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Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine

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Since 1991, the absence of the concept of a Ukrainian nation and national identity has led to a controversial, often ambivalent process of identity formation. The aim of this paper is to analyze and map the widely shared concepts about national identity that exist in Ukrainian society after 20 years of independence. Analysis of 43 interviews with Ukrainian political and intellectual elites reveals five different shared narratives: (1) dual identity; (2) being pro-Soviet; (3) a fight for Ukrainian identity; (4) a recognition of Ukrainian identity; and (5) a multicultural-civic concept. Each narrative is characterized by three main features: a coherent structure with strong internal logic and justification of its legitimacy; connection to a specific conception of power and morality; and an opposition to other narratives. All these features lead to the perception of society as a zero-sum game where one narrative must prevail over all others. At the same time, all these features ensure that there can be neither an overwhelming victory of one narrative over others nor a satisfying compromise between them. The results shed light on the complex process of narrative construction of identity and power in newly independent states.

Keywords: Ukraine; national identity; history; language; conflict

The movement from colonialism and totalitarianism to political pluralism is connected to the construction of a state and the reshaping of national identities (Billig 1995; Brubaker 1996; Gellner 1994; Smith 1991). In the social sciences, national identity is viewed as a part of an individual's social identity, and as a collective phenomenon that unites people into national groups. "National identity is the group definition of itself as a group – its conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values; its strengths and weaknesses; its hopes and fears; its reputation and conditions of existence; its institutions and traditions; and its past history, current purposes, and future prospects" (Kelman 2001, 191). National identity is a product of both (1) ethnic history and identity of the community, religion, and belief system, and (2) dominant ideology and conscious manipulation, including commemoration, ideology, and symbolism (Smith 1991, 2009). Anderson (1991) also approaches national identity as a socio-cognitive concept and stresses its constructed nature. Kelman (1997, 2001) develops this approach and points out that the dual process of social construction of identity involves discovery and creation of common elements. These elements – priorities and boundaries – can have different definitions, depending on the political, economic, and religious goals of leaders and elites. According to Kelman (2001), national identity is constantly reconstructed to serve several functions: first, to provide a sense of uniqueness and unity, as well as a sense of belonging, to group members; second, to develop a positive self-image; third, to offer a basis for cultural development, religious beliefs, and way of life; fourth, to grant the foundation for ownership of land and resources; and finally, to justify the claims and grievances of the group.

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The process of formation of national identity can involve the development of several alternative, even contradictory, concepts of the nation. As Brubaker (1996) stresses, the formation of a nation in a newly independent state evokes the activities of national minorities and their proclivity to initiate conflicts. Conflict can develop when the identity chosen by an individual is incompatible either with an identity imposed by others or with the social context in which identity is constantly being recreated (Kelman 1997; Stein 1998; Stern 1995).

Ukraine represents a clear case where conflicts around national identity have been continuous for the 20 years since Ukraine achieved independence in 1991. The absence of the concept of nationhood and a shared national idea accepted by the entire population has led to a controversial and often ambivalent process of identity formation, leaving Ukraine's people without the internal and external social boundaries that define the meaning of the nation (Arel 1995; Arel and Ruble 2006; Aslund 2009; Hansen and Hesli 2009; Hnatuk 2004; Korostelina 2008, 2009, 2011; Kulyk 2009; Kuzio 2007, 2010; Motyl 1992; Pifer 2009; Ryabchuk 2003; Shulga 2011; Shulman 2005; Wilson 2002, 2006).

The uncertainty around the Ukrainian concept of state has been recently stated by experts from several international organizations: "It is universally acknowledged that Ukraine needs to fundamentally change its political, administrative, economic, social and education system. However, the question of which socio-economic model exactly Ukraine should embrace remains a matter of dispute and source of stagnation" (Umland 2011). Umland further notes high social and cultural polarization, growing fragmentation of Ukrainian society, and the rise of extremist organizations. The divisions within the country are also emphasized in a 2011 NATO report:

Since independence at the end of 1991, Ukraine has been divided between an anti-Russian, pro-European West and a more pro-Russian South and East. Ukrainian nationalism, anchored in the West of the country around Lviv (part of Austria-Hungary only a century ago and part of interwar Poland), is Western-looking, built against Russia as the significant rival, while the Eastern and Southern parts of the country see themselves as more organically linked to Russia. (Malan 2011)

The absence of shared national ideals leads to disputes between Ukrainians supporting different concepts of national identity. Ukrainian and foreign scholars and publicists actively promote their ideas about Ukraine and sharply criticize opponents, both in academic journals and in the public media. Mass media and the Web are full of aggressive publications and postings; accusations and justifications saturate discussions about Ukrainian national identity. The fight over national identity has even become a form of popular entertainment: the TV program *Shuster Live* airs every Friday for four full hours, amusing the Ukrainian public with squabbles and conflicts between representatives of the political and intellectual elite.

The aim of this paper is to analyze and map the widely shared concepts about national identity that exist among the intellectual and political elite of Ukraine. The role of elites in shaping ideology and national identity with regard to the formation of the nation is stressed by Anderson (1991), Smith (2009), and other scholars. As Smith (2009) notes, many ideological and nationalist movements have originated in elite circles, which "rediscovered, selected and reinterpreted existing ethnic symbols, memories, myths, values and traditions, and out of these elements forged the narratives of the nation" (101). In Ukraine, these constructed narratives trickle down through TV and radio broadcasts, newspapers and new media, infiltrating the national consciousness of the general public and shaping the population's views on national identity.

Despite widespread belief that numerous concepts of Ukrainian national identity exist and differ from person to person, the author posits that a limited number of articulate, persuasive national narratives are shared by Ukrainian citizens. This paper purposely avoids any judgment or assessment of the merits of existing narratives; it describes them as competing but equally valid ideologies, justified and legitimated by the people of Ukraine. I believe that this analysis and mapping provides a framework for a national dialogue aimed at the creation of a common national concept and the formation of a shared national identity.

Methodology

Method. The main method of this research was a semi-structured interview consisting of six questions aimed at assessment of the current situation in Ukraine, the status of national identity, the politics of language and history, the value and use of history textbooks, and the future development of the nation. All interviews were conducted face to face; 54 were with a single interviewee, while 2 were with two interviewees from the same organization. Each interview was recorded with the use of a Livescribe recording pen; the interviewer took notes during the interview. Interviews lasted between one and a half and three hours and were conducted in Ukrainian, Russian, or English. In addition, the author used a participant-observation method at several academic round-tables and political discussions, monitored major television programs that feature political discussions (e.g. *Shuster Live*, *Freedom of Speech*), and analyzed data available at the libraries and on the websites of academic institutes and independent research centers.

