


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Constructing nation: national narratives of history teachers in Ukraine

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Constructing nation: national narratives of history teachers in Ukraine

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This paper scrutinizes history narratives as a practice of a specific kind of nation-building and analyzes the role of history teachers in this process. Based on 60 semi-structural interviews with history teachers in Ukraine, this paper analyzes three major national narratives used by history teachers to produce specific meaning of social identity among school pupils. This paper shows how history teachers reproduce national identity in their classrooms by altering the teaching program and textbook narratives and by promoting their vision of a nation, rights of specific groups to participate in nation-building process and defining enemies and allies.

Keywords: Ukraine; national identity; history teachers; conflict; narrative

A state uses history narratives as a practice of a specific kind of nation-building that is central for the nation's 'self-contained process of coming-to-consciousness' (Hill, 2008, p. ix). While the impact of the system of history education and textbooks in particular on the development of national identity was analyzed in numerous studies (see for example Cajani & Ross, 2007; Hein & Selden, 1998; Schissler & Soysal, 2005; Vickers & Jones, 2005), only few studies shed light on the impact of political orientations and social identity of history teachers on the teaching process and reproduction of national identity (see for example Anderson, 2008, 2011; Makkawi, 2002; Worchel & Coutant, 2008).

The view of narrative as a tool for the creation of meaning of social identity provides an opportunity to scrutinize the role of memory, ideology, and culture in this process. The analysis of narrative sheds light on the role of structure and agency in identity formation (Somers, 1994), construction of citizenship and discourses of national identity (De Cillia, Reisigl, & Wodak, 1999; Haste, 2004), employment of history in the process of identification with nation (Suny, 2001), engagement with collective stories of particular community (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012), and institutionalization of social memory into a coherent story that legitimizes the structure of power or proclaims foundations for resistance (Bar-On & Sarsar, 2004; Bar-Tal, 1998, 2000; Fivush, 2010; Martin, 1995).

On the level of history education, national narratives as social representations exist both on the level of society and individual with interconnections between two levels (Moscovici, 1988). School textbooks serve as a 'symbolic reserve,' the 'totalities' of social categories, beliefs and sentiments, common to a particular group in the nation, that

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create a system ‘with the life of its own’ (Durkheim, 1983, p. 39; Liu & Atsumi, 2008; Liu & Hilton, 2005). Through history textbooks, political agents and representatives of the state shape the perceptions, categorization, interpretation, and memory that serve as a foundation for national identity (Bourdieu, 1993). Personal narratives of history teachers mirror some of national narratives of history and identity, including key components about social categories, collective memory, and social representations of history and collective identity (Greenwalt, 2009; Hammack, 2010).

This paper concentrates on the role of history teachers in the process of nation-building in Ukraine. Analysis of 60 semi-structural interviews with history teachers in Ukraine presented in this paper helps reveal three major national narratives used by history teachers. While there are some variations within these narratives, they represent very distinct and specific meaning of social identity. The important finding is that the three narratives are not only coherent and strong, but exclude one another. This paper argues that all three narratives have similar structure, including dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order. Analysis of this structure helps compare prevalent national narratives and shows how history teachers reproduce national identity in their classrooms. This paper demonstrates how they alter the teaching program and textbook narratives, promote their vision of a nation, rights of specific groups to participate in nation-building process, and define enemies and allies.

Structure of national narratives

Complex narratives are underpinned by the ‘concrete and stable system of symbols’ (Parsons, 1954, p. 126), ‘conceptual scaffolding,’ which is erected to construct new ideologies or to modify the existing ones (Snow & Benford, 1988), or ‘primary frameworks’ that offer a point of comparison (Goffman, 1974, p. 21). These simplistic structures are organized as polarities that replicate the existential and metaphysical contrast between sacred and profane (Arendt, 1958; Bataille, 2001; Benhabib, 2003). According to structural semiotic theory, underpinning social narratives are binary symbolic codes that are composed of a positive and a negative value (Alexander, 2003, 2004; Smith, 1998). A collective axiology (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, 2011) is defined through categories of right/wrong, good/bad, and/or virtuous/vicious, drawing upon stories of a sacred past and propelled forward in the form of obligations, expectations, requirements, demands, and rights.

