaints before state and party officialdom which reinforced their prestige in the eyes of peasantry. As a force promoting the self organisation of peasants, they raised the peasant's self-confidence as a group.

The rehabilitation of the rural intelligentsia was the other important factor in the consolidation of the villages' national forces. The rural intelligentsia seized the opportunities made available to them. The institutions which came under their control – the village school, the reading-rooms, literacy courses, veterinary and agricultural stations – all became outposts for the articulation of a national ideology. The party was very much concerned that the 'increased political activity of the intelligentsia – an undeniable fact – does not lead to an alliance [which] will threaten us with a new peasant party'.¹¹⁹ To prevent this from happening, the material conditions of the rural intelligentsia were improved and they were given more responsibility, in the hope that this would bind them closer to the regime.¹²⁰ The result was not what the party had hoped.

The ideological influence of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the majority of whom have nationalist deviations, on the toiling masses and in particular on the peasantry is more and more widespread.

The sharp break of the wide mass of the peasantry and of a certain layer of the proletariat from our party leadership is now an imminent danger unless the party follows the path indicated by the decisions of the Twelfth [CPSU] Congress on the national question.¹²¹

The rural intelligentsia, this seemingly awesome group, represented a mere 0.3 per cent of the population in the countryside.¹²² This tiny group could influence millions because the concrete experiences of the latter had confirmed in practice what the intelligentsia affirmed in theory.

When draconian measures in dealing with the village were replaced by market relationships, and the village was allowed to breathe and express itself more freely, the party press now saw the rise of a new '*kul'turnist*' (culturedness) instead of peasant 'banditism'. The Ukrainisation of the rural apparatus, the rise in educational opportunities, the expansion of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church, the enfranchisement of the peasantry through the development of local Soviets in 1924, when *komnezamy* were played down, were some of the factors which contributed to the 'unbelievable tempo in the growth of the political maturity and activity of the village'.¹²³

In this situation party officialdom found that it was 'easier to march against an armed force' than to 'face the village'.¹²⁴ A peasant from the Donets'k region offered what was a common opinion about the average party worker in the village, 'They bring him from the city, like a cat in the bag, and let him loose, and he will stay for about five months and then run away carrying off with him to the city either five cows or a pocketful of money.'¹²⁵ The Dymivka affair revealed that in Ukraine, rural party cells were guilty of corruption and abuse of power.¹²⁶ A commission sent to investigate these organisations found widespread drunkenness, rape and brawling as the common norms of party members' behaviour, all of which was combined with an ethereal infatuation with 'high politics'. The kinds of questions which made up 70 per cent of the party discussions were: "the tactics of French socialists", "the role of the individual in history." Rural organisations, it turned out, were totally unfamiliar with economic questions and policies in general, and their local application in particular. Nonsensical resolutions filled entire books. The following were offered by the commission as examples of the party's 'political illiteracy': "On the national question – to learn it by heart", "On Shevchenko – to carry out his commandments!"¹²⁷ It was observed that 'the non-party activists in the village had a higher cultural level

than the average communist in the countryside'.¹²⁸ Here the legacy of the Ukrainian revolution played an enormous role. 'In every village in our district,' wrote a correspondent,

we have a politically developed and active leadership comprised of peasants who have lived through much, and who during the war and revolution spent some time in various lands, heard and read much, and now read newspapers. These leading elements make observations, criticise and put us in our place.¹²⁹

The crisis in authority experienced by the party in this period formed the backdrop to the decision to open its doors to those whom it had kept out. Thus the national current within the party was reinforced.

There was a growing impatience reflected in the renewed activism of the village. Demand for books, newspapers and schools seemed to increase exponentially. A Ukrainisation of the central apparatus was demanded so that 'our time isn't wasted when dealing with officials'.¹³⁰ Central offices received many complaints about the fact that peasants were angry with state and party officials for using the gentry's vocabulary in addressing peasants as 'moujik', 'yokel' or '*khokhol*', the latter being a pejorative Russian term for 'Ukrainian'.¹³¹ When a troupe of Russian performers came to one village and spoke about the glories of the 'Russian Empire' they found that they had lost their audience.¹³² The village wanted medical facilities and agronomists. It was, in short, demanding the right of entry into the twentieth century. Peasants were not convinced by the party's argument that socio-cultural development could not proceed as quickly in the village as in the town because of the lack of funds.¹³³ In the city people 'live well,' wrote a peasant from Podillia, 'they smoke cigarettes and visit theatres, wear boots. But the entire burden falls on the peasantry. And they stuff the *smychka* under our noses.'¹³⁴ (*Smychka* refers to the alliance between workers and peasants.) Lebed', the Ukrainophobe Central Committee secretary (until 1925), called these peasant demands 'expressions of their petty-bourgeois nature'.¹³⁵ These grievances which combined with the new *kul'turnist* produced 'a national chauvinism that has eaten its way deep into the peasant masses,' wrote Petrov's'kyi in 1924.¹³⁶ But as a peasant delegate to the second session of the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee (VTsVK) explained, 'Give us equality of opportunity and then there won't be any chauvinism in Ukraine.'¹³⁷ The peasantry was merely giving notice that they were no longer content with being the pack animals of history.

Peasant activism expressed itself with considerable force on economic questions with demands for more credit, better state support for the development of cooperatives and more investment in agriculture. The Soviet regime had certainly inherited a formidable legacy of economic backwardness. The basic problem in Ukraine was the existence of many small uneconomical households lacking farm implements and livestock and which could not develop the intensive forms of production needed to raise their incomes.¹³⁸ During NEP the social differentiation which this produced occurred not so much through changes in the size of land holdings, but rather those who had economically viable farms increased their wealth through the purchase of livestock and the marketing of grain.¹³⁹ What this pointed to was the absence of energetic measures to improve the infrastructure in the countryside. The marketing of grain was a case in point. The higher grain prices, a subject of so much discussion during the 1920s, brought little benefit to the majority of peasants since most of the profits went to middle-men (Nepmen) who were reselling the grain bought from the peasantry at two to four times the initial purchase price. The peasantry saw a 'new bourgeoisie being born' at their expense and wondered why the state failed to give more energetic support to the development of cooperatives.¹⁴⁰ When peasants demanded backing for cooperatives, this was not, as Carr asserts, the voice of the kulak speaking.¹⁴¹ In 1927, 53 per cent of the members of agricultural cooperatives were poor peasants, 41.5 per cent middle peasants and a mere 2.4 per cent were kulaks.¹⁴² The government, of course, claimed inadequate resources as the reason why it did not come to the aid of the countryside. But as Odynets', a Ukrainian government official, pointed out at the second session of the VTsVK, the problem was that Ukraine did not have its own budget and the sum of money it received for agricultural purposes was inadequate.¹⁴³ As of 1 March 1925, Ukraine, with over 5 million rural households, had seen 50 million rubles lent to peasants, over half of which was raised by cooperatives.¹⁴⁴ Ukraine's budget, allocated by Moscow, hardly paid attention to agriculture. The 1926-7 budget, for example, assigned 18 million out of a total of 245 million rubles for agricultural development. Expenditures on administration, by contrast, consumed 52 million rubles, almost three times that given agriculture. Yet, agriculture provided 91 per cent of all tax revenues.¹⁴⁵ For the Ukrainian peasantry the argument of 'lack of funds' was hardly convincing, since they were taxed more heavily than their Russian counterparts: taxes in Russia were lower for

households with less livestock, but in Ukraine this was not taken into account; in Russia taxes were based on the actual harvest in any given region, but in Ukraine taxes were levied on the basis of estimated yields, which generally erred on the side of optimism.¹⁴⁶ By 1924 the Ukrainian peasantry was delivering almost 16.5 million tonnes of grain (91 per cent of the 1916 figure).¹⁴⁷ With necessary infrastructures, a profitable export trade could have developed, which in turn would have facilitated the development of industry.¹⁴⁸ Because of inadequate grain handling facilities and other infrastructures, the state was 'killing the goose that laid the golden eggs'.

For the poorest element in the countryside, some form of collective effort was clearly needed, since as individual producers they did not have the wherewithal to increase substantially their output. The poor peasantry had identified which of the several possible forms of collective enterprise it preferred. By far the most popular, because it combined socialised and private activity, was the form of cooperation known as TSOZ (*Tovarystvo po suspil' nomu obrobittku zemli* – Association for the Common Cultivation of Land).¹⁴⁹ Absence of credit facilities and party dogma which favoured communes or artels (with full or almost total socialisation of production), prevented the TSOZy from growing as fast as they could have. Not having supported initiatives which came from peasants themselves, the regime in 1928 decided to organise a major push for the establishment of communes violating the basic proprietary instincts of peasants. Since communes did not offer the promise of superior agricultural techniques and did not have the advantage of the old entrepreneurial stimulus, peasants merely looked at these initiatives as yet another hare-brained scheme of urban origin.

The economic dilemma of the Ukrainian village cannot be abstracted from broader political questions. Pavlo Khrystiuk, anticipating the arguments of latter-day economic reformers, argued in his analysis of NEP that without 'freedom of socio-political life for the toiling masses' the economic development of the country would be blocked.¹⁵⁰ Had attention been paid to many of the suggestions offered by the peasants themselves, the problems experienced during the fateful harvest of 1927–8 would not have existed.¹⁵¹ It was not the peasants' fault that grain purchases that year were dominated by private merchants because cooperatives had not developed, or that existing goods were poorly distributed, with mountains of unsold stocks to be found in some regions, and none to be offered in exchange for grain in others.¹⁵² Faced with grain procurement

difficulties, the state decided to force the peasantry to sell its grain at prices fixed well below the market value. According to M. Maksudov, the state could have bought the necessary grain at market value and avoided the use of force by allocating an additional 67 million rubles for that purpose.¹⁵³ An analysis of grain procurement problems written in early 1929 showed that chaos in the state's financial organs was responsible for most of the difficulties – kulaks were not even mentioned once in the analysis.¹⁵⁴ As things worked out, however, the Ukrainian peasantry was forced to pay a high price for a problem it had no hand in creating.

The economic improvements which took place in the village during the 1920s were the product of the unlocking of the creative energies of village society under NEP. With appropriate policies, the improvements could have been much greater.¹⁵⁵ The 1920s also demonstrated that the peasantry, having begun its self-emancipation on the economic front, would not be content until its cultural and political institutions were subjected to the same process. The mobilisation of village society and its rise in expectations also meant that whenever opportunities for social mobility presented themselves, they would be seized. It was out of the human material shaped by the Ukrainian village that new working class was being forged. To this aspect of Ukrainian society we now turn.

THE WORKING CLASS

It was with great difficulty that Ukrainian political parties challenged the monopoly enjoyed by Russian political groups in their access to the working class. However, where Ukrainian workers solved the problem of lack of propaganda materials and a shortage of 'educated and politically experienced workers' the national movement made progress.¹⁵⁶ Outside the Donbass-Dnipro region, 'a sizeable portion of the proletariat in large and small towns and in the provinces, followed the yellow and blue flag of Ukrainian nationalism'.¹⁵⁷ Towards the end of 1917, the national movement was beginning to gain a foothold in the industrial heartland. In Luhans'k (Voroshylvhrad), for example, a 'Ukrainian workers' club' was formed.¹⁵⁸ In that proletarian bastion, complained the Bolshevik K. E. Voroshilov, there were bitter disputes with Ukrainians who were set on Ukrainising the city, recognising only the Central Rada, and viewing Bolsheviks as 'a foreign element'.¹⁵⁹ A mass meeting of workers in a

Dnipropetrovs'k metallurgical plant, to give another example, voted 'All Power to the Central Rada'.¹⁶⁰ Most workers in the southern regions of Ukraine first heard of Ukrainian political parties during the mass campaign around the elections to the Constituent Assembly.¹⁶¹ If the majority of workers in those regions remained indifferent to the national-cultural demands of the Ukrainian people, it was not because there was something inherent in workers which made them resistant to these claims. Rather, as L. Chykalenko found in his discussions with pro-Bolshevik workers in Mykolaiv, nobody had confronted the proletariat with these issues.¹⁶² The revolution did just that.

The non-Ukrainian sectors of the working class were by no means a homogenous entity. Workers with longer records of employment, those with some skill, the better educated, the factory proletariat (especially in the large foreign firms where, unlike in Russia, collective bargaining was practised), and finally the artisans, were largely Menshevik in orientation.¹⁶³ Mazepa maintains that this sector of the working class was also the most politically conscious and expressed the greatest hostility to the 'nanny' services of the Bolshevik intelligentsia.¹⁶⁴ The workers we have described were the backbone of the trade union movement in Ukraine. The younger, less literate, unskilled workers, generally of peasant stock, who had recently arrived from Russia to work in the mines, were the group which furnished the bulk of the Bolsheviks' recruits.¹⁶⁵ These structural divisions within the working class played a very significant role in forming its orientation towards the national movement. Menshevik workers, the most rooted in Ukrainian soil, were at the same time the most inclined to reach an agreement with the national movement. Throughout 1917 they formed a 'loyal opposition' to the Central Rada.¹⁶⁶ Here, however, one should add that many Bolshevik workers were also inclined to some form of accommodation with the Ukrainian movement: the war with the Rada was not their doing.

The first Bolshevik regime in Ukraine received 'far less' support than its counterpart in Russia had received from workers there.¹⁶⁷ For many workers in Ukraine, their experiences with the first Soviet government proved to be negative. In Dnipropetrovs'k and Kharkiv, for example, Russian workers were shocked by the wave of terror unleashed by the Red Army against the Bolsheviks' political opponents.¹⁶⁸ When the Bolshevik government began to organise a massive evacuation of equipment and machinery, many workers resisted this removal of their means of livelihood.¹⁶⁹ It was against

the backdrop of these events that the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Workers met in May 1918. Attended by over 300 delegates representing over half a million workers in 311 trade unions, the Congress (which was not boycotted by the Bolsheviks) gave the Mensheviks a solid majority.¹⁷⁰ Delegates, the overwhelming majority of whom were non-Ukrainian, voted for far-reaching changes in labour legislation, the nationalisation of industry, as well as proclaiming themselves in favour of an independent Ukrainian People's Republic.¹⁷¹

The congress created the first trade union centre for Ukraine – *Utsentroprof* – and it was independent of Russian trade union organisations. Soon afterwards, metallurgists, miners, chemical workers and others also established their own all-Ukrainian territorial organisations independent of their Russian counterparts. During Skoropads'kyi's rule an intensive organisational drive saw the trade unions greatly expand their membership. This invigorated trade union movement could have been won to the side of the national movement. When the Directory took power, representatives of *Utsentroprof*, especially its far left, were enthusiastic about Vynnychenko's proposed radical course. But the Directory's turn to the right, '*otamaniia*', especially P. Bolbochan's repression of workers in the left-bank Ukraine, and new military incursions foreclosed such collaboration.¹⁷² The fact, however, that independent trade unions existed and were in Menshevik hands posed a major problem for the second Bolshevik government when it was installed in December 1919.

Skoropads'kyi's reactionary social policies and disenchantment with the Directory led most workers to view the arrival of the second Bolshevik government with sympathy.¹⁷³ But this was the period of war communism; in Russia the Second Congress of trade unions (January 1919) proclaimed the 'etatisation' (*ogosudarstvlenie*) of trade unions and stripped them of their independence. These decisions were soon implemented in Ukraine. But there, because Mensheviks had dominated the trade union movement for years, the execution of these policies was much more difficult. In Ukraine, moreover, the struggle against the independence of trade unions had a double thrust: subordination to the state and absorption into all-Russian bodies. Having purged the trade unions, the Bolsheviks convoked their First All-Ukrainian Trade Union congress in April 1919 which implemented both policies.¹⁷⁴ Advocating the merger of Ukrainian trade unions into the all-Russian organisations, a Bolshevik party leader used arguments strongly marked by Russian chauvinism:

The boundaries of an independent Ukrainian state . . . have left their mark among wide strata of the Ukrainian population. . . The communist proletariat with its iron fist has begun to eradicate these boundaries . . . This decision is characteristic of the clear understanding of the proletariat of Ukraine that Great Russia and Ukraine, the north and south of Russia, in and of themselves represent a single economic whole . . . We must fight against the petty-bourgeois illusions of the toiling masses of south Russia and bring about this unity . . .¹⁷⁵

The liquidation of independent (in the double sense) trade unions, combined with the introduction of military discipline within the working class and other aspects of the Bolsheviki's economic policies, resulted in a situation where

the attitudes of the working class markedly changed during the second Soviet government . . . Among workers there occurred a well-known relapse into a Menshevik frame of mind, and the proletariat, in the final analysis, did not give the Soviet government in the last weeks and months of its existence the support which it ought to have expected.¹⁷⁶

With the collapse of the second Bolshevik government, the working class under the difficult conditions of White army occupation once again rebuilt an all-Ukrainian organisation. A congress was held with delegates holding mandates from over a quarter million workers. Metallurgists, miners and others soon followed in the re-establishment of an all-Ukrainian centre. Once again Mensheviks were in the leadership of the trade unions.¹⁷⁷ When the third and final Bolshevik government was installed these independent territorial trade unions were liquidated and the organisations were once again merged into all-Russian ones.¹⁷⁸

The re-establishment of Bolshevik control over the trade unions took several years to accomplish. The economic collapse, the introduction of one-man management, the complete subordination of trade unions to the party and the state, and the militarisation of labour generated a high degree of discontent within the working class. Where free elections were held, Mensheviks obtained majorities because their 'slogans were more concrete, more tangible, more understandable . . . [by] the broad working class' than Bolshevik propaganda.¹⁷⁹ In the face of this situation Bolsheviks unleashed a

wave of repression against their opponents within the working class: over 200 000 people were expelled from the trade unions.¹⁸⁰ It was only after the economic circumstances of the country had improved and control over the trade unions had been firmly established that a territorial trade union organisation was established in Ukraine. This occurred in 1924, the same year that trade unions were handed the Ukrainisation decree for consideration. Not surprisingly it was found that among 'trade union cadres there is a deviation in the direction of Great Russian chauvinism'. The basis of this chauvinism, it was explained, lay in the 'fear that Ukrainisation will destroy the existing trade union apparatus'.¹⁸¹ This is important to bear in mind when analysing the movement for Ukrainisation within the working class during the 1920s: the voice of the bureaucracy must not be mistaken for that of the working class. The point was well illustrated in a play written about Ukrainisation, in which the trade union official Petrov opposes Ukrainisation, arguing that the working class orients towards Russian culture and is indifferent or even hostile to the Ukrainian culture. He is answered by Bystrov:

And I say as a worker . . . that you are lying. All sorts of vileness is spewed in the name of workers. Only Russian jingoists (*rusotiapy*), trade union bureaucrats like you, can say these things, those who have occupied for seven years the post of head of the cultural department [of the trade union] and still haven't learnt a single Ukrainian word.¹⁸²

The Bolsheviks established control over a working class that was rapidly changing. In the early 1920s, the economic chaos brought about by the civil war and war communism resulted in a massive de-proletarianisation of the population. Compulsory mobilisations of workers and the general militarisation of labour did not stop the flight from the factories.¹⁸³ By 1921, Ukraine had only 260 000 factory workers, a little more than one per cent of the total population, half the size of the pre-revolutionary figure. With NEP and economic recovery the working class began to reconstitute itself, and increased to 360 000 factory workers by 1924, rising to 675 000 by 1927. The total work force (industry, transport and communication) virtually doubled between 1924 and 1927, from 1.2 to 2.7 million.¹⁸⁴ What was significant about the new working class that was being formed was that for the first time in the history of the country, the majority of new recruits were Ukrainian.

Trade union membership data show that Ukrainians increased from 41 per cent of the total membership in 1923, to 57 per cent by the autumn of 1929.¹⁸⁵ The most complete record of the working class according to nationality is provided by the 1926 general population census. It revealed that Ukrainians formed 55 per cent of the working class, Russians, 29 per cent, Jews 9 and other nationalities, 7 per cent. Ukrainians were, however, a minority among workers in industry – 43 per cent.¹⁸⁶ With the upsurge in the economy in the second half of the 1920s this was changing. Between the winter of 1926 and the autumn of 1929, Ukrainians in industry (according to the trade union census) increased from 41 to 48 per cent; among miners, an occupation Ukrainians traditionally eschewed, the increase was from 36 to 40 per cent.¹⁸⁷ In the younger age groups, Ukrainians predominated. Among apprentices being trained for industry, Ukrainians formed 62 per cent of the total.¹⁸⁸ In the large labour-intensive projects such as Dniprel'stan (Dnieproges), the hydro-electric dam, two-thirds of the work force was Ukrainian.¹⁸⁹ What was most indicative of the new abilities of Ukrainians to seek industrial employment was their recruitment into the most skilled sector of the working class as metal workers, that is, those who worked in the machine-building industry with precision tools. Traditionally, this sector of the working class was dominated by non-Ukrainians. A 1929 survey (which included the southern regions of Ukraine) showed that 52 per cent of new cadres in this demanding profession belonged to the Ukrainian nationality.¹⁹⁰ Indicative of the new situation was the fact that in 1927, 44 per cent of the republic's skilled manpower originated in the Ukrainian village.¹⁹¹

In the pre-revolutionary era workers, never having attended a Ukrainian language school or having read a Ukrainian-language newspaper or book, had to acquire their elementary exposure to culture in the Russian language. The result was a working class that Russified. Mykola Skrypnyk, Commissar of Education in the second half of the 1920s, like many others, was confident that this legacy of tsarism would gradually be overcome as new working class cadres who had graduated from Ukrainian-language schools arrived on the scene and older workers seized the opportunity to Ukrainise themselves during the 1920s.¹⁹² Comparing the 1926 and 1929 trade union census it is clear that the de-Russification of the working class was proceeding briskly (see Table 2.5). The 1929 trade union census also revealed that among workers giving Ukrainian as their nationality native language usage at home ranged from 94 per cent in the case of

TABLE 2.5 Nationality data on Ukraine's trade union membership, 1926, 1929

Type of union	Total membership enumerated		Ukrainians by nationality (as % of total)		Speak Ukrainian at home (as % of total)		Read Ukrainian (as % of total)		Write Ukrainian (as % of total)	
	1926	1929	1926	1929	1926 ^a	1929	1926	1929	1926	1929
Agricultural	50 820	205 241	75	80	68	78	66	81	61	80
Industrial	166 170	226 969	41	48	22	32	22	43	17	38
Transport & communication	138 394	227 081	65	73	39	50	47	65	39	56

^a 1926 figures refer to mother-tongue.

SOURCES *Trud i profsoiuzy na Ukraine. Statisticheskii spravochnik 1921-28 gg.* (Kharkiv, 1928) pp. 110-13; *Natsional'nyi perepys robitynykiv ta sluzhbovisiv Ukrainy (zhovten' - lystopad 1929)* (Kharkiv, 1930) pp. xvi, xxv, xxix.

workers in agriculture, to 68 per cent among those in transport and communication and 66 per cent among those in industry.¹⁹³ Russification was very much a regional phenomenon. Outside of the mining (Donbass) and steppe regions (55 and 62 per cent respectively), the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian workers spoke their native language at home. Significant here are the figures for the Dnipro region, where much new economic development was underway and where almost 80 per cent of Ukrainian workers spoke their native language in the home setting.¹⁹⁴

Language data, while very enlightening, nevertheless cannot capture the nuances of the real situation. Language usage data for Donbass are particularly misleading in this respect. A 1925 study of the 'language problem in Donbass' found that among Russian youth the 'articulation base' of the Russian spoken was Ukrainian and their speech was replete with Ukrainian words. Among Russified Ukrainian workers, what passed for Russian was a language whose pronunciation, sentence construction and vocabulary of everyday life was Ukrainian while Russian was used for work-related discussions. What the researcher found, in effect, was that in urban industrial centres a new language existed, a 'Ukraino-Russian dialect' and teachers of Russian noted that they had 'great difficulties teaching children correct Russian'. Because of this, it was argued that with little instruction many Russian speakers could easily transfer into the Ukrainian language.¹⁹⁵ As for the culture of workers, P. Solodub wrote, 'Is it true that the proletariat in Ukraine is oriented towards Russian culture? Obviously not.' The proletariat he argued, had little of any culture and was only awakening to the possibilities of enlightenment. What culture it had was an amalgum of various elements, with Ukrainian 'motifs of peasant-proletarian existence' occupying a prominent role.¹⁹⁶

In examining the Ukrainisation of the proletariat in more detail it is necessary to make a distinction between two elements in the process. The first is the linguistic Ukrainisation of official trade union business and the promotion of Ukrainian culture within the working class – these we call Ukrainisation policies. The second is the development of an identification with the territory and institutions of the Ukrainian republic. We will consider each in turn.

Ukrainisation as a policy within the trade unions had an immediate impact on the working class in two ways. The first was an attempt to introduce Ukrainian as the language in which the business of the trade unions was conducted. The second was an effort to promote

and popularise Ukrainian culture and language among workers through courses, the distribution of Ukrainian books, newspapers, and the organisation of concerts and films. Neither of these activities was made subject to statutory provisions. Only state institutions were obligated by legislation to make a knowledge of Ukrainian compulsory for their employees.¹⁹⁷ Trade unions, like other social organisations, were allowed to develop their own Ukrainisation programmes. This independence in turn was used by the trade union bureaucracies as an excuse for them to do very little about either aspect of Ukrainisation.

The reluctance of the trade union apparatus to promote Ukrainisation was challenged from two sources. The first came from rank-and-file workers themselves among whom Ukrainisation was very popular. A 1929 survey of almost a hundred metallurgical workers in Donbass found that only 6 opposed Ukrainisation. Of these 5 were older workers; 59 wanted more Ukrainian culture courses, and 14 argued for cheaper books in the Ukrainian language.¹⁹⁸ There were numerous examples cited in the press of rank-and-file initiatives being frustrated by the trade union apparatus. The experience of railway workers in one region was quite typical in this respect: when these workers decided to organise evening courses on Ukrainian language and culture, instead of the Ukrainian books they requested, the central cultural-educational department of the trade union sent them Russian books with the following note: 'trade unions do not need to stock Ukrainian language materials'.¹⁹⁹ Such incidents provided ammunition for the second group which challenged the trade union bureaucracy on the Ukrainisation front, namely the Ukrainian intelligentsia and national communists within the party and state. Leading this opposition was *Narkomos*, a unique institution – both a ministry of education and a super-ministry charged with overseeing the republic's cultural affairs and Ukrainisation in all areas of life. It was also the major institutional power base of national communists.

Officials of *Narkomos* first confronted the trade unions on the question of Ukrainisation in 1924, the year Oleksander Shums'kyi took over as head of that institution.²⁰⁰ The trade union apparatus balked at their suggestions. As a result, when Kvirig was removed from office and Kaganovich took his place, *Narkomos* made a move to assume responsibility for Ukrainisation within the trade unions, by-passing the trade union apparatus.²⁰¹ It was this attempt which gave rise to the false charge levied against Shums'kyi that he attempted to forcibly Ukrainise non-Ukrainian workers. 'Only an idiot would propose this,' said Shums'kyi, 'and I do not consider myself to

be one.²⁰² Faced with the threat of having Ukrainisation within the trade unions taken up as an objective by national communists outside the trade union apparatus, the apparatus decided to take control of the policy themselves. This was the essence of the compromise reached in the spring of 1925.

The Ukrainisation of the administrative language of trade unions did not begin until 1925 in the industrial branches. In the forefront here were railway workers, who in January 1925 at the second congress decided to Ukrainise the language of business first at the local level, and then at the centre as the next step.²⁰³ Ukrainisation in other industrial sectors – metallurgy, mining, and the chemical industry – did not begin until late 1926, when Ukrainisation commissions were formed and began to make concrete plans.²⁰⁴ By the autumn of 1929, about half the industrial trade unions were now conducting their business in the Ukrainian language.²⁰⁵ The least Ukrainised in this respect were the unions in Donbass. With the sizable influx of new workers in the last years of the 1920s the demand for Ukrainisation increased. A. Khvyliya provides us with many graphic accounts of this. He quotes D. Leikin, a worker from Stalino (Donets'k), for example, who made the following observation (1929):

In the past few years we have listened to hundreds of lecturers on different themes. All of them spoke in Russian. However, one heard many shouts 'speak in Ukrainian'. There exists a solid basis for these cries. Out of a thousand workers in our factory . . . half are either Ukrainians or those who speak the Ukrainian language. Therefore the pull towards Ukrainian culture is widespread.²⁰⁶

Perhaps the most fascinating development during the 1920s was the impact of Ukrainian culture on the working class and the movement 'from below' for Ukrainisation. Here the role of the press – books and newspapers – was decisive. Workers who did not know Ukrainian, wrote a miner from Donbass, were simply too tired to attend evening lectures to learn it. What they needed and wanted for their Ukrainisation was newspapers and books to read at home.²⁰⁷ The industrial proletariat in large factories, observed another worker (in 1925) comprised two types: the Russified worker who functioned mostly in Russian because he had never had an opportunity to study Ukrainian, and the less numerous group who functioned entirely in Ukrainian. The former group, contrary 'to what Russifiers say, is an element extremely interested in Ukrainian culture and literature.

Often when we see a Ukrainian book appear in the factory a mass of these workers gravitate to the book and pass it around from hand to hand. The majority of factory workers are in this category.²⁰⁸ Because the printed word was so central for the workers' self-Ukrainisation, demands for it escalated to campaign proportions within the working class.²⁰⁹

Concerts, amateur choirs and literary evenings were an important component of the movement for Ukrainian culture within the working class. In 1928, for example, almost half a million workers participated in cultural circles.²¹⁰ Visits by professional troupes organised by trade unions played an important role in popularising Ukrainian culture. For many workers this was their first encounter with Ukrainian cultural production and the enthusiasm with which these troupes were received, especially in Donbass, astounded observers.²¹¹

The movement for Ukrainian culture in the working class developed because for the first time in the history of the country the indigenous intelligentsia had wide access to the proletariat. The implementation of Ukrainisation policies within the trade unions, as Rabchev reported in 1927, necessitated the involvement of Ukrainian cultural organisations and the local Ukrainian intelligentsia.²¹² The decision of the 1924 trade union congress breaking the monopoly of cultural work enjoyed by full-time trade union staff and allowing workers' initiatives in this area, enabled rank-and-file activists to approach the Ukrainian intelligentsia for help in organising lectures and cultural events.²¹³ As the ties between the working class and the intelligentsia multiplied, the cultural movement within the working class strengthened. Where the intelligentsia was weak, as in the case of Donbass, that movement took a longer time to develop. In Donbass, it was only in the late 1920s that the cultural movement assumed mass proportions. Visiting Donbass in 1929 Antonenko-Davydovych was moved to write:

How beautiful is the rebirth of the country! Donbass is on the move. From below, from the mines, from the factory it draws towards Ukrainian books, towards the Ukrainian theatre, towards newspapers. Management goes to meet this locomotive of Ukrainisation from below under orders . . . [and] instructions.²¹⁴

The second element in the Ukrainisation process we mentioned was the development of an identification with the territory and institu-

tions of the Ukrainian republic. Of all the possible ways of approaching this question, perhaps the most indicative trend was the evolution of the trade union leadership from an arch-centralist position to being the defender of the republic's prerogatives. Their arrival at this position was tied to the economic policies pursued by the Moscow centre. Before one can appreciate the trade union leaderships' response, these policies must be briefly described.

If Ukraine industrialised during the second half of the nineteenth century it was entirely the work of foreign capital which did not share the prejudices and concerns of Russia's dominant economic interests. The revolution swept foreign capital out of Ukraine, but the Russian state remained. From the very start of Soviet rule all the levers of economic policy and decision-making were assumed by the central government in Moscow. After 1927, the republic was further stripped of its economic prerogatives.²¹⁵ But as S. Iavors'kyi complained during the second session of the VTsVK (1925), the traditional Russian view of Ukraine as only a source of raw materials for Russian industry became established orthodoxy in the economic thought and policies of the Moscow centre.²¹⁶ Only in the post-revolutionary situation, the resurrected ambitions of Russian bureaucrats could be pursued with vigour.

Ukraine's economy suffered in numerous ways from this arrangement; we will mention three points in this respect. The first was a drain on its capital resources. V. Dobrohaiev showed that between 1923–27 around 20–30 per cent of Ukraine's budgetary receipts left the country for reinvestment in Russia.²¹⁷ What this meant was that the country's industry was being starved for lack of new investment.

The second aspect had to do with Moscow's industrial location policy. Russia needed Ukraine's raw materials and it did not develop the republic's manufacturing capacity. The reason for this, as economists such as Volobuiev argued, had little to do with economic rationality and efficiency, but was caused by Russian economic nationalism.²¹⁸ What began to develop in the 1920s was an economic insanity which in subsequent decades was to flourish. A few examples will demonstrate this point. At a session of the VTsVK, Peizak, representing Polissia, argued that the region could sustain a prosperous forest products industry, but as things stood logs from Volyn' were being shipped to Russia only to be re-imported as timber.²¹⁹ P. Liubchenko at the 10th CPU Congress (1927) complained that new refineries and distilleries were being built in Russia to process sugar beets supplied by the right bank, whereas the right bank, the historic

centre of this activity, was witnessing a sharp decline in investment in its processing industry.²²⁰ Ukrainian scientists were outraged when they learnt that the new sugar research institute was to be located in the city of Moscow whereas the crop was grown largely in their republic.²²¹ The right bank suffered most from the decision to avoid investment in Ukraine's manufacturing capacity. The 'serious, large-scale industry' demanded for the right bank by Ukraine's leadership was not considered.²²² As things stood in the 1920s, what managed to save the right bank from dramatic economic decline was the existence of small-scale industry run by private capital.²²³ When NEP was liquidated and this economic activity fell into the hands of the Moscow centre, the right bank slid deeper into the status of an economic backwater.

The third aspect had to do with the development of Ukraine's industrial heartland – the Dnipro-Donbass region. There were two contested issues here. The first was the fact that investment in coal and iron ore extraction was inadequate in view of the massive damage to equipment which had occurred during the war. The lack of capital caused enormous hardships for workers in these industries which were using labour-intensive methods to produce output.²²⁴ The second issue was whether the 'all-round development' of the Dnipro-Donbass region would occur.²²⁵ From the standpoint of the Moscow centre, Ukraine's coal and iron ore resources were to be exploited since these raw materials were essential for the survival of Russian industry. Shrah, expressing a point of view shared by most other economists in Ukraine, accused central authorities of discrimination in their support of only the extraction of coal and iron ore and the primary processing of metals and of refusing to permit the development of the machine-building capacities of the region.²²⁶ The close proximity of coal (coke) and high grade ores (ferrous metals) could have laid the basis for a powerful machine-building sector.²²⁷ During the 1920s, however, not only were new machine-building plants not established, but also, as Chubar complained, Moscow's economic organs were 'disorganising' the existing capacity.²²⁸ When the centre decided to expand the metallurgical, coal and machine-building industries in the Urals and the Kuzbass, Ukrainians engaged in an acrimonious debate with the centre for its neglect of the Dnipro-Donbass region.²²⁹ But with metals and coal directly administered by all-Union commissariats, there was little they could do to prevent the implementation of these plans.²³⁰

The low standard of living and the difficulties in economic recon-

struction which these policies produced in Ukraine generated much bitterness among workers in the republic.²³¹ Probably for the first time proletarian discontent was beginning to flow in a substantial way along the lines of a defence of Ukraine's rights as a state. Here the trade union bureaucracy itself played an important role. It was composed largely of Russians or Russified Ukrainians, who were reluctant about cultural Ukrainisation lest this threaten their own positions. But when it came to demanding greater economic and administrative rights for Ukraine, they were quite adamant. The apparatus had the ungratifying task of managing and representing a disgruntled work force. A source of many of the problems was the excessively centralised Soviet state which was holding back the republic's economic growth. There was little alternative other than to articulate grievances in the form of more rights for Ukraine. During trade union congresses and plenums this sentiment was expressed time and time again. A sample of the interventions made during the fourth all-Ukrainian trade union congress (1928) will illustrate the point.

Zuiev, representing Dniprel'stan, argued that 'our VRNH [Supreme Council of the National Economy] knows local conditions better' and must be given control over the project. Limarov', the head of the miners' union, demanded that the coal industry be transferred from its status as an all-Union commissariat and placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 'VRNH of Ukraine, which stands close to this industry and knows its daily problems. We often end up in a catastrophic situation . . . because the Ukrainian VRNH cannot interfere . . . in what is "Moscow's business".' Iefremov, representing metal workers, could not understand why the Ukrainian VRNH was so timid in its dealings with Moscow. They should 'force' the question of new factories for Ukraine and better manpower training programmes. Serdiukov from Kharkiv criticised all-Union economic organs for building new plants in Russia when those in Ukraine were starved for investment. Sdobnikov from the tobacco industry demanded that 'our VRNH must be more aggressive with officials in the USSR'. Antontsev from Stalino, Alekseev from Kiev, Cherenov from Artmiv'sk, Israileva representing tailors. Veselov from the wood workers and many others raised identical demands.²³² What is interesting is that there is hardly a Ukrainian name to be found in this list.

A working class whose Ukrainian contingent was rapidly increasing, a movement for the national culture within the proletariat and a trade union leadership now defending the institutional prerogatives

of the republic were three new elements that emerged during the 1920s, bringing the Ukrainian people to the threshold of nationhood by the end of that decade.

EDUCATION

The Soviet regime inherited an unenviable legacy of cultural backwardness. The first step in tackling this legacy was the liquidation of illiteracy. In 1923 it was announced that illiteracy was to be abolished by 1927.²³³ But the particular national and social structure of Ukraine posed an immediate problem. In what language was literacy to be acquired? Prior to 1923, when the CPU's national policy was characterised by the 'struggle between two cultures' theory in which the 'superior', 'proletarian' Russian culture was to be promoted at the expense of the 'inferior', 'peasant' culture of Ukrainians, Russian was the language in which literacy had largely been taught.²³⁴ After 1923, however, literacy schools (*likpunkty*) became part of the Ukrainisation campaign. By the autumn of 1925, 81 per cent of *likpunkty* had been Ukrainised. The process was slower in the towns where, since citizens had a choice in the matter, the national composition of cities ensured that Russian literacy schools dominated.²³⁵

By 1926 considerable progress had been achieved in the campaign against illiteracy. The literate population between the ages of 9–49 had more than doubled when compared to the 1897 figures: 28 per cent in 1897, 64 per cent in 1926. In rural areas the percentages for the respective years were 24 and 59.²³⁶ The gains made by Ukrainians in this respect were impressive. According to the 1920 census 24 per cent of the total Ukrainian population was literate (little change from the 1897 figures). Six years later this increased to 42 per cent.²³⁷ If much was accomplished in the acquisition of literacy among Ukrainians it was because of the ceaseless efforts of Ukrainian teachers 'on whose shoulders the entire literacy campaign rested'. For minimal remuneration they spent many hours after work to bring elementary enlightenment to the population.²³⁸

The 1926 census form asked respondents in Ukraine whether they were literate in their native language. The results showed that two out of three literate Ukrainians had native language reading ability. In urban areas this declined to 57 per cent. In the Donbass, little more than a third of Ukrainians claimed native language literacy.²³⁹ As educational facilities grew and the Ukrainised school turned out its school leavers, this changed. By 1929, two out of three literate

Ukrainians working in the Donbass basin could read Ukrainian. For the republic as a whole the 1929 study showed that 76 per cent of literate Ukrainians could now read Ukrainian and 74 per cent could read Russian. An obstacle to Ukrainisation was that the bilingualism of Ukrainians was not matched by Russians. In 1929 less than a quarter of Russians employed in the republic could read Ukrainian, while about 60 per cent of Jews and Poles could do so.²⁴⁰

Often frustrated by adults, Ukrainisers placed their hope in the future generation. A study of schools shows that their optimism in this respect was not misplaced. During the revolution a mass movement in favour of Ukrainian schools developed. Hundreds of new schools came into being, over two million textbooks were produced and pedagogical courses for the training of new staff were established.²⁴¹ In 1917 'The village,' wrote E. Hrytsak, who taught in rural schools during the revolution, 'spontaneously surged towards the Ukrainian school.'²⁴²

When the first and second Bolshevik governments were installed in Ukraine, the country already had a modest network of Ukrainian language schools. The Bolsheviks, however, did not trust these establishments, charging them with Ukrainian nationalism and chauvinism, and converting many Ukrainised schools back into Russian ones.²⁴³ Irrespective of the fact that in 1921 the equality of Ukrainian and Russian in the republic was proclaimed, the local plenipotentiary 'when he saw a teacher or a pupil with a certificate written in Ukrainian would froth with anger, often rip it up and stamp on it'.²⁴⁴ This chauvinism received its theoretical justification in the formulation 'the struggle between two cultures'. This theory, which held sway in the CPU until 1923, heralded the 'merging of the Ukrainian language into the Russian language' and condemned the Ukrainian schools as reactionary.²⁴⁵ The root of Bolshevik hostility towards the Ukrainian language schools lay in their inability to lead the Ukrainisation process. Were they to implement such a policy they would have to share power and influence with their former bitter opponents, the Ukrainian intelligentsia. But with 72 per cent of the republic's teachers belonging to the Ukrainian nationality, sooner or later the regime would have to reach a *modus vivendi* with this group.²⁴⁶

Party opposition to the Ukrainian language school was clearly leading the country into a blind alley. Without such a school there could be no socio-economic progress, let alone peace. With Ukrainisation in 1923 the party held out an olive branch to the Ukrainian teachers. Zatons'kyi explained away the 'sins' of those teachers:

The Ukrainian teacher by and large hated the Bolsheviks not because the teacher stood on the side of capital, but because it seemed to him that Bolsheviks had robbed him of an opportunity to work calmly and peacefully 'for the good of our dear motherland, the peasant-democratic Ukraine'.²⁴⁷

Teachers were now invited to continue their efforts on behalf of a Soviet Ukrainian 'motherland'. As a group they were now reclassified, from 'Petliurites' to 'the toiling intelligentsia'.²⁴⁸ The detente was successful, and 'by the end of 1924, the participation of teachers in cultural-educational work assumed a mass character'.²⁴⁹ The Ukrainising school became a formidable tool of cultural and national awakening.

According to the education laws that were passed in 1923–4, instruction of all children was to be conducted in Ukrainian where that nationality predominated; where national minorities formed a compact group, they were to be guaranteed education in their native language. Both Ukrainian and Russian were made compulsory subjects in all schools, irrespective of the language of instruction.²⁵⁰ The implementation of Ukrainisation varied throughout the republic. Lists of teachers who knew Ukrainian had to be compiled; wherever possible, these teachers were regrouped to form complete schools. Elsewhere, Ukrainian-Russian instruction was offered as a stop-gap measure.²⁵¹ In the south and south-east Ukrainisation first began with the earliest classes, and gradually worked its way through all levels of the school ladder: the elementary or four-year schools (ages 8–12), the incomplete secondary or seven-year schools and finally the complete secondary or ten-year schools. Although Ukrainisation began in 1923, it was only in 1925 that a major campaign was launched to establish the supremacy of the Ukrainian-language school system.

The success of Ukrainisation of the schools can best be appreciated when placed in the context of the difficulties that had to be surmounted along the way. Among the most important was the shortage of teachers. While it was estimated that 100 000 teachers were needed (in 1923) to meet basic educational requirements, only 45 000 teachers were to be found in the educational system.²⁵² The dire shortage of Ukrainian teachers in the Donbass was cited as the major obstacle to the growth of Ukrainian language schools in that region. Teachers from the right and left banks had to be imported to staff schools in Donbass.²⁵³ This in itself was an extremely significant

development, since it provided that region with its first cadres of the national movement.

A chronic shortage of textbooks also undermined efforts at Ukrainising the schools. In Donbass it led parents to take their children out of the Ukrainian language schools and place them in Russian schools instead.²⁵⁴ According to Ia. Riappo, the assistant head of *Narkomos*, in 1924 half the Ukrainian language schools were without textbooks.²⁵⁵ Chauvinist policies during the era of the 'struggle between two cultures' were at fault here. The development of textbooks did not really begin until 1924. In 1923, for example, out of 2513 school texts published in Ukraine, only 459 were Ukrainian language titles.²⁵⁶ Although the State Publishing House (DVU) greatly increased its output of books intended for schools after 1924, a teacher from the Dnipropetrovs'k region claimed that government reports that '90 per cent of school textbook needs were being met' was sheer nonsense. 'Take away the last zero and you have the real situation,' he wrote.²⁵⁷ In 1929 reports indicated that 'schools were being Ukrainised in the Donbass without textbooks'.²⁵⁸

Despite the difficulties, by 1927, 82 per cent of schools were Ukrainised and 76 per cent of the total number of pupils in the republic were attending Ukrainian-language schools. In 1927, 49 per cent urban schools were operating in the Ukrainian language, and they accounted for 42 per cent of urban enrolments. These figures do not include the mixed schools, where Ukrainian and Russian were used in instruction. Over a quarter of the pupils in the Donbass region, for example, attended mixed schools.²⁵⁹ Particularly significant in this respect was the Ukrainisation of schools in Donbass. Whereas in 1923 there was only one Ukrainian-language school in the urban areas of that region, by 1929, over a third of the schools had been Ukrainised and half the children were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools.²⁶⁰

The dream of nineteenth-century pedagogues such as Borys Hrinchenko that all Ukrainian children should study in their native language was largely realised by 1927, with 94 per cent of all Ukrainian pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools.²⁶¹ By 1929 this had increased to 97.2 per cent.²⁶² The effect of legislation making knowledge of Ukrainian a precondition for state employment can be seen in the fact that almost a quarter of Russian and Jewish children in the republic were being sent to Ukrainian-language classrooms by their parents (1927). In the city of Kiev, for example, one in three Russian children was studying in a Ukrainian school.²⁶³ With

Ukrainian a compulsory language in all of the republic's schools, as well as the language of state, it had broken out of its confines as the vernacular of the Ukrainian village to emerge as the medium of all of society. What a change this was in comparison with the 1890s when Hrinchenko taught Ukrainian illegally to peasant children using hand-written sheets for a textbook. In the 'march of millions on their way to the Ukrainian school,' wrote Antonenko-Davydovych, could be seen 'the fire of a great revival'.²⁶⁴

The same factors which stymied the Ukrainisation of the elementary level were present in the secondary schools as well, but in greater proportions. Ukraine had its own unique secondary school system, called professional schools – *profshkoly*.²⁶⁵ The Ukrainisation of these institutions had to begin from scratch: in 1922, 0.3 per cent of *profshkoly* were Ukrainised.²⁶⁶ As those who had completed elementary school made their way through the educational system, and as the economic situation in the village improved, both the social and national composition of the pupil population changed in the Ukrainians' favour. By 1929, 66 per cent such schools were Ukrainian-language institutions and a further 16 per cent offered instruction in Ukrainian and Russian. Two-thirds of Ukraine's secondary school pupils were enrolled in Ukrainian-language establishments and 21 per cent in establishments where Ukrainian and Russian were used in instruction.²⁶⁷

During the 1920s considerable attention was given to Ukrainising the summit of the educational ladder; the institutes, the technical colleges (*tekhnikumy*, which were considered institutions of tertiary learning in Ukraine), and workers' faculties (a kind of preparatory school for workers and peasants attached to institutes). Three problems had to be resolved: higher education had to be democratised in both the social and national senses, since for centuries higher education had been dominated by the scions of the non-Ukrainian elite; these institutions had to be Ukrainised both in form and content; the imperial hyper-centralisation of educational facilities in Moscow and Leningrad had to be redressed and a network of higher educational establishments had to be created in Ukraine. Let us consider briefly what was achieved with respect to each of these tasks.

To democratise the selection process, normal admission requirements were suspended in the case of workers and poor peasants seeking tertiary education in 1922–3 following the pattern established in Russian. The desire to democratise was however tempered by the state's need for specialists. Moreover, higher education demanded a

relatively solid academic background, difficult for the offspring of peasants and workers to achieve. Still, the liberalisation of admissions policies, combined with mobilisation of rural youth, meant that a larger proportion of young peasants were entering higher educational establishments. This was particularly the case after 1923, when the economic recovery of the village allowed peasants to subsidise their children attending institutions of higher learning – *vuzy* – an important fact, since few students could survive on the pitiful state stipends. If a fundamental weakness of the social structure of the Ukrainian nation in the past had been the absence of a substantial intelligentsia, the 35 000 Ukrainian attending institutes and *tekhnikumy* by 1928 represented a major gain. In 1922, only 19 per cent of the student population of institutes and 16 per cent in the case of *tekhnikumy* was Ukrainian. By 1928 the figures were 54 and 63 per cent respectively. That same year, 53 per cent of students attending workers' faculties were Ukrainian.²⁶⁸

The first step in the Ukrainisation of higher education was the introduction of courses with Ukrainian content. The study of the history, language, literature and economic geography of Ukraine became compulsory for all students. By 1927, a knowledge of the Ukrainian language became a precondition for admission to higher education and of graduation from these institutions.²⁶⁹ A 1928 survey showed the impact of these policies on the student population. About half the *vuz* students knew the Ukrainian language quite well. Most were familiar with Ukrainian literature and were avid followers of Ukrainian theatre. Their knowledge of Ukrainian history, however, left much to be desired. Rural youth were the best informed on this subject, as were students of working class origin. The least informed were students who came from the families of white-collar staff. Surprisingly, students knew more about nineteenth-century Ukrainian history than the events of the contemporary period.²⁷⁰

The second step in the Ukrainisation of higher education, the introduction of Ukrainian as the language of instruction in *vuzy* was a much more difficult one to make. The Achilles' heel of the Ukrainisation of higher education was the national composition of the academic staff. With a significant proportion of those Ukrainians who had occupied university positions emigrating in the wake of the defeat of the national movement during the revolution, the republic's resources of Ukrainian-speaking academics were in a precarious condition. In 1925, a third of the teaching staff in institutes and 43 per cent in *tekhnikumy* were Ukrainian.²⁷¹ Resistance to Ukrainisation

among the Russian academic staff, whose attitudes were shaped under tsarism, was intense. Professor Tolstoi's declaration at a meeting of the Odessa Institute of the National Economy was not atypical: 'I consider the laws governing the national question as a violation of civil rights and all comrades who have switched to lecturing in the Ukrainian language as renegades'.²⁷² While three-quarters of Ukrainian academic personnel lectured in the Ukrainian language, very few non-Ukrainian staff did so.²⁷³ Various measures were proposed to hasten Ukrainisation, among them the large-scale recruitment of lecturers from Galicia and the Ukrainian diaspora, but these were rejected on political grounds.²⁷⁴ Ukrainisation had to be enforced through regulations making knowledge of Ukrainian equivalent to that demanded of government officials a precondition of academic employment. These regulations, however, could rarely be enforced, and the implementation of full Ukrainisation at the *vuz* level was postponed, first to 1924, then 1925, until finally it was hoped the process could be completed by 1930.²⁷⁵ Despite the difficulties, some progress had been achieved by 1928. Almost a quarter of all students enrolled in institutes in 1928 received instruction only in the Ukrainian language; 68 per cent were instructed in both the Ukrainian and Russian languages (with Ukrainian predominating). The figures were 38 and 30 per cent respectively in the case of *tekhnikumy*, and 65 and 17 per cent respectively for workers' faculties.²⁷⁶ It was hoped that the new generation of graduates would have the required language skills and be free of the 'Russificatory superstitions' about the unsuitability of Ukrainian for use in higher education.²⁷⁷ With almost 60 per cent of all post-graduate students in the republic in 1928 giving Ukrainian as their nationality, these were not pipe dreams.²⁷⁸

After the revolution, Russia inherited the facilities and resources in higher education which tsarism, with funds gathered from all of the nations of the Empire, had concentrated in Leningrad and Moscow.²⁷⁹ Ukraine, on the other hand, was left a legacy of a very weakly developed higher educational system and a chronic shortage of scholarly and scientific personnel. In redressing the imbalance, the republic had to confront the resurgent claims of Russian centralism which blocked the development of higher education in Ukraine. Only institutions in Russia, for example, received the designation 'institution of all-Union significance' and were thus entitled for funding from the all-Union budget. Ukrainian academics protested against the fact that four agricultural institutes in Moscow, three in Leningrad and

one in Saratov were given that classification when not a single agricultural institute in Ukraine was given this honour. The republic received a mere 5 per cent of the all-Union budget for agricultural research. The same discriminatory practice was to be seen in the case of sugar and coal research establishments.²⁸⁰ Overall, in 1924, Russian higher educational institutions received 10 times more funds for research than those in Ukraine, and this figure did not include establishments in Russia already subsidised because of their 'all-Union' status.²⁸¹ To these budgetary constraints must be added a myriad of petty restrictions imposed on Ukrainian academics but not applied to their counterparts in Russia. For example, parcels of books from abroad could be received by scholars in the RSFSR without special restrictions, whereas in Ukraine all such materials had to be registered with state officials before they could be released.²⁸²

The expansion of higher education in the face of budgetary restrictions simply meant that Ukrainian *vuzy* had to do more with much less money. There were twice as many post-graduate students per staff member in Ukraine as in the RSFSR, academic salaries were much lower in Ukraine, institute libraries were so poor that they could not afford to order *belles lettres* since all available funds had to be mobilised for specialist literature, and laboratories were poorly equipped.²⁸³ The academic community in the republic, irrespective of nationality, was very vocal in its protests over this blatant discrimination.²⁸⁴

Despite these impediments, the achievements in higher education during the 1920s in Ukraine were impressive. The education gap between Ukraine and Russia was rapidly being closed. By the autumn of 1929, the per capita student population in Ukraine was higher than in Russia, the number of students attending *vuzy* was growing faster than in Russia, and the social composition of the student population was also a good deal more egalitarian.²⁸⁵

The Ukrainising higher educational system was bringing about profound changes in the life of the republic. Osyp Hermaize summarised them well. M. Hrushevs'kyi, with money raised from a few private sponsors, once organised a Ukrainian scientific society, which, hounded by tsarist authorities, managed to produce a few collections a year. 'Today we see how that same society under the leadership of the same old chief has 14 scholarly institutions researching history . . . and publishes every year scores of serious scholarly publications.' A new generation of intelligentsia was being

produced in an atmosphere where they never 'had to suffer the national schizophrenia that the older generation had experienced'. This younger generation, 'organically tied to the Ukrainian language,' had a much deeper understanding of their society and history and a much stronger sense of national identity than those who had preceded them.²⁸⁶ The research carried out in the 1920s in history, economics, demography and geography added much to the Ukrainian people's knowledge about themselves, a crucial element in the development of a national identity. There was a new generation emerging, capable of articulating and popularising that store of information. This prospect did not escape the notice of central authorities.

Because education is so central in the socialisation process, Moscow organs steadily encroached on this republican jurisdiction during the 1920s. By the end of that decade the administrative basis for a complete centralisation of education was laid. It began with the creation of an all-Union Commissariat of Education charged with standardising education throughout the Union – a move which was strongly opposed in Ukraine.²⁸⁷ It continued with the transformation of the Russian Academy of Sciences into an all-Union institution with responsibility for overseeing the scholarly life of the entire USSR. This move was fought by the academic community in Ukraine and by CPU party leaders as unpardonable chauvinism.²⁸⁸ By 1929, when the All-Union Supreme Council of the Economy ordered Ukraine's education system to be reorganised along Russian lines from top to bottom, the first phase of centralisation was completed.²⁸⁹ With it came a witch-hunt of 'nationalist deviation' in the republic's social sciences and humanities departments as the second phase of the centralisation process.²⁹⁰ The third would be accomplished in 1933.

BOOK PUBLISHING AND THE PRESS

The national mobilisation of 1917 generated a voracious appetite in the population for Ukrainian books. To meet it, over a hundred new publishing houses sprang into being and they issued virtually everything they could get their hands on: re-editions, new manuscripts and brochures on every conceivable theme. This activity continued under the Skoropads'kyi regime. The years 1917–18 generated 1831 Ukrainian-language titles published in 16.2 million copies, or 70 per cent of the total book production in Ukraine. The 'enemies of the Ukrainian nation,' as a Soviet writer described those who carried out the renaissance of the printed word, published more Ukrainian books

in those two years than were produced in the first four years of the third Soviet Ukrainian republic (1920–4).²⁹¹ In 1922 only 186 Ukrainian-language books were published in Ukraine, that is, 27 per cent of the total output of 680 titles. By 1928, 5413 book titles were issued in Ukraine with Ukrainian-language titles claiming 54 per cent of the total.²⁹² In terms of Ukrainian language books as a proportion of the total number of books published on the territory of Ukraine, the Soviet regime would not surpass the achievement of the revolution until 1930.

There were many factors underlying the poor record of the Soviet regime in the field of Ukrainian language book publishing. Among the most obvious was the economic collapse of the country under war communism, the dislocation of the distribution system and the penury of an exhausted population. But these objective factors played a minor role by comparison with considerations of a political, subjective nature.

Those who ran Ukrainian publishing concerns in 1917–18 were ordered to cease their activity and their presses were confiscated.²⁹³ With the ‘theory of the struggle between two cultures’ dominating party policy, support was withdrawn from Ukrainian publishing, and it was pushed steadily into oblivion until rescued by Ukrainisation. The Ukrainisation of publishing did not begin as a concerted policy until the spring of 1925, when the younger Ukrainian intelligentsia were permitted to become involved in publishing under the protectorship of Shums’kyi.

Among the most important factors frustrating the development of the Ukrainian book publishing industry was the budgetary chicanery of all-Union organs. This first began during the allocation of capital when accountability (*khozraschet*) and the ‘self-financing of books’ was introduced in 1922.²⁹⁴ The decision on how capital was to be divided was made in Moscow and it was carried out in such a way as to leave Ukraine’s largest publishing house, State Publishing House (DVU), without a printing press and with stocks of useless, faded paper. Any adjustments or requests for additional funds had to be processed in Moscow, and DVU delegations more often than not returned empty-handed. It was only in the spring of 1925 that DVU obtained assistance from the government.²⁹⁵ But here DVU and others encountered the problem of a centralised budget. Ukraine, with a fifth of the USSR’s population, received no more than one tenth of all-Union funds allocated for publishing activity.²⁹⁶ Ukrainians, approximately 20 per cent of the USSR’s population, had only

seven per cent of the USSR's total book output in their language.²⁹⁷ The financial crisis of DVU was so severe that in 1925 it stopped paying royalties to authors.²⁹⁸ In addition to money, the fact that the paper supply was allocated by all-Union organs and that the republic's share was less than it deserved contributed to the emergence of a chronic book shortage.²⁹⁹ The financial predicament of Ukrainian publishers also meant that Ukrainian books on the average cost 10 per cent more than Russian publications. Good editions were considerably more expensive.³⁰⁰ The high cost of Ukrainian books was a constant theme of readers' complaints during that decade.

The frustration of Ukrainian publishers was understandable in view of the demands that were placed on them. With school texts accounting for over 80 per cent of DVU's production, it is not difficult to see why the wider public's demand for Ukrainian books was never satisfied.³⁰¹ Taking *belles lettres* as an example, these books normally took one to one and a half years to sell out in the USSR. Most Ukrainian novels, however, sold their press runs in half that time.³⁰²

A weakness of the Ukrainian book-publishing profile was the 'overproduction of agitational and socio-historical literature and a shortage of scientific works'.³⁰³ Until the spring of 1924 not a single textbook for higher education was produced in Ukrainian.³⁰⁴ An improvement in the output of scientific literature occurred in the latter years of the 1920s as the need for technical literature grew under the impact of industrial growth.³⁰⁵ By then much had been accomplished in the standardisation of the Ukrainian language and the development of terminology, which in itself represented as important cultural achievement of that decade.

The small quantity of books published in the 1920s was compensated by their quality. (Journals deserve a special mention in this respect.)³⁰⁶ Written in a relatively unfettered intellectual environment, the published works of that period tower above the hack-work of later years. The fact that these books were purchased not out of patriotic duty, but because of their artistic merit or originality of research, gave Ukrainian culture the prestige which made it increasingly attractive for the urban, sophisticated reader. Moreover, a network of Ukrainian bookshops covering all the major centres was established, bringing Ukrainian literature to cities which had never seen such works in the past. In 1927, 83 per cent of all Ukrainian-language books purchased were bought in towns.³⁰⁷ The town of Artmiv'sk in Donbass, for example, had the unlikely reputation of having one of the finest Ukrainian bookshops in the republic.³⁰⁸

Newspaper publishing followed an evolution similar to that of books. The revolution gave birth to 84 Ukrainian-language newspapers.³⁰⁹ Although the total circulation of these publications is not known, information available for individual titles (1917) such as *Narodnia volia* (200 000), demonstrated the tremendous vitality of the Ukrainian press. Because newspapers were the most powerful means of mass communication at that time, they were the first to feel the effects of political repression. By 1920 all non-Bolshevik newspapers were ordered to be closed down, including *Chervonyi prapor*, organ of the still legal Ukrainian Communist Party.³¹⁰ A Bolshevik press in the Ukrainian language did not exist until 1918, and the policies which prevailed until 1923 prevented its development.³¹¹ In 1920–1 there were between 7 and 10 Ukrainian-language newspapers for the entire country, and most of them had half their pages printed in Russian.³¹² In the period of the 'struggle between two cultures' most of the newspapers that survived were suspended and only *Visti* was allowed to exist, publishing 2000 copies in 1922.³¹³ This blindly chauvinist policy was criticised in 1923, when it was pointed out that not a single Ukrainian newspaper was published for the millions of peasants whose sympathy the regime was allegedly soliciting.³¹⁴

The Ukrainisation of newspapers began in 1923, but little was achieved until 1925. In 1925, 116 newspapers were published in Ukraine, only 31 of these were Ukrainian-language editions (accounting for 21 per cent of the total circulation of 1.3 million copies).³¹⁵ During that year 21 local (*okruh*) and three central Ukrainian newspapers were founded. The push to bring the Ukrainian printed word to the working class started in 1926 with the launching of *Proletar*.³¹⁶ In 1927 Ukrainian language newspapers were read by 1.5–2.0 million people.³¹⁷ With Skrypnyk at the helm of *Narkomos*, the Ukrainisation of newspapers reached campaign proportions. By 1929, there were 54 Ukrainian newspapers as compared with 20 Russian and 11 for other national minorities. Ukrainian newspapers represented 65 per cent of the total circulation.³¹⁸ By the winter of 1929, newspapers in the Ukrainian language aimed at workers outnumbered similar Russian editions by 12 to 9, and in circulation they reached parity. As for the central republican press, the ratio of Ukrainian to Russian newspapers was 17 to 2.³¹⁹

The Ukrainian intelligentsia used the press very consciously to strengthen their people's sense of nationality, to hasten the 'rebirth of the Ukrainian people,' as a *Visti* editorial described its goal.³²⁰

(When radio appeared it too became a 'front of Ukrainisation'.³²¹) Newspapers were also the tool used by the intelligentsia to mobilise public opinion in pursuit of national demands. *Visti* was in this respect deservedly called by Zaton's'kyi 'the pioneer of Ukrainisation'.³²² Ukrainisation was not just a question of form, but of content as well. So far as the latter was concerned, the aim was to ensure that Ukrainian newspapers did not become second-rate versions of Moscow editions, but, on the contrary, to allow a 'unique Ukrainian newspaper style' to emerge.³²³ There was also the effort to make Ukrainian culture contemporary through its presentation in newspapers. The task of the press, argued Ravych-Cherkas'kyi at the first congress of journalists (1925), was to ensure that 'Ukrainisation is not peasantisation'.³²⁴ What was at stake in the development of the Ukrainian press was also whether Ukrainian or Russian newspapers would be the major source of opinion formation. By the end of the 1920s, papers such as *Visti* sold far more copies in the republic than *Pravda*.³²⁵ This represented a considerable achievement.

THE PARTY

The revolution found the Bolsheviks without a territorial organisation in Ukraine and with a leadership resisting the creation of such a body lest this imply a legitimisation of the national idea. (The Bolshevik leadership in Ukraine supported Rosa Luxemburg's position opposing the slogan of national self-determination.) The exigencies of the national revolution however demanded a different approach. In November 1917, the same Luxemburgist element asked the party centre in Russia for permission to create a separate organisation to be called 'Social Democracy of Ukraine' to 'counter the growing influence of Ukrainian socialist parties'.³²⁶ The answer received from Ia. Sverdlov, organisational secretary of the Russian party, was unequivocal, 'The creation of a separate Ukrainian party, no matter what its name, no matter what programme it adopts, is considered undesirable'.³²⁷ None the less, several attempts were made to establish a territorial organisation in Ukraine because it was recognised that without one the party was doomed. When Ukraine was cut off from Russia during the German advance, and party members in Ukraine were more or less on their own, Bolsheviks meeting in Taganrog in April 1918 proclaimed an independent Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU), tied to the Russian party only through the Third

International. This decision was overturned under pressure from the Moscow Central Committee when the Ukrainian party met in Moscow in July 1918.³²⁸ The CPU was at that time established as an integral, though autonomous, part of the CPSU, subject to the discipline of the latter's Central Committee, without its own budget, autonomous only in local matters.³²⁹

On the eve of the October revolution the Bolshevik organisation in Ukraine was characterised by 'trifling party branches and membership'.³³⁰ Although party statistics for 1917 are not entirely reliable in view of the fluid situation, the figure of 22 569 members released by the mandate commission of the 6th CPSU Congress (August 1917) probably comes closest to mirroring the reality. Two-thirds of the membership was in Donbass.³³¹ There were entire regions of the country which for all intents and purposes did not have a party organisation, namely the right and left banks outside the cities of Kiev and Kharkiv.³³² With a mere 209 rural party cells and 16 per cent of the total membership listed as peasants, in terms of their social origin, Bolsheviks were very weak in the countryside.³³³ The majority of party members were Russians, and most of the leadership at the local level 'were only temporarily on the territory of Ukraine'. The 'absence of permanent party forces' in Ukraine was major factor in the organisations' political and organisational weakness. In this respect the party in Ukraine was quite different from the Latvian, Polish, Caucasian and even Siberian organisations.³³⁴

The record of the local Bolsheviks in Ukraine during the revolution was characterised by helplessness. During the events of 1918, for example, the party simply collapsed, leaving in July of that year a membership total of 4364.³³⁵ Prior to 1920, 'it is a well-known fact,' wrote *Bil'shovyk*, 'that the Borot'bisty had more members than the CPU'.³³⁶ If party fortunes improved after 1920, at which time total membership was 37 958, it was because new blood was infused from two sources.³³⁷ By far the most important was the arrival of cadres from Russia with the Red army to bolster what by Lenin's admission was a pathetically weak Soviet apparatus.³³⁸ Approximately half the CPU membership in 1920 was composed of 'comrades who had arrived with and are stationed in military units'.³³⁹ The second source of new members was the absorption of other parties in the CPU. The most important of these were the Borot'bisty, who had proven their mettle during the Austro-German occupation. According to Skrypnyk, 4000 Borot'bisty entered CPU ranks, providing the party with much needed influence among the peasantry and cadres 'who spoke

Ukrainian'.³⁴⁰ By late 1920 almost 20 per cent of party members were former members of other organisations.³⁴¹

Whatever weight Ukrainians may have gained inside the CPU as a result of the entry of Borot'bisty was soon to be undermined. On the surface, the resolutions of the 10th CPSU Congress, which contained a condemnation of Great Russian chauvinism and a call to draw into the party more members of the indigenous nationalities to strengthen party influence in the countryside in connection with NEP, ought to have favoured the entry of Ukrainians. The same Congress, however, announced a purge of 'petty bourgeois' elements 'not trained in the Communist spirit'.³⁴² Since Lebed', the arch-opponent of concessions to Ukrainians' national aspirations, was the CPU organisational secretary responsible for carrying out the purge, he used the occasion to expell the Borot'bisty.³⁴³ Out of the 4000 who had joined the CPU in 1920, only 118 remained by 1921.³⁴⁴

The 1922 party census illustrates well the crisis confronting the CPU. The party (56 000 strong) had become an urban military-bureaucratic non-Ukrainian apparatus. Almost half the membership (48 per cent) was in the Red Army. Only 14 per cent of this wing of the organisation was Ukrainian. Almost 80 per cent of the CPU membership lived in towns (44 per cent in provincial capitals). While 51 per cent of the membership claimed to be proletarian, almost 90 per cent of all workers in the party were employed as functionaries in the state, party, trade union or economic administration. All in all 92 per cent of CPU members were functionaries by occupation. The toiling element in the party was represented by 7 per cent of the membership who still worked in factories, and 1 per cent employed in agriculture. In terms of nationality, Ukrainians represented 23 per cent of the total membership, Russians 54 per cent and others 21 per cent. Linguistically the party was worlds apart from the population: 99 per cent of CPU members spoke Russian fluently, 82 per cent claimed it as their language of everyday use. Ukrainian was spoken by 11 per cent of the membership.³⁴⁵ Even this figure exaggerates the point, since party members interpreted the question 'language of conversation' to mean 'mother-tongue'.³⁴⁶ In a 1921 report, Rakovsky admitted that only 2 per cent of party members 'maintained a tie with the Ukrainian language'.³⁴⁷

The party was thus alienated not only from the millions of Ukrainians whom it ruled, but also from the proletariat in whose name it claimed to exercise a dictatorship. Within the party, Frunze, Popov and many others argued that a radical change in policy was needed.