Sample. The aim of this research was to interview people who represent the “track 1.5 diplomacy” level: scholars, political leaders, and journalists who are active in the political sphere and impact political discourse. The author used purposive sampling of Ukrainian experts with elements of snowballing. For snowballing, seven independent entry points were used. In addition, three widely recognized experts were asked to review the list of interviewees to ensure that the sample included key experts and equally represented all political and scientific constituencies. The final sample consisted of 53 interviewees in Kiev.¹ Among the interviewees, 7 were directors or chairs of foreign foundations, 13 were directors or leading scientists at the academic institutes within the Ukrainian Academy of Science (the Institutes of Philosophy, History, Sociology, Political and Ethnographic Research, World Economy, etc.), 10 were directors or leading experts at Ukrainian independent think tanks and research centers, 7 were faculty members of leading Ukrainian universities, eight were political leaders (members of government, deputies in the *Verhovna Rada* [Parliament], and directors of the Institute of National Memory and the National Institute for Strategic Studies), and three were journalists. This paper presents the analysis of interviews of 43 Ukrainian respondents (the answers of 10 foreign experts from Europe and the US are excluded for the purposes of this paper). Gender representation among respondents was influenced by the specificity of the academic and political spheres in Ukraine: 35 were male and 8 were female.

Methods of data analysis. Initially, all answers were organized into 14 categories; a 53 × 14 table was created to represent all answers that corresponded to the categories of analysis. Analysis of recorded narratives about Ukraine’s national concept and common

national idea revealed seven major subthemes. They are: (1) a source of national pride; (2) dynamics of identity during the two most recent presidencies (Vladimir Yushchenko and Victor Yanukovich); (3) concepts of national identity; (4) common unifying factors; (5) the roots of division; (6) the role of language; (6) the politics of history; (7) and reactions to changes to textbooks by Dmytro Tabachnyk, the minister of education in Yanukovich's government. Respondents' narratives varied by the level of the development of each category; some categories were not addressed by every respondent.

At the second stage, all narratives were clustered in groups based on their similarities and consistency within each of the categories of analysis. The analysis revealed five *widely shared narrative concepts*: (1) dual identity; (2) pro-Soviet attitudes; (3) the fight for Ukrainian identity; (4) recognition of Ukrainian identity; and (5) multicultural-civic identity. Each narrative was analyzed by identifying the core of the narrative (represented by 90–100% of respondents) for each of the five types. Individual differences within each type were not considered for this analysis.

Results

Dual Identity narrative (28% of respondents)

Pride subtheme

In the Dual Identity narrative, the major source of pride for Ukraine is the prominent spirituality of the people and their orientation toward higher values. Ukraine has a historic core of Rus'² identity, considered to be a sacred center of Eastern Slavic civilization; thus, Ukraine is the modern successor of the Rus'. This orientation represents a vast mental potential, providing emotional connections to sacral symbols and the foundation for an idealized and prosperous independent Ukraine. This Ukraine can develop a democratic European identity different from the authoritarian Russian state; this democratic identity is tolerant, inclusive of different cultures and religions, and supportive of the dual identity of citizens educated in both (Russian and Ukrainian) cultures. This narrative notes that it is important to preserve Russian culture in Ukraine because it uniquely embodies Ukrainian culture and is different from Russian culture in Russia (for example, the writers Nikolai Vasilievich Gogol and Mikhaíl Afanasyevich Bulgakov wrote in Russian, but their work had a distinctly Ukrainian cultural basis). These multicultural roots help Ukraine to resolve its conflicts without violence and to prosper as a peaceful society.

Identity Conflict Dynamics subtheme

The first independent Ukrainian governments were perceived as lacking in moral principles and values, aimed solely at personal profiteering and "easy money," and served as the trendsetters of national identity. At this beginning, Ukrainian identity was formed in opposition to other identities and functioned through the imposition of a primitive Ukrainian idea and the suppression of cultural conflict. Following President Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine slowly came apart as conflicts around values emerged and grew. This Ukraine exists in a marginal circumstance, uncomfortably adrift between two key projects of the state – exiting the sphere of Russia on one hand but failing to enter the space of Europe on the other.

The Orange Revolution represented the explosion of a new Ukrainian national identity with hegemonic ambitions. President Victor Yushchenko tried to destroy Ukraine's old symbols and beliefs, but he failed to fulfill the expectations of the people, eventually leading Ukraine to a state of further degeneration. He utterly failed in his attempts to

implement a systemic ethno-cultural agenda and build an ethnocentric concept of national identity. He supported nationalism and the dominance of one cultural group over others; he encouraged expunction of the Russian language and the development of strong social boundaries vis-à-vis Russia, portraying Russia as an enemy of Ukraine. His approach to the use of history (i.e. the Holodomor, victimization, Stepan Bandera³) did not have majority support and led to an increase in national tensions. People subsequently supported Victor Yanukovich in opposition to Yushchenko's overt and discriminatory form of Ukrainian nationalism. Yanukovich's government has avoided nation building; while there is no aggressive imposition of cultural or ethnic identity as before, there is also no alternative agenda. President Yanukovich's program echoes the previous President Kuchma, concentrating on economics and the de-ideologization of society, thus avoiding or suppressing conflicts. As Yanukovich has pursued this generic platform, his party has become amorphous.

Identity subtheme

Ukraine has a multilayered national identity: (1) the heritage of the Rus', with the historical Ukrainian language being Russian; (2) the modern Ukrainian language of the nineteenth century; and (3) ethno-cultural development of the Russian language in Ukraine as a regional phenomenon. However, the first and third pieces – as well as the values of Eastern Ukraine – are not present in current conceptions of national identity. If the nation is defined through ethnic Ukrainian group membership, then all Ukrainians in the world are members of the nation, which is inaccurate. Yet, basing the current identity on being born in Ukraine also leads to incorrect interpretations. As well, the category "Russian-speaking" does not reflect Russian ethnic identity. Russian-language identity carries low status, thus advancing Ukrainian-language identity while reducing the number of people with Russian identity. Consequently, pride in the great culture of Russia is lost. Ukraine has not developed its own pride to replace this loss, which has resulted in underutilized or destroyed mechanisms of nationalist promotion (e.g. cinema production has been lost, etc.). In this narrative, the culture of Ukraine should be developed only through support of both Russian and Ukrainian cultures; the ideology of one culture cannot be anathema to another. Hegemony and domination must give way to commonality. Europe and Russia have their own internal problems; Ukraine must resolve its problems as a common nation with two equal ethnic groups.

Common subtheme

All Ukrainians share a common European Christian culture, a Ukrainian national character and humor. Everyone is united by Ukraine's independence and common territory, but the central idea shared by people today is a "get rich" ideology without moral or cultural values.

Divide subtheme

The major divide in this narrative is not between Russians and Ukrainians but between the West and East of Ukraine. These regions have different histories, shared experiences, and moral values; these were developed in fundamentally different state structures and empires for centuries and thus have divergent geopolitical vectors of development and assessments of the past. This divide deepened after the Orange Revolution and is likely to persist for decades to come. People often believe that the divide in Ukraine is sharpened and manipulated by politicians, but the society is truly divided. Ethnic conflicts between West

(European and traditional) and East (market-based and industrial) are increasing. Western Ukraine aims to impose an ethno-cultural, “messianic” nationalism and considers itself to have a justifiable monopoly on national identity, as in the slogan, “Galicia will remain, Pridneprov’ie will become Galicia.” Aggressive anti-Russian nationalism in Western Ukraine is based on a declared connection with ethno-national projects of Europe in the nineteenth century and the traumas experienced during the Soviet period. These nationalists try to push Ukraine toward another “civilizational space” by promoting Polish culture, the Greco-Catholic Church, and anti-Byzantine discourse. Eastern Ukraine has both a less salient ethno-cultural identity and a Russian Orthodox religious identity. The radical Russian identity is a reaction to Western Ukraine’s nationalism and a result of manipulation by Russian politicians (who promote the idea of Russia as Motherland). Attitudes toward Georgia serve as a good index of this Ukrainian divide.

