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To cite this article: Zenon E. Kohut (2014) From Commonwealth to Ukraine: The Reconceptualization of “Fatherland” in Cossack Political Culture (1660s–1680s), Canadian Slavonic Papers, 56:3-4, 269-289, DOI: [10.1080/00085006.2014.11417929](https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2014.11417929)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2014.11417929>



Published online: 13 Apr 2015.



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## From Commonwealth to Ukraine: The Reconceptualization of “Fatherland” in Cossack Political Culture (1660s–1680s)

ABSTRACT: This article shows how the Cossacks developed the concept of a united Cossack Ukraine on both banks of the Dnipro as their “fatherland” and began viewing this “fatherland” as an object of common identity, loyalty, and reverence. It demonstrates that in a period of two decades the Cossack elite underwent a major shift in group identity from considering as its fatherland the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in favour of a Cossack Ukrainian/Little Russian polity. It further indicates that all major political actors in Cossack Ukraine accepted and adopted this concept and that by the late 1680s the idea of a Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland had become entrenched in early modern Ukrainian political culture. Finally, it points to the long-term consequences of this identity shift on relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Muscovy/Russia, and the emergence of a modern Ukrainian identity.

RÉSUMÉ : Cet article montre comment les Cosaques ont développé le concept d'une Ukraine cosaque unie, située sur les deux rives du Dniepr, représentant leur « patrie » et ont commencé à voir cette « patrie » comme un objet d'identité commune, de loyauté et de vénération. Il démontre qu'en deux décennies, un retournement majeur de l'identité de groupe s'est opéré au sein de l'élite cosaque qui en est venue à considérer comme sa patrie non plus la République des Deux-Nations, mais un régime politique cosaque ukrainien/petit-russien. L'article montre en outre que tous les acteurs politiques importants de l'Ukraine cosaque ont accepté et ont adopté ce concept et qu'à la fin des années 1680, l'idée d'une patrie ukrainienne/petite-russienne s'était enracinée dans la culture politique de l'Ukraine alors à l'aube de sa modernité. Finalement, ce texte met en lumière les conséquences à long terme de ce changement identitaire sur les relations de l'Ukraine avec d'un côté la République des Deux Nations et de l'autre la Moscovie/Russie, ainsi que sur l'émergence d'une identité ukrainienne moderne.

In the last several decades there has been a growing interest in early modern discourses on identity and patriotism and whether such discourses represent a direct link between early modern and modern expressions of identity and national consciousness.<sup>1</sup> Most national histories assume such a link. However,

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<sup>1</sup> *National Consciousness, History and Political Culture in Early Modern Europe*, edited by Orest Ranum (Baltimore: London, 1957); *Nations, Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past*, edited by Claus Björn, Alexander Grant, and Keith J. Stringer (Copenhagen: Academic Press, 1994); David Avrom Bell, “Recent Works on Early Modern French National Identity,” *Journal of Modern History* 58.1 (1996): 84–113.

many modernist historians insist that national identity is primarily a nineteenth-century phenomenon and cannot be applied to the early modern period. Moreover, the postmodern questioning of national history as a legitimate historical construct deprives historians of a ready-made framework for the study of early modern patriotism and identity. Thus in addition to the national narrative, historians have placed early modern regional identity and patriotism within other overarching constructs. One focus has been on the manifestation of regional collective identities within a “composite monarchy” of varied lands and traditions.<sup>2</sup> Another approach, more aimed at Eastern Europe, places regional identity into the context of borderlands, territories on the periphery of multicultural states that differ from the core, and that are in a constant struggle with a centre that is attempting to assert sovereignty and control over them.<sup>3</sup> While the majority of historians of early modern Ukraine have adopted variants of the national history model, others adhere to regional and border frameworks.<sup>4</sup> One manifestation of early modern collective identity was the concept of “patria” or fatherland—a collective identification with and expression of loyalty to a specific territory or polity and its constitutional arrangement.<sup>5</sup> *Patria* might apply to a native city, to a historical territory, or to the entire community of the realm. While in the twenty-first century historians are reluctant to associate *patria* of the early modern period with feelings of patriotism and national identity, this was not the case with authors of the sixteenth and seventeenth

<sup>2</sup> John H. Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” *Past and Present* 137 (1992): 48–71.

<sup>3</sup> Alfred J. Rieber, *Struggle Over the Eurasian Borderlands: From the Early Modern Period to the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Also see Rieber, “The Frontier in History,” in *The International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, vol. 9, edited by Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (New York: Elsevier Sciences, 2001): 5812–5818; also his “Changing Concepts and Construction of Frontiers. A Comparative Approach,” *Ab Imperio* 1 (2003): 23–38.

<sup>4</sup> Frank E. Sysyn, “Ukrainian Nation-Building in the Early Modern Period: New Research Findings,” *Theatrum Humanae Vitae. Studii na poshanu Natali Iakovenko*, edited by N. Bilous, L. Dovha, et al. (Kyiv: Laurus, 2012) 358–368.