On the eve of the 7th CPU Congress (April 1923) N. N. Popov wrote, 'We have been unable at the present time, in the sixth year of the Revolution, in spite of the strengthening of Soviet rule, to suppress political banditism about which the Moscow provinces have forgotten a long time ago.' Those party members who thought that they could conquer the Ukrainian nation by Russifying it were mistaken. The only alternative, Popov concluded, was 'to conquer the Ukrainian masses' by transacting 'party and cultural work in the Ukrainian language'.³⁴⁸ With Ukrainisation a new era in the party began.

From 1923 on, a number of developments within the party and society favoured the growth of Ukrainian membership. Influential party spokesmen pressed for a more systematic recruitment of Ukrainians. The rehabilitation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia after 1923 facilitated this. The economic recovery saw Ukrainian youth leave the village to join the working class, resulting in 'the entry of new, young cadres' into the CPU.³⁴⁹ Finally, the removal of Kviring and Lebed' from the levers of power played an important role. Although Shums'kyi's demand for a Ukrainian to head the CPU was not granted by Stalin,³⁵⁰ Kaganovich, who replaced Kviring, was the most Ukrainised head of the party to date. Unlike Kviring, who was born and raised in Russia, Kaganovich's roots were in the Kiev region.³⁵¹ Under his leadership it was announced that by 1 January of 1927 'all party business was to be conducted in the Ukrainian language'.³⁵²

The 1927 party census showed the results of the new policies and social developments. The party had greatly expanded its membership – 182 396 full and candidate members by 1927. Of the 168 087 members who completed their questionnaires, 52 per cent were Ukrainian, virtually double the 1922 figure, and almost 70 per cent of the Ukrainian membership gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue (as compared with 46 per cent in 1922). In the party as a whole, one-third of the membership now claimed Ukrainian as their native language. Although in terms of class designation 62 per cent of the CPU were workers, only 34 per cent were proletarians in their present occupation, and 9 per cent were peasants. Half the membership was concentrated in the industrial regions of Ukraine. The change in the nature of the ethnically Ukrainian membership of the party reflected the ever-growing penetration of that group into the urban and industrial environment. While in 1922, 20 per cent of the Ukrainian membership of the CPU was considered to be working class, by 1927 this rose to 56 per cent.³⁵³

In the party as in other spheres of the country's life, the absence of

democracy meant that the Ukrainisation of the heights of power proceeded more slowly than the process at the base. Kaganovich reported that Ukrainians in the Central Committee increased from 16 per cent in 1923 to 25 per cent in 1925.³⁵⁴ Ukrainians were better represented at the local party leadership level. Among the secretaries of *okruh* committees, 55 per cent gave Ukrainian as their nationality in 1927, and 56 per cent of raion committee secretaries.³⁵⁵ By 1926 over half (52 per cent) of the 'leading cadres' in the CPU were Ukrainian, a considerable increase over the 24 per cent of 1923.³⁵⁶ In 1925, 10 per cent of the central party press was published in the Ukrainian language. This reached 100 per cent by 1929.³⁵⁷ In 1925, half the business of the central apparatus was conducted in the Ukrainian language.³⁵⁸

The CPU came to power in Ukraine with the opprobrium of an alien force. But the longer the party existed on Ukrainian soil, the more it came to identify with the particularistic demands of the republic. Ukrainisation hastened this development by committing the party to a Ukrainian cultural form as the medium of its daily work, by facilitating the recruitment of Ukrainians into its ranks and by legitimising national demands within the bosom of the party. The most visible and most studied manifestation of this Ukrainisation in substance was the emergence of national communist currents within the CPU, who were particularly bold in their formulation of political, economic and cultural programmes. However, Ukrainian particularism was not limited to the national communist current. Other deviations – the workers' opposition, the left or right oppositions – also had a national specificity about which little has been written. Zatons'kyi made an interesting point in this regard at the Kharkiv party conference in 1928 when he said that 'any deviation in Ukraine is serious, because each deviation in Ukrainian conditions can be tied to the national question'.³⁵⁹ In the republic one also found *mestnichestvo* (localism) as a widespread 'deviation', especially in the southern regions of the republic.³⁶⁰

It is unfortunate that the scholarly literature on national communism, the clearest expression of identification with the republic, tends to view these currents as personifications of individuals who were declared 'deviationists': Shums'kyi, Volobuev and Khvył'ovy. ³⁶¹ This individualisation obscures that fact that the views espoused by these individuals were widely held in Ukraine's political circles. Volobuevism is a case in point. The views he expressed in his famous article published in the CPU theoretical organ *Bil'shovyk Ukrainy*

were rather typical of sentiments expressed by many leading figures in the republic. The theoretical elaboration of Ukraine's predicament as a colony was advanced with equal clarity in 1925 by S. Iavors'kyi, the head of *Holovnauka*, the governments's higher education branch. The need of an 'economic base' for real statehood was expressed with considerable vigour by P. Solodub, deputy Commissar of Education.³⁶² The concrete tasks of economic decolonisation outlined by Volobuiev were also posed by Slyn'ko of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs and Katel', from Ukraine's State Planning Commission.³⁶³ When Shums'kyi, to take another example, posed the problem of the Ukrainisation of the working class, this aspect of 'Shums'kyism' was endorsed by all CPU Central Committee members with only one dissenting vote.³⁶⁴

Without access to party archives, it is impossible to determine the specific weight of national communist sentiments within the party. Judging from the press, however, it was considerable. Only the same archives will reveal who took the lead in pronouncing these sentiments as 'deviations'. Since most of these 'deviations' were first published as articles on the pages of the Ukrainian state and party press, there is reason to suspect the initiative was largely Moscow's.³⁶⁵ It seems that the major difference between the national communists and many of the more centrist members of the CPU leadership was one of tone, formulation, strategy and tactics, rather than one of principle. When A. Richyts'kyi answered Volobuiev's article on behalf of the party leadership, one of his more telling arguments was that to pose contentious issues in a sharp way at a time when Ukraine was in the throes of great national development was simply bad politics.³⁶⁶ (Richyts'kyi's reply was itself labelled 'the reverse side of the Volobuiev coin', a charge denied by Richyts'kyi's mentor, Skrypnyk.)³⁶⁷

As the party became rooted in the reality of Ukraine, a wide range of differences emerged between those making policies in Moscow and those charged with implementing unpalatable decisions in Ukraine. Many communists from Russia sent to Ukraine as plenipotentiaries came to identify with the victims of unbridled centralisation.³⁶⁸ Rakovsky's conversion was typical: he began his career in Ukraine in 1919 questioning the very existence of a Ukrainian national identity, only to emerge later as a defender of its culture and constitutional prerogatives.³⁶⁹ The national aspirations of Ukrainians found an unlikely defendant in Frunze, the head of the military in Ukraine and one of the proponents of Ukrainisation and decentralisation.³⁷⁰ Even

Russian jingoists (*rusotiapy*) slowly began to reckon with the specificity of conditions of work in Ukraine, and ended by arguing 'for the creation of a complete Ukrainian national-economic entity in a Soviet federation'.³⁷¹ In 1921 Iakovlev, formerly a leading opponent of Ukrainian aspirations, was removed from office for 'tending towards Ukrainian independence'.³⁷² Lobanov, the left-oppositionist who dismissed Ukrainisation with disdain in 1925, by 1927 attacked Odynets', the party spokesman on Ukrainisation of his narrow conception of Ukrainian nationality. To be a Ukrainian, argued Lobanov, was not 'determined by blood', but through one's identification with Ukrainian culture, and many Russians in the republic were increasingly finding themselves in that position.³⁷³ When Hrushevs'kyi delivered an embittered denunciation of Great Russian chauvinism and centralism, his speech was endorsed by none other than the future hangman of Ukraine, Pavel Postyshev.³⁷⁴ When the party and state leadership at the closing session of the 9th Congress of Soviets sang Shevchenko's *Zapovit* (Testament), the hymn of the national revival in 1917, this gesture symbolised a much more profound change of heart among the republic's leadership.³⁷⁵ If, as an official party policy, the Ukrainian version of indigenisation (*korenizatsiia*) went further than elsewhere,³⁷⁶ it was not merely because of mounting pressure from the depths of Ukrainian society. One feels that after the ravages of the long civil war in Ukraine, the leadership was relieved by Ukrainisation policies which allowed them to pursue the goal of national consolidation and reconciliation.³⁷⁷ Also, the republic's institutions had begun to foster the emergence of a new political elite. This elite, whose power and prestige were rooted in these institutions, defended them out of self-preservation. They supported the development of a distinct national identity, if only to reinforce their claims to power and authority.

There were, of course, many within the party who did not so much oppose Ukrainisation as ignore it, claiming that age and heavy responsibilities made it 'too difficult to learn Ukrainian because it is so similar to Russian'.³⁷⁸ This 'petty bourgeois or bureaucratic element' was quite 'capable of loving Little Russia with its charming gardens and white houses', so long as they did not have to learn the language of its people.³⁷⁹ Manuils'kyi said that 'Ukrainisation was a new revolution, which will overturn existing conditions' but to break the spine of 'chauvinist' inertia 'was not a matter of weeks or months, but a matter of years'.³⁸⁰

An important current within the party opposed concessions to

Ukrainian national aspirations and favoured political and economic centralisation. The centre of this opposition were the 'bosses' (*nachal'stvo*) in Donbass, especially those recently arrived from Russia to manage industry directly administered by all-union commissariats.³⁸¹ But in and of itself this current was too weak to reverse the very autonomist course charted by the majority of the party's leading cadres. It would take a massive intervention from outside and two large-scale purges before the party in Ukraine could be brought to heel. During the 1920s this opposition was steadily losing influence in the party. At a 1924 CPU Central Committee plenum party leaders expressed the hope that 'new social groups . . . for whom the Ukrainian language and culture are native' would carry forward the national policies initiated in 1923.³⁸² Our discussion of changes in the CPU membership shows that this was in fact the case.

THE BUREAUCRACY

The revolution brought basic transformations in the nature of elites. The old ruling classes were expropriated and in their place a new ruling elite comprised of those in authority in the various apparatuses of the party, state and social organisations was crystallising. The social weight of these administrators was due not only to their numbers, but also to the technical superiority and monopoly of culture that they enjoyed. 'You can throw out the tsar, throw out the landowners, throw out the capitalist . . . But you cannot "throw out" bureaucracy in a peasant country,' said Lenin in 1921, 'you can only reduce it by slow and stubborn effort'.³⁸³

Yet, 'the apparatus and the bureaucracy are growing despite all our attempts to limit this,' complained a delegate to the 8th CPU Conference in 1924. He showed how the 1924 reform designed to reduce the size of the bureaucracy merely produced the contrary effect. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (RSI) was pared down to 148 employees after the reform, only to have the tasks of financial control now performed by the CPU Central Committee, whose staff had mushroomed to 1200.³⁸⁴ Indeed, prior to the July 1924 reform the bureaucracy in Ukraine numbered 335 700; seven months later, 360 000.³⁸⁵

Before the idea became fashionable, Vynnychenko in 1920 warned that a new 'bureaucratic caste', a new 'Soviet bourgeoisie' had come into being. What made this bureaucracy worse in Ukraine was that it

had inherited from tsarism '300 years of imperialist dogma'.³⁸⁶ This was the apparatus that was to have been Ukrainised during the 1920s. After the military defeats of the national movement, if the national aspirations of Ukrainians were to be pursued and articulated, it would have to be through this bureaucracy or not at all. The major task facing the programme of national consolidation was to Ukrainise that bureaucracy in the fullest sense of the term. As we have already discussed the party, our task here will be to examine other groups involved in the organisation of society: white-collar staff and others who laboured with their minds.

Many laws, decrees and regulations were promulgated during the effort to Ukrainise the administration. The first significant announcement was a 1921 party resolution on the need to take measures to 'ensure that sufficient Ukrainian speakers are to be found in the state apparatus'.³⁸⁷ Only in 1923, however, was the Ukrainian language introduced as a language of work together with Russian in most branches of administration, both centrally and at the local level.³⁸⁸ White-collar staff could no longer be hired without special authorisation unless they knew Ukrainian or would undertake to learn the language in six months. In 1925 several laws were passed hastening the Ukrainisation of administration – all signs, forms, as well as the language of business were to change into Ukrainian.³⁸⁹ In 1927 further measures were taken ordering the Ukrainisation of cooperatives and voluntary associations. In addition to these general regulations, each locality and each administrative branch and enterprise had its own schedule of Ukrainisation worked out. During this period many deadlines for Ukrainisation were set and employees were threatened with losing their jobs if they did not comply with regulations by 1 January 1924, then 1 January 1925, 1 January 1926, 1 January 1927 and finally 1 July 1929.³⁹⁰ These dates alone are indicative of the problems which existed in this regard.

'Ukrainisation,' said Chubar in 1924, 'cannot be merely understood as the introduction of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainisation consists of involving in the work of the state the maximum number of representatives of the Ukrainian milieu.'³⁹¹ The starting point in both respects was extremely low. The only force that could carry out Ukrainisation, the Ukrainian intelligentsia, was outside the corridors of power. The struggle against the national movement had produced a situation where in 1921 'great power chauvinism' was rife in the state apparatus which was comprised of 'urban petty bourgeois elements' and where less than one in ten employees spoke the

TABLE 2.6 *Representation of major nationalities in occupation structure of Ukraine, 1926^a (in %)*

<i>Occupation</i>	<i>Total number</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>Jews</i>	<i>Others</i>
<i>Workers</i>	1 071 856	54.6	29.2	8.7	7.5
<i>White-collar staff</i>	750 130	51.7	25.0	16.9	6.4
<i>Liberal professions</i>	32 299	47.9	15.2	30.4	6.5
<i>Military</i>	119 046	50.0	39.6	3.7	6.7
<i>Craftsmen, artisans, merchants, small entrepreneurs</i>	518 978	40.0	12.0	42.3	5.7
<i>Peasants</i>	14 930 487	89.4	5.1	0.4	5.1

^a Economically active population only.

SOURCE *Perepis' 1926*, Vol. 28, Table 1.

indigenous language.³⁹² On the eve of Ukrainisation, 35 per cent of state employees were Ukrainian, and the state apparatus 'from top to bottom functioned in the Russian language, with few exceptions' (the primary exception was *Narkomos*).³⁹³ It was in 1923 that the party leadership extended an invitation to the Ukrainian intelligentsia to participate in the state administration.³⁹⁴ The intelligentsia responded enthusiastically, hoping to influence the Soviet Ukrainian regime. By 1925, 50 per cent of state employees were Ukrainian; by 1926, 54 per cent.³⁹⁵

The entry of Ukrainians into white-collar occupations, even when more propitious recruitment policies were adopted, was hindered by the historic inequalities in the social structure of the country. The mobilisation of Ukrainian society had only begun when the 1926 census was taken. The census showed that Ukrainians were poorly represented among white-collar staff and in the liberal professions (see Table 2.6). The situation in this respect was better than it had been prior to the revolution, but it improved vastly only in the final years of the 1920s.

The most comprehensive source of information on white-collar staff and mental labour in general after 1926 is the 1929 census of the labour force. When compared with the 1926 general population census returns, it enables us to gauge the impact of Ukrainisation policies on this strategic sector of society. In that three year period,

Ukrainians among those involved in all forms of mental labour (white-collar staff, medicine, law, culture, education) increased from 52 to 58 per cent. In 1926, 44 per cent of those involved in mental labour gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue. In 1929, according to the more stringent test, Ukrainian as the language in the home, the figure was 51 per cent. The national composition of the various age groups provides insight into future trends. Among those engaged in mental labour under the age of 35 (1929), Ukrainians represented 64 per cent of the total, whereas in the 51–55 age group they accounted for 49 per cent. When the results are analysed for Ukrainians alone, one can say that the cultural Russification of this stratum (mental labour), which weakened the social basis of Ukrainian national consciousness in the past, came to an end following the revolution: 83 per cent of Ukrainians engaged in mental labour spoke Ukrainian at home and the younger the age group the stronger the identification with the language. Moreover, 95 per cent of Ukrainians read and 85 per cent wrote in their native language, representing a large market (150 000) for the consumption of Ukrainian culture. The 1929 census returns also enable us to measure the success of Ukrainisation policies among those employed in all forms of mental labour: in 1926, 67 per cent of this group could read and 62 per cent could write in Ukrainian. Three years later the figures for the respective skills were 79 and 76 per cent.³⁹⁶

The strongest representation of Russians among those engaged in mental labour was among technical specialists (*spetsy*). In 1926 Russians in this category formed the largest single national group: 34 per cent of all specialists in all branches of the administration, 43 per cent in the case of industry and manufacturing.³⁹⁷ Among the specialists, the most important group was the engineers, whose role was to grow so large in the order being constructed under Stalin. This was a very self-assured group with all of the characteristics of a 'closed caste', wrote Antonenko-Davydovych.³⁹⁸ They were also the backbone of resistance to Ukrainisation and as 'highly qualified people' they were in fact exempt from Ukrainisation decrees.³⁹⁹ Among engineers in 1926 Ukrainians represented a mere 14 per cent of the total.⁴⁰⁰ Probably the most revealing figure of the extent of social mobilisation of Ukrainians in the second half of the 1920s is for the national composition of mining engineers, the aristocracy among the specialists. By 1929, half were Ukrainian.⁴⁰¹

The linguistic Ukrainisation of the state and economic administration is another aspect of the policy to consider. To introduce Ukrain-

ian as the language of business in administration was a radical measure. It meant the penetration of the national fact into a bureaucratic machine that for centuries had been the bulwark of Russification and colonisation. Modes of behaviour and attitudes that had become ingrained over the centuries had to be shattered. This mammoth task had to be carried out in a difficult context. Not the least of the difficulties was the absence of popular democracy in the face of *edinonachalie* (one-man management). Workers were always a good deal more enthusiastic about Ukrainisation than the management. The press of that period provides many examples of this. In a Kharkiv paper factory, to take once instance, the personnel had a positive attitude towards Ukrainisation and had carried it forward. But when a new director arrived, he ordered Russian to be used instead of Ukrainian.⁴⁰² In the case of the administration of the southern railways, the entire staff functioned in Ukrainian, except for the top managers, who stubbornly refused to make this move.⁴⁰³

Ukrainisation had to contend with the fact that most white-collar employees had been born and raised in the pre-revolutionary period and had never studied Ukrainian. To learn it, they had to attend Ukrainisation courses after work for several hours a day. Having completed the first phase of Ukrainisation, namely the acquisition of 'literacy in Ukrainian', they were tested and placed in a category according to their language skills. The second stage consisted of courses to familiarise them with Ukrainian culture and history.⁴⁰⁴ Ukrainisation courses were taxing in time and energy and it is not surprising that many complained about this additional burden.

To supervise the Ukrainisation of administration the state had a central commission, and similar bodies were created at every level of administration, down to the individual factory level. While this provided much employment for the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the shortage of competent 'Ukrainisation lecturers' remained a major problem in south-eastern regions of Ukraine. By 1926 the shortage of lecturers in Ukrainian language courses had been more or less overcome; specialists in culture and history remained at a premium.⁴⁰⁵ The dire shortage of technical literature was also a stumbling block in the Ukrainisation process. To understand the scope of the problem one has but to look at one branch of the economy, railway transport, where 5000 different terms had to be translated into Ukrainian.⁴⁰⁶

Ukrainisation was particularly difficult in all-Union enterprises, which according to the 1923 law, were exempt from the process.

After a good deal of pressure, all-Union enterprises were made subject to Ukrainisation norms. While their communication with the centre in Russia could take place in Russian, they had to use Ukrainian when dealing with local or republican institutions, and their staffs had to learn the language or face the threat of dismissal.⁴⁰⁷ It is not hard to imagine the reception given to these policies by the managerial strata at the centre. The reactions of a Moscow journalist writing for *Novyi mir* were not atypical in this respect. Visiting Donbass in 1929 he was shocked to find specialists grappling with Ukrainian grammar books and telephone operators who spoke only the Ukrainian language.⁴⁰⁸

The battle for Ukrainisation in the republic had to be waged in the face of growing hostility to this policy from the all-Union centre. The first major attack on Ukrainisation was made in 1926 when a high level Ukrainian delegation arrived in Moscow to give a report at a session of the All-Union Central Executive Committee. Led by Iu. Larin, Bukharin's protégé, Russian spokesmen confronted the Ukrainian delegation with a litany of complaints about the violations of the rights of Russians in the republic. The reaction of the Ukrainian leadership revealed much about the dominant mood in that milieu. Larin was attacked for 'offering a protectorate for Russian bureaucrats [*chinovniki*] in the national republics'.⁴⁰⁹ Chubar claimed Larin's intervention was an attempt to distract attention from the more pressing question, a fairer share of the allocation of resources for Ukraine's economic development.⁴¹⁰ Skrypnyk sensed that this was a move of a more fundamental nature: 'Larin says because of our initiative "we founded" many national republics. Congratulations, comrade Larin, you have forgotten that the idea of the USSR was Ukraine's initiative. Larin was opposed to the USSR and wanted to incorporate Ukraine into the RSFSR.' Zaton's'kyi claimed, 'Larin used to be in the *Spilka* [Ukrainian Social Democratic Union]. I worked with him there, so he knows perfectly well why we need the Ukrainian language. This is a manoeuvre on his part.' It was very revealing to learn who in Ukraine had helped Larin prepare his case. Petrov's'kyi said, 'Larin bases his facts on materials published in Russian by Russian comrades prepared by the NKVD. Only in the last 4–5 months did the NKVD hire its first Ukrainian.'⁴¹¹

To what extent did Ukrainisation succeed in converting the administration to use of Ukrainian as its business medium? Overall, the proportion of state business conducted in the Ukrainian language grew from 20 per cent in early 1925 to 70 per cent by the spring of

1927.⁴¹² The rural apparatus was virtually completely Ukrainised, and in major urban centres it made impressive inroads. In the city of Dnipropetrovs'k, for example, three-quarters of all paper work was Ukrainised.⁴¹³ The Ukrainisation of the military, aided by the gradual formation of a republican army, was initiated. Where Ukrainians predominated, regimental schools and business were completely Ukrainised.⁴¹⁴ Ukrainisation in the right and left banks was very successful, but less so, for obvious historic reasons, in the country's industrial heartland. The slowest to Ukrainise were economic and trade organisations where Ukrainisation did not begin until 1925. That year, a little more than a third of the business had been Ukrainised, although this varied from enterprise to enterprise.⁴¹⁵ Perhaps the most significant indicator of progress of the Ukrainisation of factory and trade enterprises was the proportion of functionaries examined and certified as knowing Ukrainian. Their weight increased from 46 per cent of the total in 1924 to 52 per cent in 1929. The progress was slow, but S. Iavors'kyi, reporting on Ukrainisation in the economic sphere, was optimistic that with further economic growth, the process would proceed full steam ahead.⁴¹⁶

CONCLUSION

For Ukrainians, a people with such a tortuous history, the indigenisation policies opened an avenue for their emergence into the ranks of nationhood. The Georgian Menshevik N. Iordania assessed these policies as follows: 'From the standpoint of national relationships, Bolsheviks have pushed ahead unhistorical nations and have brought them onto the path of rebirth. For instance, before our very eyes Ukraine has been created.'⁴¹⁷ This assessment, not uncommon at that time, is only partially correct. It overlooks the fact that through protracted struggle, the Ukrainian nation paid a heavy price in extracting the 'Ukrainisation' concession from its new rulers. Also overlooked are the social transformations after 1917 which made Ukrainisation a 'natural process' in which the party had scarcely any choice but to participate, if it was to contain the forces unleashed by the changes. As A. Khvyliia remarked at the 10th CPU Congress in 1927, without Ukrainisation, 'we would have a civil war in Ukraine under nationalist slogans'.⁴¹⁸

Ukrainisation's successes were not so much the product of regulations, laws, rules and threats of dismissal, although these played a

role. The policy achieved much because it legitimised the outpouring of the energy and zeal of thousands of local activists. Every town and village, every government department and factory, had its individuals such as Piven' in Nikopol', described by Antonenko-Davydovych as the 'pillar of Ukrainisation in that city', or 'comrade Karpenko' and his friends who in 'seemingly Russified Stalino . . . stubbornly everywhere, even when welcoming writers from Moscow, spoke only in Ukrainian — these are the pillars of Ukrainisation . . .'.⁴¹⁹ These initiatives were possible also because the regime, although authoritarian, was not yet totalitarian. The social trends during the 1920s constantly added fresh cadres to the existing corps of activists.

Stalin's point at the 12th CPSU Congress, 'You won't get far with Ukrainising the schools only . . . You must introduce industrialisation to succeed', was well taken, although this was not the whole story.⁴²⁰ The background to Ukrainisation was NEP, a period of steady, but relatively slow economic growth. If one examines the Ukrainisation process over the entire span of the 1920s, the process scored its most important successes towards the end of the decade, when economic expansion facilitated the absorption of young people into the labour force. Of course, the Ukrainised school had prepared them for their working life. But Ukrainisation was not merely a question of form, it was one of substance as well. What was at stake was whether the new social weight of the Ukrainian fact would be able to place on the agenda further measures for the self-emancipation of the Ukrainian nation. As Ukraine approached the end of its 'golden era,' the republic, with the introduction of the first five year plan, witnessed an accretion by the Moscow centre of its authority in every field. The first major blow at the content of Ukrainisation came in the wake of the trial of 'bourgeois specialists' in the Shakhty region in March 1928 with an attack on the Ukrainian intelligentsia.⁴²¹ When in 1929 the new General Secretary of the CPU, S. Kosior, praised the form of Ukrainisation, but attacked the 'elite' of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and insisted that the content must be given a new 'class character',⁴²² he announced in effect the beginning of the end of Ukrainisation. In less than five years' time, the form itself would be declared too subversive to tolerate.

3 Ukrainian Society in the 1930s

POPULATION

Far-reaching changes in Ukrainian society occurred during the 1930s. Urbanisation, industrialisation, and the expansion of education transformed the social structure of the Ukrainian nation. With Ukrainians emerging as a majority in all the categories indicating social mobilisation, it seemed that the social preconditions for national consolidation had been laid. But the entry of the Ukrainian nation into modernity was accompanied by the unleashing of terror on a mass scale during which millions died and the nation's cultural and political elite was eliminated. Ukrainisation was abandoned and Russian supremacy was imposed. A totalitarian regime was established under which the state and its apparatus of repression destroyed all semblance of civil society. The most appropriate question we can ask concerning the 1930s is: what of the Ukrainian nation survived that decade?

In studying those years we are severely handicapped by a lack of data. As the regime rose to its full totalitarian posture it suppressed information to cover up its deeds. The 1937 census, for example, was declared 'counter-revolutionary' and its results were not released. To this day the Soviet regime has not provided a full breakdown of the population of Ukraine according to nationality in the light of the following census, that of 1939. Throughout the entire 1930s less than a dozen statistical handbooks were published. But this period is a watershed in Ukrainian history; piecing together fragmentary evidence one can reconstruct social developments during those eventful years.

Ukrainians had among the highest rates of natural increase of any nation in Europe during the second half of the 1920s.¹ The favourable demographic trends during the 1920s ought to have produced a sizeable increase in the population of Ukraine in the next decade. This did not occur because collectivisation, the man-made famine of

1932–3 and the purges decimated the population of the republic. These events will be discussed below: here our concern is to analyse the demographic impact of these tragedies.

How many millions died during the famine of 1932–3? Harry Lang, editor of the left-wing Jewish daily *Forward*, published in New York, visited Kharkiv in 1933 and was told by a high-ranking state official: “Six million people perished from the famine in our country. . . .” The official paused, and repeated, “six million!”² The *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, on the basis of discussions with officials in Moscow, concluded that at least six million perished in Ukraine.³

Official statistics published during the 1930s were notorious for their falsifications, yet even they confirm the major decrease in population. In the autumn of 1932, Petrovs’kyi claimed that the population of Ukraine was 32.1 million and also stated that the increase in the population for 1933 would probably amount to 622 000.⁴ In 1934, according to P. P. Liubchenko’s report to the 7th Congress of Soviets in Moscow, Ukraine had thirty million people.⁵ Thus in 1933 alone, almost three million people disappeared.

The effects of the famine and the purges can also be noted by comparing the results of the 1939 general population census with those of the 1926 census. In 1939, Ukraine’s population (within 1926 boundaries) was 30.9 million; in 1926, 29.0 million. Under normal conditions, according to M. V. Ptukha’s 1931 projections, Ukraine (within 1926 boundaries) ought to have had 36 million people. Over 5 million people were missing.⁶ According to M. Maksudov, whose study of population loss in Ukraine takes migration into account, the available sources allow a ‘minimum estimate’ of 4.5 million unnatural deaths in Ukraine between 1927 and 1938. The real figure, according to the author, was probably higher.⁷

‘Ukrainians,’ as the Polish scholar J. Radziejowski pointed out, ‘were not the only ones to suffer during this period. But if we speak of collectivisation in particular, they surely have the sad distinction of being its greatest victims.’⁸ In 1926, there were 31.2 million Ukrainians in the USSR, but in 1939, 28.1 million: over a thirteen year period the number of Ukrainians diminished by 3.1 million, or almost 10 per cent. The population of the USSR, on the other hand, increased by 16 per cent, and the number of Russians by 27 per cent.⁹ Some, who refuse to recognise the fact that the famine took millions of lives in Ukraine, have suggested that the decline in the number of Ukrainians in the USSR can be explained by the assimilation of Ukrainians into a Russian national identity.¹⁰ Comparison with the Belorussians, who faced the same assimilatory pressures but did not experience the

TABLE 3.1 *National composition of the population of Ukraine, 1926–39^a*

	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>(%) of total</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>(%) of total</i>	<i>Others</i>	<i>(%) of total</i>
1926	29 733 000	23 296 000	78.4	2 977 000	10.0	3 460 000	11.6
1939	31 785 000	23 362 000	73.5	4 100 000	12.9	4 323 000	13.6

^a Includes the Crimea.

SOURCES Table 2.1; V. Sadovs'kyi, 'Ukrainci poza mezhany USSR na osnovi perepysu 1926 r.', *Ukrains'ka liudnist' SSSR* (Warsaw, 1931) p. 139; V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR. Etnodemograficheskii obzor* (Moscow, 1975), Table 13, pp. 108–9.

famine is particularly significant here. Although the Belorussians' sense of national identity was considerably weaker than that of the Ukrainians', Belorussians, between 1926 and 1939, registered an 11.3 per cent increase.

According to Radziejowski's calculations, there ought to have been 33.7 million Ukrainians in the Soviet Union in 1939. Instead, there were only 28.1 million, which meant a demographic loss of 9.3 million people.¹¹ Perhaps the most accurate and comprehensive assessment of the total number of Ukrainians who died during the 1930s was provided by V. Kubijovyč, a leading Ukrainian émigré demographer. He estimates that approximately three million Ukrainians died as a result of the famine, one million during collectivisation and the purges, and an additional two to three million were deported to Siberia and other regions.¹²

Until recently it was impossible to evaluate the effects of the events of the 1930s on the ethno-demographic structure of Ukraine. V. I. Kozlov's study, published in 1975, was the first to make public the number of Ukrainians and Russians in the Ukrainian SSR in the light of the 1939 census. His figures include the Crimea. Comparing the 1939 census results with those of 1926 (including the Crimea), we find that the Ukrainians' share of the republic's population dropped by 5 per cent, whereas the number of Russians increased by 3 per cent (see Table 3.1). This development reflected the impact of collectivisation, the famine and the purges on the Ukrainian population. It was also brought about by the sizable Russian immigration that occurred during the 1930s, especially the influx of many Russian functionaries who arrived to take control of the republic's institutions. In 1938, for example, almost a quarter of those migrated to urban centres in Ukraine came from outside the boundaries of the republic.¹³

Khrushchev was right when he wrote, 'Perhaps we'll never know how many people perished directly as a result of collectivisation, or indirectly as a result of Stalin's eagerness to blame his failure on others.'¹⁴ What we do know is that Ukrainians were not merely incidental victims of the Stalinist terror that gripped the entire Soviet Union. There was as we discuss below, a Ukrainian specificity to the terror, a perverse recognition of Ukrainians' claims to separate development.

URBANISATION

Stalin, in a 1931 speech to Soviet industrial administrators, explained the need to maintain high levels of industrial growth in the following way:

The tempo must not be reduced! . . . To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her – because of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, political backwardness, cultural backwardness, agricultural backwardness, industrial backwardness. . . You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary poet: 'You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia.' . . . This is why we must no longer lag behind.¹⁵

This panegyric to Russian nationalism made it clear whose interests were foremost in the industrialisation drive. To understand how Ukraine's urban growth suffered from the instrumental role assigned to Ukraine, it is first necessary to trace the main features of the republic's economic development during the 1930s.

To begin with, during the 1930s, Moscow assumed control over the entire economy of Ukraine. In 1935, for example, 84 per cent of the republic's industrial capital was in the hands of all-Union enterprises.¹⁶ Ukraine was obliged to subsidise economic development in other parts of the Soviet Union. During the first five-year plan, a

third of all capital created in the republic was exported. The sum involved represented 53.3 per cent of all capital investments in the Ukrainian economy during the first five-year plan.¹⁷ Industrial growth in Ukraine focused primarily on the Donbass-Dnipro coal-metallurgical complex, since the region, as Stalin pointed out in 1931, 'supplied metal to our industrial regions . . . [and] coal to the principal enterprises in the Soviet Union'.¹⁸ The intensive economic development of these regions, however, was seen as a stop-gap measure until a coal-metallurgical complex could be established in Russia, in the Urals and to the east of the mountain range.¹⁹ In the second five-year plan, Donbass' and Dnipro's share of investment dropped.²⁰

The branches of industry producing finished-goods were sorely neglected in Ukraine. As late as May 1932 Ukrainian economists still had the audacity to pass a resolution at one of their congresses demanding that the five-year plan should be oriented towards consumer goods and that the 'irrational practice' of exporting raw materials to Russia and importing finished products be abandoned. Ukrainian light industry, they argued, should receive five times more capital investment than was allocated in the first five-year plan, and the new productive capacity should be located in the right-bank Ukraine.²¹ Following the purges of 1933, no one dared make the same point again, at least not in public. In 1928, the consumer goods industry (sector B) represented 47 per cent of Ukraine's gross industrial production; by 1937 its share declined to 38 per cent. In the Soviet Union as a whole, sector B still represented 42 per cent of gross industrial production in 1937.²² I. S. Koropec'kyj, who studied industrial locations politics in Ukraine during the 1930s, concluded that as a result of these policies, 'some branches of the heavy industry in which Ukraine was already well developed expanded rapidly, while there was very little progress in light industry . . . The imbalance between producer-and-consumer goods branches widened further.'²³

The imbalance existed not only between producer-goods and consumer-goods branches but also between individual branches of heavy industry. This was particularly the case in machine-building and ferrous metallurgy, which specialised in 'branches requiring less processing'.²⁴ In 1932, for example, while Ukraine supplied 70 per cent of the Soviet Union's coal, iron ore and pig iron, and 63 per cent of its steel, it provided only 23 per cent of the USSR's finished metal products, and by 1937 this declined to 21 per cent.²⁵

Of course, in the climacteric industrialisation era of the 1930s

Ukraine's economy expanded rapidly: by 1940, industrial production had increased 7.3 times as compared with the 1913 figure. However, the increase for the USSR as a whole was 7.6, and for Russia 8.9.²⁶ The growth rate differential must be seen against the background of Ukraine's industrial potential. Capital productivity, for example, was much higher there than in other regions of the USSR.²⁷ The argument that Ukraine's development had to be held back in order to facilitate the location of industry, for strategic reasons, east of the Urals does not explain the economic anomaly. It was the traditional centres of the European parts of Russia that experienced the most rapid growth in final-goods industries.²⁸ Leningrad's industry, for example, expanded eleven-fold between 1928 and 1940.²⁹ The eastern regions, like Ukraine, supplied raw materials for Russian industry. Defence considerations would have required the development of all stages of production in the east. Ukraine's economic predicament reflected the rise of an aggressive Russian nationalism during the 1930s. Fedir Butenko, a Soviet diplomat serving in Romania who defected in 1938, told an Italian newspaper that 'all chemical, aeronautic and military industry, machine-building and electro-technical industry' had been concentrated in Russia. 'From the point of view of industrial development, Ukraine now resembles a colony of Moscow.'³⁰

The economic policies entailed two major consequences for Ukraine's urbanisation during the 1930s. First, while the increase in the urban population was the highest in Ukraine's history – from 5.4 to 11.2 million between 1926 and 1939 – on a comparative basis, Ukraine ranked seventh among the eleven republics in the rate of urban population growth.³¹ (Approximately 20 per cent of Ukraine's urban population growth was due to the reclassification of villages and rural settlements into towns.)³² In the intercensal period the proportion of urban residents increased from 18.5 to 36.2 per cent of the population total.

Secondly, since only cities tied to coal and iron ore experienced substantial growth during the 1930s, the regional imbalances in the distribution of the republic's urban population were greatly accentuated.³³ Three-quarters of the increase in Ukraine's urban population between 1926 and 1939 was claimed by the Donbass and Dnipro regions. By 1939, 48 per cent of the republic's total urban population was centred in those areas, as compared with 26 per cent in 1926. In 1939, 74 per cent of Donbass' population lived in towns. The urban population of the right bank, on the other hand, stag-

nated. In 1926, 16.1 per cent on the population of the right bank lived in towns; by 1939, 20.5 per cent. That increase was almost entirely due to the transfer of Ukraine's capital from Kharkiv to Kiev in 1934: the city of Kiev was responsible for two-thirds of the urban population growth in right-bank Ukraine between 1926 and 1939. In the case of Polissia, the rate of urbanisation actually dropped by 5 per cent between 1926 and 1939.³⁴

In the course of industrialisation, the rural population of Ukraine declined from 24 to 20 million between 1926 and 1939.³⁵ The new circumstances of peasant life which collectivisation brought about accelerated the migration of peasants to the city. According to M. Kulischer, most of the two million new urban residents of the Donbass, Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovs'k and Kharkiv regions were Ukrainian peasants.³⁶ This migration changed the national composition of Ukraine's urban population. Between 1926 and 1939 the number of Ukrainians in towns increased from 2.5 to 6.8 million and the rate of urbanisation among Ukrainians rose to 29 per cent by 1939, almost triple the 1926 figure. By 1939, Ukrainians had emerged as a majority of the urban population – 58.1 per cent.³⁷

There is no doubt that the opportunities created for urban immigration during the 1930s were seized by Ukrainians. In those areas where collectivisation was most intense, the flow of people from the country to urban areas was greatest.³⁸ The increase in the Ukrainian urban representation would have been much higher had it not been for the demographic catastrophe of 1932–3 which diminished the number of Ukrainians available for urbanisation. Moreover, to combat the spontaneous process of immigration, which created problems in 'labour discipline', a series of laws regulating migration was passed in 1931 and 1932. Organised methods of labour recruitment based on contracts concluded between collective farms and recruiting agencies were introduced. Even this was insufficient to stem large-scale migration, and on the 27 December 1932 a passport was introduced for the urban population which was also to register their place of residence. By making the peasant apply for a passport in his village and report his destination, migration to towns was artificially controlled.³⁹

Urbanisation during the 1930s was accompanied by intense social strain. There was a chronic shortage of housing in industrial centres. Iu. Lapchyns'kyi reported in 1932 that almost 60 per cent of the 1931 housing plan was unfulfilled.⁴⁰ Hundreds of thousands of people lived in wretched make-shift shacks, *nakhalovky* as they were called in Donbass, constructed from cardboard, or whatever other materials

came into hand. Food supply was in perpetual crisis and in 1932–3 famine struck the industrial centres.⁴¹ The social tensions were responsible for a rise in nationalism among Ukrainians in the industrial south-east. For example, discussing the 1930 CPU Central Committee resolution 'On Ukrainisation in Industrial Regions', a *Visti* article noted that 'national enmity is greatly increasing in Donbass'. It stated that newly arrived Ukrainian workers were mocked and taunted by officials who refused to recognise the workers' national and social rights. In some cities of Donbass, Ukrainians rioted. The article called for accelerated Ukrainisation to prevent further outbreaks of violence.⁴² By 1933, the combination of the new influx of Ukrainian-speaking peasants and Ukrainisation resulted in a situation where all schools in Makiivka, a major mining centre in Donbass, were Ukrainised.⁴³ But the Ukrainisation solution to some of the tensions bred by urbanisation was abandoned in 1933 at the very time when Ukrainisation was on the verge of success.

CLASS STRUCTURE

In 1930 there began what Lev Kopelev called 'the destruction of the peasantry, that is, pulling out the living roots of national historical existence'.⁴⁴ The immediate background was the problem of meeting highly unrealistic goals set by the Stalinist leadership in the first five-year plan. It must be remembered that throughout most of the 1920s Stalin opposed planning and industrialisation. Had preparations for industrialisation been made early in the 1920s, this would have allowed time to think through economic strategies and permit their more gradual implementation. Rather, it was only in 1928–9 that Stalin, very abruptly, changed direction. The result was a highly improvised and dilettantish first five-year plan. Rudzutak, a leading Soviet economic official, in his 1934 report provided many instances of the chaos which existed in industry at that time. Plans for the Tagil engineering works, for example, had to be altered nine times in twenty-six months, involving a loss of several hundred million rubles. As a result of poor and hasty planning, 50 per cent of the manufactures produced by the Stankolit works in Moscow were entirely useless.⁴⁵ Because too many projects had been started simultaneously, and too many resources had been wasted through bureaucratic incompetence, by 1930 an acute shortage of capital made itself felt. The depression in the West which saw grain prices drop sharply

in relation to those of manufactured goods, compounded the effects of economic mismanagement. In order to industrialise, equipment from the West had to be imported. To pay for it, the USSR exported grain. Now more grain would have to be exported for the same quantity of equipment. More grain had to be squeezed out of the peasantry and the quickest method of doing this was, in the words of Stalin, 'to establish a system whereby the collective farmers will deliver to the state and the cooperative organisations the whole of their marketable grain under penalty. . . .'⁴⁶ Ukraine, as the Soviet Union's major grain producing area, was singled out for accelerated collectivisation.⁴⁷

The scope of collectivisation that was proclaimed caught everyone, including CPU and state officials, by surprise. In the autumn of 1929, several months before 'total collectivisation' was ordered, collective farms (of all kinds) represented a mere 3.7 per cent of Ukraine's arable land and 5.6 per cent of the total number of rural households. This was the result of almost two years of intensive campaigning for the voluntary formation of collective farms.⁴⁸ The original version of the first five-year plan called for collectivisation of approximately 10 per cent of Ukraine's arable land by the end of 1932, with rudimentary forms of collective labour as the dominant organisational form, not collective farms.⁴⁹ In November 1929, however, the CPSU Politburo ordered collectivisation in Ukraine to be speeded up in order to 'intensify export and the production of raw materials for industry'.⁵⁰ Initially, peasants were to have been allowed to keep livestock for their personal consumption. The revised plan called for the establishment of collective farms on 20 per cent of the republic's arable land involving 30 per cent of peasant households by the end of 1932.⁵¹ In February 1930 the policy was again changed. All peasant households were ordered to be collectivised by the autumn of 1930 and the 'complete socialisation' of all peasant livestock was decreed.⁵² War was declared on the Ukrainian peasant.

An essential component of forced collectivisation, according to Stalin, was the 'elimination of kulaks as a class' in order to 'replace their output by the output of the collective farms and state farms'.⁵³ In reality, the destruction of kulaks had little to do with economic considerations. By Stalin's own admission, kulaks supplied only a fifth of the Soviet Union's marketable grain surplus (that is, grain not consumed in the countryside). The middle and poor peasants furnished three-quarters.⁵⁴ The procurement campaigns of 1928 and 1929 had already crippled the richer peasants as producers. In 1929 in

particular the heavy fines imposed on the richer peasants, including the confiscation of the property of 33 000 households for the non-delivery of grain quotas, undermined the economic power of this sector of the peasantry.⁵⁵

The word 'kulak' conjures up an image of a wealthy, grasping peasant. The reality had little in common with the myth. The average annual income per working peasant in the richest kulak household in Ukraine, that is, one with over 16.5 hectares of land, was 200 rubles in 1924. The average annual income of a worker, on the other hand, was 521 rubles, not including the many social security benefits which workers enjoyed and which were not available to the peasantry.⁵⁶ When the 'dekulakisation' campaign was started, the Soviet regime was at a loss for a definition of what constituted a kulak. A haphazard set of criteria were produced. For example, a household owning a motor of any kind was classified as belonging to the kulak category.⁵⁷ Even the seemingly more solid definition of a kulak household as one hiring labour, was off the mark.

As Maksudov has shown, the majority of those employing labour in the countryside were invalids of the First World War and the revolution, widows and families with few children. Some peasant households did, of course, own more land than others. But these households, as a general rule, also had larger families to support. According to agricultural surveys carried out in Ukraine in 1929, 71 500 households were classified as kulak.⁵⁸ But in the course of the dekulakisation campaign, which began in January 1930 and continued until 1932, according to official sources, 200 000 kulak households (or approximately one million people) were 'liquidated'.⁵⁹ Dekulakisation was primarily intended to rid the countryside of the natural leadership of the peasantry. As V. Gsovski noted, 'it was not so much the prosperity of a peasant as his attitude towards collectivisation which determined his class character'.⁶⁰

During dekulakisation, kulaks had their property confiscated and were forbidden to join collective farms. The kulaks were divided into three groups. The first group, called 'counter-revolutionary kulak activists', was composed of peasants who actively resisted collectivisation; they were either executed or sent to prison camps and their families were deported. The 'wealthiest kulaks', who made up the second group, were deported with their families to remote regions of the Soviet Union. The rest were ordered to leave their districts. These were the general rules established by the CPSU Politburo in January 1930. Their implementation varied greatly from region to

region.⁶¹ In Ukraine, the dekulakisation campaign took on especially brutal forms:

Barefooted and underclothed peasants were jammed into railroad cars and transported to the regions of Murmansk, Vologda, Kotlas and the like. This kurkulisation [*kurkul'* is the Ukrainian for kulak] was carried on in the Russian districts, but here it took on a more human form, if one may apply that term here. Those Russian kurkuls whose property was taken away were often allowed to remain in their villages and if they were deported they were generally deported to the western districts of Siberia or the region of Sadensk. The death rate amongst the expropriated Russian peasants was disproportionately lower. . .⁶²

According to one eyewitness account, peasants were 'unloaded into the snow about six feet deep. The frost registered at 75 degrees below zero. . . . Without even an axe or a saw we began building huts from tree branches. In two weeks all the children, the sick and the aged had frozen to death.' The death rate among Ukrainian peasants deported to Nadezhdinsk in the Sverdlovsk region in Russia was typical: only 2300 out of the original group of 4800 survived the winter.⁶³

Forced collectivisation unleashed wide and spontaneous resistance among all strata of village society. Peasant revolts broke out in most regions of Ukraine. In Chernihiv, the 21st Red Army regiment joined the peasant rebellion.⁶⁴ Everywhere peasants slaughtered their livestock, burnt their crops, and as many as could fled to the cities. *Komnezamy*, hitherto the mainstay of the party in rural areas, became 'hostile to the Soviet regime'.⁶⁵ Rural state and party officials opposed collectivisation. In 1930 a fifth of all rural state and party functionaries were dismissed on charges of 'right opportunism'.⁶⁶ The army, the GPU, the militia and armed brigades of reliable urban party members were sent into the villages to implement collectivisation. Just as in earlier revolts against the Soviet regime, during forced collectivisation the village poor were in the forefront of unrest. According to a newspaper report, the slaughter of animals was carried out mostly by poor and middle peasants.⁶⁷ V. A. Iakovtsevskii, a Soviet historian, pointed out that resistance to collectivisation was greatest among the poor peasants who had recently obtained land and among the middle peasantry who had recently risen from the ranks of the poor.⁶⁸

The publication of Stalin's article 'Dizzy with Success' was evidence that the Soviet leadership had become nervous about rural unrest. Stalin admitted that 'excesses' had occurred during collectivisation, and pinned the entire blame on local officials.⁶⁹ The Ukrainian press, during the momentary thaw which followed the publication of Stalin's article, published several accounts which gave some indication of how collectivisation had been carried out. The homes of poor and middle peasants, according to one report, were razed in the middle of the night, and the peasants forced at gunpoint to enter collective farms. Confiscated property was often stolen by urban brigades. The militia roamed village streets arresting anyone in sight. Communalisation of property in many villages extended even to clothes and footwear.⁷⁰

The emphasis on the 'voluntary' nature of collective farms following Stalin's article was prompted by the fear that growing peasant resistance would severely damage spring sowing. Peasants were allowed to leave collective farms, and in Ukraine a mass exodus occurred. Whereas on 1 March 1930, 69 per cent of the arable land and 63 per cent of peasant households had been collectivised, by May 1930 the corresponding figures were 50 and 41 per cent.⁷¹ This permitted the regime to get the situation in the countryside under control and it also facilitated work on the fields, resulting in a good harvest in 1930: 23.1 million tonnes. That year 7.7 million tonnes of grain were taken from Ukraine, or a third of the harvest. 'That Ukraine was being exploited,' wrote V. Holubnychy, 'can be seen from the fact that while the total grain harvest in Ukraine amounted to 27 per cent of the all-Union harvest in 1930, the consignment of grain in Ukraine accounted for 38 per cent of the grain consigned in the entire Soviet Union in 1930.'⁷² The amount of grain taken out of Ukraine in 1930 was 2.3 times what it had been in 1926. Three factors made this possible. Climatic conditions were optimal that year, the private sector boosted production and, finally, the requisition campaign was so intense that seed grain needed for the following year was confiscated. Reassured by this success, forced collectivisation was renewed, and by 1931, 65 per cent of rural households and 67 per cent of arable land had been collectivised. By 1933, the figures were 73 and 86 per cent respectively.⁷³ The 1931 quota for grain delivery to the state was set at the level achieved in 1930 – 7.7 million tonnes. Very early in 1932 famine appeared in Ukraine, and it ravaged the countryside until the end of 1933.

In explaining why the famine occurred, two factors must be mentioned by way of providing background information. The first was the collapse of agricultural production brought about by collectivisation. Rather than surrender their animals to the collectives, many peasants slaughtered them: in 1928 there were 7.0 million pigs in Ukraine, in 1933, 2.1 million; cattle declined in the same period from 8.6 to 4.4 million and the number of horses from 5.4 to 2.6 million.⁷⁴ This not only meant that meat delivery quotas could not be fulfilled, it also accentuated what was always a major problem in Ukrainian agriculture – the shortage of draught animals. The production of tractors was in its infancy and could not replace animal power. In 1932, for example, Ukraine had on the average one tractor per collective farm.⁷⁵ Moreover, tractors were under a separate jurisdiction from the collective farms; they belonged to the Machine Tractor Stations, an arrangement which was opposed by the Ukrainian leadership on the grounds that it made an effective integration of agricultural production impossible.⁷⁶ The tractors themselves were of extremely low quality and were constantly breaking down. During the fateful harvest of 1932, to give an example, 70 per cent of the tractors in Dnipropetrovs'k *oblast'* were inoperative in August, and by September this had increased to 90 per cent.⁷⁷ The peasantry was given no incentive to produce. By the end of 1930, 78 per cent of collective farms had failed to pay peasants their 'labour days' worked.⁷⁸ Moreover, the 'labour day' payment in Ukraine (in kilograms of food produce) was half what it was in Russia.⁷⁹ Collective farms were excessively large, reflecting the mania for gargantuan projects that dominated Stalinist economic thinking; the Ukrainian leadership had called for small 'cooperative collectives'.⁸⁰ Highly bureaucratised in their decision-making structure, collective farms left no room for individual or group initiatives. In 1932 some collective farm chairmen wished to sow rye instead of wheat, arguing that rye was a more suitable crop for their region. 'These bearers of anti-wheat sentiments must be severely punished,' was the reply that came from Moscow.⁸¹ The combination of all these factors resulted in unbelievable chaos in production. Between 1931 and 1932 the total sowing area in Ukraine contracted by one fifth; in 1931, almost 30 per cent of the grain yield was lost during the harvest.⁸²

To add to the difficulties, a drought affected Ukraine. It began in 1931 and was limited largely to the steppe region.⁸³ In 1934 another far more serious drought developed. The disruption in agricultural

production together with climatic conditions caused relatively poor yields in 1931, 1932 and especially in 1934. The 1931 harvest, according to official sources, gave 18.3 million tonnes of grain, considerably less than the 23.1 million tonne figure of 1930. In 1932, 14.6 million tonnes were harvested, in 1933, 22.3 and in 1934, 12.3 million tonnes.⁸⁴

The factors we have mentioned, chaos in agricultural production and the drought, contributed to the famine, but they were not its main cause. In 1934, the year of the poorest harvest, there was no famine in Ukraine. Responsibility for the famine rested with the Stalinist leadership and the draconian grain requisition quotas that were imposed on Ukraine in order to maintain the heady pace of industrialisation. In 1931, 7.7 million tonnes were ordered to be requisitioned from Ukraine, the same as in 1930, even though the harvest was 20 per cent less than in 1930. Moscow ordered that the grain be obtained at any cost and applied enormous pressure to that end. Troops and police were used to take all peasant stocks. Seven million tonnes were obtained, leaving the average peasant household in Ukraine with only 112 kilograms of grain. 'For the peasants, whose main staple had for centuries been bread, this was a catastrophe.'⁸⁵ The amount of grain requisitioned was so great that the republic was short of seed grain by 45 per cent.⁸⁶

Anxious about the impending catastrophe, the Ukrainian leadership argued with Moscow for a major downward revision of its agricultural obligations for the year 1932. The amount was lowered to 6.2 million tonnes, but this was still far above the capacities of the republic in view of the poor harvest – 14.6 million tonnes of grain, of which 40 per cent was lost during the harvest because of the breakdown of machinery and the chaotic transportation system.⁸⁷ To ensure that the Ukrainian party obeyed orders, a special mission headed by Molotov and Kaganovich arrived in Kharkiv (then the capital of Ukraine). Every conceivable method was used to extract 6.2 million tonnes. The state and party apparatus was purged in those regions that lagged behind in grain requisition; newspapers that failed to campaign aggressively for the collection of grain had their staffs dismissed; every third person holding a responsible position in the collective farms was purged; troops and armed brigades were sent into the villages to carry out mass repression of peasants who did not surrender their last morsel of bread.⁸⁸

It was during the 1932 harvest, in August, that the infamous law was passed stipulating the death penalty and, under exceptional

circumstances, a ten year sentence in a labour camp, for 'theft of socialist property'.⁸⁹ Visiting assizes of the regional court of Dnipropetrovsk *oblast'*, for example, sentenced peasants to the firing squad for the theft of a sack of wheat.⁹⁰ Ukrainian farmers became 'the most numerous' among 'political offenders' in the Soviet Gulag.⁹¹ According to the last available information, in early January 1933, 75 per cent of the grain quota was fulfilled, that is, 4.7 million tonnes.⁹² This left the average peasant family with 80 kilograms of grain with which to feed itself.⁹³

The famine, which began in January 1932, finally subsided in 1934, when the 1933 harvest was brought in. This was because Ukraine, lacking 55 per cent of its seed grain, was 'lent' seed grain by Moscow, and more significantly, Moscow reduced the quantity of grain to be delivered to the state to 5.0 million tonnes, even though the 1933 harvest was 22.3 million tonnes of grain.⁹⁴ 1934 could have been a famine year as well, since the grain harvest was a mere 12.3 million tonnes. It was not, however, because the amount of grain requisitioned was reduced further and Stalin even released grain from existing stocks to feed the population.⁹⁵ He could have done something similar in 1932–3, but he did not, and one of the worst famines in human history raged in Ukraine.

What is important to stress about the 1932–3 famine in Ukraine is that it was artificially created and that no effort was made to relieve the plight of its victims. When Ukraine was famine stricken, the Soviet regime exported 1.7 million tonnes of grain to the West.⁹⁶ The offers of international relief organisations to assist the starving were rejected on the grounds that there was no famine in Ukraine and hence no need to aid its victims.⁹⁷ Moreover, the borders of Ukraine were closely patrolled, and starving Ukrainian peasants were not allowed to cross into Russia in search for bread.⁹⁸

Because many eyewitness accounts of the famine have been published we need not describe in detail the ghastly scenes which were to be observed in Ukraine throughout 1932 and 1933. But something has to be said about the famine as a lived experience, for the event cannot be understood only through the presentation of the economic factors which brought it about. Victor Kravchenko, a former Soviet official, wrote that 'on the battlefield men die quickly, they fight back, they are sustained by fellowship and a sense of duty'. But in Ukrainian villages throughout 1932–3, he observed, 'I saw people dying in solitude by slow degrees, dying hideously. . . . They had been trapped and left to starve, each in his home, by a political

decision made in a far-off capital around conference and banquet tables.⁹⁹

The main victims of the famine were not even the imagined enemies of the Soviet regime, the kulaks, since they had been eliminated by 1932 when the famine began. It was the poor and middle peasantry who died agonising deaths in the millions. The death of hundreds of thousands of children was perhaps the most horrible scene to be observed in Ukraine. They would lie on the streets and in the ditches, trying to gather their remaining force to look for something to eat. But they were so weak that they would remain lying there, until death released them from their agony. 'The poor children,' wrote a German agricultural expert who travelled throughout Ukraine in 1933, 'perished like wild beasts.'¹⁰⁰ Hundreds of thousands of children were orphaned and many of these foraged the countryside in search of food and were ultimately eliminated by troops and the police by means of mass executions.¹⁰¹

What happened in the village of Pleshkan in the Poltava district was typical. Prior to the famine the village had 2000 inhabitants. Only 982 people survived by eating everything, all the dogs and cats, the barks of trees, all sorts of roots. There was a school in the village before 1932–3, with all four rooms filled with children. After the famine the school was closed—there were no children left to attend it.¹⁰²

The effects of the experience of collectivisation and the famine on the attitudes of the peasantry may have been reflected in the findings of the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System which interviewed Soviet refugees after the Second World War. When asked 'whether or not it would be a good idea to drop an atom bomb on Moscow', half the Ukrainian collective farmers answered yes, twice the proportion of the Russian collective farmers.¹⁰³ But though the Ukrainian peasantry seethed with hatred for Moscow, Moscow's agrarian policies had destroyed them as a social force. The institutions of collective and democratic decision-making in the village, such as the *hromady* (community assemblies) were liquidated. Collectivisation destroyed the age-old collectivism of rural life. The Ukrainian village was silenced, and never again rose in opposition to the Soviet regime.

The tragedy of the Ukrainian peasantry was a national tragedy. It was, after all, Stalin who wrote, 'the peasantry represents the main army of a national movement . . . Without the peasantry there cannot be a strong national movement.'¹⁰⁴ While this is obviously not a transhistorical truth, it applied in that period. If in the 1920s, the Soviet regime adopted Ukrainisation policies, it was because it feared

peasant unrest. When the Ukrainian peasantry was under attack in 1932–3, the Ukrainian elite, whose existence was nurtured by Ukrainisation, sprang to their defence. Ewald Ammende, who analysed this question wrote:

The widest circle of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had entered the struggle; teachers, students, Soviet officials, all thought it was their duty to protest against a further sucking dry of the country. Future historians will have to admit that in the campaign against the Ukrainians, during the spring and summer of 1933, the Soviet regime was faced by a united people, a solid front, including everyone, from the highest Soviet officials down to the poorest peasants.¹⁰⁵

National solidarity, which threatened Stalin's plans for Ukraine's exploitation, was fostered by Ukrainisation policies. In 1933 Stalin ordered that these policies be abandoned. Ukrainisation, born with the peasantry, died with it too.

It was out of the dispossessed peasantry that the working class was forged during the 1930s. Escaping collectivisation and attracted by the higher standard of living and opportunities for social mobility offered by industrial employment, hundreds of thousands of peasants flocked to industry whose labour needs were growing rapidly. In 1930, for example, almost 80 per cent of the new recruits to Donbass mines were peasants from the Ukrainian countryside.¹⁰⁶ The workers entering industry were also very young. By 1933, 40 per cent of the republic's working class was less than 23 years old.¹⁰⁷ When Stalin declared in November 1936 that the Soviet working class was 'a completely new working class' he was not exaggerating.¹⁰⁸

The rapid expansion of the working class was a phenomenon confined to the period of the first five-year plan, and was focused on the Donbass and Dnipro regions. The number of workers in heavy industry expanded from 607 000 on 1 January 1929 to 1.1 million by 1 January 1933. In 1939 the same industry had 1.4 million workers.¹⁰⁹ This process was not unique to Ukraine; it occurred throughout the Soviet Union, as increasing labour productivity and the mastery of new technology was emphasised. The contraction of growth, however, was sharper in Ukraine than in Russia because of the economic policies we have already described.¹¹⁰ As a result of the economic division of labour imposed on Ukraine, by 1935 the coal and metallurgical industry claimed almost 60 per cent of the total number of workers employed in heavy and light industry.¹¹¹

During the 1930s the working class increased its social weight – from 6.2 per cent of the economically active population in 1926 to 37 per cent in 1939.¹¹² By 1939, 29 per cent of Ukrainians belonged to the working class, 55 per cent were listed as collective farmers and 13 per cent as white-collar staff.¹¹³ More indicative of the level of Ukrainians' social mobilisation were the changes that occurred in the national composition of the industrial working class. Here Ukrainians increased their representation from 52 per cent of the total in 1930, to 66 per cent by 1939.¹¹⁴ By 1932, Ukrainians had established a majority among coal miners – 50 per cent – and their weight among metallurgists increased from 53 per cent in 1932 to 70 per cent by 1936. They represented 77 per cent of workers in the iron ore industry in 1932, 77 per cent among railwaymen, and in the chemical industry their share of the working class rose from 58 per cent in 1932 to 75 per cent by 1936.¹¹⁵

The working class which came into existence during the early years of industrialisation was formed when Ukrainisation was still in force. The new influx of Ukrainian workers gave fresh impetus to the Ukrainisation of the trade unions. In Donbass, for example, by 1932, 56 per cent of trade unionists were Ukrainian.¹¹⁶ The new cadres coming from the village and the Ukrainised school could only be influenced through the Ukrainian language. By 1933, 88 per cent of all factory newspapers were published in the Ukrainian language, double the figure for 1928.¹¹⁷ In 1932, almost 60 per cent of cultural work in the republic's trade unions was completely Ukrainised.¹¹⁸ By the summer of 1930, 70 per cent of books in workers' clubs in Donbass were Ukrainian language titles.¹¹⁹ Ukrainian culture, wrote a correspondent from Donbass, 'has now become the culture of factories, plants, mines and workshops'.¹²⁰

The Soviet leadership was forced to consider the unsettling fact that the working class was moving towards a more distinctly national posture. The growing dominance of the indigenous nation and its culture within the working class was not the only reason for this development. Industrialisation was accompanied by extreme social strain, and one of the responses was a growth of nationalism within the working class. A newspaper article referred to this and cited the example of the Krasnoluts'k region in Donbass where fights had broken out between Ukrainian and Russian miners. In that region, almost 60 per cent of miners were now Ukrainian and tensions existed because 'officialdom refused to recognise this fact and blocked Ukrainisation'.¹²¹ Contributing to the growth of nationalism

within the proletariat was the fact that a high proportion of the peasants arriving in Donbass were the most nationally conscious rural element, namely, the victims of the 'dekulakisation' campaign.¹²²

Ukrainisation, in the words of Skrypnyk, 'raised the consciousness of millions of toilers'.¹²³ It deepened their awareness of their cultural heritage and their claims to separate national and socio-economic development. As a speaker at the July 1933 Komsomol plenum expressed it, Ukrainisation stressed the 'national specificity of Ukraine' and therefore challenged the notion that there was only one path of socialist development, namely the one 'charted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Comintern'.¹²⁴ According to Postyshev, the emphasis on 'national specificity' in culture and public life was simply 'a refusal to submit to all-Union interests'.¹²⁵ Thus the first step in enforcing that submission was to end the movement fostering the national-cultural individuality of Ukraine, since this led only to 'separatism and counter-revolution'. When Postyshev announced that 'even such a little matter' as certain changes in Ukrainian orthography introduced during the 1920s were 'symptomatic of much deeper counter-revolution', it was a signal that the campaign against Ukrainian culture would attend to the most minute details.¹²⁶

The Ukrainisation policies hitherto pursued within the working class were attacked in 1933 as 'cultural counter-revolution' aimed at 'fanning national enmity among the proletariat' and isolating the Ukrainian proletariat from the positive influence of Russian culture.¹²⁷ 'Nationalist counter-revolution' was discovered in the trade unions' cultural work: there were far too many Ukrainian-language books in trade union libraries and not enough Russian titles. New books were ordered and old titles confiscated. Among amateur cultural groups, 'nationalist counter-revolution' consisted of the performance of too many Ukrainian plays and songs. The programmes of these groups were revamped.¹²⁸

The struggle against Ukrainian culture in the trade unions was a prelude to further centralisation. Between 1934 and 1937 the trade unions in Ukraine were purged. In 1937, the republican trade union council was abolished and trade unions were merged into organisations directly controlled by Moscow. It was only in 1945 that the republic regained a territorial trade union structure.¹²⁹

The end of Ukrainisation and the purge of trade unions coincided with the introduction of a totalitarian factory regime. The changes in the condition of the working class had profound repercussions on its national consciousness. In the second half of the 1920s, the workers'

close ties to the village, Ukrainisation policies, and the workers' relationship with the Ukrainian intelligentsia reinforced their national consciousness. Throughout most of the 1930s workers had to establish roots and affirm an identity in a new and unfamiliar environment, without the support of their national collectivity. Certainly, as the results of the Harvard Project suggest, the experiences of the 1930s made Ukrainian workers far more hostile to the Soviet regime than their Russian counterparts. Moreover, it was found that national symbols still had substantial 'drawing power'.¹³⁰ But the elaboration of the national idea is above all a collective undertaking. By atomising the working class and forcing workers to concentrate on survival as individuals, open, unfettered social interaction essential for the existence of a national community was undermined. Although a Ukrainian working class survived the 1930s as an objective cultural category, the working class as part of a Ukrainian national community was undermined.

Turning to white-collar staff, between 1929 and 1940 their number grew from 500 000 to two million.¹³¹ Since the economy experienced an acute shortage of technical personnel, there was a particularly rapid growth in the number of engineering and technical staff. They increased from 25 000 in 1926 to 123 000 by 1936.¹³² The majority of the new specialists were the so-called *vydvizhentsy*, former workers and peasants who were given an education and promoted to positions of responsibility. Of the engineering and technical staff that graduated in 1933, 60 per cent were *vydvizhentsy*.¹³³

Very little information on changes in the national composition of white-collar staff during the 1930s has come to light. What data are available suggest that although in absolute terms Ukrainians registered an increase, their share of white-collar positions declined. Kosior in 1935 boasted that approximately 50 per cent of engineers in industry were Ukrainians.¹³⁴ But since, as early as 1929, 50 per cent of engineers in the coal mining industry were Ukrainian, it is doubtful that there was much improvement during the 1930s.¹³⁵ The only relatively comprehensive data for the white-collar group are derived from the trade union censuses, and they include all those involved in mental labour. Comparing 1929 and 1934, we find that the Ukrainians' share of mental work occupations declined from 58 to 56 per cent during a period of unprecedented expansion of mental work occupations.¹³⁶ The 1939 census revealed that 56 per cent of those engaged in predominantly mental work gave Ukrainian as their nationality. (See Table 3.2)

TABLE 3.2 *Class structure of Ukraine according to nationality, 1939^a*

	Total number	Ukrainians as % of total
Workers	10 362 000	66.1
White-collar staff	5 467 000	56.0
Collective farmers	15 956 000	84.4

^a Includes dependents.

SOURCES *Perepis' 1959*, Vol. 2, Table 1, Table 28, Iu.V. Arutiunian, 'Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1972) Table 3, p. 6.