Language subtheme

Ukraine is a stable bilingual state with two mother tongues, Russian and Ukrainian, as components of an ethno-political process. According to the 1989 language law (which is currently in force), Russian should be taught throughout the territory of Ukraine, yet it is not taught in many regions. While the Ukrainian language is taught universally, Russian is taught only at the request of parents. Regional governments often manipulate this matter, denying parents an opportunity to choose the language of instruction. In Riga, there are 64 Russian schools, yet in Kiev there are only 4. Over the last 20 years, the use of Russian in education has decreased from 50% to 20%. This state policy has led to the use of “Surzhyk”:⁴ children speak Russian but write Ukrainian, ultimately losing the intact value of both language and culture. People who choose to use the Russian language are not guaranteed equal status and opportunity for self-realization. For Eastern Ukraine this is a very painful issue: more than five and a half million people there do not speak Ukrainian. Ukrainian nationalists’ promotion of the supremacy of the Ukrainian language and culture impedes the development of a common national identity and leads to conflicts. Russians in Ukraine are different from Russians in Russia; their identity has become a *mélange* of cultures. They want to live in Ukraine but also seek to preserve their Russian language and heritage.

Language is a dividing factor in Ukraine: 50% of the population is bilingual but 50% speak only Russian or only Ukrainian, with a preponderance of Russian speakers. A dual-language law is needed to support and preserve both cultures and give an opportunity for Russian culture to flourish. This law would probably provoke temporary discontent, but the society is generally tolerant; in time, the people will accept it, and the law will reduce overall tensions in the society. Many people in Ukraine feel that they live in a foreign country; the nation should give them an opportunity to speak their own language. Russia aims to end the suppression of the Russian language and culture among the Russian community. If a dual-language law is adopted, Russia will not have cause to intervene to defend the Russian language. There is also some need to move toward teaching English, but currently Russian remains the language of international communication, science, and international paradigms. Ukraine could not survive without continued use of the Russian language.

History subtheme

History plays an important role in Ukrainian society, where history is represented in very insensitive and extreme forms. There is no common concept of history; interpretations of

traumatic events in history are bipolar and provoke conflicts. Presently, Ukrainian history is saturated by the concept of victimization (“tears and fears”) and by opposition to “threatening” entities (Russia and Poland). The narrative of the Holodomor is used by the people of Western Ukraine – people who never experienced it – for their own political purposes, capitalizing on the human tragedy. Though Ukrainians were also complicit in these crimes, they prefer not to admit it.

Ukrainian history remains ambivalent: people celebrate the holidays of both sides of the nationalist divide. Nationalists and communists dislike this ambivalence and history has become an instrument of politics. The events of May 9th represent a clash between “Svoboda” ultranationalists and Ukrainians celebrating the great Soviet Victory during World War II.⁵ The red flag law that requires the use of Soviet flag replicas on holidays in Ukraine is a poor idea, but 70–80% of people have acquiesced to this social manipulation; on the other hand, people will preserve their beliefs regardless of the policy. Ukraine needs to create a national idea, establish a dialogue on Ukraine’s history, and cease the cynical use of the politics of memory by embracing its divergent past.

History Textbooks subtheme

The “Orange” history textbooks were poorly written, oriented toward memorization, and in need of updating. Textbooks written during the Orange Revolution resemble Western Ukrainian textbooks of the 1930s: nationalist rhetoric, notions of victimhood, and discussion of Ukrainians’ miserable destiny proliferate throughout. The textbooks glorified the Orange Revolution and Ukrainian ethnic values and vilified Russia and Russians. Newer textbooks aim to revise depictions of WWII, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), Stepan Bandera, Ivan Mazepa,⁶ and the Holodomor. These new texts promote tolerance, emphasizing that Ukraine was part of the Russian empire but was not colonized and that the USSR brought both negative and positive experiences to the lives of Ukrainians. Ideally, textbooks should represent the social history that was diminished by Yushchenko’s use of ideology, which deformed and distorted representations of history. Any change that promotes democratic culture, accommodates pluralism in political thought, and stimulates thoughtful reflection on Southern and Eastern Ukraine is positive.

Pro-Soviet narrative (7% of respondents)

Pride subtheme

In this narrative, the sources for pride are rooted in the cultural values and history of Ukraine, including Kievan Rus’, the national revolution under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky,⁷ the Allied victory in the Great Patriotic War, and the technological achievements of Soviet Ukraine (e.g. airplanes, rockets, science). The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic established Ukraine as one of the world’s 10 most developed countries, and Ukraine was invited to be one of the founding states of the UN in recognition of its contribution to the defeat of fascism.

Dynamics subtheme

Yushchenko was an authoritarian personality, not concerned with broader Ukrainian society and willing to impose his personal experience of history onto all of Ukraine. He constructed a national memory grounded in negative assessments of Ukrainian

history from 1918–1991. His regime fomented conflict by promoting a partisan, univocal national story instead of a search for common ground based on the multiple experiences of Ukraine’s citizens. On taking power, Yanukovich declared that his new government would “clean the blockages” of the past and reflect greater common sense than Yushchenko’s. But in the place of an inclusive, fully conceptualized national idea, Yanukovich has merely instituted a set of simplistic beliefs.

Identity subtheme

The interviewees described Ukraine as a European country where being perceived as European is highly valued. Ukrainian society represents a unity of different social realities: Soviet, European, Russian, Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, Hungarian, Jewish, etc. Regional identities prevail over any common national identity. The post-genocide national narrative is considered neither valid nor well-founded: Ukraine was one of the 10 most developed countries in the twentieth century, with high levels of economic development and technological progress (e.g. rocketry, Paton’s Institute, biotechnology, etc.). There was no cultural sense of trauma, but for 20 years the younger generation was taught that Ukraine paid more in blood than any of its neighbors. The respondents indicated a need to build a nation on both positive and negative historical examples, to view Ukraine as a product of historic development resulting from the activities of all the various people who lived there.

Common subtheme

The Ukrainian people are united by a common destiny, the desire for a good life, and a shared will to preserve Ukrainian identity.