<sup>5</sup> The foremost historian to have dealt with the concept of “patria” is J. H. Elliott. See “King and Patria in the Hispanic World,” in J. H. Elliott, *Spain, Europe and the Wider World, 1500–1800* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Elliott, “Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe,” *Past and Present* 42 (1969): 35–56, reprinted in Elliott, *Spain and its World, 1500–1700* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989); Elliott, “National and Transnational History,” in Elliott, *History in the Making* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012) 40–79. See also Robert von Friedeburg, “In Defense of Patria: Resisting Magistrates and the Duties of Patriots in the Empire from the 1530s to the 1640s,” *Sixteenth Century Journal* XXXII/2 (2001): 357–382, and *Formuły patriotyzmu w Europie Wschodniej i Środkowej od nowożytności do współczesności*, edited by Andrzej Nowak and Andrzej A. Zięba (Cracow: Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2009).

centuries. J. H. Elliott notes numerous writers of that era who ascribed manifestations of patriotic sentiment as the driving force in sparking revolts, repelling invaders, or simply defending long-established constitutional order.<sup>6</sup> In fact, according to Elliot, devotion to the *patria* was a common characteristic of early modern Europe.<sup>7</sup>

Ukraine was no exception. Scholars have noted the appearance of the concept of a “Ukrainian fatherland” in the late seventeenth century and its varied manifestations in the eighteenth century.<sup>8</sup> While there have been a number of studies on the manifestations of the fatherland concept in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they do not indicate when and under what circumstances the concept was adopted by the Cossack elite. This study focuses not only on the concept’s origins but also its reception. It shows how the Cossacks developed the concept of a united Cossack Ukraine on both banks of the Dnipro as their “fatherland” and viewed this “fatherland” as an object of common identity, loyalty, and reverence. It demonstrates that in a period of two decades the Cossack elite underwent a major shift in group identity from considering as its fatherland the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in favour of a Cossack Ukrainian/Little Russian polity. It further indicates that all major political actors in Cossack Ukraine accepted and adopted this concept and that by the late 1680s the idea of a Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland had become entrenched in early modern Ukrainian political culture. Finally, it points to the long-term consequences of this identity shift on relations with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Muscovy/Russia, and the emergence of a modern Ukrainian identity.

<sup>6</sup> J. H. Elliott, “Revolution and Continuity in Early Modern Europe,” *Past & Present* 42 (1969): 35–56.

<sup>7</sup> Elliott, “National and Transnational History,” 56.

<sup>8</sup> Frank E. Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,” *Mazepa and His Time: History, Culture, Society*, edited by Giovanna Siedina (Allesandria: Edizioni dell’Orso, 2004) 39–40; Zenon E. Kohut, “The Birth of a Ukrainian Fatherland: Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and Innovation in Political Culture (1650s–1660s),” in *Formuly patriotyzmu*, 55–66; also Kohut, “Vid Hadiacha do Andrusova: osmyslennia ‘otchyzny’ v ukrains’kii politychnii kul’turi,” in *Hadiats’ka uniia 1658 roku*, edited by Pavlo Sokhan (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 2008) 228–239; Tat’iana Tairova-Iakovleva, “‘Otechestvo’ v predstavleniakh ukrainskoi kazatskoi starshiny kontsa XVII–nachala XVIII vekov,” *Tentorium Honorum. Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on His Sixtieth Birthday*, edited by Olga A. Andriewsky, Zenon E. Kohut, Serhii Plokhly and Larry Wolff (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2010) 453–458; also Tairova-Iakovleva, “‘Otechestvo’ v predstavleniakh ukrainskoi politicheskoi elity serediny XVII–nachala XVIII vekov,” *Vestnik SPbGU* 2.4 (2010): 66–70. Serhii Plokhly gives a brief overview of the “Fatherland” concept in Plokhly, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Pre-modern Identities in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 334–336.

## THE COMMONWEALTH: THE FATHERLAND OF THE RUTHENIANS AND COSSACKS

By the seventeenth century the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was very much a “composite monarchy” comprising the Kingdom of Poland, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ducal and Royal Prussia, and several duchies and autonomous cities. The Union of Lublin (1569) created the Commonwealth—the common state—with the king and the parliament as the main institutions that held the Commonwealth together. Ukraine was largely a component of the Kingdom of Poland. At the Union of Lublin, three Ruthenian palatinates—Volhynia, Bratslav, and Kyiv—were transferred from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to the Kingdom of Poland. Subsequently, a Chernihiv palatinate was created in 1635 from lands acquired from Muscovy and this new palatinate was placed on the same legal status as the territories incorporated into the Kingdom of Poland in 1569. A regional Ruthenian political identity began to emerge in the Kingdom of Poland based on the three incorporated palatinates, the newly created Chernihiv palatinate and the Ruthenian (Galicia) and Podillia palatinates that had long been part of Poland. In the seventeenth century this growing political territorial identity accompanied the articulation of the concept of a Ruthenian nation as an equal partner of the Polish and Lithuanian nations. These claims were based on the alleged rights guaranteed at the incorporation of the three Ruthenian palatinates into the Kingdom of Poland.