The various purges of the 1930s were the principal reason for the seeming inability of Ukrainians to improve their share of white-collar positions. The first purge, during 1929–30, saw 12 per cent of all white-collar employees dismissed.¹³⁷ The second, in 1932–3, resulted in a quarter of all employees of central state and economic institutions being removed from their posts. These measures were motivated ostensibly by the 'struggle against bureaucratism and violations of labour discipline'.¹³⁸ However, the 1929–30 purge occurred at a time when the propaganda apparatus had whipped up a hysterical campaign against 'Ukrainian nationalist counter-revolution'.¹³⁹ In that climate, Ukrainians were probably disproportionately victimised. There can be little doubt that the 1932–3 dismissals, occurring at the height of the famine, primarily affected Ukrainians.

The 1933–4 purge, under Postyshev's guidance, had the express aim of removing Ukrainians suspected of nationalism. In the central state institutions of Kharkiv alone, 2500 Ukrainians were dismissed.¹⁴⁰ The Commissariat of Education, the centre of Ukrainisation, was so thoroughly purged that the entire staff of the apparatus at the *oblast'* level had been dismissed and 90 per cent at the *raion* level. Over 4000 Ukrainian teachers were fired, as were 210 lecturers at pedagogical institutions. In the case of the latter, they were replaced with 185 'cadres from the fraternal republics'.¹⁴¹ The proportion of Ukrainians among the staff of research institutions dropped from 50 per cent of the total in 1929 to 31 per cent in 1934, whereas the share of Russians increased from 30 to 50 per cent of the total in the same period.¹⁴² During the 'great terror' of 1936–8 the victims were legion. 'The purge swept through every sort of establishment in the Republic . . . state industrial enterprises, the municipal councils, the educational and scientific bodies. . .'¹⁴³

During the 1930s, according to Iu. Lavrynenko, 80 per cent of Ukraine's writers and creative intelligentsia were eliminated.¹⁴⁴ Among Ukrainian historians, clergymen, national communists and many other groups an equal, if not higher, proportion were sent to their deaths.¹⁴⁵ The desire to stamp out the agents of the Ukrainian national idea was so extreme that several hundred blind *bandurysty* – itinerant folk singers – were executed.¹⁴⁶ The purges decimated the Ukrainian nation's leadership, the intelligentsia that had been forged during the 1920s and that had been awakened to the possibilities of nationhood. The assault on the Ukrainian school, newspapers and books during the 1930s was carried out to ensure that the legacy of the intelligentsia of the 1920s would not be communicated to the new intelligentsia that was coming into being.

EDUCATION BOOK PUBLISHING AND THE PRESS

Industrialisation demanded a literate work force. As part of the first five-year plan it was decided that each year two million illiterates and semi-literates had to be taught how to read and write. A special 'Literacy Commission' was established within the CPU Politburo to coordinate the campaign.¹⁴⁷ On 1 January 1938 it was triumphantly announced that 98 per cent of the total population of Ukraine was now considered literate.¹⁴⁸ This figure was probably fabricated, since in the light of the 1939 census data released after Stalin's death only 85 per cent of the republic's population was literate.¹⁴⁹ Nevertheless, the fact remains that in the course of the 1930s illiteracy was largely eliminated.

An important question for our purposes is the language in which literacy was acquired. In 1927, 78 per cent of all literacy schools were conducted in the Ukrainian language.¹⁵⁰ Between 1927 and 1933, officials of the Commissariat of Education made a concerted effort to have Ukrainian universally adopted in the republic as the language in which illiterates would learn to read and write, irrespective of nationality. At the second Donets'k party conference in January 1934, complaints were voiced that 'activity in the schools of literacy was conducted only in the Ukrainian language, and this retarded the acquisition of reading skills by citizens of non-Ukrainian nationality'.¹⁵¹ In Kiev, for example, the number of Russian literacy schools had declined from 131 in 1925 to 7 by 1932.¹⁵² After 1933 it was charged that throughout Ukraine 'evidence of forcible Ukrainisation

was to be found in the fact that only Ukrainian literature and Ukrainian cadres were assigned to literacy schools'.¹⁵³ In 1934 these 'shortcomings' were corrected. But inasmuch as between 1930 and 1934 almost 5.5 million citizens of the republic had acquired literacy during the period of 'forced Ukrainisation',¹⁵⁴ even assuming a decline in Ukrainian literacy schools after that date, the literacy campaign of the 1930s added millions of new Ukrainian readers.

Industrialisation also brought major changes to the school system. In July 1930 the CPSU Central Committee ordered compulsory elementary education (four classes) to be implemented in the countryside and incomplete secondary education (seven classes) in urban areas beginning with the 1930–1 school year.¹⁵⁵ The resources of the state were mobilized for the task. The number of children of school age enrolled in the elementary and incomplete secondary school system increased from 2.8 million in 1929–30 to 4.6 million by 1932–3.¹⁵⁶ The main beneficiaries of the crash programme to expand the educational system were Ukrainian children who had been previously denied access to either elementary or secondary education.

The period between 1930 and 1933 marked the high point of achievement in the Ukrainisation of schools. By 1932, 87 per cent of general education schools had Ukrainian as their language of instruction and 88 per cent of the total number of pupils enrolled were receiving instruction in that language.¹⁵⁷ Pupils of Ukrainian nationality represented 85 per cent of school enrolment in 1933.¹⁵⁸ The process of Ukrainisation was particularly successful in the urban areas of Ukraine's industrial heartland. In 1933, all elementary schools in Makiivka (Donbass) and Kherson had been converted into Ukrainian-language establishments.¹⁵⁹ In Dnipropetrovs'k, to give another example, some Ukrainian-language schools had 4847 pupils, of which only 2700 were pupils giving Ukrainian as their mother tongue.¹⁶⁰ The Ukrainian-language school system had broken out of its narrow ethnic confines to become not merely an institution for Ukrainians, but for the entire population of Ukraine. As those who had completed their education at these schools entered post-secondary education or the labour force, they would accelerate the Ukrainisation of their milieux. Ukrainian language and culture would emerge hegemonic in their own territory and the process of national consolidation would have been completed. The attack on Ukrainisation in 1933 was designed to prevent this from happening.

In the spring of 1933 Postyshev arrived in Kharkiv with a mandate from Moscow to radically alter Ukrainisation policies.¹⁶¹ His attack

was focused on Skrypnyk and the Commissariat of Education which he headed, who were accused of having 'delivered the policy of Ukrainisation into the hands of Petliurites, Makhnovites and other national elements'.¹⁶² On 7 July 1933 Skrypnyk committed suicide.¹⁶³ The November 1933 CPU Central Committee plenum signalled the turning point. Prior to that time, in all its major pronouncements on the national problem, the party considered Great Russian chauvinism as the fundamental danger. Local nationalism had always been viewed as the secondary threat. In keeping with Stalin's dictum,¹⁶⁴ a new interpretation was given at the November plenum – the positions of the two were reversed.¹⁶⁵ At the Kharkiv city party conference in July 1933, 'nationalist counter-revolution' was defined in six points which served as a guideline for the changes that were to be made in the educational, media and cultural spheres. 'Nationalist counter-revolution' consisted of: (1) exaggerating the importance of the national question and refusing to submit to all-Union interests; (2) negating Lenin and Stalin as theorists of the national question, that is, searching for legitimacy in Ukrainian political thought; (3) advocating the theory of 'national Bolshevism', meaning that each nation should choose its own path to socialism; (4) considering the 'cultural development of Ukraine as limitless', that is, advocating that Ukrainian culture should permeate all aspects of the republic's life; (5) 'forced Ukrainisation'; and (6) artificially separating Ukrainian from Russian culture.¹⁶⁶

The school system was affected in five ways by the 1933–4 purge. First, as already mentioned, thousands of teachers, educational administrators and instructors in pedagogical institutes were dismissed. Secondly, the last remnants of Ukraine's unique educational system were liquidated and the Russian model was imposed.¹⁶⁷ Thirdly, the school curriculum was purged of textbooks and programmes inspired by Skrypnyk's 'fascist theory of national emotions'.¹⁶⁸ At the kindergarten level, for example, the fact that only Ukrainian fairy tales were read to children was offered as proof that the 'fascist theory' guided school programmes. Russian fairy tales were ordered to be introduced as a corrective measure.¹⁶⁹ Fourthly, the school system serving Ukraine's non-Russian minorities was attacked. It was claimed that 'Ukrainian nationalists formed a bloc with Jewish nationalists to push through forced Judaisation in order to prevent the normal assimilation of Jewish children'.¹⁷⁰ Jewish teachers were accused of crimes such as 'teaching Jewish children that Jews are a nation', and teaching Yiddish to Jewish children whose mother

tongue was Russian.¹⁷¹ Many Polish and German schools were ordered to be closed because they contained 'too many fascist elements'.¹⁷² Finally, children who were either Russian according to nationality or who gave Russian as their mother tongue were removed from Ukrainian-language schools and placed in the reinvigorated Russian school system.¹⁷³ In short, the role of the school as an agent communicating national values other than authorised Soviet and Russian patriotism was undermined, and the Ukrainian-language school was driven back to being a school only for Ukrainians.

School statistics for the 1933–4 academic year showed that no time was wasted in implementing the new course. The number of pupils enrolled in the Ukrainian-language school system dropped from 88 per cent of the total enrolment in 1932–3 to 84 per cent by 1933–4. Registration in the Russian school network increased from 6 to 10 per cent.¹⁷⁴ By 1937, 83 per cent of total pupil enrolment was accounted for by the Ukrainian-language network.¹⁷⁵ Urban schools were the focus of the new policies. In Kharkiv, for example, the percentage of pupils enrolled in Russian-language schools increased from 20 for 1932–3 school year to 39 by 1933–4. In Kherson in the same period registration in Russian schools grew from zero to 30 per cent.¹⁷⁶

With Khrushchev's arrival at the post of First Secretary of the CPU following the 'great terror', a new assault was made on the republic's Ukrainian-language school system. The focus of the new measures was not to reduce enrolment in the Ukrainian language school system. In 1938–9 that school system accounted for 82 per cent of the total number of registrations.¹⁷⁷ Rather, the emphasis was on Russifying the programme of Ukrainian-language schools. It was charged that 'national-fascists, Trotskyites and spies . . . had attempted to push out the Russian language from the curriculum of schools in order to prevent the Ukrainian people from mastering the rich treasures of Russian culture'.¹⁷⁸ In 1938 Russian was introduced as a compulsory subject from the second class onward, the number of hours devoted to the study of Russian was greatly increased, and Russian culture and literature courses were introduced.¹⁷⁹ Since 'many harmful elements' had survived the 1933–4 purge, the Ukrainian history and literature courses received major revisions.¹⁸⁰

With industrialisation, the regime's need to provide itself with its own intelligentsia was met at a break-neck pace. Post-secondary educational facilities were greatly expanded. The number of *vuzy* increased from 39 in 1928 to 173 by 1940 and the number of students in them grew from 29 141 to 196 775 in the same period. Similarly,

tekhnikumy and institutions offering a specialised secondary education grew from 158 in 1928 to 693 by 1940 and student enrolment from 31 176 to 196 200.¹⁸¹ Between 1928 and 1936, with almost 300 000 students having graduated from *vuzy* and *tekhnikumy*, an entirely new intelligentsia had come into being.¹⁸²

In the course of the 1930s Ukraine's post-secondary educational system was completely reorganised along the lines of what existed in the RSFSR. At the same time notions about the prior claim of the working class to educational facilities were gradually abandoned as the quality of graduates was stressed.¹⁸³ As A. L. Unger expressed it, 'At a time when the supreme slogan was "cadres decide everything", the regime became increasingly reluctant to forego the vital contribution of the culturally most advanced sectors of the community. Merit rather than social origin now opened the door to education and career.'¹⁸⁴ The peasantry were most affected by these measures. In 1929 they represented 26 per cent of the *vuzy* student population; by 1936 their share had dropped by 6 or more per cent depending on the type of higher educational establishment.¹⁸⁵

The new nationalities policy proclaimed in 1933 affected post-secondary education in a way similar to its impact on the school system. The only difference was that the purge of Ukrainians accused of nationalism was much more thorough. As mentioned, Ukrainians among the research staff declined from 49 to 31 per cent of the total between 1929 and 1934, whereas the proportion of Russians increased from 30 to 50 per cent in the same period. Students were purged as well – between 20 and 30 per cent in the case of pedagogical institutions.¹⁸⁶ The social sciences and humanities were most affected by the witch-hunt. Both the Hrushevs'kyi and M. Iavors'kyi schools of history were liquidated, as were numerous others in linguistics, literature, economics, etc. In 1938, a concerted effort was made to introduce Russian-language instruction in higher education.¹⁸⁷ There was no overt government decree ordering the de-Ukrainisation of higher education because none was needed. Given the prevailing hysteria against 'nationalist counter-revolution' and 'linguistic wrecking',¹⁸⁸ many lecturers undoubtedly followed the example of the Luhans'k pedagogical staff, who interpreted the new policies introduced in 1933–4 to mean that Russian was to be used as the medium of instruction.¹⁸⁹ The impact of the new national and social policies in higher education on Ukrainians' representation in the student population is difficult to evaluate on the basis of existing information. Data for the years 1933 and 1935 indicate that Ukrain-

ians improved their share of the student enrolment in *tekhnikumy*, that is, institutions producing the semi-intelligentsia, or para-professionals, from 69 to 73 per cent. At the *vuzy* level, however, institutions which served as a pool of manpower for the new elite, the representation of Ukrainians in the student population declined from 55 per cent to 53 per cent in the same period.¹⁹⁰ More importantly, the educational experience of Ukrainian students had drastically altered. The most brilliant representatives of Ukrainian scholarship were physically eliminated, and with them an entire intellectual tradition perished. Their books were removed from libraries in order to banish the memory of the national revival of the 1920s.¹⁹¹

In publishing, industrialisation accelerated the Ukrainisation of newspapers and book production at an unprecedented rate. In part this was due to the success of Ukrainisation policies. Industrialisation itself, however, greatly contributed to this development. A large number of Ukrainians were entering industrial employment. To deny them the right to learn in their own language how best to use modern equipment connected with industrialisation would have meant slowing the tempo of industrialisation. To make every participant in industrialisation conscious of the tasks which the party set, it was necessary to make him technically, and of course politically literate.¹⁹² The output of scientific and technical literature was particularly affected by these processes. If in 1927, 25 per cent of such works were Ukrainian-language titles, by 1931 the figure rose to 61 per cent.¹⁹³ In 1930, to give another example, 80 per cent of titles intended for use as textbooks in technical schools were in Ukrainian.¹⁹⁴ Overall, the share of Ukrainian-language titles in the republic's total book production increased from 54 per cent in 1928 to 79 per cent by 1930.¹⁹⁵

The high point of Ukrainian book production was in 1930. Towards the end of the summer of that year Ukrainian-language publications were affected by encroachment on the autonomy of Ukraine's cultural and literary associations. The publishing houses which these associations operated were eliminated in a drive to centralise the book trade in the hands of a few major establishments.¹⁹⁶ In 1931, in the aftermath of the show trial of members of the alleged Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Iefremov and others), the 'quality' of books produced between 1928 and 1930 was verified and it was noted that 'many books contained major ideological errors'.¹⁹⁷ Since it was claimed that the Ukrainian publishing industry 'had been in the hands of the Iefremovs' to quote M. Gorky,¹⁹⁸ a purge of Ukrainians

on the editorial staffs of publishing houses was ordered.¹⁹⁹ The statistics on book production in Ukraine for that year showed the consequences of this campaign: Ukrainian-language titles dropped to 72.2 per cent of the total number of titles published.²⁰⁰

The biggest blow to Ukrainian-language publishing was delivered by the change in nationalities policies initiated in 1933–4. The ‘forced Ukrainisation’ of the book trade was attacked and ‘internationalist education’ was stressed.²⁰¹ The following was offered as a concrete example of the new orientation: in 1934 the republic’s publishing houses issued thirteen titles of Russian classical literature, as compared with three titles in the case of Ukrainian classical literature.²⁰² By 1936, Ukrainian-language titles represented 56 per cent of the total number of titles published in Ukraine. In 1940, this declined to 42 per cent.²⁰³ A full circle was completed and the share of Ukrainian-language titles in 1940 was the same as it had been in 1924, on the eve of Ukrainisation. At the same time the number of books published in Ukraine declined during the 1930s when compared with the second half of the 1920s. Thus in 1934, 4711 titles were published, of which 2750 were in the Ukrainian language. In 1928, the figures had been 5413 and 2920 respectively.²⁰⁴ The Ukrainian-language book ceased to develop at a pace necessary to meet the requirements of a modernising society.

The effect of the year 1933 on Ukrainian language newspapers was best expressed by Popov in his speech to the November 1933 CPU Central Committee plenum:

For some individual comrades it seems that the liquidation of excessive Ukrainisation means the liquidation of Ukrainisation as such . . . We now notice a marked tendency to transfer all newspapers which serve workers into Russian-language publications . . . This mechanical transfer is a capitulation to Great Russian chauvinism.²⁰⁵

In 1931, 89 per cent of the republic’s newspapers were Ukrainian-language titles. By 1940 this declined to 69 per cent.²⁰⁶ As concerns journals, in 1930 there were 261 Ukrainian-language titles or 85 per cent of the total output in the republic. By 1940, there were 144 Ukrainian-language journals, or 45 per cent of the total number of journals published in Ukraine.²⁰⁷

The decline of the Ukrainian-language press during the 1930s meant that the Ukrainian language could not serve as a vehicle of

modernisation. Those wanting access to knowledge and current opinion had to acquire it, increasingly, through the Russian language. The content of publications was drastically changed. Newspapers and journals, which in the past had articulated national values and served as vehicles of national mobilisation, now focused their attention on combating the slightest manifestation of Ukrainian individuality. The monotonous exhortations to overfulfil the plan, and paeans in praise of Stalin's genius filled the pages of the Russian press as well. But in Ukraine things were worse. The central focus of commentary on the national question was to drive home the point that Ukraine's development, be it cultural or economic, could only be achieved through the intermediacy of Russia. Denied an independent existence, Ukrainian culture and thought was reduced to narrow provincialism, even by the standards of the Stalinist USSR. At the same time, Russian cultural influence in the republic was accelerated. Over 200 Ukrainian plays were banned and scores of Ukrainian theatres closed, while the number of Russian theatres increased from 9 in 1931 to 30 by 1935.²⁰⁸ In music, in 1934, over 5000 'new songs' were printed, especially 'the best works of Russian composers', while the finest representatives of the Ukrainian musical tradition had their works removed from circulation. Museums were ordered to stop 'idealising Cossack history', while figures from the Russian imperial past were rehabilitated.²⁰⁹ In 1937, the republic was accused of having failed to celebrate 'Peter the Great's victory at Poltava'.²¹⁰ Not a single stone was left unturned in the struggle against what *Na fronti kul'tury* called 'the nationalist theory of the specificity of Ukraine'.²¹¹

THE PARTY

'Nowhere did restrictions, purges, repressions, and in general all forms of bureaucratic hooliganism assume such murderous sweep as they did in Ukraine in the struggle against the powerful, deeply rooted longings of the Ukrainian masses for greater freedom and independence.' Thus Trotsky summarised Stalinist policies in the republic during the 1930s.²¹² As Postyshev explained in 1936, the purges had to be more sweeping in Ukraine than elsewhere because the 'Ukrainian specificity' kept producing 'more enemies' than elsewhere.²¹³ Throughout the 1930s the CPU was bled three times, until finally, by 1938, the republic had 'become little more than an NKVD fief, where even the formalities of party and state activities were barely gone through.'²¹⁴

The purge which began in the spring of 1929 had as its objective the expulsion of 'right deviationists . . . who have a foreign class position'.²¹⁵ Ostensibly this meant Bukharin's supporters in Ukraine, notably the so-called 'bourgeois specialists', but in reality, it included all those who publically opposed the disruption of civil peace that the abolition of NEP represented. In the case of Ukrainians within the CPU, judging by the press reports of the time, those expelled were individuals tied to the peasant movement during the revolution: former members of Ukrainian socialist parties, cooperatives, and of course the peasant membership of the CPU itself. Whereas in the towns, under the impact of industrialisation and a recruitment campaign to increase the representation of workers, the party registered an impressive growth of its membership: by January 1933, the CPU numbered over half a million,²¹⁶ in the villages, the CPU membership declined. The rural membership of the party was cut in half: from 40 000 in January 1929 to 21 000 by January 1930.²¹⁷ As resistance to collectivisation grew, the purge initiated in April 1929 became a permanent feature of rural party life. A verification of rural party cells carried out in 1930 found that many had to be dissolved for lack of membership.²¹⁸ Collectivisation was but the beginning of the crisis within the party ranks. The situation became much more acute the second half of 1931 when Moscow imposed on Ukraine a plan for grain requisition to be exacted by party members from collective farms. Between January 1930 and July 1932, 80 per cent of *raion* committee party secretaries were removed. The turnover rate among secretaries of village party cells was 156 per cent.²¹⁹

Moscow was seriously disconcerted by the inability of the Ukrainian party to execute the tasks imposed by the party centre, in particular, the failure to fulfil the 1931–2 plan for grain collections. It was at this time that the Ukrainian leadership – Chubar, Kosior, Skrypnyk, Petrovs'kyi – appealed to Moscow to slow down the pace of collectivisation and reduce the grain requisition quotas. In order to make a more convincing case, that leadership decided to obtain first-hand information by touring areas particularly affected by the famine.²²⁰ Armed with this information, they proceeded to the Third All-Ukrainian Conference of the CPU which was held 6–9 July 1932 in Kharkiv, during which an effort was made to rally support for a dramatic downward revision of Ukraine's agricultural obligations and for an easing of the tempo of collectivisation.

The Third All-Ukrainian Party Conference proved to be a turning point. The Moscow centre was represented by Molotov and Kaganov-

vich. At the conference, Kosior mentioned that many districts were 'seriously short of food'. Liubchenko and Skrypnyk spoke along the same lines. Skrypnyk recounted how, while touring the famine regions, he had heard from peasants that 'we have everything taken away from us but the broom'.²²¹ Shlikhter, Commissar of Agriculture, argued that kulak opposition and loss of party vigilance were not the reasons for 'the loss of the harvest.' Rather, both the method and pace of collectivisation were unrealistic. The highlight of the conference was the speech by Chubar, the head of the Soviet Ukrainian government. He criticised the mania for 'collective farm gigantism'. Moreover, in what amounted to a call for disobedience, he urged collective farm managers not to 'accept an order regardless of its practicability and then ruin the economy of the collective farm, justifying this by orders from above'. He argued that neither the peasants nor the Ukrainian government were at fault for the agricultural crisis, rather, the problem lay with the unrealistic plans of Moscow.²²²

The CPSU remained unyielding. Its representative, Molotov, emphasised at the conference that the 1933 grain requisition quota for Ukraine would remain at the very high figure of 5.8 million tonnes. As for the developing famine, he placed the blame on the leadership of the CPU. 'The difficult food situation,' he claimed, was attributable to the fact that 'the Bolsheviks of Ukraine have not coped with their tasks.' Referring to CPU criticism of the high quotas imposed on Ukraine by Moscow, Molotov warned that

an attempt is now being made to gloss over the shortcomings of work in Ukrainian agriculture by pinning the blame for all the unpleasant facts of the last grain requisition campaign in Ukraine on 'external' factors – namely, the size of the grain requisition plan. Such anti-Bolshevik attempts will be resisted.²²³

Listening to the speeches and discussions at the Third Conference, Stalin's envoys must have been struck by a certain stubbornness evinced by the Ukrainian Communist leaders. Returning to Moscow, they no doubt reported the unsettling mood in Kharkiv to their chief. As a result of the Third Conference, the CPU found itself in a state of turmoil. Its leadership tried to steer an implausible middle course. On the one hand, it attempted to uphold the rapidly diminishing prerogatives of the Ukrainian party and state. Chubar's speech at the September 1932 Komsomol conference pleading for more freedom

and decentralisation was evidence of this.²²⁴ On the other hand, the CPU set about carrying out, albeit half-heartedly, the new grain requisition plan.

The attempt by the CPU to enforce Moscow's grain requisition policy continued to meet with resistance among the party rank-and-file. Moreover, in the final months of 1932, it was increasingly clear that the CPU leadership was losing whatever hold it had over the apparatus. In November 1932 yet another purge of rural organisations was announced, since it was found that the existing membership was unwilling to enforce the party's agricultural policies.²²⁵ Although data on the number of people expelled were never published, we do know that the indigenous rural cadres were so depleted that, according to Postyshev, 'workers of Russian nationality' had to be brought in to implement the grain requisition campaign.²²⁶ When in early January 1933 *Pravda* printed an article 'Ukraine – the Decisive Factor in Grain Collection' upbraiding the CPU for the republic's lagging behind in the fulfilment of the annual grain plan and for enabling the 'class enemy to get organised',²²⁷ it was a clear sign that heads would begin to roll on an even greater scale.

Emphasising Ukraine's inordinately long experience with Stalinist terror, Kopelev wrote, 'the year '37 began in Ukraine with '33'.²²⁸ The immediate cause of the 1933 purge was the Ukrainian leadership's refusal to become willing tools in the extermination of their people. This hastened what would have been an inevitable development, given the nature of Stalinist rule. The national current within the CPU, which defended a vision of Ukraine's autonomous socio-economic and cultural development, had become an anomaly. 'To the totalitarian bureaucracy,' wrote Trotsky, 'Soviet Ukraine became an administrative division of an economic unit and a military base of the USSR.'²²⁹ That bureaucracy could not tolerate national communists such as Skrypyk for whom 'among the highest goals of Soviet society was the free development of each separate people'.²³⁰ The national communists' resistance on the grain front was for Stalin symptomatic of a more general problem. In 1930 he had condemned those stressing separate national development. Not wishing, however, to move against the Ukrainian national current on all fronts at the same time, he had allowed Ukraine a measure of cultural autonomy between 1930 and 1933, while thoroughly centralising economic and political activities. But inasmuch as cultural autonomy, Ukrainisation in particular, was a node for the crystallisation of political opposition, keeping alive the Ukrainian people's hopes and ambi-

tions for separate development, the Stalinist leadership had to bring culture under its control.²³¹ With that end in mind, the CPU was ordered to be purged in January 1933. Postyshev was appointed Second Secretary of the organisation and was given the assignment to rid the CPU of 'Skrypnykite counter-revolution in cultural development' as well as to provide 'Bolshevik leadership in agriculture'.²³² V. A. Balitskii, characterised by a French newspaper as 'a son of a tsarist *gendarme* who, for reasons unknown, hates all that is Ukrainian,' arrived from Moscow to take over the all-important post of Commissar of State Security.²³³ Early in January 1933, Moscow's representatives established control over the CPU. The mass expulsions began in the spring of 1933.

According to a French correspondent, national communists in the CPU led by Skrypnyk made a last ditch effort at resistance. The correspondent wrote, 'Skrypnyk, not without courage, addressed a vigorous letter to the CPSU Central Committee demanding that Balitskii and Postyshev be relieved of their functions.' When Balitskii and Postyshev accused Skrypnyk of 'being an accomplice of saboteurs', Skrypnyk,

exasperated and disgusted by the fact that his country was being persecuted, decided to raise the question of the intolerable regime that had been imposed on his compatriots during a session of Ukraine's Central Executive Committee. He asked that the article of the constitution which granted Ukraine the right to leave the Soviet Union be made use of.²³⁴

This account of Skrypnyk's last struggle cannot be verified. But the violence with which the 1933 purge was carried out suggests that something along those lines did occur.

In 1933 the word 'purge' took on a new meaning. As Postyshev explained during the November 1933 CPU Central Committee plenum, 'almost all the people removed were arrested and put before the firing squad or exiled,²³⁵ – exile meant sent to prison camps. Throughout Ukraine close to 15 000 people holding 'responsible positions' in the party were expelled for nationalism.²³⁶ At the rank-and-file level, it was reported in November 1933 that 27 400 members had been expelled from the CPU.²³⁷ After November the terror gained impetus as Shums'kyi, M. Iavors'kyi, Solodub and many other well-known figures were accused of belonging to groups such as the 'Ukrainian Military Organisation', the 'All-Ukrainian Social-Revolutionary Centre', and the 'All-Ukrainian Borot'bist Centre'.

These organisations were invented to justify the size and scope of the purge as well as an indictment on a charge of high treason.²³⁸ All in all, between January 1933 and January 1934 the CPU lost close to 100 000 people.²³⁹ The delegate to the 12th CPU Congress (January 1934) who said, 'It feels as though Stalin were here among us', had expressed a bitter truth.²⁴⁰

The elimination of the national communists during 1933 began a period in the history of the CPU appropriately labelled by Jurij Borys 'the return of the Russians.'²⁴¹ In 1933, thousands of members of political sections' from Russia were sent to Ukraine, in addition to '3000 leading cadres' assigned to the republic by the CPSU Central Committee, as well as several thousand others directed to 'leading posts' in the *raiony*.²⁴² Postyshev in 1936 pointed out that the purges represented not an attack on 'Ukrainians but on national deviationists'.²⁴³ Judging by the statistics on the national composition of the CPU the Ukrainians' share of the total party membership did not decline in major proportions: on January 1933, Ukrainians represented 61 per cent of the total membership; 60 per cent by October 1933.²⁴⁴ The losses, however, were heaviest where they mattered most. Individuals with a measure of independent thought, those who had experienced relatively unfettered national and cultural development, were removed. The new raw recruits were now led by a largely Russian leadership. The twelve-member Politburo of the CPU Central Committee that emerged from the January 1934 Congress contained only four Ukrainians. Of the four Central Committee secretaries only one, the Fourth Secretary, was a Ukrainian.²⁴⁵

Postyshev and his clique, having sent hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians to their doom in the struggle against 'Ukrainian specificity', in time became captives of that same 'specificity'. During the brief relative calm that prevailed in the republic between 1935 and 1936, the new holders of power attempted to consolidate their positions in the republic by promoting Ukraine's uniqueness. John Reshetar wrote:

Postyshev wore Ukrainian embroidered shirts and had an impressive monument erected to Ukraine's greatest poet, Shevchenko. He had the capital returned to Kiev from Kharkiv . . . Ukrainian cultural development continued, although at a sharply reduced tempo . . . All of this was apparently calculated to have a stabilising and calming effect on the Ukrainians following the first mass purges . . . In the last analysis, it seems likely that Postyshev

perished because he was probably alleged to have been building his own machine in Ukraine and had become a kind of Soviet Ukrainian 'Hetman' – an unpardonable sin in the eyes of the Chief and his coterie in the Kremlin.²⁴⁶

Hryhory Kostiuk noted that Postyshev 'began to show a lively interest in Ukrainian history and culture, and in the preservation of Ukrainian cadres in the CPU'.²⁴⁷ An example of this was his 1935 article admonishing party members for de-Ukrainising themselves:

Recently members have begun to de-Ukrainise themselves and even to stop speaking the Ukrainian language. We must say that these people are pouring water on the mills of our enemies. This is a very serious development and we must pay considerable attention to it . . . We have many fine Ukrainian cadres now: our workers, our collective farmers, our Ukrainian intelligentsia. We have far too few of them – Soviet Ukrainian cadres – in our party. We have to recruit these cadres . . . We need more Ukrainisation of party education and not only in terms of language, but also our members must learn about Ukrainian history, culture, the economy.²⁴⁸

This discourse was a new development in the period after the 1933 purge. Equally novel was Postyshev's admission that there was hunger on collective farms and that 'comrades' in the centre should stop demanding 'help from regions' because grain reserves had been exhausted.²⁴⁹ Ukraine's cultural, social and economic peculiarities had an uncanny way of asserting themselves.

The Ukrainian leadership became embroiled in a new struggle with Moscow in an effort to preserve the cadres in the republic. According to Roy Medvedev, at the 17th CPSU Congress held early in 1934, the so-called 'Congress of Victors', 'a considerable number of leading party members formed an illegal bloc', hoping to remove Stalin from office. This bloc consisted 'basically of secretaries of *oblast*' committees and secretaries of the non-Russian central committees, people who knew the shortcomings of Stalin's policies better than anyone else'.²⁵⁰ Among those who approached S. M. Kirov to replace Stalin as Secretary General was Petrovs'kyi, representing the CPU. Dissatisfaction with Stalin was also expressed in the election of the CPSU Central Committee. Medvedev maintains: 'Only three votes were cast against Kirov, while 270 delegates voted against Stalin, who was elected only because there were exactly as many candidates as there

were members to be elected.²⁵¹ Stalin was well aware of the efforts to remove him. On 1 December 1934 Kirov was assassinated on Stalin's orders, as a prelude to Stalin's renewed attempt to destroy all remaining opposition.

In the wake of Kirov's assassination the remaining national communists, Trotskyists and Bukharinists were expelled from the CPU and charged with belonging to groups such as the 'Nationalist Terrorist Bloc', the 'Trotskyite Nationalist Terrorist Bloc', and other equally absurd concoctions; then they were executed.²⁵² It was, however, the CPSU Central Committee letter dated 13 April 1935, ordering a general verification of party documents, that began the mass expulsions which culminated in the *Ezhovshchina*, the largest purge yet.²⁵³ The CPU leadership resisted this new bloodletting. For the first few months the purge made little headway in Ukraine, and the CPU Central Committee was criticised for its lack of enthusiasm in the verification process.²⁵⁴ In February 1936 the purge began in earnest. Having decimated the party ranks, Stalin appointed Khrushchev in January 1938 to the post of First Secretary of the CPU with orders to rebuild the organisation.²⁵⁵

Examining party membership data between January 1934 and May 1938 it is possible to arrive at an estimate of the number of victims of the *Ezhovshchina*, especially since during that period recruitment into the CPU was at a virtual standstill.²⁵⁶ In January 1934 the party numbered 453 526 individuals; by May 1938, 285 818. The party lost approximately 167 708 members, or 37 per cent of its total membership. The national and social composition of the party members was substantially altered as a result of the purge. We do not have data which allow us to gauge the impact of the entire purge period; our figures are for 1 April 1937. On that day Ukrainians represented 57 per cent of the total membership of the CPU, a drop of three percentage points when compared to October 1933. This means that approximately 40 per cent of the Ukrainians in the party in 1933 were purged by April 1937. In terms of the occupational structure of the CPU ranks, workers represented 51 per cent of the total in 1932 and a mere 25 per cent by 1937. Collective farmers declined from 15 to 5 per cent of the total membership in the same period, while the proportion of white-collar staff increased from 32 to 70 per cent.²⁵⁷ The overwhelming majority of party members were now 'functionaries in the party, state and economic organisations'.²⁵⁸ Unger summarised the effects of the purge as follows:

[The party] . . . was rapidly becoming an association of 'better people' – better not because they were enlightened, class-conscious workers . . . but because they had succeeded in making their mark in the kind of society which the Soviet Union had become under the iron rule of Stalinist totalitarianism . . . The criterion of social origin, still powerful in the early years of industrialisation, had lost all relevance . . . It was inevitable that the 'profiteers' of the revolution should join the Jacobin Club, and that the character of the latter should be irrevocably transformed in the process.²⁵⁹

One of the most important reasons why, in Khrushchev's words, the CPU 'had been purged spotless' was because the CPU leadership had offered the greatest resistance to Stalin's apparatus of terror.²⁶⁰ During the February-March 1937 CPSU Central Committee plenum, a number of Committee members agreed to oppose the attempt to bring Bukharin to trial, making it a test case to try to limit the NKVD's powers. The dissenters were led by Postyshev. Although Stalin's victory over the CPSU was assured when he crushed his opposition at the February-March plenum, 'there was to be one last flicker of resistance – in Ukraine'.²⁶¹ Despite Postyshev's removal from his CPU office and his banishment to Kuibyshev,²⁶² those that remained in power in Ukraine continued to oppose the extension of the purge. As Robert Conquest notes:

This was action on a local scale, an attempt to defend a last outpost of comparative sanity. There was no longer any prospect of victory in the Union as a whole, and the struggle which now went on in Kiev might be compared to that of the garrison of an isolated fort which continues with a gallant but hopeless defense after its main armies have been defeated in the field.²⁶³

A CPSU Politburo commission consisting of Molotov, Khrushchev and N. Ezhov arrived in Kiev in August 1937 with a large force of 'special troops' of the NKVD. At a session of the CPU Central Committee Molotov proposed the dismissal of Kosior, Petrovs'kyi, Liubchenko and others from their posts and from the Central Committee, suggesting the election of Khrushchev as head of the CPU. 'The Ukrainians refused to vote as instructed, in spite of Molotov ringing Moscow for Stalin's instructions.'²⁶⁴ Finally, Molotov suggested that the Ukrainian Politburo should go to Moscow for a

combined session of the CPSU Politburo. Liubchenko, the head of the Ukrainian government, shot himself and his wife rather than walk into the trap. The others went to Moscow since they could hardly avoid doing so without an open breach of party discipline. They were either arrested at once or on their return to Ukraine.

Stalin took revenge for the attempt to bloc him during the February – March plenum and especially for the temporarily successful resistance offered by the CPU leadership on their home ground. What unfolded was an orgy of terror even by the standards of the day. Every sort of establishment – industrial enterprises, municipal councils, educational and scientific bodies, creative associations – lost their leaders by the hundreds. At the 14th CPU Congress in June 1938 it was announced that almost two-thirds of the party's leadership at the city, *oblast'*, *raion* and village levels had been purged.²⁶⁵ The 59 member Central Committee elected at that congress had only one individual (S. Tymoshenko, later Marshall of the Soviet Union) who survived from the previous Central Committee.²⁶⁶ The entire Politburo and Central Committee secretariat perished, with the exception of Petrovs'kyi, who was arrested and later released.²⁶⁷ The purge was so quick and thorough that it was impossible to hold a Central Committee meeting or Politburo meeting, and the CPU as an organisation ceased to function. Between May and June 1938, the entire government of Ukraine was executed. Alex Weissberg, a CPU member arrested during the purge, wrote that 'one premier after another had been arrested', to the point where nobody seemed to know who was technically in charge of the government.²⁶⁸ The continuity of rule had for the first time been completely destroyed. Khrushchev noted, 'it seemed as though not one regional or executive Committee secretary, not one secretary of the Council of People's Commissars, not even a single deputy was left. We had to start rebuilding from scratch.'²⁶⁹

The Communist Party of Ukraine was rebuilding very quickly. Spurred by various resolutions urging an all-out campaign to gain new members,²⁷⁰ the CPU grew from 285 818 members at the time of the Fourteenth CPU Congress (June 1938), to 521 078 by the Fifteenth CPU Congress (May 1940). The rapid intake of new members improved the representation of Ukrainians in the party. In May 1940 they accounted for 63 per cent of the total membership, up six percentage points from the 1937 figure.²⁷¹ Ukrainians improved their position because of the insecurity that Khrushchev felt when assuming the leadership of the CPU. He had told Stalin that he was 'afraid the

Ukrainians, and particularly the intelligentsia, might be very cool to me'; that 'it hardly makes sense to send me, a Russian to Ukraine'.²⁷² At the Fifteenth Congress Khrushchev sought to reassure the Ukrainian cadres that they would have a place in the new regime. 'The new Ukrainian intelligentsia, a people's socialist intelligentsia,' he said, had assumed 'its proper role in all branches of the economy and was rapidly entering the ranks of the party.'²⁷³ Nevertheless, the fact remained that although the rank and file was largely Ukrainian, within the Politburo, out of eight full and candidate members, only three belonged to the indigenous nationality.²⁷⁴ Yugoslav Communists visiting Kiev, according to Milovan Djilas, were surprised that 'among the Ukrainians, a nation as numerous as the French and in some ways more cultured than the Russians, there was not a single person capable of being premier of the Government'.²⁷⁵ (Khrushchev headed the government as well as the party.) Inasmuch as Stalin told Roosevelt at Yalta that his 'position in Ukraine was difficult and insecure',²⁷⁶ one can assume that Ukrainians, despite the nightmare they had lived through, continued to be restive about the state of affairs in their republic.

CONCLUSION

In 1929 S. Dimanshtein argued that the influx of the indigenous population into the towns under industrialisation in the context of a policy not only tolerating but also promoting indigenous cultural development, gave Ukrainian culture an historically unprecedented opportunity for development. Having an urban base denied it in the past, with resources of the state backing Ukrainian culture, and a wider public than ever before as a result of the liquidation of illiteracy and progress in education, this culture and language would not only flourish, but would 'also increasingly differentiate itself' from the culture of other nations, in particular the Russian. Dimanshtein noted that the language of the 'contemporary Ukrainian writers' had evolved to such a stage as to be incomprehensible for 'those of us who know the Ukrainian language only on the basis of Russian'.²⁷⁷ He predicted that this development would unleash centrifugal forces.

Stalin retorted in 1931 that Dimanshtein was wrong, not because of faculty logic, but rather because the content of culture would be controlled to ensure that a national self-emancipatory message would not be communicated. As things developed, the controls that Stalin put into place were so thorough that, as Butenko, the Soviet diplomat,

noted, every sign of Ukrainian national consciousness, 'even when it did not venture beyond the established norm of Soviet life, was rooted out and destroyed'.²⁷⁸ The Ukrainian elite which could serve as a focal point of national discontent was liquidated. The school system and the press which could reinforce national consciousness were emasculated and subjected to Russification. The tsarist imperial past was rehabilitated in order to undermine the Ukrainians' shared collective experience. According to Khrushchev, the only reason why Ukrainians escaped the fate of deportation suffered by much smaller nationalities such as the Chechen, Ingush and Balkars, was that 'there were too many of them and there was no place to which to deport them'.²⁷⁹

There were, however, major aspects of Ukrainian national life which survived even Stalin's destructive hand. Many republican institutions remained, at least in form. Moreover, to meet the needs of industrialisation, a new intelligentsia had come into being, replacing the one that had been destroyed. The fact that these and other aspects remained raised the possibility that perhaps, at some time in the future, the drive for national self-assertion could be resumed. In summing up the 1930s, it is no exaggeration to say that Ukrainians' greatest achievement during that decade was that they outlasted it.

4 Ukraine in the Second World War

Ukraine had barely begun to recover from the traumas of the 1930s when it was plunged into the cauldron of the Second World War. It was the largest Soviet republic which the Germans occupied in full, and it was held longer than parts of Russia which they were able to seize.¹ In the course of the conflict 6.8 million people were killed, of whom 600 000 were Jews and 1.4 million were military personnel who either perished on the front or died as prisoners of war. In addition, over two million citizens of the republic were sent to Germany as 'slave labour'.² By 1944, when the German armies were cleared from Soviet Ukrainian soil, the republic was literally in ruins. Over 700 cities and towns were destroyed – 42 per cent of all urban centres devastated by the war in the entire USSR – and over 28 000 villages. Direct material damage amounted to 285 milliard rubles (in 1941 prices) or over 40 per cent of the USSR's losses. But the real costs of the war to the Ukrainian republic (damage, war effort, goods requisitioned by Germans, etc) are estimated at an astronomical one trillion two hundred milliard rubles (in 1941 prices).³

The Second World War, reported Edgar Snow during his travels in Ukraine in 1945, 'which some are apt to dismiss as "the Russian glory," has, in all truth and in many costly ways, been first of all a Ukrainian war. . . . No single European country suffered deeper wounds to its cities, its industries, its farmlands and its humanity.'⁴ Despite the awesome burden shouldered by Ukraine during the Second World War, this period of Ukraine's history remains obscure. Here we can only summarise the most important developments in Soviet Ukraine and suggest their impact on national consciousness.

The German advance into Ukraine was rapid and spectacular. The invasion was launched on 22 June 1941, and by 29 August Kharkiv, lying on Ukraine's eastern border with Russia, was captured. The swift defeat of Soviet troops can be understood as a natural consequence of the many weaknesses of Stalin's regime. Low morale

among troops, the depletion of experienced commanders in the purges, and a military organisation as bureaucratic and inflexible as its peacetime one frustrated the Soviet effort.

The Germans encountered an army with little will. One of their soldiers reported, 'Only a few small special detachments fought stubbornly. The great majority of Red soldiers was not influenced at all by a spirit of resistance.'⁵ Widespread defeatism in the Red Army was partly due to prior discontent which stemmed from the population's experience of the 1930s.⁶ The bureaucratic centralisation of military decision-making in Stalin's hands also contributed to the collapse.⁷ Ignoring the pleas of Ukraine's republican leadership for flexible manoeuvres and a regroupment of forces in order to draw up new lines of defence, he ordered haphazard, uncoordinated offensives which resulted in the encirclement and capture of entire armies.⁸ The Red Army itself had suffered terrible blows to its fighting capacity during the 1936-8 purges. Almost 60 per cent of army commanders at the corps, division and brigade levels had either been executed or died in prison camps prior to the war. Those who replaced the purged officers were unseasoned and less capable.⁹ Local authorities, reduced to a state of servility by Stalin's bureaucratic system, did not exhibit the necessary independent initiative demanded of them in crisis situations and retreated instead.¹⁰ As a result of these factors, hordes of prisoners were captured by the Germans. As early as November 1941, Germans held 3.6 million prisoners of war (POWs), amongst whom were an estimated 1.3 million Ukrainians.¹¹

In the face of the German advance 'Stalin's strategic plan' was put into effect. This consisted of 'destroying all that which cannot be evacuated'.¹² Cities, factories and food supplies were blown up. Tens of thousands of prisoners in the hands of the NKVD were executed.¹³ Almost 45 per cent of all collective and state farm cattle were driven across the border to Russia. Over 50 000 factories and plants were dismantled and removed.¹⁴ As for people, approximately 3.5 million men, women and children moved into the interior of Russia and Central Asia.¹⁵ Since 'pull and friends were used to get out ahead of the Germans', it was mostly the leading stratum – prominent party and state officials, the labour aristocracy and the 'higher intelligentsia' – that left.¹⁶ Given the Nazis' extermination policies, the evacuation of people was necessary; however, Western Ukrainian observers noted that the departure of the most well-known members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia produced a leadership vacuum.¹⁷ The popu-

lation could not help but think that it was being abandoned to face the Germans on their own. This, when combined with the widespread destruction which accompanied the Soviet retreat 'helped infuriate the population against the Soviet regime'.¹⁸

The initial response of the civilian population towards the Germans has yet to be studied in a systematic way. However, it is safe to say that the image of smiling Ukrainians in national costume welcoming the German 'liberators' with the traditional bread and salt has been grossly overwrought. This stereotype was peddled, rather effectively, during the Cold War as proof that American commitment to psychological warfare directed at the Soviet population would pay huge dividends.¹⁹ Its source was the measured welcome that the residents of the Western regions, annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939, offered the Germans. Popular moods towards the Germans in the Soviet regions during the first days of occupation were 'considerably more complex,' according to an *Einsatzgruppe* (special action team) report of 9 July 1941.²⁰ Judging from eye-witness accounts and interviews with refugees, the vast majority of people were relieved to see the Soviets leave, but they were 'completely disoriented' by the rapid turn of events and waited for the situation to clarify itself.²¹ Most saw 'no reason to be overjoyed by the Germans' since common sense dictated that 'they have not come to Ukraine to do good'.²² Others, notably some former urban petty bourgeois (small shopkeepers and the like), some intellectuals, as well as some peasants whose families had had substantial holdings before the revolution, engaged in 'watchful waiting'.²³ Their hopes were pinned on the expectation that 'Germans are a cultured people' and that the events of the First World War – when Germans occupied Ukraine in 1918 and 'things were not so bad' — would be repeated.²⁴ (Tragically, some Jewish artisans also shared this illusion and thought that they would be permitted to open private shops.²⁵) The announcement of a positive programme in this initial period of uncertainty and confusion would have yielded results for the Germans. Their silence, however, was not an oversight. Giving consideration to the wishes of the conquered peoples would have meant compromising Hitler's goals. Confident of victory, German propagandists were strictly forbidden to say anything about Nazis' plans for the occupied territories.²⁶

The hiatus between the evacuation of Soviet authority and the entrenchment of the German administration lasted approximately two months, from July to September 1941 in most regions. In this short span of time, numerous attempts at the self-organisation of

Ukrainian society (in local administration, schools, newspapers, etc.) were made. In explaining this unexpected self-activity, which often manifested itself days after the departure of Soviet officials, two factors must be taken into account. The first is the role of Western Ukrainians, several thousand of whom were sent into Soviet Ukraine by their revolutionary nationalist parties. The second was the development of the national consciousness of Soviet Ukrainians during the previous two decades. Let us examine each factor in somewhat more detail.

Western Ukrainian intervention in Soviet Ukraine is intertwined with the story of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), founded in 1929. The OUN propagated a brand of revolutionary integral nationalism, emphasising voluntarism, self-sacrifice, discipline and obedience to the leadership. Apart from a militant attachment to Ukrainian independence, its political and social programme was confused, with an unimaginative recast of Italian fascism co-existing within an essentially populist framework.²⁷ When Hitler took power, a member of the OUN leadership condemned Nazi ideology as imperialist, racist and anti-Christian.²⁸ The Soviet-German non-aggression treaty in 1939 and the subsequent Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine, as well as Hitler's backing of Hungary's destruction of the short-lived Carpatho-Ukrainian Republic, whose defence forces the OUN helped to organise,²⁹ reinforced OUN suspicions of German ambitions. Nonetheless, Germany was the only power opposed to the European status quo and a German-Soviet conflict seemed to be the only way out of the impasse in which Ukraine found itself. For this reason the OUN continued to bank on a new war to give them an opportunity to assert Ukrainian statehood, and it prepared for this moment by maintaining contact with the *Abwehr*, the German military intelligence service and by mobilising OUN cadres.³⁰

Because of its conspiratorial nature, the OUN survived the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine 1939 and 1941 better than socialist formations and the large electoralist parties such as the Ukrainian National Democratic Union, which all collapsed. Indeed, it used the opportunity to establish contact with some Eastern Ukrainians.³¹ It should be noted that Soviet rule in Western Ukraine between 1939 and 1941 was relatively mild by comparison with the post-Second World War period.³² The regime alienated the Western Ukrainian population without completely destroying the cadres of the nationalist movement. Moreover, the OUN had members scattered throughout Western Europe. Many lived in German-occupied Poland, having crossed the border when the Red Army entered Western

Ukraine. In 1940 the OUN split: the younger, more radical elements followed S. Bandera, the rest remained A. Mel'nyk's adherents. Both factions started forming expeditionary groups (*pokhidni hrupy*) whose task would be to follow the Germans into Ukraine and seize power. The groups were also instructed to organise anti-German resistance if this became necessary.³³ In 1941 the OUN had close to 20 000 members, half of whom were under 21 years of age.³⁴ It sent some 8000 members into Soviet Ukraine as soon as the Germans launched their offensive.³⁵ Of these, roughly 300 acted as translators with the German forces and were to facilitate the work of expeditionary groups.³⁶ The rest were formed into small detachments of ten to fifteen and spread into all the regions of Ukraine where they served as a catalyst and filled part of the leadership vacuum.

When the expeditionary groups entered Soviet Ukraine they encountered a population on whom 'the era of Ukrainisation and the formal existence of a Soviet Ukrainian state had left a great mark,' to quote a Western Ukrainian observer.³⁷ Former members of the Ukrainian Galician Army who were in Ukraine in 1918–19 and who visited the country again in 1941 noted that 'national consciousness is now incomparably greater than during the revolution'.³⁸ This was also observed to be the case in Ukraine's industrial regions whose human fabric had been transformed by the influx of Ukrainian peasants during the 1930s.³⁹ In Donbass, according to a local resident, 'the need for Ukrainian statehood was taken for granted'.⁴⁰ This national awareness served as a basis for common action between Soviet and Western Ukrainians.

The political culture of Western Ukrainians, on the other hand, differed markedly from that of their Soviet compatriots and emerged as a point of tension. Western Ukrainian nationalists ignored socio-economic and civil rights issues and viewed the attainment of national independence as a panacea, while Eastern Ukrainians regarded these questions with great concern and rejected the integral nationalist doctrine as elitist, intolerant and obscurantist.⁴¹ But at a time when Soviet Ukrainians had no political organisations, and the democratic and socialist parties either from Western Ukraine or those in exile in Western Europe were 'absent from the scene', 'what remained were only the nationalists'.⁴² People were prepared to work with Western Ukrainian nationalists in establishing local administration, schools, etc., not only because these institutions were essential for a minimal functioning of society, but also in order to give these institutions a national content. It was felt that embryonic self-organisation at the

local level was the first step in achieving a national government.⁴³ The OUN's singleness of purpose and dynamism impressed the still atomised Soviet Ukrainian population and was taken by them as a sign that the activity which was being undertaken would be tolerated by the Germans. The fact that the *Wehrmacht* had left a relatively free hand to the inhabitants in the first month or so reinforced this false belief.⁴⁴

Within a matter of weeks a local administration (with various departments such as health and education) was established at the municipal, village and occasionally at the *oblast'* levels. These administrations (many of whom were elected) and the militias served as organs of self-government and attempted to rebuild the shattered communities. Since these organs were targeted for control by the OUN members, in many regions they became dominated by 'separatist elements'.⁴⁵ Where this occurred, the OUN together with their Eastern Ukrainian sympathisers Ukrainised the administrations linguistically and transformed these organs into vehicles promoting Ukrainian national goals. The work of some administrations was marred by the factional conflict between the Bandera and Mel'nyk OUN groups, and in some instances by Eastern Ukrainians' resentment of OUN high-handedness, OUN's neglect of social welfare issues and virulent anti-Russian attitudes.⁴⁶ However, as one eye-witness reported, the local organs were initially largely headed by 'honest people, intellectuals and [the formerly] "repressed"'. There was no talk about them being puppets or German agents. People hoped that they would be the nucleus of a government.⁴⁷ Indeed, 'the wildest rumours' circulated about the imminent arrival of Vynnychenko (with his Jewish wife!) and other well-known socialist personalities to head a new government.⁴⁸

Throughout Ukraine many elementary, secondary and vocational schools were repaired and reopened by local community efforts. Wherever possible, universities and institutes renewed their activity. An All-Ukrainian Teachers' Union was founded which had as one of its principal aims the production of new textbooks.⁴⁹ As a result of local initiatives, the school curriculum was revised in order to turn schools into agencies communicating a Ukrainian national message, stressing language, history and culture.⁵⁰ In Poltava, for example, children were taught national songs hitherto forbidden by Soviet authorities.⁵¹ In Voroshylovhrad, in Donbass, a teachers' conference decided to make Ukrainian the language of instruction in all schools.⁵² At the start of the German occupation 115 Ukrainian-

language newspapers were founded.⁵³ Some, such as the Kievan *Ukrains'ke slovo* (Ukrainian Word), established by the Mel'nyk faction of the OUN with a circulation of 50 000, developed a substantial readership.⁵⁴ Many newspapers 'maintained an autonomous position'.⁵⁵ They carried articles outlining the case for Ukrainian independence, revelatory *exposés* of events during the 1930s, discussions of the works of Khvył'ovyi and of other cultural figures purged under Stalin, and popular accounts of Ukrainian history.⁵⁶ At the same time, scores of theatres and choirs (with new repertoires) were founded.⁵⁷ Peasants began to divide up collective farms on the basis of the old principle of the size of family.⁵⁸ Cooperatives and an agricultural bank were established. Roughly two months after the Soviet evacuation *Zhytomyr oblast'*, for example, had an agricultural bank with eleven branches and a cooperative with 140 branches.⁵⁹ *Prosvita* societies, popular enlightenment associations, came into being. In the industrial centre of Kryvyi Rih, for instance, the *Prosvita* 'was well organised holding many courses and concerts . . . with branches in dozens of villages'.⁶⁰ After one of its concerts, attended by thousands of people, the entire audience rose in the spontaneous singing of the Ukrainian national anthem which was banned under Soviet rule.⁶¹ In Mykolaiv, in southern Ukraine, the revived *Prosvita* was run by local trade unionists who established it as 'the centre of Ukrainian cultural life for the region'. *Prosvita* members debated 'plans for Ukrainisation and the methods to be used'.⁶² Trade unions were revived. In Kryvyi Rih these unions, together with the newly established Club of Ukrainian Engineers, began to reconstruct the factories and plants as well as establish forms of self-management.⁶³ A Ukrainian Red Cross undertook the operation of hospitals and clinics, and provided assistance for Ukrainian POWs.⁶⁴ Religious life developed briskly. The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church quickly took root and established thousands of new parishes.⁶⁵ Streets were renamed in honour of Ukrainian national heroes, and in urban centres it was noted that 'more Ukrainian is being spoken since people no longer have the same fear of reprisals'.⁶⁶

In the course of this activity there occurred a strengthening of national consciousness. 'People began to voice public opinion more freely,' according to a former resident of Dnipropetrovs'k.⁶⁷ Nationally conscious elements came out of hiding and 'raised their heads'.⁶⁸ Books and periodicals published during the 1920s and forbidden under Stalin circulated freely and were in great demand.

The classics of Ukrainian history could now be read.⁶⁹ Teachers spoke openly in schools about national oppression.⁷⁰ During countless meetings and rallies hundreds of thousands of people heard a national message and became involved in a debate over Ukraine's future. Judging by the reports, these discussions invariably focussed on five 'burning questions': the need for Ukrainians to have their own national state; the dismantling of collective farms and the introduction of an agrarian order which would allow peasants to 'keep the fruits of their labour'; the 'emancipation' of the working class; the reopening and Ukrainisation of institutions of high education in order to give youth opportunities for study; the release of prisoners of war.⁷¹ It is true that caution and hesitancy characterised these organisational initiatives and discussions, a natural consequence of the atomisation of society under Stalin and the often brutal behaviour of German troops.⁷² But in this early period the German occupational forces could not possibly penetrate Ukrainian society with anything approaching the same effectiveness as did the Soviet regime or the German civil administration which was to follow. This permitted a movement for national and social emancipation, coming from the depths of society, to manifest itself. Indeed, the strong reactive Ukrainian patriotism that arose in response to subsequent Nazi terror can only be understood against the background of the mobilisation of the population in this brief period.

On the basis of available information it is difficult to establish the exact composition of the Soviet Ukrainians who emerged as the leadership in this initial period. The composition appears to have varied from region to region. Surviving members of the 'old intelligentsia' – those who participated in the 1917-20 revolution, individuals who had suffered repression during the Soviet period, activists of the Ukrainisation era, former state and trade union functionaries, teachers, members of the younger intelligentsia – all appear to have played an important role. Noticeably absent were the higher Soviet intelligentsia and party functionaries, many of whom had either evacuated or remained passive fearing German reprisals.⁷³ Certainly, the expansion of higher education during the preceding decades ensured that, unlike during the period of the revolution of 1917, there was no shortage of skilled, trained Ukrainian personnel to assume the management of society. The small town of Zhytomyr with a population of 40 000 in 1941, for example, boasted over 500 'very nationally conscious members of the intelligentsia'.⁷⁴ In this process of cultural-national revival, as already noted, Western Ukrainians

frequently found themselves in the roles of initiators and intermediaries. Thus in Mariupol' (Zhdanov) in Donbass, when Ukrainian efforts to found a newspaper were blocked by Russians who remained in charge of the local administration, Western Ukrainians intervened and secured permission for the establishment of the newspaper.⁷⁵ Often it was they who called the first meetings and began the political discussion. But their role in the cultural, educational and economic initiatives was considerably less pronounced than the part they played in the establishment of local administrations and the militias.⁷⁶

The period of national revival 'passed like lightning'.⁷⁷ The first concerted German campaign against Ukrainian national assertion began on 31 August 1941 in Zhytomyr, and by the end of September 1941 had engulfed all of Ukraine.⁷⁸ The instruments used for the task were the *Einsatzgruppen*, task forces of specially selected police officials headed by SS officers from H. Himmler's trusted circles.⁷⁹ They struck at the cadres of the nascent Ukrainian national movement at the same time as they initiated the slaughter of Jews. First to fall victim in the attack against the Ukrainian movement were members of the expeditionary groups sent by the Bandera faction of the OUN and their Eastern Ukrainian sympathisers. In November, following a mass patriotic rally in Bazar organised by the Mel'nyk faction of the OUN which demonstrated the strength of Ukrainian national sentiment and alarmed the Germans, an attack on the Mel'nyk groups and their Eastern Ukrainian co-workers was launched.⁸⁰ By January 1942, most 'Ukrainian independentists', Western and Eastern Ukrainians alike, who had openly participated in the founding of local administrations, militias, *Prosvita* societies, cooperatives, newspapers and schools had been caught in the Nazi net.⁸¹ These people, wrote an eye-witness, 'had naively "deconspiratorialised" themselves . . . and it was easy for the Germans now to arrest them'.⁸² A 'colossal number' were executed in this campaign, which marked the entrenchment of German administration in Ukraine.⁸³

Among the Nazis there were important differences of opinion on the formal state structures which were to replace the union republics. Alfred Rosenberg, a Russophobic Baltic German who was the Nazis' 'theorist' on matters of race and Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories (the *Ostministerium*), favoured the establishment of a series of buffer states (Ukraine, Belorussia, Central Asia, etc.) dependent on the Reich but exercising a measure of self-government,

as a *cordon sanitaire* against Russia. He also advocated cultural policies (such as the establishment of a major university in Kiev) which would 'awaken the historical consciousness of Ukrainians' and serve to mobilise them against Russia.⁸⁴ His concepts, however, clashed with the views of the Nazi establishment, which wanted only to colonise and exploit the East. Hitler himself had spoken against the creation of any kind of Ukrainian state and advocated direct Nazi control over this and other Eastern territories.⁸⁵ Thus the *Reichskommissariat Ukraine*, as the German civil administration was called, was formed as a branch of the Reich's *Ostministerium*. Since Hitler thought that Ukraine was 'undoubtedly the most important [Eastern] district', he appointed a loyal servitor, Erich Koch, to head the *Reichskommissariat*.⁸⁶ Although nominally subordinated to Rosenberg, Koch could ignore the policies of his formal superior because he was favoured by powerful figures such as M. Bormann and H. Göring and had direct access to Hitler. In his inaugural speech, Koch described himself as 'a brutal dog. For this reason I was appointed *Reichskommissar* of Ukraine.' His mission, said Koch, was 'to suck from Ukraine all the goods we can get hold of, without consideration for the feeling or the property of Ukrainians'.⁸⁷ Whatever else can be said of Koch, he was a man of his word. (Incredibly, Koch is still alive in Poland and has never stood trial for his crimes committed in Ukraine. The reasons for this unprecedented 'humanitarianism' on the part of Polish and Soviet authorities remain a mystery.)⁸⁸

German policy paid not the slightest attention to Ukrainian national sensitivities. The country was divided: Galicia became a district of the General Government of Poland (the *Generalgouvernement*); most of Odessa, parts of Vinnytsia and Mykolaiv, as well as northern Bukovyna were assigned to Romania (which called the region Transnistria) as compensation for Romania's loss of Transylvania to Hungary.⁸⁹ The rest of Ukraine, except for the Eastern districts near the front which remained under the jurisdiction of the *Wehrmacht*, fell under the direct control of Koch. To emphasise the point that 'Ukraine does not exist . . . it is merely a geographical concept,' Koch made the small provincial town of Rovno the 'capital' of the *Reichskommissariat*.⁹⁰

A vast German administrative network encompassing all spheres of activity was established in both the *Reichskommissariat* and the regions held by the *Wehrmacht*. As noted by a Soviet source, 'in none of the countries hitherto occupied by the fascists was there such a large occupational force and such a numerous occupational appara-

tus' as in Ukraine.⁹¹ Indigenous administrations operated only on the lowest levels – the village or groups of villages and in towns. Even here they were under the strict control of German supervisory personnel who could dismiss indigenous staff at will.⁹² By far the largest local administration was in Kiev. That entire apparatus (all employees in all departments) numbered 2000 (1942), a trifling figure for a city of some 352 000 people (1942).⁹³ Whereas other groups had national committees which acted as representative bodies, as George Fischer observed, 'It was the Ukrainians, alone of the non-Russian nationalities who most of the time had no German-recognised National Committee.'⁹⁴ A Ukrainian National Committee was formed only in March 1945, in Germany. If participation in civil administration under German occupation is taken as a measure of the level of collaboration, then in Soviet Ukraine collaboration was the lowest in occupied Europe, if only for the simple reason that the Germans did not allow it.

It should also be pointed out that when Germans used the adjective 'Ukrainian' to describe the local administration and its officials they were referring merely to the territory of Ukraine. In fact, many officials were Russians or local ethnic Germans (*Volksdeutsche*). This was especially the case after those with a pro-Ukrainian orientation were repressed.⁹⁵ While many who served in the local administration did so only to survive the famine which ravaged urban centres, others did so because they were 'opportunists' or because they were 'Soviet agents'.⁹⁶ The national composition of the auxilliary police (or militia) was also varied.⁹⁷ As Ievhen Stakhiv observed sardonically, after the Nazi purges, all that remained of nationalists' efforts to 'Ukrainise' the 'Ukrainian' police was the name and the fact that they continued to wear blue and yellow stripes on their uniforms.⁹⁸ The police, some of whom participated in the Nazis' round-up and extermination of Jews, was comprised of the 'worst elements of society' and was 'detested' by the population.⁹⁹ The police also 'contained the strongest Communist infiltration',¹⁰⁰ a development greatly assisted by the German 'practice of retaining the Soviet *militia* [police] as a matter of convenience'.¹⁰¹ If one takes into account the systematic penetration of the local administration and police by the Soviets, then the number of people who participated voluntarily in these institutions is thus considerably reduced. By the winter and spring of 1942, according to the official Soviet history of Ukraine, 'members of the [Communist] underground had infiltrated the auxilliary [local] organs established by the occupiers. Very often these organs were in

the hands of Bolshevik agents or Communists.¹⁰² Finally, 'only a very few' Ukrainian units were established in the German army. Their numbers have been greatly exaggerated because of the fact that after the war (for unknown reasons) the Western allies described all of the *Wehrmacht's* eastern units (*Osttruppen*), whatever their national origin, as 'Ukrainians'.¹⁰³

Another aspect of German policy which provoked mass indignation was the treatment of prisoners of war. Initially Soviet POWs were segregated according to nationality and some non-Russian prisoners, among them some Ukrainians whom the Nazis considered essential for harvesting the crops, were released.¹⁰⁴ But after the Bandera faction of the OUN proclaimed an independent Ukraine in L'viv on 30 June 1941 against the wishes of German occupational forces, Berlin reversed its policies. Hitler ordered the suspect Ukrainians to be held captive, while allowing the freeing of the nationals of the Baltic states to be continued.¹⁰⁵ Soviet POWs, unlike prisoners from the other Allied countries, were held under conditions designed to bring about their death. Paltry food rations, exposure to severe weather, diseases, beatings and mass executions, decimated the POW ranks. In Khyriv, in Ukraine, to give an example, only 17 out of a camp of 8000 troops survived to 1943 – the rest had perished from famine.¹⁰⁶ Of the 5.8 million Soviet POWs who fell into German hands, 2 million are known to have died, another million are unaccounted for and it could be presumed that most of them met a similar fate.¹⁰⁷ The Soviet government, for its part, turned a blind eye to the fate of the POWs. It considered any soldier who fell into enemy hands to be a traitor and not deserving of protection, as International Red Cross officials discovered when they made overtures to Soviet authorities during the war to gain an understanding with the Axis powers regarding captives.¹⁰⁸ Since many of the camps were located in Ukraine, the population soon became aware of conditions in them. Indeed, the Ukrainian civilian population attempted unsuccessfully to bring food to POWs.¹⁰⁹ The 'grapevine', a very developed form of communication in the USSR, soon spread information about the conditions of POWs to all corners of the country. The resistance of the Red Army and of the civilian population stiffened as the belief that the Germans were out to destroy the Slavic peoples became widespread. The treatment of POWs was considered by many to have been one of the biggest mistakes the Germans committed.¹¹⁰ It was certainly not the last.