Divide subtheme

Ukraine was created by the joining of two distinct socio-cultural communities: (1) Western territories that experienced Magdeburg law⁸ and the European Renaissance but preserve a traditional agricultural culture – these regions were economically developed after WWII to raise them to the level of the rest of Ukraine – and (2) new industrialized territories whose development was based on immigration from Russia and assimilation by Russian people. There was a tolerant co-existence of these two communities during the period of the USSR based on a common Soviet identity. Since independence, this has given way to the growth of regional patriotism, increases in ethno-cultural movements, an emphasis on ethnic differences, and willingness to sacrifice the unity of Ukraine by Ukrainian nationalists. The people of Ukraine paid too high a price in the past to unite all of Ukraine’s lands, and the respondents felt that the people should work to preserve their country against disunity.

Language subtheme

The issue of language is politicized and divides Ukraine. The idea of a “Russian World” advanced by Russia is not realistic: nobody in Ukraine wants to unite with Russia. People in Donbas speak “Surzhyk” – a language which is 80% Ukrainian. Russian as a second state language is not deemed necessary and would probably lead to tensions between the two communities. Russian can be treated as a regional language, through the decisions of local governments, but the Ukrainian language is the most widely known. Because there

are people who cannot learn new languages, the problem of language must be approached very liberally, by, for example, creating conditions in which language becomes a need, a foundation for self-realization; developing high-quality products both in Russian and Ukrainian; and building schools and classes for the Russian language without treating it as a threat to the Ukrainian language. With the degradation of a language, culture falls into decline as well: some children who cannot write in Russian are losing their deep cultural background. It is wrong to promote the Ukrainian language at the expense of Russian language; linguistic assimilation, according to the respondents, is useless.

History subtheme

The role of Ukraine's history is underestimated because historic education is superficial and politicized and lacks a defined connection with the Motherland. It was not possible to achieve an understanding of history and a common assessment of the past because of differences in the social-historic experiences of people from various Ukrainian regions. The people of the 1930s perceived Joseph Stalin's regime ambiguously. Some Ukrainians collaborated with the Nazis in order to support their aspirations for independence, but others committed violent crimes against Poles, Jews, and communists. It was not possible to impose this version of history (OUN/UPA) on all of Ukrainian society, justifying their actions and supporting their celebrations. A majority of people see the Great Patriotic War as a source of national pride. Ukraine must rethink its ideas about history but must not deny the achievements of the twentieth century, including BAM (the Baikal-Amur railway) and industrialization. Politicians should try to minimize conflict between the opposing groups that commemorate the Great Patriotic War and the OUN/UPA.

Textbooks subtheme

We need textbooks that are not written by dilettanti but rather are grounded in a scientific approach and that portray a truth that combines both positive and negative assessments of Ukraine and its history. Older textbooks tend to provoke division in society. A gap exists between Ukraine's generations, propagated by the exclusion or negative interpretations of many historical events from texts. For example, in some books, a description of Ukraine as a Russian colony has replaced the account of the history of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Fight for Ukrainian Identity narrative (23% of respondents)

Pride subtheme

The source of pride, according to this narrative theme, is Ukraine's original history, culture, language, literature, and democratic traditions. Ukraine has survived as a nation, escaping and recovering from past slavery, and emerged like a Phoenix rising from the ashes. Its success is due to liberal cultural nationalism. Ukraine has avoided civil war and conflicts because of its traditions of tolerance, which serve as a foundation of Ukrainian culture.

Dynamics subtheme

Yushchenko understands the European roots of Western Ukraine and tried to develop these values for the whole nation. He accomplished a great deal, including introducing

a correct policy that ended the ambivalent policy of Kuchma, establishing the Holodomor as a holocaust and a key event that changed the nation, unveiling the truth about the 1920–30s and WWII, creating a new national dynamic, and destroying old Soviet myths. But he did not take into consideration the strong opposition of Ukraine’s Eastern regions and its Russian-speaking population. Thus, Yushchenko’s national project was not fully developed or realized; he did not develop a balanced approach, explain his policy adequately, or promote it sufficiently through the mass media and educational systems. Yanukovich’s present government creates conflict around history and language, introducing the red flag law as a provocation and a challenge to Ukrainian independence. He has underscored Eastern ideas from Ukraine’s Soviet past and a Russian model alien to the people of Western Ukraine, but he failed to transform it into a successful national concept.

Identity subtheme

We need to form the Ukrainian nation with a distinctly Ukrainian core. Discussions about a civic society distract attention from a national idea based on the Ukrainian renaissance and the revival of the Ukrainian language. Yushchenko created and promoted a concept of Ukraine as a post-colonial, post-genocidal, post-totalitarian country. Independent Ukraine must prohibit the use of the red flag, proscribe the detestable model of Soviet–Ukrainian diffidence, and stop the continuation of the colonial regime engendered by Great Russian brown nationalism and rife with Russian imperial ambitions. Democracy should be developed based explicitly on Ukrainian history and identity; Russian identity should be repudiated because it rests on violence by the state and represents the dependency produced by state welfare systems. The Russian path leads to a totalitarian regime and forced assimilation. Ukrainian nationalism is not ethnically based: it is inclusive and based on the idea of the nation’s return to European membership.

Common subtheme

Eighty percent of the people of Ukraine represent the Ukrainian ethnic group from three to four separate subcultures. The people are united by their common territory and country.

Divide subtheme

The major division in Ukrainian society is between those promoting a Soviet ideology and those moving Ukraine toward more European ideals. The country is divided by culture and language into four separate zones: Western Ukraine, 15%; North-Central (historic Ukraine), 33%; Southeastern (colonies of Catherine the Great and Peter the Great,⁹ with a mixed population), 28%; Donbas, Crimea (of Soviet development and Russian population), 20%. The most divergent regions by culture and mentality – the West and the East – are furthest from each other, with the “swamp” in the middle of the country between them. The West–East divide extends from core differences: in the West, there is support for Ukrainian independence and democracy based on deep historical heritage, national consciousness, connections with European history, Magdeburg law, and the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; in the East, a post-colonial pro-Russian and Soviet sector was developed in the nineteenth century and again in the 1930s. The North region is “authentic Ukraine,” comprising Kievan Rus’, where Ukrainians have lived on their own land under different regimes but preserved their own culture and identity. The South is a Ukraine colonized during the Russian

Romanov dynasty and during the Soviet period; people there retain Russian identities and Soviet mentalities. This divide is used by Russia, which spends billions of dollars on destructive initiatives and seeks to create instability in Ukraine.

Language subtheme

This narrative laments a lost opportunity over the past 20 years for greater development of the Ukrainian language; instead, the dynamic of pushing the Ukrainian language out of the social sphere has continued even after years of independence. The Ukrainian language remains suppressed and faces continued internal and external threat. Mass media and publications are dominated by the Russian language; Ukraine does not have its own film industry, high-quality translations of significant texts, or Ukrainian-language popular media. Nothing has been done to support Ukrainian language and culture; administrative methods alone are ineffectual without strong enforceable requirements on speaking Ukrainian and specific policy and program structures to motivate people to use the language. Ukrainian serves as the genetic code of the nation and a symbol of independence; it should be the only language of Ukraine. Any attempts to accord Russian status as a second state language will lead to the loss of political power and pose a direct threat to the Ukrainian language. For Ukrainian-speaking people, this matter is one of the survival of the language. Ukrainian as the sole state language should be enforced, and all citizens should be compelled to learn it. Russian could exist as a regional language at the discretion of local governments, but for all state offices and universities Ukrainian should be the only language. The Yanukovich government is specifically noted for not speaking Ukrainian. The government should provide economic motivation for citizens to learn Ukrainian, perhaps by providing additional remuneration to those embracing Ukrainian and imposing financial penalties on regions that elect to use the Russian language. Parents may be empowered to choose the language of education in the schools their children attend, but Ukrainian should remain the primary language for instruction.