The Commonwealth was not only a composite monarchy but its southern borders formed a rather porous frontier between the Slavic and Tatar world. This borderland was increasingly inhabited by the Cossacks. Recruited primarily from the non-noble parts of the Ruthenian population, the Cossacks organized themselves into a military host that defended the southern frontier of the Commonwealth against the Tatars. The Cossacks’ military capabilities were utilized by the Commonwealth in its many military campaigns. The Cossacks saw themselves as frontier knights, a military order that possessed certain “rights and liberties.” At times, the Commonwealth recognized some of these rights for some of the Cossacks (those who were officially registered) but refused to give any official status to the Cossack stratum as a whole.

Eventually the Cossack claims began to include a territorial dimension. The Cossacks’ military core was the Zaporozhian Sich, below or beyond the rapids of the Dnipro River. Most Cossacks, however, were part of the Upper Host (above the rapids) where, when they were not on military campaigns, they lived on homesteads with their families. This territory associated with the Cossacks was frequently referred to as Ukraine. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Cossacks conceived a large stretch of territory from Belarus to the Black Sea as theirs, “all the Ukraines starting from Mahilyoŭ to the mouth of the Dnipro—all are [areas] that we inhabit.”<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Viktor Brekhunenko, *Kozaky na stepovomu kordoni Ievropy. Typolohiia kozats'kykh spil'not XVI-pershoi polovyny XVII st.* (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 2011) 316. Unless

By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the concept of “fatherland” had a long history as both a political and territorial designation for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and/or the Polish Crown (Kingdom).<sup>10</sup> It implied a common inheritance and loyalty that was superior to any government or a particular ruler.<sup>11</sup> As in other parts of Europe, *patria* or *ojczyzna* was frequently associated with manifestations of patriotic sentiment. In his magisterial study, David M. Althoen analyses 480 uses of this term in the seventeenth century. He demonstrates that *ojczyzna* was used in terms of self-sacrifice (spilling blood for; risking bodily harm for), devotion (love of; attachment to), defence (defending; saving; protecting), honour and obligation (winning fame for; serving), assisting (actions for the good of the fatherland), treachery (enemy of; subversion of; causing disgrace to), and ruin (causing ruin or harm to the fatherland).<sup>12</sup>

Did the Ukrainian elites in the Commonwealth have an idea of a fatherland? In medieval Ukrainian the term “fatherland” or *otchyzna* (modern Ukrainian *vitchyzna*) meant an ancestral inheritance of a particular territory, such as a ruler’s state.<sup>13</sup> Thus, for the Rus’ princes *otchyzna* signified their patrimony. The meaning began to change under Polish rule. In the Commonwealth, the Polish *ojczyzna* began to be regarded as the equivalent of the Latin *patria* and could mean state, country, and population. Such a concept was fully adopted by the Ruthenian elites and for them the Commonwealth was their “fatherland.” For example, in a speech at the Diet in 1641, the nobleman and de facto leader of the Orthodox Ruthenian nation, Adam Kysil’, outlined the rights and prerogatives of the Ruthenian territories in “our common fatherland.”<sup>14</sup> It was this concept of “fatherland” as the Commonwealth and the Polish Crown that was assumed also by the Ukrainian Cossacks. From the early seventeenth century, the Cossacks demanded the recognition of their corporate rights for their services as

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otherwise indicated, all translations are mine.

<sup>10</sup> Ewa Bem, “Termin ‘ojczyzna’ w literaturze XVII i XVIII wieku. Refleksje o języku,” *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce* 34 (1989): 131–157; David Althoen, *That Noble Quest: From True Nobility to Enlightened Society in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, 1550–1830*, 2 vols., Diss. (University of Michigan, 2000), revised for DMA Printing and Publishing (2001) 1: 190–197.

<sup>11</sup> Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,” 40–41.

<sup>12</sup> Althoen 1: 207.

<sup>13</sup> Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,” 40. For the meaning of this term in medieval Ukrainian, see *Slovnyk ukrains’koi movy XIV–XV st.*, vol. 2 (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1978) 111–112.

<sup>14</sup> Frank E. Sysyn, “Regionalism and Political Thought in Seventeenth-Century Ukraine: The Nobility’s Grievances at the Diet of 1641,” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 6.2 (1982): 167–190. The speech is on pages 186–190.

“guardians of the fatherland,” and their readiness to die for “the unity of the fatherland.”<sup>15</sup>

FROM THE COMMONWEALTH TO UKRAINE: THE FATHERLAND OF AN EMERGING HETMANATE

With the 1648 revolt, Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi and his Cossack army obtained control over most of Ukraine, thus bringing the Ruthenian territories of the Ukrainian core together with the Cossack areas of the borderland. However, Khmel'nyts'kyi was unable to preserve his hold over such a large territory. By the Zboriv Agreement of 1649 between the Cossacks and the Commonwealth, the central Ukrainian lands were now considered Cossack lands (i.e., the lands from which the Cossacks were accepted into the register) and included the Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav palatinates, but excluded Volhynia and Galicia. In this territory, not only were the estate rights for the Cossacks recognized, the entire area became the de facto possession of the Zaporozhian Host. This territory was divided into sixteen regimental units that administered the area. This regimental system was “laid out more or less equally on both banks of the Dnipro”: on the Right Bank there were nine regiments while on the Left Bank there were seven.<sup>16</sup> The regiments were subsequently adjusted, but the regimental system of administration persisted throughout the existence of the new Cossack polity.