Turning to agriculture, the striking characteristic of the agrarian order established by the Germans was that they preserved intact the entire Soviet collective and state farm system, including even work norms, price scales and administrative machinery. Attempts to dissolve collective farms were 'fought with the severest measures'.¹¹¹ There were, of course, a few 'innovations'. Notable among these was the renaming of collective farms as 'community farms' (*hromads'ki hospodarstva*). Some in the German hierarchy such as Rosenberg and elements of the *Wehrmacht* argued that Ukrainians would never cooperate with the Germans until land had been distributed amongst the peasants.¹¹² In Rosenberg's programme for a 'new agrarian order', the parcelling out of land to individual peasants was to occur through a transitional arrangement called an 'agricultural cooperative' (*khliborobs'ka spilka*). In this phase peasants would receive an allotment and be allowed to keep a portion of the harvest from this land. Major agricultural operations, however, would still be performed in common, under German supervision.¹¹³ But Koch, backed by Göring's Eastern Economic staff, successfully resisted the implementation of this reform because it would hinder the seizure of surpluses.¹¹⁴ By the summer of 1943, only 10 per cent of peasant households in the *Reichskommissariat* had received allotments under the 'agricultural cooperative' scheme.¹¹⁵ The outright distribution of land to the peasantry was not even seriously discussed.¹¹⁶ In the meantime, Koch made certain that Ukraine contributed 'to the salvation of European civilization'.¹¹⁷ Of the six million tonnes of grain requisitioned by the Reich from the USSR between 1941 and 1944, five million came from Ukraine.¹¹⁸ In many regions, grain quotas imposed by the Nazis on collective farms were double the 1941 Soviet norm.¹¹⁹ If Ukraine's peasantry avoided mass starvation it was because Germans, following Soviet practice, permitted private plots.¹²⁰ A complex administrative network of German officials supervised Ukrainian agriculture. At the bottom of this pyramid were close to 15 000 *Landwirtschaftsführer* or agricultural leaders, dispatched to Ukraine to supervise the peasants' work. These *La-Führer*, as they were known, ruled collective and state farms as their private bailiwick. In Rovno, for example, they regularly beat peasants who failed to doff their hats.¹²¹ Flogging was introduced for the non-fulfillment of work norms; curfews were imposed; the carrying of pocket knives was prohibited and punishable by death — to name a few of the many new measures which plagued the lives of the

peasants.¹²² Mass executions as punishment for voluntary or involuntary peasant assistance to partisans were commonplace. Indeed, in Ukraine 250 villages and their inhabitants were totally obliterated as part of the Nazi campaign against the resistance.¹²³

One of the consequences of the Nazis' exploitation of Ukrainian agriculture was the disastrous food supply situation in the urban centres. In December 1941 German economic administrators decided to increase the delivery of foodstuffs to the Reich by eliminating 'superfluous eaters', namely, 'Jews and the population of Ukrainian cities such as Kiev.'¹²⁴ The reduction of the urban population was achieved by a drastic cut in food rations, the establishment of road blocks to prevent food from entering towns and cities and the closing of urban (collective) farm markets.¹²⁵ Some of these measures were subsequently repealed. However, according to L. Forostivs'kyi, by the end of 1943 food rations in Kiev amounted to less than 30 per cent of minimal requirements.¹²⁶ The urban population plummeted. In the case of Kharkiv, it dropped from 850 000 in 1939 to 450 000 by December 1941.¹²⁷ Between 70 000 and 80 000 residents of Kharkiv died of famine during the German occupation.¹²⁸

One of the most hated aspects of German rule in Ukraine was the *Ostarbeiter*, or Eastern conscript labour programme. Initially, some Ukrainians volunteered to work in German industry in order to escape famine or to learn a new trade.¹²⁹ But the volunteers 'were packed into freight cars without food or sanitary facilities and shipped off to Germany. Those who survived were put behind barbed wire and fed only enough to keep them alive.'¹³⁰ Unlike West European and even Galician Ukrainian foreign workers, they were treated as social pariahs and were forced to wear a humiliating badge – *Ost* (East) – and were subjected to draconian labour discipline. A month or two after the departure of the volunteers news of their treatment reached Ukraine and thus by the summer of 1941, force had to be used to meet labour quotas. People were arbitrarily rounded up in cinemas, churches, and so on and shipped to Germany.¹³¹ In the summer of 1942 a mandatory two-year labour service in Germany for all men and women in Ukraine between the ages of 18 and 20 was decreed.¹³² Entire communities suffered severe reprisals for failure to comply with the labour quotas. Of the 2.8 million *Ostarbeiter* carried off to Germany, 2.3 million were from Ukraine.¹³³

Attention should be paid to the consequences of the occupation for education, culture and health. The Nazis' approach towards edu-

cation was quite straightforward. As Hitler explained during his 1942 visit to Ukraine, Ukrainians 'should be given only the crudest kind of education necessary for communication between them and their German masters'.¹³⁴ In January 1942 it was announced that all schools above the fourth grade were to be closed. Only the occasional vocational school survived the implementation of this policy.¹³⁵ Printing school textbooks was strictly forbidden.¹³⁶ So far as culture was concerned, most theatres, choirs and operas were disbanded. The best of that which did survive was reserved for Germans.¹³⁷ Of the 115 newspapers founded in the early summer of 1941, only 40 remained by April 1942.¹³⁸ Judging by the issues that are available in the West, these publications were heavily censored propaganda broadsheets. The publishing of books, journals and magazines was not allowed.¹³⁹ The myriad of Ukrainian national organisations which were re-born following the Soviet evacuation were banned – from the Ukrainian Red Cross to sports clubs.¹⁴⁰ As for health, it was decided as much as possible to curtail medical services in order to check 'the biological power of the Ukrainians,' as Koch put it.¹⁴¹ Policies such as these were utterly incomprehensible to a population on whom the ideology of progress had left such a deep imprint and who accepted as axiomatic the development of educational, medical and social services.

Finally, we must consider the effect of Nazi racial policies. The genocide of Jews is so well-researched that it need not be discussed here. The popular revulsion produced by the German atrocities, however, has not been emphasised enough.¹⁴² It should be noted that unlike in most countries occupied by the Nazis, in Ukraine and Poland, assisting Jews was punishable by death and that hundreds in Ukraine were executed for such actions.¹⁴³ Nazi racial doctrines towards Jews were, of course, qualitatively different from those applied to *Untermenschen* such as Ukrainians. However, by any other measure, Nazi views concerning Ukrainians were extreme. Göring thought 'the best thing would be to kill all men in Ukraine over fifteen years of age'. Himmler advocated that 'the entire Ukrainian intelligentsia must be decimated . . . do away with it and the leaderless mass would become obedient'. Koch declared, 'If I find a Ukrainian who is worthy of sitting at the same table with me I must have him shot.'¹⁴⁴ Such views resulted in a campaign of terror which has yet to be chronicled: the mass destruction of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the execution of hundreds of thousands of hostages, the incarceration of countless others in Buchenwald, Auschwitz, Ravensbrück and other camps where Ukrainians were even denied

the right to wear the letter 'U' to indicate their nationality.¹⁴⁵ In daily life, in countless ways, including such seemingly petty things as stores and latrines marked 'For Germans Only', the message of German racial superiority was driven home.¹⁴⁶

The 'strong hatred' which Nazi actions provoked expressed itself in an affirmation of a Ukrainian national identity.¹⁴⁷ 'The German occupation increased national consciousness in Ukraine,' commented an eyewitness. 'By their behaviour the Germans evoked a reaction in the form of a counter-chauvinism.'¹⁴⁸ Another noted that 'the idea of Ukrainian independence grew'.¹⁴⁹ The national revival of the early months served as a reminder of unrealised ambitions and contributed to this 'upsurge of Ukrainian patriotism'.¹⁵⁰ In Transnistria as well, where the civil administration was less oppressive than in the neighbouring German-held areas, 'the national consciousness of the Ukrainian population was . . . stirred by Romanian behaviour'.¹⁵¹ Nazi policies also gave rise to large-scale resistance movements (both national and Soviet) which were influenced, albeit in different ways, by this new patriotism.

From the military point of view the national resistance movement counted for something only in Western Ukraine. In Volyn', in 1941, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (*Ukrains'ka povstans'ka armiiia* – UPA) was established and by 1942 it had 15 000 men under arms and controlled a liberated zone of some 50 000 square kilometers and two million people. By 1943, after the UPA had come under the control of the Bandera faction of the OUN, the UPA began to extend its operations to Galicia and by 1944 the UPA numbered approximately 40 000 people.¹⁵² In Eastern Ukraine, on the other hand, apart from a few forays by the UPA and the emergence of small 'independent' guerilla detachments which were either quickly absorbed or, more often than not, destroyed by Soviet partisan formations,¹⁵³ the resistance movement did not take the form of armed struggle.¹⁵⁴ The dominant organisational mode of the Ukrainian national resistance was clandestine groups engaged in anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation.¹⁵⁵ Interestingly enough, these groups were most successful in Ukraine's industrial heartland, among workers in Dnipropetrovs'k, Kryvyi Rih and especially Donbass.¹⁵⁶ In Donbass, for instance, members of Bandera's expeditionary groups built an OUN network which encompassed a dozen cities and whose organisational core consisted of over 500 people with some 10 000 others who could be considered 'active sympathizers', that is, those who distributed leaflets and the like.¹⁵⁷ This organisation was unquestionably more significant than the Communist underground in Donbass.¹⁵⁸ The

ingredients which contributed to this success were varied. To begin with, having arrived in Donbass after the Germans had started purging and executing pro-Ukrainian elements in the right bank, the OUN here never attempted open work such as assuming control of local administrations. Rather, they remained underground, thus preserving their cadres as well as a resolutely anti-Nazi reputation. Another factor was the readiness of Western Ukrainian OUN members to abandon, under pressure from Eastern Ukrainian workers, the integral nationalist doctrine in favour of a programme calling for a radical democratisation of socio-economic and political life. The workers, on the other hand, embittered by their exploitation under Stalin, and whose Ukrainian identity Nazi policies had reinforced, were more than willing to support what they called, 'the struggle to complete the social revolution of 1917 by giving it a concrete national form'. Thus in Donbass the OUN advanced the slogan 'For a Soviet Ukraine without the dictatorship of the Communist Party.'¹⁵⁹

The rise of Ukrainian patriotism during the war was such that even Stalin was forced to concede to it in order to harness its force. Undoubtedly for him this was merely an expedient to improve the battle-worthiness of the 4.5 million citizens of Ukraine who served in the armed forces (1941–5).¹⁶⁰ Moreover, the 250 000 strong Soviet partisan force in Ukraine, of whom 60 per cent were Ukrainians,¹⁶¹ represented a major force and they too had to be permitted to communicate to the population a message somewhat more palatable than the dreary slogans which characterised Soviet propaganda hitherto. In concrete terms Stalin's concessions did not amount to much: Ukraine obtained its own ministry of foreign affairs and was eventually admitted to the United Nations; measures were taken to revive the study of Ukrainian ethnography, archaeology and history; the adjective 'Ukrainian' was attached to the names of armies and fronts; the Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi was created.¹⁶² Yet these concessions had an enormous symbolic significance for they legitimised the expression of Ukrainian national self-awareness. The opportunity was seized by the Ukrainian intelligentsia and party leaders and transformed into a major propaganda effort. In countless leaflets, posters, meetings and publications the historical continuity of the Ukrainian nation was affirmed and its uniqueness stressed. The struggle against Hitler was legitimised not by reference to the party, to Stalin or to any other familiar themes. Rather, the traditions of the Ukrainian liberation struggle were invoked.¹⁶³ Ukrainians were called upon to fight Hitler in order to defend 'our Ukrainian statehood',

'our native culture, our native tongue',¹⁶⁴ or 'our national honour and pride'.¹⁶⁵ Important concessions to Ukrainians, it was felt, were in the offing.¹⁶⁶ This mood was reinforced by a whispering campaign, initiated by the Soviet underground, to the effect that collective farms would soon be disbanded.¹⁶⁷

The Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia and party leadership, which had been caught up in the surge of patriotism during the war, attempted to continue the momentum when the last German troops were chased out of Ukraine in the autumn of 1944. They were stopped by A. Zhdanov's crackdown on liberalisation which began in Ukraine in 1946. The focus of this campaign was the struggle against the relaxation of ideological controls during the war which had led 'Ukrainian historians to publish books with a less russified version of history', 'prompted Ukrainian writers to press for freedom from censorship', and allowed others to commit a host of serious 'Ukrainian nationalistic errors'.¹⁶⁸ Donbass was singled out as requiring particularly 'decisive measures' to correct shortcomings in the ideological sphere.¹⁶⁹ The Soviet Ukrainian citizen could be forgiven for thinking, *plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*.

5 Ukrainian Society after the Second World War

POPULATION

The end of the war did not bring respite to the republic. In 1946–7 a drought, more acute than the one which had occurred in 1921–2, affected the steppe. History repeated itself: ‘train after train’ loaded with food-stuffs from the non-famine regions of Ukraine departed for Russia, while the population of the steppe was left to starve.¹ The western regions of Ukraine, added to the republic during the war, also lost many people as a result of mass deportations to Siberia and the Far East between 1947 and 1951 in the course of the Soviet regime’s campaign to stamp out the nationalist movement.²

Ukraine’s population losses during the war and post-war period were so extreme that, despite the addition of two million citizens with the incorporation of Transcarpathia (1944) and the Crimea (1954), it was only in 1960 that the republic recovered its 1 January 1941 population total of 42.1 million.³ (The 1941 figure included all of Western Ukraine except for Transcarpathia.) When the casualties of the civil war, collectivisation, the purges and the Second World War are combined, more than half the male and a quarter of the female population perished.⁴

Society in Ukraine began its recovery in the 1950s with a changed ethno-demographic structure. As a result of Nazi extermination policies, Jews diminished to a mere 2 per cent of Ukraine’s population by 1959. Many Poles, Hungarians, Romanians and other East European minorities living in Ukraine were resettled after the war in the newly established peoples’ democracies. The incorporation of Western Ukraine added approximately 7 million Ukrainians to the republic.⁵ The above mentioned were the factors responsible for an

increase in the Ukrainians' representation in the total population of the republic between 1930 and 1959. Ukrainians had not augmented their share of the population at the expense of the Russian minority. On the contrary, in the post-war period the growth of the Russian population in Ukraine was unprecedented. By 1970 there were over 9 million Russians in Ukraine, almost 20 per cent of the population. Ukrainians during the 1960s saw their plurality eroded by 2 per cent. (See Table 5.1) Many Ukrainians viewed this ethno-demographic trend with alarm.

Because (as we discuss below) the large increase in the number of Russians in Ukraine posed such a major challenge for Ukrainians both in terms of the preservation of their national identity and in establishing a dominant position in the republic's social structure, the causes of the increase deserve to be examined in some detail. Four factors were at play: the rate of natural increase of the population of Ukraine, the in-migration of Russians, the assimilation of Ukrainians to a Russian identity and, finally, the out-migration of Ukrainians. We will examine each of these factors in turn.

The rate of natural population growth in Ukraine dropped from 13.6 per 1000 inhabitants in 1960 to 6.4 per 1000 by 1970, giving the republic the fourth lowest natural population increase among the fifteen republics in the USSR. This situation was brought about by two developments. The first was the drop in Ukraine's crude birth-rate (births per 1000 of population, per year) from 20.5 in 1960 to 15.2 in 1970.⁶ The universal employment of women, a higher level of education among females, as well as extensive labour outlays by women on domestic chores, poor housing and inadequate day care and kindergarten facilities, are the major factors which have had a restraining influence on family size.⁷ The average family in Ukraine in 1970 consisted of 3.4 people. Ukrainians in the republic had birth-rates which were not appreciably higher than that of the Russian residents of Ukraine, despite the higher proportion of urban dwellers among the Russian population.⁸ This was because the flight of young people to urban centres and changing life styles have produced a situation where the Ukrainian village has ceased to be a reservoir of population renewal. By 1967 urban and rural birth-rates in Ukraine had been equalised, and since that date urban birth-rates have surpassed those in rural areas everywhere in Ukraine except for some *oblasti* in Western Ukraine.⁹ Thus the average size of Ukraine's rural family had virtually reached the urban norm: 3.6 per family in rural areas, 3.3 in urban centres in 1970.¹⁰ The second factor respon-

TABLE 5.1 National composition of the population of Ukraine, 1795-1970

Year	Total population	Ukrainians	% of total	Russians	% of total	Jews	% of total	Others	% of total
1795 ^a	3 974 000	3 522 000	88.6	—	—	—	—	—	—
1897 ^b	23 430 000	17 004 000	72.6	2 768 000	11.8	1 908 000	8.1	1 750 000	7.5
1926 ^c	29 018 000	23 219 000	80.0	2 677 000	9.2	1 574 000	5.5	1 548 000	5.3
c. 1930 ^d	38 569 000	28 626 000	74.2	3 165 000	8.2	2 492 000	6.5	4 286 000	11.1
1939 ^e	31 785 000	23 362 000	73.5	4 100 000	12.9	1 570 000	4.9	2 753 000	8.7
1959	41 869 000	32 159 000	76.8	7 091 000	16.9	840 000	2.0	1 779 000	4.3
1970	47 127 000	35 284 000	74.9	9 126 000	19.4	777 000	1.6	1 940 000	4.1

^a Male population only, nine provinces of tsarist Russia.

^b Nine provinces of tsarist Russia. Nationality is denoted by mother-tongue.

^c Territories of the Ukrainian SSR before 1939.

^d This figure includes all of the territories within the present boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR (that is, post 1954).

^e Territories of the Ukrainian SSR before 1939.

SOURCES 1795 - V.M. Kabuzan & G.P. Makhnova, 'Chislennost' i udel'nyi ves ukrainskogo naselenia na territorii SSSR v 1795-1959 gg.', *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1, 1965, Table 1, pp. 31-2; 1897 - *Perepis' 1897*, Tables XXI and XXII in Vols 8, 13, 16, 32, 33, 41, 46, 47, 48; 1926 - *Perepis' 1926*, Table via, Vol. 2; c. 1930 - V.I. Naulko, *Razvitiie mezheimicheskikh svyazei na Ukraïne* (Kiev, 1975), Table 4, p. 64; 1939 - V.I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR. Etnodemograficheskii obzor* (Moscow, 1975), Table 13, pp. 108-9; L. Zinger, *Dos banavite folk: tsiferni un faktm vegn di yidn in FSSR* (Moscow, 1941), p. 126; 1959 - *Perepis' 1959*, Table 53, Vol. 2; 1970 - *Perepis' 1970*, Table 7, Vol. 4.

sible for Ukraine's low natural population growth was the increase in the death-rate from 6.9 per 1000 people in 1960 to 8.8 per 1000 in 1970. Ukraine moved from fourth to third place among the fifteen republics between 1960 and 1970 in this respect.¹¹ The higher death-rate is in part a natural outcome of an aging population. But the rise in mortality is also in part attributable to the regime's inability to improve or even to keep stable the quality of life.¹² Since the death-rate among Ukrainians in Ukraine was higher than for the republic's Russian population, this offset whatever gains Ukrainians may have made from a slightly higher birth-rate.¹³ In this situation of demographic parity, it is other processes which played the determining role in altering the ethnic structure of the republic's population.

The first of these to be considered is Russian in-migration to Ukraine. It is estimated that between 1959 and 1970 one million Russians migrated to Ukraine.¹⁴ The great size of this migration has led some to claim that it represented a conscious policy to Russify the republic.¹⁵ Because migration is a complex process and existing Soviet literature on the subject leaves many questions unanswered, it is difficult to either disprove or to substantiate such a claim. Officially, the Administration for Organised Recruitment of Labour (ONR) of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in coordination with the all-Union Gosplan was charged with ensuring that Ukraine's labour needs were met.¹⁶ The ONR, however, had no jurisdiction over institutions and enterprises in Ukraine under all-Union control. These establishments recruited largely from outside the republic despite instructions stating that local labour reserves had to be used.¹⁷ Only a tenth of Ukraine's immigrants were brought through the aegis of the republic's labour recruitment agencies.¹⁸ Soviet researchers claimed that in the overwhelming majority of cases, immigrants were moving to Ukraine on their own personal initiative.¹⁹ They were attracted by the climate, the developed economy offering job possibilities for a wide variety of skills and qualifications, as well as by the developed social infrastructures (schools, hospitals) of Ukraine's southern regions.²⁰ The existence of a Russian 'old boys' network in the enterprises located in the republic meant that many Russian immigrants had little difficulty in securing good employment.²¹ A Soviet Academy of Sciences study of labour resources pointed out that the large-scale movement of Russians into Ukraine was technically illegal, since it was not part of the plan for balancing labour resources.²² Although Ukrainian party leaders attempted to stem the tide of Russian immigration, their efforts in this direction were not successful.²³

Because Russian migration was concentrated in certain regions, it altered the existing ethnic structure of these areas. Our only source of information for the regional pattern of immigrant settlement is the 1970 census, the first since 1926 to collect information on migration. The census gathered this data by asking residents who had lived less than two years at their current address to indicate their previous place of residence. The results showed that 13.8 million people in Ukraine changed their place of residence between 1968 and 1970. A little fewer than 600 000 had arrived from outside the republic; of these 428 000 came from the RSFSR. The majority – 51.2 per cent – of migrants from Russia settled in the Donbass and Southern regions.²⁴ Although the census did not provide demographic information about the new arrivals, some of these data can be gleaned from surveys. A 1968 study of 4500 migrants, for example, found that two-thirds were males, 84 per cent were under the age of 40 and almost a third had higher or specialised secondary education.²⁵ This profile indicated that immigrants were equipped to play a dynamic role in the socio-economic life of the republic.

Apart from immigration, the Russian population of Ukraine increased as a result of the assimilation of other minorities living in the republic (Belorussians, Bulgarians, Greeks) to a Russian identity. As regards Ukrainians, S. I. Bruk noted, 'As early as 1959, more than two million Ukrainians living in Ukraine identified Russian as their native tongue, and a proportion of them (or their children), might in the intervening period have changed their national self-identity as well.'²⁶ In the process of assimilation, the level of multinationality plays a decisive role. In some regions this level is much higher than in others. (In Western Ukraine it has actually declined.) (See Table 5.2)

A high index of multinationality exerts an influence on assimilation through many avenues. Among the most significant is inter-marriage between Ukrainians and Russians, something which is encouraged by the regime as a way of promoting the development of 'international, all-Soviet characteristics and of overcoming national specificities'.²⁷ The number of ethnically mixed marriages in Ukraine increased from 15 per cent of the total number of marriages in 1959 to 20 per cent by 1970.²⁸ In the city of Kharkiv, which has a large Russian population, the figure rose to 48 per cent.²⁹ The offspring of ethnically mixed-marriages choose (irrevocably) the nationality of either of the parents when applying for their internal passport at the age of 16. Several factors influence their decision. Among the most important is the nationality of the father, as well as the 'socio-cultural status' of a given nationality.³⁰ A 1968 Kiev survey, for example, found that half

TABLE 5.2 National composition of Ukraine according to region 1926-70^a

	Year	Total population	Ukrainians	Russians	Others
<i>Donbass</i>	1926	2 982 059	65.4	25.7	8.9
	1959	6 714 220	56.4	37.4	6.2
	1970	7 642 545	53.7	41.0	5.3
<i>Dnipro</i>	1926	4 315 232	80.8	10.0	9.2
	1959	5 386 561	77.6	17.6	4.8
	1970	6 377 109	74.8	20.8	4.4
<i>North East</i>	1926	6 368 755	85.6	10.7	3.7
	1959	5 665 553	81.0	16.2	2.8
	1970	6 037 018	78.5	18.7	2.8
<i>Central West</i>	1926	12 606 774	84.0	3.5	12.5
	1959	11 237 522	88.3	6.3	5.4
	1970	11 934 679	87.5	7.7	4.8
<i>West</i>	c.1930	8 502 400	66.1	0.3	33.6
	1959	7 802 058	87.1	5.2	7.7
	1970	8 754 522	88.2	5.1	6.7
<i>South</i>	1926	3 735 568	52.5	20.7	26.8
	1959	5 066 132	56.9	30.9	12.2
	1970	6 380 614	55.0	34.0	11.0

^a Data for 1926 and for Western Ukraine c. 1930 were obtained from index cards supplied by Lew Shankovsky and reproduced with his permission. Mr Shankovsky translated pre-war administrative divisions into post-war *oblasti*.

We have regrouped Ukraine's twenty-five *oblasti* into six major regions following the system used by Roman Szporluk, 'Russians in Ukraine and Problems of Ukrainian Identity in the USSR,' in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, Peter J. Potichnyj, (ed.) (Oakville, Ontario, 1975), p. 202. *Donbass* consists of two *oblasti*: Donets'k and Voroshylovhrad; *Dnipro*: Dnipropetrovs'k, Zaporizhzhia and Kirovohrad; *North East*: Kharkiv, Poltava and Sumy; *Central West*: Kiev, Chernihiv, Cherkasy, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia and Khmel'nyts'kyi; *West*: L'viv, Rovno, Ternopil, Ivano-Frankivs'k, Transcarpathia and Chernivtsi; *South*: Odessa, the Crimea, Kherson and Mykolaiv *oblasti*.

SOURCES *Perepis' 1959*, Table 54, Vol. 2; *Perepis' 1970*, Table 8, Vol. 4.

the children raised in families where one of the parents was a Ukrainian claimed Ukrainian as their nationality on reaching the age of 16.³¹ Since immigration beyond the borders of the Soviet Union plays an insignificant role in the demographic process of Ukrainians, it is possible to estimate the numbers lost to the Ukrainian nation in the Soviet Union as a whole through mixed-marriages and other

avenues of assimilation. Comparing the results of the 1959 and 1970 censuses with the figure that would have resulted from the rate of natural increase we arrive at a deficit of 670 000 Ukrainians. It is therefore quite likely that the Ukrainian nation in the Ukrainian SSR lost approximately 400 000 individuals between 1959 and 1970, through assimilation.³²

In the post-war period, under-employment and even unemployment in the Western and Central-Western regions created pressure for out-migration.³³ During the 1960s, several hundred thousand Ukrainians were directed by labour recruitment agencies to settle the virgin lands in Kazahhstan and to work on major projects in the RSFSR. Many who settled outside their republic in this period, dissatisfied with living conditions in their new locale, returned home. Indeed, between 1959 and 1970, there was a net in-migration of Ukrainians from the RSFSR into Ukraine of more than 300 000.³⁴ In general, in the second half of the 1960s, the out-migration of Ukrainians beyond the borders of the republic declined. A group of prominent Soviet geographers made the following observation about Ukraine's contribution to the total migration into Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East:

The contribution of Ukraine is unexpectedly small. Although Ukraine is well supplied with manpower, and even has a surplus in the western part, out-migration from Ukraine was lower than for Belorussia, whose population is five times smaller.³⁵

An important factor in stemming out-migration was a shift in the geographical pattern of capital investment. The dispersement of investment funds to the less developed regions of Ukraine where the majority of Ukrainians lived was a long-standing demand of Ukrainian economic nationalism. This demand was tied to the development of Ukraine's light and manufacturing industries. It was in the mid-1960s, when autonomist currents within the CPU gained the upper hand under the leadership of P. Iu. Shelest, that an attempt was made to implement this policy.³⁶ The Central West and West were among the regions whose share of total capital investment increased from 1965 onwards.³⁷ The emphasis that was placed on consumer industry by the Brezhnev leadership after Khrushchev's fall aided the industrialisation of this region. The development of Western Ukraine was also 'motivated by a desire for greater integration with the adjoining Comecon countries'.³⁸ Finally, the disinclination of

the local population in Western Ukraine to migrate to the eastern regions experiencing labour shortages provided Ukrainian officials with an additional argument to shift capital investment to the region.³⁹ Since the Western and Central-Western regions were also those where the national self-identification of Ukrainians was strongest, the economic trends of the 1960s had the effect of strengthening the social basis of national identity in the republic.

Studies of internal Ukrainian migration have shown that the desire for a higher standard of living, more satisfying employment and better cultural facilities are the decisive motivating factors.⁴⁰ This is what one would expect to find among those changing residence in a modern society. Migration everywhere involves rivalry, as people vie for well paid, interesting employment. Not everywhere, however, does this rivalry entail tensions between nations and ethnic groups. In Ukraine, because of substantial Russian immigration, it did. The focal point of the tensions was the cities.

URBANISATION

During the Second World War Ukraine's cities bore the brunt of military confrontations. In view of the extent of war damage, one would have thought Ukraine more than qualified for a massive infusion of investment to rebuild the war-torn country.⁴¹ Between 1946 and 1951, however, only 15 per cent of Soviet construction funds were spent in Ukraine, where 40 per cent of the Soviet population left homeless by the war resided. Had it not been for the savings of Ukraine's impoverished population, there would have been little reconstruction at all.⁴² The central government's neglect of investment in Ukrainian urban reconstruction meant that as late as 1950, Ukrainian towns had 12.8 million people, well below the 1940 mark of 13.8 million, and two-thirds of the republic's population lived in the countryside, just as in 1940.⁴³

During the 1950s, the urban population of Ukraine was recovering its losses. Real urban growth did not begin until the 1960s when the number of urban residents in the republic grew from 19 million in 1959 to 26 million by 1970. By 1966 Ukraine (but not Ukrainians) had emerged as a mobilised society, the criterion of which, according to Deutsch, is an urban population which exceeds half the total population.⁴⁴ The fact that Ukraine reached modernity so late, a full decade behind the Russian republic, pointed to major problems in

the republic's urbanisation. Urbanisation is related to industrial development, a point well documented by B. S. Khorev.⁴⁵ Ukraine's slow pace of urban growth was a reflection of the republic's economic predicament within the USSR. Since major industrial investment decisions are the monopoly of the all-Union government, this meant Ukraine suffered from discriminatory practices in the location of new plants and factories.⁴⁶ At the same time the republic's economic development was affected by a substantial drain of capital. Z. L. Melnyk has calculated that 34 per cent of the total receipts of the budgetary system in Ukraine between 1959 and 1970 were lost to the republic. This net capital outflow represented 20 per cent of Ukraine's reported national income.⁴⁷ Melnyk's conclusions have been corroborated by Soviet Ukrainian economists who demonstrated that between 1959 and 1961 the all-Union government expropriated almost a third of all budgetary revenues in Ukraine.⁴⁸

Because Ukraine did not receive a fair share of industrial development, the republic's urban growth was held back. The economic and urban growth that did occur during the 1960s, however, had a distinctive regional pattern not experienced in previous decades. Under the impact of renewed trade with capitalist countries and the build-up of the USSR's Mediterranean fleet, the southern port cities expanded rapidly.⁴⁹ The Central West and West, for reasons we have already mentioned, saw new investment. At the same time, the shift of the USSR's energy and raw material development to Siberia and the Soviet north, combined with urban saturation in Donbass, resulted in a downplaying of investment in the Dnipro-Donbass coal-metallurgical complex which affected the region's overall urban expansion.⁵⁰

To evaluate the impact of these economic trends on the republic's urban network it is first necessary to isolate the three different sources that bring about urban population growth. The first, changes in the administrative boundaries of cities, represented 14 per cent of Ukraine's urban population increase between 1959 and 1970. The second, natural increase of the population, accounted for 38 per cent of the growth and, finally, in-migration or mechanical increase was responsible for 48 per cent.⁵¹ Mechanical increase is the indicator which points to an expansion of urban employment opportunities and other processes associated with social mobilisation. Prior to 1960, Donbass and Dnipro were the regions experiencing the highest rates of mechanical increase. After 1960 the focal points in this respect were the South, the Central West and some *oblasti* of the Western

TABLE 5.3 *Changes in the rate of urbanisation of Ukraine according to region, 1959–70*

<i>Region</i>	<i>1959 Total urban population</i>	<i>As % of total population</i>	<i>1970 Total urban population</i>	<i>As % of total population</i>
<i>Donbass</i>	5 601 000	83.4	6 546 000	85.7
<i>Dnipro</i>	3 108 000	57.6	4 268 000	66.9
<i>North East</i>	2 539 000	45.1	3 293 000	54.5
<i>Central West</i>	3 327 000	29.6	4 932 000	41.3
<i>West</i>	2 107 000	27.0	3 009 000	34.4
<i>South</i>	2 465 000	48.7	3 641 000	57.1
<i>Ukraine – Total</i>	19 147 000	45.7	25 689 000	54.5

SOURCES *Perepis' 1959*, Table 5, Vol. 2; *Perepis' 1970*, Table 2, Vol. 1.

region. Thus while in-migration accounted for less than 10 per cent of the urban population increase in Donets'k *oblast'* in the case of Cherkasy *oblast'* in the Central-Western region, over 40 per cent of its urban population growth was due to in-migration.⁵² As a consequence of these trends, between 1959 and 1970 a shift towards a more even regional distribution of Ukraine's urban population could be discerned, even though the trends were too recent a development to alter the regional contrasts in the rate of urbanisation (see Table 5.3).

When the 1959 census was taken, Ukrainians were far from a fully mobilised nation, since their rate of urbanisation was only 36 per cent. Although they were a majority of the urban population in 1959, 62 per cent of the total, that in itself does not give us the whole picture. The modernisation of the social structure of a people consists not only of their movement from rural to urban centres, but also of a strengthening of their presence in large cities. The major metropolitan centres with their wide range of services, employment opportunities and cultural facilities represent a much richer urban experience than small towns. In the light of 1959 data we find that 53 per cent of the 12 million urban residents claiming Ukrainian as their nationality inhabited towns with a population under 50 000. By contrast, 63 per cent of the Russian urban population in Ukraine lived in towns with populations greater than 50 000.⁵³ The weight of Ukrainians in the urban population also decreased in direct proportion to the size of town. In urban centres with a population of less than 20 000, Ukrainians enjoyed a decisive majority – 72 per cent of the total population. But in the crucial urban centres, the five major cities of the

TABLE 5.4 *Distribution of the urban population of the major national groups in Ukraine according to size of town, 1959 (in %)*

<i>Size of town</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>Total population</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>Others</i>
Less than 20 000	936	6 045 567	71.6	23.1	5.3
20 000–50 000	91	2 844 465	65.6	26.9	7.5
50 000–100 000	25	1 898 281	57.9	34.7	7.4
100 000–300 000	15	2 703 688	52.4	37.7	9.9
300 000–500 000	4	1 590 470	59.2	32.8	8.0
500 000 and over	5	4 064 948	52.5	33.4	14.1

SOURCES Calculated from *Karta shuchasnoho etnichnoho skladu naseleennia Ukraïns'koi RSR* (Moscow, 1966); *Perepis' 1959*, Vol. 2, Tables 6–8; *Istoriia mist i sil Ukraïns'koi RSR. Luhans'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1968); *Istoriia mist i sil Ukraïns'koi RSR. Dnipropetrovs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1969); *Istoriia mist i sil Ukraïns'koi RSR. Donets'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1970); *Ukraïns'ka RSR. Administratyvno-terytorial'nyi podil na l sichnia 1972 roku* (Kiev, 1973); Chauncey D. Harris, comp., 'Population of Cities of the Soviet Union, 1897, 1926, 1939, 1959 and 1967: Tables, Maps and Gazetteer,' *Soviet Geography*, no. 5, (1970) pp. 18–24.

republic with a population of over half a million, the Ukrainians' share diminished to 53 per cent (see Table 5.4). Not surprisingly, there were pronounced regional variations in the pattern of Ukrainian urban settlement according to size of town. The weak points in this respect were the southern regions (*oblasti*) of Odessa and, of course, the Crimea, an *oblast'*, which became a destination for Ukrainian migration only after 1954. The rather strong Ukrainian urban presence in cities of all sizes in Dnipropetrovs'k *oblast'*, one of the most economically developed in the republic, is important to note. Also, although in Donets'k *oblast'* Ukrainians were a minority of the population of the capital of the region (Donets'k city), in the smaller mining centres they were a majority (see Table 5.5). Unfortunately no data giving the national composition of the urban population according to size of town were released after 1959 so the qualitative aspect of Ukrainians' urbanisation process during the 1960s cannot be studied directly; it has to be inferred.

Although between 1959 and 1970 the rate of Ukrainians' urbanisation increased from 37 to 46 per cent, by 1970 Ukrainians could still not be considered a fully modernised nation. Because the number of Russians in Ukraine's cities increased in roughly the same proportion as the number of Ukrainians (34 and 37 per cent respectively) the

TABLE 5.5 National composition of urban population of Ukraine by oblast' according to size of town, 1959 (in %)

Oblast'	1 000 000-300 000		300 000-100 000		100 000-30 000		30 000-10 000		up to 10 000				
	Ukrainians	Others	Ukrainians	Others	Ukrainians	Others	Ukrainians	Others	Ukrainians	Others			
Donets'k	42	51	7	39	59	37	4	61	35	4	63	31	6
Luhans'k	—	—	—	48	52	44	4	65	30	5	58	37	5
Dnipropetrovs'k	71	20	9	23	78	19	3	79	17	4	86	10	4
Zaporizhzhia	61	33	6	—	48	47	5	73	25	2	74	22	4
Kirovohrad	—	—	—	85	8	5	5	87	9	4	81	16	3
Kharkiv	57	31	12	—	83	16	1	81	15	4	75	21	4
Poltava	—	—	—	80	15	17	8	86	10	4	92	4	4
Sumy	—	—	—	—	81	16	3	82	14	4	83	16	1
Kiev	60	23	17	—	75	18	7	85	10	5	84	11	5
Vinnitsia	—	—	—	61	21	18	—	69	16	15	79	8	13
Zhytomyr	—	—	—	56	19	25	59	17	24	63	20	17	78
Cherkasy	—	—	—	—	75	18	7	87	7	7	87	9	4
Chernihiv	—	—	—	—	78	15	7	90	7	3	86	9	5
Khmel'nyts'kyi	—	—	—	—	67	17	16	67	18	15	83	6	11
L'viv	60	27	13	—	69	26	5	77	14	9	85	8	7
Ivano-Frankivs'k	—	—	—	—	68	22	10	88	8	4	90	6	4
Ternopil'	—	—	—	—	78	15	7	80	14	6	88	8	4
Chernivtsi	—	—	—	42	22	36	—	76	12	12	63	11	26
Transcarpathia	—	—	—	—	59	30	11	60	8	32	66	33	1
Volyn'	—	—	—	—	76	19	5	78	17	5	91	3	6
Rovno	—	—	—	—	67	25	8	72	19	9	76	14	10
Odessa	44	37	21	—	30	60	10	46	29	25	57	21	22
Kherson	—	—	—	63	29	8	—	78	19	3	83	14	3
Mykolaiv	—	—	—	60	30	10	78	16	6	8	86	10	4
Crimea	—	—	—	18	74	8	7	21	73	6	20	75	5

SOURCES Calculated from *Karta suchasnoho etnichnoho skladu naseleennia Ukrainy'koi RSR* (Moscow, 1966); *Perepis' 1959*, Vol.2, Tables 6-8; *Istoriia misti i sil Ukrainy'koi RSR. Luhans'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1968); *Istoriia misti i sil Ukrainy'koi RSR. Dnipropetrovs'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1969); *Istoriia misti i sil Ukrainy'koi RSR. Dneps'ka oblast'* (Kiev, 1970); *Ukrains'ka oblast' (Kiev, 1970); Administratyvno-terytorial'nyi podil na l'sichnia 1972 roku* (Kiev, 1973); Chauncy D. Harris, comp., 'Population of Cities of the Soviet Union, 1897, 1926, 1939, 1959 and 1967: Tables, Maps and Gazetteer', *Soviet Geography*, no. 5 (1970) pp. 18-24.

TABLE 5.6 *National composition of the urban population of Ukraine according to region, 1959-70*

Region	Total urban population		Ukrainians		Russians		Others	
	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970	1959	1970
<i>Donbass</i>	5 600 873	6 546 480	52.4	50.3	42.5	44.4	5.1	5.3
<i>Dnipro</i>	3 103 499	4 267 627	70.0	68.4	24.0	26.4	6.0	5.2
<i>North East</i>	2 542 375	3 292 687	69.2	68.9	25.1	26.5	5.7	4.6
<i>Central West</i>	3 328 307	4 931 518	70.3	74.4	16.8	16.5	12.9	9.1
<i>West</i>	2 107 144	3 009 274	71.2	77.4	16.5	13.7	12.3	8.9
<i>South</i>	2 465 221	3 640 974	43.6	46.2	44.1	43.6	12.3	10.2
<i>Ukraine - Total</i>	19 147 419	25 688 560	61.5	62.9	29.9	30.0	8.6	7.1

SOURCES Tabulated from *Perepis' 1959*, Vol 2, Table 54; *Perepis' 1970*, Vol. 4, Table 8.

Ukrainians' majority of the republic's urban population grew by a mere 1.4 per cent in the intercensal period. Some of this increase may have resulted from a re-classification of villages into towns. In a number of regions the Russian increase was larger than that of Ukrainians and as a result Ukrainians experienced a decline in their urban pluralities (see Table 5.6).

Two factors played a determining role in affecting the proportional representation of Ukrainians in the urban population. The first was assimilation. There can be no doubt that in the republic's eastern cities this process reduced the size of the Ukrainian urban population. It is in the cities, for example, that most intermarriages between Ukrainians and Russians take place, and the rate of intermarriage between partners of different nationality increased from 26 to 30 per cent of all urban marriages between 1959 and 1970.⁵⁴ The eastern industrial cities lacked a strong infrastructure of Ukrainian cultural life which could support a national identity. The city of Donets'k, for example, did not have a single Ukrainian-language school left by 1964.⁵⁵

Secondly, the large Russian immigration during the 1960s had a decisive effect on the national structure of Ukraine's urban population. Approximately three-quarters of the estimated one million Russians who immigrated to Ukraine during the 1960s settled in cities.⁵⁶ The ethno-demographic impact of this immigration was accentuated because of the settlement pattern of the newcomers. In the light of

the 1970 census data on migration, between 1968 and 1970 half of the 326 000 individuals from Russia who settled in a Ukrainian city moved to Donbass and the South. Relatively few migrants from Russia moved either to the cities of the Central West (47 000) or the West (22 000).⁵⁷ The 1970 census did not provide information on the nationality of immigrants, but some monographs did. Available data on the nationality of immigrants to Ukraine's cities can be summarised as follows:⁵⁸

TABLE 5.7 *Nationality of immigrants to urban centres of Ukraine*

	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>Others</i>
Kiev city (1967)	70.0	22.4	7.6
Kiev <i>oblast'</i> (1967)	74.5	18.5	7.0
L'viv <i>oblast'</i> (1967)	81.0	15.6	3.4
Transcarpathian <i>oblast'</i> (1967)	63.5	20.4	16.0
Odessa <i>oblast'</i> (1967)	53.8	n.a.	n.a.
Donets'k <i>oblast'</i> (1968)	47.5	41.5	11.0

We can only speculate about the qualitative aspects of the urbanisation of Ukrainians during the 1960s. Since two-thirds of migrants in the republic settled in towns with populations over 100 000, internal migration changed the national composition of some of Ukraine's larger cities in Ukrainians' favour during that decade.⁵⁹ In the case of the republic's capital, Kiev, census data showed that between 1959 and 1970 Ukrainians increased from 60 to 65 per cent of the population.⁶⁰ This was an important development, since one of the problems confronting Ukrainians in the effort for national self-determination in the past, was the absence of a capital city whose concentration of the nation's intellectual and cultural resources could act as a hot-house for the development of new cadres of a national movement. In the post-war years, Kiev emerged as such a centre. With 1.6 million people in 1970, Kiev was Ukraine's largest metropolis. As Mark Jefferson noted,

Once a city is larger than any other in its country, this mere fact gives it an impetus to grow that cannot affect any other city, and it draws away from all of them in character as well as in size . . . It is the best market for all exceptional products.⁶¹

The urbanisation of Ukraine, as a process of geographical and hence social mobility, was accompanied by competition between

Ukrainians and Russians.⁶² At stake in this rivalry were higher status and better paying jobs, political and economic power and influence. In this competitive process, Russians enjoyed considerable advantages. They were a highly mobilised immigration: the majority of them came from towns (72 per cent), and had more skills and more education than most Ukrainian migrants.⁶³ Judging by the complaints which appeared in unofficial literature, Russian immigrants obtained better positions and housing.⁶⁴ They arrived with the confidence that the superior standing of Russians throughout the USSR gave them. They migrated into Ukrainian cities, where the institutional infrastructures had been transformed since the 1930s to meet their needs. There they found Russian theatres and cinemas, Russian books, newspapers and schools, and Russian as the language of administration. These were not the immigrants that one found in most other countries in the world – newcomers moving into subordinate positions in the host society. Rather, this immigration resembled the movement of population which occurs from an imperial core to a colonised periphery.

This situation would have led to national tensions in most countries; all the more so in Ukraine because the republic was not a colony in the traditional sense of the word. It was a colony of the European type; that is, one with a relatively highly advanced economy whose development was distorted by having to meet the priorities established by the Russian state. Ukraine's predicament was that its indigenous people competed for the same positions as those migrating from the dominating nation, something not common in the classical colonial model.⁶⁵ Comparative statistics on migration demonstrate this point. In numerical terms, in-migration from beyond the borders of Ukraine to its cities was the largest among the 14 non-Russian republics. However, as a percentage of total in-migration to Ukraine's cities, external immigration was the twelfth smallest (1967).⁶⁶ This indicated a high degree of mobility of Ukraine's population in the second half of the 1960s. Indeed, between 1968 and 1970, 1.2 million of the republic's citizens moved into a Ukrainian town from another location in the republic.⁶⁷

The most mobile elements of Ukraine's population were those living in small towns, who, having gained urban experience and skills, migrated in large numbers into the same centres as the majority of in-coming Russians: Donbass, the South and Dnipro. Almost 20 per cent of migrants originating in a Ukrainian town settled in Ukraine's five largest centres in 1969.⁶⁸ Based on evidence from Donbass, many

Ukrainians, when confronted with a large Russian immigration, experienced career disappointment and had to move to another location.⁶⁹ The mobilisation of Ukrainian rural youth reached an exceptionally high tempo in the second half of the 1960s, and as a result Ukraine's rural population between 1959 and 1970 declined by 1.3 million.⁷⁰ The improvement in the level of education, notably the acquisition of secondary education, resulted in new job aspirations and an intense desire to leave the confines of the village. According to one study, few young people with more than incomplete secondary education remained in the village.⁷¹ Increased mechanisation of the countryside and a rise of rural standards of living, far from keeping youth on the farms, merely increased the tempo of out-migration. This was particularly the case in the Dnipro region where, because of a relatively highly developed agriculture, the rate of out-migration of rural youth was the highest in the republic.⁷² As the economy of the Central West and West expanded, and new industrial centres arose within close proximity to the large rural concentrations, the pull effect of the city was enhanced. The statutory regulations restricting the movement of population, namely the withholding of internal passports from the collective farm population, meant that for hundreds of thousands of rural young people, urban in-migration was a stressful process.⁷³ The rise of expectations that social transformations brought about, when combined with the highly competitive climate that was created in the republic's cities as a result of Russian immigration, were some of the principal factors underlying the re-crudescence of Ukrainian nationalism during the 1960s.

PROBLEMS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

In the post-Stalin era, official Soviet discourse on national relations in the USSR centred on four themes: *rastsvet*, the flowering or development of nations; *sblizhenie*, the drawing together or *rapprochement* of nations as a result of the building of a Union-wide economic, political and cultural unit; *sliianie*, the fusion of nations into a single nationality; and the emergence of a new historical community of people, the Soviet people – *Sovetskii narod*. At various times, depending on the political conjuncture, one or the other element in the arsenal of official theory was stressed. *Sliianie*, for example, was a dominant theme under Khrushchev between the 22nd and 23rd CPSU Congresses. When Brezhnev came to power, the notion of a

Soviet people was emphasised. The independent variable in this ideological discourse was the qualifications which were added whenever *rastsvet* was mentioned. Under Khrushchev, nations flowered and simultaneously drew closer together. Under Brezhnev, they developed in order to more vigorously affirm their unshakable unity.⁷⁴

Ideology, as Marx and Engels pointed out, is a smoke-screen which hides the interests of dominant socio-political groups. Official formulations of national relationships in the Soviet Union are no exception. The centralisation of power in the hands of the Russian leadership is the fundamental reality of the USSR. To justify it, common interests, common psychological and cultural characteristics between the rulers and the ruled are posited as a way of legitimising domination by a single group. As with most ideologies, however, the hidden agenda is not well camouflaged. In the case of official Soviet pronouncements on the national question, that agenda is Russification. This was most evident in the notion of *sliianie*. The suggestion that Georgians, with their Ibero-Caucasian language would somehow merge with the Finno-Ugric Estonians or the Turkic Uzbeks into a new nation with a common language was obviously absurd. Operationally, *sliianie* meant the assimilation of these disparate groups into Russian culture. The undertones of *sbliizhenie* were all those of Russification. For example, I. Kravtsev in the first half of the 1960s explained *sbliizhenie* as follows:

The drawing together of nations is a natural and objective process . . . The national form must not be imagined as the unalterable mould into which we pour our new socialist content . . . In the drawing together of national forms, Russian culture holds a place of great importance . . . The Russian language also plays an enormous role in this . . .⁷⁵

The same theme lurked beneath the surface of the seemingly less assimilatory notion, the Soviet people. P. Rogachev and M. Sverdlin, for example, defined the Soviet people as 'resembling a nation in many essential features: community of economy, territory, culture, psychology, consciousness . . . [and] the presence of an all-Union language of international communication,' – meaning Russian.⁷⁶

Ukrainians (and Belorussians), because of their linguistic and cultural proximity to Russians, were singled out for a vanguard role in the processes of either merging, *rapprochement* or the rise of a new Soviet people. Ukrainians, according to John Armstrong, were elevated

to the status of 'younger brother' and put on the slate for immediate and complete Russification.⁷⁷ The principal obstacle in this respect, argued Armstrong, was the peasantry, who still nurtured a separate Ukrainian identity. Urban Ukrainians, it appeared, had been successfully assimilated.

Armstrong's pessimistic prognosis of the future of a Ukrainian national identity was shared by some Soviet writers. According to them, the village tended to preserve distinctive ethnic features, while cities with their standardised material culture and a mixing of ethnic components weakened separate national identity.⁷⁸ The widespread use of Russian in the cities, according to Bruk, 'is having the effect that the national awareness of certain groups of the population is becoming less pronounced. Many members of these groups often have trouble in determining their nationality.'⁷⁹

Invariably, when measurement of the strength or weakness of national identity among the various nations of the USSR is attempted, language data drawn from the censuses are used. This is in large part dictated by necessity, since the data base for the study of national identity in the USSR contains relatively few attitudinal studies. Assimilation, it is true, is not a purely linguistic process, but a change in national self-identification. Moreover, statistics on language retention explain neither the roots of inter-ethnic conflict nor the sources of maintenance of national identity, and therefore must be supplemented by an analysis of social developments. Yet, as a first step in understanding the processes involved in national identity, language data can illuminate the strength or weakness of one of the most important objective cultural traits that distinguish one nation from another. The richest source of information in this respect is the 1970 census.

The first linguistic group we can identify in the 1970 census are those whom we call the unadapted. These are Ukrainians who gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue and did not know Russian. Those who have learnt Russian but have retained Ukrainian as their mother tongue, we call the adapted. Survey data from other republics shows that those who fell in the unadapted category tended to come from the lower rungs of society (unskilled physical labour), were more often rural than urban, and their national identity, unlike that of the more mobilised sectors, was not 'intellectual or rooted in a set of socioeconomic causes' but 'sociocultural'. The latter was rather pejoratively described as stemming from a 'national-cultural narrow-mindedness due to cultural isolation and backwardness, and the

retention of obsolete forms of the traditional culture'.⁸⁰ This unilingual group also tended to be more religious, as a survey of a western Ukrainian village noted.⁸¹ Naulko's study of some Kirovohrad districts found that the majority of those working as unskilled labourers (54.4 per cent) spoke only Ukrainian, whereas skilled workers and those employed in mental labour were bilingual Ukrainian-Russian speakers.⁸² Unilingual Ukrainians, more than any other segment of the indigenous population, preserved the old traditions and prejudices. They were, in short, the carriers of the 'old . . . nationalism of the Ukraine of the past'.⁸³

If speaking only Ukrainian is indicative of a mental set favourably disposed to the appeals of traditional Ukrainian nationalism, then the majority of Ukrainians in 1970 were in that camp. This group numbered 19.6 million, or 56 per cent of Ukrainians in the republic. Unilingual Ukrainians formed the highest proportion of the Ukrainian population in the Central West, which had been part of the USSR since its inception. Not surprisingly, the *oblasti* with the lowest proportion of unilingual Ukrainian speakers were to be found in the southern and south-eastern regions of the republic. In rural areas, only one in four Ukrainians knew Russian. In urban areas, unilingualism declined to one in three (see Table 5.8).

Desirable though unilingualism may be from the point of view of the preservation of the traditional Ukrainian ethnos, those to be found in this category cannot fully participate in contemporary Soviet Ukrainian life. In the Soviet Ukrainian context a knowledge of Russian is indispensable for entry into institutions of higher learning, and 'is almost mandatory for white-collar staff'.⁸⁴ The adapted, having acquired a second language, have broadened their field of vision. But having become bilingual, as M. N. Guboglo noted in his study of verbal behaviour,

does not as a general rule, lead to a change in the language the individual considers native, nor does it automatically imply a change in ethnic self-identity in other ethnic determinants, by means of which the individual retains firm connections with his ethnic community.⁸⁵

Although knowing Russian, the adapted have also indicated that they retain a close psychological identification with their nation by declaring Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Naulko, for example, found that bilingualism was the norm among skilled workers and qualified

TABLE 5.8 Ukrainians - National identity data according to region, 1970 (in %)^a

Region	Total Ukrainian population	unadapted	adapted	acculturated	Russified
<i>Donbass</i>	4 103 479	30.0	43.4	12.8	13.8
urban	3 296 030	23.5	44.5	15.4	16.6
rural	807 449	56.4	38.9	2.0	2.7
<i>Dniipro</i>	4 766 924	49.5	41.4	4.9	4.2
urban	2 919 817	37.2	48.6	7.7	6.5
rural	1 847 107	69.0	30.0	0.4	0.5
<i>North East</i>	4 739 075	52.3	38.9	4.6	4.2
urban	2 268 462	35.2	48.7	9.1	7.0
rural	2 470 613	68.1	29.8	0.4	1.7
<i>Central West^b</i>	9 388 645	69.4	28.8	0.9	0.9
urban	2 611 860	46.7	48.5	2.8	2.0
rural	6 776 785	78.1	21.2	0.2	0.5
<i>Kiev city</i>	1 056 905	20.6	56.9	14.8	7.7
<i>West^c</i>	7 721 898	68.5	30.6	0.6	0.3
urban	2 329 350	44.8	52.3	1.9	0.8
rural	5 392 548	78.7	21.2	0.1	0.0
<i>South^d</i>	3 026 198	46.5	40.1	6.9	6.4
urban	1 446 096	25.9	47.8	13.8	12.5
rural	1 580 102	65.6	33.0	0.7	0.7
<i>Crimea</i>	480 733	25.6	33.1	11.6	29.7
urban	235 734	12.5	32.4	17.8	37.3
rural	244 999	38.3	33.7	5.7	22.3
<i>Ukraine - Total</i>	35 283 857	55.6	35.8	4.3	4.2
urban	16 164 254	34.4	48.5	9.0	8.1
rural	19 119 603	73.6	25.1	0.4	0.9

^a*Unadapted*: unilingual Ukrainian speakers; *adapted*: Ukrainians who gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue and knew Russian; *acculturated*: Ukrainians who gave Russian as their mother tongue but knew Ukrainian; *Russified*: Ukrainians who gave Russian as their mother tongue and did not know Ukrainian.

^bDoes not include the city of Kiev.

^cPercentages do not add up to 100 because 0.2 per cent of urban population indicated a mother tongue other than Ukrainian or Russian.

^dDoes not include the Crimea.

SOURCE: Calculated from *Perepis' 1970*, Vol. 4, Tables 7 and 8.

mental workers in Kirovohrad districts. Only an insignificant percentage (3 per cent) did not know Ukrainian well.⁸⁶ (Knowledge of language in Naulko's study involved speaking, reading and writing.) The adapted, more than any other group, closely resemble the paradigm of a modern nationalist public.

Within the total Ukrainian population the adapted numbered 12.5 million or 36 per cent of the population total. Almost half the Ukrainians living in urban areas belonged to this category, and a quarter of those inhabiting rural regions. The representation of this group within the urban population was highest in Western Ukraine. In the city of Kiev, 57 per cent of Ukrainians could be considered adapted.

The third group belong to the category we call the acculturated Ukrainians. These are individuals who have lost their mother tongue identification but have preserved a knowledge of the Ukrainian language. The fact that Russian is their mother tongue signifies a 'change in the elements of the material and spiritual culture'.⁸⁷ The change is brought about largely through living and working in an ethnically mixed environment. For example, in Naulko's survey, Ukrainian was given as the mother tongue of over 90 per cent of Ukrainians in all occupational categories in the Kirovohrad sample: 97.2 per cent in the case of qualified mental labour, 93.3 per cent of skilled workers, 97.1 per cent of unskilled workers. In regions bordering on the Sea of Azov (districts of Dones'k and Zaporizhzhia *oblasti*) which contain a large Russian minority, the comparable figures for the above mentioned groups were: 72.2, 91.1 and 89.7 per cent.⁸⁸ The change to Russian as a native language may also be motivated by the desire for social advancement, especially by groups who are less secure in their status.⁸⁹ It is interesting to note, in this regard, that in the Sea of Azov and Kirovohrad districts studied by Naulko, unqualified mental workers had the lowest rate of native language identification: 69.2 and 91.6 per cent for the respective regions.⁹⁰ The change in mother tongue identification, according to Guboglo, 'does not in itself tell us about the state of the ethnic indices and the stability of the ethnos . . . The paradox lies in the fact that among some Gagauz professional people, for example, the acquisition of the Russian language [as mother tongue] has gone hand in hand with a rise in ethnic self-awareness.'⁹¹ But 'the non-coincidence of the two ethnic determinants [language and nationality] may be regarded as evidence . . . [that] less attention [is] being paid to the question of ethnic affiliation relative to those who firmly retain both determinants.'⁹²

The acculturated Ukrainian group numbered 1.6 million in 1970, or 4 per cent of the total Ukrainian population. In the villages, they were insignificant. It was the urban milieu that was conducive to changing mother tongue identification. In Kiev, the republic's largest city, 15 per cent of Ukrainians could be counted as acculturated. Throughout Ukraine, half the acculturated group lived in the *oblasti* of the Donbass and the South (including the Crimea).

Russified Ukrainians, the final group, are those individuals who gave Ukrainian as their nationality, but neither gave Ukrainian as their mother tongue, nor indicated a knowledge of the language. They were unilingual Russian speakers. Language identification and language knowledge provides an important shield against changes in national self-identity. In the case of this contingent, such protection is gone, and either they, or their children, are more likely to assimilate to a Russian national identity than any other group of Ukrainians. Unqualified mental workers were the most unilingual Russian group among all occupational categories in the Kirovohrad districts studied by Naulko. Thus while 3 per cent of skilled workers and qualified mental workers spoke only Russian, 16 per cent of unqualified mental workers spoke only Russian.⁹³ Whether this was the case because unqualified mental workers are subject to transfers from place to place more than other groups, or because psychological motives are at play, is impossible to establish.

The overwhelming majority of Ukrainians who could be defined as Russified were urban residents – 89 per cent of the total 1.5 million in the group. Those who lived in rural areas inhabited either the Crimean peninsula or the ethnically mixed districts of the North East. Two-thirds of the total number of Russified Ukrainians inhabited the Donbass and the South (including the Crimea), where less than a third of the total Ukrainian population lived.

The data presented indicate that the Ukrainian language and the Ukrainian ethnos were a good deal more stable than the theorists of the merging of nations suggested. In 1970, 96 per cent of all Ukrainians in the republic knew their native language. In the villages the figure was 99 per cent, in urban centres, 92 per cent. Over three-quarters of the total population knew Ukrainian, while approximately half knew Russian. In urban centres, 68 per cent of the total population knew Ukrainian as compared with 62 per cent who knew Russian. What these figures largely reflected was the fact that only one quarter of the Russian urban population in the republic indicated a knowledge of Ukrainian. Other minorities were much more famil-

iar with the language; 41 per cent of urban Jews, for example, knew Ukrainian.⁹⁴

The 1959 census supplied information only on mother tongue, so we can evaluate trends during the 1960s only in terms of this index. Mother tongue, for the purposes of the 1959 and 1970 census, was established by asking respondents 'the name of that language which the subject himself regards as his native language'. Thus, unlike 1926 when the subject was asked what language he or she knew best, in the later censuses, as Guboglo points out, 'the definition of the concept has shifted in the direction of the psychological attitudes of the subject toward the language which he himself chooses as native'.⁹⁵

In the intercensal period the proportion of the Ukrainian population that gave Ukrainian as their native language declined from 93.5 to 91.4 per cent. In rural areas, mother tongue identification remained stable (98.6 per cent of the total Ukrainian population in 1959 and 98.7 per cent in 1970). It was in urban areas that the tendency towards a weakening of native language identity was to be observed (84.7 per cent of the total Ukrainian urban population in 1959 and 82.8 per cent in 1970). The most serious decline was in Donbass, where the drop was not only proportional (78 per cent of the urban Ukrainian population in 1959 and 68 per cent in 1970), but numerical as well (47 000 drop between 1959 and 1970). In 1970, 942 000 more Ukrainians gave Russian as their native language when compared with 1959. Two-thirds of that increase was accounted for by Donbass (43 per cent) and the South (19 per cent) (see Table 5.9).

Data for the city of Kiev, the only information available for an individual urban centre, shows that in the intercensal period the proportion of Ukrainians giving Ukrainian as their mother tongue increased from 71.9 to 77.4 per cent. Between 1959 and 1970 Ukrainians increased by 59 per cent according to nationality, but the growth of Ukrainian mother-tongue identification was 71 per cent. In a number of regions the same process could be observed in the Ukrainian urban population (Kirovohrad, Kharkiv, Poltava and the Crimea).⁹⁶ Referring to Kiev, V. V. Pokshishevskii remarked that the very concentration of the cultural, scientific and administrative talent of Ukrainians there was creating an environment strengthening national awareness. The high increase in the number of Ukrainians in the capital during the 1960s was attributed by him in part to the fact that 'some Kievans, after some hesitation whether to consider themselves Ukrainians, later did so with absolute conviction; more children of mixed marriages have also declared themselves Ukrainians.'⁹⁷

TABLE 5.9 *Mother-tongue identification of Ukrainians according to region, 1959-70*

	Total Ukrainian population				% change in total no. giving Ukrainian as mother-tongue, 1959-70
	1959	1970	1959	1970	
	Total number giving Ukrainian as mother-tongue	As % of total Ukrainian population	Total number giving Ukrainian as mother-tongue	As % of total Ukrainian population	
<i>Donbass</i>	3 109 400	82.2	3 011 218	73.4	-3.2
<i>Dnipro</i>	3 902 932	93.3	4 336 179	91.0	11.1
<i>North East</i>	4 287 975	93.4	4 322 541	91.2	1.0
<i>Central</i>					
<i>West</i>	9 551 603	96.3	10 034 019	96.1	5.1
<i>West</i>	6 726 710	99.0	7 649 257	99.1	13.7
<i>South</i>	2 493 731	86.5	2 904 146	82.8	16.5
<i>Ukraine - Total</i>	30 072 351	93.5	32 257 360	91.4	7.3

SOURCES *Perepis' 1959*, Vol. 2, Table 54; *Perepis' 1970*, Vol. 4; Table 8.

What the data for Kiev and the urban populations of other *oblasti* point to is that mother-tongue identity, like national identity, is a dynamic process influenced by both social and political developments. Insights from some Soviet authors themselves serve as a warning against hasty generalisations about the relationship between urbanisation, modernisation and assimilation. Referring to cities, Pokshishevskii wrote,

They became the centres of national culture and ethnic consciousness with educational institutions . . . and with other institutions and agencies which fostered ethnic culture. . . In the USSR it is now the city, perhaps more than the countryside, that has become the 'carrier of the ethnos'. . . Cities, despite their ethnic diversity, are also beginning to play a key role in ethnic consolidation.⁹⁸

V. Iu. Krupianskaia and M. G. Rabinovich argued in a similar vein. For them,

The city represents not only an economic and political centre, but also a centre for the development of the country's cultural life. Here are concentrated its most advanced cultural forces, cultural institutions and values. This leaves its specific mark on all aspects of life of the urban population.⁹⁹

Ending his major attitudinal study of some non-Russian nations, the Dnipropetrovs'k scholar A. L. Kholmogorov questioned every shibboleth of party propagandists:

The appearance of international traits in Soviet nations does not mean that national features have lost their significance. The Soviet nations and nationalities still have great potential for development along national lines. Under these conditions, the notions sometimes encountered in our press to the effect that nations are 'becoming extinguished', undergoing 'mutual assimilation'; declarations to the effect that the development of the country's economy with due consideration of the ethnic factor is a 'non-existent problem'; pronouncements that administrative entities organised along lines of ethnic affiliations are becoming 'denationalised', that 'complete merger of nations in terms of public law' is a near prospect; ratiocinations to the effect that a 'federal language' of the Soviet people has become established, that the identification signs of nationhood have been seriously 'modified' and are gradually dying out – all these are premature and represent an attempt to accelerate by artificial means the course of the process of internationalisation of the social life of the Soviet nations and peoples.¹⁰⁰

Summing up at a major conference on ethnic relations held in Moscow, Ukraine's foremost ethnographer, Naulko commented,

It has been pointed out that there is a need for a deeper understanding of the problem of the growth of socialist nations and their drawing together. The essence of these processes has not been studied sufficiently, and scientific categories are sometimes brought to bear without justification and a wrong meaning is attributed to them.¹⁰¹

The stress 'on the concept of the proximity' of the national cultures of the USSR was also labelled 'mechanistic, thoroughly tentative, and

not founded on sufficient proof' by L. Novychenko, a leading Soviet Ukrainian cultural figure.¹⁰²

At a Conference on the Problems of the Drawing Together of Socialist Nations held in Luhans'k (Voroshylvhrad) in 1966, M. S. Dzhunusov stressed that the psychological aspect of nationality 'more than any other subject' needed study.¹⁰³ National self-identification is by far the most important element in ethnicity; it is distinct from and more enduring than language. As one of the Soviet Union's leading sociologists wrote,

We must also come to grips with the extraordinary durability of national self-awareness as such. Experience has shown that even when persons of different nationalities begin to speak a single language and even when the traditional distinctiveness of national characteristics fades into the past, people retain a feeling of national identity and a sense of their difference from people of different origins for a long time . . . Overcoming national differences is a long and complicated process.¹⁰⁴

The non-linguistic component has been stressed by V. I. Kozlov, 'Having achieved a definite stage of development, ethnic self-consciousness, like other ideological forms, can acquire a certain independent existence . . . it is capable of reciprocal influence on the factors that gave rise to it.'¹⁰⁵ An example of this are the findings of a study of ethnic groups in Western Siberia. In that region only 38 per cent of Ukrainians regarded Ukrainian as their mother tongue and 95 per cent were fluent in Russian. Yet when asked whether they would like their children to be taught Ukrainian in Siberian schools, a surprising two-thirds responded positively to this very sensitive question.¹⁰⁶

If a nation is defined as a group 'who conceive of themselves as being alike by virtue of their common ancestry, real or fictitious, and who are so regarded by others,'¹⁰⁷ it may be argued that Ukrainian national identity is stronger today than ever in the past. With the annexation of Western Ukraine during the Second World War, virtually all Ukrainian ethnic territories were unified for the first time since the mid-seventeenth century under a single political authority. Through historical circumstances, Western Ukrainians had developed a strong sense of national consciousness. 'Considering how fervently nationalist very many West Ukrainians are,' noted Armstrong, 'one can hardly doubt . . . that given protracted and extensive contacts . . . many will manage to convey their ideas to East Ukrain-

ians.¹⁰⁸ (In 1970, almost a quarter of the Ukrainian population lived in the Western *oblasti*.) In other respects too, the Ukrainian nation has experienced a consolidation in the past several decades. Regional subdivisions of the Ukrainian people with their own dialects – the Boykos, Lemkos and Hutsuls of Western Ukraine for whom until recently the concept of ‘Ukrainian’ was foreign – have completed their evolution to a Ukrainian national awareness since their lands were incorporated into Soviet Ukraine.¹⁰⁹ A similar development of national consciousness occurred in eastern Ukraine. L. Chizhikova observed during her expedition to a number of Ukrainian villages in the Kharkiv region near the Russian border in the 1960s that people who had formerly identified themselves as ‘*khokhly*’ by the end of the decade called themselves Ukrainians.¹¹⁰

A distinctive Ukrainian national identity, even without the Ukrainian language, exists in the most Russified regions of the republic. A recent study of ethnic identity formation among urban children, for example, found that language did not play a significant role in the formation of their Ukrainian national self-identity. The well-springs of national self-consciousness were quite variegated, involving aspects of the material and intellectual culture of Ukrainians.¹¹¹ Territorial identity is strong. As Kozlov wrote, ‘Finding themselves in the course of many centuries on the same territory, “enlivening” this territory, a people began to consider it “native” and link themselves with its historical fate.’¹¹² The unique Ukrainian manner of speaking Russian clearly distinguishes Ukrainians from others.¹¹³ At the level of daily life (*pobut*) the material and intellectual culture has been remarkably well preserved. Among Donbass miners, for example, wedding traditions, while having lost their ‘religious element, have preserved the national specificity and dazzling originality of the traditions of the Ukrainian wedding’.¹¹⁴ Iu. V. Bromlei notes that ‘at present certain cultural elements (primarily those associated with religion) are disappearing, but a number of other traditions . . . which had died out are being reborn’. His observation that ‘in the cities of the national republics this is reflected by a new deep interest in the cultural traditions of the past,’¹¹⁵ applies to many industrial centres in Donbass. A survey of Donetsk and Luhansk workers, for example, found that Ukrainians more than any other nationality in these very Russified centres preferred national-cultural objects for the interior of their homes.¹¹⁶ Among miners, interest in Ukrainian song, theatre and opera was widespread.¹¹⁷

The existence of this national self-consciousness is important for

understanding the relationship between modernisation and national consciousness in post-Stalin Ukraine. The 'independent existence' of national self-consciousness, as Kozlov wrote, means that it can have a 'reciprocal influence' on other elements of national identity, language being one of them. It is this which explains the seeming anomaly that occurred time and time again during the 1960s, when Ukrainians who had been Russified, that is, who had lost their native language facility, learned and sprang to the defence of the same Ukrainian language as a way of re-affirming their bond with their own national group, and as a way of seeking legitimacy in their own unique cultural heritage.¹¹⁸

Ukrainian unrest during the 1960s is often reported as an attempt to preserve the Ukrainian language against Russian inroads. This propensity to equate the national unrest with the more tangible features is often supported by the statements and actions of those involved. Thus, Ukrainians, as a method of asserting their non-Russian identity, waged their campaign for national survival largely in terms of their right to speak Ukrainian, rather than Russian. The language question is of course important for a nation in its struggle for continued viability. But the language issue also plays the role of a *symbol* in the important conflict between competing social groups, in particular, elites.