Language is a dividing factor: half of the people speak only one language (Russian or Ukrainian), but 90% of these live either in the West or the East. Russian-speaking people typically oppose speaking Ukrainian and protest against Ukrainian schools; their fight for continued use of Russian constitutes a fight against Ukrainian independence. According to this narrative, the establishment of a Ukrainian state language does not represent pressure against the Russian language. People retain a choice of education for their children. There is no shortage of Russian schools; everyone who speaks the official state language can also speak their own tongue. The Russian-language issue is exploited by communists who support the influence of a strong hand, friendship with foreign Russia, authoritarian values, and socialist ideas. Thus, it is important to be cautious in evaluating people's needs and preferences: those who support the Russian language also support Russia and its political influence in Ukraine.

History subtheme

The role of history is very important to the foundation of the nation. Ukraine does not need mythologization: it is important to use European traditions as a basis for Ukraine's history. History should teach people to think, but instead it is presently used to manipulate socio-political consciousness. Russia dictates how our history ought to be written, but our history is not a regional Russian history. The respondents indicated a need to

build up Ukraine's distinct history and stop the practice of idealization of the Soviet period as a golden age. The Holodomor is very important to Ukrainian identity as a core symbol and resource for Ukraine's national idea. Famine touched every Ukrainian ethnic village. The borders were closed to prevent people from escaping. Ukrainians were targeted victims. There is a dispute over differing interpretations of WWII: Bandera's struggle is portrayed as an anti-Soviet fight rather than collaboration with Germans; alternately, those Ukrainians who worship the Red Army are not criminals because of their allegiance.

Since such dual consciousness remains, Ukrainian history has not become a foundation of national identity. The lies of the Soviet-authored history of 1931–1991 have not all been disproved; indeed, only fragments of it have been refuted. Yanukovich supports the Soviet model that portrays a positive past: the USSR as virtuous and good, the UPA as Nazis. But the UPA was the only movement fighting against the totalitarian regimes of both Stalin and Hitler. Ukraine needs to overcome the myth of Stalinism and acknowledge how many people were sacrificed during WWII and the Red Army's rape of Europe. This Ukrainian model of history leads to truth, whereas the Russian model leads backwards to totalitarianism. These respondents feel that the state should influence mass media in an effort to destroy these Soviet myths that dominate newspapers and TV. Ukraine must defend and support state-TV efforts to this end and work with private channels to support a national idea of Ukrainian history.

Textbooks subtheme

The new textbooks are the result of political and symbolic battles as well as the influence of Russia and the Russian Church. This represents a return to the old style of textbooks notable for Soviet values centered on the Great Patriotic War and a lack of any reference to the Holodomor. These new textbooks will only precipitate resistance by educated children; they will not be accepted by society. Instead, they will lead to irritation and greater internal conflicts; hopefully, they will soon be replaced by more balanced texts.

Recognition of Ukrainian Identity narrative (23% of respondents)

Pride subtheme

Pride derives from the view that Ukrainian people are hard-working, are devoted to their land, and have supported democratic traditions since the Middle Ages. Ukraine is a peaceful, free society not dependent on power, patronage, or totalitarian ideology, all of which highlights the importance of preserving its difference from Russia.

Dynamics subtheme

Yushchenko wanted to unite the nation, but his effort fell short of success. His willingness to develop a national idea was positive, but his policies were ineffective, failing to reach society and provoking resistance. He was inconsistent and careless in his invocation of the historic past. He initiated a reevaluation of Ukraine's history, presenting information about the Holodomor as a crime against Ukrainian peasants who resisted Soviet evil; but he also discredited the UPA and Bandera. Yanukovich and his government, on the other hand, promote a pro-Russian policy and support the revival of Soviet myths but try to avoid any proper review of Ukraine's history.

Identity subtheme

Ukraine is an ethnic state of chiefly Ukrainians with small groups of Tatars, Russians, Hungarians, and others. Thus, national identity, according to these respondents, should be based on Ukrainian traditions and the unity of Ukrainian history, language, and culture; it should integrate Russians, Hungarians, and Crimean Tatars into its national identity. Ukraine possesses a unique identity rooted in high standards for people's rights and freedoms and Ukrainian values of democracy. Union with Russia is not a popular idea in Ukraine even among its Russian population; this is a Russian idea brought from outside, one that Russia is using to fuel internal Ukrainian conflicts for its own benefit.

Common subtheme

People are united by aspirations for Ukraine's own path of development based on notions of citizenship grounded in the Ukrainian culture and traditions of diligence, tolerance, and spirituality. Ukraine is not inferior to Europe in any such regard, and is capable of fashioning itself into a European state.

Divide subtheme

Opposition between the West and East of Ukraine is induced and financed by Russia and its imperial ambitions.

Language subtheme

This narrative's major requirement is the widespread use of the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian should be studied everywhere, and should be the sole state language. It is important to increase the recognition of the Ukrainian language as a language of power. For the future of Ukraine's children, more schools must teach and use the Ukrainian language, with the ultimate goal of producing high-quality literary products in Ukrainian. The majority of people speak Ukrainian and do not have a problem using the language. As the acceptance of a Ukrainian ethnic identity has significantly increased (only around 15% of people report nostalgia for the Soviet time and see themselves as Russian), there has been an accompanying trend toward seeing oneself as a representative of the Ukrainian language. Russian is considered a regional language in some parts of Ukraine, and it has retained its position in society; people continue to speak it, and TV channels are in Russian. However, some Russian speakers do not want to learn Ukrainian and refuse to provide an opportunity for their children to do so. The major obstacle here is the manipulation of the language issue by politicians as a distraction from economic problems. All resulting conflicts are portrayed as the result of political manipulation from Russia.

History subtheme

We cannot create an independent Ukraine without an effective history. There are still differences in the perception of history in different regions of Ukraine, and thus there are no integrated narratives of Ukrainian history. Society needs to understand the bad and good of its past to be able to move properly into the future. We cannot deny that Ukraine became a modern state as the Ukrainian SSR. The nation needs a more

complex assessment of the Soviet Union and World War II, without the distortion of ideological interpretation. However, the groups controlling the state have not defined any novel concept of history and instead have borrowed an historical model from Russia. Ukraine has a distinct history from Russia, but Russia perceives any reformulation of Ukrainian history as a threat to Russia and its efforts to re-establish the Soviet myth. According to the respondents, Ukraine should be developed using an historical model that includes a commonly accepted past: Kievan Rus, the Cossack state,¹⁰ Taras Shevchenko¹¹, and “Sobornost” of Ukraine.