With its confirmation by the Diet, the Zboriv Agreement was the first legal act that established the administrative division and borders of the Cossack-controlled lands. In fact, it created the Hetmanate—a polity of the Zaporozhian Host and the Ruthenian nation on the territory of the three palatinates of Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Bratslav. Within this territory the prerogatives of the Ruthenian faith and nation were acknowledged: special privileges were granted only to adherents of the “Greek religion,” special rights for the Kyivan metropolitan, Ruthenian schools, and royal offices were limited to Orthodox Ruthenians.

After the 1648 revolt, Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack elite continued to view the Commonwealth as their “fatherland.”<sup>17</sup> In 1654, however, Khmel'nyts'kyi placed the Hetmanate under the protection of the tsar thus severing ties with the common fatherland. Yet, this total severance from the

<sup>15</sup> Viktor Brekhunenko, “‘Vitchyzna’ v uiavlenniakh khrystyians'kykh kozatstv XVI–pershei polovyny XVII st.,” *Od Kijowa do Rzymu. Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej ze Stolicą Apostolską i Ukrainą*, edited by Mariusz R. Drozdowski, et al. (Białystok: Instytut Badań, 2012) 117–136.

<sup>16</sup> Mykhailo Hrushevsky, *History of Ukraine-Rus'*, edited by Frank E. Sysyn, vol. 8, pt. 2 (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2002) 641–647.

<sup>17</sup> Sysyn, “Fatherland in Early Eighteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Culture,” 39–40; Plokhy, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 334–336. Also see Michał Łesiów, “Bałkiwyszczyna, wiczyzna, ridnyj kraj. Ojczyzna w języku ukraińskim,” in *Pojęcie ojczyzny we współczesnych językach europejskich*, edited by Jerzy Bartmiński (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo-wschodniej, 1993) 93–104.

Commonwealth was short-lived. Increasingly strained relations with Muscovy led Khmel'nyts'kyi's successor, Ivan Vyhovs'kyi to break with Muscovy and attempt to reach an accommodation with the Commonwealth. The Union of Hadiach (1658) reaffirmed a specific territorial entity for the Cossack Host and the Ruthenian nation—the Great Principality of Rus' ("Ducatum Russiae") which was to become one of the components of a tripartite Commonwealth. This principality was to be modelled on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. In negotiating this union the Cossack Council suggested that the Great Principality of Rus' was to include all the Ruthenian palatinates of the Kingdom of Poland (Belz, Bratslav, Volhynia, Kyiv, Podillia, Ruthenia, and Chernihiv) and the Pinsk and Mstyslaū areas of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. Such a territorial expanse would cover completely the Ruthenian areas of the Kingdom of Poland and southern Belarus.<sup>18</sup> However, these proposals were not accepted by the Polish side and the actual treaty limited the "Great Principality of Rus'" to the borders of the palatinates of Bratslav, Kyiv and Chernihiv, in essence confining the principality to the borders of the Zboriv Agreement.<sup>19</sup>

The Hadiach Union undoubtedly strengthened the idea of a specific Cossack homeland, but within the framework of the common fatherland. In fact, the Hadiach Union documents emphasized "the return" of the Cossacks to "their common fatherland," stating that the Cossack hetman together with the entire Host of Zaporozhian Cossacks, who had been separated from the Commonwealth, were returning under the power of His Majesty the King while turning their back on other rulers' protection.<sup>20</sup> Indeed Vyhovs'kyi followed the appropriate formula and in one of his post-Hadiach manifestos to the Cossack host and all non-Cossacks (7 February 1660) wrote: "[...] the Rossian nation [*narod*]<sup>21</sup> with their nobility and [common] people joined with their merciful

<sup>18</sup> Vasyl' Harasymchuk, "Vyhovshchyna i Hadiats'kyi traktat," *Zapysky naukovoho tovarystva im. Shevchenka (ZNTSh)* 89 (1909): 82.

<sup>19</sup> Oleksandr Hurzhii, *Ukrains'ka kozats'ka derzhava v druhii polovyni XVII–XVIII st.: kordony, naseleattia, pravo* (Kyiv: Osnovy, 1996) 37.

<sup>20</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobrannye i izdannye arkheograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 7 (St. Petersburg: V Tip. P. A. Kulisha, 1863) 143.