Urbanisation, education and social mobility lead not simply to a change in the statistical structure of the population, but also alter the very nature of that population. Because of their greater mobilisation the urban, the educated, the mobile groups experience 'a sharpening of ethnic awareness that arises from the possibility of constantly comparing one's own culture with other ethnic cultures in the urban community' and 'such an increase in ethnic awareness tends to stimulate . . . competition between ethnic groups in a particular city'.¹¹⁹ The question of competition is crucial in explaining the rise of national consciousness. With mobilised individuals, expectations race ahead of the real possibilities. These were the same people who had to compete with Russians for employment, and the rivalry led to an exacerbation of ethnic tensions. M. I. Kulichenko referred to this development somewhat obliquely when he wrote, ' . . . At the present time we are currently witnessing some activation of national life – a growth of national consciousness, and national feeling . . .'.¹²⁰ Iu. V. Arutiunian related this consciousness directly to 'conditions for mobility of non-Russian personnel'.¹²¹ As will be clear from our discussion of occupations below, the 'conditions for mobility' of

Ukrainians took a turn for the worse during the 1960s, and the exacerbated social tensions that resulted from this situation tended to flow along national lines.

The language data that were presented pointed to a slow erosion of native language identity during the 1960s. This development was of course linked to the steady downgrading of the Ukrainian language in public life, and of the Ukrainian language school system and the press. Language usage, like national identity, however, is a dynamic process. A preponderant factor in determining its strength and future direction is the specific behaviour of elites. National identity is an alignment in society brought about when elites consciously choose to select ethnic symbols either for control over a local society or for equal or privileged access to opportunities and resources. Elite competition serves as the catalyst for the mobilisation of people around particularistic national demands, which in turn can shore up the 'objective' cultural markers of a people, among them language. It was in this context that the language issue emerged as a subject in the political arena, having been banned from public debate for decades.

Soon after Stalin's death a movement in defence of the Ukrainian language developed in the republic. The intelligentsia was in the forefront of demands to enhance the social role of Ukrainian. What was probably more significant, however, was that the Ukrainian party leadership took up the issue. The articulation of the Ukrainian leadership's position on the language issue surfaced on the pages of the republican press following the 20th Congress of the CPSU, with the *sovnrkhoz* reform. For the republic's political authorities, an expansion of their autonomy was not to be limited to the economic sphere. What the new broadening of rights for the republic implied in the sphere of language was spelled out in *Komunist Ukrainy*, the theoretical organ of the CPU. The importance of the article was underscored by the fact that it appeared under the heading of 'Lessons and Consultations,' a section reserved for the propaganda apparatus' instructions to the population:

Not all Soviet and party functionaries understand the nature of our party's language policy. Alas, we often encounter among them people, even from the national cadres, who, although they are working in their own nations, often do not know their people's language and history. It is the duty of the communist working in a national republic to support with every means the development of his people's national language and culture. Every functionary

must, of course, speak this people's language and know its cultural history and national traditions, for otherwise there can be no real political and organizational work among the masses. In his Draft Decree of the CPSU CC on 'Soviet Power in Ukraine', V. I. Lenin wrote that the party and Soviet organs should display great care for the national traditions and must grant the working masses the practical right to learn their mother tongue and speak it in all Soviet institutions, resist all Russification attempts aimed at pushing Ukrainian into second place, and make it a means for the communist education of the working masses.

The development of the national language, its introduction into all spheres of the republic's state, party and economic structure were questions of principle in Lenin's nationality policy.¹²²

The efforts of the Ukrainian party leadership to enhance the role of the Ukrainian language in the republic ran afoul of the policies being made in Moscow. The first point of contention was that, with the abolition of the central ministries under the *sovnarkhoz* reform, tens of thousands of officials from Moscow were dispatched to the republics to work in the regional economic organs. This personnel policy was resisted by Ukrainian party officials who saw it as an encroachment on their newly gained rights. This insistence on the need for all officials in Ukraine to be trained in the indigenous language was part of their programme of opposition. Kravtsev expressed the contentions very clearly in his book published in 1960:

Relics of nationalism also reveal themselves in the practice of juxtaposing the cadres of the basic nation to the cadres of other nations living in a given republic by an attempt to select *cadres solely on the basis of nationality or in accordance with knowledge of the national language*. The rights of persons who do not belong to the indigenous nation are often infringed in the process of rotating cadres.¹²³

Despite several similar strictures, a surreptitious campaign against incoming Russian officials continued to be waged by Ukrainian officialdom.¹²⁴

The language question surfaced in many forms during the 1950s and 1960s. The highest demand that could be raised as regards the language (we discuss education and the press below) was to make Ukrainian the official state language, a status it never enjoyed.¹²⁵ This demand was raised at a conference on the Ukrainian language held in Kiev, 10–15 February 1963 which was attended by

over a thousand members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The conference passed a resolution appealing to the party leadership to proclaim Ukrainian as the official language in state and public institutions and in all places of work.¹²⁶ Although the party leadership did not endorse the formal recognition of Ukrainian as the official language, numerous veiled references to this were made throughout the 1960s.¹²⁷ In a 1967 interview, for example, Shelest, the First Secretary of the CPU, noted that in the period after the October Revolution, 'Ukraine's language has been enriched immeasurably and its social role has vastly increased.'¹²⁸ By saying 'Ukraine's language' rather than 'the Ukrainian language,' Shelest implied official status for the language. He also told a delegation of Ukrainian-Canadian communists in 1967 that 'only a fool could imagine that there is any possibility of Russian taking over in Ukraine'.¹²⁹ His sentiments were echoed by the head of the Ukrainian Gosplan who told the same delegation, 'I believe that here in Ukraine we should speak Ukrainian.'¹³⁰ Throughout his tenure of office, Shelest helped create a climate where demands concerning the language could be raised with greater frequency. At the 5th Congress of Writers of Ukraine (1966) Shelest said, 'We must treat our beautiful Ukrainian language with great care and respect. It is our treasure, our great heritage, which all of us, but in the first place you, our writers, must preserve and develop. . . Your efforts in this direction always have been and will be supported by the Communist Party.'¹³¹

In the press of the 1960s it is possible to find wide-ranging demands for an improvement in the status of the Ukrainian language in all spheres of the republic's life.¹³² Russians were taken to task in the press for refusing to learn the indigenous language of the republic. To this end, an attempt was also made to rally the support of Russians sympathetic to Ukrainian national aspirations. Thus a Russian resident of Donbass chastised other Russians for failing to learn Ukrainian. She wrote, 'I am Russian and have been living in Donets'k for only four years, but during this time I have grown to love the Ukrainian language and understand it.'¹³³ The main literary newspaper in Ukraine pointed out to Russians that 'if one has the good fortune of living within a certain linguistic community, then one should know the language of the nation in whose land one lives and works'.¹³⁴ Some, such as, Vyshevlavskii, a Russian writer living in Ukraine, intimated that statutory provisions like those enforced during the 1920s ought to be used. 'I am convinced,' he wrote, 'that a situation has to be created where a Russian living in Ukraine will know the Ukrainian language.'¹³⁵

The language data presented point to a slow erosion of native language fluency during the 1960s. This development itself was linked to the steady downgrading, since 1933, of Ukrainian as the medium of public administration. Ukrainians, according to several surveys, used their language much more frequently at home than at the place of work.¹³⁶ The impact of the work place and of the educational system on language is very clearly shown by language data according to age group. This information, provided only for Ukrainians in the entire USSR, showed that three-quarters of Ukrainian children under the age of nine were unilingual Ukrainian speakers in 1970, substantially higher than the average for the population as a whole.¹³⁷ The deterioration of the objective indices of language retention and usage, therefore, cannot be abstracted from the wider political context. The spread of the Russian language occurred not because urbanisation and the modernisation of the social structure were taking their inexorable toll – quite the contrary. These social processes gave the Ukrainian nation the social strength and capacity to pose the demand for an upgrading of the status of the language in the republic. What the ‘objective’ facts reflected was the political defeat of the Ukrainian party leadership, the intelligentsia and the broad sectors of the public who supported the first effort to elevate the status of Ukrainian in the post-Stalin period.

CLASS STRUCTURE

There exists a large body of literature showing that the Soviet Union is a stratified society marked by profound social inequalities.¹³⁸ The connection between social and national differentiation in Soviet Ukraine is particularly relevant to understanding the relationship between social mobilisation and national consciousness. At the theoretical level, there are two competing schools of thought. The first includes both Western modernisation theorists inspired by structural-functionalism as well as official Soviet theory which, notwithstanding its denunciations of ‘bourgeois sociology’, shares many of its assumptions. Both agree that with industrialisation, the social structure of the core region (in our case Russia) diffuses into the periphery (Ukraine and other republics), causing a multi-faceted interaction that produces commonality. In time, wealth becomes equally distributed among the various regions, and cultural differences cease to be socially significant. These global changes in the

socio-economic base of the regions produce a thoroughgoing convergence in the performance of individual roles. Industrialisation brings about structural differentiation: status is achieved rather than ascribed, and social relations become largely impersonal.¹³⁹ As a consequence of industrialisation, to cite two Soviet writers, 'the division of labour has everywhere come to be based on professional, and not on [the] national identity of population groups'.¹⁴⁰

Another model, which is far less optimistic about the possibility of industrialisation causing national-cultural convergence in multinational states, is that of 'internal colonialism'. Increased core-periphery contact, according to Hechter, a leading writer of this school of thought, does not result in social structural convergence. Rather, 'the spatially uneven wave of modernisation over state territory creates relatively advanced and less advanced groups'. Using its initial advantage, the more developed core region imposes itself on the less developed peripheral areas and stabilises and monopolises its advantages through policies aimed at preserving this unequal relationship. Out of this situation emerges a 'cultural division of labour' in which the high-status positions are reserved for members of the core and the populations in the periphery are relegated to lower-level positions. 'To the extent that social stratification in the periphery is based on observable cultural differences, there exists the probability that the disadvantaged group will, in time, reactively assert its culture.'¹⁴¹

An inquiry into cultural-national stratification is severely hampered by a lack of data. The last census to publish correlations between nationality and occupations was in 1926. While the rebirth of sociology in the Soviet Union in the 1960s generated much new and interesting information on many aspects of social stratification, information on ethnic variables was not so forthcoming. In Ukraine, moreover, sociology as a discipline languished, and not a single scholarly journal was devoted to it. The data at our disposal are fragmentary; major lacunae exist, and available statistics require extensive re-calculation to be meaningful. An additional problem is that much of our information is for large social categories which obscure finer, but crucial, differences. The category 'white-collar staff', for example, which includes both secretaries and managers, is far too broad for a precise analysis of Ukrainians' share of high status positions. But given such a paucity of information, we must make use of the nationality data for the class structure of the republic and, wherever possible, supplement it with other information.

TABLE 5.10 *Class structure of the population of Ukraine, 1939–70*

	1939 ^a		1959		1970	
	Total no.	(%)	Total no.	(%)	Total no.	(%)
<i>Working class</i>	10 362 000	32.6	17 123 000	40.9	23 430 000	49.8
<i>White-collar staff</i>	5 467 000	17.2	7 253 000	17.3	9 281 000	19.7
<i>Collective farmers^b</i>	15 956 000	50.2	17 472 000	41.7	14 230 000	30.3

^a Includes dependents; 1939 figure for Ukraine without the western *oblasti*.

^b The 1939 figure includes 1.5 of the population listed as craftsmen and non-collectivised farmers; the 1959 figure includes 0.5 per cent of the same group.

SOURCES *Perepis' 1959*, Vol. 2, Table 1, Table 28, Table 29; *Perepis' 1970*, Vol. 5, Table 2.

The industrial growth that Ukraine experienced after the Second World War significantly altered the class structure of the republic. By 1970 the working class represented half the population of Ukraine, white-collar staff one-fifth, and collective farmers less than one-third of the population (see Table 5.10). Social change, however, is a relative concept; and when development is highly uneven it produces tensions. If the evolution of Ukraine's class structure is compared with that of Russia's or of the USSR's as a whole, the consequences of discriminatory economic policies described earlier are very much apparent. Whereas in 1939 Ukraine's social structure was roughly as modernized as that of the USSR's, and only slightly less so than Russia's, by 1970 major social structural inequalities had developed. For example, the working class representation in Russia's social structure in 1939 was only 2.4 per cent larger than the figure for Ukraine. In 1970, the gap had widened to 9.8 per cent within the 1939 boundaries, and 11.5 per cent in all of Ukraine's territory. Similar trends were to be observed as concerns white-collar staff.¹⁴² The social structural convergence between core and periphery, which ought to have accompanied industrialisation according to Soviet theory, had not materialised.

The social structure of the Ukrainian nation within the Ukrainian SSR underwent considerable change during the 1960s. In 1959 the majority of Ukrainians were still collective farmers. By 1970, however, the working class had emerged as the dominant group in Ukrainian society (see Table 5.11). Here again, on a comparative basis, Ukrainians lagged behind the Russians, who could build on their initial advantage. The social structure of the Russian nation in

TABLE 5.11 *Class structure of Ukrainians in the Ukrainian SSR, 1939–70*

	1939 ^a	1959 ^a	1970 ^b
Working class	29.0	34.0	47.0
White-collar staff	13.0	13.0	16.0
Collective farmers	58.0	53.0	37.0
Ukrainians	100.0	100.0	100.0

^a Includes dependents

^b Economically active population only

SOURCES Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1972) Table 3, p. 6, Table 8, p. 15; Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Razvitie odnotipnoi sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii,' in *Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR* (Moscow, 1977), Table 4, p. 131.

the RSFSR had been modernised much more quickly than was the case with Ukrainians. In 1939, the working class within the Russian population in the RSFSR was 8.9 per cent larger than the working class within the Ukrainian population in the Ukrainian SSR. This difference increased to 13 per cent by 1959 and stood at 16 per cent by 1970. Similarly, in 1939 the weight of white-collar staff within the class structure of Russians (in the RSFSR) was 5 per cent greater than for Ukrainians. By 1970, however, the gap had widened to 9 per cent. The least mobilised class, the collective farmers, was over-represented among Ukrainians, whose class structure contained 25 per cent more collective farmers in 1970 than that of the Russians. In 1939 the difference between the two titular nations had been only 4.8 per cent.¹⁴³

The changes in the class structure of Ukraine pointed to a crisis in the social mobility of Ukrainians in their own republic. One must distinguish between structural and individual social mobility, or between real and perceived mobility. Ukrainians registered substantial increases within the working class: from 66 per cent of the total in 1939 to 74 per cent by 1970. By 1970 Ukrainians were no longer under-represented within that class. Moreover, the working class of Ukraine occupied third place among the republics of the USSR in terms of its national homogeneity.¹⁴⁴ What did not change between 1939 and 1970 was the under-representation of Ukrainians among white-collar staff. Russians, it appeared, had moved out of the working class in Ukraine in large numbers, and Ukrainians had taken their place. The class pyramid and the position of the various nations

TABLE 5.12 Ukrainians' share of a given social class, 1939–70

	1939	1959	1970
Working class ^a	65.8	69.5	73.6
White-collar staff	56.2 ^b	58.7 ^b	59.9 ^a
Collective farmers	85.3 ^b	95.5 ^b	93.3 ^a

^a Includes economically active population only within the given social class.

^b Includes dependents within the given social class.

SOURCES Calculated from V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR, Etnodemograficheskii obzor*, (Moscow, 1975), Table 13, p. 109; Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii,' *Istoriia SSSR*, No. 4, (1972) Table 3, p. 6, Table 8, p. 13; Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Razvitie odnotipnoi sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii,' in *Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR* (Moscow, 1977), Table 4, p. 131; S. L. Seniavskii, *Rost rabocheho klassa SSSR (1951–1964 g.g.)* (Moscow, 1966), Table 16, p. 223; *Rabochii klass SSSR i ego veduschaia rol' v stroitel'stve kommunizma* (Moscow, 1975), p. 405; *Perepis' 1959*, Vol. 2, table 53; *Perepis' 1970*, Table 3, vol. 4, Table 7.

within it had remained virtually the same (see Table 5.12). In Hechter's terms, Ukraine still had a 'cultural division of labour'.

All studies of social stratification in the USSR have placed manual labourers in agriculture at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy in terms of prestige and income.¹⁴⁵ The status of Ukrainians in their own republic was exemplified by the fact that in 1959, 48 per cent of all Ukrainians were employed in predominantly physical labour in agriculture.¹⁴⁶ In the inter-census period (1959–70), the total number involved in manual labour in agriculture declined from 8.7 to 5.5 million. The flight from the countryside that these figures represented was a well documented phenomenon. In Ukraine, as elsewhere, the young accounted for most of those who left the village. Agriculture, however, remained a very significant economic activity in the republic. In 1970 every third worker (defined as someone engaged in predominantly physical labour) was employed in agriculture. In 1970, 37 per cent of all Ukrainians were collective farmers. Agriculture also provided almost 30 per cent of Ukraine's national income (1965).¹⁴⁷

In the past, highly discriminatory economic policies nurtured a reactive nationalism among the peasantry. It is therefore not unreasonable to assume that if the same policies remained, so did the objective basis for that nationalism. The socio-economic plight and the disaffection of the Soviet Union's collective population has been

the subject of considerable scholarly analysis.¹⁴⁸ Ukraine's collective farm population was at the bottom of this sector of the work force. The earned income (from all sources) of collective farmers in Ukraine in 1970 was the lowest among the 15 republics of the USSR.¹⁴⁹ Yet in 1975, Ukraine contributed over 25 per cent of the USSR's agricultural income.¹⁵⁰

Ukraine's agriculture was the object of discriminatory policies in pricing and crop specialisation.¹⁵¹ Moreover, collective farms in Ukraine, unlike those in Russia, had to bear a disproportionate share of investment in schools, hospitals and housing. In 1970, 28 per cent of such investment in Ukraine's collective farm villages came from state funds. Russia's collective farms, on the other hand, obtained 49 per cent of their investment from the state treasury.¹⁵² The level of educational achievement of Ukraine's rural population also revealed glaring inequalities. In considering these data it must be remembered that Ukrainians historically enjoyed a substantial educational advantage over other titular nationalities. In 1926, for example, Ukrainians ranked second among 11 titular nationalities (pre-1939 boundaries) in literacy. By 1970, the rural population of Ukraine ranked last among the 15 titular nationalities in the proportion of young people (ages 20–29) with some higher education.¹⁵³ If rural youth in the republic had such a poor showing in obtaining higher education, it was not because of a lack of motivation on their part. V. S. Petrenko's study of Ukraine's collective farm population revealed that secondary school finishers had an almost universal desire to continue their education.¹⁵⁴ Indeed, considering the proportion of young people between the ages of 16 and 19 with complete secondary education, Ukraine's rural youth was the second best educated among the 15 titular nations of the USSR in 1970.¹⁵⁵ During the 1960s, unable to pursue social mobility through higher education, Ukraine's rural youth flocked to industrial occupations. But the disappointments that they must have felt when they were unable to realise their ambitions was undoubtedly a major source of social and national tensions. At the same time, the high educational level of rural youth meant that industry was receiving fresh cadres with high expectations.

When a distinction is made between 'workers' and 'peasants' in the Soviet context, a methodological error is frequently committed: location of employment (urban/rural, agriculture/industry) is confused with class. Forty years after collectivisation, the Soviet collective farmers were no longer peasants, but rural proletarians with a

corresponding consciousness. Their demands – higher wages, a shorter working week, mechanisation of manual tasks, better social, cultural and educational amenities – were no different from those of industrial workers.¹⁵⁶ Significantly, when the discontent of collective farmers assumed an organised, public character, the method of protest used was that of strikes.¹⁵⁷ In Ukraine this transformation of the rural population had a particular significance. If historically the petty commodity producer in the village was an uncertain ally of the urban proletariat, this was no longer the case. The objective basis of the age-old antagonism between town and country was removed with the abolition of private property and the emergence of Ukrainians as the hegemonic nation within their republic's proletariat.

In the early years of the Soviet regime in Ukraine, the weakest link was the peasantry. A combination of brutal repression and the creation of a safety valve for the rural population in the form of opportunities for social mobility into the growing industrial sector, helped defuse rural discontent.¹⁵⁸ In the post-Second World War period, however, it became apparent that the working class was emerging as the Achilles heel of the regime. De-Stalinisation in 1956 brought a noticeable increase in industrial conflict in Ukraine. 'Protests against low wages and bad working conditions mounted; workers, especially in the industrial centres, displayed a lack of trust in the regime.'¹⁵⁹ In the city of Kharkiv in 1956, V. Titov, the *oblast*' first secretary, criticised workers who 'rejected the one-man management principle' and wanted to introduce workers' control.¹⁶⁰ In 1962, Donbass was the scene of large-scale rioting that produced a semi-insurrectionary situation. Throughout the 1960s many strikes occurred in Ukraine as the republic's working class took its first hesitant steps towards self-assertion.¹⁶¹ (In the 1970s, some embryonic free trade unions emerged.)¹⁶² Ukraine was a prominent centre of worker unrest in the Soviet Union.¹⁶³ This was not merely the result of economic difficulties, nor of the suppression of workers' rights, which is common throughout the Soviet Union. There were some reasons entirely specific to Ukraine.

Among the most significant was the strengthening of the working class as a 'class in itself'. Numerically, the working class in Ukraine (as defined by statistical handbooks) grew from 4.6 million in 1940, to 7.9 million in 1959 and stood at 11.6 million in 1970. In reality, the working class was larger, and Ukrainian society was a good deal more proletarianised, than these figures suggest.¹⁶⁴ The branches of industry that accounted for most of that growth were machine-building and

metal work. Ukraine's proletariat was highly concentrated, with two-thirds employed in factories containing over 1000 workers.¹⁶⁵ Indicative of larger economic problems was the fact that the rapid growth of Ukraine's working class was to a significant degree brought about by a level of labour productivity much below the all-Union norm.¹⁶⁶ What this pointed to was inadequate industrial investment and poor mechanisation, which in turn produced a conflictual factory regime. In Donbass, for example, because mining was starved for new investment, workers' safety deteriorated and became a major cause of unrest.¹⁶⁷ These problems existed because between 1959 and 1970, half the total capital formed in Ukraine was reinvested outside the republic.¹⁶⁸

The drain of capital from Ukraine during the 1960s affected the working class in many other ways. The earned income of workers in the republic in 1960 ranked sixth out of the 15 republics and slipped to ninth place by 1970. Consumption of consumer durables, as well as the development of the infrastructure of social welfare (hospitals and the like), were below the Soviet norm.¹⁶⁹ A similar situation prevailed in food consumption. This was particularly irritating to the population because of Ukraine's role as an agricultural producer.¹⁷⁰ The main cause of food shortages was obvious. In the case of *Poltava oblast'*, for instance, 98 per cent of its sunflower oil production was exported beyond the borders of the republic.¹⁷¹

The material predicament and the nature of the factory regime were major sources of working-class discontent in the republic. The published results of a survey of young workers' attitudes in Voroshylovhrad confirmed the observations made by individual observers.¹⁷² In 1968, 54 per cent of those questioned said that pay was poor, and this figure increased to 66 per cent by 1973. In both years 71 per cent were unhappy with their equipment; 65 per cent in 1968 and 70 per cent in 1973 were dissatisfied with sanitary and hygienic conditions; two thirds in 1973 (no information was provided for 1968) were critical of the level of productivity in general and labour productivity in particular.¹⁷³

It is when difficult material circumstances clash with rising expectations that conflict and tensions increase. In Ukraine the rise in expectations came about as a result of two developments. The first was the influx of youth into the working class. In 1970 every third worker was under the age of 29, and among machine-building and metal workers this rose to 46 per cent.¹⁷⁴ The second and perhaps more significant factor was the improvement in the educational level.

When Soviet sociologists spoke of the educational revolution in the working class, they meant that a much higher proportion of workers had completed secondary education. The working class of Ukraine presented a paradox in this respect. It was on the one hand, among the best educated in the USSR, as can be seen by comparing the working class of the RSFSR with that of Ukraine. In Russia 12.0 per cent of all workers had completed secondary education and 3.0 per cent had either incomplete higher or specialised secondary education (1970). In Ukraine the corresponding figures were 18.0 and 3.2 per cent.¹⁷⁵ Ukrainian youth in particular had an exceptionally high rate of educational achievement. Calculations by V. S. Nemchenko of the Labour Resources Laboratory of Moscow State University showed that in 1970, 55 per cent of young people entering the blue-collar labour force for the first time in the city of Moscow had completed secondary education.¹⁷⁶ In Ukraine as a whole, the figure was 63 per cent.¹⁷⁷ The paradox was that while the proportion of Ukrainian youth with qualifications necessary for higher education (that is, complete secondary education) was among the highest in the USSR, their rate of entry into higher educational establishments was among the lowest in the USSR (see discussion below). What this pointed to is that Ukrainian youth were denied their aspirations to acquire higher education, and therefore joined the working class.¹⁷⁸ The growth of a substantial layer of workers who only became workers because their hopes for social mobility were dashed created fertile conditions for discontent. At the same time, as studies showed, with education, workers became more socially aware, more demanding of their work environment, greater consumers of culture, and more prone to take initiative.¹⁷⁹ It was for this reason that management actually preferred 'workers with as little as five or six years of schooling'.¹⁸⁰

After de-Stalinisation, the reactivation of the republic's working class was in its infancy as society slowly emerged out of a state of immobility and fear. Given the mechanisms of social control, working-class self-assertion represented as yet an unrealised potential.¹⁸¹ However, in the post-1956 period it was clear that this self-assertion could flow along national lines. One could read in the pages of the main party organ for Ukraine's workers, *Robitnycha hazeta*, numerous demands for a broadening of the republic's economic prerogatives, as well as protests against the economic division of labour imposed on Ukraine.¹⁸² On the cultural front, workers' letters from all regions of Ukraine, including Donbass, Odessa, Kherson and

Kiev, complained about the shortages of Ukrainian-language literature, films, theatres and other cultural facilities.¹⁸³ It is significant that in 1972, when Ukraine's institutions were massively purged in connection with Shelest's dismissal, 'a chauvinistic pogrom was carried out at *Robitnycha hazeta*'.¹⁸⁴

Workers also participated in national protest outside official institutions in the post-1956 period. In Western Ukraine, virtually the entire membership of the two major clandestine nationalist groups formed in the latter half of the 1950s were workers.¹⁸⁵ In Kiev, workers were arrested for distributing leaflets opposing Russification.¹⁸⁶ In Donbass, young miners in an open letter questioned party authorities about their policies regarding the development of the Ukrainian language.¹⁸⁷ In 1964 in Darnytsia, the working-class district of Kiev, a flag was hoisted on May Day and flew over a factory for several days before officials noted the slogan (written in Russian): 'Long Live a Free Ukraine!'¹⁸⁸ As Dziuba wrote in 1965,

It is no secret that during recent years a growing number of people in Ukraine, especially among the younger generation (not only students, scientists and creative writers, and artists, but also now, quite often, workers) have been coming to the conclusion that there is something amiss with the nationalities policy in Ukraine.¹⁸⁹

There were several important social structural factors reinforcing the appeal of the national message within the working class. The industrial development of the Central-West and Western regions of Ukraine was among them. By 1970, every third worker in the republic lived in these regions where national identification was traditionally very strong, and the overwhelming majority of workers were Ukrainian.¹⁹⁰ The growth of commuter workers also contributed to the maintenance of national identity within the working class. By 1968, one million workers, or 17 per cent of the industrial work force, lived in the culturally Ukrainian environment of the village and commuted to the city to work.¹⁹¹

The most significant factor, however, was the growing national homogeneity within the working class. In 1959, 70 per cent of the working class was Ukrainian. By 1970 their share had increased to 74 per cent. Russians within the republic's working class represented 23 per cent of the total in 1959 and their share may well have decreased to below the 20 per cent mark in the intercensus period.¹⁹² This meant that the traditional determinants of national identity were

more likely to be preserved. Inter-ethnic marriages among workers, for example, were considerably lower than among white-collar staff.¹⁹³ Unlike in the past, the strategic sectors of the proletariat, the qualified and educated sectors, were also Ukrainian.¹⁹⁴ By the mid-1960s, for example, 70 per cent of industrial workers in the republic were Ukrainian.¹⁹⁵ Moreover, as a result of the crisis of Ukrainians' social mobility, an increasingly ossified cultural division of labour emerged. As early as 1959, every second Russian who worked in Ukraine was a white-collar employee.¹⁹⁶ In this situation, as Dziuba wrote:

. . . The national question again develops into a social one: we see that in city life the Ukrainian language is in a certain sense opposed as the language of the 'lower' strata of the population (caretakers, maids, unskilled labourers, newly hired workers . . ., rank and file workers, especially in the suburbs) to the Russian language as the language of the 'higher', 'more educated' strata of society ('captains of industry', clerks and the intelligentsia). And it is not possible to 'brush aside' this social rift. The language barrier aggravates and exacerbates social divisions.¹⁹⁷

This is why when workers in Ukraine first began asserting their claims as a class, they inevitably raised national demands as well.

Leading social groups play a preponderant role in the development of national consciousness. In the Soviet context the intelligentsia, who provide 'high-level specialists for all branches of human endeavour, including government and administration,' was such a group.¹⁹⁸ The intelligentsia is not the same as white-collar staff. White-collar staff include clerks, secretaries and other low grade personnel. M. N. Rutkevich defined the intelligentsia as those with higher or specialised secondary education.¹⁹⁹ But as L. G. Churchward pointed out, 'There is in most professions an important distinction between jobs requiring tertiary training and those requiring secondary specialist qualifications.'²⁰⁰ The former one could regard as constituting the occupations of the intelligentsia, the latter as those of the semi-intelligentsia.

The demands of scientific and technological development necessitated the rapid numerical growth of the intelligentsia. In Ukraine, between 1960 and 1970, the intelligentsia employed in the national economy expanded from 0.7 to 1.4 million.²⁰¹ While the size and structure of the intelligentsia has been extensively researched by

Soviet writers, they have largely avoided a discussion of the intelligentsia's national composition.²⁰² It is possible to ascertain the Ukrainians' share of the intelligentsia as a whole (those gainfully employed, students and pensioners) for 1970: the 1.1 million Ukrainians who belonged to the intelligentsia represented 54.7 per cent of the total group in the republic. In the case of the semi-intelligentsia (as a whole) 63.1 per cent or 2.6 million were Ukrainian.²⁰³ Recently released data on the national composition of specialists, defined as all those with a higher or specialised secondary education currently employed in the national economy, show that Ukrainians' share of this occupational group dropped slightly in the intercensus period: from 63.5 per cent in 1960 to 63.2 per cent in 1970.²⁰⁴

The 3.6 million members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia were potentially a major force in promoting the Ukrainian national cause. However, forming a slim majority of the intelligentsia, they were exposed to the impact of Russian culture and were, more than any other layer of society, subjected to the pressures of Russification. The Soviet state conducted a concerted campaign to elevate Russian culture and to make it synonymous with all that was modern and progressive. The message contained in a book devoted to an analysis of the influence of culture on personality development in the USSR was not uncommon:

The Russian language is unusually supple and brimming with bright colours. The Russian language is the greatest achievement of all human communication; it has gathered all of the finest elements of world culture and science . . . Without it, a cultural revolution and the formation of a new man is impossible . . .²⁰⁵

The author explained it was for these reasons that Russians had such a 'boundless sense of responsibility' to develop and propagate their language.

Colonial powers have always masked their rapacity as a mission to civilise the world. That civilising drive was itself an important component of colonial policy. The metropolitan culture was propagated as superior for the realisation of universal ends. The denigration of indigenous culture was intended to 'undermine the native's will to resist the colonial regime'.²⁰⁶ The underlying assumption of colonial cultural policy was that by changing individuals' cultural preferences, the psychological attitude of people towards those who dominate

them would change as well. In essence, the strategy of Russification is no different. By teaching non-Russians Russian culture and language, the authorities hope that the new cultural orientation will produce indifference to particularistic claims based on national distinctiveness and that Russian domination in society will not be found objectionable as more come to identify with Russian culture. If there are those who persist in advancing the claims of their nation, their attitudes are labelled relics of a mental set inherited from the past, which a protracted exposure to Russian culture will wipe out.

The intelligentsia more than any other group in Ukrainian society was exposed to and participated in Russian culture. Yet, on the pages of the Soviet Ukrainian press one could read comments such as: 'in recent years our intelligentsia has begun to display moods alien to our way of life,' or 'nationalist manifestations among our student youth are still far too dangerous to be underestimated.'²⁰⁷ A correspondent to *Politicheskii dnevnik*, a *samizdat* journal, whose circle of contributors and readers is thought to have included members of the Soviet establishment offered the following comment: 'In the opinion of many comrades, a strengthening of nationalist tendencies in Ukraine is being witnessed . . . Nationalist moods . . . have gained wide currency within a sector of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.'²⁰⁸ What accounted for the revival of nationalism among the intelligentsia? What were the flaws, if any, in the strategy of the Soviet regime to dry, by protracted exposure to Russian culture, the well-springs which fed a separate Ukrainian national identity?

The attitudes towards national identity and inter-ethnic relationships of the contemporary Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia are not a single-valued phenomenon, rather they follow a highly complex pattern.²⁰⁹ Simply because archaic and in many respects residual forms of traditional culture (some rituals, for example) display a tendency to disappear or atrophy among the educated sectors of society, this does not signify growing indifference to the national culture. An exhaustive survey of Georgia, for example, found that 'the contemporary living forms of national culture are preserved rather stably in all groups of the population, including the intelligentsia . . .'²¹⁰ It is true, as many empiricial Soviet sociological investigations have confirmed, that the urban and especially the educated are much more international in their cultural preferences (music, literature, art, dance, food) than the rural and less educated members of their nation. On the two continua of cultural orientation – traditional to contemporary, narrowly national to international –

the preferences of the intelligentsia cluster around the latter in far greater proportions than those of any other sector of the population. This does not, however, imply anorexia for the national. What occurs in the intelligentsia is an expansion of their cultural fund such that the international does not replace the national in their cultural orientation, but is added to it. Thus:

Irrespective of all the differences between the scientific intelligentsia and other strata of the population on the level of their cultural requirements, they are united in their love of national forms. This suggests a very important conclusion: the scientific intelligentsia, the more educated and highly qualified, reflecting the tendency of general development sharply expands the range of its cultural-aesthetic tastes, but at the same time seeks to preserve its national cultural heritage.²¹¹

In the realm of national identity the orientations of the intelligentsia are complex and diverse. They make unquestionably broader use of integrated culture and inter-ethnic families and friendships are more prevalent in this milieu. But their level of culture, their capacity to engage in abstract thought, and their interest in intellectual values 'make the intelligentsia precisely the most active voice of national self-awareness. They are the most sensitive to the historical past of the nation and its culture.'²¹² For the intelligentsia, an awareness and appreciation of shared, collective experience is a much more important component of their national identity than for other strata of society. For workers and collective farmers, the 'we-they' dichotomy is the basic determinant of national self-identification. Thus Soviet investigators found that responses to the question 'What does your national group have in common?' were relatively infrequent among these groups – it was their differences with other national groups that were stressed.²¹³ The Soviet psychologist L. S. Vygotskii explained this phenomenon in the following way: 'Awareness of similarity requires a much more highly developed capacity for generalisation and conceptualisation than awareness of differences; awareness of similarity presumes a generalisation or concept embracing a number of similar things, while awareness of difference is possible even on the sensory level.'²¹⁴ In the recognition of national similarity, historical consciousness plays a determining role. The results of a survey of reader preferences among engineering-technical staff employed in a number of industrial enterprises in Ukraine found that novels

exploring historical themes (such as Mykola Rudenko's *Ostannia shablia*, Ivan Le's *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi*) were ranked as the most widely read pieces of literature. Amazed, the newspaper commented, 'this explosion of interest in historical subjects requires a special study'.²¹⁵ The intelligentsia did not have a weak national identity, only one that was structurally different.

What impact did the intelligentsia's differently structured national self-awareness have on their attitudes towards relations between nations? Soviet sociologists conducted studies of the non-Russian intelligentsia, investigating specifically the correlation between national-cultural orientations (judged by responses to questions such as knowledge of languages, cultural figures, literature) and national-psychological orientation (identified from the combination of answers about attitudes towards work in a nationally mixed work force, and whether the nationality of the enterprise's manager made any difference). The most succinct and revealing summary of the findings on the intelligentsia's attitudes was provided by Arutiunian. He wrote:

There exists a somewhat simplified understanding of the mechanics of interaction between cultural change and cross-national relationships. At times it is regarded as self-evident that an internationalisation of culture and a mutual exchange of cultural values leads almost automatically to optimising mutual understanding among nations. On the basis of concrete sociological research, we have repeatedly had occasion to refute this simplistic point of view. The results of our present study once again confirm that there is no direct and single-valued relationship between cultural and national-psychological orientations. Thus the scientific intelligentsia, which exhibits a great interest in international culture, does not by any means reach the same statistical 'ratio' in expressing positive attitudes in national relationships. This permits the assumption that we are dealing with two independent systems of orientations.²¹⁶

The findings of concrete Soviet sociological investigations have shown that the system of attitudes on inter-national relationships depends not so much on cultural orientation and the degree of the internationalisation of an individual's cultural pattern as on a complex combination of social and occupational interests. Thus, despite the fact that the intelligentsia is the best educated and the most

cosmopolitan social stratum, it does not have a higher degree of positive attitudes in cross-national relationships. On the contrary, a study of the Tatar ASSR revealed that it was the intelligentsia, especially 'top executives,' 'middle-level management,' 'professionals with higher education' and 'paraprofessionals', who had a much higher rate of negative responses to the question 'the nationality of the superior makes no difference' than manual workers.²¹⁷ Similarly it was the intelligentsia who, as emerged in an exhaustive survey of the Baltic republics, of the rural population of Tatar ASSR, and of a Georgian factory, opposed cross-national contact at the work place more often than workers.²¹⁸ The explanation given was that in contrast to manual labourers, whose negative attitude towards international relationships stemmed primarily from cultural differences, the critical attitude of the intelligentsia was rooted in 'the competitive strivings that exist as a result of [nationally] mixed environments'.²¹⁹

The gap between the social expectations which come with a higher level of education and the possibility of their realisation was one of the principal factors behind the growth of nationalism within the intelligentsia in Ukraine, as in other union republics. 'When social expectations are not wholly realised,' wrote Arutiunian, 'a dissatisfaction appears that is projected on national relations.'²²⁰ National 'exclusiveness and prejudice,' to cite another Soviet sociologist, that is bred by social conditions, can be found among all strata of the population, 'but they are more characteristic of educated people: their cultural horizons are fairly broad, but their social expectations are always higher, and so they are more often dissatisfied.'²²¹ The most forthright study establishing the causal relationship between the growth of the Russian intelligentsia in the union republics and the growth of national consciousness in the indigenous intelligentsia was done by A. A. Susokolov. His data base included Ukraine. He concluded, 'where a rapid increase in the number of the indigenous and of the Russian intelligentsia is taking place, there appears a more intense rise in national consciousness'. He added that if 'there occurs a rapid growth of the intelligentsia of the indigenous nationality under conditions of a relatively stable number of jobs requiring mental labour . . . this may intensify national consolidation'.²²²

In Ukraine the socially competitive milieu in which the intelligentsia found itself was created above all by the large influx of Russian specialists into the republic. One study acknowledged the dissatisfaction of many Ukrainian students who, having graduated from Kiev's higher educational establishments, were unable to obtain positions in

the city and were forced to resettle in far less attractive locations.²²³ Dziuba's point that the in-migration of Russian specialists was forcing the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia to seek employment elsewhere (Central Asia and Siberia primarily),²²⁴ was confirmed by statistics provided by V. A. Shpyliuk. Ukrainians had the second highest percentage of their intelligentsia employed outside the republic among the fifteen titular nations of the USSR. The fact that every fourth member of the Ukrainian intelligentsia was working outside Ukraine explains to some extent the low representation of Ukrainians within the intelligentsia at home.²²⁵

The in-migration of Russians was also forcing the native Ukrainian populace into low-paid jobs while the better positions, jobs and professions within the intelligentsia went to the newcomers.²²⁶ This occurred at a time when the material position of the rank-and-file intelligentsia was steadily worsening. Workers could maintain and even improve their wages because they were in a much better position to manipulate wage norms, wage grades and piece rates. The rank-and-file intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia did not have this option open to them.²²⁷ The movement of real wages throughout the 1960s was against the rank-and-file intelligentsia.²²⁸ The upper strata of the intelligentsia, on the other hand, continued to evolve into a highly privileged group.²²⁹ National divisions in Ukraine exacerbated the tensions that were produced by these 'scissors' in the standard of living.

In explaining the process of the *rapprochement* of nations in the USSR official Soviet theory placed great emphasis on social structural convergence. While all republics in the Soviet Union experienced economic development and a modernisation of their social structure, what was important for national relations was the great unevenness of development. Moreover, as Arutiunian pointed out, economic development itself 'does not always lead to a growing solidarity between nations'.²³⁰ The key to inter-nation solidarity was a high rate of social mobility for the indigenous population. 'The more favourable the conditions for the mobility of non-Russian personnel,' he wrote, 'the more successfully it is possible to eliminate tensions in national relations.'²³¹ Eradicating national animosities among the intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia required 'socio-economic measures directly touching on their socio-occupational interests'.²³² Simply to accelerate 'cultural influence' (that is, to Russify) would not bring about a 'change in nationality attitudes'.²³³ On the contrary, a low rate of social mobility accompanied by an assault on the

national culture would force the intelligentsia to assert its own national culture as a way of forging a link with other members of its threatened national group.

At the turn of the 1960s, Ukrainians were seriously under-represented in the intelligentsia of their republic. In the course of the decade their representation in the upper echelons of society further deteriorated. The unfavourable conditions for the social mobility of Ukrainians were part of an overall social trend in the Soviet Union. As Soviet society stabilised following the end of the rapid growth demanded by early industrialisation, the opportunities to secure higher positions stabilised as well. Soviet sociologists themselves came to realise that during the 1960s, with the end of major social and economic change, the structural sources of a high rate of mobility had been exhausted. L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, for example, stressed the emergence of hereditary occupational patterns with the setting-in of 'social stabilisation'.²³⁴ In Ukraine, however, this social stability conserved a cultural division of labour. The re-emergence of a national movement can be seen as one of the consequences of this.

EDUCATION, BOOK PUBLISHING AND THE PRESS

Throughout the Soviet Union higher education is the principal avenue of social mobility. By the end of the 1930s, Ukrainians, when compared to most nations of the Soviet Union, were in a favourable position to develop a strong intelligentsia. In 1939, 7.7 per cent of Ukrainians had completed secondary or higher education. They ranked fourth among the eleven titular nations of the USSR in this respect – very close to Russians (8.0 per cent).²³⁵ By 1959, out of the original eleven nations, Ukrainians ranked sixth in the ratio of their population with higher or incomplete higher education, or ninth if all the fifteen nations in 1959 are counted. During the 1960s their relative standing further declined, so that by 1970 Ukrainians ranked eleventh out of the fifteen.²³⁶

It is true that with the incorporation of Western Ukraine, the republic received a population which, as a result of Polish and Romanian domination and extreme poverty, had been deprived of opportunities for higher studies. But the population of Western Ukraine rapidly overcame its initial educational disadvantage relative to other regions of Ukraine. By 1970 Western Ukrainians acquired higher education at the same rate as the inhabitants of most other

regions of Ukraine.²³⁷ The incorporation of Western Ukraine therefore cannot account for the continuing decline of the relative standing of Ukrainians in higher education.

If in comparison with other nations a much smaller proportion of the Ukrainian population had higher education, it was not because the youth of that nation had inadequately prepared itself for admission to *vuzy*. Available evidence suggests the contrary. In 1959, 80.3 per cent of Ukrainian 16–19-year-olds had some higher or complete and incomplete secondary education, making them the best educated young people in the Soviet Union among the fifteen titular nations.²³⁸ By 1970 Ukrainian youth held fourth place among the fifteen titular nations in the proportion of 16–19-year-olds with incomplete higher or complete secondary education. But rank obscures what were in reality marginal differences between the highly educated Armenians, who ranked second with 40.5 per cent, and Ukrainians with 39.4 per cent. By examining the next age group we can get some idea of where Ukrainians stood in terms of the proportion of youth going on to attend institutions of higher learning. The 1970 census provided data on those in the 20–29-year-old group with complete higher education. Here the Ukrainians' relative standing plummeted to fourteenth place out of the fifteen titular nations.²³⁹ Since access to higher education is predicated on secondary education, the contrast between Ukrainian youth's achievements in the one and the other is anomalous, and socially significant.

In Ukraine, as elsewhere in the Soviet Union, a revolution in the social expectations of young people had occurred. As a consequence, a high proportion of young people in Ukraine completed their secondary education, making themselves eligible for university entrance. The overwhelming majority of pupils who had completed secondary school desired to continue their studies. As P. P. Udovychenko, Minister of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, reported (1969):

During the last three years the number of pupils who have gone on to attain a general or special secondary education after completing the eighth grade has increased from 76 to 82 per cent. Most of them want to go on to higher education. As a result, the professional aspirations of those who have completed secondary education do not coincide with the needs of society. The majority of these school leavers see their future only in continuing their studies in higher or specialised secondary educational institutions.²⁴⁰

Gaining entry into institutions of higher education was a highly competitive process in Ukraine, as throughout the Soviet Union, because the numbers seeking admission to higher education grew much more rapidly than places available therein. The increase in the pressure can be seen in the admission statistics reported for the year 1972–3 for the USSR. Only 22 per cent of secondary school finishers could enter day-time education. This could be contrasted with 50 per cent in 1950, and 80 per cent in 1940.²⁴¹ In Ukraine the ratio between the number of applicants for full-time study in post-secondary educational establishments and the number accepted indicated an intense rivalry for the available places. In Donets'k *oblast'* in 1968, for example, only 10 000 out of the 56 000 secondary school finishers seeking admission to higher education were accepted. Throughout Ukraine in all post-secondary institutions in 1965 there were three times more applicants than places available, and this increased to four times by 1972.²⁴²

As the ratio of failures to successful candidates increased steadily, the chances of students of Ukrainian nationality inevitably decreased. Ukrainians suffered from three disadvantages. The first was their social origin. M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov have emphasised that the greater competition for *vuz* places resulted in a steady increase in the proportion of students from intelligentsia backgrounds, and a decrease in those from working class and collective farm origins:

It is quite obvious that, given equal abilities of youngsters, those families in which the parents have higher educational attainment provide greater opportunities for preparing young people for competitive [entrance] examinations. . . In ignoring the conditions under which applicants are trained . . . admissions committees in effect sanction inequality of opportunity.²⁴³

The advantages held by the offspring of the intelligentsia in securing admittance to higher education were not simply a consequence of their cultural advantages and more affluent home environments which enabled them to achieve better scores in examination results. In addition, their families could provide special tutoring, and they could use various kinds of pressure, even bribery of university officials to gain admission. As Khrushchev pointed out in 1958, 'In some cases, the higher educational institution accepts not the candidate who is well qualified but the one with an influential papa and mama

who can help in getting their son or daughter into the higher educational institution.²⁴⁴ The bias of the Soviet educational system of higher education in favour of the upper strata of society was well documented in a series of Soviet sociological investigations.²⁴⁵ L. I. Senikova noted that trends pointed to 'a decline in the proportion of workers and collective farmers among the students' and an increase in the representation of white-collar staff and the intelligentsia.²⁴⁶ What was characteristic about white-collar staff and especially the intelligentsia in Ukraine was the pronounced under-representation of Ukrainians.

Few data are available on the highly sensitive, but important question of the class composition of the student population of Ukraine. Those which were published are quite revealing. In 1965, for example, 70 per cent of the first-year students in Kharkiv university were the offspring of white-collar staff, 23 per cent of workers and a mere 7 per cent of collective farmers.²⁴⁷ Kurnosov noted in 1975 that 'the relative weight of white-collar staff among students in higher education has remained substantially higher than their weight in the population as a whole'.²⁴⁸ The social bias in higher education was weighted most heavily against the indigenous nationality in Ukraine.

The second factor impeding Ukrainian access to universities was the Russification of higher education. As Nicholas De Witt wrote, 'the policy of cultural Russification which is particularly evident in higher education . . . is reflected in the low representation of local nationalities in student enrolments'.²⁴⁹ The impact of Russification on the recruitment of Ukrainians into institutions of higher education was most forcefully stated by the dissident S. Karavans'kyi:

People of Ukrainian nationality whose native tongue is Ukrainian do not enjoy the same rights in entering the *vuzy* as do those whose native tongue is Russian. Russian language and literature are a compulsory part of the *vuzy* entrance examinations, and so the graduates from Russian schools are more successful in passing this examination with higher marks than the graduates from Ukrainian schools. Furthermore, entrance examinations for special disciplines are also conducted in Russian, and this too, makes it difficult for graduates from Ukrainian schools to pass special subjects. And so Ukrainian-speaking applicants get lower marks in competitive examinations.²⁵⁰

A former student at Kharkiv University had the following to say about the role of the Ukrainian language in admission procedures at the university:

Students seeking entry to the university had to fill out some twenty-odd questionnaires, the questions, rubrics and headings being phrased in Russian only, and woe to the applicant who wrote his answers in the Ukrainian language. His application would be tossed into the waste-basket by contemptuous officials.²⁵¹

Finally, the disadvantaged position of Ukrainians contemplating entry into higher education also derived from the excessive centralisation of higher education in the hands of Moscow authorities. The power of these authorities was greatly enhanced when in 1959 a Union-Republic Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education was established.²⁵² In 1965 only 50 out of Ukraine's 132 *vuzy* were under the jurisdiction of Ukraine's Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education.²⁵³ Postgraduate programmes could only be established with Moscow's permission. In Ukraine, for example, it was not possible to obtain a doctorate in pedagogy; of the seven institutions endowed with this power, all were located in the RSFSR. Ukraine's budgetary allocation for post-secondary education was decided upon centrally and the republic received less than it was entitled to on a per capita basis. This meant that higher education expanded at a slower tempo than the local population and authorities would have wished. Ukraine also did not have control over *vuzy* admissions policies. From 1954 on, Ukrainian was dropped as a compulsory entrance requirement; Russian remained.²⁵⁴ This, when combined with the overall Russification of Ukraine's *vuzy*, facilitated the admission of students from Russia. Since in Russia competition for entrance to *vuzy* had also intensified, a greater proportion of Russian students considered Ukraine for their higher education. With most entrance examinations conducted in Russian, the candidates from the RSFSR stood a much better chance of gaining entry than the students whose native language was Ukrainian.

The statistics on the national composition of the student body of Ukraine confirmed the effects of social and national discrimination. In the 1955–6 academic year Ukrainians were 63.8 per cent of the students attending the republic's *vuzy*. By 1970–1 Ukrainians dropped to 59.9 per cent (see Table 5.13). The declining share of

TABLE 5.13 National composition of the vuzы student population of Ukraine, 1955-71

	1955-6 ^a		1960-1 ^b		1965-6 ^c		1970-1 ^c	
	Total student population	(%)						
Ukraine	326 000	100.0	417 748	100.0	687 798	100.0	813 026	100.0
Ukrainians	208 000	63.8	260 945	62.5	421 447	61.3	487 292	59.9
Russians	89 000	27.3	125 464	30.0	218 237	31.7	267 309	32.9
Others	29 000	8.9	30 339	7.5	48 114	7.0	58 425	7.2

SOURCES ^a *Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 December 1956 and *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainy'koi RSR. Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1957), Table 20, p. 449.

^b *Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1961), p. 130.

^c Calculated from *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1971), p. 197. (Calculated from data on the number of female students by nationality and their share of the total enrolment.)

Ukrainians in the student population of the republic was certainly not because a greater proportion of them were studying in other regions of the USSR. Quite the contrary: in 1960–1, 24.4 per cent of the total number of Ukrainian *vuzy* students in the USSR studied in republics other than Ukraine, and this declined to 20 per cent by 1970–1.²⁵⁵ At the level of specialised secondary training, which prepared the republic's semi-intelligentsia, Ukrainians' representation rose slightly between 1955–6 and 1970–1. Here Russians maintained their share of the student population. Ukrainian gains were made possible by a decline of 'others', primarily Jews (see Table 5.14).²⁵⁶ As a result of the under-representation of Ukrainians in post-secondary institutions, the education gap between Ukrainians and Russians in the republic increased between 1959 and 1970.²⁵⁷

The deteriorating position of Ukrainians in higher education emerged as a source of considerable tension in the republic during the 1960s. The results of L. M. Drobizheva's study of Tatar youth could be applied equally to Ukrainian young people. She found that youth under the age of 18 had the most 'favourable nationality sets' (positive attitudes towards work in a nationally mixed collective, and so on). 'However, as early as in the very next age group (18 to 22) these sets became noticeably worse.' Explaining why this should be the case, she wrote, 'It is especially at 18 or a little later that boys and girls choose their path in work. They often continue their studies, but now it is under conditions of competitive examinations. Because their plans are not always realised, dissatisfaction may arise, which in some people becomes a critical attitude towards certain phenomena of life,' namely, national relationships.²⁵⁸

The status of the Ukrainian language in higher education became one of the central focuses of the new national movement that emerged during the 1960s. Undoubtedly under pressure from the Ukrainian intelligentsia, the issue was also taken up by the Ukrainian political elite. In a bold move at national self-assertion, the Ukrainian party leadership under Shelest issued far-reaching instructions regarding higher education in the republic. The instructions, unknown in the West until their publication in a Ukrainian *samvydav* (*samizdat*) journal, were delivered by Iu. M. Dadenkov, the republic's Minister of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education, first in the form of a lecture (August 1965) to an assembly of the rectors of higher educational institutions. This lecture then became the basis for a circular memorandum which contained the following points:

TABLE 5.14 National composition of students attending specialised secondary educational establishments in Ukraine, 1955-71

	1955-6 ^a		1960-1 ^b		1965-6 ^c		1970-1 ^c	
	Total student population	(%)						
Ukraine	374 642	100.0	399 677	100.0	648 996	100.0	792 862	100.0
Ukrainians	257 379	68.7	272 137	68.1	441 461	68.0	557 723	70.3
Russians	87 292	23.3	100 045	25.0	167 241	25.8	204 137	25.8
Others	29 971	8.0	27 495	6.9	40 294	6.2	31 002	3.9

SOURCES ^a *Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 December 1956 and *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrainy'koi RSR. Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1957), Table 20, p. 449.

^c Calculated from *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1971), p. 205. (Calculated from data on the number of female students by nationality and their share of the total enrolment.)

- (1) Priority in admission should be given to those students who are either in full command of the Ukrainian language, are in the process of learning it, or are willing to study it. The opportunity to sit Candidate's examinations in all disciplines in Ukrainian should be provided.
- (2) All the social sciences should be taught in the Ukrainian language in all higher educational institutes.
- (3) All instructors who have a good knowledge of the Ukrainian language should be requested to use this language in their lectures; courses in the Ukrainian language should be provided for those who have an inadequate knowledge of the language.
- (4) The entire educational process should be gradually converted to the Ukrainian language.
- (5) Administrative work in the institutions of higher learning should be conducted in the Ukrainian language.
- (6) Scholarly journals, textbooks, instructional manuals intended for use in higher education should be published primarily in Ukrainian.
- (7) Teaching programmes should reflect special preparation of students for future professional work in Ukraine.
- (8) Mass political, cultural and educational instruction in the higher educational institutes should be conducted primarily in Ukrainian.²⁵⁹

That such measures were needed could clearly be seen from information supplied by Dadenkov. In the fifty educational institutes of the republic under his ministry's jurisdiction, Ukrainians formed a mere 55 per cent of students and 49 per cent of teaching staff. (The latter figure was roughly equivalent to what it had been in 1926!) Of the 75 027 students attending the eight universities of the republic, 61 per cent were Ukrainian; 56 per cent of the staff was also Ukrainian, but only 34 per cent lectured in Ukrainian. Of the thirty-six technical educational institutions under the republic's jurisdiction, lectures in Ukrainian and Russian were given in only six of them. In the rest, Russian reigned supreme. Almost 70 per cent of the total number of subjects in the curricula of all eight universities were not supplied with Ukrainian-language textbooks.²⁶⁰

The importance of the measures Dadenkov proposed cannot be emphasised enough. Higher education is the key to social mobility in the Soviet Union. The recommendation on the priority admission of Ukrainian speakers would have had the effect of reinforcing the

Ukrainian contingent within the intelligentsia of the republic. Also, the measures would have sent reverberations throughout the educational system. For example, since Ukrainian parents, solicitous of their children's occupational future, prefer for that reason to send their children to Russian language schools in the republic, the elevation of the role of Ukrainian in higher education would have also begun to reverse the Russification trend in primary and secondary education. Thus, even without a specific statute ordering the Ukrainisation of the lower levels of education, the very fact that priority admission was to be given to students 'who know, are studying, or are willing to learn Ukrainian' would have had a major impact on parental choice of schools. Making Ukrainian the medium of instruction in higher education would have enhanced the prestige of the language and would have broadened its social function. The measures were not as far-reaching as the Ukrainisation proposals of the 1920s, but they were the most significant step in that direction since the abandonment of Ukrainisation in 1933.

The advancement of such measures by the republic's leadership meant that decades of centralisation and repression had not stamped out the autonomist drive in the republic. The timing of Dadenkov's proposals was significant. Khrushchev had been removed from power in 1964, and in 1965 his various educational reforms were dismantled.²⁶¹ The Moscow leadership was not yet secure, and it included M. Pidhornyi, (N. Podgorny), the former CPU First Secretary who, with L. Brezhnev and A. Kosygin, formed a leading triumvirate. Undoubtedly Ukrainian party leaders thought that the time was opportune for a change in the nationalities policy. Dadenkov's instructions were also a response to the national revival of the 1960s, to the growing boldness of Ukrainian public opinion as evidenced by the 1963 conference which demanded that Ukrainian be made the official language of the republic. Moreover, the very future of the Ukrainian political elite, its strength as a social group, lay in the development of a power base within the indigeneous intelligentsia. The Ukrainisation proposals would have greatly reinforced that base. Shelest and other political leaders were surely also aware that higher education, offering Ukrainian youth social mobility, would act as an important safety valve for their discontent. Dadenkov's measures were timely ones from the point of view of tension management. While we have to speculate on the motives underlying Dadenkov's proposed reform, it is not necessary to speculate about why it was never intro-

duced. The reform was quashed by 'a directive from Moscow.'²⁶²

The failure of the 1965 attempt to reform the republic's higher educational system did not end the controversy. Less radical demands, such as the introduction of Ukrainian as a language of university entrance examinations in all subjects, were raised after that date, indicating that within Ukrainian officialdom the issue was still smouldering.²⁶³ A major impediment in the efforts of the republic's leadership to bring about a change in the system of higher education was that only a small percentage of the total number of *vuzy* and specialised secondary establishments fell under the direct authority of the union-republic Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education. Little influence could be exerted by the Ukrainian leadership on the important decisions to be made, such as the appointment of professors, the development of new programmes or the method of admission of new applicants. In the latter half of the 1960s, some measures aimed at expanding the republic's authority over higher education had already been taken with the creation of a Rectors' Council, which was established to coordinate the majority of the republic's higher educational establishments, including those under the jurisdiction of all-Union ministries. The initiative for the council appears to have come from Dadenkov, with Shelest's backing. In 1971, however, the Shelest leadership pressed its claims further. That year, Dadenkov, in a bold article, wrote that 'transferring all institutions of higher learning on the territory of the republic to the direct authority of the Ministry of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education of the Ukrainian SSR' was an urgent issue. 'In our view,' he concluded, 'the quality of the education of specialists will only profit from this.'²⁶⁴ Shortly thereafter, Shelest was removed from office, as was Dadenkov.

Although Ukrainian as a language of instruction in the republic's school system was much more widespread than in higher education, there too, the situation had been steadily deteriorating since the Second World War. In 1948–9, 90 per cent of general education schools had Ukrainian as their language of instruction. By 1969–70 this had declined to 79 per cent.²⁶⁵ The number of pupils enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools fell from 81 per cent of the total in 1950–1 to 60 per cent by 1974. An exception to the overall decline were the figures for 1964, when Ukrainian-language schools increased their share of pupil enrolment to 70 per cent of the total or 6 per cent more than the 1961–2 figure of 64 per cent.²⁶⁶ It is difficult to

say what stimulated this upturn, perhaps some measures Shelest took when coming to power. In any case, the increase proved that there was nothing inevitable about the atrophy of the Ukrainian-language school system. Rather, the future of instruction in the native language was tied to the capacity of the local elite to assert its political claims.

The real predicament of Ukrainian-language schools was even worse than the global figures imply. First, in urban centres, the majority of pupils received instruction in Russian. In 1966, in Kiev, for example, only 23 per cent of the total number of pupils were enrolled in Ukrainian-language schools. Moreover, the Ukrainian language schools that remained open in the cities tended to be located in working-class neighbourhoods, while the elite districts were served by Russian schools.²⁶⁷ Secondly, there were marked regional variations in the distribution of Ukrainian-language schools. In Western Ukraine (and probably in the Central West as well), the Ukrainian-language network dominated. Thus, in L'viv *oblast'* in 1968, 95 per cent of schools were offering Ukrainian-language instruction. In Odessa *oblast'*, on the other hand, 65 per cent of schools in 1965 were Ukrainian-language institutions.²⁶⁸ Thirdly, Russian schools were larger, better equipped and offered a wider range of science subjects. In short, the Russian-language school system offered a superior education.²⁶⁹ With higher education Russified, it was not surprising that many Ukrainian parents, with an eye to their children's future, preferred to send their offspring to Russian-language schools.

Because schools are one of the most important instruments of socialisation, and because native language instruction is a major factor enhancing national consciousness, Russian authorities made a concerted effort in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s to Russify the educational systems of union and autonomous republics. As one Russian educational official expressed it in 1963, 'The conversion of elementary school[s] . . . to Russian as the language of instruction is an important phenomenon in the sphere of education in our country [and has] enormous progressive significance.'²⁷⁰ Central authorities justified this measure as one dictated by objective laws of socio-economic development, and claimed that the atrophy of the non-Russian school system was a purely voluntary process. The former claim contained a grain of truth. A uniform school system conducted only in Russian would greatly facilitate economic centralisation and control, especially as it would enhance the geographical mobility of Russian cadres. This point was made rather clearly in 1961 during the

22nd CPSU Congress, which formally sanctioned the theory of the merging of nations.²⁷¹ In Ukraine, Kravtsev, reiterating the conclusions of the Congress, called native-language development 'attempts to isolate one nation from another by a language barrier' and this 'nationalist prejudice' was linked to yet another, namely, 'attempts to establish a nationally-closed economy'. Russian, which 'internationalises' and makes 'uniform the content of the cultures of the peoples of the USSR', was proposed as the antidote.²⁷² As for the claim that Russification was a voluntary process, a writer in *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* refused to agree to this, saying, 'This is not a spontaneous process, as the authorities attempt to explain it. It is consciously directed and stimulated . . .'.²⁷³ The most ambitious 'consciously directed' assault on the non-Russian language school system occurred under Khrushchev. It is worthwhile considering these policies and their reception in Ukraine as a small case-study of the impact of Moscow's directives on the Ukrainian-language school system.

In the autumn of 1958 Khrushchev unveiled his new 'Seven-Year Plan', which promised to overtake America in numerous areas of economic performance and was heralded as a giant step in building the material prerequisites of communism. To meet such ambitious goals the educational system was to be reformed to make it more attuned to the requirements of the economy. The 'production education' reform, as it was called, also proposed a dramatic reversal of policy on indigenous language instruction in the union republics. The nineteenth thesis of Khrushchev's reform proposal affirmed that second-language instruction (in Russian schools the Ukrainian language, and in Ukrainian schools Russian) was to be made an optional subject.²⁷⁴ In the course of the debate, and in authoritative articles following the passage of the school reform, it was made absolutely clear that Russian would remain a compulsory subject in Ukrainian-language schools.²⁷⁵ The real intent of the reform, therefore, was to drop Ukrainian-language instruction from the Russian school network. The problem was defined as the unnecessary 'overburdening' of pupils with subjects of no great importance. In view of the volume of propaganda unleashed at the time in favour of the Russian language as the only language opening the way for better educational opportunities and access to the treasury of technology and science, it was apparent that the development of the Russian school system in the republic was to be stressed.²⁷⁶ With parents encouraged to send their children to Russian-language schools, and Ukrainian disappearing as a compulsory subject in the school curriculum, the

indigenous language was gradually to be relegated to the status of a historical relic. As an attack on Ukrainian-language instruction, Khrushchev's proposal was without precedent in Soviet history.

In keeping with his demagogic style of leadership, Khrushchev allowed an 'all-people's' debate on his education reform to occur first. The position of the CPU as expressed publically (unofficial views are discussed below) was to be firm on two points: that Ukrainian must remain a compulsory subject in Russian-language schools in the republic and that the republic's jurisdiction over the public education system must be expanded. The CPU position was first expressed by P. Tron'ko, then a secretary of the Kiev *obkom* when Shelest was First Secretary of the *oblast'*. Writing in the authoritative *Komunist Ukrainy*, Tron'ko demanded that '*the learning of Russian, Ukrainian and one foreign language must remain compulsory in all schools.*'²⁷⁷ [Emphasis in original.] He also argued that the educational system must take into account the republic's specificity and that programmes should be developed in that light. When after six weeks of discussion the education reform was brought to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for ratification, the Ukrainian delegation clearly expressed its opposition to the nineteenth thesis. The strongest condemnation came from S. Chervonenko, a teacher by profession, candidate member of the CPU Presidium, and secretary of the CC CPU's Department of Culture and Education.²⁷⁸ (Chervonenko subsequently became the Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, a post he occupied during the 1968 invasion.) Chervonenko called for the compulsory study of Ukrainian to remain and argued that 'any other formulation of the question, it seems to us, would be a retrograde step'. Similar remarks were made by M. S. Hrechukha, full member of the CPU Presidium and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, who also used the occasion to plead for a greater allocation of funds for the republic's public school system.²⁷⁹

The reaction to Khrushchev's reform was similarly reflected in the Ukrainian press. It is significant that not a single letter or comment in the twenty publications (including five central republican dailies) examined supported the nineteenth thesis of the proposed reform. The opposition was spearheaded by teachers and pedagogues. The resolution of the Board of the Poltava Pedagogical Institute was typical of the sentiments expressed at the time:

The Institute Board believes that on no account should the learning of the mother tongue be displaced in the national and auton-

omous republics. On the contrary, the role of the native language and literature should be expanded throughout the whole education system.²⁸⁰

Prominent cultural figures and members of the Supreme Soviet of the republic also voiced their criticism, as did many members of the general public.²⁸¹ The Director of the Communications Department of Chernihiv *oblast'* suggested that the problem could be resolved if Ukraine developed its own unique 12-year educational system, instead of the 10-year one that Khrushchev proposed.²⁸² An effort was made to stress the negative international implications of an adoption of the reform; testimonials in defence of the Ukrainian language from East European authors were translated and published in the Soviet Ukrainian newspapers in the course of the discussion.²⁸³ The education debate was, in effect, the first mass public mobilisation of Ukrainian opinion since the Stalin period. There was little doubt that this opinion wished more to be done to enhance the Ukrainian language in the republic's schools, not less.