Textbooks subtheme

Current changes to textbooks are the result of Russian influence. They reveal attempts by some to unite with Russia and undermine distinct Ukrainian culture and history. Such changes to textbooks forecast the destruction of national values, discarding one set of facts for another. This is a big mistake: these textbooks will not last long and will be challenged by children who have access to different and competing sources of information.

Multicultural-Civic narrative (16% of respondents)

Pride subtheme

The sources of pride are the achievements of the Ukrainian people and the beauty of its land.

Dynamics subtheme

Yushchenko provoked many problems with his chaotic actions and ethnocentrism; he worked counter to the unity of the people and discredited the idea of Ukrainian culture. He developed the concept of the Holodomor without any methodology for the collection of data and allowed a lie to destroy an alternative explanation. His fervent actions to promote the OUN/UPA and Bandera quashed the valuable idea of creating a revised Ukrainian history. There was no evolution or graduated process of altering values left over from the Soviet era. Yanukovich, on the other hand, came to power using anti-Ukrainian slogans but now wants to become a president for the whole of Ukraine. He employs Soviet myths, the red flag, and the psychology of the Soviet regime, and sells out ideological positions in exchange for Russian gas.

Identity subtheme

According to these respondents, Ukraine is a multicultural society without a common national identity that unites all ethnic groups as coequal members of the nation. Ukraine remains split between two language groups, but the percentage of mixed marriages is very high. The regional distribution of bilingual people is unequal, with 45% in the East and only 6% in the West. Thus, people with two ethnic identities have greater affinity with Russians. A key mistake is to believe that Russian propaganda works effectively in Ukraine and that people want to be in union with Russia. People actually want to live in a Ukraine with a common shared society and the aim of joining the European Union. Ukraine should build its own civic identity and civic society, but this project is undermined by two major and conflicting ideologies. On the one side, the Ukrainian narrative builds national identity on the ethnic identity of one group, excluding all

others, and does not have a civic component. The national idea of “one language—one culture” is mixed with the Soviet legacy of social opposition – the idea of the “castle under siege,” a need always to fight against an enemy. On the other side, the civic concept is transformed into a Soviet concept without any liberal values, resting on collective consciousness, with imperial values influenced by Russia.

Common subtheme

People are united by common territory, a “common shell” connected to the idea of Ukrainian independence.

Divide subtheme

The divide is connected with social ideology and territory. On the one hand, nationalist fundamentalism is represented by national-democratic fundamentalists, supporting ethno-cultural populists in the West and anti-Ukrainian Stalinists in the East. On the other hand, clientelists support a Soviet style of society with an economic executive-leader and workers. The people are also divided by language: Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, Russian-speaking Ukrainians, and Russian-speaking Russians. The majority of people want closer relations with Russia but do not want to return to the Soviet period. All groups want to join the European Union in the future.

Language subtheme

According to the interviewees, the Ukrainian language should be the sole state language, to promote a common national identity. But the policy aimed at increasing the status of the Ukrainian language has been misguided: forced rapid transformation led to resistance by and confrontations with the Russian-speaking population. Instead, the Ukrainian language should be supported through promotive structures and state assistance. Establishing Russian as a secondary state language will serve to divide the bilingual society and decrease its stability. People are adapted to both languages and speak both languages to one another. A majority of young people speak Ukrainian even if their family speaks Russian. Most people accept Ukrainian as a state language, but in some regions problems remain, sharpened by the influence from Russia. People ought to be free to use Russian by personal choice and Russian can be treated as a regional language.

History subtheme

History is the basic foundation of a common Ukrainian identity that connects people to the country, including concepts of citizenship, love, pride, and moral principles. National identity should be built on the multiplicity of voices from Ukrainian history. All people who lived in the territory of Ukraine have contributed to Ukrainian identity. Historic narratives should be presented in continuity, a connection of the will and efforts of all Ukrainian citizens. Today the world is resolving the problem of unity in diversity. The fight for independence should not lead to imposition of one ethnic history over others. Ukraine has a common shared history of Bogdan Khmel’ nitskii and Taras Shevchenko. The Soviet past should be understood through both its negative and positive aspects; the Holodomor should be presented as a result of class struggle. Historic beliefs are easily mobilized by politicians through the use of Soviet symbols (the red flag law), war monuments, Soviet

monumentalism, and the celebration of Soviet holidays. Restoration of a glorified picture of the Soviet period is dangerous for Ukrainian society and for civic identity.

History Textbooks subtheme

New textbooks that proffer a kind of naked patriotism will meet resistance from children who have been exposed to other concepts of Ukrainian identity. Textbooks should provide a depiction of civic society, relate multiple perspectives, and avoid fear-mongering and accusations toward groups.

Discussion

The results show that the five narratives found in this study are internally consistent yet differ significantly from each other. The main structure of the narratives is presented in the Table 1.

The Dual Identity narrative describes Ukraine as a country comprising two co-equal ethnic groups. People supporting this narrative are proud of their Ukrainian Russian culture and heritage, and insist that it differs from Russian culture in Russia. They see the country as divided by regional differences and believe that Ukrainian nationalists are the ones responsible for increasing tensions in the country. The Russian language is perceived to be under threat and should be established as a second state language. Regions have distinctive histories and approaches to the past that impede the development of a common national identity. Textbooks should be revised to remove Ukrainian nationalistic interpretations of history and culture.

Those who profess a pro-Soviet narrative orient their views toward the reassessment of the history of the Soviet Union and aim to increase national pride and unity by incorporating Soviet achievements into the core of the country's national identity. Ukraine is thus portrayed as a multicultural society where all internal conflicts are provoked by nationalists. The narrative confirms Ukrainian as the only state language but stresses the importance of support for a liberal policy toward use of the Russian language. The historic narrative of Ukraine should include both positive and negative assessments of its Soviet past, and history textbooks should be revised to correct the present one-sided presentation of history.

The Fight for Ukrainian Identity narrative describes Ukraine as a homogenous culture of ethnic Ukrainians with enclaves of pro-Soviet Russians that have resulted from colonization and immigration. Ukraine is a post-colonial, post-genocidal society that was able to survive, preserve its culture and language, and achieve independence. But Ukrainian culture, language, and history remain under threat from its pro-Soviet population and from the present government, which is supported by Russia. The major divide in the society is between authentic Ukrainian democratic values and pro-Soviet Russian totalitarian ideals. It is important to protect Ukrainian language and history from pro-Soviet influences and create policies that enforce Ukrainian as the sole state language.

The Recognition of Ukrainian Identity narrative describes Ukraine as a homogenous culture of ethnic Ukrainians with small ethnic minority groups: Russians, Crimean Tatars, and Hungarians. The society is united by the deep democratic tradition of Ukrainian culture, which differs from Russian totalitarianism. The majority of people speak the Ukrainian language and accept Ukrainian as the sole state language. The Russian-speaking population enjoy sufficient opportunities to preserve their language; linguistic tensions are provoked only when Russia manipulates the issue. Despite regional differences in the

Table 1. Structure of narratives.