By defining ingroup and outgroup in the nation through the binary idea of who ‘we’ are and who ‘we’ are not, dualistic order fulfills the function of creation of the meaning of national identity. It amalgamates the most important values and deep beliefs that are sacred and vital for the existence of the ingroup within the nation. *Dualistic order* can be represented by different binaries of ingroup–outgroup. The first type of dualistic order, *social group (ethnic, religious, class, and political party) duality*, represents a nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ethnic, political, racial, or religious groups. *Bi-national duality* emphasizes conflict between two countries (and political and ideological systems they represent) as a major problem for a nation, entailing that one’s own nation has made a right choice for its development, supports sacred and pure values, and fights with an evil enemy that aspires to control, dominate, and take over a neighboring nation. *Temporal duality* emphasizes the gap between a positive moral past and negative corrupt present of a nation, positing a specific period in nation’s past as a best time in the history of a nation that was virtuous, worthy, and representing the most important values. *Ideological duality*

describes nation as an arena of zero-sum fights between two ideologies/mentalities, implying that one ideology is an essence of all the worth in a nation, representing the most important values and virtues, and showing a way for national prosperity.

The meaning of *dualistic order* is extended and further developed in the narratives and myths that constitute the cultural foundation of social group (Alexander, 2003; Snow & Benford, 1988). Myths, as stories of origination, create the vision of the continuity of social community through recounting of its past. They increase the salience of ingroup identity and define the criteria for membership and exclusion based on ingroup history and the current position of groups within the society. Myth expresses the people's 'reality postulates' about the world and concerns 'a moral universe of meaning' (Overing, 1997, p. 12). Myth does not provide commemoration of mythical events, it reiterates them, making the protagonists of the myth present in the contemporary life (Eliade, 1998). The standpoint of their accounts as true or false is less important than the meaning they produce and the effect they have on a community in specific social situations (Bottici, 2007; Wittgenstein, 1987). Thus, myth is one of the crucial mechanisms of cultural reproduction and 'management of meaning' through the production and reproduction of significance in a particular context (Blumenberg, 1988; Bourdieu, 1993; Horowitz, 2000; Schopflin, 1997). In collective axiology (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, 2011), we define mythic narratives as stories that establish where, why, and how the group was formed, what encounters it had with outgroups, and what shared glories and trauma constitute the evolution of the ingroup. To justify dualistic order, mythic narratives employ iconic order – a system of symbols, symbolic events, prototypes, historic figures, and the current leaders.

The *dualistic orders* create a foundation of normative positioning of groups (Harré & Langenhove, 1998) or *normative order* (Rothbart & Korostelina, 2006, 2011). *Normative order* reflects a tension between stability and change, between fixed identities and social border crossings. More than simply a distillation of prescriptions and injunctions, a normative order comprises a set of rules and resources that are deployed for acting and thinking, for doing and reflecting, or for living and understanding. The normative order legitimizes group decisions and actions and provides foundation for future activities. Although the recommendation for the improvement of the nation could include multiple areas and spheres of social life, normative orders of national narratives concentrate on the structure of power that rests on the duality of ingroup and outgroup presented in the dualistic order.

On the each of three levels – dualistic order, mythic narratives, and normative order – national narrative defines and redefines meaning through the formation and redefinition of national identity and legitimization of power and social order. On the level of dualistic order, the meaning of national identity and power is produced within binary constructs. The national identity is defined by the opposition of ingroup and outgroup and the meanings of binary constructs, while connotation of power arrives from the positioning of groups as deserving and not deserving to hold and exercise power. On the level of mythic narratives, the meaning of national identity receives further clarification and justification by employment of historic accounts that emphasize the continuity of the national community. Normative order furthers justification of claims about ingroup and outgroup identity provided in mythic narratives. It solidifies the meaning of national identity by attaching value judgments to the ingroup and outgroup and by outlining the social boundary between them. The mythic accounts of power structures is promoted into

different approaches to legitimacy and prescription of policies that support the meaning of national identity and concept of power.

Context of research

After 20 years of independence of Ukraine, the process of nation-building still remains contested and controversial, complicated by historic, cultural, ethnic, and linguistic differences between regions. The social distance between two major ethnic groups, Russians and Ukrainians, also diverges among the regions with the strongest social boundary in the Western regions and Crimea and a blended social boundary in the central and Eastern regions. Of the Ukrainian population, Ukrainophone Ukrainians comprise 45%, Russophone Ukrainians 34%, and Russophone Russians 15% (Hmelko & Oksamitnaya, 2008).

