



ELSEVIER

Contents lists available at [SciVerse ScienceDirect](http://SciVerse.Sciencedirect.com)

## Communist and Post-Communist Studies

journal homepage: [www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud](http://www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud)

## Ukraine twenty years after independence: Concept models of the society



Karina V. Korostelina

School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, 3330 N. Washington Blvd., Truland Building, 5th Floor, Arlington, VA 22201, USA

## ARTICLE INFO

## Article history:

Available online 5 January 2013

## Keywords:

Ukraine  
National identity  
Ethnic and regional divide  
Democracy  
Civic society  
Economy  
Corruption  
Power  
Conflict

## ABSTRACT

This paper attempts to create an overview of the Ukraine twenty years after independence by presenting prevailing conceptual narrative models of Ukraine employed by Ukrainian and foreign experts. Based on the analysis of 58 interviews of Ukrainian political and intellectual elites and foreign experts, the study revealed several categories of conceptual narrative models employed by respondents: (1) a state without a national idea and a common identity; (2) a country in an unfinished transition and degradation; (3) a divided society; and (4) Ukraine as a colony or “wild capitalism”. The analysis of these categories helps to assess conflict potential in Ukraine and discuss some ideas for conflict prevention and resolution.

© 2013 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Twenty years ago Ukraine gained its independence and started its path toward a free market economy and democratic governance. Where it is now after the change of four presidents and the Orange Revolution? There is a vast literature on the process of development and the various aspects leading up to the current political, economic, and socio-cultural situations in Ukraine. This paper aims to create a comprehensive view on Ukraine after twenty years of independence by presenting prevailing conceptual narrative models of Ukraine employed by Ukrainian and foreign experts. In addition to assessing the potential for conflict in Ukraine, this paper also discusses some ideas for conflict prevention and resolution.

Several international organizations have recently rated Ukrainian's economic and democratic performance. According to the Freedom House Annual Report 2011, the level of civic society in Ukraine scored at 2.75, democracy scored 4.61, and corruption scored 5.75 (all scores are on the scale from 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level). The Report further states that national political power in Ukraine is consolidated in the hands of President Yanukovich, who regained control over the cabinet, the security service, and the prosecutor general after the restoration of the constitution in October 2010 to its pre-2004 state. Despite President Yanukovich's pledge to increase the autonomy of local governments, his actions and policies resulted in the strengthening of centralization of political power. The Freedom House Report also emphasized antidemocratic trends that impacts civic society and freedom of media including political pressure, arrests, and administrative detentions of NGO activists and journalists. As the report states, “a combination of societal apathy and lack of capacity among NGOs prevented them from effectively resisting the year's antidemocratic trend” (Freedom House, p. 591). This increase of negative socio-political tendencies in Ukrainian Society, particularly in the field of democratic rights and liberties was also affirmed in a NATO report (Malan, 2011).

According to Pew Forum research, the approval of change to democracy in Ukraine dropped from 72% in 1991 to 30% in 2009, a decline of 42% – the biggest fall among all post-Soviet countries. Approval of change to capitalism also declined from 52% to 36% positioning Ukraine in the fourth place from the end, after Hungary, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. Moreover, 69% of respondents prefer

E-mail address: [ckoroste@gmu.edu](mailto:ckoroste@gmu.edu).

a strong leader over democratic government (20%), again the biggest gap in Europe. Moreover, the preference of having democratic leaders declined from 57% in 1991 to 20% in 2009. 55% percent of Ukrainians disapprove of democracy (the biggest disapproval rate in Europe) and the support for multiparty system declined from 72% in 1991 to 30% in 2009. Ukrainian respondents declared that economic prosperity was more important for them than democracy (74% vs. 50%). According to the report “78% of Ukrainian respondents, more than seven-in-ten say that if they had to choose, they would prefer a strong economy than democracy (12%), the biggest gap in Europe” (Pew Forum, 2009). Nan described this culture as “individualist, protectionist and survivalist...Successive governments using quasi-democratic parliamentary systems have simply re-enforced this position to the extent that the majority now see democracy as a discredited system that has bought nothing positive” (Nan, 2011).

The promise of the President to combat corruption as a major problem in Ukraine also has failed: “Glaring conflicts of interest among senior officials in the new government, combined with further delays in the passage of anticorruption legislation, fueled public skepticism about the leadership’s pledges to combat graft in 2010” (Freedom House, 2011, p. 585). According to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, in 2010 Ukraine was ranked 134 out of 178 surveyed countries (Transparency International, 2010). The Heritage Foundation’s 2010 Index of Economic Freedom put Ukraine on 162 place out of 179 surveyed states (Heritage Foundation, 2010). Corruption was reported as a major national problem by 70% of respondents, followed by pollution (64%) and crime (56%) (Pew Forum, 2009).

In July 2011, Forbes placed Ukraine in fourth place among the world’s worst economies, stating that “Ukraine has rich farmland and generous mineral resources and could become a leading European economy — yet per-capita GDP trails far behind even countries like Serbia and Bulgaria. The U.S. State Dept. blames ‘complex laws and regulations, poor corporate governance, weak enforcement of contract law by courts, and particularly corruption’” (Forbes, 2011). The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development stated that 35 percent of Ukraine’s population could be defined as living in poverty (on the basis of the World Bank’s threshold of income less than a dollar per day) (OECD, 2011, p. 6). The Pew Forum survey also shows that 62% of Ukrainian people feel worse off than under communism, placing Ukraine in second place in Europe after Hungary. 47% reported that they lost ground in the past 5 years while only 26% reported making progress (Pew Forum, 2009). According to the Institute of Sociology, 74% of respondents stated that there is high level of disorder and uncertainty in the society; 73.4% declared that they could not comprehend changes in the society, and 80% agreed that the majority of people do not believe in anything (Vorona and Shulga, 2010).

The situation in Ukraine after 20 year of independence has also been extensively discussed by Ukrainian and international scholars. Some focused on structural issues. For example, the uncertainty around the Ukrainian model of development was commented upon by Umland as follows: “It is universally acknowledged that Ukraine needs to fundamentally change its political, administrative, economic, social and education system. However, the question of which socio-economic model exactly Ukraine should embrace remains a matter of dispute and source of stagnation” (Umland, 2011). He also acknowledged a high social and cultural polarization, growing fragmentation of the Ukrainian society, and the rise of extremist organizations. These divisions within the country were also emphasized by Malan in a NATO report: “Since independence at the end of 1991, Ukraine has been divided between an anti-Russian, pro-European West and a more pro-Russian South and East. Ukrainian nationalism, anchored in the West of the country around Lviv (part of Austria-Hungary only a century ago and part of interwar Poland), is Western-looking, built against Russia as the significant rival, while the Eastern and Southern parts of the country see themselves as more organically linked to Russia” (Malan, 2011).