It appears that in various meetings and encounters not reported in the official press, Ukrainian public opinion posed the question of native language in a much sharper manner. Kravtsev, writing shortly after the debate, admonished people for proposing that 'their native language be written in their constitution as the official language'. He also noted an 'erroneous trend . . . to develop education according to nationality: children of Russians should allegedly study in Russian schools, Ukrainians in Ukrainian [schools]'. He criticised those who wished to 'force people who are not members of the indigenous nation to acquire a knowledge of the local language within a prescribed period while they are living in the republic'. Lenin, when writing on Ukraine, pointed out 'that all officials should *know* how to speak Ukrainian . . . [he did not] say that all officials working in Ukraine *have a duty* to speak only Ukrainian,' he concluded.²⁸⁴ (Italics in original.)

Opposition to thesis 19 of the educational reform proposal was so widespread in Ukraine, and in all other union republics, that it had to be dropped from the education law which was passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 24 December 1958. The implementation of the nineteenth thesis was to be left to each republic to resolve for itself. Moscow's tactic was to fight for the implementation of the nineteenth thesis republic by republic. Republican leaderships that made the mistake of not including the thesis in their legislation suffered severe consequences. In Azerbaidzhan and Latvia, for example, top party and state officials were purged.²⁸⁵

Between the passing of the education reform minus the nineteenth thesis by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the convocation of the Ukrainian body in April 1959, opposition to the thesis in Ukraine persisted.²⁸⁶ On 13 October 1959, a high-level conference of the republic's leading educational authorities, party officials and representatives from the CPSU was held in Kiev.²⁸⁷ No information on what transpired at the conference is available. The next day, however, a teachers' conference opened in the capital and all who attended the earlier conference arrived to inform the teachers what the policy would be. A highly edited stenographic report of the teachers' conference, which was later published in book form, made it clear that major opposition to the inclusion of thesis 19 in Ukraine's educational legislation was articulated on that occasion.

The teacher's conference was attended by M. P. Kuzin, head of the CC CPSU Department of Education and Science. In an authoritative explanation of what was expected of Ukrainian party leaders in the realm of language, he stressed the following: (a) the learning of Ukrainian in the Russian school system must 'be offered on a strictly voluntary basis'; and (b) 'If the second language is studied voluntarily then a poor mark obtained in this language must not be considered an impediment in passing the pupil to a higher grade.' This point was reiterated twice by Kuzin, the second time with regard to admission into higher education.²⁸⁸ The instructions that came from the CC CPSU were very clear in their intent: Ukrainian was to be considered an unimportant subject in the school curriculum.

In view of Kuzin's instructions, it was all the more significant that in a long address to the conference, I. Bilodid, Minister of Education of the Ukrainian SSR, gave no hint whatsoever that Ukrainian would be dropped as a compulsory subject from the Russian-language school system. In fact, most of his speech dealing with languages focused on the need to improve instruction in both Ukrainian and Russian. Moreover, the assembled delegates, in the presence of high-level officials from Moscow, also offered resistance. M. Ryl's'kyi, a well-known Ukrainian poet invited to speak to the conference, delivered a spirited defence of the Ukrainian language. It was reported that the conference delegates 'spoke out very sharply on the question of the number of hours to be devoted to the study of the native language'. The curriculum plans that were approved did not diminish the number of hours to be devoted to the study of Ukrainian in Russian-language schools. Demands were raised not only that

additional hours should be given to the study of Ukrainian, but also an expanded number of hours should be allotted to programmes dealing with Ukrainian history, literature and geography.²⁸⁹

When the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR met in April 1959, the question of language was not debated. The only speaker to address himself to the issue was Bilodid. He introduced a variant of thesis 19 which was adopted. The variant was noteworthy in that it stressed an improvement in the teaching of both Russian and Ukrainian. However, public and party opinion in Ukraine suffered a defeat in that the education law which was passed stated explicitly that in the Russian-language schools instruction in the Ukrainian language was to be an optional subject, to be taught only if there was sufficient student demand. In the Ukrainian-language network, Russian was to be a compulsory subject.²⁹⁰

The passage of the law did not end the controversy, or resistance to the measure. A letter of seven pupils attending a secondary school in Uman' argued that although the Ukrainian language was taught in their school, they were unable to learn it properly, and called for 'love and cultivation of the mother tongue'. The letter caused something of a sensation in the republic when it was published in *Radians'ka osvita*, the official organ of the Ministry of Education.²⁹¹ Also in 1963 the All-Ukrainian Scientific Conference on the Cultivation of the Ukrainian Language, to which we have already referred, developed into an impressive demonstration on behalf of the Ukrainian language. Several speakers issued a strong condemnation of the Russification of schools, and former captain V. F. Lobko, whose address was repeatedly interrupted by applause said:

It looks as if these successors of Stalin and Kaganovich have some kind of special power, for even the resistance of the Ukrainian people has been unable so far to achieve a repeal of these criminals' interdictions; has been unable to obtain the simplest, most natural, yet dearest and most hallowed thing possessed by all the peoples of the world – the right to teach its children in their mother tongue in nurseries, kindergartens and schools.²⁹²

Press silence on the question of Ukrainian language instruction allowed for the assumption that Ukrainian had in fact disappeared as a compulsory subject in the Russian-language school system. But subsequently it was made clear that *de facto* Ukrainian was a compulsory subject in

Russian schools. This was admitted in an article by Alla Bondar, Shelest's Minister of Education who succeeded Bilodid. It appears as though all permanent residents of Ukraine with children in the Russian-language school system were obliged to study Ukrainian. Bondar also pointed out,

it is also noteworthy that children whose parents, due to the nature of their occupation, are often compelled to change their place of residence and who come to Ukraine from other republics (military personnel, geologists, construction workers, etc), in a great majority of cases express a wish to study the Ukrainian language and successfully realise that wish. That is why in schools with Russian as the language of instruction there are practically no classes which would not study Ukrainian.²⁹³

A correspondent from the Crimea writing in 1965 claimed that Ukrainian, in an *oblast'* where Russians were a majority of the population, was a compulsory subject.²⁹⁴

Another issue which caused contention between the Ukrainian and central party leaders was the rights of the republic in the field of education. With education left entirely in the hands of the republic (the Ministry of Education was a republican ministry), it appeared on the surface that republics had wide autonomy in this area. Their autonomy, however, was severely curtailed by the existence of the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. The Academy was a deceptive institution. It was, as the name implied, not organised on an all-Union basis, but was limited to the RSFSR. It enjoyed, however, a quasi-official status in the Soviet governmental framework. It was the Academy that worked out, approved and published curriculum plans and textbooks for all the schools of the Soviet Union. Through its directorate dealing with nationalities, it in fact regulated the school system in the non-Russian republics.²⁹⁵ In Ukraine, curricula and textbooks were developed by local authorities only in the fields of Ukrainian language and literature, Ukrainian history and geography.²⁹⁶ All other subjects were centrally controlled through the RSFSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences. In the course of the debate, the Ukrainian party leadership through the person of Chervonenko, speaking at the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in December 1958, let it be known that it was unhappy with this arrangement. Chervonenko sharply criticised the state of pedagogical sciences in the Soviet Union, attacking the statements of the members of the Academy as 'without foundation and unscientific,' and

demanded that the Academy be transformed into a Union-Republic institution. He claimed that branches of this Academy ought to be located in the Union republics so that the curricula of the republics could be developed according to 'their specific needs'.²⁹⁷ Given the crucial role of the Academy in the centralisation of education, this demand in fact called for the decentralisation of curriculum development. It should be noted that the Ukrainian party leadership was the strongest articulator of this demand in the educational debate.

The RSFSR Academy, called 'the prime agency of Russification of the schools of Ukraine' by one Western writer, remained as an RSFSR Academy until 1966.²⁹⁸ Ukrainian leaders failed in their efforts to expand their jurisdiction in the field of education. In 1966, however, the Academy was transformed into a Union-Republic institution.²⁹⁹ As a decentralising measure this proved very illusory, since at the same time education was taken out of a solely republican jurisdiction, and a Union-Republic ministry was created.³⁰⁰ The centre reinforced its grip over the curricula of the schools in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian party leadership and public opinion lost the struggle over education in the Ukrainian language at the post-secondary and at the elementary and secondary levels. The deteriorating position of the Ukrainian language in education was certainly not the result of some inner logic of social mobilisation. It reflected the dominance of the Russian apparatus. An analysis of Ukrainian-language books, newspapers and journals show that their fate was also determined by political considerations.

In the post-war period the share of Ukrainian-language titles in the total number of books and brochures published in Ukraine slipped from 61 per cent in 1945 to 45 per cent in 1950. After Stalin's death the situation improved. During the first two years of the *sovmarkhoz* reform (1958–9), when most of the enterprises located in Ukraine were under the jurisdiction of the republic's Council of Ministers, the share of Ukrainian language titles climbed to 60 per cent of the total. With the change in nationalities policies initiated by Khrushchev shortly before the 21st CPSU Congress – a change epitomised by his school reform – Ukrainian-language books plummeted to 49 per cent of the global output in 1960. With the fall of Shelest in 1972, the share of Ukrainian books in the total number of titles produced in the republic dropped a full 9 per cent: from 39 in 1971 to a mere 30 per cent by 1975. The decline in the relative position of Ukrainian books was particularly accelerated in the case of scholarly titles: from 60 per cent of the total published in Ukraine in 1946 to 31 per cent by 1971.

Looking at individual disciplines, it was only in the case of *belles-lettres*, agriculture and the social sciences that Ukrainian-language titles were a majority of the works published.³⁰¹ This was in keeping with the CPSU's policy to constantly minimise the role of non-Russian languages in scientific and technical literature.³⁰²

Decision-making in and the financing of the publishing industry in the Soviet Union were highly centralised in the hands of the Moscow bureaucracy.³⁰³ Thus the deteriorating position of Ukrainian language titles was not a spontaneous process, but was the result of central initiatives. Shelest tried to change this. He upbraided V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi, then Chairman of Ukraine's Council of Ministers and Brezhnev's protégé, for not 'allocating enough funds for various kinds of publishing activities and for the printing of books'. Shcherbyts'kyi answered that 'the allocation of funds here is centralised' (that is, came from Moscow). Shelest called Shcherbyts'kyi an 'ignoramus' who 'just didn't want to work' harder to increase Ukraine's allocation.³⁰⁴ Shelest himself made such an effort. In 1968, in a speech before a Kiev university student audience he said:

We must look more fearlessly into the future . . . Work on perfecting educational plans, programmes and lecturing methods. It is necessary to take into consideration the requirements of the national economy, not just today, but five, ten years from now! The time has come to compile new textbooks which measure up to the contemporary scientific and technical levels. *And most important of all, these must be published in the Ukrainian language.* [Author's italics]³⁰⁵

Shelest appeared to have succeeded in increasing the output of textbooks in the Ukrainian language at the post-secondary level. In the year he gave his speech, 1968, only 17 per cent of such textbooks were published in the Ukrainian language. By 1969 this figure had almost doubled (to 30 per cent), and continued to increase steadily, reaching 40 per cent in 1972, the year of his ousting from office. His initiative was abandoned by the succeeding leadership, and textbooks intended for higher education dropped to 19 per cent of total output by 1975.³⁰⁶

The sorry state of the Ukrainian-language book was a clear violation of the rights and preferences of the reading public in Ukraine. For example, in Melitopol', in the Zaporizhzhia region, local officials claimed that they were not ordering Ukrainian-language books be-

cause 'readers were unenthusiastic' about them. Employees of the Ministry of Culture of the Ukrainian SSR who visited the Central City library to verify this allegation found that Ukrainian books 'enjoy a great demand' and that some titles, such as novels by Petro Panch, 'literally passed from hand to hand'.³⁰⁷ A large survey of workers and engineering and technical employees in Donbass and loaders and chemical workers in Vinnytsia conducted in 1970 found that out of 743 who answered the questionnaire, 732 read books constantly. Of this total 474 were manual workers, 219 were specialists, and the rest represented diverse professions. The 'best books of the year', according to the survey, and the most widely read were all Ukrainian-language titles. Moreover, 'readers demonstrated good taste and exacting criteria in their selection . . . works of little artistic merit were ignored'.³⁰⁸

Within the limits of censorship, a vigorous campaign was fought by the Ukrainian reading public on behalf of Ukrainian books during the latter half of the 1950s and throughout the 1960s. In countless newspaper articles they attacked officials of the distribution system who were unwilling to fill orders for Ukrainian-language titles. The case of Vera Bondar, Director of the Kharkiv *oblast'* book trade centre, provides an interesting insight into the politics of book distribution.

She decided to wage a relentless battle against the republic's publishing houses, and to close the door to the finest examples of Ukrainian literature to hundreds of thousands of readers . . . At the Kharkiv *oblast'* book trade centre . . . for example, 50 copies of a book are ordered by a bookstore. Comrade Bondar says her magic word, and the order drops to 20 copies . . . If a book comes out in Ukrainian and Russian, she makes a categorical statement, 'We will take this book only in Russian'. Discussion turned to O. Diachenko's monograph, 'The National Character and Its Evolution'. Comrade Bondar . . . shouted, 'What heroes' character is this about? Ukrainians? Then this is nationalism . . .'³⁰⁹

As part of the campaign for Ukrainian-language titles, a concerted effort was made to popularise them in the Russified cities of Donbass and Odessa, with considerable success.³¹⁰ Restrictions on the allocation of funds for scientific titles in Ukrainian were also assailed.³¹¹ An effort was made to prove that 'Ukrainian is quite adequate for conveying the most complicated scientific concepts'.³¹² Proof came in

the form of two pathbreaking works on cybernetics published in the Ukrainian language: O. Ivakhnenko's *Kibernetychni systemy z kombinovanim keruvanniam* (1963) (Cybernetic Systems in Automated Management) and the two-volume *Entsyklopediia kibernetiky* (1973) (Encyclopaedia of Cybernetics). These works, unique in the Soviet Union, could rightly be considered a major breakthrough in Ukrainian cultural and scientific life.³¹³ The supply of books to Ukrainians living outside their republic was also undertaken.³¹⁴ If this campaign did not succeed in achieving its goals, it was not because the Ukrainian reading public had not clearly demonstrated its preferences. In 1966 the mail order book service was receiving requests for not less than 20 000 copies of Ukrainian-language titles a day! But the CPSU had decided that in Ukraine:

The publication of books and brochures, newspapers and journals in the Russian language is growing too slowly and far from completely satisfying the growing demands of the population. And, of course, this means that the less readers are offered Russian-language literature, the less they will be capable of mastering the Russian language.³¹⁵

The predicament of Ukrainian-language newspapers was somewhat more favourable than that of Ukrainian-language books. In 1971, for example, 70 per cent of all titles (excluding collective farm newspapers) and 68 per cent of total circulation, was claimed by Ukrainian-language editions.³¹⁶ Under Shelest a number of important developments occurred in Ukrainian-language newspaper publishing. The most notable was the establishment in 1972 of mass-circulation evening newspapers in the Ukrainian language in Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovs'k. That the evening newspapers were published only in Ukrainian in those cities demonstrated the viability of the Ukrainian-language press in the seemingly Russified urban milieu.³¹⁷

The position of the Ukrainian-language press in the republic was deemed to be far from satisfactory. Readers constantly complained about the unavailability of Ukrainian-language newspapers.³¹⁸ Much of the discontent was focused on *Soiuzpechat'*, the all-Union agency which monopolised the distribution of periodical literature in the republic. This agency was accused of systematically discriminating against Ukrainian-language newspapers.³¹⁹ Demands were raised for

the republic to establish its own distribution network.³²⁰ Ukrainian newspaper editors, in particular at *Robitnycha hazeta* (Workers' Newspaper), had to wage a battle with Russian officialdom for the right of access to their reading public. Workers in a Kiev shoe factory and in mine number 8 in Donetsk protested when factory management told them not to subscribe to *Robitnycha hazeta*,³²¹ perhaps the most interesting newspaper published during the 1960s. In the Kherston Cellulose plant, to give another example, 'Comrade Filippov, head of the plant party committee' refused to allow representatives of *Robitnycha hazeta* into the plant to discuss their newspaper with workers. Only a public outcry, from the workers themselves among others, overturned Filippov's decision.³²² As concerns journals, during the period of the *sovmarkhoz* reform many new titles were established. But here again, judging from readers' complaints, demand far exceeded supply.³²³ In 1970, 62 per cent of the 103 journals published in Ukraine were Ukrainian-language titles.³²⁴

Throughout the 1960s Ukrainian public opinion waged a battle not only to increase the output of Ukrainian-language publications (and of Ukrainian-language radio and television programmes)³²⁵ but also for an improvement of their content and style. Some editors made an effort to make Ukrainian-language editions particularly interesting. Authors such as Hemingway, for example, were published in *Vsesvit*, the Ukrainian-language journal of world literature in translation, before being published in Russian: *Vsesvit* had to demand that its press run be increased to satisfy requests pouring in from Russia.³²⁶ The magazine *Ukraina* was another that partially succeeded in freeing itself from the constraints of bureaucratised journalism to become a very popular magazine in all regions of Ukraine, especially Dnipropetrovs'k and Donetsk *oblasti*.³²⁷ To understand its success it is helpful to quote from a 1971 newspaper article that attacked the magazine as part of a broader campaign to improve the ideological tenor of the republic's press. *Ukraina* was accused of excessive concern for the purity of the Ukrainian language ('the language is littered with archaisms and far-fetched expressions'), of failure to 'expose modern bourgeois nationalism', of carrying 'ideologically dubious apolitical poems by Drach', 'seldom printing criticism of decadent bourgeois art,' of writing 'articles based on private impressions which lack the necessary socio-political interpretations,' etc.³²⁸ Because of these 'deviations' *Ukraina* managed to increase its circulation from 100 000 in 1966 to 300 000 by 1969.³²⁹

THE PARTY

The dismissal of Petro Shelest from his post as First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine in May 1972 was a notable event in the history of the party. He was charged not merely with having failed to perform his job, but with having intentionally promoted a heretical tendency (Ukrainian nationalism) within the bosom of the party.³³⁰ An attitude of greater national self-assertiveness had penetrated the upper levels of the party leadership. One of the reasons for this development was the change that had occurred in the national composition of the CPU.

The Second World War was a watershed in the history of the CPU. During the war, (as already noted) in an effort to rally Ukrainians' support, strong appeals were made to their sense of national identity. The constitutional rights of the republic were also expanded, at least on paper.³³¹ This concessionary policy reinforced a mood of self-confidence within the republic's leadership. Evidence of this could be seen at the 1946 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, where Ukrainian leaders were vocal in demanding more funds for their war-torn country.³³² Shortly thereafter, however, with the coming of *Zhdanovshchina*, sterner methods in dealing with the republic were introduced. Russian nationalism reached new heights and a campaign against Ukrainian cultural figures was launched. The bitterness and resentment that these new policies evoked within the Ukrainian leadership hovered beneath the surface. They emerged into the open when Stalin died.³³³

During the Second World War, a new leadership within the CPU was being forged, the so-called 'partisan clan'.³³⁴ The background of this development was the evacuation of most CPU members to the east in the face of the rapid German advance. Only 15 000 members and candidate members remained in the territory of Ukraine.³³⁵ In October 1942, the Politburo decided to develop underground resistance to the German occupation and ordered the establishment of a clandestine party network. Between 1942 and 1944, illegal party committees had developed to such an extent that they included over 100 000 communists and Komsomol members.³³⁶ Since these people were described as those accustomed to local conditions, and since heavy recruitment took place in *oblasti* with small Russian populations (Central West, Poltava, Chernihiv), it seems that the majority of the membership was Ukrainian.³³⁷ Many future Ukrainian party

leaders rose to prominence in this period: L. R. Korniiets', M. S. Hrechukha and others.

After the war, the party was in a perilous condition. Its membership had dropped from 680 000 in 1940 to less than 200 000 by July 1945. There were entire districts, especially in rural areas, without primary organisations. The 1943–4 purge of some of the members who had joined the party during the underground period in what was an unsupervised recruitment merely added to the crisis. Between 1945 and 1949 the party increased its membership to 684 000.³³⁸ This rapid growth offered a major opportunity for Ukrainians' recruitment into the party.

The first post-war congress (the 16th in the history of the CPU) which met in January 1949 reflected the changes that had taken place in the organisation since 1940. Almost half of the members had entered the party after 1945. White-collar staff (using the criterion of social origin) formed the largest contingent in the party – 43 per cent. Over a third of the membership had completed higher or secondary education. The only indication of the representation of Ukrainians within the CPU was data on the national composition of congress delegates: 61 per cent were Ukrainians, 36 per cent were Russian and 3.5 per cent belonged to other nationalities.³³⁹ Of the 119 members and candidate members elected to the Central Committee at the pre-war congress in 1940, only 21 were re-elected in 1949.³⁴⁰ Sixty per cent of the Central Committee members were Ukrainian, a marked improvement over the estimated 40 per cent in 1940.³⁴¹ At the summit of power, however, control was vested in the hands of Russians. Both the First Secretary (Khrushchev) and the Second (L. G. Mel'nikov) were Russians. Of the 13 full Politburo and Orgburo members, only 6 were Ukrainian.³⁴² The contrast between the top leadership and those holding responsible positions beneath them was all the more marked in the light of data supplied by an unpublished Soviet dissertation. In 1951, according to that source, 71.4 per cent of 'leading cadres' in the party (at all levels) were Ukrainian.³⁴³

Stalin's death in March 1953 was timely: it saved the CPU cadres from a major purge being prepared in connection with the Jewish 'doctors' plot'.³⁴⁴ After Stalin's death, developments in the Ukrainian party leadership took a somewhat different course than those in the central Moscow leadership. Whereas uncertainty and an intense struggle for succession prevailed in Moscow, the party leadership in Ukraine was characterised by a process of consolidation. The most

important event along that road was the June 1953 CC CPU plenum which dismissed Mel'nikov as head of the party on charges 'of having failed to provide leadership, allowing grave errors in the selection of cadres and in the implementation of the party's nationalities policy'.³⁴⁵ Kyrychenko was appointed First Secretary, the first Ukrainian in the history of the CPU to occupy the post. The position of indigenous cadres in the top leadership was enhanced with Pidhornyi's promotion to the strategic post of Second Secretary in August 1953. Shortly after Khrushchev's appointment as First Secretary of the CPSU, the advance of Ukrainians to leading posts in the state apparatus was also accelerated. The 18th CPU Congress, held in March 1954, revealed the extent to which Ukrainians had penetrated into positions of leadership. The turnover of Central Committee members was high: 40 per cent of those elected to the Central Committee at the 18th Congress were new to their posts.³⁴⁶ Among those who found their way into the Central Committee for the first time as candidate members were Shelest and Shcherbyts'kyi. The representation of Ukrainians in that body registered an impressive leap: from 62 to 72 per cent.³⁴⁷ In a major reversal of past practices, all eight full members of the Politburo were Ukrainian. Of the three candidate members, one was a Ukrainian. Not only were the first and second secretaries Ukrainian (Kyrychenko and Pidhornyi), but the other two Central Committee secretaries as well.³⁴⁸

The 18th Congress saw the emergence of a new Ukrainian political elite, the first such elite to hold a decided majority of key posts in the republic. They were different from the preceding one not only by nationality, but also in their lack of political experience in the Donbass. It is not true, as Sullivant claims, that the nine full Politburo members and Secretaries of the Central Committee were 'as far removed from the Ukrainians of the countryside as Communists sent from Russia'.³⁴⁹ With one exception, all were born in the Ukrainian countryside, and six held their first positions of responsibility in a field of work connected with agriculture. Most (seven) were born in the *oblasti* of the Central West and North East in the first decade of this century, entered the party during the first five-year plan, were trained as engineers or technicians, held minor appointments in the second half of the 1930s, and were promoted to positions of rank after the Second World War.³⁵⁰ The change in the geographical pattern of elite recruitment meant that the new elite was far more influenced by the Ukrainian fact than its predecessors from Donbass.

That Ukrainians achieved a monopoly of top positions in the party was a reflection of the transformations which had occurred in the social structure of the Ukrainian nation. It was also the result of new attitudes of the Moscow leadership towards the Ukrainian party. In Khrushchev's leadership bid, the Ukrainian party's support proved decisive.³⁵¹ The support he obtained was a result of the fact that he, perhaps more than any other major figure in the CPSU Politburo at that time, recognised that the new national cadres in the republic had to be given a greater role in running their affairs. His attitude was epitomised by the theme that was developed in 1954 during the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the Pereiaslav Treaty. For the first time, a note of partnership between Ukrainians and Russians was sounded. Ukrainians, it was claimed, along with Russians, 'were the two great Slav peoples' of the Soviet Union.³⁵² The partnership was not to be an equal one – Russians were described as the 'leading nation' – but Ukrainians were singled out from among the other national groups for the role of associates in the building of the USSR. The new Ukrainian leadership was of course grateful for the trust shown them, but it also began, hesitantly at first, to demand a greater voice in managing the republic. The Ukrainian leadership, of course, did not question or challenge the unity of the Soviet Union. But it was increasingly caught in the cross-fire between the demands of the party centre for conformity and obedience, on the one hand, and its own political ambitions and the growing voice of the Ukrainian public for more autonomy on the other. Following the 18th Congress, the tension between the two poles characterised politics in the republic.

The 20th Congress of the CPSU initiated a new period for Ukraine and for Soviet nationalities policy in general. In the section of Khrushchev's report devoted to 'Some Questions of Our Nationality Policy,' he said:

Formerly, when there were few specialists, when the cadres in some republics were weak and when there were not so many industrial enterprises, the management of almost all enterprises was undertaken by the union ministries. Now the situation has changed: people grew along with industry in all union republics: national cadres were developed . . . Under these new conditions the old methods of economic management must undergo serious revision . . . The rights of the republican ministries are to be considerably expanded.³⁵³

This statement was a preliminary announcement of the *sovnarkhoz* reform. Instituted in 1957, it enhanced the republic's rights in the economic field. Under that reform, 97 per cent of the gross industrial production in the republic was now under the operational control of republican authorities, unlike in 1953 when only 36 per cent of enterprises located in Ukraine were under the administrative authority of Kiev.³⁵⁴

Despite the welcome that greeted the reform in Ukraine, major differences developed between the leadership of the CPU and the Moscow centre over the reform. The aspect that concerns us here revolved around the question of who was to staff the eleven *sovnarkhozy* that were created in Ukraine. The Ukrainian press officially stated that efforts should be made to recruit 'employees who had gained their experience in the enterprises which were located in the economic regions'.³⁵⁵ While the former ministries located in Ukraine provided much personnel for the regional *sovnarkhozy*, at the same time thousands of employees from the now defunct union ministries in Moscow were sent to work in the local bodies. Although global figures on the numbers transferred to Ukraine were never published, reports from the various economic regions indicate that the number was substantial. Moreover, the cadres from Moscow occupied many of the top positions in the *sovnarkhozy*.³⁵⁶ The transfers provoked opposition in Ukraine and the party in that republic had to be reminded that, 'In the selection and placement of personnel, remnants of nationalism show up in opposing personnel of the native nationality to personnel of another nationality, in the desire to select personnel according to nationality only.'³⁵⁷

In 1958 the first data on the national and social composition of the CPU were released, showing that the party counted 1.1 million full and candidate members. Half the total membership was the offspring of white-collar staff, 20 per cent came from working-class backgrounds and only 14 per cent from collective farm families. By occupation, two-thirds were employed as white-collar workers, 20 per cent as blue-collar workers and 14 per cent as collective farmers. Three-quarters of the CPU ranks had joined either during or after the Second World War. Ukrainians represented 60 per cent of the CPU membership, a 3 per cent drop when compared with the 1940 figure.³⁵⁸ This change was undoubtedly brought about by the addition to the republic, in 1954, of the Crimean *oblast'*, where Ukrainians were a minority of the population, as well as by the influx of Russian officials in the wake of the *sovnarkhoz* reform. Both factors were

only a temporary setback in the Ukrainians' share of the total CPU membership, since in 1960, for example, 73 per cent of those accepted into candidate status were Ukrainians.³⁵⁹

From the time of Mel'nikov's ouster in 1953 to the 19th Congress in 1956, the leadership of the CPU was a model of stability. After 1956, however, it witnessed changes in personnel and a shifting of forces under the impact of various all-Union events. The CPU, one of the largest territorial organisations of the CPSU, played an important role in the factional struggles which characterized politics in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev. Both Kyrychenko (in 1957) and his successor as First Secretary of the CPU, Pidhornyi (in 1963), were promoted to important positions in the CPSU Central Committee for their role in these conflicts. Pidhornyi's replacement was Shelest, who headed the Ukrainian party from 1963 to 1972.

The hegemony enjoyed by Ukrainians in the top leadership of the CPU under Kyrychenko and Pidhornyi continued under Shelest. In 1966, for example, 9 out of 11 full members and 4 out of 5 candidate members of the Politburo were Ukrainians. In 1971, 9 out of 10 full Politburo members and all five candidate members belonged to the indigenous nationality.³⁶⁰ According to a CIA study, in 1964 out of 33 'top party officials' in the republic, 30 were Ukrainian.³⁶¹ Grey Hodnett's comprehensive study of the leadership in both state and party sectors showed that over 75 per cent of 'all leading jobs' between 1955 and 1972 were held by Ukrainians.³⁶²

In examining the changes that occurred in party membership between 1958 and 1971, the first fact which should be noted is the exceptionally high rate of growth in the total numbers: from 1.1 million in 1958 to 2.5 million by 1971. In terms of the geographical distribution of the party ranks, Donbass and Dnipro were far from being the pre-eminent regions that they used to be. In 1971, every third member of the party resided in those regions. The Central West, because it contained the capital city, accounted for every fourth CPU member. Western Ukraine claimed over 13 per cent of the CPU total. Data on the social origins of the membership showed that the CPU became somewhat more proletarian between 1958 and 1971. Party members giving white-collar staff as their social origin declined from 49 to 42 per cent of the total between 1958 and 1971, whereas those claiming working class origins grew from 33 to 50 per cent in the same period. These figures, however, are misleading since they are not based on the occupation of individuals but on their origins. In 1971, over 43 per cent of the CPU ranks were specialists

with higher or specialised secondary education. Ukrainians by 1968 represented 65 per cent of the CPU membership.³⁶³ This was less than their share of the total population, but it approximated their position within the urban and educated sectors of society from which the CPU recruited most of its members.

After Stalin's death, national aspirations within the CPU took a qualitatively new form. The precondition for this development was the emergence of Ukrainians as the dominant group within the leadership and membership of the party. The central government's economic policies, which discriminated against Ukraine, intensified national feelings by adding socio-economic grievances to national antagonism based on culture.

In the post-war period, Ukraine was the victim of what D. Solovei called the 'scissors of colonialism'.³⁶⁴ In every significant sector of industry, Ukraine's share of all-Union production declined, whereas Russia's share increased.³⁶⁵ Opposing discrimination in development policies, the CPU made efforts to gain control of Ukraine's economy. Even Khrushchev's *sovnarkhoz* reform, which gave Ukrainian leaders operational control of enterprises located on their soil, did not satisfy them. In 1957, for example, the CPU Central Committee passed a resolution demanding that the Ukrainian Gosplan, not the all-Union one, have responsibility for both 'current and long-term plans' as well as control over the entire economic life of the republic.³⁶⁶ This was the strongest statement of republican economic autonomism ever made by a CPU Central Committee. An irritated Ukrainian official in an article called the extensive re-centralisation of economic power under Brezhnev 'a very grave mistake . . . [that] should not have been allowed in a socialist economy'.³⁶⁷ A good example of the mood of Ukrainian economic officials was provided by a Moscow *samizdat* report commenting on the recrudescence of Ukrainian nationalism. Officials of the State Planning Committee and the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR kept insisting that their share of funds allocated for capital investment be increased. They based their arguments on statistics showing Ukraine's high contribution to all-Union funds. 'They declared bluntly that they were being robbed.'³⁶⁸ Koropeckyj noted that 'according to the statements of recent emigrants from the USSR, nationalism is particularly strong among the Ukrainian planners and managers who have an intimate knowledge of the economic discrimination against their republic'.³⁶⁹ The 'increasingly bitter criticism of the economic

exploitation of Ukraine³⁷⁰ which Shelest tolerated, played a major role in bringing about his downfall.

A new Ukrainian political elite comprised of individuals with modern skills had come into being and found itself frustrated politically and economically by a hyper-centralised system which refused to recognise it as a force, or share power with it. Shelest, for example, could not even sanction the construction of a pedestrian underpass in Kiev without first having obtained permission from Moscow.³⁷¹ The nationalism that this situation produced was new, the 'result of the superimposition of new conflicts on top of old ethnic differences'.³⁷² The new elite attempted to consolidate its position. Under Shelest, for example, an attempt was made to 're-Ukrainise' the political apparatus by opposing the influx of non-Ukrainian cadres into the republic.³⁷³ The new elite sought its own ideology to justify its claims and found sources of legitimacy in its own unique national heritage.³⁷⁴

In May 1972 Shelest was purged. The charges brought against him, published eleven months later, were very revealing. He was accused of misinterpreting the Soviet federal system, promoting 'elements of economic autarkism', failing to acknowledge nationalist deviations in the CPU and Ukrainian cultural circles during the 1920s, idealising Ukrainian cossacks, ignoring the positive influence of Russian culture on Ukrainian culture and education and of other similar sins.³⁷⁵ In a clear reference to Shelest, the new party leader Shcherbyts'kyi admonished those standing 'on the side of reactionary nationalist philistinism'; speaking of economic integration he said that 'anyone who would attempt to hold this back, to take the path of national seclusion, would inflict grave damage to the goal of communist construction'.³⁷⁶ At the April 1975 plenum of the CPU Central Committee Shcherbyts'kyi criticised 'the unprincipled tolerant attitude on the part of individual leading cadres toward manifestations of national limitedness and localism'.³⁷⁷

Shelest's removal was engineered by the Brezhnev leadership and occurred at a time when Moscow was introducing new centralist initiatives. What is significant is that Shelest's position was supported by virtually the entire Ukrainian apparatus. His ouster was backed by only three of the twenty-five *oblast'* first secretaries. The purge that followed Shelest's fall was the most thorough since Stalin's time. At the regional, city and district levels a quarter of the secretaries responsible for ideology were replaced. Every major institution in

Ukraine was affected by the purge.³⁷⁸ With the fall of Shelest, autonomism as a movement within the CPU suffered a major setback. But since the conditions that gave rise to it have not changed, its re-emergence within the CPU remains part of the historical agenda.

DISSIDENTS

In Ukraine there emerged during the 1960s a 'spontaneous, multi-form, widespread, self-originating' movement of 'national self-defence'.³⁷⁹ This movement articulated its own democratic vision of society which included broad cultural, political and economic rights for the republic. When the regime attempted to intimidate and silence this new voice, the movement offered resistance, and a new phenomenon surfaced: dissent and dissidents.³⁸⁰

A socio-economic profile of individuals involved in dissent may contribute towards an understanding of the relationship between social mobilisation and national consciousness. If dissidents were drawn from sectors of society closely identified with modernity, then this would be evidence that social mobilisation, far from weakening a separate identity, may have played a role in enhancing it.

A dissident is here defined as any individual who expressed disapproval of the existing regime or of one of its policies or actions in a public way, be it by signing a petition, authoring or circulating *samizdat*, writing a letter of protest or complaint, participating in unofficial gatherings such as discussion groups or demonstrations, writing slogans in public places or similar actions. The chief characteristic of such public activity was that it went beyond official forums and was perceived by authorities as violating their norms of permissible behaviour. Our investigation is limited to the territory of Ukraine; former residents of the republic involved in dissident activity outside the boundaries of Ukraine are not included. By limiting our sources to the major documents of the Ukrainian dissident movement and the Moscow *Khronika tekushchikh sobytii* (Chronicle of Current Events), ours is not a comprehensive analysis of individuals involved in dissent activity in the republic. Religious movements, for example, are inadequately covered by these sources. The analysis does, however, provide fairly complete information on the Ukrainian national current, as well as the human rights movement. Our sources covered the period from 1960 to 1972. However, since the bulk of our

information was contained in issues of the *samizdat* journals *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* and the *Khronika*, and since these publications were initiated only in 1970 and 1968 respectively, the study can be said to focus essentially on individuals active in the dissident movement from 1969 to 1972. All in all we collected information on 942 individuals, which is quite a large sample.³⁸¹

By nationality, 77.2 per cent of dissidents were Ukrainian, 0.5 per cent were Russians, 9.9 per cent belonged to other nationalities (mostly Jews and Crimean Tatars) and the nationality of 12.4 per cent of our total sample of 942 was impossible to determine. Bearing in mind that almost 20 per cent of the total population in the republic was Russian, and their representation in the urban population was higher, Russians were clearly under-represented among dissidents. Since the Moscow *Khronika* was also used as a source of information, Russians participating in the movement for human rights in Ukraine ought to have appeared in the sample. It is therefore unlikely that the source base biased the results. We can only conclude that as a relatively privileged group in the republic, Russians were less likely to engage in protest activity.

The place of residence of the individuals allows an insight into the geographical distribution of dissidents in the republic. Information on this question was available for 749 cases. The single largest contingent came from the city of Kiev – 283 or 38 per cent. The city of L'viv supplied 190 dissidents or 25 per cent. Thus the lion's share of dissidents was claimed by these two cities – 63 per cent. The Crimean *oblast'* supplied 61 dissidents, followed by Ivano-Frankivs'k – 55, Dnipropetrovs'k – 34, Kharkiv – 24, Odessa – 21, Ternopil' – 15. The remaining *oblasti* had less than 10 dissidents each. Only seven dissidents resided in the heavily industrialised Donets'k *oblast'*.

Dissent in Ukraine was very much an urban phenomenon. It was possible to identify the type of residence (city, town or village) in the case of 626 individuals. Of this total, 89 per cent lived in cities and three per cent in towns. Thus 91 per cent of dissidents inhabited urban centres. In the 1960s cities had emerged as the focal points of the Ukrainian national revival.

Examining dissidents from the point of view of official Soviet characterisations of social class, it is evident that the opposition in Ukraine came from the socially mobilised sectors of society. Our sample here included 659 individuals identifiable by class: 86 per cent were white-collar staff, 13 per cent were workers and only one per cent were collective farmers. The vast majority of those belonging

to the white-collar staff category were in fact members of the intelligentsia (see below).

Detailed information on the actual occupation of dissidents was available for 584 individuals. That information showed the following:

workers		67
skilled	54	
unskilled	13	
teachers		63
humanities	36	
science and technology	17	
social sciences	7	
other	3	
research scientists		56
writers and poets		55
engineers		52
students		48
humanities	19	
science and technology	10	
social sciences	8	
other	11	
academics in humanities		30
clergy		30
visual artists		26
managers/directors		24
journalists		21
academics in social sciences		21
performing artists		19
translators and editors		14
literary critics		12
clerical workers		11
unemployed		8
collective farm labourers		7
pensioners		6
lawyers		5
military officers		5
nurses		4
Total		584

Detailed data on the level of educational achievement of dissidents were available for 215 individuals. The results showed that this was a highly educated group: 94 per cent had some post-secondary education, 52 individuals had reached the rank of candidate of sciences and 12 held the title of doctor of sciences.

It was possible to identify the issues raised by individual dissidents in the case of 753 individuals. These people made a total of 2186 dissenting statements and actions pertaining to specific issues. (Some individuals made more than one such statement.) The majority of such statements and actions – 1044 – addressed the issue of democratisation, that is, freedom of speech, thought, assembly, and so on. In this category were many statements and actions motivated by national considerations. For example, almost 200 dealt with the right of individuals to have access to Ukrainian works banned by authorities. Statements and actions in defence of the victims of repression ranked second in frequency (754) with almost 600 being undertaken on behalf of Ukrainian political prisoners. Protest against Russification and the limitations of the political and economic rights of Ukraine was the subject of 388 actions and statements.

CONCLUSION

Developments in Ukrainian society in the post-war period were highly contradictory. The Russian population of the republic increased substantially, creating an environment promoting the assimilation of Ukrainians. That increase was also instrumental in bringing about a crisis in the social mobility of Ukrainians. A hierarchical cultural division of labour crystallised, contributing to the rise of a reactive Ukrainian nationalism. The integrationist and assimilationist policies of the Russian leadership succeeded in eroding the sense of national identity of some. But because this integration was on unequal terms, Ukraine's exploitation provoked national outrage in many more. Centralisation was designed to unify the Soviet Union under Russian hegemony; but by trampling on the ambitions of the new Ukrainian elite it succeeded in making that elite 'more Ukrainian than Soviet', in the words of H  l  ne Carr  re d'Encausse.³⁸² Every thesis, in time, produces its antithesis, as every Soviet citizen who has studied dialectical materialism knows.

The Soviet leadership chose repressive means to resolve the tensions that their policies produced in Ukraine.³⁸³ Far from demonstrating the strength and stability of the existing regime, such a policy revealed a fundamental weakness. Repression can only succeed temporarily.³⁸⁴ There are historical factors stronger than the will of the most resolute party leader of the CPSU. In his 'Instead of a Final Statement,' Valentyn Moroz made reference to them when he said:

You close your eyes and pretend there is no problem . . . What then? The new processes in Ukraine (and in the entire USSR) *are just beginning*. The Ukrainian renaissance has not yet become a mass movement. But do not expect that it will always be so. In the epoch of universal literacy, when in Ukraine there are 800 000 students and everyone has a radio, every socially significant phenomenon takes on mass proportions. Are you really not able to understand that soon you will be dealing with a mass social movement?³⁸⁵

Conclusion

In the decades preceding the revolution, formidable obstacles blocked the development of the Ukrainian national movement. Autonomous Ukrainian institutions had been destroyed by the end of the eighteenth century and the administration of the country was firmly in the hands of the Russian bureaucracy. The old Ukrainian ruling class, the Cossack officer class, had ceased to exist as a cohesive national elite, and tsarist statist economic policies prevented the emergence of an alternative elite based on the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. The leadership of the national movement went by default to the not too numerous intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, whose ability to mobilise the Ukrainian people was greatly hampered by the relentless efforts of the tsarist regime to block the emergence of the infrastructures of national life – schools, social and political organisations, book publishing and newspapers.

Of course, some progress towards the development of a Ukrainian national movement was apparent by the eve of the revolution. An inchoate rural cooperative movement provided a rudimentary organisational structure. Modest improvements in education enlarged the Ukrainian intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. Moreover, as the experience of the 1905 revolution showed, the agrarian movement in Ukraine could flow along national channels. Thus in 1917 the Ukrainian national movement was far from having reached its full potential: it was only beginning in earnest.

During the revolution millions of Ukrainians were drawn into the struggle for social and national emancipation. While this movement was unable to achieve Ukraine's independence, it proved strong enough to force major concessions from the Bolsheviks. The establishment of a Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, of a Communist Party of Ukraine, and acceptance of the principle of Ukrainisation were the most notable such concessions. The Bolsheviks found that while they could maintain control of the society from their urban fortresses, they could not bring about much-needed social, economic and cultural development, especially in the countryside, without

involving their former opponents – the activists of the Ukrainian national movement: teachers, members of the cooperative movement and the like. Tasks which were purely economic in nature in Russia, carried with them major national overtones in Ukraine. The recruitment of representatives of the social groups mentioned above to positions of responsibility resulted in the penetration of the national idea into Soviet Ukrainian institutions which had initially eschewed them. The activism and energy which these groups showed in organising Ukrainian-language schools, newspapers and cultural groups ensured that Ukrainian culture deepened and broadened its influence in the society.

The revolution fundamentally altered economic relations in the country. Foreign capital, hitherto the motor force of Ukraine's industrialisation, was expropriated, while the most important levers of economic policy and decision-making fell into the hands of central economic organs who defended the interests of the Russian economy to the detriment of the Ukrainian. Ukraine was subjected to discriminatory taxation and industrial location policies which hindered its economic development and depressed its population's standard of living. The leadership of the republic's institutions – the party, state, and trade unions – charged with the responsibility of managing the republic under these adverse conditions, reacted by attempting to broaden the republic's powers and prerogatives as a way of ameliorating local conditions. The cultural movement led by the Ukrainian intelligentsia began to dovetail with the increasing autonomist assertiveness of the republic's new political and administrative elite.

The transformation of agrarian relations in the country, the mobilising effect of the revolution and the expansion of education altered fundamentally the migratory patterns of the Ukrainian population. The Ukrainian peasantry, especially village youth, began to stream into the towns to seek employment in industry and state administration or admission to technical schools and universities. As Ukrainians increased their representation in the strategic sectors of society, the Ukrainisation of these sectors gained momentum. Ukrainisation 'from below', when combined with the Ukrainisation of the summit of society, brought Ukrainians to the threshold of nationhood by the end of the 1920s.

The centralistic drive initiated by Stalin in connection with the first five-year plan provoked much discontent in Ukraine. When the Ukrainian elite refused to become willing tools in the extermination of their own people during the 1932–3 grain requisition campaigns,

Stalin launched his first mass purge of the republic. At the same time, Ukrainisation which nurtured republican particularism was abandoned, and the republic's schools, mass media and intellectual life were remoulded and forced to propagate the virtues of extreme centralism. The decimation of Ukraine's population during the great famine of 1932–3 and the purges of 1933–4, combined with the imposition of a totalitarian social order, destroyed much of the fabric of Ukrainian national life. Even so, Ukrainian particularism had an uncanny way of asserting itself. The new leadership after the 1933–4 purges made some efforts at national consolidation and played a leading role in opposing Stalin's plans for a new purge. They were mercilessly liquidated during the *Ezhovshchina* and the republic was reduced to a NKVD fiefdom. From 1938 onward, the infrastructures of Ukrainian national life were further weakened when their Russification was ordered.

The era of the first five-year plan saw much urban and industrial development in Ukraine. It was however, a highly uneven growth, reflecting all-Union economic priorities, not those of Ukraine. The large-scale transfers of capital from Ukraine to the USSR exchequer accentuated a trend discernible early in the 1920s when, in contrast to the pre-revolutionary period, Ukraine's level of socio-economic development lagged substantially behind that of Russia. The socio-economic development transformations which did occur during the 1930s in Ukraine, however, were sufficient for Ukrainians to emerge as a majority of the socially-mobilised sectors of the population. This, combined with the fact that many republican institutions, at least in form, survived even Stalin's destructive hand, raised the possibility that perhaps the drive for national self-assertion could be resumed in the future.

In the post-Second World War period Ukraine fell further behind Russia in overall levels of socio-economic development. The highly competitive social environment created by the sizeable Russian immigration to Ukraine further restricted opportunities for the social mobility of Ukrainians, as did the Russification of Ukraine's educational system, post-secondary education in particular. These were some of the factors which served as the social backdrop for the resurgence of Ukrainian national assertiveness in the post-Stalin era. The most vocal exponents of Ukraine's national claims were the intelligentsia, supported by broad sectors of public opinion. Many of the intelligentsia's demands were backed by the new generation of Ukrainian political leaders who, having been trained for responsible

positions, were anxious to assume them free from excessive interference from the centre. Taking advantage of momentary relaxations of central control, that leadership made efforts to strengthen Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions, promote the indigenous language, and exert greater control over the economy.

The Russian leadership's response to this new autonomism was to accelerate Russification. This policy failed because it did not address itself to the principal source of nationalism which was socio-economic in nature. Indeed, the attempted Russification exacerbated the crisis of social mobility and soon had to be backed up by repression – Shelest's dismissal and the purge of the state and party apparatus. None of the pressing social, economic, political and cultural questions confronting Ukraine were tackled, and the deteriorating economic situation left the Soviet regime with less capacity to deal with them. Given current conditions and policies, there is reason to anticipate a continued growth in national tensions and these are unlikely to be appeased without major concessions.

Notes and References

INTRODUCTION

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1 UKRAINIAN SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF THE REVOLUTION

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3. Mykhailo Drahomanov, 'Perednie slovo do 'Hromady',' in *Vybrani tvory* (Prague and New York, 1937), vol I, p. 93.
4. In 1897, 36 per cent of the population of the Crimea was Tatar. After the revolution, the Crimea became an autonomous republic of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. In 1944, Tatars were deported *en masse* to Central Asia, charged with collaborating with the Nazis. The charges were formally withdrawn in 1967 by a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Tatars, however, were not allowed to return to their ancestral homeland.
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cited below the tables will refer to all the above mentioned volumes, unless otherwise indicated.

The 1897 census did not collect nationality data based on self-identification of the respondents. Rather, individuals were asked to state their mother tongue. Since many Ukrainians gave Russian as their mother tongue, there were more ethnic Ukrainians than the census reveals. Throughout this chapter when reference is made to the 1897 census nationality is defined by mother tongue.

7. The right bank consists of Volyn', Podillia and Kiev provinces. The left bank: Chernihiv, Poltava and Kharkiv. The steppe: Katerynoslav, Kherson and Tavria provinces.
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14. A. I. Dotsenko, 'Heohrafichni osoblyvosti protsesiv urbanizatsii na Ukraini (XIX-XX st.),' *Ukrains'kyi istoryko-heohrafichniy zbirnyk*, vypusk 2 (1972) p. 47.
15. A. G. Rashin, 'Dinamika chislennosti i protsessy formirovaniia gorodskogo naselennia Rossii v XIX-nachale XX vv.,' *Istoricheskie zapiski*, no. 36 (1950) p. 43.
16. Michael Hechter, *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1836-1966* (Los Angeles and Berkley, 1974) pp.30-1.
17. Patricia Herlihy, 'Odessa: Staple Trade and Urbanization in New Russia,' *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, no. 2 (1973) pp. 184-95.
18. M. Iavors'kyi, *Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu. V superekakh imperiializmu* (Kharkiv, 1925) p. 18.
19. Roger L. Thiede, 'Industry and Urbanization in New Russia from 1860 to 1910,' in Michael F. Hamm (ed.) *The City in Russian History* (Lexington, 1976) p. 126.
20. Stephen Rudnitsky, *Ukraine: The Land and Its People* (New York, 1918) p. 323.
21. Baranovich, *Ukraina*, p. 139. Approximately 70 per cent of the urban population of the right bank was Ukrainian. In left-bank Ukraine, the figure was even higher. See Mykhailyna, *Vyzvol'na borot'ba*, pp. 38-9; O. S. Kompan, *Mista Ukrainy v druhii polovyni XVII st.* (Kiev, 1963) p. 106.
22. O. Ohloblyn, *Het'man Ivan Mazepa ta ioho doba* (New York, 1960) pp. 202, 218-9, 231.

23. Kompan, *Mista*, pp. 88–92; V. A. Golobutskii, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo* (Kiev, 1957) pp. 46 passim.
24. Władysław Serczyk, *Hajdamacy* (Krakow, 1972) p. 32.
25. V. A. Markina, *Krest'iane pravoberezhnoi Ukrainy. Konets XVII– 60e vody XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1971) p. 99.
26. See M. Iavors'kyi, *Istoriia Ukrainy v styslomu narysi* (Kharkiv, 1928) p. 83. As early as the end of the seventeenth century, 90 per cent of towns in the Kiev region, for example, belonged to the gentry. *Istoriia Ukrain's'koi RSR*, 8 vols (Kiev, 1977–9) vol. II, pp. 141–2.
27. Markina, *Krest'iane*, p. 99.
28. Kompan, *Mista*, pp. 101–4.
29. In Dobrovtsi, for example, in 1712, Jews represented 27 per cent of the households; by 1760, 50 per cent. In Khmel'nyk, their representation increased from 17 per cent in 1739 to 69 per cent in 1763. Markina, *Krest'iane*, pp. 93, 96.
30. Kompan, *Mista*, p. 92.
31. This is the reason why the majority of non-seasonal workers in the sugar refineries were non-Ukrainians according to Mykola Baiier, *Prychyny agrarnoi revoliutsii na Ukraini i shliakhy do rozviazannia agrarnoi spravy* (Kiev and Vienna, 1920) p. 11.
32. O. R-ain [pseudonym] 'Do statystyky pravobichnoi Ukrainy,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistyntk*, vol. XXXVIII, bk IV (1907) p. 95.
33. S.M. Dubnow, *History of Jews in Russia and Poland from the Earliest Times Until the Present Day*, 3 vols (Philadelphia, 1916–20), vol. II; p. 312.
34. Viacheslav Prokopovych, *Pid zolotoiu korohvoiu* (Paris, 1943) pp. 5–6, 70.
35. *Vossoedinenie Ukrainy s Rossiei 1654–1954. Sbornik statei* (Moscow, 1954) pp. 405, 422.
36. See V. A. Diadychenko, *Narysy suspil'no-politychnoho ustroiu li-voberezhnoi Ukrainy kintsia XVII–pochatku XVIII st.* (Kiev, 1959) pp. 78-9, 103, 311; Kompan, *Mista*, pp. 89, 144; Leo Okinshevich, *Ukrainian Society and Government 1648-1781* (Munich, 1978) p. 61.
37. Diadychenko, *Narysy*, p. 80; P. G. Liubomirov, *Ocherki po istorii russ-koi promyshlennosti. XVII, XVIII i nachalo XIX veka* (Moscow, 1947) p. 191.
38. Oleksander Ohloblyn, *A History of Ukrainian Industry* (Munich, 1971), (reprint of A. P. Ogloblin, *Ocherki istorii ukrainskoi fabriki*) (Kiev, 1925), vol. I, pp. 32–7; Kompan, *Mista*, pp. 99–100.
39. For a discussion of Petrine economic policies and their impact on Ukraine see: Ohloblyn, *A History*, vol. I, pp. 32 passim; Ivan Dzhydzhora, *Ukraina v pershii polovyni XVIII viku. Rozvidky i zamitky* (Kiev, 1930) pp. 1–93.
40. Dzhydzhora, *Ukraina*, p. 1; N. S. [torozhenko], 'K istorii malorossiiskikh kozakov v kontse XVIII i v nachale XIX veka,' *Kievskaiia starina*, no. 6 (1897) pp. 472-83; Golobutskii, *Zaporozhskoe kazachestvo*, p. 420.
41. See Ohloblyn, *A History*, vol. III, pp. 45–52; I.O. Hurzhii, *Rozvy-tok tovarnoho vyrobnystva i torhivli na Ukraini* (Kiev, 1962) pp. 134–5; N. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Zaselennia pivdennoi Ukrainy v polo-vyni XVIII st. (1734-1775)*, 2 vols (Munich, 1960) vol. II, p. 99.

42. A. Shafonskii, *Chernigovskogo namestnichestva topograficheskoe opisanie* (edited by M. Sudienko), (Kiev, 1851) pp. 475–7.
 43. M. Ie. Slabchenko, *Materialy do ekonomichno-sotsial'noi istorii Ukrainy XIX stolittia* (Kiev, 1925) p. 199.
 44. Zenon Eugene Kohut, 'The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy (1763–1786): A Case Study in the Integration of a non-Russian Area,' (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1975) p. 273.
 45. Volodymyr Shcherbyna, 'Borot'ba Kyiva za avtonomiiu,' in M. Hrushevs'kyi (ed.) *Kyiv ta ioho okolytsia v istorii i pam"iatkakh* (Kiev, 1926) p. 216.
 46. Thomas Stanley Fedor, *Patterns of Urban Growth in the Russian Empire during the Nineteenth Century* (Chicago, 1975) p. 146; P. G. Ryndziunskii, 'Krest'iane i gorod v doreformennoi Rossii,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 9 (1955) pp. 26–40.
 47. M. I. Tugan-Baranovsky, *The Russian Factory in the 19th Century* (Homewood, 1970) pp. 171–214.
 48. V. P. Teplyts'kyi, *Reforma 1861 roku i ahraryni vidnosyny na Ukraini* (Kiev, 1959) p. 30.
 49. See Hurzhii, *Rozvytok*, p. 135; and S. I. Smetanin, 'Razlozhenie soslovii i formirovanie klassovoi struktury gorodskogo naseleniia Rossii v 1800–1961 g.g.,' *Istoricheskie zapiski*, no. 102 (1978) p. 173.
 50. Slabchenko, *Materialy*, p. 200.
 51. P. G. Ryndziunskii, *Krest'ianskaia promyshlennost' v poreformennoi Rossii* (Moscow, 1966) pp. 106, 115, 120.
 52. See 'Kritika,' *Russkaia beseda*, no. 4, pt 2 (1857) pp. 32–3.
 53. *Bil'shovyk*, 21 March 1923.
 54. See B. V. Tikhonov, *Pereseleniia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX v.* (Moscow, 1978) Table 5, p. 184.
- It should be noted that the abolition of serfdom did not mean that peasants were free to travel wherever they pleased. Administrative restrictions remained, which applied to Russian peasants as well. However, in right-bank Ukraine, where the regime was anxious not to weaken the 'Russian element' there were special regulations in force making out-migration more difficult than in other regions of the Empire.
55. V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, 45 vols (Moscow, 1960–70, 4th edn) vol 3, pp. 484–96; Mykola Porsh, *Ukraina i Rosiia na robitnychomu rynku* (Kiev, 1918) p. 39.
 56. For a succinct analysis of the underdevelopment of capitalism in Ukraine see: Mykola Stasiuk, *Avtonomiia i rozvytok produktsiinykh syl na Ukraini* (St Petersburg, 1908).
 57. A. Finn-Enotaevskii, *Kapitalizm v Rossii (1890–1917 gg.)* (Moscow, 1925) vol. I, p. 110.
 58. Mykola Stasiuk, 'Emigratsiia ta ii znachynie v ekonomichnomu zhyttiu Ukrainy,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. LX, bk XII (1912) p. 578.
 59. Panas Fedenko, *Ukrains'kyi rukh v XX stolitti* (London, 1959) p. 9.
 60. See Stasiuk, *Avtonomiia*, pp. 21–2; Mykola Hekhter, 'Khersonskaia guberniia,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. LIII, bk 1 (1911) pp. 234–6.

61. See P. Miliukov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoi kul'tury* (St Petersburg, 1896) vol. I, p. 178.
62. Kohut, 'The Abolition of Ukrainian Autonomy,' pp. 283, 374; D. B. Saunders, 'The Political and Cultural Impact of the Ukraine on Great Russia, c. 1775-c. 1835,' (D. Phil. dissertation, University of Oxford, 1978) pp. 118-50.
63. M. V. Kurman and I. V. Lebedinskii, *Naselenie bol'shogo sotsialisticheskogo goroda* (Moscow, 1968) p. 121.
64. Aleksandr Pushkin, *Eugene Onegin: A Novel in Verse*, 4 vols (translated by Vladimir Nabokov), (London, 1964) vol. IV, p. 340.
65. Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Ukrains'ka revoliutsiia. Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrains'koi revoliutsii 1917-1920 rr.*, 4 vols (New York, 1969, reprint of 1921-2 edn) vol. I, p. 58.
66. V. Skorovskanskii [V. Shakhrai], *Revoliutsiia na Ukraine* (Saratov, 1919) pp. 7-8.
67. M. Shapoval, *Sotsiologiia ukrains'koho vidrozhennia* (Prague, 1937) p. 39.
68. Kharakternyk [Roman Bzhes'kyi], 'Zhadky z myhuloho (1916-1921 r.),' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. LXXXIII, bks VII-IX (1924) pp. 285-6.
69. *Rada*, 31 October 1907.
70. Steven L. Guthrie, 'The Popular Base of Ukrainian Nationalism in 1917,' *Slavic Review*, no. 1 (1979) p. 43.
71. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 21 July and 21 November 1917.
72. I. Mazepa, *Ukraina v vohni i buri revoliutsii, 1917-21*, 3 vols (n.p., 1951) vol. II, p. 31.
73. Fedenko, *Ukrains'kyi rukh*, p. 122.
74. *Perepis' 1897*, Tables XXI, XXII.
75. V. Ko-yi [V. Kosovyi], 'Natsional'no-terytoriialni mezhi Ukrainy i terytorii in'shykh oblastei Rosii,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. XI, bk XII (1907) p. 468.
76. M. Porsh, 'Statystyka zemlevolodinnia v 1905 r. i. mobilizatsiia zemel'noi vlastnosti na Ukraini vid 1877 r. po 1905 r.,' *Ukraina*, no. 4 (1907) p. 176; *Istoriia selianstva Ukrains'koi RSR*, 2 vols (Kiev, 1967) vol. I, p. 394.
77. *Rada*, 28 October 1905; M. Hekhter, 'Z ukrains'koho zhyttia. Pere-selennie,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. L. bk IV (1910) pp. 186-8.
78. The per acre yield of wheat in Ukraine was half that of Denmark, Belgium or Germany. Isidor Shafarenko, *The Natural Resources, Industry, Exports and Imports of the Ukraine* (London, 1920) p. 3.
79. L. Kotelianskii, 'Ocherki podvornoii Rossii,' *Otechestvennye zapiski*, no. 2, pt 2 (1878) p. 133.
80. Iu. Ianson, *Opyt statisticheskogo issledovaniia o krest'ianskikh nadelakh i platezhakh* (St Petersburg, 1881) p. 66.
81. *Pobeda sovetskoi vlasti na Ukraine* (Moscow, 1967) p. 47; *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rosnytok sil's'koho hospodarstva Ukrains'koi RSR*, 2 vols (Kiev, 1967-8), vol. I, p. 18.
82. Sir John Maynard, *Russia in Flux: Before October* (New York, 1962) p. 62.

83. The national composition of nobles (hereditary and non-hereditary) in the light of the 1897 census was as follows: Ukrainians, 26 per cent; Russians, 50 per cent; Poles, 20; others, 4 per cent. *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXIV.
84. O. I. Luhova, 'Pro stanovyshe Ukrainy v period kapitalizmu,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 3 (1967) p. 18.
85. See H. Sen'ko, *Narodni prypovidky-chastivky pro natsional'no-vyzvol'nu borot'bu 1917-21 rr.* (Buenos-Aires, 1953) pp. 5-9.
86. A. Ia. Efimenko, *Istoriia ukrainskogo naroda* (St Petersburg, 1906) p. 325.
87. *Perepis' 1897*, Table xv.
88. In 1915, Russia's per capita expenditure on education, to give a comparison, was 30 per cent less than Bolivia's. See N. V. Chekhov (ed.) *Narodnoe obrazovanie v Rossii s 60-kh godov XIX veka* (Moscow, 1912) pp. 220-1.
89. *Rada*, 17 September 1906. In Cherkassy, to give another example, the pupil-teacher ratio was 200 to 1. *Rada*, 29 September 1906.
90. I. N. Romanchenko (ed.) *Sil's'ke hospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1958) p. 408; V. I. Borysenko, *Borot'ba demokratychnykh syl za narodnu osvitu na Ukraini v 60-90-kh rokakh XIX st.* (Kiev, 1980) pp. 43-6.
91. *Rada*, 25 May 1911.
92. To say that Ukrainian was banned is not quite accurate. In the eighteenth century, the language of instruction in the schools was the Ukrainian variant of Church Slavonic and this is what was banned. Modern literary Ukrainian developed in the nineteenth century. The first grammar of living Ukrainian was published in 1818 (Oleksii Pavlovs'kyi's).
93. Aleksandra Efimenko, *Iuzhnaia Rus'. Ocherki, issledovania i zametki*, 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1905) vol. I, p. 219.
94. *Rada*, 26 and 28 October 1907. Prior to the 1905 revolution the Ministry of Education allowed Ukrainian to be used in instruction in two private schools; after the 1905 revolution, in three private schools. See D. Doroshenko, 'Ukraina v 1906 rotsi,' *Ukraina*, no. 1, pt II (1907) p. 23.
95. According to teachers attending a conference in Poltava in 1905 over fifty per cent of what went on in the classroom was incomprehensible to Ukrainian children. Iu. Budiak [Iu. Pokos], 'Zapysky uchytelia 1899-1906,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistykyk*, vol. LIV, bk v (1911) p. 217.
96. *Rada*, 14 August 1917.
97. Budiak, 'Zapysky,' vol. XLVI, bk IV (1909) p. 106.
98. S. Todosiienko, 'Ukrains'ka shkola na pershim vserosiis'kim z'izdi po narodnii osviti,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistykyk*, vol. LXV (1914) p. 121.
99. *Rada*, 11 October 1907.
100. Otto Bauer, *Die Nationalitätenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie* (Vienna, 1924) pp. 215-17.
101. For a reactionary's succinct statement on the question see P. I. Kovalevskii, *Russkii natsionalizm i natsional'noe vospitanie* (St Petersburg, 1912).
102. See V. I. Kizchenko, *Kul'turno-osvittii riven' robitychoho klasu*

- Ukrainy naperedodni revoliutsii 1905–1907 r.r.* (Kiev, 1972). Half the clergy in Ukraine were Russian according to the 1897 census.
103. Cited by *Rada*, 17 December 1911. The sum total of Ukrainian instruction, at the level of higher education, was represented by one course on 'Little Russian literature' at Kiev university, a philology and history course at Kharkiv and a history course in St Petersburg. *Rada*, 25 September, 11 October 1907.
 104. S. N. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap iuzhnorusskogo separatizma* (Kiev, 1912) p. 349.
 105. William I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 2 vols (New York, 1927) vol. II, p. 1368.
 106. Ivan Krevets'kyi, 'Ne bylo, net i byt' ne mozhet,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. XXVI, bk III (1904) pp. 132–48; vol. XXVII, bk III, p. 11.
 107. *Rada*, 12 August 1907.
 108. I. Mazepa, *Pidstavy nashoho vidrozhennia*, 2 vols (n.p., 1946), vol. I, pp. 147–8.
 109. *Rada*, 26 October 1907.
 110. V. Ozerians'kyi, 'Persha vseukrains'ka vystavka drukovanoho slova v Kyivi,' *Chervonyi shliakh*, nos 4–5 (1923) pp. 229–32.
 111. V. Ihnatiienko, *Ukrains'ka presa (1816–1923 rr.)* (Kiev, 1926) p. 11.
 112. *20 let sovetskoi vlasti. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1937) Table 85, p. 104.
 113. V. St., 'Ukrains'ka polityka,' p. 239.
 114. Solomon I. Goldelman, *Jewish National Autonomy in Ukraine 1917–1920* (Chicago, 1968) p. 19.
 115. *Rada*, 26 October 1906.
 116. *Rada*, 17 September 1906.
 117. Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution*, 3 vols (London, 1967) vol. III, p. 32.
 118. *Istoriia selianstva*, vol. I, p. 466.
 119. N. Mirza-Avakians, *Selians'ki rozrukhny na Ukraini 1905–1907 roku* (Kharkiv, 1925) pp. 41–8.
 120. Lev Okinshevych, 'Znachne viis'kove tovarystvo v Ukraini-het'man-shchyni XVII–XVIII st.,' *Zapysky naukovoho tovarystva imeny Shevchenka*, vol. CLVII (1948) pp. 200–1.
 121. D. Miller, 'Ocherki iz istorii i iuridicheskogo byta staroi Malorossii. Prevrashchenie kozatskoi starshiny v dvorianstvo,' *Kievskaiia starina*, vol. LVI, no. 2 (1897) pp. 190–2, 204–19. Nobility status could only be granted by a monarch, hence outrageous genealogies tracing ancestors to Polish, Russian, Moldavian, Tatar, Hungarian, Serbian, German, even Ragusan (Dubrovnik) nobility.
 122. V. M. Kabuzan and S. M. Troitskii, 'Izmeneniia v chislennosti, udel'nom vese i razmeshchenii dvorianstva v Rossii v 1782–1858 gg.,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1971) Table I, pp. 162–5.
 123. Miller, 'Ocherki,' vol. LVII, no. 4 (1897) pp. 14, 40–7.
 124. O. M. Apanovych, 'Peredumovy ta naslidky likvidatsii Zaporiz'koi sichi,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 9 (1970) p. 32; Nataliia Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *Zaporizhzhia XVII stolittia ta ioho spadshchyna*, 2 vols (Munich, 1965, 1967) vol. II, pp. 134–5.