These regional and linguistic divisions are underpinned by opposite attitudes toward the past and have impeded the development of a common vision for the nation and a shared meaning of national identity. The issue of historical memory in Ukraine is strongly connected with the justification of the current social positions and ambitions as well as with the vision of the future of Ukraine, thus becoming the ground for continued battles (Jilge & Troebst, 2006). As Shevel (2011) states, 'the Ukrainian states response to the challenge of divided historical memory was not the promotion of a democratic memory but oscillation between competing ideologically charged narratives of the past' (p. 138). One of the major divisions in the perception of history is the historic interpretations of World War II that are extremely contested and differ between the western and south-eastern regions of Ukraine. In particular, one of the most contested issues is the role and position of the Bandera faction of the Ukrainian nationalists organization (OUN) and the Ukrainian insurgent army (UPA). Communists and pro-Soviet groups view the OUN and the UPA as an enemy to their ideals, a violent opposition to communist rule, and a separatist movement that aimed to divide Ukraine. The nationalist and national-democratic right treats the OUN and the UPA activities as a national liberation struggle of the Ukrainian nation and positive protagonists in the struggle with communists.

Another important historic event that provokes different interpretations is the Great Ukrainian famine of 1932–1933, or the Holodomor. The scholarship on Holodomor is divided between academics who see it as an ethnic genocide (Kul'chyts'kyi, 2001, Marochko, 2003) and academics who are not convinced that the goal of the famine was to punish ethnic Ukrainians and partially explain this famine by ecological and natural factors (Kasyanov, 2009). This fundamental divide became a political issue. Those who have supported the genocide argument have been accused of exploiting the issue to prop the nationalistic agenda, while those who oppose it have been perceived as pro-Soviet or pro-Russian in their political leanings (Dietsch, 2006; Kasyanov, 2009).

History textbooks became entwined in the swings of the political pendulum. They were completely rewritten several times: after the fall of the Soviet Union, after the Orange Revolution of 2004, and after the election of a new government in February 2010. As Janmaat (2002) notes in his analysis of the first change, Ukrainian government sees history education as a vital tool in the nation-building process. The Ministry of Education stipulates which books should be used. The required history textbooks are systematically distributed in all regions of Ukraine, thus the same books are used throughout the country. The first change of textbooks included more balanced account of all events, including the Soviet time, emphasis on Ukrainian language and culture, description of the

Great October Socialist Revolution and Bolshevik movement as alien to Ukraine and denial of support for them among ethnic Ukrainians, and efforts to rehabilitate the OUN (Janmaat, 2002). Textbooks written after 2004 posited Russia as an alien state and promoted the history of Ukraine as a history of the Ukrainian ethnic group (Janmaat, 2007; Kasyanov, 2009; Korostelina, 2009). In contrast, the most recent government has radically changed the concept of national identity toward Russification and altered the presentation and interpretation of the same events (including Great Rus, Great October Revolution, civil war, repressions, World War II, and orange revolution) (Korostelina, 2011, 2013). These radical changes in a relatively recent and short-time period have obliged teachers and history education to promote opposite ideas during ever-changing identity meaning-making processes. Depending on a change, teachers in different regions protested against the curriculum changes that were in divergence with their views, beliefs, and values. For example, in recent research in eastern Ukraine, ‘many teachers noted how previously they had taught a Soviet interpretation of history, whilst today the ‘History of Ukraine’ course had been specifically tailored to foster a sense of loyalty to the Ukrainian state and promote national consciousness amongst Ukraine’s children’ (Rodgers, 2007, p. 505).

Methodology

The study was conducted in December 2011 to May 2012 in several regions of Ukraine: Simferopol, Crimea (South-East), L’viv and Uzhhorod (West), and Kiev (capital of Ukraine, central region). In each region, 12 schools were selected from the list of urban schools based on stratified random sample. I randomly chose schools from three groups: (1) private schools, (2) leading (best according to city’s educational council) state schools, and (3) ordinary state schools. The language of instruction in schools varied across the regions: in Crimea, only two schools out of 12 had Ukrainian language as a primary language of instruction and in L’viv and Uzhhorod all schools had Ukrainian language as a primary language of instruction. In Kiev, only one school out of 12 had Russian as a primary language of instruction; however 10 out of 24 teachers used Russian as a language of instruction.