Other scholars focus on the absence of real political reforms, power, and the persistence of corruption. Kusio (2011) discusses four factors that contribute to the Ukrainian state’s immobility and corruption: political culture, weak political will and civil society, absence of institutions that can fight with corruption, weakness of ideology and dependency of political parties on business. D’Anieri concentrates on the factors that impede and contribute to consolidation of power in Ukraine. Thus, according to the scholar, regional divisions, the absence of a natural-resource-based economy, and the relative weakness of the post-communist security services obstruct concentration of power, while weak institutions, weak norms, and methods of putting down of competitors support concentration of power (D’Anieri, 2011). Nan also stresses the absence of the stability of power because of the internal competition of five clans within the Party of Regions and its impact on degradation of economy (Nan, 2011). The weakness of Ukrainian political system that sustains political populism is also described by Kuzio who states that “Ukraine’s political system remains weak, fractured, highly personalized, and ideologically vacuous, while the judiciary and media fail to hold politicians to account. Such an environment permits social populism to flourish across the entire Ukrainian political spectrum and does not punish politicians for writing one thing, saying another, and ignoring everything that went before” (Kuzio, 2010).

Thus, while various aspects of Ukraine are analyzed and discussed by the international organizations and scholars, there is no comprehensive description of the Ukrainian State and society after 20 years of independence that combines an examination of different features of the society. This paper seeks to rectify this by providing an inclusive depiction of Ukraine as viewed by Ukrainian and foreign experts. This paper also aims to assess potential conflicts in Ukraine and discuss several ideas for conflict prevention and resolution.

## 1. Methodology

### 1.1. Method

The main method of this research is a semi-structural interview consisting of 6 questions regarding: an assessment of the current situation in Ukraine, its national identity, the politics of language and history, history textbooks, and possible future

developments within Ukraine (note: this paper analyzes answers to the first question regarding the current situation in Ukraine). Each interview lasted between 1.5 and 3 h. In addition, the author used participant-observation method during several academic round-tables and political discussions, monitored major TV programs that present political discussions (Shuster Live, Freedom of Speech), and analyzed data available at the libraries and on the websites of academic institutes and independent research centers.

## 1.2. Sample

The aim of this research was to interview people who represent the “1.5 diplomacy” level: scholars, political leaders, and journalists that are active in the political sphere and have an impact on political discourse. The author used purposive sample of experts with elements of snowballing. For snowballing, 7 independent entry points were used. In addition, 3 widely recognized experts were asked to assess the list of interviewees to insure that the sample included major experts and equally represented all political and scientific groups. The final sample consists of 58 interviewees, 53 in Kiev and 5 in Simferopol, Crimea. Among them 7 are Directors or Chairs of foreign foundations, 16 are Directors or leading scientists at the academic institutes within the Ukrainian Academy of Science, including the Institute of Philosophy, Institute of History, Institute of Sociology, Institute of Political and Ethnographic research, Institute of World Economy, and others. Ten are Directors or leading experts at independent think tanks and research centers, 7 are faculty members of leading Ukrainian Universities, 9 are political leaders (members of Government, Deputies of Verhovna Rada (Parliament) and Directors of the Institute of National Memory and the National Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of Ukraine), and 4 are journalists. Among respondents 48 are Ukrainians and 10 are foreign experts from Europe and the U.S. The gender representation is influenced by the specificity of the academic and political spheres in Ukraine: among respondents 47 are male and 11 are female.

## 1.3. Methods of data analysis

At the first stage, all the respondents' answers were organized into 14 categories. A  $58 \times 14$  table was created to present answers of all respondents that correspond with the categories of the analysis. The respondents' narratives varied by the level of the development of each category, and some categories were not always addressed by each respondents. The first stage of analysis had two different formats of answers to the questions about problems and achievements of Ukraine after 20 years of independence. One group of respondents provided a comprehensive concept or model that describes the current state of Ukraine. The other group of respondents offered a list of problems and achievements.

At the second stage, the models were organized in several categories based upon the narrative content from the first stage: (1) state without a national idea and a common identity; (2) a country in an unfinished transition and degradation; (3) a divided society; and (4) Ukraine as a colony or “wild capitalism”. Each category of conceptual models was then further analyzed as a narrative, and corresponding problems were added to the analysis of each narrative. The analysis was conducted within two groups: Ukrainian respondents and foreign experts.

## 2. Results

### 2.1. Ukraine as a state without national identity

Seventeen respondents employ this narrative as a conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; 41 respondents mention it among other problems. Thus this idea is presented in narratives of 100% of Ukrainian respondents.

At the core of this narrative is a concern that the absence of unity of public consciousness impedes resolution of important problems that Ukraine faces now. The narrative stresses the need for a common national identity. There is a state of Ukraine, but there is no nation: no common view on Ukraine, no national idea, and as a result, no motivation among the population to contribute to Ukrainian development. The absence of national ideology and political course leads to political apathy. Consequently, the society experiences a lack of permanent development, a deficiency of solidarity, a limited long-term outlook, and a divide between generations in values and beliefs.

In 1991, when Ukraine gained its independence, there were limited conceptualizations about the direction of development or national ideology. People who fought for Ukrainian independence for centuries were inspired by the idea of sovereignty but lacked a comprehensive concept of Ukraine. Yet in 1991 there was no vision of a Ukrainian nation-state; independence was declared by communists who either did not understand the need for a new concept or were afraid of enacting radical changes in order to preserve their power. Even after 20 years of independence Marxist-Leninist ideas still prevail in the understanding of the society; Soviet concepts such as *national'nost'*, native people, and national minorities are still included in the Constitution. As such, the process of the development of a national idea has failed and the foundation for a new nation-state was never created.