<sup>21</sup> The term *narod* can be translated as either people or nation. In fact, Poland-Lithuania was referred to as the Commonwealth of Two Nations (*narody*) and much of the conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was over the accommodation of possibly a third component—a Rus' or Ruthenian nation. In some instances, the meaning of *narod* is clear: for example, Orthodox people, not nation. However, whenever *narod* is preceded by an adjectival form of Rus', it is more difficult to ascertain whether the term signifies an ethnic group or a political nation. In such instances, I translate *narod* as people/nation. For a discussion of early modern nationhood see Frank Sysyn, "Concepts of Nationhood in Ukrainian History Writing, 1620–1690," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 10.3–4 (1986): 393–423. There is even a greater problem in translating various adjectival forms of Rus'.

and hereditary monarch and king, their lord, and the Commonwealth of the Polish Crown and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, bonding together in the common fatherland [...].”<sup>22</sup>

The Hadiach Union had very little chance for success. It was not acceptable to Muscovy, the Polish *szlachta*, and many rank-and-file Cossacks. The Hadiach Union and Vyhovs'kyi were challenged immediately by Moscow and, although the hetman decisively defeated the Muscovite forces at the Battle of Konotop (1659), a revolt against him on the Left Bank of the Dnipro River resulted in the election of a substitute, pro-Muscovite hetman on the Left Bank. As a result, the Cossack-Ruthenian polity, the Hetmanate, was divided along the Dnipro, each bank with its own hetman, army, and administration. The Right-Bank polity recognized the Polish king, while the Left-Bank Ukraine recognized the Muscovite tsar.

At times the Hetmanate as a whole or in part found itself under the protection of the Muscovite tsar. The existence of a Cossack polity with no ties to the Commonwealth challenged the traditional concept of fatherland. Would not such a shift of allegiance be treated as a betrayal of the fatherland? Would the Hetmanate not be considered simply an illegitimate entity in rebellion against its rightful monarch?

In seventeenth-century Muscovy there was no concept of fatherland as *patria*, only the idea of the tsar's hereditary possession or patrimony.<sup>23</sup> Khmel'nyts'kyi and the Cossack elite attempted to utilize the concept of tsarist patrimony in justifying their change of allegiance. They argued that as a successor to the princes of Kyivan Rus', the Muscovite tsar was the “natural” monarch of Ukraine/Little Russia,<sup>24</sup> trumping the claims to the Ukrainian lands

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In the Commonwealth *Rus'* and *Rusyny* were used in describing the Ruthenian people/nation. In the seventeenth century, a Hellenized version *Rossiane* displaced *Rusyny* and was rendered *rossiiskyi* in adjectival form. Thus, *rossiiskyi narod* still designated the Ruthenian nation (meaning Ukrainians, possibly Belarusians, but not Russians). However, *rossiiskyi* was also being introduced to designate the Muscovite tsar and his realm: for example, the *rossiiskyi* monarch. In translating various forms of *rossiiskyi*, I use “Rossian” when it refers to Ukraine and “Russian” when it refers to the tsar. For a study of these terms see Hans Rothe, “What is the Meaning of ‘Rossijski’ and ‘Rossija’ in the Polish and Russian Conception of the State in the 17th century?” *Ricerche slavistiche* 37 (1990): 111–121. At the same time, the more official term of “Little Russia” and the more popular term “Ukraine” were widely utilized in differentiating Ukraine and Ukrainians from Russia and the Russians.

<sup>22</sup> “Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv vid Ivana Vyhovs'koho do Ivana Samoilovycha (1657–1687),” in *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv. Materialy do ukrains'koho dyplomatariiu*. Serii I (Kyiv and L'viv: NTSh, 2004) 97–98.

<sup>23</sup> Paul Bushkovitch, “Fatherland in Russian Culture (Fifteenth–Seventeenth Centuries),” *Tentorium Honorum. Essays Presented to Frank E. Sysyn on His Sixtieth Birthday* 93.

<sup>24</sup> At this time “Ukraine” was becoming the more popular designation for the territory of the Hetmanate and “Ukrainian fatherland” was becoming the most common designation.

by the Polish Crown. According to the Cossacks, the change of allegiance was not a betrayal of the Polish king or the common fatherland, but merely the recognition of the patrimonial rights of the tsar. In opposition to the claim of a common or joint “fatherland,” the Cossacks posited that Ukraine/Little Russia was in reality a specific patrimony of the tsar (*otchyna, otechestvo, otechesko*).<sup>25</sup>

The next step in the evolution of the “Ukrainian fatherland” concept was a change in terminology from “the tsar’s patrimony” to “our patrimony,” which conceptually corresponded to “our fatherland.” The first record of such a transition occurred on 1 July 1659, when a group of Hetman Vyhovs'kyi’s top officers wrote a letter to acting Hetman Ivan Bepalyi, who did not follow Vyhovs'kyi and chose to remain under Muscovite protection. In this letter, the Cossack officers marvelled at Bepalyi’s support of the enemy (the Muscovites), reminding him of his origins and of Little Russia as “our Fatherland” (“*otchine nashei*”).<sup>26</sup>

What ensued was a struggle of two fatherlands. On the Right Bank, Vyhovs'kyi’s successor, Hetman Pavlo Teteria, with the support of the Polish king, attempted to conquer the Left Bank and reunite the two banks within the structure of a common fatherland, the Polish Crown. In Teteria’s letter to the Polish king, he stressed: “Not only before the eyes of Your Majesty, our benevolent Lord of the *whole fatherland, the Polish Crown*, had these events taken place [...] It infected the fatherland with incurable diseases, [imposed] terrible losses, and filled it with bitter cries.”<sup>27</sup> Teteria’s views were no different in addressing a Ukrainian audience. In his manifesto of 22 October 1663 to the