The teachers were evenly distributed across three regions: 19 in Crimea, 17 in L’viv and Uzhhorod, and 24 in Kiev. Because the majority of teachers in Ukrainian schools is comprised of middle aged and elderly women, the sample was skewed toward female gender and people aged above 40. However, around 25% of teachers participating in the study were male and around 30% were aged between 25 and 40 years. The majority of teachers (80%) were teaching in grades 8 to 11, while 20% were teaching in grades 5 to 11.

This study was conducted through the triangulation of several methods:

- (1) 60 semi-structural interviews with history teachers. Each interview lasted between 1 and 2.5 hours. These interviews included several groups of questions: (a) questions about the salience and meaning of ethnic and national identity of teachers (‘What make you proud to be Ukrainian?’, ‘How important is it for you to be Ukrainian?’); (b) questions regarding the current situation and national identity in Ukraine (‘Do you think Ukraine has a common national idea?’, ‘What do you think unite and what divide people in Ukraine?’, ‘What is the role of history in the development of national identity?’); (c) questions regarding history textbooks and teaching (‘How did textbook change over the last year?’, ‘How do

you teach history and do you use new textbooks?’), and (d) questions regarding all the aforementioned indicators as they represented in revised history textbooks and the attitudes of history teachers toward these indicators (e.g. ‘Who are national heroes represented in revised textbooks? Do you agree with the change and why?’, ‘Was the representation of relations between Russia and Ukraine changed in new textbook? What do you think about this change?’, etc.).

- (2) Observation of history lessons in schools with elements of micro-ethnographic analysis. I observed 8 lessons on the topic connected with the 20 years of the referendum for Ukrainian independence during which teachers I interviewed discussed the aftermath of independence and the current situation in Ukraine. I also observed 7 lessons on and the twentieth-century history of Ukraine.
- (3) To analyze the data, I employ thematic analysis that allows the researcher to manage large data clusters without losing the deep meaning of received information and the focus of the research question (Boyatzis, 1998; Wiebe, Durepos, & Mills, 2009). I form specific clusters by merging the similar or related themes and making a summary table of the structured themes. The theme analysis made on each individual interview contributes to the generation of common, general themes for all or most of the interviews (Saldana, 2009; Willig, 2008).

Results

Research reveals three major national narratives employed by history teachers in Ukraine: pro-ethnic Ukrainian narrative, pro-ethnic Russian narrative, and multicultural narrative. All teachers in the study consistently used one of three narratives without overlapping of their components. While there were some variations within each major narrative, the narrative of each teacher was coherent and reflected the main content of one of the major narrative.

Pro-ethnic Ukrainian narrative

Totally 95% of teachers participating in the study in Western Ukraine and 35% of teachers participating in the study in Kiev used this narrative.

This national narrative is based on *social group duality* ‘Ukrainian–Russians,’ *bi-national duality* ‘Ukraine as part of Europe–Russia,’ and *temporal duality* ‘Soviet past–Independent Ukraine.’

The first duality positively presents Ukrainian nationalists and posits Russian people in Ukraine as pro-communist and anti-Ukrainian, with totalitarian values and imperial ambitions. As teacher F.E stresses, ‘Ukrainian people are the strongest, most beautiful and hardworking people in the former Soviet Union.’ They present Ukrainians as more educated and culturally developed than Russians: ‘The culture of the Ukrainian ethnic group is very rich; it has a long history of fighting for independence. Western Ukraine is more connected to Europe, people there have higher morality and values than people in the East.’ Russians are depicted in negative terms: ‘There are a lot of Russian children with militant negative attitudes toward Ukraine.’ Russian people in Ukraine are associated with communism, totalitarianism, and imperial ambitions. As teacher A.G. states, Russians have nostalgia for the Soviet Union, they distance themselves from Ukraine.’ This group depicts Ukraine as homogeneously ethnic Ukrainian with the

strongest representation of culture in the central and rural areas. As teacher F.O. stresses, 'I see Ukraine as a common space, as the unity of Ukrainian people.' While respondents discuss the cultural, historic, and ideological differences between west and east of Ukraine, they believe that they can be overcome through the creation of common Ukraine.

In the second duality, Ukraine is presented as a victim of Russian oppression: 'Ukraine is a victim of several Russifications, many Russians were brought here by Russian governments to take control over Ukraine. Those who tried to defend Ukrainian cultures became victims of repression and the Holodomor.' As teacher H.H. notes, 'I do not say bad things about Russia, I just bring into the classroom the facts that show its aggressive and imperialist nature. Russia betrayed us and started a fight during the time of Bogdan Khmelnytsky.¹' Comparing and opposing themselves to Russia, this group of teachers praises Ukrainian ethnic culture and nationalism as a foundation for Ukrainian nation. As teacher O.A. describes, 'The national idea is very important and should be brought from Western Ukraine to the rest of the country. The future is with Ukrainian nationalism and Europe. I am enraged by Russia and Russians in Ukraine who want to bring us back to totalitarianism.'