Ukraine, rich with geographic potential, an established industrial base, extensive natural resources, and a stable productive economy was viewed as a trophy territory by the Government and people. This “trophy” perception (steal and squander) prevailed, affecting people's value system. The only consensus on a national image evolved around the ideas of a “fence around the house” that praises individualism, and the idea of “good life” or “being in Europe” that concentrates on economic wellbeing. Based on the latter, Ukrainians gave power to oligarchs, a people representing success, in the hope that they would know how to build the country and change life for the better. But current governments and oligarchs have not

been motivated by nationalistic principles, and care little about Ukraine and its future.<sup>1</sup> There are no national leaders who promote a nationalistic narrative and who are supported by 80–90% of population. The absence of a national narrative results in the view of the nation as a set of dissimilar civilizations and cultures with radical differences in history, politics, and mentality. In turn, these difficulties in finding a balanced compromise in the politics of memory, negatively mobilizes the electorate when “rocking the boat” of identity.<sup>2</sup>

Currently, Ukraine is too politically weak to define its place in the world system, making it an easy target from influences from Russia and the West. However, reunification with Russia is unpopular among Ukrainians, especially after the Georgian war and the gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainians want to live in Europe but feel it is still just a dream, an expectation that Europe will provide for Ukraine. At this time, there are no real reforms being enacted that could bring Ukraine up to Europe standards.<sup>3</sup> Ukraine was and continues to be dependent on their neighbors, and became a victim of all conflicts within and between empires it belonged to: the Soviet experiment, World War II, the Cold War. As a frontier society, Ukraine lies on the crossroad of different orientations, always a desired object of expansions, influences, and interests. Ukraine always fought with oppressors for their own interest, searched for independence from different external groups, and learned how to adopt and play games with powerful empires. The inertia of dependency impacts all spheres of life where independence is only a façade, not a reality. Only 5% of population is represented in the Parliament. Another problem that derives from the history of a frontier state is the inability to move forward without assistance, independently of neighboring countries. That is why Ukraine is fluctuating between Russia and the West.

Thus, this narrative model emphasizes the absence of the common national identity, national ideology, and a unified nation-state concept. The original communist leadership who brought independence to Ukraine continued to use Marxists–Leninist theories of the society, bypassing public discussions around the state as a nation. Instead, the government and the society, concerned about economic wellbeing as a higher priority, saw and acted as if Ukraine was a purse for their own profit. The creation of a national identity was also obstructed by conflicts around the role of Ukraine’s Soviet past in the development of the current nation. It resulted in power elite that cares little about Ukraine and its prosperity, in resolving ethnic and regional tensions, and an absence of a clear concept of international relations.

## 2.2. *Country in an unfinished transition and degradation*

Thirteen respondents employed this narrative as a conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition 32 respondents mention it among other problems (total, 89% of Ukrainian respondents describe this issue).

This narrative describes Ukraine as a country that is still on the way to modernization and is finding the transition to be very frustrating, painful, and challenging. Despite a strong eagerness for change expressed in the society, real changes, steps forward or reforms, or shifts from a Soviet to market economy are few. This failed transitional process results in social pessimism, doubts, and disappointment among Ukrainians. Further, not only the transitional process is not complete after 20 years, it is impossible to predict the timeframes within which it might be completed.

One of the major reasons for the slow transition is the absence of a common vision about the direction or final outcome of the transitional process from communism. Ukraine’s transformation has been a unique one. Faced with limited and untested models for overcoming communism embedded in societies, the Government never created an image of a new Ukraine as self-efficient and integrated nation-state. The population is united by an abstract idea that Ukraine should join the European Union, but it is hard to imagine the European future while being excluded from European experiences. Elites had hoped that the transformation of the economy to a free market type of economy would lead to a change in people mentality (“as Karl Marx had taught”), but now understand that they need to change people’s perceptions first.

The transitional process has not been linear; developments have cycled through stages of euphoria and depression. The Orange Revolution was a break-through, an inspiration, but soon Ukraine again entered a period of pessimism and an absence of progress. In political spheres there seems to be a permanent political crisis starting with the 2000 “cassette scandal”.

Ukraine today cannot be understood without comprehending its Soviet heritage. The dependency upon the Soviet past has been extremely hard to overcome. The Soviet reality still dominates society and is evident in the high level of corruption, paternalism, administrative management, and aversion of innovation. There is an ongoing struggle between Soviet and post-Soviet identity in which Soviet characteristics still prevails. Communism as an ideology and a form of social life defines the consciousness of people. Many still expect the State to provide for the people, giving them a stable job that can last all life. They see the labor collective as a referent group, a group of support and a guaranty of stability where people have worked for decades. Dissatisfaction with the government is represented by the idea “Government is not thinking about me, I am not wanted by the Country.” Many people have nostalgia for the Soviet times, seeking to continue the previously effective (or at least idolized) practices of societal creation, sustained by the Soviet type of enthusiasm of the people, and receiving support from the state. Political thinking continues to be based on a culture from the past, one that supports paternalism, infancy, and a craving for a strong leader with a “magic formula” for success.

<sup>1</sup> More discussion on this topic is in the section “Ukraine as a colony.”

<sup>2</sup> More on the diversity of Ukraine is in section “divided society”.

<sup>3</sup> More on European dream is in the section “unfinished transition”.

Even if Ukrainians expect the State to provide for them they do not trust it, and due to high levels of corruption, have a low confidence in the President and Verhovna Rada. Civil society development is very low as reflected by an almost total absence of civil society organizations, limited opportunities for civic responsibility and participation, and few demands from the society; even the freedom of press is being affected. Further efforts to increase civil society options are stymied by the vertical systems of social connections, including the Soviet-style of Government and party system.

Thus, the country is very far from political democracy, democracy is weak, not consolidated, there are steps backwards, and in many spheres, democracy became tokenism. Ukraine is steadily moving toward an authoritarian state but still preserves some liberal policy toward mass media. The majority of people do not consider democracy as an important value or an aim of the society. Rather the value of wealth and stability prevails. Ironically, many people think that democracy brings oligarchs and economic problems: achievement of personal wealth has become a common idea that unites people.

This unfinished transition leads to continuous degradation of Ukrainian society, economy, and state. There are several areas where decline is most present:

#### 1. Economic decline (72% of respondents)

Ukraine came into its twentieth anniversary of independence with a destroyed infrastructure and economy. According to different data sets used by respondents, the current GDP of Ukraine is only 63 to 75 percent of the level of 1991. During 20 year of independence there has been no significant economic development: 15% of the economic structure of Ukraine was developed before 1917, 5–7% during 1920–40s, 80% during 1956–89 and after 1991 where was almost no economic development or reconstruction. Thus, Ukraine is “eating up” old infrastructures and economics, losing its industrial potential. At the source is the loss of the USSR military-industrial establishment whose intellectual and industrial-technological resources were centered in Ukraine. Now they are completely destroyed.

There is capital outflow, inflation, absence of investments, deficiency of fundamental science and technology, emigration of the educated cadre. It is important to invest in research and development, yet there is no interest among oligarchs to invest into new technologies. Thus, instead of progress, Ukraine faces an involution: a reduction of production and productivity of labor.

Ukraine's economy is completely dependent on Russia's economy and energy resources. What is left of the USSR's economic infrastructure has left the two country's economies intertwined. Around 1.5 thousands Ukrainian enterprises, and military-industrial establishments are connected with Russia's industrial cycles making an autonomous Ukrainian economy almost impossible to establish.