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However, various forms of Rus' were also utilized, particularly “Little Rus” or “Rossia.” The latter appeared more frequently in association with Muscovy and probably reflects official nomenclature after the addition of “Little Russia” to the tsar’s title. Thus the same hetman would utilize “Ukrainian fatherland” in one case and “Little Russian fatherland” in another. In citing sources, I use the nomenclature of the original. For an analysis of terminological changes see Ploky, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations*, 161–202; and Natalia Iakovenko’s *Narys istorii Ukrainy z naidavnishykh chasiv do kintsia XVIII stolittia* (Kyiv: Geneza, 1997) 430–438; also Iakovenko, “Choice of Name versus Choice of Path. The Names of Ukrainian Territories from the Late Sixteenth to the Late Seventeenth Centuries,” in *A Laboratory of Transnational History: Ukraine and Recent Ukrainian Historiography*, edited by Georgiy Kasianov and Philipp Ther (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009) 131–132.

<sup>25</sup> For a detailed analysis of the conceptual evolution from “the tsar’s patrimony” to “our Little Russian patrimony,” see Zenon E. Kohut, “The Birth of a Ukrainian Fatherland: Civil War, Foreign Intervention, and Innovation in Political Culture (1650s–1660s),” in *Formuly patriotyzmu*, 55–66.

<sup>26</sup> See *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobrannye i izdannye arkhograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 15 (St. Petersburg: A. Katanskii, 1892) 405.

<sup>27</sup> *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv* 232. The italics are mine.

residents of Zolotonosha in Left-Bank Ukraine, he reproached them for their “betrayal of the common Fatherland.”<sup>28</sup>

While Teteria was chiding the populace of the Left-Bank for betraying the “common fatherland,” the pro-Muscovite, Left-Bank Hetman Ivan Briukhovets'kyi adopted fully the Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland concept. He conducted raids into the Right Bank attempting to extend his authority there. In these efforts, Briukhovets'kyi was exhorting the population of the Right Bank in the name of the Muscovite tsar and the Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland. In a manifesto issued in July or August 1663, he introduced himself to the inhabitants of Right-Bank Ukraine (under Teteria’s authority) thus:

Ivan Briukhovets'kyi, hetman of the Zaporozhian Host, faithful to His Illustrious Majesty, the Tsar [...] while observing with the knights of our Zaporozhian Host that our beloved fatherland, Little Rus', because of domestic disputes and frequent Muslim, Polish, and other foreign troops' [invasions] and discord among the [Cossack] leaders is drawing near the abyss [...] we [...] single-heartedly and with one brotherly thought and love, seek to achieve [...] good order in our lamented fatherland [...].<sup>29</sup>

The political situation changed abruptly when the Commonwealth and Muscovy negotiated the Truce of Andrusovo (1667), which legally partitioned the Hetmanate into two along the Dnipro River. This formal partitioning of the Hetmanate was not accepted by the elite of either bank. On the Left Bank, it contributed to a major anti-Muscovite uprising in 1668, which Briukhovets'kyi attempted to lead. In February 1668 he issued manifestos to the residents of various Ukrainian towns, calling them to drive out the Muscovite troops. For example, in his 10 February 1668 manifesto to the residents of Novhorod-Sivers'kyi, Briukhovets'kyi wrote the following:

It was not only because of our own decision, but after taking the advice of the Cossack officers of the Zaporozhian Host, that we broke [our] allegiance and friendship with Moscow. There were good reasons for doing so [...] the Muscovite envoys and the Polish commissars negotiated peace between them and swore to plunder and deprecate our beloved fatherland, Ukraine, from both sides, the Polish and the Muscovite [...].<sup>30</sup>

Thus Hetman Briukhovets'kyi posited the “beloved fatherland, Ukraine” as an ultimate value that even trumped allegiance to the tsar.

<sup>28</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobrannye i izdannye arkhograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 5 (St. Petersburg: E. Pratz, 1867) 187–88.

<sup>29</sup> *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv* 291–292; 293–294.

<sup>30</sup> *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv* 353.

## PROMOTING AND DEFENDING THE UKRAINIAN/LITTLE RUSSIAN FATHERLAND: DOROSHENKO, SAMOILOVYCH, AND SIRKO

Since the Truce of Andrusovo negated any possibility of reuniting the Hetmanate under the auspices of either the Commonwealth or Muscovy, the new Right-Bank hetman, Petro Doroshenko (who had replaced the completely discredited Teteria) attempted a third alternative, unification by means of a Cossack-Tatar-Ottoman alliance. However, this option only plunged the Hetmanate into further conflict involving the Commonwealth, the Khanate of Crimea, the Ottoman Porte, and Muscovy. Thus, by the late 1660s there were up to four hetmans and an elected chieftain (*koshovyi otaman*) of the Sich competing for power in Ukraine, all of them supported by neighbouring powers: Muscovy, Poland, Turkey, and Crimea. As a result, Cossack Ukraine endured two decades of constant warfare, which desolated the Right Bank. Ukrainian historian Mykola Kostomarov coined the term “the Ruin” for this period between the 1660s and 1680s.