Temporal duality is based on negative judgments about the Soviet past and support of Ukrainian independence. Thus, the following notes on the Soviet power were made by several teachers from this group: 'people did not have any rights,' 'The Soviet Union was like a family where 15 children did not have any voice or freedom,' 'Ukraine gave everything to Moscow but did not receive anything back,' 'Moscow took all the money and resources from Ukraine and Ukraine did not have an opportunity for development.' These teachers also connect Russia and Russification with communism and Sovietization of Ukraine. As teacher F.S. states, 'Sovietization of Ukraine could not be forgiven. It is not right to enforce alien ideas and values. Communists have their own ideals that they still try to impose on the Ukrainian population.'

To substantiate these dualities, teachers employ various mythic narratives, vigorously defending ethnic nationalism and justifying violence committed in the past. As teacher F.E. states:

People blame Ukrainian ethnic nationalism and call it terrorism. But in reality Ukrainian nationalism is the same as all other nationalisms. Ukraine was occupied by Russia and Poland for centuries. Both these nations were cruel and oppressive and Ukrainians had to defend themselves by any means

The justification of violence is also based on the equation of Nazism and Communism and the presentation of Ukraine as a victim of both. As teacher L.S. describes, 'Ukrainian nationalists were fighting with both Nazis and communists. These aggressive and cruel regimes were trying to dominate Ukraine and Ukrainians bravely defended their Motherland.' Teacher H.H. emphasizes, 'The Soviet Army is an army of occupiers. In reality they defended the Soviet regime, not independence for Ukraine. People who were brought to work in Germany lived in much better conditions than those evacuated to Russia.' They believe that OUN/UPA represents the values of national independence and fight for the freedom of Ukrainian nation. Teachers admit that many children have negative views of Bandera and Shushkevich, but stress that they spend significant amount of time in classroom explaining why they received the status of heroes of Ukraine. As teacher A.G. argues:

It is a crying injustice to blame OUN/UPA for nationalism or violence. It was formed as a response to cruel Polish oppression and the dominant Polish nationalism. The killing of Poles is justified as self-defense of an oppressed nation. Poles took the land from Ukrainian peasants and they had to defend their lands.

They also see Mazepa as a national hero, promoting his devotion to the idea of independence and personal sacrifice. As teacher E.B. emphasizes:

My students should understand that Mazepa is not a traitor. Yes, Mazepa betrayed Russia but he did it for the future of independent Ukraine. Ethnic nationalism is a positive idea, a way to sovereignty and prosperity. It is a reaction to discrimination and oppression by other ethnic groups.

Thus, Mazepa as a prototype symbolizes the fight for independence and great patriotism.

The normative order for this group is based on the belief that ethnic Ukrainians have more rights than any other groups to define the meaning of national identity. The importance of Ukrainian culture as a basis of the developing national identity is connected with the denial of the rights of minorities. The following are examples of the perception of the role of Ukrainian and other ethnic groups in nation-building process: 'It is very important for the Ukrainian ethnic group to be a cement foundation for our nation. Minorities should accept this fact'; 'the Ukrainian ethnic group should create the basis for national identity. Ethnic nationalism and monolithic culture form the state. Ethnic minorities are not important.' The ethnic concept of national identity leads to the negative assessment of the textbook that, on their opinion, lacks a strong emphasis on Ukrainian ethnic culture as the foundation for the nation. Many respondents discuss how they alter this lack of an ethnic core to the national idea by presenting Ukrainian history as a constant fight for Ukrainian independence. 'I try to stress Ukrainian ethnic identity in teaching every topic or event in history. The Ukrainian nation is based on the culture and spirituality of ethnic Ukrainians.'