125. S. Drahomaniv, 'Dribne zemlevolodinnie na Poltavshchyni,' *Zapysky Ukrain's'koho naukovooho tovarystva v Kyivi*, bk x (1912) p. 85.
126. Efimenko, *Iuzhnaia*, pp. 180-2.
127. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Ukrainian National Movement on the Eve of the First World War,' *East European Quarterly*, no. 2 (1977) pp. 143-5.
128. Understood to mean a nation lacking its own ruling class.
129. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 10 June 1917.
130. Omelian Pritsak, 'U stolittia narodyn M. Hrushevs'koho,' *Lysty do pryiateliv*, vol. xiv, bk 5-7 (1966) pp. 10-16.
131. *Rada*, 9 August 1907.
132. Oleksander Lotots'kyi, *Storinky mynuloho*, 4 vols (Warsaw, 1932) vol. I, p. 138.
133. Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, pp. 101-2.
134. See James D. White, 'Historiography of the Russian Revolution in the Twenties,' *Critique*, no. 1 (1973) pp. 42-54.
135. See Stasiuk, *Avtonomiia*, pp. 6-8.
136. Margaret S. Miller, *The Economic Development of Russia 1905-1914* (London, 1926), p. 255; I. O. Hurzhii, *Ukraina v systemi vserosiis'koho rynku 60-90kh rokiv XIX st.* (Kiev, 1968) p. 33.
137. Luhova, 'Pro stanovyshe Ukrainy,' p. 21.
138. *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXI.
139. V. M. Orlovs'kyi, *Zalizerudna promyslovist' Ukrainy v dorevoliutsiinyi period* (Kiev, 1974) pp. 144-5.
140. V. V. Krutikov, 'Hirnychopromyslova burzhuaziia Ukrainy ta mytna polityka tsaryzmu v ostannii chverti XIX st.,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 5 (1978) pp. 81-8.
141. Stasiuk, *Avtonomiia*, pp. 1, 3, 31.
142. Ievhen Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk (1907-1917)* (L'viv, 1931) p. 289.
143. Miroslav Hroch, *Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegung bei den kleinen Völkern Europas*, cited by John-Paul Himka, 'Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (the 1870s),' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, no. 2 (1978) pp. 235-6.
144. *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXI. Almost two-thirds of those engaged in trade and commerce were Jewish.
145. A. Finn-Enotaevskii, *Sovremennoe khoziaistvo Rossii* (St Petersburg, 1911) p. 74.
146. See S. Podolyns'kyi, *Remesla i khvabryky na Ukraini* (Geneva, 1880) p. 66; Iavors'kyi, *Ukraina v epokhu kapitalizmu. V superekakh*, pp. 42-5; *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXI.
147. P. Khrystiuk, 'Ukrains'ka dribna burzhuaziia v ukrains'kii revoliutsii,' *Boritiesia-poborete!* no. 4 (1920) p. 41; M. Iu. Shapoval, 'Narodnytstvo v Ukr. vyzvol'nomu rukhovi,' *Vil'na spilka*, no. 3 (1927-9) pp. 113-4. See Ber Borochoy, *Nationalism and the Class Struggle: A Marxian Approach to the Jewish Problem* (New York, 1937) pp. 154-7 for an analysis of the 'wretched type of nationalism' desperate artisans produce.
148. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 10 June 1917.
149. Ko-yi, 'Natsional'no-terytorial'ni mezhi,' vol. XL, bk. XII (1907) p. 467.
150. I. Chopivs'kyi, *Ekonomichni narysy* (Kiev, 1918) p. 93.

151. I. S. Bisk, *K voprosu o sotsial'nom sostave naseleniia g. Kieva (po dannym perepisi 1917 g.)* (Kiev, 1920) p. 12. Nationality here is defined by ethnic self-identification.
152. *Narodna osvita, nauka i kul'tura v Ukraini'skii RSR. Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1973) p. 149. See V. R. Leikina-Svirskaiia, *Intelligentsia v Rossii vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* (Moscow, 1971) pp. 63–4 for data on the social origins of students.
153. *Perepis' 1897*, Table IX.
154. *Perepis' 1897*, Tables XXI, XXII.
155. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk*, p. 289.
156. Martin Malia, "What is the Intelligentsia?" in Richard Pipes (ed.) *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York, 1961) pp. 5–6.
157. Hrøch, 'The Social Composition,' p. 50.
158. *Rada*, 17 and 28 August 1907; D. Doroshenko, 'Kul'turno-prosvitna diial'nist' ukrains'koho hromadianstva za ostanni dva roky,' *Ukraina*, vol. IV, pt II (1907) p. 29.
159. St. V., 'Ukrains'ka polityka,' pp. 240–1.
160. O. Shums'kyi, 'Stara i nova Ukraina,' *Chervonyishliakh*, no. 2 (1923) p. 99.
161. Chykalenko, *Shchodennyk*, p. 284.
162. Tom Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (London, 1977) p. 340.
163. Ivan Franko, 'Moloda Ukraina,' in *Vybir iz tvoriv* (New York and Paris, 1956) p. 386.
164. Roman Serbyn (ed.) 'Lénine et la question ukrainienne en 1914: le discours "séparatiste" de Zurich.' *Pluriel*, no. 25 (1981) p. 83. Lenin's 1914 speech is not in any edition of Lenin's *Sochineniia* nor is it listed in the index of the yet untraced works. The Ukrainian Canadian communist historian Petro Kravchuk has, however, published this speech in his brochure on Lenin and Ukrainians. See Petro Kravchuk, *Pid provodom blahorodnykh idei* (Toronto, 1969) pp. 28–9. According to Roman Serbyn it is because Lenin advanced the demand for an independent Ukraine that his speech has been omitted from Soviet editions of his works.
165. H. Petrovs'kyi, *Vybrani statti i promovy* (Kiev, 1974) p. 12.
166. Cited by Stasiuk, *Avtonomiia*, p. 9.
167. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 3, pp. 603–7.
168. O. O. Nesterenko, *Rozvytok promyslovosti na Ukraini*, 3 vols (Kiev, 1962) vol. II, p. 495.
169. Mykhailo Volobuiev, 'Do problemy ukrains'koi ekonomiky,' in *Dokumenty ukrains'koho komunizmu* (New York, 1962) p. 176.
Metallurgical enterprises in southern Ukraine at the turn of the century showed 50 per cent net profits, and 100 per cent in the case of Hughes' factory. M. Hekhter, 'Chy mozhlyva v nas intensyfikatsiia selians'koho khliborobstva,' *Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk*, vol. XLI, bk II (1903) p. 364.
170. N. Iasnopol'skii, 'Ekonomicheskaiia budushchnost' iuga Rossii,' *Otechestvennye zapiski*, no. 6, pt 2 (1876) pp. 271–2.
171. D. I. Mendeleev, *Problemy ekonomicheskogo razvitiia Rossii* (Moscow, 1960) p. 374. See also pp. 419, 427.

172. P. Ia. Stebnitskii, *Ukraina v ekonomike Rossii* (Petrograd, 1918) p. 24.
173. N. A. Troinitskii (ed.) *Chislennost' i sostav rabochikh v Rossii na osnovanii dannykh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia Rossiiskoi imperii 1897 g.* 2 vols (St Petersburg, 1906) vol. I, Table 1.
174. V. Sadovs'kyi, *Pratsia v USSR* (Warsaw, 1932) p. 15.
175. Stasiuk, *Avtonomiia*, p. 20.
176. A. A. Nesterenko, *Ocherki istorii promyshlennosti i polozheniia proletariata Ukrainy v kontse XIX i nachale XX v.* (Moscow, 1954), pp. 147-8.
177. Porsh, *Ukraina i Rosiia*, p. 31.
178. Iu. I. Kir'ianov, *Zhiznennyi uroven' rabochikh Rossii* (Moscow, 1979) Table 13, pp. 108-9.
179. See M. Hekhter, 'Do istorii robochoho klasu na Ukraini rosiis'kii,' *Studii z polia suspil'nykh nauk i statystyky*, no. 1 (1909) pp. 161-94.
180. 'Hrunt, knyzhka ta 'prepiatstviia'. Lysty i uvahy vporiadchuka pro novyny na Ukraini,' *Hromada. Ukrajin's'ka zbirka*, no. 4 (1879) p. 315.
181. Mykola Porsh, 'Robitnytstvo Ukrainy. Narysy do statystyky pratsi,' *Zapysky Ukrains'koho naukovoho tovarystva v Kyivi*, bk XI (1913) p. 122-4.
182. T. I. Derev'iankin, *Promyslovyi perevorot na Ukraini* (Kiev, 1975) p. 215.
183. S. I. Potolov, *Rabochie Donbassa v XIX veke* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1963), Table 7, pp. 108-9; Iu. I. Kir'ianov, *Rabochie iuga Rossii 1914-fevral' 1917* (Moscow, 1971) p. 30
184. *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXI.
185. F. E. Los', *Formirovanie rabocheho klasa na Ukraine i evo revoliutsionnaia bor'ba* (Kiev, 1955) pp. 95-6.
186. *Istoriia robitynochoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR*, 2 vols (Kiev, 1967) vol. I, p. 134.
187. Porsh, 'Robitnytstvo,' p. 160; *Perepis' 1897*, Table XXI.
188. V. I. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad naselennia Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1965) p. 49.
189. M. M. Popov, *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovyktiv) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1929) p. 27.
190. S. A. Podolyns'kyi, 'Revoliutsiine narodnytstvo 70-kh rokiv XIX st. i ukrains'ki Hromady. Lyst S. A. Podolyns'koho pro "Ukrains'ku sotsial'no-demokratychnu partiiu",' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 9 (1968) p. 131.
191. Lev Iurkevych, 'Paki i paki. V spravi ukrains'koi robitynochoi gazety,' *Dzvin*, no. 6 (1914) pp. 539-40.
192. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*, 3 vols (Vienna and Kiev, 1920) vol. I, p. 262.
193. As early as 1907 Kosovyi expressed the hope that Jews would play this role. See Ko-yi, 'Natsional'no-terytorial'ni mezhi,' vol. XL, bk XII (1907) pp. 469-70. During the revolution the Ukrainian intelligentsia had hoped to attract Jews to their side. The pogroms, the work of brigand *otamany*, ruined all chances of such cooperation on a large scale. See M. G. Rafes, *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine. Evoliutsiia i*

raskol 'Bunda' (Moscow, 1920) p. 8. For an analysis of the social origins of anti-semitism in Ukraine see Iavors'kyi, *Istoriia*, pp. 88–9; Shapoval, 'Narodnytstvo,' p. 114.

2 UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN THE 1920s

1. For an account and map detailing boundary changes see Naulko, *Etnichniy sklad*, pp. 56–8.
2. S. V. Minaiev, *Naslidky vseliudnogo perepysu 1926 r. na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1928) p. 13.
3. Kazuo Nakai, 'Soviet Agricultural Policies in the Ukraine and the 1921–1922 Famine,' *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, no. 1 (1982) p. 62.
4. *Bil'shovyk*, 17 August 1922
5. V. A. Arnavtov, *Golod i deti na Ukraine* (Kharkiv, 1922) pp. 22–3.
6. Minaiev, *Naslidky*, p.13.
7. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1926 goda*, 56 vols (Moscow, 1928–33), vol. 11, pp. 2–3. Hereafter referred to as *Perepis' 1926*.
8. A. Khomenko, *Natsional'nyi sklad liudnosity USRR* (Kharkiv, 1931) p. 50.
9. *Visti* (Visty until 1929) *Vseukrains'koho tsentral'noho vykonavchoho komitetu*, 27 March 1926. (Hereafter referred to as *Visti*.)
10. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk* (Kharkiv, 1925) Table 6, p. 13; *SSSR v tsifrah 1933* (Moscow, 1934) Table 1, p. 92.
11. M. I. Shrah, R. I. Ianovs'kyi, *Promyslovisť USRR. Statystychno-ekonomichnyi poradnyk* (Kharkiv, 1929) p. 11.
12. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk*, Table 6, p. 14; *Statystychnyi shchorichnyk 1929* (Kharkiv, 1929) Table 2, p. 20.
13. 'Pryrodnyi rukh naselennia Ukrainy v 1927 r.,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. iv, no. 169 (1929) pp. 2–15; *Mis'ki selyshcha USRR. Zbirnyk stat-ekonomichnykh vidomosti* (Kharkiv, 1929) pp. 4–23.
14. A. Khomenko, *Naselennia Ukrainy 1897–1927 rr.* (Kharkiv, 1927) p. 35.
15. *Perepis' 1926*, Table vi in vols 11,12,13.
16. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk*, Table 6, p. 13; Table 2.3.
17. 'Korotki pidsumky perepysu naselennia Ukrainy 17 hrudnia roku 1926,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. v no. 124 (1928) p. xiv.
18. Seventy per cent of peasant households possessed between 2.3 and 6.6 hectares of land. Z. P. Shul'ha, *Pidhotovka susil'noi kolektyvizatsii na Ukraini* (Kiev, 1960) p. 43.
19. M. Krasil'nikov, 'Sostav pereselentsev,' *Statisticheskoe obozrenie*, no. 12 (1928) p. 107.
20. For a discussion of the state's unsuccessful campaign to encourage re-settlement see *Visti*, 11 August 1927, 17 March and 20 October 1928.
21. *Kommunist*, 13 April 1925.
22. Between 1916 and 1925 the number of households increased by 30.2

- per cent, land under cultivation by 16.7 per cent. P. I. Fomin, 'Promyshlennost' Ukrainy,' in *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Kharkiv, 1927) p. 14.
23. *Bil'shovyk*, 14 September 1923.
 24. *Biuletyn II-oi sesii Vseukrains'koho tsentral'noho vykonavchoho komitetu VIII sklykannia*, no. 3 (14 April) (1924) p. 159.
 25. *Visti*, 25 March 1926.
 26. Hanna Mandrykova, 'Robitnyk ta selianyn iak sotsial'ni typy,' *Nova Ukraina*, no. 8-9 (1927) p. 49.
 27. Borys Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu ukrains'koiu* [reprint] (Philadelphia, 1955) p. 143.
 28. See 'Selians'ki biudzhety Ukrainy. Monohrafichne obsliduvannia selians'kykh biudzhety za 1924-5 hospodarchyi rik,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. VI, no. 115 (1927) p. 191; 'Dyferentsiatsiia zarobitnoi platy v 1925 i 1926 rr.,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. I, no. 101 (1927) p. 2.
 29. M. Galitskii, 'Ukraina. Obshchaia ekonomicheskaiia kharakteristika USSR,' *Sotsialisticheskoe khoziaistvo*, bk 1 (1926) p. 203.
 30. I. Vikul, 'Liudnist' mista Kyiva,' *Demohrafichnyi zbirnyk*, vol. VII, no. 22 (1930) Table XIII, p. 221.
 31. *Bil'shovyk*, 14 September 1922.
 32. V. Pidmohyl'nyi, *Misto. Roman* (Kiev, 1929) pp. 37,95.
 33. A. Hirshfel'd, *Migratsiini protsesy na Ukraini (v svitli perepysu 1926 r.)*(Kharkiv, 1930) p. 30.
 34. V. Grekhov, 'Mekhanicheskoe dvizhenie naseleniia v gorodakh SSSR za tretii kvartal 1927 goda,' *Statisticheskoe obozrenie*, no. 11 (1927) pp. 92-3.
 35. *Kontrol'nye tsifry narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR na 1927-28 goda* (Moscow, 1928) pp. 214-5.
 36. *Dilo*, 26 October 1923 reports a visitor's impressions of Ukraine.
 37. *Perepis' 1926*, Table VI in vols 11, 12, 13; Table XII, vol. 11. The 1926 census defined mother tongue as the language which the individual usually spoke or spoke best.
 38. Khomenko, *Natsional'nyi sklad*, pp. 98-9.
 39. *Visti*, 20 April 1926.
 40. See *Torgovo-promyshlennyi kalendar'-spravochnik Ukrainy na 1923 god* (Kiev, 1923).
 41. *Visti*, 15 October 1925.
 42. See Khrystiuk, *Ukrains'ka revoliutsiia*, vol. I, pp. 24-5; pp. 45-6; I. V. Khmil', *Trudishche selianstvo Ukrainy v borot'bi za vladu rad* (Kiev, 1977) pp. 23-5.
 43. For example, see *Robitnycha hazeta*, 12 April, 11 May, 10 June, 23 August and 31 August 1917.
 44. In the Constituent Assembly elections Ukrainian parties received a little less than two-thirds of the total number of votes cast. O. H. Radkey, *The Elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950) pp. 78-9.
 45. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*, vol. I, p. 176.
 46. Khrystiuk, *Ukrains'ka revoliutsiia*, vol. I, pp. 22-3.
 47. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*, vol. I, p. 176.
 48. *Ibid.*, 259.

49. L. Trots'kyi, 'Natsional'na sprava. Iz promovy vyholoshenoï na VII Vseukrains'kii partkonferentsii KP(b)U,' *Nova kul'tura*, no. 1 (1923) p. 34.
50. For the lessons of the 1905 revolution in this respect see H. R. Weinstein, 'Land Hunger and Nationalism in the Ukraine, 1905-1917,' *Journal of Economic History*, no. 1 (1942) p. 35.
51. Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*, vol. I, p. 177.
52. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk. Tom pershyi. 1911-1920* (Edmonton and New York, 1980) p. 273.
53. S. Dubrowski, *Die Bauernbewegung in der Russischen Revolution 1917* (Berlin, 1929) p. 90.
54. Khrystiuk, *Ukrains'ka revoliutsiia*, vol. I, pp. 65, 66.
55. The First Universal (June 1917) called on peasants to wait for the Constituent Assembly. The Second Universal (July 1917) did not even mention the agrarian programme. The texts of the various 'universals' can be found in Iakiv Zozulia, (ed.) *Velyka ukrains'ka revoliutsiia. Materiialy do istorii vidnovlennia ukrains'koi derzhavnosti* (New York, 1967) pp. 65-70.
56. Vsevolod Holubnychy, 'The 1917 Agrarian Revolution in Ukraine', in I. S. Koropec'kyj (ed.) *Soviet Regional Economics: Selected Works of Vsevolod Holubnychy*, (Edmonton, 1982) pp. 42, 56-7.
57. See Iwan Majstrenko, *Borot'bism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York, 1954) for an account of the Borot'bisty and Hryhoriiv's group: Oleksander Vyshnov's'kyi, *Povstans'kyi rukh i otamania* (Detroit, 1973) for other *otamany*. The evolution of the N. Makhno movement towards a conscious national position is discussed by Michael Palij, *The Anarchism of Nestor Makhno 1918-1921: An Aspect of the Ukrainian Revolution* (Seattle and London, 1976) pp.78-80.
58. We are referring to the isolation characteristic of the semi-Asiatic nature of the former Russian Empire. This natural atomisation of village communities was broken only by a hyper-centralised state which arose for the purposes of defence and which existed through the extraction of surpluses from the countryside. For the presentation of the Asiatic mode of production in its application to the Russian Empire see Karl A. Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power* (New Haven, 1968) pp. 375-80.
59. *Nova doba*, no. 6 (1920) p. 6. When citing articles from this magazine we will provide complete references only in the case of signed articles.
60. A fascinating glimpse into the national attitudes prevailing in the village is provided by Sen'ko, *Narodni pryovidky-chastivky*.
61. Arthur E. Adams, 'The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie,' in Taras Hunczak (ed.) *The Ukraine, 1917-21: A Study in Revolution*, (Cambridge, Mass., 1977) p. 259.
62. Trotsky, *History of the Russian Revolution*, vol. III, p. 24.
63. For some of the problems involved in converting peasant guerrilla units into a regular army, see Leon Trotsky, *Problems of Civil War* (New York, 1976) pp. 9, 22-3.
64. *Kommunist*, 28 May 1925.
65. *Visti*, 10 April 1925.

66. I. V. Khmil', who tried hard to prove the impact of Bolsheviks on the Ukrainian peasantry in the post-Decree period, came up with fewer than two score of instances of peasant actions which were attributed to Bolshevik influence. I. V. Khmil', 'Borot'ba selian Ukrainy za zdiisnennia dekretu pro zemliu (zhovten'-hruden' 1917 r.),' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no.5 (1971) pp. 46-53.
67. V. A. Antonov-Ovseenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine*, 4 vols (Moscow, 1924-33) vol. I, p. 175.
68. M. A. Rubach, *Ocherki po istorii revoliutsionnogo preobrazovaniia agrarnykh otnoshenii na Ukraine v period provedeniia Oktiabr'skoi revoliutsii* (Kiev, 1957) pp. 156-9, 258-9, 373-4, 379-82.
69. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-1923*, 3 vols (London, 1966) vol. II, p. 163n.
70. I. Mazepa, *Bol'shevyzm i okupatsiia Ukrainy. Sotsial'no-ekonomichni prychny nedozrilosty syl ukrains'koi revoliutsii* (L'viv-Kiev, 1922) p. 90. For the functions of *komnezamy* see A. Shlikhter, 'Bor'ba za khleb na Ukraine v 1919 g.,' *Litopys revoliutsii*, no. 2 (1928) p. 105.
71. M. M. Popov, *Narys istorii Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy*, 5th edn (Kharkiv, 1931) p. 183. See also P. M. Ponomarenko, 'O politike partii v ukrainskoi derevnev 1919-1920 gg.,' *Voprosy istorii*, no. 8 (1956) p. 106.
72. F. V. Holovach, 'Zemel'na polityka Radians'koi vlady na Ukraini v 1917-1921 rr.,' *Visnyk Kyivs'koho universytetu. Seriia suspil'nykh nauk*, no. 7 (1965) p. 149.
73. Shlikhter, 'Bor'ba,' p. 106; Popov, *Narys*, (5th edn) pp. 194-5.
74. Nakai, 'Soviet Agricultural Policies,' p. 47.
75. Shlikhter, 'Bor'ba,' p. 134.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
77. In 1917 A. Iakubov claimed that to 'squeeze' 820-980 thousand tonnes of grain out of the Ukrainian peasantry a railroad car of textile goods and 200 million rubles in money were needed. *Bol'shevistskie organizatsii Ukrainy v period ustanovleniia i ukrepleniia sovetskoii vlasti (noiabr' 1917-aprel' 1918 gg.)*. *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Kiev, 1962) p. 52.
78. See the Central Committee resolution 'O sovetskoii vlasti na Ukraine,' in *Vsesoiuznaia Kommunisticheskaia partiia (bol'shevikov) v rezoliutsiiakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov Ts.K.*, 2 vols (Moscow, 1935) vol. I, pp. 324-6. See also the report of the Fourth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets in *Nova doba*, no. 23 (1920) pp. 2-3.
79. Holovach, 'Zemel'na polityka,' pp. 149-50.
80. *Visti*, 14 August 1925. See peasant complaints about corrupt heads of land commissions, surveyors, etc. in *Bil'shovyk*, 10 August, 14 September 1922.
81. *Entsyklopediia narodnogo hospodarstva Ukrain'skoi RSR*, 4 vols (Kiev, 1969-72) vol. III, p. 466.
82. *Komitety nezamozhnykh selian Ukrainy (1920-1933)*. *Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev, 1968) p. 12.
83. Jurij Borys, *The Sovietization of Ukraine 1917-1923: The Communist*

- Doctrine and Practice of National Self-Determination* (revised edition) (Edmonton, 1980) p. 290.
84. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 293.
 85. M. Ravich-Cherkasskii [Rabinovich], *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii (b-ov) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1923) pp. 158–9.
 86. The names of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) have changed several times. The CPSU was known as the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (Bolsheviks) – RSDLP (B) – until 1918, when the name changed to the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks). ‘Russian’ here is *rossiiskaia* not *rusaskaia* and denotes the entire territory of the Russian state, rather than ethnic Russia. In 1925 the party name was changed to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) – CPSU (B) – and in 1952 the word ‘Bolshevik’ was dropped. The Communist Party of Ukraine founded in 1918 was the Communist Party (Bolshevik) of Ukraine, until 1952, when the adjective ‘Bolshevik’ was dropped. Hereafter the abbreviations CPSU and CPU will be used to note these organizations, except in direct quotes.
 87. *Bil'shovyk*, 27 July 1922; *Visti*, 12 November 1923.
 88. Non-payment meant the immediate confiscation of the harvest plus a minimum eight-month prison sentence. ‘Interference’ in tax collection resulted in summary execution. ‘Many errors,’ it appears, were committed by the tribunals according to *Bil'shovyk*, 6 and 22 August 1922.
 89. *Bil'shovyk*, 14 September and 10 August 1922.
 90. *Bil'shovyk*, 12 September 1922.
 91. *Bil'shovyk*, 24 August 1922.
 92. See the report of Frunze’s growing disagreements with the Moscow centre in *Dilo*, 22 October 1922.
 93. See *Bil'shovyk*, 10 August and 14 September 1922; *Visti*, 17 November 1923.
 94. *Bil'shovyk*, 27 July 1922.
 95. *Bil'shovyk*, 10 August 1922.
 96. *Nova doba*, no. 43 (1920) p. 4.
 97. O. O. Kucher, *Rozhrom zbroinoi vnutrishn’oi kontrevoliutsii na Ukraini v 1921–1923 rr.* (Kharkiv, 1971) pp. 17–18.
 98. At the Fourth All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets the independent Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP) argued that the village needed class struggle, only Bolshevik policies were generating inter-class solidarity, rather than class antagonisms. See *Nova doba*, no. 24 (1920) p. 3.
 99. A scholarly analysis of peasant resistance during this period has yet to be written. Popov, *Narys*, p. 247, provides interesting examples of the size of partisan units that were active in 1920, For instance, 15 000 partisans in the Oleksandrivs’k district, 7000 near Kaniv, 3000 in the Zolotonosha region, etc.
 100. Kucher, *Rozhrom*, p. 24. As for the powerful Makhnovist movement, from 1920 on it moved towards a decidedly national, even chauvinist, position. The newspaper of that movement, for example, called for ‘the liberation of our native Ukraine from Russians’. This develop-

- ment is well documented in an early study. See M. Kubanin, *Makhnovshchina. Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v stepnoi Ukraine v gody grazhdanskoi voiny* (Leningrad, 1927) pp. 165-6.
101. M. Halushchyns'kyi 'Pozashkil'na osvita,' *Kaliendar tovarystva 'Pros- vity' na perestupnyi rik 1928* (L'viv, 1928) p. 28; I. Ivasiuk, *Kredytova kooperatsiia na Ukraini* (Warsaw, 1933) pp. 9, 10-12.
 102. *Bil'shovyk*, 21 March and 19 April 1923.
 103. Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, p. 158. Local Soviets existed but *komne- zamny* members were instructed to ensure that non-members did not participate in elections to Soviets and their executive committees and that non-members were not present during elections. See Mazepa, *Bol'shevyzm*, p. 89. Elections to the republic's Congress of Soviets were weighted in such a way as to ensure that peasants would never gain a majority: one deputy was elected per 1000 Red army soldiers, one deputy per 10 000 workers and one per 50 000 peasants. See Myk. Shapoval, 'Svitova revoliutsiia, Rosiia i Ukraina,' *Boritiesia-poborete!* no. 3 (1920) p. 19.
 104. E. H. Carr, *Socialism in One Country, 1924-1926*, 2 vols (London, 1970) vol. 1, pp. 257-8.
 105. Among the duties of *komnezam* members was to keep a register and a close watch over all those whom the *komnezam* statutes excluded from membership in the organisation. The material incentives were formidable: exemption from taxation, a share of taxes collected in addition to a share of stocks of grain and seeds from state warehouses, first priority on all manufactured goods arriving in the village, free medical, veterinary, agronomical and surveying services, free use of state-owned agricultural machines, priority in admission and tuition-free education (at all levels), priority in obtaining employment in the state apparatus and, free use of forests, implements, buildings, livestock and lands of estates not distributed to the peasants. See *Komitety nezamozhnykh*, pp. 12-14, 119-20, 157-8, 177; Iu. Ozers'kyi, 'Chotyry z'izdy komnezamiv,' *Znannia*, no. 27, (1924) p. 3.
 106. *Kommunist*, 15 July 1923.
 107. *Bil'shovyk* 15 May 1925.
 108. *Ibid.*
 109. *Visti*, 20 August 1925.
 110. *Kommunist*, 27 June 1925.
 111. *Bil'shovyk*, 17 June 1923.
 112. *Bil'shovyk*, 5 December 1923.
 113. *Bil'shovyk*, 13 and 23 April 1923.
 114. *Bil'shovyk*, 1 June 1923.
 115. *Robitnycho-selians'ka pravda*, cited by *Bil'shovyk*, 23 January 1924. The editors of the latter denounced the former as publishing 'anti-party propaganda on the pages of the party press'.
 116. *Bil'shovyk*, 12 September 1922.
 117. Illia Vytanovych, *Istoriia ukrains'koho kooperatyvnoho rukhu* (New York, 1964) p. 295.
 118. Cooperatives published books, magazines, newspapers and ran rural libraries and reading houses, museums and special training schools.

- See S. Zarudnyi, 'Osvitnia diial'nist' kooperatsii,' *Znannia*, no. 25 (1925) pp. 16–17.
119. D. Ie. Lebed', 'Robota na seli,' in *Partiia i selo. Stati i promovy za 1924 rik provodyriv Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovyktiv) Ukrainy: tt. Hr. Petrovs'koho, V. Chubaria, D. Lebedia, E. Kvirinha* (Kharkiv, 1925) p. 49.
 120. *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50.
 121. *Kommunist*, 17 April 1925.
 122. V. Arnautiv, 'Intelihentsiia i radians'ka vlada,' *Znannia*, no. 21–2 (1924) p. 7.
 123. *Kommunist*, 28 May 1925.
 124. *Pravda*, 14 March 1925.
 125. *Pravda*, 13 January 1925.
 126. Dymivka was a village in the Mykolaiv *okruh* where local party officials were exposed after they had murdered a peasant named Malynovs'kyi. It was cited as an example of what was wrong with many rural organizations. See Ie. I. Kvirinh, 'Pro Dymivku,' in *Partiia i selo*, pp. 85–7.
 127. *Kommunist*, 24 March 1925.
 128. *Kommunist*, 24 October 1925.
 129. *Pravda*, 29 January 1925.
 130. *Bil'shovyk*, 15 April 1925.
 131. *Visti*, 30 April 1925.
 132. *Bil'shovyk*, 6 May 1925.
 133. *Bil'shovyk*, 7 April 1925.
 134. *Pravda*, 4 September 1925.
 135. D. Lebed', 'Partiia i selo,' in *Partiia i selo*, p. 42.
 136. H. Petrovs'kyi, 'P'iat' rokiv radians'koi vlady na Ukraini,' *ibid.*, p. 32.
 137. *Visti*, 22 October 1925.
 138. Forty per cent of Ukraine's households were without implements and there was only one plough for every 11.3 hectares of land. *Visti*, 11 July 1928.
 139. M. Volobuiev, 'Suchasne selo (pro klasove rozsharuvannia),' *Znannia*, no. 21–22 (1924) pp. 4–5.
 140. *Izvestiia*, 24 February 1925.
 141. Carr, *Socialism in One Country*, vol. I, p. 239.
 142. *Sotsialistychna perebudova i rozvytok sil's'koho hospodarstva*, vol. I, p. 157.
 143. *Visti*, 22 October 1925. Agricultural policies together with land-use legislation was not in the hands of the republic's government, an arrangement against which the republic's leadership protested. See S. Pidhainyi, *Ukrains'ka intelihentsiia na Solovkakh* (n.p., 1947) pp. 51–2 for reminiscences of Poloz, the republic's Commissar of Finance and his complaints on this score.
 144. *Visti*, 6 May 1925.
 145. *Finansy Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1927) pp. 45–7.
 146. M. B. Gurevich, *Priamoe oblozhenie sel'skogo khoziaistva Ukrainy* (Kharkiv, 1923) p. 64; *Kommunist*, 9 December 1924.
 147. V. Chubar', 'Voprosy khoziaistvennogo stroitel'stva na Ukraine,' in

- Khoziaistvo Ukrainy. Sbornik materialov, osveshchaiushchikh sovremennoe sostoianie vazhneishikh otraslei khoziaistva Ukrainy* (Moscow, 1926) p. 4.
148. To give an example of how profitable that trade could be one has but to compare commodity prices on the Moscow and London exchanges. Oats, for example, sold for 42 (gold) kopecks per 16.4 kilograms in Moscow, 118 in London. See *Bil'shovyk*, 21 March 1923.
 149. See 'Kolektyvni hospodarstva na Ukraini,' *Statytyka Ukrainy*, no. 163 (1929) pp. vi–vii.
 150. P. Khrystiuk, 'Novyi kurs komunistychnoi polityky i nasha partiia,' *Boritiesia-poborete!* no. 10 (1921) p. 22.
 151. For a discussion of that harvest see Janusz Radziejowski, 'Collectivisation in Ukraine in Light of Soviet Historiography,' *Journal of Ukrainian Studies*, no. 9 (1980) p. 5.
 152. See *Visti*, 19 January and 20 February 1929.
 153. M. Maksudov, 'Poteri naseleniia Ukrainy v 1930–ykh godakh,' (unpublished manuscript, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta).
 154. *Visti*, 9 January 1929.
 155. An analysis of these improvements can be found in Mykhailo Trykhrst, *NEP na Ukraini* (n.p., 1947).
 156. This was a point made by Ukrainian workers attending the First All-Ukrainian Congress of Railwaymen. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 15 July 1917.
 157. M. Skrypnyk, 'Donbas i Ukraina,' in *Statti i promovy z natsional'noho pytannia* (Munich, 1974) p. 12.
 158. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 8 December 1917.
 159. *Bol'shevistskie organizatsii Ukrainy*, p. 46.
 160. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 9 December 1917. Many more examples could be provided. See Oksen Lola's interesting report in *Robitnycha hazeta*, 23 December 1917.
 161. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 22 December 1917.
 162. L. Chykalenko, *Uryvky zi spohadiv z rokiv 1919–1920* (New York, 1963) p. 59.
 163. David Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism: A Social and Historical Study of Russian Social-Democracy 1898–1907* (Assen, 1969) pp. 50–1, 175; Mazepa, *Bol'shevyzm*, pp. 28–37.
 164. Mazepa, *Bol'shevyzm*, p. 31.
 165. Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism*, pp. 50–1; V. Modestov, *Rabochee i professionalnoe dvizhenie v Donabasse do Velikoi Oktiabr'skoi sotsialisticheskoi revoliutsii* (Moscow, 1957) p. 21.
 166. S. Volin, 'Men'sheviki na Ukraine 1917–1921,' Inter-University Project on the History of the Menshevik Movement, Paper no. 11 (New York, 1962) p. 79.
 167. Popov, *Narys*, p. 122.
 168. *Ibid.*, p. 135; P. Fedenko, *Isaak Mazepa* (London, 1954), pp. 38–9.
 169. *Robitnychiy kontrol' i natsionalizatsiia promyslovosti na Ukraini. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv. Berezen' 1917–berezen' 1921 rr.* (Kiev, 1957) p. 28.

170. B. Kolos, 'Profesiyni rukh na Ukraini,' *Vpered. Kaliendar dlia ukrains'koho robinystva na rik 1925* (New York, 1924) p. 194. Bolsheviks formed eight per cent of the delegates.
- In some sources this Congress is referred to as the 'Second All-Ukrainian . . .' The First All-Ukrainian Workers Congress met in Kiev in July 1917 under the leadership of Ukrainian Social Democrats. It was not representative of the entire working class in Ukraine. The 'Second' was really the 'First' representative Congress.
171. Khrystiuk, *Ukrains'ka revoliutsiia*, vol. III, pp. 16–17.
172. Kolos, 'Profesiyni rukh,' p. 199; Volin, 'Men'sheviki,' pp. 82–3, 90–4. 'Otamaniia' refers to the various insurgent groups which operated more or less independently of the leadership of the Ukrainian national movement.
173. Volin, 'Men'sheviki,' p. 96.
174. Ie. M. Skliarenko, *Narysy istorii profspilkovoho rukhu na Ukraini 1917–1920* (Kiev, 1974) pp. 90–1.
175. V. Polonskii, 'Pervyi vseukrainskii s'ezd professional'nykh soiuzov,' *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Ukrainy*, nos 2–3 (1919) pp. 61–2.
176. Popov, *Narys*, pp. 183, 186.
177. M. I. Suprunenko, *Borot'ba trudiashchych Ukrainy proty denikinshchyny* (Kiev, 1979) pp. 137–49; Volin, 'Men'sheviki,' pp. 93–104; Kolos, 'Profesiyni rukh,' pp. 201–3.
178. Kolos, 'Profesiyni rukh,' p. 203.
179. *Tretii vserossiiskii s'ezd professional'nykh soiuzov 6–13 aprelia 1920. Stenograficheskii otchet. Chast' 1. Plenumy* (Moscow, 1921) p. 43.
180. M. Horlach, *Virna opora partii komunistiv. Profsplyky Ukrainy u borot'bi za zdiisnennia lenins'koho planu komunistychnoho budivnytstva* (Kiev, 1966) pp. 33–4n.
181. *Znannia*, no. 43–4 (1924) p. 22; *Visti*, 7 November 1924.
182. L. Nedolia, 'Khoroba. Pobutova khronika 1929 roku,' *Nova generatsiia*, no. 6–7 (1930) p. 15.
183. Sadovs'kyi, *Pratsia*, pp. 132–4.
184. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk*, pp. 13, 107; *Ukraina. Statystychnyi shchorichnyk na 1928 r.* (Kharkiv, 1928) pp. 192, 227,
185. *Trud i profsoiuzy na Ukraine. Statisticheskii spravochnik za 1921–1928 gg.* (Kharkiv, 1928), p. 110; *Natsional'nyi perepys robitnykiv ta sluzhbovtiv Ukrainy (zhovten'–lystopad 1929)* (Kharkiv, 1930) p. xvi.
- The trade union censuses included white-collar staff. However, since the overwhelming majority of trade unionists were industrial workers (83 per cent in 1925), it is safe to assume that changes in the national composition of trade union membership reflected nationality changes in the proletariat.
186. *Perepis' 1926*, Table 1, vol. 28.
187. *Natsional'nyi perepys*, p. xvi.
188. *Ibid.*, pp. 72–4.
189. Sadovs'kyi, *Pratsia*, pp. 130.
190. A. I. Epshstein, *Robitnyky Ukrainy v borot'bi za stvorennia material'no-tekhnichnoi bazy sotsializmu (1928–1929)* (Kharkiv, 1968) p. 15.

191. *Statystychna khronika viddilu statystryky pratsi Tsentral'noho statystychnoho upravlinnia*, no. 26 (1928) p. 10.
192. M. Skrypnyk, 'Zbyzhennia i zlyttia natsii za doby sotsializmu,' *Statti i promovy*, pp. 260–1.
193. *Natsional'nyi perepys*, p. xxiii.
194. *Ibid.*, pp. xxiii, 96–101.
195. K. Kimchynaz, 'Do iazykovoi problemy v Donbasi,' *Kul'tura i pobut*, 15 November 1925. (Supplement to *Visti*.)
196. *Kommunist*, 31 January 1925.
197. See the law governing Ukrainisation in *Natsional'nyi sostav Sovetskoï Ukrainy. Ob'iasnitel'naia zapiska k etnograficheskoi karte Ukrainiskoi sotsialisticheskoi sovetskoï respubliki* (Kharkiv, 1925) pp. 126–30.
198. *Visti*, 9 January 1929.
199. *Visti*, 28 May 1924.
200. *Visti*, 7 and 11 November 1924.
201. *Visti*, 4 December 1927. This is the substance of Rabichev's attack on Shums'kyi. Rabichev was the trade union functionary responsible for cultural work in the trade unions.
202. *Budivnytstvo radians'koi Ukrainy. Zbirnyk. Vypusk 1. Za lenins'ku natsional'nu polityku* (Kharkiv, no date, probably 1930) p. 107.
203. *Visti*, 17 January 1925. The Ukrainisation of unions of agriculture and forestry and sugar refinery workers was completed by 1924.
204. *Visti*, 10 September 1926.
205. *Natsional'nyi perepys*, pp. 132–3, 138–9.
206. A. Khvyliia, *Do rozv'iazannia natsional'noho pytannia na Ukraini* (Kharkiv, 1930) pp. 110–11.
207. *Visti*, 20 October 1925.
208. *Visti*, 2 August 1925.
209. For examples see *Visti*, 12 April 1925, 22 September 1928, especially the report of the State Publishing House's first exhibition of Ukrainian books in Donbass in *Visti*, 17 April 1925.
210. *iv Vseukrains'kyi z'izd profspilok 1–8 hrudnia 1928 r. Stenohrafichnyi zvit* (Kharkiv, 1929) p. 28.
211. See *Visti*, 21 December 1928 and *Literatura, nauka i mystetstvo*, 1 June 1924 (supplement to *Visti*).
212. *Visti*, 20 January 1927.
213. Horlach, *Virna opora*, p. 33.
214. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu*, p. 149.
215. Pricing, budgets, finances, investment, trade and operational control of industry – all were in the hands of central authorities. The leading sectors of the Ukrainian economy were under all-Union jurisdiction. The function of the Ukrainian Supreme Council for the National Economy was 'to ensure that the direction given to the economy centrally will be implemented.' *Promyshlennost' Ukrainy. Itogi 1921–22 g. i promplan na 1922–23 g.* (Kharkiv, 1923) p. 516. For the post-1927 situation see: R.S. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917–1957* (New York, 1962) pp. 151–8.
216. *Visti*, 21 October 1925.
217. Cited by Volobuiev, 'Do problemy ukrains'koi ekonomiky,' p. 223.

218. Ibid., pp. 227–30. It should be mentioned here that Volobuiev, whose article cited above is considered to be the most far-reaching elaboration of the economic platform of national communism, was not an ‘obscure’ economist, as is generally believed. See Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine*, p. 154. He was the head of *Holovpolitovita*, a large branch of *Narkomos* responsible for all adult education, literacy schools, and so on. In this capacity Volobuiev delivered a number of important reports to various conferences. See *Visti*, 30 October 1925. Volobuiev was also a widely published author whose articles appeared in *Znannia*, *Radians’ka osvita* and other publications. Articles such as his ‘Orhanizatsiia pratsi,’ *Radians’ka osvita*, no. 1 (1923) pp. 20–4 show that he was in fact an economist and not as V. Holubnychy maintains in ‘The Views of M. Volobuyev and V. Dobrohaiyev [sic] and Party Criticism,’ *Ukrainian Review* (Munich), no. 3, (1956) pp. 5–12, merely a pedagogue. We make these points in order to show that Volobuiev’s positions undoubtedly reflected the views of a significant section of the republic’s leadership.
219. *Visti*, 22 May 1927.
220. *Visti*, 1 December 1927. Dudnyk at the same congress demonstrated that the left bank was suffering from the same location policy.
221. *Visti*, 18 May 1927. Over a quarter of a century later N. Khrushchev observed, ‘sugar is mainly grown in Ukraine,’ so ‘is it necessary for the Institute [of sugar] to be near Moscow?’ *Pravda*, 21 March 1954.
222. *Visti*, 14 February 1928.
223. See B. V. Sihal, *Do pytannia pro pryvatnyi kapital na Ukraini* (Khar-kiv, 1929) pp. 146–7.
224. See Kaganovich’s report to the 15th CPSU Congress: *Piatnadsatsyi s’ezd Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (b) 2-19 dekabria 1927 g. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1928) pp. 887–92.
225. *Visti*, 16 May 1928.
226. *Visti*, 14 February 1928.
227. See V. Ivanys, ‘Donbas i uralo-kuznets’kyi basein za chasiv pershoi i druhoi piatylytky,’ *Suchasni problemi ekonomiky Ukrainy*, vol. III (1936) pp. 66–75.
228. *Visti*, 2 March 1929.
229. N. I. Fomin, ‘Promyshlennost’ Ukrainy,’ *Voprosy ekonomiki* (Khar-kiv, 1927) pp. 5–40. ‘Ukraine or the Urals?’ was a question intensely debated between 1927–9 on the pages of the Ukrainian press, See *Visti*, 6 July 1927, 13 and 15 May 1928 in particular.
230. The demand that these industries be turned over to republican jurisdiction was raised but turned down. *Visti*, 7 December 1925.
231. For example workers in communication in 1926 received 50 per cent of their pre-war wage and ‘in comparison with other workers communications workers were far from occupying last place’. *Kommunist*, 3 April 1926.
232. *iv Vseukrains’kyi z’izd profspilok*, pp. 195, 185, 196–7, 203, 179, 175, 203, 207. The pages refer respectively to each of the speakers cited.
233. *Znannia*, no. 41–2 (1924) p. 15.
234. See *Bil’shovyk*, 4 January 1923.

235. *Visti*, 25 September 1925.
236. *Nauka, osvita i kul'tura*, p. 16.
237. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi spravochnyk*, Table 3, p. 56; *Perepis' 1926*, Table XIV, vol. 11.
238. *Bil'shovyk*, 11 September 1924.
239. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi shchorichnyk za 1928 rik*, Table 8, pp. 34–5, 38–9.
240. *Natsional'nyi perepys*, Tables 28, pp. 102, 106, 109, XXIX.
241. Hryhorii Vas'kovych, *Shkil'nytstvo v Ukraini (1905–1920)* (Munich, 1969) pp. 59–119; *Robitnycha hazeta*, 2 September and 23 December 1917.
242. Evhen Hrytsak, *Pid chervonoiiu vladoiu. Shkil'na sprava na radians'kii Ukraini* (Peremysl', 1923) p. 29.
243. *Ibid.*, pp. 9–27.
244. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
245. M. Skrypnyk, *Do teorii borot'by dvokh kul'tur* (Kharkiv, 1926) p. 10.
246. *Perepis' 1926*, Table VI, vol. 28.
247. V. Zatons'kyi, 'Do radians'koho uchytelia,' *Radians'ka osvita*, no. 1 (1923) p. 7.
248. Compare *Bil'shovyk*, 19 April 1923 and 1 January 1924.
249. *Znannia*, no. 24 (1925) p. 30.
250. Harold R. Weinstein, 'Language and Education in the Soviet Ukraine,' *Slavonic and East European Review*, no. 20 (1941) p. 130.
251. *Bil'shovyk*, 11 August 1923.
252. *Bil'shovyk*, 7 February 1923.
253. *Visti*, 20 November 1926.
254. *Visti*, 1 April 1926.
255. *Visti*, 9 August 1924.
256. P. P. Bachyns'kyi, 'Kerivnytstvo KP(b)U protsesom ukrainizatsii narodnoi osvity v 1917–1927 rr.,' *Naukovi pratsi z istorii KPRS*, vypusk 5, (Kiev, 1965) p. 48.
257. *Visti*, 7 April 1925.
258. *Visti*, 6 January 1929.
259. 'Narodnia osvita na Ukraini na 15 hrudnia 1927 r. Poperedni pidsumky shkil'noho perepysu,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. VII, no. 131 (1928) Table 4, pp. 20–3; Table 5, pp. 26–7; 'Vsesoiuznyi shkil'nyi perepys 15–XII 1927 roku. Shkil'ni ustanovy sotsial'noho vykhovannia na Ukraini,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, no. 194, (1930) Table 13, p. 27, Table 9, pp. 196–201.
260. 'Narodnoe obrazovanie Ukrainy na 1 ianvaria 1923 g. Uchrezhdeniia sotsial'nogo vospitaniia,' *Statistika Ukrainy*, vol. III, no. 46 (1924) pp. XVI–XVII, XIX, Table 1, pp. 2–3; 'Narodnia osvita Ukrainy. Ustanovy sotsial'noho vykhovannia na 1 lystopada 1929 r.,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, no. 201 (1930) Table 1, pp. 2–4; Table 2a, p. 10; Table 6, p. 17
261. 'Vsesoiuznyi shkil'nyi perepys 15–XII 1927 roku,' Table 9, p. 196; Table 10, p. 200; Table 11, p. 202.
262. *Vseobshchee obuchenie. Likvidatsiia negramotnosti i podgotovka kadrov. Statisticheskii ocherk* (Moscow, 1930) p. 26.

263. 'Vsesoiuznyi shkil'nyi perepys 15–XII 1927 roku,' Table 9, p. 196; Table 10, p. 200; Table 11, p. 202.
264. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu*, p. 148.
265. In the 1920s Ukraine's educational system was unique in the Soviet Union. Its secondary schools were geared to meet a shortage of skilled labour and thus offered a wide range of vocational training programmes. See Ia. P. Riappo, *Narodnia osvita na Ukraini za desiat' rokov revoliutsii* (Kharkiv, 1927).
266. 'Narodnoe obrazovanie Ukrainy po obsledovaniiu na 1-e ianvaria 1922 goda. Predvaritel'nye itogi,' *Statistika Ukrainy*, vol. II, no. 27 (1923) pp. 34–5.
267. 'Narodnia osvita Ukrainy. Ustanovy profesiinoi osvity na 1 lystopada 1928 ta 1929 rr.,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, no. 209 (1931) Table 3, pp. 42–3; Table 8, p. 60.
268. *Visti*, 14 May 1924; M. Avdiienko, *Zahal'ne navchannia na Ukraini. Stan i perspektyvy* (Kharkiv, 1930), Table 12, p. 80.
269. *Bil'shovyk*, 26 February 1925.
270. *Visti*, 16 June 1928.
271. 'Narodnia osvita Ukrainy. Ustanovy profesiinoi ta politychnoi osvity na 1 hrudnia 1925 r.,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. VI, no. 110 (1927) Table VIII, p. 26.
272. M. Skrypnyk, *Neprymyrennym shliakhom. Dopovid' na okrpartkonferentsii v Odesi 12–ho hrudnia 1928 roku* (Kharkiv, 1929) p. 82.
273. 'Vsesoiuznyi shkil'nyi perepys 15–XII 1927 roku. Ustanovy profesiinoi osvity na Ukraini,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, no. 199 (1930) Table Ila, p. 133.
274. *Visti*, 6 August 1925.
275. Ibid.
276. 'Narodnia osvita Ukrainy. Ustanovy profesiinoi osvity na 1 lystopada 1928 ta 1929 rr.,' Table 3, pp. 12–13.
277. *Visti*, 6 August 1925.
278. L. V. Ivanova, *Formirovanie sovetskoï nauchnoï intelligentsii (1917–1927 gg.)* (Moscow, 1980) p. 309.
279. In 1914–15 out of 105 *vuzy* only 21 were located outside of Russia. Ukraine had 17 *vuzy*. By 1927–8 Ukraine had 37 such institutions out of a total for the USSR of 131. Ivanova, *Formirovanie*, p. 293.
280. M. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Perspektyvy i vymohy ukrains'koi nauky. Kyivs'ka sesiiia Ukr. nauky,' *Ukraina. Naukovyi dvokhmisiachnyk ukrainoznavstva*, bk 1 (1926) p. 5.
281. *Visti*, 22 October 1925.
282. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Perspektyvy,' p. 8.
283. *Vseobshchee obuchenie*, p. 121; Ivanova, *Formirovanie*, p. 296; Hrushevs'kyi, 'Perspektyvy,' pp. 7–8; *Visti*, 16 June 1928; *Komunist*, 1 July 1929.
284. See *Visti*, 12 March 1927, 22 October 1925.
285. The number of *vuz* students per 10 000 population was 13.1 in Ukraine, 11.6 in Russia. Between 1924 and 1929 the number of students in *vuzy* in Ukraine grew by 50 per cent (27 224 to 40 844) as compared with a 6 per cent increase for Russia (117 485 to 124 124). In

- 1929 students of peasant origin accounted for 26 per cent of *vuz* students in Ukraine, 21 per cent in Russian. Similarly the figures for workers were 36 and 35 per cent respectively and in the case of white-collar staff 32 and 40 per cent. See *Vseobshchee obuchenie*, pp. 114, 117, 129.
- Ukraine's unique educational system, which focused on producing as quickly as possible a basic complement of intelligentsia through the *tekhnikumy* facilitated the expansion of higher education. Ukraine's institutes had 17 per cent of the all-Union institute student populations' weight in the union. *Ukraina. Statystychnyi shchorichnyk na 1928 rik*, p. XVIII.
286. Osyp Hermaize, 'Desiatylittia zhovtnevoi revoliutsii i ukrains'ka nauka,' *Ukraina*, bk 6 (1927) p. iv.
287. See *Visti*, 11 November 1924 for Riappo's attack on Lunacharsky for his proposed all-Union Commissariat of Education. See *Nauka i osvita*, 17 March and 24 March 1929 (supplement to *Visti*) for the unification of Ukraine's educational system with Russia's.
288. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Perspektyvy,' p. 13. For other examples of Ukraine's opposition to the measure see *Visti*, 8 September 1925 and 15 March 1927.
289. *Visti*, 8 March 1929.
290. See the campaign for a 'clear class line' in literature, history, etc. in *Visti*, 8 January and 8 March 1929.
291. S. Pylypenko, '10 rokiv ukrains'koi radians'koi knyhy,' *Biuletyn' Derzhavnoho vydavnytstva Ukrainy*, no. 4-5 (1929) p. 6.
292. Ozernians'kyi, 'Persha vseukrains'ka vystavka,' Table 5, p. 233; S. Siropolko, *Narodnia osvita na Soviets'kii Ukraini* (Warsaw, 1931) p. 184.
293. *Nova doba*, no. 4 (1920) p. 6.
294. V. A. Ruban, *Formuvannia lenins'kykh tradytsii ukrains'koi radians'koi presy (1917-1925 rr.)* (Kiev, 1971) pp. 157-9.
295. M. Khliebnikov, 'Finansy Derzhavnoho vydavnytstva Ukrainy za 10 rokiv (1920-1929),' *Biuletyn' Derzhavnoho vydavnytstva Ukrainy*, no. 4-5 (1929) p. 25.
296. D. Isaievych, 'Moderni iezuity abo peremoha ukrains'koi stykhii. Z nahody vystavky knyh SSSR v Prazi,' *Nova Ukraina*, no. 2-3 (1925) p. 139.
297. M. Shapoval, *Sotsiografiia Ukrainy. Sotsial'na struktura Ukrainy* (Prague, 1933) p. 67.
298. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Perspektyvy,' pp. 13-14.
299. *Visti*, 7 February 1929.
300. *Kul'tura i pobut*, 8 October 1927 (supplement to *Visti*).
301. *Visti*, 3 September 1926.
302. *Literature, nauka i mystetstvo*, 1 June 1924.
303. *Bil'shovyk*, 16 May 1924. See Siropolko, *Narodnia osvita*, pp. 181-4 for statistics on book output according to subject matter.
304. *Bil'shovyk*, 20 March 1924.
305. The Ukrainian language share of technical literature jumped from 25

- per cent of the total (332 titles) to 50 per cent (785 total number of titles) between 1927 and 1929. 'Presa,' *Chervonyi shliakh*, no. 5-6 (1932) p. 148.
306. Because of their high cost there were no mass circulation journals in the republic and few individual subscribers. Journals were received by institutions and libraries, and appear to have had a large readership. The Ukrainisation of journals was considerable. In 1928 there were 232 Ukrainian language titles or 77 per cent of the total, 74 per cent of the total number of copies of journals published. They covered a wide range of themes. Pylypenko, '10 rokiv,' p. 8.
307. *Visti*, 27 August 1927.
308. O. Poltorats'kyi and D. Sotnyk, 'Donbas na pivdorozi,' *Nova generatsiia*, no. 6 (1929) p. 9.
309. Ihnatienko, *Ukrains'ka presa*, p. 71.
310. *Nova doba*, no. 41 (1920) pp. 3-4; no. 43 (1920) pp. 1-3.
311. Ihnatiienko, *Ukrains'ka presa*, p. 73.
312. A. Khvyliia, *Natsional'nyi vopros na Ukraine* (Kharkiv, 1926) p. 41.
313. N. N. Popov, 'Ocherednye zadachi partii v natsional'nom voprose,' *Kommunisticheskaia revoliutsiia*, no. 12 (1923) p. 21; *Visti*, 28 May 1925.
314. *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezoliutsiakh*, vol. 1, p. 234.
315. *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR 1918-1975. Naukovo-statystychnyi dovidnyk* (Kharkiv, 1976) Tables 83, 84, pp. 172-174.
316. Avdiienko, *Zahal'ne navchannia*, pp. 100-3.
317. *Visti*, 6 May 1927.
318. Khvyliia, *Do rozv'iazannia*, p. 64.
319. Avdiienko, *Zahal'ne navchannia*, pp. 100-3.
320. *Visti*, 28 May 1925.
321. *Visti*, 6 March 1927. Radio was under the jurisdiction of the all-Union commissariat of posts and telegraph. *Narkomos* under Skrypnyk demanded exclusive jurisdiction over radio. See *Visti*, 8 May 1928.
322. *Visti*, 28 May 1925.
323. *Visti*, 5 May 1926.
324. *Visti*, 17 January 1925. Ravych-Cherkas'kyi was the head of the press department of the CPU Central Committee.
325. In 1929, for example, *Pravda* sold 48 000 copies in Ukraine. *Visti* sold 70 000 and *Komunist*, 79 000. *Zhurnalist*, no. 5 (1929) cited by *Dilo*, 20 March 1929; Avdiienko, *Zahal'ne navchannia*, Table 2, p. 100.
326. *Bol'shevistskie organizatsii Ukrainy*, pp. 418-9.
327. *Ibid.*, p. 419. See Ie. M. Skliarenko, *Utvorennia Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy ta ii kerivnytstvo borot'boiu trudiashchykh proty avstro-nimets'kykh okupantiv u 1918 r.* (Kiev, 1958) p. 28 for earlier attempts to form a unified Ukrainian organisation which were also foiled by the Russian Central Committee.
328. Ivan Maistrenko, 'Promovchuvanyi iuvilei. Tahanriz'ka narada KP(b)U,' *Diiialoh*, no. 3 (1980) pp. 29-30.
329. Iu. Iu. Kondufor, 'Stvorennia KP(b)U - skladovoi i nevid'iemnoi chastyny lenins'koi partii komunistiv,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (1976) pp. 42-52.

330. M. Skrypnyk, 'Nacherk istorii proletars'koi revoliutsii na Ukraini,' *Chervonyi shliakh*, no. 1 (1923) p. 105.
331. *Shestoi s'ezd RSDRP (bol'shevikov) avgust 1917 goda. Protokoly* (Moscow, 1958) p. 207.
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349. F. Sherstiuk, *Partiine budivnytstvo na Ukraini v 1926–1929 rr.* (Kiev, 1960) p. 61.
350. See James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983) p. 100.
351. *Bil'shovyk*, 9 April 1925. I. Ie. Klymenko, a Ukrainian born in a village in the Sumy region and whose entire political career was in Ukraine, replaced Lebed' as organizational secretary. Klymenko perished in the 1937 purge. See *Pravda*, 10 December 1925; *Radians'ka entsyklopediia istorii Ukrainy*, 4 vols (Kiev, 1969–72) vol. II, pp. 394–5.
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354. *Pravda*, 10 December 1925.
355. Sherstiuk, *Partiine budivnytstvo*, p. 60.
356. L. Kahanovych, *Natsional'na polityka bil'shovykiv Ukrainy. Dopovid' vyholoshena na X. z"izdi Komunistychnoi partii (bil'shovykiv) Ukrainy* (New York, 1928) p. 32.
357. *Visti*, 26 April 1925 and Pylypenko, '10 rokov,' p. 9.
358. *Pravda*, 10 December 1925.
359. *Visti*, 2 December 1928.
360. Gilinskii, 'Sostoianie KP(b)U,' p. 175.
361. For example Basil Dmytryshyn, *The Ukraine 1918–1953: A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy* (New York, 1956), chapter IV, 'National Deviations'.
362. *Visti*, 21 October 1925.
363. *Visti*, 17 October 1928.
364. *Visti*, 10 April 1925 and *Bil'shovyk*, 10 April 1925.
365. At the 10th CPU Congress, following Shums'kyi's removal from Ukraine for his 'deviation' it is noteworthy that the deviation was hardly mentioned in the speeches delivered by the party leadership on that occasion. The Presidium of the Congress, however, did receive two questions regarding Shums'kyi. The first asked, 'Shums'kyi has been sent out of Ukraine, but I am still not clear what is the nature of his deviation?' The second, more poignantly, 'What kind of Ukrainian statehood and independence is this, when the best workers who have defended Ukrainian statehood have been sent out of Ukraine?' That the press reported these questions is in itself highly indicative of the mood of many within the CPU. *Visti*, 29 November 1927.
366. Holubnychy, 'The Views of M. Volobuyev,' pp. 8, 10.
367. M. Skrypnyk, 'Z pryvodu ekonomichnoi platformy natsionalizmu,' in *Budivnytstvo radians'koi Ukrainy*, p. 191.
368. See 'Lyst tov. H. Lapchynskoho do red. 'Chervonoho praporu',' *Nova doba*, no. 38 (1920) pp. 1–2.
369. See *Izvestiia*, 3 January 1919 for Rakovsky's infamous article questioning the existence of a Ukrainian language. His speech to the 12th CPSU Congress is the best testament to his change of mind. See Christian Rakovsky, *Selected Writings on Opposition in the USSR 1923–30* (London, 1980) pp. 77–87.
370. *Bil'shovyk*, 13 April 1923. *Nova doba* (no. 10, 1921. p. 1) wrote the following about Frunze, 'the name is absolutely unknown in Ukrainian party circles, obviously appointed from Moscow'.
371. Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia*, p. 160.
372. *Nova doba*, no. 10 (1921) p. 1.
373. For a critique of Lobanov's earlier positions see Solodub's intervention at the 9th CPU Congress, *Visti*, 7 December 1925. For his later position see *Visti*, 11 January 1927.
374. Hrushevs'kyi, 'Perspektyvy,' p. 13.
375. *Visti*, 12 May 1924.
376. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation*, p. 3.

377. One could justifiably fault these leaders for their illusions about the possibility of carrying out this consolidation within the context of an increasingly totalitarian regime. Butsenko, the Ukrainian 'Danton,' was later to admit that their greatest mistake was that 'we were unable to guarantee our security and that of our nation' and we accepted 'the fiction of statehood as a reality'. Hryhorii Kostiuk, *Okaianni roky. Vid Luk'ianivs'koi tiumry do Vorkuts'koi trahedii (1935-40 rr.)* (Toronto, 1978) p. 105.
378. *Visti*, 17 April 1925.
379. *Visti*, 30 March 1924.
380. *Bil'shovyk*, 6 June 1923.
381. *Visti*, 22 March 1927.
382. *Bil'shovyk*, 30 March 1924.
383. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 35, p. 492.
384. *Visti*, 15 May 1924.
385. 'Pratsia v ustanovakh i torhovel'nykh pidpriemstvakh Ukrainy v 1924 rotsi,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. II, no. 64 (1925) p. 14; 'Pratsia v derzhavnykh ustanovakh i torhovel'nykh zakladakh Ukrainy v 1925 rotsi,' *Statystyka Ukrainy*, vol. II, no. 99 (1927) p. viii.
386. V. Vynnychenko, 'Revoliutsiia v nebezpetsi!' *Nova doba*, no. 37 (1920) pp. 1-2; no. 38 (1920) pp. 2-3.
387. *Kul'turne budivnytstvo v Ukraini'kii RSR. Vazhlyvishi rishennia Komunistychnoi partii i Radians'koho uriadu 1917-1959*, 2 vols (Kiev, 1959) vol. I, p. 120.
388. *Ibid.*, pp. 244-6.
389. *Zbirnyk uzakonen' ta rosporiadzen' robitnycho-selians'koho uriadu Ukrainy*, no. 26 (1925) pp. 379-85; no. 27 (1925) pp. 69-70; no. 56 (1925) pp. 653-7.
390. *Visti*, 21 August 1924; *Bil'shovyk*, 6 January 1925; *Visti*, 10 November 1925, 15 September 1926, 1 March 1929.
391. Cited by B. M. Babii, *Ukrains'ka radians'ka derzhava v period vidbudovy narodnoho hospodarstva (1921-1925 rr.)* (Kiev, 1961) p. 284.
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393. Popov, *Narys*, p. 275.
394. See *Kommunist*, 19 July 1923 and *Visti*, 18 May 1924.
395. Babii, *Ukrains'ka radians'ka derzhava*, p. 288 and *Piatnadtsatyi s'ezd VKP(b)*, p. 443.
396. Calculated from *Natsional'nyi perepys*, pp. XVI, XXV, XXIII, XXIV, XXVI, XXIX, XXX, XLII; Table 3, p. 24; Table 4, p. 38. This source compares the 1929 census with the results of the 1926 general population census. The figure giving the nationality of those involved in mental labour according to age is for males only: males occupied more important positions in the administration than females.
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398. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu*, p. 161.
399. S. V. Kosior, *Vybrani statti i promovy* (Kiev, 1968) p. 497.
400. *Bil'shovyk*, 5 August 1923.
401. Khvyliia, *Do rozv'iazannia*, p. 72.

402. *Visti*, 16 November 1926.
403. *Visti*, 14 October 1926.
404. *Visti*, 8 April 1926.
405. *Visti*, 6 October 1926.
406. *Visti*, 21 November 1925.
407. *Visti*, 20 October 1925.
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409. *Visti*, 20 April 1926.
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411. *Visti*, 19 April 1926.
412. *Visti*, 15 June 1926 and 7 April 1927.
413. *Bil'shovyk*, 31 July 1924 and *Visti*, 22 March 1927.
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418. *Visti*, 29 November 1927.
419. Antonenko-Davydovych, *Zemleiu*, pp. 9, 149–50.
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4 UKRAINE IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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3. *Ukrainskaia SSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine*, vol. 3, pp. 152, 157–8.
4. Edgar Snow, 'The Ukraine Pays the Bill,' *Saturday Evening Post*, 27 January 1945, p. 18.
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6. Documents from the Smolensk party archives, which were captured by the Germans during the war and thereafter fell into Western hands, provide much evidence of this. For example, a secret police informant reported the following conversation: 'Now, comrades it appears that war is approaching. Soviet rule will not last long, it will tumble in an instant. . . People have been robbed and taxed heavily. . . I, like many others, will not go to defend Soviet rule.' 'Svodka no. 7, April 1933 (OGPU 3/0)' Smolensk Archives, reel 20.