Doroshenko’s efforts to unify the Hetmanate had an auspicious start. In early 1668, he entered into negotiations with the Left Bank hetman, Briukhovets'kyi, who was attempting to lead an anti-Muscovite uprising. By May, Briukhovets'kyi's armies had driven the Muscovite garrisons from a number of Ukrainian towns. As the Right-Bank regiments commanded by Doroshenko entered Left-Bank Ukraine in support of Briukhovets'kyi, the Left-Bank Cossacks rebelled against Briukhovets'kyi, killed him, and elected Doroshenko hetman of a united Hetmanate.<sup>31</sup>

The May 1668 election to a united hetmancy was the apex of Doroshenko’s career. For a brief moment, and in defiance of both the Commonwealth and Muscovy, Doroshenko achieved the single overriding purpose of his hetmancy—uniting both banks of the Dnipro under one rule. Doroshenko, who had become the Right-Bank hetman in 1665, first relied on the Tatars to rid himself de facto of his Polish protector. He subsequently negotiated with Muscovy, offering to recognize the tsar as the sole protector of a united Hetmanate. While Muscovite diplomacy kept him engaged, it could not meet his fundamental demand—a united Hetmanate. Similarly, the Poles were unwilling and unable to repudiate Andrusovo and accept a united Ukraine under Polish protection. Finally Doroshenko turned to the Ottomans, who did assist him in

<sup>31</sup> Valerii Smolii and Valerii Stepankov, *Petro Doroshenko. Politychnyi portret* (Kyiv: Tempora, 2011) 145–170; Dmytro Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko. Ohliad ioho zhyttia i politychnoi diial'nosti* (New York: Vyd. UVAN u SShA, 1985) 163–196; “The Eyewitness Chronicle,” *Harvard Series in Ukrainian Studies* 7.1 (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1972) [Reprint of the Orest Levyc'kyj edition (Kyiv, 1878)] 97–100. Also see Vitalii Eingorn, *Ocherki iz istorii Malorossii v XVII veke. Snosheniia malorossiiskago dukhovenstva s Moskovskim pravitel'stvom v tsarstvovanie Alekseia Mikhailovicha* (Moscow: 1899) 416–419.

regaining Right-Bank Ukraine, but whose protection was too ephemeral, inconsistent, and costly in human terms for him to be able to achieve his goal of a united Ukraine.<sup>32</sup>

Soon after his triumph in 1668, Doroshenko was challenged on the Right Bank by a Crimean-supported candidate for hetman, Petro Sukhovii; and once he had defeated him, Doroshenko had to face a Polish-sponsored claimant, Mykhailo Khanenko. While battling his enemies on the Right Bank, his commander on the Left Bank, Dem'ian Mnohohrishnyi, was pressured to renounce his loyalty to Doroshenko and assume the Left-Bank hetmancy himself under the tsar's protection. While his subsequent alliance with the Ottomans allowed Doroshenko to periodically regain control of much of the Right-Bank Ukraine, it involved Doroshenko in a two-sided war that devastated the land, destroyed his army, and in 1676 forced him to surrender to the Muscovites and to the current Left-Bank hetman, Ivan Samoilovych.<sup>33</sup>

Petro Doroshenko was one of the Cossack officers who had signed the 1659 manifesto—thus far the earliest recorded Cossack use of the term "fatherland" in reference to Ukraine.<sup>34</sup> And indeed Doroshenko dropped his predecessor's (Teteria) recognition of the Commonwealth as the "common fatherland" and fully adopted the rhetoric of the "Ukrainian fatherland." It is true that, on occasion, when addressing the Polish authorities Doroshenko would employ the term "fatherland" in the traditional way expected by them. For example, on 23 November 1667 in his letter to prince Boguslav Radvila (Radziwiłł), Doroshenko asked Radvila to render his support for the Cossack cause at the Sejm, rhetorically inquiring why "the troubles continue in the Fatherland" and responded himself that they were caused by injustices of the Commonwealth toward the Cossacks.<sup>35</sup> Negotiating a political settlement with the Polish commissars at Ostrih (May–December 1670), Hetman Doroshenko defended the autonomy and freedoms of Ukraine but used the term "fatherland" in a way which was well-established in Polish political culture: "[...] In a common fatherland, common rights, freedoms and benefits must be shared by both peoples [...]."<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Iakovenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* 386–387; 390–393. Also see "The Eyewitness Chronicle," 100; *Traktaty miedzy mocarstwami europejskimi od roku 1648 zaszle*, vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1773) 225–266; Dmytro Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy*, vols. 1–2 (Munich: Dniprova khvyliia, 1966) 73–77; Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th century)* (Leiden et al.: Brill, 2000) 476–489; Taras Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy. Ukrains'ka derzhava v mizhnarodnykh vidnosynakh 1648–1714 rokiv* (Kyiv and New York: NTSh; Instytut Istorii Ukrainy, 2003) 102.