#### 2. Corruption (72% of respondents)

Corruption has penetrated every sphere of life, at all level of society, starting from the top, and becoming a generalized moral phenomenon, and integrated style of thinking. Corruption on the government level created a self-sufficient state of bureaucracy, commercialization of the state services and political activity, and control over money flows disregarding responsible uses of proper power. Ordinary citizens are also becoming corrupted, supporting the circle of corruption, resulting in a lack of trust society wide.

#### 3. Failing state (68% of respondents)

Ukraine is a weak and ineffective state without the foundational principles of an effective administration and a national vision. Problems with an imbalanced apparatus of power, a deficient of interconnections between the vertical silos of power, and the destruction of executive power by the mass dismissal from executive offices completed by presidents Yushchenko and Yanukovich contribute to the issue. The relations between the state and the society are absent; citizens do not have any ownership of the state, voting for politicians they do not trust. The elite is not well educated, and is not concern about the prosperity of the society.

Ukraine does not have any leverage in international relations, nor does it attempt to position itself in international relations. It was a mistake to give up the atomic resources it once had, and along with it, the inherent respect by other countries, counterbalancing Russia and Europe.

#### 4. Decreased level of education and culture (65% of respondents).

The level of education is seen as decreasing. There is a drastic decline in the quality of education, the system of education is considered non-effective, there are high rates of absenteeism of teachers in rural areas, and there is a scarcity of school equipment and laboratory instruments. There is no demand for knowledge, good education, or technologies as the natural inclinations toward these aspirations are suppressed by the Government and mass media. Moral cynicism dominates among the population.

Corruption prevails at all levels of education, knowledge is less important than the ability to pay. Not a meritocracy, the State does little to prepare the best representatives of the next generation to manage the country, or become good specialists. Most of the public schools are housed in old premises, with the best buildings reserved for privatized schools and kindergartens.

### 5. Loss of human potential (55% of respondents)

Ukraine lost seven million people during the 20 years of independence. Among the reasons are job migration to foreign countries, increased mortality rates among the population because of high level of inflation and forced privatization of the economy resulting in increase rates of death due to poverty related factors. Ongoing impacts of Ukraine's 20th century history are still felt: civil war, famine, repressions, oppression of the intelligentsia, World War II and so on. Thus Ukraine lost a huge portion of its population and still "pays a bill of wars."

### 6. Degradation of agriculture (30% of respondents)

There has been a destruction of agricultural cycles, neglected buildings, absence of machinery, hostile methods of privatization, and misappropriation of lands. The rural population is declining, and people are migrating to the cities.

Therefore, this model narrative describes Ukraine as captured in the unfinished process of transformation without clear vision where it should be heading. This undulating process is pulling Ukraine from crisis to crisis with some inspiring periods like the Orange Revolution. The communist past deeply impacts the current reality; people still have a Soviet mentality, view the Government as a paternalistic provider, and are waiting for a strong personality that will magically create change. The Government itself still reflects Soviet styles of governing, inhibiting a democratic parliament by underdeveloping the party system and not addressing the needs of society. The level of civil society is low, democracy is weak, and not consolidated. Thus, this model narrative notes that communism is very difficult to overcome and the current Government makes little if any efforts to change the situation. The degradation of the society is presented in decline of economy, corruption, failing state, degradation of education and culture, loss of human potential, and decline of agriculture.

## 3. Divided society

Five respondents employed this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition 18 respondents mention it among other problems (total, 47% of the respondents describe this problem). While all these experts similarly acknowledge this problem, their narrative descriptions of the nature and sources of the divide differ significantly. Thus, the description of the narrative model will be followed by 5 sub-models that represent alternative interpretations of the schism. These various explanations of this rift by experts not only reflect the divide but also confirm its existence.

The country is divided completely by differences in moral values, ethnic identity, and class. Cultural differences are antagonistic, regionally fixed, and rest on the historic character of the regions. These regions were parts of different states for centuries, developed within fundamentally different state structures and empires, have different histories and different experience. In recent history, Western Ukraine was occupied in 1939 and did not receive anything positive from the Soviet Union; the rest of Ukrainian population saw both positive and negative sides of the Soviet regime. It results in significant differences in geopolitical vectors of development and assessments of history. Despite the common perception that Ukraine is moving toward Europe, the society has multiple trajectories. These differences are strengthened by the disagreements between Europe and Russia around the issue of Ukraine. The elites in the society do not provide compromises, decisions or common visions. Instead the ruling class supports differences and use ethnic identity to cover class divides and redirect attention from economic issues. The mass media contributes to the problem using scandals, playing up conflicts, and ignores opportunities for compromise.

There are several models of the divide.

#### Model 1: The divide between nationalists and the Ukrainian population (pro-Soviet narrative)

The current territory of Ukraine was established only in 1945, so different parts of Ukraine had diverse levels of economic development. Ukraine was completely destroyed after the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45 but was completely rebuilt, with a national economy reconstructed incorporating the new Western regions that previously were colonies of the West, bringing them up to a similar development level with the rest of Ukraine. But it was not enough time to deal with differences. Thus regions still have different perspectives and views of the past and future. For example, the leadership of the West was trying to cancel Victory Day celebrations based on their deep belief that "everything in the past was bad". Almost half of the public see strong differences between West and East Ukraine. The population of Galicia is very conservative, rural, and patriarchal; despite calling themselves European, they find the West European culture to be alien to them. They are ready to sacrifice the unity of Ukraine, to return the territory of Donbas to Russia and rejoin Galicia to Poland. Others feel that the people of Ukraine paid too much to unite all Ukrainian lands and real patriots should preserve the country, and should seek to educate people about the unity of Ukraine and their responsibility to maintain it as a state.

#### Model 2: The divide between Ukrainian and Russian identity (pro-Russian narrative)

The problem of the divide between East and West came out of the Orange revolution and will remain as an issue for decades to come. People of Russian background living in Ukraine want to be considered an equal ethnic group with

Ukrainians, and do not see themselves as a minority. Further, they oppose imposition of other Ukrainian values and identities on their group. On the other side, Ukrainian nationalists describe themselves as constantly traumatized, victimized, and colonized subjects of Russia. This divide is symbolically represented in two different names for the monument called Arch of Friendship built in Kiev during the Soviet time: Russian people still call it an “arch” while Ukrainian people call it a “yoke.” This divide significantly increased during the period of 2004–07 because of the intolerance of Ukrainian nationalists who utilize ethnicity narratives in every issue. Yushchenko exasperated the situation by imposing his anti-Russian nationalistic ideas on everyone (“raping of society”), denied Russian ethnic legitimacy by burying it under a one rule system, and supported Western Ukraine control in all societal matters. Currently, Yanukovich supports pluralism of opinions and de-ideologization of the society. The Government, including the Minister of Education Dmitry Tabachnic, consults with all people, but the population of Western Ukraine still criticizes them for their lack of support of Ukrainian ideals