My observations of the lessons taught by the teachers with this narrative reveal how teachers promote their views among children. They use very emotional descriptions of the victimization of Ukraine by Russia and communists, bringing examples from family experiences of forced Russification and repressions. Many teachers constantly stress that students must be proud of their young but developing nation. For example, during the lessons devoted to the referendum on the independence, several teachers employed comparison of the negative conditions in Ukraine during the Soviet time and positive development of independent Ukraine. They present Ukrainian ethnic identity as a national identity of Ukraine, stressing ethnic Ukrainian culture and traditions as foundations of the nation. For example, the majority of teachers were constantly stressing that Ukrainian nation is very old and has a long history. They also deny involvement of OUN/UPA in collaboration with Nazi regime. For example, during the lesson devoted to Holocaust in L'viv, a teacher demonstrated photos of German soldiers killing Jews and told that, while these photos are not from L'viv, the events in L'viv were the same as on the demonstrated photos.

Thus, this group of teachers promotes an ethnic concept of national identity by stressing the moral and cultural superiority of the Ukrainian ethnic group, positing ethnic nationalism as the best source for nation-building, emphasizing the importance of a monoethnic nature to the nation and one uniting language and culture, and denial of the right of minorities to contribute to nation-building efforts. In their teaching they promote

this vision by concentrating on history and culture of the Ukrainian ethnic group and presenting the history of Ukraine as a constant fight for independence.

Pro-ethnic Russian narrative

Totally 15% of teachers participating in the study in Kiev and 65% of teachers participating in the study in Crimea support this narrative.

This narrative rests on *ideological duality* of ‘Ukrainian nationalists people of Ukraine’ and a *temporal duality* of ‘Soviet friendship of people current nationalistic divide.’ Ideological duality condemns nationalists for their tunnel vision: ‘they are afraid of Russia but are not afraid to get under the influence of Western states.’ These teachers glorify Red Army Veterans as moral winners of a just war and perceive the Ukrainian nationalists as vicious traitors, collaborators with Nazis, and belligerent killers of women and children. As teacher G.A. describes, ‘I do not like textbooks: they promote nationalistic ideas and develop Russo-phobic attitudes. To combat anti-Russian stereotypes I often ask provocative questions and bring photographs.’

The temporal duality is based on positive assessment of Soviet power, its achievements in the creation of a prosperous Ukraine, and accusations of Western Ukraine as responsible for the current economic and social crisis. As teacher K.V. states, ‘From the textbooks students learn that Ukraine was a colony of Russia. I tell them that it is not true. There were a lot of positive things during Soviet time.’ These teachers use their own materials and notes, provoke discussions and supplement the history of Ukraine with the history of the Soviet Union. Many respondents confirmed that they teach history of Russia not as a history of foreign state, but in wider perspective, including many events that impacted Ukraine. As teacher A.E. states, ‘The Soviet past is considered negative but in reality we were living in a tolerant country with positive relations between all ethnic groups. There was internationalism and friendship of people.’

To support these dualities, this group of teachers uses mythic narratives of the Great Patriotic War and stresses that they will never accept the Western Ukrainian perception of World War II. As teacher V.F. states, ‘People who collaborated with Nazis in the OUN and UPA are stained forever.’ As teacher O.I. describes, ‘I explain to children that the Red Army saved Ukraine and that the OUN/UPA collaborated with Nazis killing thousands of innocent people. I use the history of pogroms, Holocaust, mass killing of the Poles to show the crimes of OUN/UPA.’ Teachers openly express in class their opinion that it was a mistake to give Bandera and Shushkevich the status of heroes of Ukraine. As teacher R.M. states, ‘I could not call them heroes and describe them in this way during lessons. They were in the millstones of history, I can understand their problems, but I also see them as enemies based on my education and beliefs. If I do not believe in something, students will not believe me.’ Thus, this group of teachers uses prototypes to negatively present ethnic Ukrainian nationalism through a connection with Nazis, violence, and cruelty toward innocent people.

Similarly, many teachers from this group state that Cossacks represent the only Ukrainian ethnic group and could not be considered national prototypes. As teacher V.G. tells, ‘It is hard for me to connect myself with Cossacks. My identity is in conflict with Ukrainian identity built on the Cossacks idea.’ To justify their position, teachers describe to students the violence and disorder of the Cossacks. As teacher I.A. argues, ‘I describe Cossacks differently from the textbook, stressing their cruelty and numerous treasons of their leaders. Cossacks do not represent all Ukrainian people.’