Narrative → Subtheme ↓	Dual Identity	Pro-Soviet	Fight for Ukrainian Identity	Recognition of Ukrainian Identity	Multicultural-Civic
<i>Pride</i>	Russian culture in Ukraine: spirituality and deep values	History of Ukraine including achievements of Ukr. SSR	Ukraine recovered like the Phoenix and is fulfilled with liberal nationalism	Free country with deep democratic traditions	Achievements of Ukrainian people, beauty of the land
<i>Dynamics</i>	Yushchenko: imposition of Ukrainian identity Yanukovich: absence of ideology	Yushchenko: wrong politics of memory Yanukovich: absence of national concept	Yushchenko: right policy but did not do enough Yanukovich: pro-Soviet and Russian	Yushchenko: right policy but did not unite nation Yanukovich: influenced by Russia	Yushchenko: worked against unity of people Yanukovich: employs Soviet myths
<i>Identity</i>	Dual identity with two equal ethnic groups; threat to Russian identity	Multilayer identity that needs incorporation of positive achievement of the past	Ukrainian nationalism as a core; threat of Soviet pro-Russian mentality	Ethnic state of Ukrainians with small minorities; different from Russia	Multicultural shared society that should build civic identity; offset by nationalist and pro-Soviet groups
<i>Common</i>	Christian culture and independence	Common destiny and independence	Ukrainian culture and territory	Ukraine's own way of development	Common territory and independence
<i>Divide</i>	Between East and West region; Ukrainian nationalism as a trigger	Between two ethnic groups based on history of 20th century	Between authentic democratic Ukraine and pro-Soviet migrants	No real divide; tensions provoked by Russia	Based on social ideology, language, and territory
<i>Language</i>	Dividing factor, discrimination of Russian language; need for bilingual law	Ukrainian as a state language with the support of and liberal policy toward Russian	Ukrainian as a state language is under threat by Russians and must be protected	Ukrainian as commonly accepted state language; problems developed by politicians	Ukrainian as a state language with liberal policies of enforcement; freedom for Russian language
<i>History</i>	Two regions with two histories and approaches to the past	Needs to be built on balanced assessment of 20th century	Ukrainian model of history is threatened by Soviet myths	Need for common history different from Russian	Multiplicity of shared history with civic component
<i>History textbooks</i>	Good change based on the need for revisions and corrections	Good change based on the need for a balanced approach	Return to Soviet values that will produce resistance	Result of the influence of Russia; will provoke conflicts	Naked patriotism instead of civic perspective

interpretation of history, Ukraine has one common historical past, distinct from Russia. Ukraine should defend its independence from Russian influence in both politics and education.

The Multicultural-Civic narrative describes Ukraine as a multicultural society with co-equal ethnic groups that should build a civic, not ethnic, concept of national identity. This society is the product of the efforts of all Ukrainian citizens, united by the idea of independence. The civic concept is undermined by Ukrainian and Russian nationalists as well as by the pro-Soviet population. The Ukrainian language as the sole state language serves to unite Ukraine but ought not be enforced. The ability to use Russian in other spheres should be a free choice of the people. The historic narrative that forms the foundation of Ukraine's common identity should be grounded in inclusive ideas of citizenship and should reflect the plural voices of Ukrainian history.

All these narratives rest on opposing interpretations of various features of society and critiques of some current government policies. Ukraine is perceived as a multicultural society in the Dual Identity narrative, the Pro-Soviet narrative, and the Multicultural-Civic narrative. However, both of the Ukrainian narratives describe the country as a mainly homogeneous society of ethnic Ukrainians. The definition of "the enemy" is absent only in the Multicultural-Civic narrative, while the Dual Identity and Pro-Soviet narratives posit Ukrainian nationalists as an enemy. The Recognition of Ukrainian Identity Narrative posits Russia as an enemy. The Fight for Ukrainian Identity narrative identifies the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine as an enemy that is influenced by Russia.

Yushchenko's policies are perceived as an imposition of Ukrainian ethnic identity in the Dual Identity, Pro-Soviet, and Multicultural-Civic narratives. However, they are evaluated as correct policies that were not properly implemented in the Fight for Ukrainian Identity narrative. The Recognition of Ukrainian Identity narrative evaluates Yushchenko's as a good policy that nevertheless was not explained well and did not validate stories of different groups within Ukraine. Yanukovich is described in the Dual Identity and Pro-Soviet narratives as not having any concept of national identity or national idea, while all other narratives describe him as pro-Soviet and pro-Russian.

The concept of civic society (as opposed to an ethnic society) is developed only in the Multicultural-Civic narrative. It is nearly absent in the Dual Identity and Recognition of Ukrainian Identity narratives. The civic-society concept is considered a threat in the Pro-Soviet and Fight for Ukrainian Identity narratives. The interpretations of history and the status of the Russian language differ completely among the narratives.

Major differences are visible between the Dual Identity narrative and both Ukrainian narratives. The Holodomor is interpreted in the Dual Identity narrative as a result of a class struggle that took place in many parts of the USSR, but in both Ukrainian narratives it was a unique genocide committed by Russians against Ukrainians. The decline of the number of people with Russian identity is interpreted in the Dual Identity narrative as the result of coercive pressure and an imposed lower status on Russian identity; in both Ukrainian narratives it is viewed as the result of free choice by people who have a double identity. The fact that the Russian language is used more broadly than Ukrainian is interpreted as representing a need to introduce a second official language in the Dual Identity narrative, but as reason to protect the Ukrainian language in both Ukrainian narratives. The possibility of introduction of the Russian language as a second state language is perceived as a way to reduce conflicts in the Dual Identity narrative, but both Ukrainian narratives consider it a way to divide the country.

The Dual Identity and Fight for Ukrainian Identity narratives employ opposite dual concepts in the descriptions of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups (see Table 2).

Table 2. Dual concepts in descriptions of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups.

Dual Identity narrative		Ukrainian narratives	
<i>Russians</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>	<i>Russians</i>	<i>Ukrainians</i>
Market-based	Traditional	Collectivistic, patriarchal	Rights and freedoms
Progressive	Conservative	Totalitarian values	Democracy
High spirituality, developed culture	Rural culture, simplistic	Communists	Liberal nationalists
Industrial	Agrarian	Soviet values	National values
Not ethno-cultural	“Messianic” nationalism	Russia-oriented	West-oriented
Orthodox Church, Byzantine culture	Polish culture, Greco- Catholic Church	Asian	European
Progress	Regress	Regress	Progress
New	Old	Old	New

While these dual concepts are opposite to one another, both groups use similar constructs to define the other: progressive–regressive, traditional–modern, and West–East orientation. Each group depicts the in-group in positive terms that derive from multiple interpretations of the concepts of progress, modernity, and geographic orientation while attributing opposite negative meanings to the out-group. These interpretations of the concepts allow both groups to justify the narratives and ideological positions they use to define the standing of Russian and Ukrainian ethnic groups in the society.