#### Model 3: The divide between Ukrainian and Russian identity (pro-Ukrainian narrative)

The majority of the population are Ukrainians, but there are “two Ukraines”: (1) The northern region represents authentic Ukraine, the Rus, people who lived on their own land under different regimes but preserved their Ukrainian language and culture. As the area was conquered and reconquered, these groups regard all ruling powers as foreign to them, and the people developed a tradition of mistrust toward governments. Historically under attack, their ethnic identity is more salient especially during the fight with Poland (17th century) for Ukrainian independence. Western Ukraine was never a part of the Russian Empire, and is generally more democratic than most fragments of the former USSR. For Galicia, the heart of the Western Ukraine, the inclusion into the USSR provoked very painful reactions. (2) Southern region is a territory colonized by Russia: plains were colonized during Romanov dynasty and the South–East – during the Soviet time. Three hundred years ago there were just wild plains and wild nomads. People on these new lands incorporated a Russian identity under Soviet rule, different mentality that is hard to change. These sentiments are supported by the ongoing imperial ambitions of Russia: Ukraine, as a heir of Kievan Rus', is seen by the Russians as the heart of Russia, it is very hard for them to separate these two countries. Soviet and Russian propaganda coming from Moscow is very effective with Russia spending millions of rubles on subversive actions, creating an imbalance in Ukraine. This narrative also describes Ukraine as post-genocide and post-colonial country with a perverted mentality, an absence of human values, and persistent dominance of Soviet values. As all post-colonial societies, Ukraine is divided by different identities; language and history are deemed to be the sources of conflict in the society.

#### Model 4: The divide between West-orientation and Soviet orientation

The Ukrainian territory was developed through a “Lego-connection” of two socio-cultural communities: (1) Pre-colonial segment – on the old territory that has a history of Magdeburg law, European Renaissance, traditional culture, deep historic heritage, national consciousness, and deep memory about Ukrainian traditions. This group supports Ukrainian independence, democracy, revival of the Ukrainian language, desires an increase of its status, and wants to move forward toward Europe. (2) Post-colonial segment: A pro-Russian and Soviet territories that were industrialized based on immigration; their history is not as deep, Donbas was established in 19th century and many parts of it as late as the 1930s. These people have lost their Russian culture and cut their cultural roots when they moved to Ukraine, so they are not a Russian community of immigrants who is preserving their culture. These two regions have very different histories of 1920s: Sovietization in the Eastern Ukraine versus a Ukrainian national movement in the Western Ukraine. There was a tolerant co-existence between these two regions during the USSR, but it could be acknowledged as a golden era: all ethnic identities were suppressed by the common Soviet identity. The fall of the Soviet Union resulted in the growth of regional patriotism and an increase of ethno-cultural movements.

#### Model 5: Intermixed geographic: 3–4 parts of Ukraine and mixed population

There are 3 (or 4) major regions of Ukraine: Western Ukraine 15%, North-Center (historic Ukraine, axis Kharkiv–Odesa) 35%, South–East –30%, and (Donbas and Crimea –20%). These four zones are different by culture and language, with each behaving almost as separate countries. Active national fundamentalists live along the edges of the Ukraine. In the West, a national-democratic fundamentalists support populist leaders who promote ethno-cultural identity. To the East, pro-Russian Stalinists speak out with anti-Ukrainian sentiments. These stridently different regions by culture and mentality are kept apart by the “swamp” in the middle of Ukraine, limiting direct contact of oppositional territories. In one part of this “swamp” are “clientalists”, those who support a Soviet style of society represented by an economic executive – leader and a class of workers. Their identity is essentially Soviet, speaking Russian, and following Soviet values promoted by the USSR, including the development of an ideal enemy. There are different proportions of Russians and Ukrainians in the regions, so it is hard to draw the line by the Dnepr River. There are numerous transitional or mixed cultural enclaves, represented by three groups: Russians, Ukrainian speaking Ukrainians, and Russian speaking Ukrainians. Many mixed marriages and an interesting mix of Russian language and Ukrainian culture is developing.

Thus, this narrative model describes Ukraine as a divided society, with the differences deeply rooted in history, culture, mentality, and inspirations for the future. The political entrepreneurs are actively using these ethno-cultural divides to remove the attention from economic problems and class divisions. The influence of Russia sharpens the conflict. There are 5

general explanations of the nature of the schism: a pro-Soviet narrative of the divide between Ukrainian nationalists and the rest of the population, a pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian narratives of ethnic divide, a narrative of divide between pro-Western and Soviet orientation, and finally, a narrative of multiple identities within Ukraine.

### 3.1. *Ukraine as a colony*

Five respondents employ this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition 15 respondents mention it among other problems (total, 42% of respondents discuss this issue).

This model reflects the idea that the current Ukraine is a colony for oligarchs who accumulate their capital through the use of internal sources. There is increasing concentration of capital in the hands of the oligarchs, whose financial interests are realized through political, legislative, and financial systems: in May 2011 the Government acquitted oligarchs of their tax debt; the taxes on added value that are taking from all businesses are returned to only a few oligarchs. The Government and oligarchs assume the right to define national interests and see economy of the country through their own interests. Many oligarchs are considered not to be Ukrainian, they see Ukraine only as a territory for the concentration of their gains, as a temporary object of getting money, and do not have a respect and pride for the country. Both oligarchs and the Government are indifferent to the destiny of Ukraine: they do not develop new markets, technology, and science. There are no capital investments in the economy, no systemic approaches to development, especially in agriculture. They orient on short term gains or supra-gains in select areas (chocolate, vodka).

The social stratification is enormous: there is a chasm between the wealthy and the poor. According to different data sets, the ratio between the former and the latter is 1:47 and 1:50. Citizens are treated as slaves and as a source of wealth for elite. The State uses people, makes a profit out of people's work, and hardly provides opportunities to the population to support themselves through small businesses. Oligarchs are not interested in support the older generation nor increase of quality of life of general population. Social spheres, including social support and security, are neglected. For colonial powers, the most important aim of the population management is the increase of population. Thus the Government invests in increasing birth rates and supports immigration of cheap workers from the Caucasus and Central Asia, while doing little for their general welfare when they arrive.