The normative order of this narrative opposes the development of the ethnic national identity in the multicultural state of Ukraine. The following words of teacher A.K. are representative for this group: 'The national idea is created on the ideal of nationalism and Ukrainian ethnic culture and history: Cossacks, Shevchenko, and the fight for independence.' As teacher V.F. states, 'The textbook still represents the history of the Ukrainian ethnic group as well ethnic Ukrainian culture: Ukraine for ethnic Ukrainians. Russians are excluded. All prototypes are Ukrainians.' The forced imposition of Ukrainian language and culture produces resistance among respondents who stress that people should have a motivation to speak Ukrainian language, but no policies were created to form this motivation. According to these teachers, many people in Ukraine do not have national pride, do not accept Ukrainian ethnic tradition and culture, and do not support the Ukrainian nationalistic idea. As teacher D.F. notes:

It is hard to teach about Ukrainian culture and history if you do not belong to it, it is not interesting for teachers or children. Children do not study Ukrainian history as their own history but as the history of the state.

In their teaching they emphasize the narrowness and inadequacy of an ethnic national narrative, its exclusive and alien nature for many children, and promote a vision of Ukraine as comprised of different ethnic groups which contribute to the prosperity of the nation.

My observations of the lessons taught by the teachers using this narrative reveal that the majority of these teachers do not use textbooks and build lessons around their own notes. Many teachers constantly compare prosperous Soviet time and the current social and economic development of independent Ukraine, emphasizing growing decline and devastation in the society. For example, during the lessons devoted to the referendum on independence, several teachers specifically organized the class discussion to show the erroneous nature of the decision to support Ukrainian independence. Many teachers also develop pride of Russian culture and ethnicity among children, constantly comparing achievements of current Russia with problems of Ukraine. Finally, during the lessons devoted to World War II, both observed teachers constantly united Ukrainian nationalists with Nazi, emphasizing similarities of their brutality and violent actions.

Multicultural narrative

Totally 50% of teachers participating in the study in Kiev, 25% of teachers participating in the study in Crimea, and 5% of teachers participating in the study in Western Ukraine support this narrative.

This narrative rests on an *ideological duality* of 'nationalism multiculturalism,' *bi-national duality* 'independent Ukraine-imperialistic Russia,' and a *temporal duality* of 'Soviet totalitarianism growing democracy.' These teachers condemn the imposition of nationalism but do not praise the Soviet time. The first duality supports equality of all ethnic groups in the nation. These teachers describe south-east and central Ukraine as multicultural regions, while Western Ukraine is depicted as homogenously ethnic Ukrainian. According to these teachers, population of the south-east and center are tolerant and live in peace with all ethnic groups but it could not accept aggressive nationalism of Western Ukrainians. As teacher N.E. states:

The aggressive Ukrainian nationalism dominates the national narrative. They promote a myth that Western Ukraine has a monopoly to define Ukrainian national identity. I have specific methods to denounce this myth. For example, I ask students what city best represents the Ukrainian identity. They usually name L'viv. And I show them documents describing L'viv as multicultural city with a significant Jewish and Polish population.

The second duality depicts Russia as an enemy of Ukrainian independence. As teacher O.E. states, 'We need to be as far from Russia as possible. Russia and Russians are impudent and rude. There is no brotherhood or common support. They promote their own interest.' The third duality stresses the totalitarian and aggressive nature of the Soviet Union. To support their view, teachers use specific documents from the textbooks: 'The approach to history in the Soviet Union was not true. Everyone has their own opinion, but to find the truth we need to use documents.'

To support these dualities, teachers use mythic narratives that condemn nationalism and totalitarianism. For example, the respondents resist accepting Hetman Mazepa as a Ukrainian prototype. As teacher V.S. states, 'Children trust me and form their opinion about national heroes based on my position. If children have another opinion about Mazepa I would accept it but may try to explain why I do not agree.' They also criticize the glorification of the Soviet past. As teacher N.A. states, 'The red flag law had a very negative effect on the society. Russians have nostalgia for the Soviet Union, and they distance themselves from Ukraine.'