Thus, the “Us–Them” perception evident in these two narratives (Dual Identity and Fight for Ukrainian Identity) can serve as one dimension for the mapping of existing narratives. One side of the continuum is characterized by the predominance of pro-Russian sentiments, and the other by pro-Ukrainian sentiments. Another dimension for mapping derives from the interpretation of Ukrainian society as mostly homogeneous or heterogeneous. Thus, the map of prevailing narratives could be as shown in Figure 1.

Based on the two dimensions of homogeneous–heterogeneous society and pro-Russian–pro-Ukrainian sentiments, the Fight for Ukrainian Identity narrative is placed



Figure 1. Map of the narratives in conceptual space (version 1).




Figure 2. Map of the narratives in conceptual space (version 2).

in the heterogeneous society/pro-Ukrainian quadrant. The Recognition of Ukrainian Identity narrative is placed in the homogeneous society/pro-Ukrainian quadrant. The Pro-Soviet narrative is placed in the homogeneous society/pro-Russian quadrant, and the Dual Identity narrative is placed in the heterogeneous society/pro-Russian quadrant. The Multiethnic-Civic narrative is placed on the heterogeneous-society side but cannot be defined by the pro-Russian–pro-Ukrainian dimension. Hence, the proposed map of the predominant narratives must be reconsidered to include the Multicultural-Civic narrative.

Another version of the mapping could include a dimension reflecting a concept of national identity represented by the civic concept (liberal ideology) versus the ethnic concept (primordial ideology) (Figure 2). The second dimension, homogeneous–heterogeneous society, can remain.

The second map places the Dual Identity and Fight for Ukrainian Identity narratives in the heterogeneous society/ethnic concept quadrant. The Pro-Soviet and Recognition of Ukrainian Identity narratives are placed in the homogeneous society/ethnic concept quadrant; and the Multicultural-Civic narrative is placed in the heterogeneous society/civic concept quadrant. This mapping has several advantages: it provides an opportunity to place all narratives on the map and to recognize what narratives are missing in the society. The map shows that four of the five narratives rest on a primordial ideology and employ ethnic concepts in the development of the national idea. Only one narrative, the Multicultural-Civic one, represented by 16% of respondents, is based on a liberal ideology and civic meaning of national identity. Nevertheless, this narrative recognizes the ethnic diversity of Ukrainian society. Thus, the intellectual landscape of Ukraine is deficient in liberal civic ideologies that define society as a community of equal citizens independently of their ethnicity, language, or religion.

Conclusion

Analysis reveals the existence of five different narratives about Ukraine's national concept and national identity. Each narrative is characterized by three main features: (1) it is very coherent and articulate, with strong internal logic and justification of its legitimacy; (2) it is

connected with a specific conception of power and morality; and (3) and it is different and in many features opposite to other narratives. All these features of the narratives lead to the perception that conceiving a society is a zero-sum game where one narrative must prevail over all others. This produces aggressiveness, enemy hunts, antagonism, and hostility among people. At the same time, these features of the narratives ensure that there can be neither an overwhelming victory of one narrative over others nor a satisfying compromise between them. The realization of this fact is very important for the opening of a much-needed real dialogue in the society. Only through systematic dialogue can common ground be established and a cohesive national identity develop – one based on *unifying* ideas, including ideas of civic society and a civic concept of national identity, emphasizing human rights and the equality of every citizen, independent of his or her religion, ethnicity, or language.

One of the greatest threats to the civic-based national narrative is the Pro-Soviet narrative, which masks itself under the pretense of a common identity for citizens who comprise Ukrainian society. A major difference is the horizontal relations (active participation, agency of the people, and civic responsibility) that characterize the democracy-focused systems versus the vertical relations (paternalism, submission to the state, and blind patriotism) in the Soviet-style systems. In conclusion, Ukraine's national idea should include civic education and the fostering of democratic culture among its citizens.

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Notes

1. The choice of Kiev as a venue for interviews was based on the following reasons: (1) Kiev is the capital of the country, so the concentration of elites is the highest there; (2) Kiev's population is multicultural and represents the diverse ideologies and narratives of the Ukraine; (3) elites living in Kiev have more opportunities to interact with the representatives of other narratives and thus formulate their positions.
2. Kievan Rus' (also Kyivan Rus' or Rus) was the first eastern Slavic state (late ninth to mid-thirteenth century). It is considered the earliest predecessor of modern Ukraine and Russia.
3. Stepan Andriyovych Bandera (1909 –1959) was one of the leaders of the Ukrainian national movement in Western Ukraine (Galicia) who headed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). Bandera is a controversial figure in contemporary Ukraine given his cooperation with Nazi Germany in 1939–1941. On 22 January 2010, the outgoing president of Ukraine, Viktor Yushchenko, posthumously awarded Bandera the title of Hero of Ukraine. The award was declared illegal by a Ukrainian court in April 2010. In January 2011, under President Viktor Yanukovich, the award was officially annulled. See a review of this issue by Timothy Snyder, "A Fascist Hero in Democratic Kiev" (<http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2010/feb/24/a-fascist-hero-in-democratic-kiev>).
4. *Surzhyk*: a range of russified variations of the Ukrainian language used in eastern and southern regions of Ukraine.
5. On Victory Day, May 9, 2011, there were clashes in Lviv (Western Ukraine) between supporters of the Svoboda Party and people celebrating Victory Day. The former is the nationalist ultra-right party; the majority of the latter group, including World War II veterans, came from Eastern Ukraine carrying replicas of the Soviet red flag. Fourteen people were injured and nine were detained for disorderly conduct.
6. Ivan Stepanovych Mazepa (1639–1709), Cossack hetman of the Hetmanate in Left Bank Ukraine. In response to Peter the Great's harsh demands on Ukraine, which threatened Cossack autonomy, Mazepa sided with Charles of Sweden. The Russian Orthodox Church laid an anathema on his name in the beginning of the eighteenth century and has refused to renounce it to this day.

7. Bohdan Khmelnytsky (1595–1657), leader of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, who organized a rebellion against Polish rule in Ukraine that ultimately led to the transfer of the Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper River from Polish to Russian control.
8. Magdeburg law is the legal code adopted in medieval times by the city of Magdeburg and copied by many municipalities in Germany and Eastern and Central Europe, including Ukraine and Belarus. The code was based on compilations of Germanic law (the *Sachsenspiegel*) and showed little influence of Roman law. It combined norms of customary law with various municipal regulations.
9. Rulers of the Russian empire who carried out a policy of modernization and expansion.
10. The autonomous hetman state, or Hetmanate, was limited territorially to the east, in Left Bank Ukraine (1649–1782). At the head of the state stood the hetman, elected theoretically by a general Cossack assembly but effectively by senior officers, who in turn were largely swayed by the tsar's preference.
11. Taras Hryhorovych Shevchenko (1814–1861) is the foremost Ukrainian poet of the nineteenth century and a major figure of the Ukrainian national revival. Born a serf, Shevchenko was freed in 1838 while a student at the St. Petersburg Academy of Art. His poems expressed Ukrainian romanticism and gave a somber portrayal of Ukrainian history.

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