Thus, Ukraine is building capitalism as it was described by Karl Marx: upper bourgeoisie in power, no middle class, and workers without rights. While the developed countries are building information-based and civil societies with responsible government, Ukraine has created the system of wild capitalism of the 19th century exactly as it was depicted in the textbooks on Marxism–Leninism. It is paternalistic and a patriarchal society of workers and employers (not a civic society), where power is not controlled by the society, power and capital are merged, and legal and legislative powers are limited. The new Ukrainian class structure and distribution of property sustains a new class of employers, suppresses small and medium business, and curtails workers' rights. Accordingly, an upper bourgeoisie dominates in Kiev. They do not have a national idea, they obstruct development of the middle class, and have exclusive rights to deal with the workers. The middle class was hoping to obtain power in 2004, but the elite did not give them a chance, using the exact forcible means as described by Marx.

## 4. Narratives of foreign experts

### 4.1. *Country in an unfinished transition*

Out of ten foreign respondents four of them employ this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition 6 respondents mention it among other problems (total, 100% of respondents discuss this problem).

This narrative describes Ukraine as a society in slow transition, absent of any real change in the ways of thinking, acting, and working. Ukraine lives in a cocoon of a Soviet system similar to that of the 1950–60s complete with a Soviet government. There is neither concept of actual governance, nor accountability to the people, nor emphasis on the society in any way. Maintaining absolute control and power replaces duties to civic service. Instead of changing inherited Soviet structures, the state just renamed some of them. The Government manipulates people's consciousness "proposing food of low quality": soap operas, Soviet movies, and low quality news. Ukraine has lost from a psychological point of view: it fought for independence to get its own place in the world, but did not escape from the mentality of the Soviet era, retaining paternalism, absence of agency, and a strong nostalgia for the Soviet times.

Ukrainian society can be described as a façade democracy and virtual reality: there are the state, the courts, and a Parliament, but in reality, they are just imitations of democratic processes. The decisions are made informally, with policies changing from president to president. People accept this virtual reality as a true, believing that just one more step would change life for the better. This virtual world created for the West and the Ukrainian people does not intersect with the real world of corruption as a way of life. This dual system provides people in power an opportunity to manage the country and accumulate capital. Hence they strive to preserve it. They do not have a real resistance from the society as any who might oppose them have no power and cannot easily unite. The social engineering that facilitates this system is bringing the country to its destruction.

Thus, Ukrainian democracy is a semi-democracy, an authoritarian system with an undefined political regime, low economic development, and a divided society creating, as one respondent mentioned: "meaningless trample at the deadlock". There is no direct link between the Verhovna Rada and the constituency; members of Rada do not visit their constituency or even go to the Rada, do not know what European values are, or how democracy works. There is neither rule of law, nor national security concepts, nor even national defense. Ukraine suffers only the negatives of centralization, never

reaping the benefits usually associated with it. The European Union opened a window of opportunity for Ukraine in 2004, but the political elite missed it since it was so corrupt, immature, embedded with post-Soviet mentality, had no plans or strategy, and seriously lacked an understanding of democracy and the nature of a sovereign state. It was believed that a market economy would result in wealth and democracy for all, but this is not, as it turns out, the way of how democracy evolves. A culture of democracy is embryonic with democracy as a subject taught only for 12 h at a University level within a general philosophy course, and for 3 h at a school level.

The Orange Revolution replaced a “bad tsar with another tsar”, failing to build a civil society with civic responsibilities and citizen agency. The society is not united, not organized, has no identity of “us”, no civic accountability, or even any real interest in such matters. The Soviet legacy of vertical relations impacts all spheres of society: corruption, fear, retribution, an absence of investment in culture and science, and a prevalence of a populist culture. There is a consensus to be part of Europe but no one is working to change anything. They are waiting for something, believe and even demand that Europe should do more for Ukraine. People feel more anxiety in life, uncertainty, and pessimism with unfulfilled hopes. The general philosophy among people is “family first, me the second, the hell with the rest”. There is no respect for others, a “me first scenario” prevails. Once children, a primary concern, are looked after, a state can do whatever it wants. People proceed to blame the government, but lacking civic responsibilities to hold the government accountable, they simply increase the problem. They too are only inspired to increase their personal wealth and are waiting for a strong political leader to resolve their problems.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as a country with the mentality of a Soviet era and Soviet type of Government. The democratic institutions are just a façade completely disconnected with the reality where corruption permeated all spheres. This duality is preserved by the Government and the oligarchs. There is a semi-democracy without rule of law, or accountability of Government and Parliament, nor a culture of democracy. Civil society is in an embryonic stage with scarce civic responsibilities, is poor as a community agency, and is self subjected to paternalistic attitudes toward the Ukrainian Government and the European Union.

#### 4.2. *Country without national identity*

Three foreign respondents employ this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition 7 respondents mention it among other problems (total, 100% of respondents discuss this issue).

This narrative states that Ukraine still lacks a common national identity and national vision and is fragmented politically and socially. Ukraine is a provincial civilization without national aspirations, a full-fledged Ukrainian culture, and institutions that support its development. Currently there is a regression of any potential national identity as laws and reforms are infiltrating from Russia through cultural and legal impositions. The Government is giving up national interests and supporting of regional differences, and is returning to active Russification. Russian mass media and TV dominates in the media spheres. National ideas are not connected with democracy while a white and black mentality prevails, leading to a further degradation from nationalism to Nazism and other extreme values among the population.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as a country without a national identity, open to influences from Russia and extremist organizations.

#### 4.3. *Ukraine as a colony*

Two respondents employ this narrative as their conceptual model of current Ukrainian society; in addition 6 respondents mention it among other problems (total 80% of respondents discussed this issue).

Ukraine is attempting to build a capitalist state based on Marxists theories. Instead, it is inadvertently recreating the feared bourgeoisie class system complete with its cruel system of brutal exploitation of workers who are not united into civic society. There is no understanding of modern capitalism as a system for people by the people. Oligarchs have all power, and seek to increase their control over society by promoting a culture of pure accumulation of wealth. They regularly abuse power to acquire “money at all cost” through economic and political engineering, misappropriations, and illegal actions. Politicians are also involved in this process, as one respondent noted they “do not break the law, they use the law”. The new tax codes policies lead to the elimination of potential competition from small businesses, new rules are created against individuals engaging in business, and transparency of government policies and practices is denied. The Government sees people as slaves, or as instruments for the attainment of wealth. Poverty levels are very high and with the socio-economic gap growing people are emigrating in such numbers that it is decreasing the overall population. People are suffering from tuberculosis, abuse of drugs, and hard drinking, even among children. Ukraine has a social structure of a developing country with an educated public similar to that of a modern state.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as a colony of oligarchs, who have built the brutal capitalist system described by Marxists textbooks, abusing power to concentrate money in their own hands. People are treated as slaves and are becoming increasingly impoverished.

#### 4.4. *Divided society*

5 foreign respondents mention it among other problems (total 50% of respondents discuss this problem).