These teachers promote a normative order that emphasizes the multicultural nature of Ukraine because of the presence of different ethnic groups, their accomplishments, and prominent figures. 'I am trying to present the rights of all ethnic groups and tell about the achievements of Russians, Jews, and other ethnic groups. I always stress ethnic identity of historic figures if I know about them. Children bring a lot of biases and prejudices to the class and I always start discussions to combat them.' Many teachers stress that the cultures and history of other ethnic groups are not represented in the national historic narrative. As teacher K.K. describes, 'The interests of small peoples should be integrated into the vision of the nation. You could not create a patriotic feeling through the promotion of one culture: The Ukrainian, Russian, Hungarian, Jewish and Crimean Tatars cultures are different.' The multicultural vision of national identity leads to the negative assessment of textbooks, because even the new textbook still promotes Ukrainian nationalistic values. 'Textbooks impose a Ukrainian ethnic nationalism. The Ukrainian population is presented as homogeneously Ukrainian, the presence of Russians, Jews, Hungarians, Crimean Tatars is dissembled.' Some of respondents also state that if Ukraine is longing for Europe it should accept the definition of a nation that is built on citizenship rather than an ethnic culture. As teacher V.S. stated, 'Ukraine should be a modern democratic state, not 'Ukraine for Ukrainians.' The state should be independent from ethnic identity.' Teacher R.C. echoes, 'Our nation should be political rather than ethnic; it should include everyone who lives in Ukraine.' Thus, this group of teachers endorses a multicultural concept of national identity by condemning ethnic nationalism and homogenous concept of national identity, emphasizing the multicultural nature of Ukraine and equal rights of all ethnic groups.

The observations of lessons taught by the teachers representing this narrative showed that these teachers present a more complex assessment of the Soviet past with the comparison with the previous two groups to students. For example, during the lessons devoted to the referendum on the independence of the Ukraine, these teachers condemned suppression of freedom and human rights during the Soviet time but also emphasized the

multicultural nature of Soviet Ukraine. I also observed that all teachers from this group constantly criticize imposition of one history, culture and ideology over all Ukraine, showing negative features of Ukrainian nationalism and communism.

Conclusion

All respondents admit that teachers play an important role in the formation of students' views on their nation and ethnic group as well as other ethnic groups. Using specific documents from the textbooks and initiating discussions to promote their own views and opinions, teachers constantly use personal judgments and provoke alternative views on historic events. Teachers support different views on their nation, relations within the nation and with the neighboring countries, and how the nation of Ukraine should develop in future.

The study shows that history teachers use specific interpretations of historic events to support their ideological and political positions, sharpening and reshaping them through sound stories and legitimizing accounts (Smith, 2011). They appropriate and render specific characteristics, values, and beliefs of the national community to create meanings of a complex social and political reality (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012; Moghaddam, 2008). They re-evaluate and develop different meanings of national identity and posit other groups within the nation as allies or enemies. Thus, history teachers express their views on the nation and political order through the process of engagement with narratives depicting the past and present of the nation and its anticipated future. They present to students narratives that provide a comprehensible and legitimate story about the nation and institutionalize collective memory. In developing national communities with a multiplicity of competing national narratives, this process becomes a matter of choice for a particular teacher.

According to Habermas (1998), in multi-cultural societies a political national identity rests on an alternative means of national solidarity from nationally specific interpretations of constitutional principles to cultural or ethnic nationalistic sentiments. The position that individuals within a nation do not share the same image of that nation's common characteristics (Gellner, 1983; Keane, 1993; MacCormick, 1996) has been widely acknowledged, and supported in numerous studies of nationalist discourses and frameworks. Thus, history teachers can have different levels of agreement and engagement with specific national narratives, but narratives they employ in class reflect the categorical structure and myths deployed in one of the available competing narratives. In situations of social transition and rapid change, history teachers can be transformed into charismatic communities that are empowered to produce new national narratives and became agents of change (Tiryakian, 1995). In this process they became real agents of change and equate with leaders in their ability to redefine the meaning of national identity.

The connection with a particular narrative chosen among the set of available national narratives provides teachers the meaning of identity, connection to the nation, and temporal coherence. It helps clearly define the ingroup and outgroups, their legitimacy, and boundaries and interconnections between them within the nation. At the same time, narratives that reinforce ingroup solidarity tend to emphasize perceptions of intergroup difference and engender antipathy toward members of outgroups within a nation. The outgroups can be perceived as threatening competitors to nation-building or a 'fifth column' that seeks to destroy national sovereignty and prosperity. These negative perceptions of outgroup, in turn, reinforce the competition between different national narratives. Thus, the existence of different competing narratives among history teachers can strengthen conflict attitudes among

students. At the same time, recognition of such different narratives can become a foundation for a dialog within the society.

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Notes on contributor

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Note

1. A leader (1648–1657) of the Zaporozhian Cossacks who organized a rebellion against Polish rule in Ukraine that ultimately led to the transfer of the Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper River from Polish to Russian control (britannica.com).

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