7. See S. M. Shtemenko, *General'nyi shtab u roky viiny*, 2 vols (Kiev, 1980) vol. 2, pp. 467 passim.
8. See Khrushchev, *Khrushchev Remembers*, ch. 6 and his *The 'Secret Speech'*.
9. Medvedev, *Let History Judge*, p. 213.
10. Harvard University Refugee Interview Project (hereafter cited as HURIP), no. 441, B6, 1.
11. *Krakivs'ki visti*, 11 November 1941; *Oborona Ukrainy. Chasopys Ukrain'skoi narodn'oi revoliutsiinoi armii*, 1 August 1942.
12. M. Suprunenko, 'Ukraina naperedodni i v vitchyzniani viini proty nimets'ko-fashysts'kykh zaharbynykiv,' in *Borot'ba Ukrain'skoho narodu proty nimets'kykh zaharbynykiv* (Ufa, 1942) p. 33.
13. See HURIP, no. 33, B6, 2; *Krakivs'ki visti*, 9 November 1941, 28 December 1941, 24 February 1942.
14. *Istoriia Ukrain'skoi RSR*, vol. 7, p. 69; *Ukrainskaia SSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine*, vol. 1, pp. 359–60.
15. *Istoriia Ukrain'skoi RSR*, vol. 7, p. 69.
16. HURIP, no. 441, B6, 2; no. 32, B6, 1. It should be noted that although it was known that the brunt of the Nazis' extermination policies would fall upon the Jews, the administration made little effort to evacuate Jews as such, rather only Jews who were prominent in the party, state and other institutions were moved.
17. *Nastup*, (Prague), 18 October 1941.
18. HURIP, no. 33, B6, 1.
19. A good example of this genre is Wallace Carroll's, 'It Takes a Russian to Beat a Russian,' *Life*, 19 December 1949 pp. 80–8.
20. Cited by Dallin, *German Rule*, p. 65n.
21. HURIP, no. 359, B6, 1.
22. Orest Zovenko, *Bezimenni. Spohady uchasnyka novitnykh vyzvol'nykh zmahan'* (n.p., 1946) p. 60.
23. HURIP, no. 441, B6, 2.
24. HURIP, no. 32, B6, 1.
25. *Ibid.* and no. 441, B6, 2; no. 359, B6, 1.
26. Dallin, *German Rule*, p. 65; V Samarin, *The Years of Turmoil. (In the German-Occupied Regions of Russia from 1941–1944)*, unpublished manuscript, Research Programme on the USSR, Columbia University.
27. See Alexander J. Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (New York, 1980); John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed (New York, 1963), chs 1 and 2.
28. Ievhen Onats'kyi, 'Ideologichni i taktychni rozkhodzhenia mizh fashyzmom i natsional-sotsializmom,' *Rozbydova natsii*, no. 5–6 (1934) pp. 142–9. (I wish to thank Myroslav Yurkevych for supplying this reference.)
29. In early March 1939, at the same time as the Nazis occupied Bohemia and Moravia, Transcarpathia, which had been part of Czechoslovakia in the inter-war period, was presented by Hitler as a prize to Hungary for the latter's alliance with the Berlin-Rome Axis. The same month the Carpatho-Ukrainian people proclaimed the independence of their

- territory and with the help of the OUN took up arms against the Nazi-backed Hungarian invasion. They were defeated and this region from 1939 to 1944 was part of Hungary. See Peter C. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe's Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine 1919-1939* (New York, 1971).
30. See Mykola Lebed', 'Do zv"iazkiv OUN z nimets'kym viis'kom,' *Suchasna Ukraina*, 12 and 26 June 1960.
 31. See Stepan Hlid, *Fragmenty zhyttia i muk. Spohady z chasiv nimets'koi okupatsii Ukrainy* (London, 1955) p. 17; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 68.
 32. For example, although the activities of the Ukrainian Catholic Church were curtailed, it was not suppressed. It should be noted that in 1940, Bukovyna, part of Romania in the inter-war period, was occupied by Soviet troops and incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR.
 33. Lev Rebet, *Svitla i tini OUN* (Munich, 1964) p. 98.
 34. Alexander Motyl, 'The Ukrainian Nationalist Movement and the Galician Reality,' *Meta*, no. 1 (1975) p. 64.
 35. This figure includes the expeditionary groups of both OUN factions. Zinovii Matla, *Pivdenna pokhidna hrupa* (Munich, 1952) p. 22; Lev Shankovs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy OUN. (Prychynky do istorii pokhidnykh hrup OUN na tsentral'nykh i skhidnikh zemliakh Ukrainy v 1941-1943 rr.)* (Munich, 1958) pp. 12, 63n.
 36. This figure includes both OUN factions. Interview with Mykola Lebed'.
 37. *Krakovs'ki visti*, 16 October 1941.
 38. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk* (Berlin) 31 August 1941.
 39. See Shankovs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy*, pp. 17-20.
 40. HURIP, no. 356, B6, 3.
 41. Differences between Eastern and Western Ukrainians are discussed by *ibid.* and no. 446, JO, 67; no. 102, B6, 5-6; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, pp. 108-10.
 42. HURIP, no. 356, B6, 1.
 43. *Ibid.* and no. 356, B6, 1, no. 148, WT, 33, Oleksander Semenenko, *Kharkiv, Kharkiv. . .* (Munich, 1977) p. 213.
 44. HURIP, no. 356, B6, 2-3.
 45. HURIP, no. 56, B6, 3.
 46. See Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, pp. 108-10.
 47. HURIP, no. 33, B6, 3.
 48. See HURIP, no. 356, B6, 2 for rumours to this effect which circulated in Donbass. See also *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 7 September 1941; Semenenko, *Kharkiv*, p. 212.
 49. *Krakovs'ki visti*, 27 November 1941; *Nastup*, 13 December 1941; *Volyn'* (Rovno), 1 October 1942.
 50. *Ukrains'kyi holos* (Kirovohrad), 1 October 1941.
 51. *Holos Poltavshchyny*, 7 December 1941.
 52. Ievhen Stakhiv, 'Natsional'no-politychne zhyttia Donbasu v 1941-1943 rr. (Na osnovi osobystykh sposterezhen'),' *Suchasna Ukraina*, 9 September 1956.
 53. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 31 October 1943.

54. *Nastup*, 1 March 1942.
55. HURIP, no. 440, B6, 1.
56. *Holos Poltavshchyny*, 7 December 1941; *Ukrains'kyi zasiv. Literaturnyi chasopys* (Kharkiv), no. 1, 1942; HURIP, no. 495, B5, 19.
57. *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 1 November 1941, 1 December 1941.
58. HURIP, no. 314, B6, 1; no. 102, B6, 1, 3.
59. *Nastup*, 13 December 1941.
60. *Krakivs'ki visti*, 18 November 1941.
61. *Ibid.*, 15 November 1941.
62. HURIP, no. 495, B6, 4.
63. Ievhen Stakhiv, 'Kryvyi Rih v 1941–1943 rr.,' *Suchasna Ukraina*, 22 January 1956.
64. *Volyn'*, 24 October 1941.
65. *Nastup*, 13 December 1941; *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 20 January 1942.
66. *Krakivs'ki visti*, 18 October 1941.
67. HURIP, no. 102, B6, 2.
68. Interview with Ievhen Stakhiv.
69. *Ibid.* See also *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 1 March 1943.
70. Stakhiv, 'Kryvyi Rih'.
71. *Krakivs'ki visti*, 3 August 1941, 31 August 1941, 3 December 1941.
72. Zovenko, *Bezimenni*, pp. 65–6; HURIP, no. 314, B6, 6; Hlid, *Fragmenty zhyttia*, pp. 12–13.
73. HURIP, no. 441, B6, 2 and no. 482, JR, pp. 23–4; *Nastup*, 18 October 1941; *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 1 December 1941; *Volyn'*, 24 October 1941; *Krakivs'ki visti*, 17 January 1942.
74. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 12 October 1942. Population data from *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 20 January 1942.
75. *Krakivs'ki visti*, 28 November 1941.
76. Interview with Ievhen Stakhiv; Shankovs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy*, pp. 6–14; Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, ch. 4.
77. HURIP, no. 356, B6, 3.
78. E. Pavliuk, 'Borot'ba ukrains'koho narodu na skhidn'o-ukrains'kykh zemliakh,' Document C 52-1, archive of Foreign Representation of the Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council, New York, p. 2.
79. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 106.
80. *Ibid.*, pp. 97, 106.
81. Pavliuk, 'Borot'ba ukrains'koho narodu,' pp. 1–2.
82. HURIP, no. 356, B6, 4.
83. Pavliuk, 'Borot'ba ukrains'koho narodu,' p. 2.
84. 'Unsigned Memorandum, 16 July 1941,' in *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918–1945*, 13 vols (London, 1949–64) vol. 13, p. 151.
85. 'Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1 October 1941,' in *ibid.*, p. 319. See also Dallin, *German Rule*, pp. 8, 49, 57.
86. 'Unsigned Memorandum, 16 July 1941,' in *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, vol. 13 p. 153.
87. Cited by J. Thorwald, *Wen sie verderben wollen* (Stuttgart, 1951) p. 74.
88. Koch was captured by the Western powers and turned over to Poland in 1950 for prosecution as a war criminal. It took Polish authorities nine years to bring him to trial and then only for crimes committed

- while *Gauleiter* of East Prussia, a post he held prior to heading the *Reichskommissariat* Ukraine. In 1959 Koch was sentenced to death, but the sentence was never carried out. Koch lives under favourable conditions in the Polish prison of Barczewo. The USSR has never asked for his extradition.
89. Considerations of space do not permit a discussion of Romanian policies in Transnistria. These have been examined by Alexander Dallin, *Odessa, 1941–1944: A Case Study of Soviet Territory Under Foreign Rule* (Santa Monica, 1957).
 90. Cited by Ie. V. Safonova, *Ideino-vykhovna robota Komunistychnoi partii sered trudiashchyykh vyzvolenykh raioniv Ukrainy v roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoï viiny (1943–1945) rr.* (Kiev, 1971) p. 91.
 91. *Istoriia Ukrain's'koi RSR*, vol. 7, p. 141.
 92. *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 10 November 1942.
 93. *Ibid.*, 10 May 1942; *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 20 September 1942.
 94. George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin: A Case Study in World War II* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952) p. 21.
 95. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, pp. 113–14n; HURIP, no. 356, B6, 4; no. 59, B6, 3.
 96. HURIP, no. 542, B6, 3; no. 356, B6, 4.
 97. See Stakhiv, 'Natsional'no-politychne zhyttia Donbasu,'; HURIP, no. 314, B6, 4; V. Volodymyrovych, *L'Ukraine sous l'occupation Allemande* (Paris, 1948) p. 36.
 98. Stakhiv, 'Natsional'no-politychne zhyttia Donbasu.'
 99. HURIP, no. 485, B6, 6.
 100. *Ibid.*
 101. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 218.
 102. *Istoriia Ukrain's'koi RSR*, vol. 7, p. 157.
 103. Fischer, *Soviet Opposition*, p. 48. According to Hans von Herworth there were 100 000 Ukrainians serving in the German army, this figure includes Western Ukrainians. See his 'Deutschland und die ukrainische Frage 1941–1945,' unpublished manuscript, Deutsches Institut für Geschichte der nationalsozialistischen Zeit, Munich, p. 19. According to Fischer, *Soviet Opposition*, p. 45, there were some 500 000 former Soviet citizens bearing arms.
 104. 'Memorandum by an Official of the Department for German Internal Affairs, 6 August 1941' and 'Memorandum by the Chief of the Reich Chancellery, 1 October 1941,' in *Documents on German Foreign Policy*, vol. 13, pp. 290, 319.
 105. Ihor Kamenetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans for Eastern Europe: A Study of Lebensraum Policies* (New York, 1961) pp. 150–1.
 106. Zovenko, *Bezimenni*, p. 62.
 107. Dallin, *German Rule*, pp. 426–7.
 108. *Ibid.*, p. 420.
 109. *Krakov's'ki visti*, 4 February 1942; Kamenetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans*, p. 153.
 110. HURIP, no. 27, B6, 1.
 111. Cited by Clifton J. Child, "The Ukraine under German Occupation, 1941–4," in Arnold Toynbee and Veronica M. Toynbee (eds) *Hitler's Europe* (London, 1954) p. 638.

112. Ibid.
113. *Novyi chas*. *Orhan Voznesens'koho gebitskomisara*, 12 July 1943.
114. Child, 'The Ukraine', p. 638.
115. *Volyn'*, 10 June 1943.
116. See Ibid., as well as *Volyn'*, 23 August 1942; *Novyi chas*, 12 July 1943, for a detailed discussion of Koch's agricultural policies which fail to mention the distribution of land. See *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 4 April 1943 for an excellent analysis of rural life in Soviet Ukraine under German occupation.
117. *Volyn'*, 23 August 1942.
118. Tabulated from Dallin, *German Rule*, Table 2, p. 374.
119. Z Shul'ha, 'Borot'ba ukrains'koho selianstva proty nimets'kofashysts'kykh okupantiv,' in *Borot'ba ukrains'koho narodu*, p. 39.
120. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, 4 April 1943.
121. Dallin, *German Rule*, p. 317.
122. Shul'ha, 'Borot'ba ukrains'koho selianstva,' p. 38; HURIP, no. 314, B6, 2.
123. *Ukrainskaia SSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine*, vol. 3, p. 152.
124. Cited by Kamenetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans*, p. 146.
125. Ibid. and (anonymous), 'Kharkov under the Germans,' unpublished manuscript, Research Programme on the USSR, Columbia University.
126. Leontii Forostivs'kyi, *Kyiv pid vorozhymy okupatsiamy* (Buenos Aires, 1952) p. 48.
127. *Krakovs'ki visti*, 7 March 1942.
128. F. Korduba, 'Der Generalplan Ost,' *Ukrains'kyi istoryk*, no. 1-4 (1981) p. 157.
129. HURIP, no. 314, B6, 2.
130. Carroll, 'It Takes a Russian,' p. 82.
131. HURIP, no. 482, B5, 9.
132. *Holos Dnipro*. *Khersons'kyi chasopys*, 23 May 1943.
133. Tabulated from Dallin, *German Rule*, Table 2, p. 452.
134. Kamenetsky, *Secret Nazi Plans*, pp. 106-7.
135. *Volyn'*, 1 October 1942; *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 10 November 1942.
136. Nikon Nemyron, 'Probudzhena v ohni stolytsia Ukrainy,' *Suchasna Ukraina*, 2 December 1956.
137. HURIP, no. 102, B6, 8; no. 121, B6, 13.
138. *Ukrains'ka diisnist'*, 5 April 1942.
139. Shankovs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy*, p. 8.
140. See Shankovs'kyi, 'Ukraina pid nimets'kym chobotom,' *Kyiv*, (Philadelphia) no. 6 (1954) p. 275.
141. Cited by Dallin, *German Rule*, p. 455.
142. See HURIP, no. 33, B6, 3; no. 121, B6, 3; no. 441, B6, 7; no. 542, B6, 1; no. 548, B6, 2.
143. *Nasha strana* (Jerusalem), 2 November 1983. See also HURIP, no. 500, B6, 7 for a report of a large number of Ukrainians executed in Berdychiv by the 'Ukrainian' police for assisting Jews.
144. Cited by Dallin, *German Rule*, pp. 123, 127, 67 respectively.
145. M. H. Marunchak, *Systema nimets'kykh kontstaboriv i polityka vnyshchuvannia v Ukraini* (Winnipeg, 1963) pp. 51-2; B. K. and A. T. (pseudonym), *Chomu svit movsychyt'? Ukrainsi v kontsentratsiinykh*

- taborakh nimechchyny 1940–1945 rr.* (Paris, 1946) pp. 36, 69.
146. HURIP, no. 102, B6, 3; no. 548, B6, 4.
 147. *Ibid.*, no. 314, B6, 7.
 148. *Ibid.*
 149. *Ibid.*, no. 121, B6, 3.
 150. *Ibid.*, no. 441, B6, 8.
 151. Dallin, *Odessa, 1941–1944*, p. 290.
 152. *Oborona Ukrainy*, 1 August 1942; *Svoboda*, 24 September 1982.
 153. *Samostiinyk*, 23 December 1943 (UPA underground publication); Shankovs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy*, pp. 192–9; HURIP, no. 542, B6, 7; no. 32, B6, 5; no. 314, B6, 7.
 154. In part this was dictated by Eastern Ukraine's terrain which, unlike Volyn', contained few forests. The wooded areas which could offer cover were in the north, bordering with Belorussia, and under the control of Soviet partisans.
 155. HURIP, no. 548, B6, 6.
 156. See Shankovs'kyi, *Pokhidni hrupy*, pp. 132–92.
 157. Stakhiv, 'Natsional'ne-politychne zhyttia Donbasu,' *Suchasna Ukraina*, 9 August 1956.
 158. *Ibid.*, *Suchasna Ukraina*, 23 August 1956. Stakhiv, an OUN organizer in Donbass, claims that the Donbass Soviet underground did not produce a single leaflet during the German occupation. In fact two were produced. One by a village pioneer organization (!), another by a Komsomol group in Donets'k. This is hardly an impressive out-put given Donbass's importance in Ukraine. See *Lystivky partiinoho pidpillia i partyzans'kykh zahoniv ukrainy u roky Velykoi Vitchyznianoi viiny* (Kiev, 1969). For a discussion of evidence from Soviet sources regarding the existence of a Ukrainian national underground in Donbass see Ievhen Stakhiv, 'Do diskusii pro Oleha Koshevoho,' *Suchasna Ukraina*, 3 February 1957.
 159. Stakhiv, 'Natsional'no-politychne zhyttia Donbasu,' *Suchasna Ukraina*, 9 August 1956. See also, Pavliuk, 'Borot'ba ukrains'koho narodu.'
 160. *Istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR*, vol. 7 p. 509.
 161. V. I. Klokov, *Vsenarodnaia bor'ba v tylu nemetsko-fashistskikh okupantov na Ukraine 1941–1944* (Kiev, 1978) p. 57; Safonova, *Ideino-vykhovna robota*, p. 208.
 162. *Pravda*, 27 May 1944; *Kul'turne budivnytstvo*, vol. 2, pp. 56–7; Safonova, *Ideino-vykhovna robota*, p. 84.
 163. See for example, *Ukraina v ohni. Al'manakh* (n.p. (Ufa?), 1942); *Lystivky partiinoho pidpillia*.
 164. *Ukraina byla i budet sovetskoi. Vtoroi antifashistskii miting predstavitelei ukrainskogo naroda 30 avgusta 1942 g.* (Saratov, 1942), pp. 63, 2.
 165. Shul'ha, 'Borot'ba ukrains'koho selianstva,' p. 41.
 166. HURIP, no. 121, B6, 3.
 167. Kamenetsky, *Hitler's Occupation of Ukraine*, p. 58.
 168. Werner C. Hahn, *Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53* (Ithaca, New York, 1982) pp. 48–9.
 169. Safonova, *Ideino-vykhovna robota*, p. 17.

5 UKRAINIAN SOCIETY AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

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2. Maksym Sahaydak, comp. *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7–8: Ethnocide of Ukrainians in the USSR* (Baltimore, 1976) p. 62. This is a translation of the Ukrainian *samvydav* (*samizdat*) journal *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*.
3. *Demograficheskoe razvitie Ukrainskoi SSR (1959–1970 gg.)* (Kiev, 1977) p. 13.
4. Based on M. Maksudov, 'Losses Suffered by the Population of the USSR 1918–1938,' in Roy Medvedev (ed.) *The Samizdat Register II*, (London, 1981) p. 276 and his 'Demograficheskie poteri naseleniia Ukrainy v 1927–1938 gg,' Unpublished manuscript, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.
5. *Ukrains'kyi statystychnyi richnyk 1935* (L'viv, 1935) p. 24.
6. *Narodne hospodarstvo Ukrains'koi RSR u 1979 rotsi. Statystychnyi schchorichnyk* (Kiev, 1980) p. 15. (Hereafter cited as *Nar. hosp.*)
7. M. Sonin, 'Problemy sem'i i rozhdaemosti v demograficheskoi literaturre,' *Kommunist*, no. 8 (1981) pp. 119–23.
8. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad*, Table 14, p. 85.
9. V. V. Onikienko and V. A. Volosozharova, 'Osobennosti demograficheskogo razvitiia Ukrainskoi SSR,' in *Regional'nye osobennosti vosproizvodstva i migratsii naseleniia v SSSR* (Moscow, 1981) p. 151.
10. *Nar. hosp. Iubileinyi statystychnyi shchorichnyk* (Kiev, 1977) p. 17.
11. *Nar. hosp.* 1979 p. 15.
12. See Nick Eberstadt, 'The Health Crisis in the USSR,' *The New York Review of Books*, 19 February 1981.
13. Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad*, Table 14, p. 85. Presumably Ukrainians had higher death-rates because of the effects of collectivisation, the Second World War as well because their age structure, income and education levels and rate of urbanisation are different from that of the Russian population of Ukraine. Soviet scholarship registers the fact of Ukrainians' higher death-rates without discussing the causes.
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15. Myroslav Prokop, 'Peremishuvannia naselennia v SRSR i Ukraina,' *Suchasnist'*, no. 6 (1974) pp. 69–82.
16. *Entsyklopediia narodnoho hospodarstva*, vol. 3, p. 235.
17. Borys Levyts'kyi, 'Migratsiia v SRSR – instrument sotsio-ekonomichnoi chy rusyfikatsiinoi polityky,' *Materialy Kongresu ukrains'koi vil'noi politychnoi dymky*, zbirnyk ch. 2 (Munich, 1973) p. 22.
18. V. V. Onikienko and V. A. Popovkin, *Kompleksnoe issledovanie migratsionnykh protsessov. Analiz migratsii naseleniia USSR* (Moscow, 1973) p. 156.
19. V. I. Perevedentsev, *Metody izuchenii migratsii naseleniia* (Moscow, 1975), pp. 101–2.

20. V. V. Onikiienko and V. A. Popovkin, 'Heohrafiia mihratsii naselenia Ukrain's'koi RSR,' *Ekonomichna heohrafiia*, vypusk 14 (1973) p. 30.
21. Ivan Dzyuba, *Internationalism or Russification? A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem* (New York, 1974) pp. 110–11.
22. *Osnovnye problemy ratsional'nogo ispol'zovaniia trudovykh resursov v SSSR* (Moscow, 1971) p. 317.
23. Levyts'kyi, 'Migratsiia,' p. 15.
24. *Itogi vsesoiuznoi perepisi naseleniia 1970 goda*, 7 vols (Moscow, 1972–4), vol. 7, Table 4. Hereafter referred to as *Perepis' 1970*.
25. Onikiienko and Popovkin, *Kompleksnoe issledovanie*, p. 36.
26. S. I. Bruk, 'Etnodemograficheskie protsessy v SSSR. (Po materialam perepisi 1970 goda),' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4 (1971) p. 29.
27. V. A. Shpiliuk, *Mezhrespublikanskaia migratsiia i sbliuzhenie natsii v SSSR* (L'viv, 1975) p. 151.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
29. Z. Sokolyns'kyi, 'Demohrafichni doslidzhennia sotsialistychnoho mista,' *Ekonomika Radians'koi Ukrainy*, no. 2 (1969) p. 89.
30. V. I. Kozlov, *Natsional'nosti SSSR. Etnodemograficheskii obzor*, 3rd ed (Moscow, 1982) p. 263.
31. Volodymyr Horlenko and Vsevolod Naulko, 'Naukovi sesii etnohrafiv,' *Narodna tvorchist' ta etnohrafia*, no. 4 (1969) p. 108.
32. Calculated from *Perepis' 1970*, Tables 1 and 2, vol. 4.
33. A study of three towns in Rovno oblast', for example, found that 13 per cent of the able-bodied population was unemployed. See M. O. Kovtoniuk, 'Mihratsii naselennia ta ikh vplyv na liudnist' sil's'kykh naselenykh punktiv Rovens'koi oblasti,' *Ekonomichna heohrafiia*, vypusk 3 (1968) p. 15. See also *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 7 June 1966, on the question of unemployment. The under-employment of the population is discussed by P. V. Voloboi and V. A. Popovkin, *Problemy terytorial'noi spetsializatsii i kompleksnoho rozvytku narodnoho hospodarstva Ukrain's'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1972) pp. 86–8.
34. Theodore Shabad, 'Ethnic Results of the 1979 Soviet Census,' *Soviet Geography*, no. 7 (1980) p. 463.
35. V. V. Pokshishevski, V. V. Vorob'yev, Ye. N. Gladysheva, V. I. Perevedentsev, 'On Basic Migration Patterns,' *Soviet Geography*, no. 19 (1964) pp. 8–9.
36. See V. O. Volos and S. I. Ishchuk, 'Problemy terytorial'noho planuvannia narodnoho hospodarstva v Ukrain's'kii RSR,' *Ekonomichna heohrafiia*, vypusk 17 (1971) pp. 3–4 for the period when a major effort was made in regional economic development.
37. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 24 June 1969.
38. Theodore Shabad, 'Note on Geography of Recent Investments in the Ukraine,' *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, no. 35–6 (1973–7) p. 172.
39. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 24 June 1969.
40. A. M. Klok, 'Dosvid konkretnoho sotsial'no-demohrafichnoho analizu rukhu naselennia suchasnoho sela (na prykladi sil Sharivs'koi sil's'koi

- radu Iarmolynets'koho raionu Khmel'nyts'koi oblasti,' *Demohrafichni doslidzhennia*, vypusk 2 (1971) pp. 198–208.
41. See Z. Lew Melnyk, 'The Economic Price of Being a Soviet Republic: The Case of Ukraine,' in Walter Dushnyk (ed.) *Ukraine in a Changing World*, (New York, 1977) pp. 156–7.
 42. Melnyk, 'The Economic Price,' p. 159.
 43. *Nar. hosp. 1964* (Kiev, 1965) p. 9; *Nar. hosp. Statystychnyi zbirnyk* (Kiev, 1957) p. 7.
 44. *Nar. hosp. 1973* (Kiev, 1974) p. 7; Deutsch, 'Social Mobilisation and Political Development,' p. 495.
 45. B. S. Khorev, *Problemy gorodov. Ekonomicheskogeograficheskoe issledovanie gorodskogo rasselenia v SSSR* (Moscow, 1971) Table 4, p. 28.
 46. I. S. Koropec'kyj. 'Economic Prerogatives,' in I. S. Koropec'kyj (ed.) *The Ukraine within the USSR: An Economic Balance Sheet* (New York, 1977) pp. 54–5.
 47. Z. L. Melnyk, 'Capital Formation and Financial Relations,' in *ibid.*, Table 10.7, p. 288.
 48. *Natsional'nyi dokhod Ukrain's'koi RSR v period rozhornutoho budivnyctva komunizmu* (Kiev, 1963), Table 33, p. 151.
 49. Peter Woroby, 'Effects of Urbanization in the Ukraine,' *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, no. 35–7 (1973–7) p. 114.
 50. Leslie Dienes, 'Issues in Soviet Energy Policy and Conflicts over Fuel Costs in Regional Development,' *Soviet Studies*, no. 1 (1971) pp. 26–58.
 51. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 30 April 1970.
 52. *Demograficheskoe razvitie*, p. 182; V. Tovkun, 'Udoskonaliuvaty oblik mihratsii naselennia,' *Ekonomika Radians'koi Ukrainy*, no. 2 (1966) p. 75.
 53. Calculated from *Karta suchasnoho etnichnoho skladu naselennia Ukrain's'koi RSR* (Moscow, 1966). This map, the only published source giving the ethnic composition of individual urban settlements in Ukraine based on the 1959 census returns, denotes the ethnic composition by using grid squares coloured to represent the different nationalities inhabiting the settlement in percentage terms. Using the map we identified almost 800 individual towns. Using other sources it was possible to assign numerical weights to the percentages. We were able to obtain precise nationality data for all towns in Ukraine with a population over 20 000. Towns under 20 000 presented some difficulty. The problem here lay in that the map identified 649 out of 936 towns with a population under 20 000. Thus the data we give for towns under 20 000 represents an average based on a 70 per cent sample. To facilitate the collection of data we used a modified version of the census categories for the purposes of the tables.
 54. Shpiliuk, *Mezhrespublikanskaia migratsiia*, p. 150.
 55. John Kolasky, *Education in Soviet Ukraine: A Study in Discrimination and Russification* (Toronto, 1968) p. 57.

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57. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 7, Table 4.
58. Onikiienko and Popovkin, *Kompleksnoe issledovanie*, pp. 39–43; V. I. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei na Ukraine. (Istoriko-etnograficheskii ocherk)* (Kiev, 1975), Table 8, p. 78.
59. V. I. Tovkun, 'Osoblyvosti mihratsii naselennia Ukrain's'koi RSR v 1959–1963 rr.,' *Ukrains'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal*, no. 4 (1966) p. 51.
60. *Perepis' 1959*, vol. 2, Table 54; *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 4, Table 8. Some of this increase may have been due to the widening of the city's boundaries.
61. Mark Jefferson, 'The Law of the Primate City,' *The Geographical Review*, no. 2 (1939) p. 227.
62. This idea is developed by Wsevolod Isajiw, 'Urban Migration and Social Change in Contemporary Ukraine,' *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, no. 1 (1980) pp. 58–66.
63. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 7, Table 4; Onikiienko and Popovkin, *Kompleksnoe issledovanie*, pp. 38–75.
64. See Sahaydak, *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7–8*, pp. 66–8, 95.
65. Isajiw, 'Urban Migration,' p. 65.
66. Shpiliuk, *Mezhrespublikanskaia migratsiia*, Table 6, p. 107.
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68. *Demograficheskoe razvitie*, pp. 169–70.
69. Onikiienko and Popovkin, *Kompleksnoe issledovanie*, p. 43.
70. *Nar. hosp. 1974* (Kiev, 1975) p. 7.
71. T. P. Zarikhhta, 'Do pytannia pro mihratsiiu sil's'koi molodi,' *Demohrafichni doslidzhennia*, vypusk 2 (1971) p. 193
72. K. I. Iakuba, 'Mashtaby ta osnovni napriamy mihratsii sil's'koho naselennia Ukrain's'koi RSR,' *Ekonomichna heohrafiia*, vypusk 20 (1976) pp. 30–5.
73. For an up-to-date account of the Soviet internal passport system in general see Archie Brown, John Fennell, Michael Kaser and H. T. Willetts (eds) *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union*, (Cambridge, 1982) pp. 384–6. The problems that these regulations pose for Ukrainian youth are discussed by a recent émigré writing in *Ukrains'ke slovo*, 15 and 22 March 1981.
74. Kenneth C. Farmer, *Ukrainian Nationalism in the Post-Stalin Era: Myth, Symbols and Ideology in Soviet Nationalities Policy* (The Hague, 1980) pp. 58–68.
75. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 20 January 1962.
76. P. M. Rogachev and M. A. Sverdlin, 'SSSR – otechestvo mnogonatsional'nogo sovetskogo naroda,' *Filosofskie nauki*, no. 2 (1973) p. 10, cited by Farmer in *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 68.
77. John A. Armstrong, 'The Ethnic Scene in the Soviet Union: The View of the Dictatorship,' in Erich Goldhagen (ed.) *Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union*, (New York, 1968). pp. 14–21.
78. S. S. Savoskul, 'Socioethnic Aspects of the Intellectual Culture of the Rural Population of the Tatar ASSR,' *Soviet Sociology*, no. 3–4 (1972–3) p. 349.
79. *Molod' Ukrainy*, 30 September 1969.

80. Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie natsional'nykh otnoshenii,' *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 12 (1969) p. 135.
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82. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei*, Table 22, p. 146. The survey results that we cite here and below were gathered during the 1960s.
83. Tibor Szamuely, 'The Resurgence of Ukrainian Nationalism,' *The Reporter*, 30 May 1968, pp. 16-17.
84. M. N. Guboglo, 'K izucheniiu perspektiv razvitiia dvuiazychiia u narodov SSSR,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 1 (1978) p. 38.
85. M. N. Guboglo, 'Sotsial'no-ethnicheskie posledstviia dvuiazychiia,' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 2 (1972) p. 31.
86. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei*, Table 21, pp. 142-4.
87. V. I. Kozlov, 'Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR. (K metodologii issledovaniia),' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 2 (1969) p. 64.
88. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei*, Table 22, p. 146.
89. M. N. Guboglo, 'Ethnolinguistic Processes in Southern Moldavia,' *Soviet Sociology*, no. 3 (1974-5) pp. 42-3.
90. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei*, Table 22. p. 146.
91. Guboglo, 'Ethnolinguistic Processes,' pp. 50, 55-6n.
92. *Sotsial'noe i natsional'noe* (Moscow, 1977) p. 29.
93. Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh sviazei*, Table 22, p. 146.
94. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 4, Table 7.
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97. V. V. Pokshishevskiy, 'Urbanization and Ethnogeographical Processes,' *Soviet Geography*, no. 2 (1972) p. 119.
98. *Ibid.*, p. 116.
99. V. Iu. Krupianskaia and M. G. Rabinovich, 'Etnografiia goroda i promyshlennogo poselka,' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4 (1964) p. 121.
100. A. I. Kholmogorov, 'International Traits of Soviet Nations (Based on Data of Concrete Sociological Research in the Baltic Area),' *Soviet Sociology*, no. 2 (1973) p. 52.
101. V. I. Naulko, 'Konferentsiia z pytan' zbyzhennia sotsialistychnykh natsii i internatsional'noho vykhovannia trudiashchykh,' *Narodna tvorchist' ta etnografiia*, no. 3 (1966) p. 105.
102. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 25 November 1966.
103. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 25 January 1966.
104. L. A. Gordon, 'Obshchee v osobennom: sotsiologicheskie ocherki ob Estonii,' *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 4 (1980) pp. 193-4.
105. V. I. Kozlov, *Dinamika chislennosti narodov* (Moscow, 1968) p. 48.
106. N. A. Tomilov, 'Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v iuzhnoi i srednei polose Zapadnoi Sibiri,' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4 (1978) pp. 17-18.

The question is sensitive because since the abandonment of Ukrainisation policies in the early 1930s, the Ukrainian language has not been taught in schools outside the boudaries of Ukraine, despite the fact that Ukrainians are a sizeable minority in the RSFSR.

107. Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, *Ethnic Stratification: A Comparative Approach* (New York, 1965) p. 47.
108. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, p. 310. See also Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'The Incorporation of Western Ukraine and Its Impact on Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine,' in Roman Szporluk (ed.) *The Influence of Eastern Europe and the Soviet West on the USSR*, (New York, 1975) pp. 180–228.
109. V. T. Zinich and V. I. Naulko, 'Kul'turno-bytovoie sblizhenie narodov Ukrainiskoi SSR,' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 6 (1972) p. 30.
110. L. N. Chizhikova, 'Ob etnicheskikh protsessakh v vostochnykh raionakh Ukrainy. (Po materialam ekspeditsionnogo obsledovaniia 1966 g.),' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 1 (1968) p. 23–4.
111. I. A. Snezhikova, 'K probleme izucheniia etnicheskogo samosoznaniia u detei i iunoshestva (po materialam Kievskoi i Zakarpatskoi oblastei),' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 1 (1982) p. 85.
112. Kozlov, *Dinamika chislennosti*, p. 48.
113. See *XIII respublikans'ka dialektolohichna narada. Tezy dopovidei* (Kiev, 1969); A. V. Lahutina, 'Kul'tura rosiis'koi movy na Ukraini,' in *Mova. Liudyna. Suspil'stvo* (Kiev, 1977) pp. 111–19.
114. V. V. Mironov, *Kul'tura i pobut hirnykiv Radians'koi Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1965) p. 96.
115. Iu. V. Bromlei, 'Etnicheskie aspekty sovremennykh natsional'nykh protsessov,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 3 (1977) p. 23.
116. A. P. Ponomar'ov, *Suchasna sim'ia i simeinyi pobut robitnykiv Donbasu* (Kiev, 1978) p. 138.
117. Mironov, *Kul'tura i pobut hirnykiv*, pp. 42–3.
118. Alla Hors'ka, who emerged as one of Ukraine's leading activists in the national-cultural revival of the 1960s, did not know Ukrainian until 1964. She and several others who participated in the national revival took private Ukrainian language lessons. See 'Interv'iu z Nadiieiu Svitlychnoiu. Alla Hors'ka i shistdesiati roky v Ukraini,' *Dialoh*, no. 5–6 (1981) pp. 3–27.
119. Pokshishevskiy, 'Urbanization,' p. 118.
120. M. I. Kulichenko, *Natsional'nye otnosheniia v SSSR i tendentsii ikh razvittia* (Moscow, 1972) p. 424.
121. Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie,' p. 137.
122. H. Emel'ianenko, 'Lenins'ki pryntsyipy natsional'noi polityky KPRS,' *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 8 (1956) pp. 58–9.
123. I. Kravtsev, *Sblizhenie sotsialisticheskikh natsii v protsesse perekhoda k kommunizmu* (Kiev, 1960) p. 81.
124. See Borys Lewytzkij, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine, 1953–1980* (Edmonton, 1984) ch. 4.
125. The old and new constitutions of the Ukrainian SSR mention the right of its citizens to use their 'native language and the language of other nations of the USSR.' *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 21 April 1978.
126. *Nasha kul'tura*, no. 3 (1965) p. 5. The conference, it was reported, 'created an interest among the public of the capital city. The main hall of the university could not hold all the persons seeking admission. During the discussions there were lively exchange of ideas. . . The

- participants expressed the need to hold such conferences on a regular basis.' *Literaturna Ukraina*, 26 February 1963.
127. See M. Tarasiuk, 'Movna diisnist' v URSR i zlisni vyhadky,' *Movoznavstvo*, no. 2 (1971) p. 42.
 128. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 7 July 1967.
 129. 'Report of Delegation to Ukraine: Central Committee Meeting – September 16, 17 and 18, 1967,' *Viewpoint*, January 1968, p. 2.
 130. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
 131. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 17 November 1966.
 132. For examples see: *Literaturna Ukraina*, 26 March and 17 October 1966, 5 March 1968; A. Poleshko, 'Terminolohiia sudovykh dokumentiv,' *Radians'ke pravo*, no. 3 (1962) pp. 122–7.
 133. *Radians'ka kul'tura*, 29 February 1963.
 134. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 3 June 1969.
 135. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 19 May 1967.
 136. See Naulko, *Razvitie mezhetnicheskikh svyazei*, Table 21, pp. 142–3; Guboglo, 'Ethnolinguistic Processes,' Table 1, p. 46.
 137. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 4, Table 32.
 138. See Mervyn Matthews, *Privilege in the Soviet Union: A Study of Elite Life-Styles under Communism* (London, 1978); Murray Yanowitch, *Social and Economic Inequality in the Soviet Union: Six Studies* (White Plains, New York, 1977).
 139. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, pp. 78. See Hechter, pp. 15–43 for a review of Western literature. The impact of industrialisation on international integration in the USSR is described by Soviet theorists in virtually the same terms, often using the same vocabulary as Western structural-functionalists. See examples of this in *Stanovlenie sovetskogo naroda i razvitie sotsialisticheskikh natsii* (Kiev, 1978) pp. 53–131; M. Kulichenko, *Ukrepnenie internatsional'nogo edinstva sovetskogo obshchestva* (Kiev, 1976) pp. 59–83.
 140. Y. V. Bromley and V. I. Kozlov, 'National Processes in the USSR,' in I. R. Grigulevich and S. Y. Kozlov (eds) *Races and Peoples: Contemporary Ethnic and Racial Problems*, (Moscow, 1974) p. 127.
 141. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, pp. 9–10.
 142. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 5, Tables 2 and 3; Arutiunian, 'Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury,' Table 3, p. 6.
 143. Arutiunian, 'Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury,' Table 3, p. 6; Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Razvitie odnotipnoi sotsial'noi struktury sovetskikh natsii,' in *Sovremennye etnicheskie protsessy v SSSR* (Moscow, 1977), Table 4, p. 131.
 144. S. L. Seniavskii, *Rost rabocheho klassa SSSR (1951–1964 g.g.)* (Moscow, 1966) Table 16, p. 223.
 145. See *Kolichestvennye metody u sotsiologicheskikh issledovaniiah* (Novosibirsk, 1964) pp. 234–5. Alex Inkeles, "Myth and Reality of Social Classes," in Alex Inkeles and Kent Geiger (eds) *Soviet Sociology: A Book of Readings*, (London, 1961) p. 560.
 146. Calculated from Arutiunian, 'Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury,' Table 10, p. 15; Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad*, p. 94; *Perepis' 1959*, vol. 2, Tables 41, 55.

147. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 6; Tables 4, 52; *Nar. hosp. 1974*, p. 415.
148. See James R. Millar (ed) *The Soviet Rural Community: A Symposium* (Chicago, 1971).
149. Gertrude E. Schroeder, 'Consumption and Personal Incomes,' in *The Ukraine within the USSR*, Table, 4.3, p. 92.
150. I. Gordiev, 'The Ukrainian Economy,' unpublished manuscript, Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta.
151. See Ihor Stebelsky, 'Ukrainian Agriculture: The Problems of Specialization and Intensification in Perspective,' in Peter J. Potichnyj (ed.) *Ukraine in the Seventies*, (Oakville, Ontario, 1975) pp. 103–21.
152. Gordiev, 'The Ukrainian Economy'.
153. *Vseobshchee obuchenie*, p. 11; *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 3, Table 1.
154. V. S. Petrenko, *Selo na shliakhakh pidnesennia. Zminy v skladi, umovakh pratsi i zhytti kolhospnoho selianstva Ukrain'skoi RSR (1951–1969)* (Kiev, 1970) pp. 27–8.
155. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 3, Table 1.
156. V. G. Afanas'ev, *Nauchnyi kommunizm* (Moscow, 1966), p. 192; *Sel'skaia zhizn'*, 20 October 1975, 7 July 1976; I. M. Slepencov and B. V. Knyazev, *Rural Youth Today* (Newtonville, Mass., 1977).
157. See veiled accounts of work stoppages in agriculture in *Pravda*, 10 July 1978; *Komsomol'skaia pravda*, 5 September 1972.
158. See William H. Overholt (ed) *Global Political Assessment* (New York, 1976) p. 34.
159. Lewytzkij, *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine*, p. 27.
160. *Pravda*, 2 September 1956.
161. M. Holubenko, 'The Soviet Working Class: Discontent and Opposition,' *Critique*, no. 4 (1975) pp. 10–18.
162. Viktor Haynes and Olga Semyonova (eds) *Workers Against the Gulag: The New Opposition in the Soviet Union* (London, 1979). See the French edition of this book, Olga Semyonova and Victor Haynes (eds) *Syndicalisme et libertés en Union soviétique* (Paris, 1979) pp. 27, 90–105, for data on Ukrainians' role in the trade union.
163. Ar"ie Vudka, 'Natsional'nyi aspekt robitnychoho pytannia,' *Suchasnist'*, no. 2 (1980) p. 126.
164. *Nar. hosp. 1973*, p. 376. For a discussion of anomalies in the statistics on the working class which result in an underestimation of the size of the working class see: Bohdan Krawchenko, 'Some Aspects of the Structure of the Soviet Working Class,' in T. M. S. Priestly (ed.) *Proceedings of the First Banff Conference on Central and East European Studies*, (Edmonton, 1977) pp. 102–27.
165. *Nar. hosp. 1973*, p. 108.
166. Iu. A. Kurnosov, 'Izmeneniia v sotsial'noi strukture USSR v usloviakh razvitogo sotsializma,' *Istoriia SSSR*, no. 4 (1979) pp. 21–2.
167. See O. Reshetnyk, V. Khyzhniak and A. Tuzman, 'Efektyvnist' vykorystannia Donets'koho vuhillia v teploenerhetytsi,' *Ekonomika Radian'koi Ukrainy*, no. 1 (1979) pp. 13–20; Haynes and Semyonova, *Workers Against the Gulag*, pp. 38–45.
168. Melnyk, 'Capital Formation,' Table 10.3, p. 283.
169. Schroeder, 'Consumption and Personal Incomes,' Table 4.2, p. 88;

- pp. 97–106; Bohdan S. Kordan and Richard L. Hubert, 'Social Welfare and the Issue of Equality in the Ukrainian SSR, 1970–1978,' paper presented to the 23rd Western Social Science Association Conference, April 1980, San Diego, California.
170. Vudka, 'Natsional'nyi aspekt,' p. 125.
 171. *Diialoh*, no. 4 (1980) p. 16.
 172. John Kolasky, *Two Years in Soviet Ukraine* (Toronto, 1970) pp. 190–5.
 173. *Izvestiia*, 24 October 1973.
 174. *Perepis' 1970*, Table 52, vol. 6.
 175. *Ibid.*, vol. 6, Tables 68–70.
 176. Aleksandr Ianov, 'Raboचाia tema. Sotsiologicheskie zametki o literaturnoi kritike,' *Novyi mir*, no. 3 (1971) p. 255.
 177. Anatolii Orlov, 'Zminy v sotsial'no-ekonomichnomu skladi suchasnoi robitnychoi molodi,' *Narodna tvorchist' ta etnografia*, no. 4 (1970) p. 9.
 178. This point is made by H. Proshcharuk, *Vidtvorennia robochoi syly na suchasnomu etapi komunistychnoho budivnytstva* (Kiev, 1973) p. 130.
 179. *Ibid.*, pp. 173–84.
 180. Ianov, 'Raboचाia tema,' p. 256.
 181. See Holubenko, 'The Soviet Working Class,' pp. 6–11 for a discussion of the mechanism of social control.
 182. For examples see *Robitnycha hazeta*, 14 May 1966, 7 January, 15 and 26 July 1967.
 183. See *Robitnycha hazeta*, 13 and 14 October 1960, 3 April 1963, 26 February 1964, 10 September 1965, 22 October 1966.
 184. Sahaydak, *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7–8*, p. 143.
 185. Michael Browne (ed.) *Ferment in the Ukraine* (London, 1971) p. 19.
 186. *Ukrains'kyi visnyk*, vypusk I–II (Paris, 1971), I; pp. 26–9.
 187. Dzyuba, *Internationalism*, p. 190.
 188. Kolasky, *Two Years*, p. 194.
 189. Dzyuba, *Internationalism*, p. 5.
 190. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 5, Table 5. In Western Ukraine in the mid-1960s, for example, 90 per cent of the working class was Ukrainian. S. A. Makarchuk, 'Raboचाia sem'ia v ukrainskom Prikarpat'e,' in *Etnograficheskoe izuchenie byta rabochikh. (Po materialam ot del'nykh promyshlennykh raionov SSSR)* (Moscow, 1968) p. 80.
 191. Petrenko, *Selo na shliakhakh*, p. 23; *Trud v SSSR* (Moscow, 1968) pp. 92–3.
 192. Seniavskii and Tel'pukhovskii, *Rabochii klass*, Table 24, p. 335.
 193. V. T. Zynych, 'Suchasnyi robitnychy shliub i vesillia,' *Narodna tvorchist' ta etnografia*, no. 2 (1957) p. 62.
 194. Orlov, 'Zminy v sotsial'no-etnichnomu skladi,' p. 11; M. R. Pliushch, *Tekhnichna tvorchist' robitnychoho klasu Ukrains'koi RSR* (Kiev, 1973), p. 155.
 195. *Istoriia Ukrains'koi RSR*, 2 vols (Kiev, 1967) vol. II, p. 550.
 196. Using data at our disposal it was possible to calculate the minimal figure. It is probable that white-collar staff within the economically active Russian population of Ukraine represented more than half the total Russian population. Calculated from Seniavskii and Tel'pukhovskii.

- kii, *Rabochii klass*, Table 24, p. 335; Naulko, *Etnichnyi sklad*, p. 95; *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 6, Table 4.
197. Dzyuba, *Internationalism*, pp. 135–6.
198. L. G. Churchward, *The Soviet Intelligentsia: An Essay on the Social Structure and Roles of the Soviet Intellectuals during the 1960s* (London, 1973) p. 90.
199. M. N. Rutkevich, 'Sotsial'nye istochniki popolneniia sovetskoii intelligentsii,' *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 6 (1967) p. 15.
200. Churchward, *The Soviet Intelligentsia*, p. 7.
201. *Nar. hosp.* 1964, p. 469; *Nar. hosp.* 1973, p. 387.
202. See for example, Iu. O. Kurnosov, *Intelligentsiia Ukrain'skoi RSR i naukovno-tekhnichnyi prohres (1959–1970)* (Kiev, 1975).
203. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 2, Table 3; vol. 3, Table 3, vol. 4, Tables 33, 40.
204. M. P. Zezina, *Sovetskaia intelligentsiia v usloviakh razvitoogo sotsializma* (Moscow, 1982) Table 4, p. 56.
205. I. M. Furman, *Vplyv kul'tury na formuvannia osoby v SRSR* (Kiev, 1973) pp. 131–2.
206. Hechter, *Internal Colonialism*, p. 64.
207. V. Malanchuk, 'Partiinaia organizatsiia i tvorcheskaia intelligentsiia,' *Kommunist Ukrainy*, no. 6 (1963) p. 54; *Molod' Ukrainy*, 21 September 1971.
208. *Politicheskii dnevnik 1964–1970* (Amsterdam, 1972) p. 90.
209. We do not have attitudinal data specifically for the Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia, although studies exist on the intelligentsia of other nations. The general conclusions arrived at by these studies should be applicable to the Ukrainian intelligentsia as well.
210. Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'O nekotorykh tendentsiakh v izmenenii kul'turnogo oblika natsii,' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 4 (1973) p. 7.
211. *Ibid.*
212. L. M. Drobizheva, 'Sotsial'no-kul'turnye osobennosti lichnosti i natsional'nye ustanovki (po materialam issledovaniia v Tatarskoi ASSR),' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 3 (1971) p. 13.
213. T. V. Starovoitova, 'K issledovaniiu etnopskikhologii gorodskikh zhitel'ei (po materialam oprosa naseleniia trekh gorodov Tatarskoi ASSR),' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 3 (1976) p. 49.
214. Cited by *ibid.*
215. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 14 November 1970.
216. Arutiunian, 'O nekotorykh tendentsiakh,' p. 11.
217. Arutiunian, 'Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie,' p. 135.
218. Kholmogorov, 'International Traits', pp. 27–61; Drobizheva, 'Sotsial'no-kul'turnye osobennosti', p. 13; A. Sh. Vacheishvilli and E. S. Menabdishvilli, 'Ethnic Relations in the Social Structure of an Industrial Work Force,' *Soviet Sociology*, no. 1 (1972) pp. 3–30.
219. Arutiunian, 'Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie,' p. 138.
220. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
221. L. M. Drobizheva, 'Mezhlichnostnye natsional'nye otnosheniia: osnovnye cherty i osobennosti,' *Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniia*, no. 4 (1982) p. 40.
222. A. A. Susokolov, 'Vliianie razlichii v urovne obrazovaniia i chislen-

- nosti kontaktiruiushchikh etnicheskikh grupp na mezhetnicheskie ot-nosheniia. (Po materialam perepisei naseleniia SSSR 1959 i 1970 gg.), *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 1 (1976) p. 110.
223. Onikienko and Popovkin, *Kompleksnoe issledovanie*, pp. 51–6.
224. Dzyuba, *Internationalism*, pp. 110–11.
225. Shpiliuk, *Sotsializm*, p. 187.
226. Vyacheslav Chornovil, comp., *The Chornovil Papers* (Toronto, 1968) p. 204.
227. Hillel H. Ticktin, 'Political Economy of the Soviet Intellectual,' *Critique*, no. 2 (1973) pp. 17–20 and his 'The Class Structure of the USSR and the Elite,' *Critique*, no. 9 (1978) pp. 37–61.
228. For example, the average salary of engineers and technicians employed in industry in 1940 was 115 per cent higher than the average industrial worker's wage; by 1970 it was only 34 per cent higher. In 1966 those employed in cultural and educational institutions (the rank-and-file intelligentsia) earned 16 per cent less than the average industrial worker's wage. By 1970 they were earning 27 per cent less. *Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922–72* (Moscow, 1972) p. 350; *Nar. hosp.* 1973 p. 383.
229. Ticktin, 'Political Economy,' pp. 17–18.
230. Iu. V. Arutiunian, 'Sotsial'no-kul'turnye aspekty razvitiia i sblizheniia natsii v SSSR. (Programma, metodika i perspektivy issledovaniia),' *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, no. 3 (1972) p. 7.
231. Arutiunian, 'Konkretno-sotsiologicheskoe issledovanie,' p. 137.
232. Arutiunian, 'O nekotorykh tendentsiakh,' p. 13.
233. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
234. L. A. Gordon and E. V. Klopov, 'Sotsial'noe razvitie rabocheho klassa SSSR,' *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 2 (1972) pp. 4–5.
235. Arutiunian, 'Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury,' Table 14, p. 19.
236. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 4, Tables 37, 40–53.
237. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 3, Table 3.
238. *Perepis' 1959. Svodnyi tom*, Table 57a.
239. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 4, Table 5.
240. *Radians'ka osvita*, 16 August 1969.
241. *Literaturnaia gazeta*, 18 October 1972.
242. *Radians'ka osvita*, 30 July 1966; 31 August 1966 and 20 September 1972.
243. M. N. Rutkevich and F. R. Filippov, *Sotsial'nye peremeshcheniia* (Moscow, 1970) p. 141.
244. *Pravda*, 19 April 1958.
245. See Murray Yanovich and Wesley A. Fisher (eds) *Social Stratification and Mobility in the USSR* (New York, 1973).
246. L. I. Senikov, 'Higher Education as a Factor in Social Mobility,' in M. N. Rutkevich (ed.) *The Career Plans of Youth*, New York, 1969 p. 147.
247. V. I. Astakhova, 'Osnovnye tendentsii izmeneniia sotsial'noi struktury studenchestva,' in *Effektivnost' podgotovki spetsialistov* (Kaunas, 1969) p. 10.
248. Kurnosov, *Intelihentsiia*, p. 17.
249. Nicholas De Witt, *Education and Professional Employment in the*

- USSR (Washington, 1961) p. 357.
250. Chornovil, *The Chornovil Papers*, pp. 170–1.
251. Leo Heiman, 'Ukrainian Universities: Dreams and Reality', *The Ukrainian Quarterly*, no. 2 (1969) p. 155.
252. George Z. F. Bereday, William W. Brickman and Gerald H. Read *The Changing Soviet School* (Boston, 1960) p. 112.
253. V. Chornovil, 'What Bohdan Stenchuk Defends and How He Does It: Sixty-Six Questions and Comments to an "Internationalist"', *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6: Dissent in Ukraine* (Baltimore, 1977) p. 33 and *Narodna osvita*, p. 149.
254. Kolasky, *Education*, pp. 127, 113, 138–9.
255. *Vysshee obrazovanie v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1961), Table 16. p. 106; Table 29, pp. 128–57; *Narodnoe obrazovanie, nauka i kul'tura v SSSR. Statisticheskii sbornik* (Moscow, 1971) p. 196.
256. That a quota system exists is known; its workings and impact, however, remain a mystery. See De Witt, *Education*, p. 357.
257. In 1959, 2.2 per cent of Ukrainians over the age of 10 in the republic had either complete higher or incomplete education. The figure for Russians in the republic was 3.9, or 3.2 higher than Ukrainians. By 1970, the gap between Ukrainians and Russians had widened to 4.7 per cent. *Perepis' 1970*, vol. 3, Table 3; vol. 4, Table 40.
258. Drobizheva, 'Sotsial'no-kul'turnye osobennosti,' p. 7.
259. Chornovil, 'What Bohdan Stenchuk Defends,' pp. 37–8.
260. *Ibid.*, pp. 33–6.
261. See *Pravda Ukrainy*, 2 July 1965.
262. Chornovil, 'What Bohdan Stenchuk Defends,' p. 24.
263. See the editorial in *Radians'ka osvita*, 17 July 1969.
264. Iu. Dadenkov, 'Vuzy Ukrainy v deviatoi piatiletke,' *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, no. 7, (1971) p. 15.
265. L. A. Shevchenko, *Druzhiba bratnikh kul'tur* (Kiev, 1971) p. 82; B. Stanchuk, *What I. Dzyuba Stands For, and How He Does It: (Once More about the Book 'Internationalism or Russification?')* (Kiev, 1970) p. 97.
The general education school network refers to elementary, incomplete secondary and complete secondary schools. The structure of the Soviet school network is discussed by Jann Pennar and Ivan I. Bakalo, *Modernization and Diversity in Soviet Education: With Special Reference to Nationality Groups* (New York, 1971).
266. O. K. Zuban', *Borot'ba Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy za rozvytok osvity i pidhotovku kadriv dlia narodnoho hospodarstva* (L'viv, 1967) p. 90; 'Sovershenstvovat' prepodavanie russkogo iazyka vo vsekhnatsional'nykh shkolakh strany,' *Narodnoe obrazovanie*, no. 3 (1974) p. 9; *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 6 December 1964.
267. *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6*, pp. 66; 75–6. See also Kolasky. *Education*, p. 57.
268. O. Dzeverin, O. Savchenko and V. Smal', 'Narodnia osvita v Ukraini'kii RSR. Real'ni fakty. Natsionalistychni vyhadky,' *Radians'ka shkola*, no 11 (1968) p. 100; Chornovil. *The Chornovil Papers* p. 176; *Narodna osvita*, p. 83.
269. See *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 6* pp. 69–76; Yaroslav Bilinsky, *The*

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270. M. Baragunov cited by Brian D. Silver, 'The Status of National Minority Languages in Soviet Education: An Assessment of Recent Trends,' *Soviet Studies*, no. 1 (1974) p. 34.
271. Ivan Maistrenko, *Natsional'naia politika KPSS v ee istoricheskomo razvitii* (Munich, 1978) p. 165.
272. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 20 January 1962.
273. *The Ukrainian Herald Issue* 6, p. 76.
274. George S. Counts (ed.) *Khrushchev and the Central Committee Speak on Education* (Pittsburg, 1959) pp. 45–6. See also Albert Boiter, 'The Khrushchev School Reform,' *Comparative Education Review*, no. 3 (1959) pp. 8–14.
275. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 24 May 1960.
276. See B. G. Gafurov, 'Uspekhi natsional'noi politiki KPSS i nekotorye voprosy internatsional'nogo vospitaniia,' *Kommunist*, no. 11 (1958) pp. 16–17.
277. P. Tron'ko, 'Tsiho vymahaie zhyttia,' *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 12 (1958) p. 23.
278. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 22 January, 28 July and December 1957.
279. *Zasedaniia Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR piatogo sozyva. Vtoraia sessiia (22–25 dekabria 1958 g.) Stenograficheskii otchet* (Moscow, 1959) pp. 356, 296.
280. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 9 December 1958.
281. See examples in *Pravda*, 22 December 1958; *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 30 November, 3 December 1958.
282. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 4 December 1958.
283. The most notable was a translation from *Rudé Pravo* of an article by the Czech writer Bohumil Řiha who had just returned from a visit to Transcarpathia. 'Battles were fought for Ukraine from all sides, different languages were imposed on it, different cultures. . . I talked to a labourer. . . "What school do the children attend? Ukrainian, of course. The children will grow up to be real Ukrainians." . . . Yes, this people has finally found itself, and no one can take advantage of them.' *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 28 November 1958.
284. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 13 April 1960.
285. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'The Soviet Education Laws of 1958–1959 and Soviet Nationality Policy,' *Soviet Studies*, no. 2 (1962) pp. 138–57.
286. See *Pravda*, 3 January 1959; *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 22 January 1959; editorial in *Ukrains'ka mova v shkoli*, no. 4 (1959) p. 5.
287. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 13 and 14 October 1959.
288. *Z'izd' uchyteliv Ukrains'koi RSR 14–16 zhovtnia* (Kiev, 1960) p. 147.
289. *Ibid.*, pp. 32, 181, 182, 195, 208.
290. *Zasedaniia Verkhovnogo soveta Ukrainskoi SSR piatogo sozyva. Pervaia sessiia. 15–17 aprelia 1959 g. Stenograficheskii otchet* (Kiev, 1959) p. 28.
291. *Radians'ka osvita*, 5 December 1962.
292. *Nasha kul'tura*, March 1963, p. 51.
293. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 5 December 1964.

294. *Radians'ka osvita*, 28 July 1965.
295. Herbert C. Rudman, *Structure and Decision-Making in Soviet Education* (Washington, 1964) p. 42; E. N. Medynskii, *Prosveshchenie v SSSR* (Moscow, 1955) p. 198.
296. *Soviet Ukraine* (Kiev, 1969) p. 394.
297. *Zasedaniia Verkhovnogo soveta SSSR*, p. 355.
298. *Vpered*, July 1959. See also Dzyuba, *Internationalism*, p. 179.
299. *Pravda*, 4 August 1966.
300. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 4 September 1966.
301. *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR, 1918-75*, Tables 10, 11, 18, 22-3, 26-7, 30-1, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 51-2.
302. Stephen Rapawy, 'Linguistic Shift among Ukrainians in the Ukraine since Stalin,' (Ph. D. dissertation Georgetown University, 1977) p. 155.
303. *Ibid.*, pp. 109-17.
304. Sahaydak, *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8*, p. 130.
305. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 4 September 1968.
306. *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR, 1918-1975*, Table 51.
307. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 30 March 1962.
308. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 14 November 1970.
309. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 11 January 1963.
310. See *Robitnycha hazeta*, 5 February 1963.
311. *Literaturna Ukraina*, 5 April 1968.
312. *Ibid.*
313. See Jaroslaw Pelenski, 'Shelest and His Period in Soviet Ukraine (1963-1972): A Revival of Controlled Ukrainian Autonomism,' in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, p. 292.
314. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 29 January 1966.
315. Kulichenko, *Ukreplenie internatsional'nogo edinstva*, p. 353.
316. *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR, 1918-1975*, Tables 83-4.
317. See Roman Szporluk, 'The Ukrainian and The Ukrainians,' in Zev Katz, Rosemarie Rogers and Frederick Harned (eds) *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities*, (New York, 1975) p. 33.
318. See *Robitnycha hazeta*, 22 October 1965 and 22 October 1966.
319. See *Literaturna Ukraina*, 2 and 22 October 1964; *Molod' Ukrainy*, 6 November 1963; *Radians'ka kul'tura*, 27 December 1964; *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 17 January 1967.
320. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 17 February 1967.
321. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 13 October 1960.
322. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 10 September 1965.
323. See *Radians'ka kul'tura*, 27 December 1965 for complaints from Donets'k oblast', and *Literaturna Ukraina*, 15 November 1963 for a letter from a worker in the synthetic fibre combine in Darnytsia (a Kiev suburb) about problems in obtaining Ukrainian literary journals.
324. *Presa Ukrains'koi RSR, 1918-1975*, Table 80.
325. See *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 5 May 1963. For an analysis of television in Ukraine see Wasyl Veryha, *Communication Media and Soviet Nationality Policy: Status of National Languages in Soviet TV Broadcasting* (New York, 1972) pp. 7-24.
326. *Lituraturna Ukraina*, 20 January 1970.

327. *Ukraina*, no. 2 (1969) p. 3.
328. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 22 January 1971.
329. *Ukraina*, no. 4 (1967) p. 3 and no. 2 (1969) p. 3.
330. See Grey Hodnett, 'Ukrainian Politics and the Purge of Shelest,' Paper delivered to Midwest Slavic Conference, Ann Arbor, 5-7 May 1977 and his 'The Views of Petro Shelest,' *The Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States*, no.37-38 (1978-80) pp. 209-43.
- At first, Shelest's dismissal was erroneously interpreted by many Western journalists as having to do with his alleged opposition to *détente*. See *Christian Science Monitor*, 27 May 1972; *The Times*, 15 June 1972; *Le Monde*, 23 May 1972. Lewtyzkyj claims that this assessment was based on misinformation fed by CPSU authorities to Western journalists. See his *Politics and Society in Soviet Ukraine*. p. 142. A year after Shelest's purge, most Western journalists changed their evaluation of the underlying reasons for his dismissal and agreed that a national 'deviation' was at the heart of it. See *The Times*, 23 April 1973; *New York Times*, 23 April 1973; *Le Monde*, 26-7 May 1974.
331. *Pravda*, 27 May 1944.
332. Koropec'kyj, 'Economic Prerogatives,' p. 21.
333. It was during the campaign against the 'anti-Party group', which included Kaganovich, who headed the CPU in 1946, that many Ukrainian party leaders expressed their views on this period. Thus Pidhornyi at the 22nd CPSU Congress said, 'Like a true sadist Kaganovich found gratification in mocking the [party] activists and intelligentsia . . . threatening them with arrest and imprisonment. It is not by chance that to this very day, many party and state officials . . . call Kaganovich's tenure the black days of soviet Ukraine.' *XXII s'ezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet*, 3 vols (Moscow, 1962) vol. I, p. 272.
334. The standard work dealing with this question is by John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus* (New York, 1959).
335. N. F. Kuzmin, *Kommunisticheskaia partiia - vdokhnovitel' i organizator bor'by ukrainskogo naroda za sozdanie i ukreplenie ukrainskogo sovet'skogo gosudarstva* (Moscow, 1954) p. 34.
336. *Ukrainskaia SSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine*, vol. I, p. 34.
337. G. T. Gorobets, *Partiinoe podpol'e na Ukraine 1941-1944 g.g.* (Moscow, 1969) pp. 72-89.
338. *Narysy istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy* (Kiev, 1971) pp. 250, 556; *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy v rezolutsiiah*, vol. II, pp. 36-7.
339. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 27 January 1949.
340. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 29 January 1949 and Holub[nychyi], 'Konspektyvnyi narys,' pp. 130-1.
341. Borys Levyts'kyi, 'Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy - 1955 rik,' *Ukrains'kyi zbirnyk*, no.3 (1955) p. 111.
342. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 29 January 1949. Here and below the nationality of Politburo and Orgburo members was established by consulting biographical entries in various encyclopaedias and the biographical

- data contained in Borys Lewytzkyj, *Die Sowjetukraine 1944-1963* (Cologne and Berlin, 1964) pp. 301–74.
343. Cited by Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 16.
344. In Ukraine the attack was centred on the Kiev party organisation which was criticised for tolerating 'manifestations of bourgeois nationalism and Zionism'. This campaign, which reached hysterical proportions reminiscent of the 1930s, suddenly came to a halt when notices of Stalin's illness appeared in the press on 4 March 1953. The next day Stalin died. See *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 29 February, 1 and 2 March 1953.
345. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 13 June 1953.
346. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 25 March 1952 and 27 March 1954.
347. Levyts'kyi, 'Komunistychna partiia,' p. 111.
348. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 27 March 1954. In 1952 the Political Bureau (Politburo) of the Central Committee of both the CPU and CPSU was renamed the Presidium of the Central Committee. In 1966 Presidium was changed back Politburo. We will use Politburo throughout.
349. Sullivant, *Soviet Politics and the Ukraine*, p. 289.
350. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 24 March 1954.
351. See Lazar Pistrak, *The Grand Tactician: Khrushchev's Rise to Power* (London, 1961) pp. 139–270.
352. *Pravda*, 30 May 1954.
353. *Pravda*, 14 February 1956.
354. I. Starovoitenko and F. Khyrliuk, 'Pro planuvannia kompleksnoho rozvytku hospodarstva oblastei', *Ekonomika Radians'koi Ukrainy*, no. 6 (1969) p. 2; *Narysy istorii Komunistychnoi partii Ukrainy* p. 571.
355. See editorial in *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 8 June 1957.
356. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 11 June 1958.
357. *Radians'ka Ukraina*, 12 December 1958.
358. *Partiinaia zhizn'*, no.12 (1958) pp. 58–9; 'Boiovyi zahin KPRS. Kompartiiia Ukrainy v tsyfrakh,' *Komunist Ukrainy*, no.6 (1978) p. 31.
359. *Partiinaia zhizn'*, no.1 (1960) p. 49.
360. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 19 March 1966, 18 March 1971; Borys Lewytzkyj, 'The Ruling Organs of Ukraine,' in *Ukraine in the Seventies*, pp. 270–7.
361. Central Intelligence Agency, *Research Aid: The CPSU Under Brezhnev* (Washington, 1976) p. 73.
362. Grey Hodnett, *Leadership in the Soviet National Republics: A Quantitative Study of Recruitment Policy* (Oakville, 1978), Table 2.13, p. 105.
363. 'Boiovyi zahin KPRS,' pp. 28–9; *Komunistychna partiia Ukrainy-boiovyi zahin KPRS* (Kiev, 1976) pp. 18–28; *Soviet Ukraine*, p. 190.
364. Dmytro Solovei, *Polityka TsK KPSS u planuvanni rozvytku promyslovosty ta promyslovykh kadriv na Ukraini* (New York, 1960) p. 82.
365. *Ibid.*, pp. 64–102.
366. *Pravda*, 28 April 1957. See also *Radians'ka osvita*, 14 July 1956.
367. *Robitnycha hazeta*, 13 January 1967.
368. *Politicheskii dnevnik*, p. 91.
369. Koropec'kyj, 'Economic Prerogatives,' p. 21.
370. Hélène Carrère d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist*

- Republics in Revolt* (New York, 1979) p. 215.
371. 'Ukrainian Communist Document,' *Meta*, no. 2 (1976) p. 40.
372. Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, 'The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR,' *Problems of Communism*, May-June (1974) p. 11.
373. Carrère d'Encausse, *Decline of an Empire*, p. 214.
374. Rakowska-Harmstone, 'The Dialectics of Nationalism,' p. 10.
375. The accusations were outlined in an unsigned review article of Shelest's book *Ukraino nasha radians'ka* (Kiev, 1970): 'Pro seriozni nedoliky ta pomylyki odniiie knyhy', *Komunist Ukrainy*, no. 4 (1973) pp. 77-82.
376. *Pravda*, 31 October 1972.
377. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 20 April 1973.
378. Sahaydak, *The Ukrainian Herald Issue 7-8*, pp. 125-51; Iurii Badz'o, *Vidkrytyi lyst do Prezydii Verkhovnoi rady Soiuzu RSR ta Tsentral'noho komitetu KPRS* (New York, 1980) pp. 50-5.
379. Dzyuba, *Internationalism*, p. 204.
380. There exists a substantial body of literature analysing dissent in Ukraine. See George Liber and Anna Mostovych, comp., *Non-conformity and Dissent in the Ukrainian SSR, 1955-1975: An Annotated Bibliography* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978)
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383. See Yaroslav Bilinsky, 'Politics, Purge, and Dissent in the Ukraine since the Fall of Shelest,' in Ihor Kamenetsky (ed.) *Nationalism and Human Rights: Processes of Modernization in the USSR*, (Littleton, Colorado, 1977) pp. 168-85.
384. For an analysis of the post-Shelest period in Ukraine see Bohdan Krawchenko (ed.) *Ukraine After Shelest* (Edmonton, 1983).
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