This narrative describes Ukraine as a big country with regions that differ in culture and history. People have lived together only for 60 years – a very short time to create a commonality. People are divided into pro-Russian or pro-Western groups, with each group having a conflictual consciousness of “white and black.” People in Eastern Ukraine believe that they provide for this country and want to let the West go. Similarly in the Western Ukraine: they want to let Donbas unite with Russia. In Galicia, “Svoboda” (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty or RFE/RL) defines policy, in Eastern Ukraine it is rather Russian TV. The Orange Revolution failed to bring a real leader that could unite the country. Now, there is no common idea for Ukraine and people are mentally divided. They turn to Nazism, extreme “Ukraine for Ukrainians,” or pro-Soviet sentiments. Politicians in power represent Eastern groups – Russian nationalists who define their identity by language and history.

Thus, this narrative describes Ukraine as divided culturally and mentally into pro-Russian and pro-Western groups. The Orange Revolution was unsuccessful in uniting the country and the new Government is pro-Russian.

## 5. Achievements

Ukrainian experts mentioned the following achievements of Ukraine: Ukraine preserved its' independence (29%), has a peaceful character of transition, with an absence of aggressive confrontations and conflict, and supports tolerance (21%), has a free political culture and is absent of authoritarian regime traits (12%), and provides increased prospects and opportunities to travel abroad (6%).

The foreign experts among achievements stated the following: free and pluralistic society (20%), had more diversity in the economy, had changes in economic and social services (20%), was an independent state with some potential (20%), and is experiencing peaceful development (10%).

## 6. Conclusion

The Ukrainian and foreign respondents are similar in defining the major conceptual models of Ukraine, but interpretative narratives differ significantly. 100% of both Ukrainian and foreign experts expressed a view on Ukraine as a country without common national identity. But while Ukrainian experts see identity development as a process and emphasize the factors that led to the absence of national identity, foreign experts concentrate on the current state of Ukrainian society. Ukrainian experts discussed the difficult process of creating a national identity complicated by the absence of a national vision at the time of independence; the efforts of communists in the Government to conserve Soviet identity in order to preserve their power and their unwillingness to open the discussion in the society; a concentration on economic prosperity instead of national conceptualizations among the people; and the divergence around the role of the Soviet past in the development of the nation. As a result, elites are not concerned about Ukraine and its prosperity, ethnic and regional tensions are growing, and the concept of national security is increasingly vague. Foreign experts describe Ukraine as a provincial, fragmented society without national inspirations, open to influences from Russia and extremist organizations.

The second narrative model – “a country in an unfinished transition and degradation” was used by 89% of Ukrainian experts and 100% of foreign experts. Both groups of experts have a similar assessment of Ukraine as a country caught in an incomplete process of transformation without clear conception of outcomes, with an entrenched mentality of Soviet era and Soviet styles of Government, Soviet-based paternalistic attitudes and an absence of civil society. Ukrainian experts put more emphasis on a general absence of democracy while foreign experts concentrate on the specific features that make Ukrainian democracy a façade. Namely, Ukraine has a semi-democracy, including a weak culture of democracy, poor understanding of democratic processes, and inadequate levels of civic responsibility. In addition, 77% of Ukrainian experts describe Ukraine through the list of major problems: declining economy, corruption, failing state concept, devaluation and degradation of education and culture, a loss of human potential and declines in agriculture.

The third narrative, “Ukraine as a divided society,” is used by 47% of Ukrainian respondents and 50% of foreign respondents. Both groups describe Ukraine as a divided society, with the deeply rooted differences manipulated by political entrepreneurs. But while Ukrainian experts propose 5 models of explanation reflecting the divide in the society, foreign experts concentrate solely on the Russian and Ukrainian ethnic divide narrative.

The fourth narrative, “Ukraine as a colony,” is used by 42% of Ukrainian experts and 80% of foreign experts. Both groups emphasize that Ukraine is building a callous capitalistic system similar to that of the 19th century as described in Marxists textbooks. But while Ukrainian experts are concentrated on structural factors and descriptions of oligarchs, foreign experts accentuate differences between Ukrainian society and modern Western society.

These descriptions of the problems of Ukraine clearly dominate over depictions of its achievements. All the experts mentioned achievements in one sentence without developing a narrative description or model. Among the commonly mentioned achievements are: preserved independence (29% of Ukrainian experts and 20% of foreign experts), peaceful transitions and development (21% of Ukrainian experts and 10% of foreign experts), and a free and pluralistic society (12% of Ukrainian experts and 20% of foreign experts).

Thus, the analysis of narratives identifies major factors that lead to the current situation in Ukraine. One of the major sources of the current Ukrainian situation is that its independence was a result of the fall of Soviet Union not of a mass conscious movement for independence. People who had fought for Ukrainian independence for centuries were inspired by

the idea of sovereignty but did not have a comprehensive concept of Ukraine. Thus, in 1991 there was no common notion about Ukrainian nation or nation-state. The Communist Government did not understand the need for a new concept or were afraid of radical changes. Preserving their power, they did not initiate any serious public discussions and did not make serious efforts to define Ukrainian nationalism and forge a common identity. Thus, the Soviet ideology continue to penetrate the society based on (a) deprivation of property rights that has led to a paternalistic dependence of the people upon the State and a prevalence of the state oppressing the society and (b) the absence of Government's accountability, civic responsibility, and collaboration between the Government and the public.

It was believed that the creation of a market economy would result in wealth for all and thus a democracy but instead it created the perception of Ukraine as a trophy territory that could be stolen and squandered and the concentration on economic wellbeing as a common national idea. There was no understanding of the need to change and alter the Soviet consciousness, inhibiting a culture of democracy from being developed. The Orange Revolution failed to build civil society with civic responsibility and community agency; instead it deceived the public with false interpretations of democracy, including the power of majority without rights for minorities. The formation of a common national identity was also impeded by the diverse cultural and historic characters of the regions that obstructed critical rethinking and assessment of the Soviet heritage, as well as by ongoing influences from neighboring Russia. This ethno-cultural divide, sharpened by the zero-sum thinking, is actively used by political leaders to draw attention away from economic problems.

As a result, on its 20 anniversary of independence, Ukraine is still a country in transition, deeply rooted in its Soviet past and deficient of a national idea, a common national identity, and any objectives for development. Despite the apparent peaceful character of past developments, the Ukrainian society is characterized by structural violence (Galtung, 1969), relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970, 2007), weakness of state (Collier, 2007; Rotberg, 2003, 2003a), and communal (ethnic) conflict (Azar, 1990; Gurr, 1970, 2007; Korostelina, 2007). The structural violence, defined as a system-based violence that deprives people of their basic human needs, and relative deprivation, defined as perception of disadvantages in comparison with other group (s), previous economic and social position, and expectations for future, are readily apparent in the growing socio-economic divide. The elites are rebuilding capitalism described by Marx that places a majority of the people below the poverty line and strips them of rights and economic opportunities. The power is concentrated in hands of a few oligarchs who control the government, and lack interest in creating a national idea and do not care enough about the society as a whole. Ukraine reflects a paternalistic and patriarchal system of workers and employers, where power is not controlled by the society, power and capital are merged, and legal and legislative powers are limited. The relative deprivation is also reflected in feelings of marginalization, anxiety in life, uncertainty, and pessimism from unfulfilled hopes among the population, longing for Soviet times.

The weakness of state is defined by five out of seven factors of the state failure: corruption, capital flight and inflation, harassment of civil society, electoral fraud, and identity conflicts (Rotberg, 2003, 2003a) and six out of nine factors of conflict described by Collier (2007): low average income, economic decline or low growth, geographic dispersion of population, size of majority is between 45% and 90% of population, significant size of Diaspora, and a history of a civil war (the last one could be accepted by taking into account the fight of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) against Ukrainian communists during the World War II). In this sense, there are two parallel worlds existing without merging: the imitation of democratic procedures and institutions and the reality of corruption penetrating all levels of society. As ratings by foreign organizations, sociological data and experts' opinions described in this paper show, Ukraine is characterized by significant economic decline, growing poverty, capital flight and inflation, harassment of civic society and mass media, semi-democratic institutions and electoral fraud. It is divided by cultural, historic, and ethnic factors and is open to external influences and extremist ideologies.

This divide also characterizes Ukraine as suffering from communal conflicts. There are deprivation of basic human needs and the needs of ethnic minorities; there is an incompetent and parochial government, and the influence of foreign countries including economic and cultural dependency (Azar, 1990) creating the potential for conflicts. The growing salience of ethno-cultural identity, collective incentives for political actions, including losses in the past and fear of future losses, group capacities for collective actions, including geographic concentration, and unfinished process of democratization (Gurr, 1970, 2007) may contribute to future reactive actions. "We-they" perceptions, and unfavorable intergroup comparisons, conflicts of interest between counterpoised interactive communities, ideologization of social identities, and moral dimensions of intergroup conflict (Korostelina, 2007) underlie significant structures of polarizing group formations. Thus, Ukraine's marginalized position between the previous Soviet and democratic system leads to a high conflict potential based on economic, political, and identity factors.

The analysis of experts' narratives leads to several suggestions on conflict prevention and resolution in Ukraine. They are as follows:

- 1) The absence of a national idea and common national identity was mentioned by all experts as a major source of the current problems. This crisis of attempting to unify disparate national conceptualizations results in an absence of a clear vision for the transition and the final outcomes, slowing the processes of transformation and increasing economic deprivation. The lack of a nationally conscious elite, corruption, and growing ethno-cultural and class divides contribute to the crisis. Most of experts emphasize the "black and white" mentality, an absence of inter-community and government dialogue, a search for an enemy, and the development of zero-sum approaches to Ukraine's national identity among the different groups.

Thus, a national dialogue on a common national idea, national identity, and visions of progress can reduce the effects of structural violence, relative deprivation, weakness of state, and communal (ethnic) conflict.

- 2) Salient national identity resulting from an emerging common national idea will increase the cohesiveness in the society and motivate people to contribute to the national wellbeing. This, in turn, should contribute to the development of civic society and better democratic governance.
- 3) The finding of a common national ideology is the mechanism for the development of democratic society. The increased civic participation and civilian agency should lead to a rise in government accountability and a decline in corruption at all levels resulting in the reduction of the effects of structural violence, relative deprivation, weakness of state, and communal (ethnic) conflict. A national dialogue will also help to insure that a common national identity incorporates democratic values thus increasing the culture of democracy in the society. Democratic development is one of the major factors that impedes the effects of structural violence, relative deprivation, weakness of state, and communal (ethnic) conflict.

## References

- Azar, E.E., 1990. *The Management of Protracted Social Conflict*. Dartmouth, Hampshire, U.K.
- Collier, P., 2007. Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy. In: Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O., Aall, P. (Eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*. USIP Press, Washington, DC.
- D'Anieri, P., 2011. Structural constraints in Ukrainian politics. *East European Politics and Societies* 25 (1), 28–46.
- Forbes, 2011. The World's Worst Economies. <http://blogs.forbes.com/danielfisher/2011/07/05/the-worlds-worst-economies/>.
- Galtung, J., 1969. Violence, peace, and peace research. *Journal of Peace Research* 6 (3), 167–191.
- Gurr, T.R., 1970. *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton University Press.
- Gurr, T.R., 2007. Minorities, nationalists, and Islamists: managing communal conflict in the twenty-first century. In: Crocker, C.A., Hampson, F.O., Aall, P. (Eds.), *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*. USIP Press, Washington, DC.
- Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal, 2010. 2010 Index of Economic Freedom. <http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking>.
- Korostelina, K.V., 2007. *Social Identity and Conflict*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kuzio, T., 2010. Populism in Ukraine in comparative European context. *Problems of Post-Communism* 57 (6), 3–18.
- Kuzio, T., 2011. Political culture and democracy: Ukraine as an immobile state. *East European Politics and Societies* 25 (1), 88–113.
- Malan, L., 2011. Post-orange Ukraine: Internal Dynamics and Foreign Policy Priorities. In: Draft Report 075 CDS DG 11 E. NATO Parliamentary Assembly. <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=2439>.
- Nan, M., 2011. *Government for the Elite, by the Elite, at the Expense of the People*. Oxford University speech, Unpublished.
- Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2011. Budget Review of Ukraine, 7th CESEE Senior Budget Officials Meeting GOV/PGC/SBO. <http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=GOV/PGC/SBO%282011%291&docLanguage=En>.
- Rotberg, R.I. (Ed.), 2003. *State Failure and State Weakness in a Time of Terror*. Brookings Institution Press, Washington, DC.
- Rotberg, R.I. (Ed.), 2003a. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton University Press.
- The Pew Research Center, November 2 2009. *Two Decades After the Wall's Fall*.
- Transparency International, 2010. *Corruption Perceptions Index*. [http://www.transparency.org/policy\\_research/surveys\\_indices/cpi/2010/](http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2010/).
- Umland, A., 2011. Four Political Dimensions of Ukraine's Future Europeanization. In: *Harvard International Review*. <http://hir.harvard.edu/four-political-dimensions-of-ukraine-s-future-europeanization>.
- Vorona, V., Shulga, M., 2010. *Ukrains'ke suspilstvo 1992–2010*. In: *Sostilozhichnyi Monitoring*. Institute of Sociology, NAS of Ukraine.