<sup>33</sup> Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* 89.

<sup>34</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 15: 405.

<sup>35</sup> Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko* 145.

<sup>36</sup> See *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobrannye i izdannye*

Ukraine as a fatherland that deserved to be united, preserved, and protected, a value that was perhaps greater than any tsar or king, was an image that Doroshenko presented repeatedly to his Ukrainian audience. It was an image that countered the Andrusovo Truce and supported Doroshenko's claim for a unified hetmancy. The image of a united fatherland as a higher value helped justify his pro-Ottoman policy that was so vigorously opposed by other parties and parts of the Orthodox Church, though not by the metropolitan of Kyiv.<sup>37</sup>

Doroshenko's use of "fatherland" is frequent. For example, in January 1669, he wrote a letter to his former commander and now pro-Muscovite hetman of the Left Bank, Mnohohrshnyi, expressing hopes that they would remain in a brotherly union, for if everyone continued living in concord and brotherly love, then their position would be firm and not a single enemy would be able to overwhelm them. The letter ends with a reminder that the separatism of recent years had brought nothing but profit to Ukraine's enemies and "unending carnage to our suffering fatherland."<sup>38</sup> In 1668, Doroshenko issued a patent to the former quartermaster general Tymish Kosachiv, confirming Kosachiv's rights of ownership of various estates. In this manifesto, the hetman referred to Kosachiv as a person who "returned from Muscovite captivity to a loving Fatherland."<sup>39</sup>

Perhaps the most eloquent expression of Doroshenko's "fatherland" views can be found in his letter to the Left-Bank hetman, and his most bitter enemy, Ivan Samoilovych, written near the end of Doroshenko's political career. In August 1675, the embattled Doroshenko, on the verge of relinquishing his office to Samoilovych, summed up his lengthy struggle for Ukraine's unification and sovereignty:

[...] By God's will, I have been fervently carrying the burden of my current position for ten years having only one thought in mind: to ensure the growth of freedoms and to establish the security of the Zaporozhian Host, to preserve the unity of the fatherland, the well-being of holy churches, all this for the good of the Christian Ukrainian nation [...] I was forced to seek friendship with the Muslims and calm the Ukrainian borders. And this was done not only by my own discretion, but

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*arkheograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 9 (St. Petersburg: M. Ettinger, 1877) 198.

<sup>37</sup> At this time the metropolitans of Kyiv were subordinated to the Ecumenical Patriarchs of Constantinople who, in turn, resided under Ottoman rule. Thus Ukrainian metropolitans had to be cautious when dealing with the Ottomans. However, the metropolitan at this time, Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi, was a close ally of Doroshenko and fully supported his policy of avoiding subordination to either Poland or Muscovy. See Roman I. Shiyani, "Between Faith and Country: The Predicament of Metropolitan Iosyf Neliubovych-Tukal's'kyi," *Canadian Slavonic Papers/Revue canadienne des slavistes* 52.3-4 (2010): 373-390.

<sup>38</sup> Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* 227.

<sup>39</sup> Doroshenko, *Het'man Petro Doroshenko* 209.

after a joint council of officers and their men; this was done not for vanity or other reasons, but for our fatherland and this country of Ukraine's unity, which, though once at hand, was broken by the hostility of the Christian monarchs.<sup>40</sup>

The appeal to the Fatherland was not limited to Doroshenko's letters and manifestos but was also made by his followers. In early 1670, when the residents of the town of Lubny were going to betray Doroshenko and switch sides, Doroshenko's deputy, acting Hetman Iakiv Lyzohub, and a group of officers sent a collective letter to the town attempting to dissuade the townsmen. The letter not only shows how the term "fatherland" was used but also encapsulates the political views of the Doroshenko camp:

[...] Everybody who loves God and truth will acknowledge that our lord hetman, Petro Doroshenko, through God's special help and grace, and by his own genuine zeal, has promoted and achieved brotherly love among Ukrainians and Cossacks of the Zaporozhian Host, who live on both banks of Dnipro, so that everybody enjoys this unity and continuing safety. And he achieved this exploit, pleasing to our fatherland, not while pursuing his own profit, but only wishing good to Ukraine and the Zaporozhian Host [...] And since the current unity and concord are now being torn apart [...] causing the ruinous separatism of our fatherland's towns, please, consider, that all this is being done by an evil foe, who never wishes any good for the Ukrainian nation [...] I believe that every one of you can remember how many recent hetmans were brought into their office in our fatherland, Ukraine, as a result of Muscovite plots, and how many honest people of our fatherland perished because of them and their greed [...] We must not divide [ourselves], but pursue together the strengthening of our freedoms and the bringing of peace to our fatherland Ukraine [...] Our lord hetman always does his best to preserve our fatherland, Ukraine, from ruin, and to ensure concord in it [...] [We] are willing to sacrifice our lives defending you, so that the enemies will never take advantage of our fatherland and the Zaporozhian Host [...].<sup>41</sup>

At the same time, Doroshenko's propaganda campaign and his fatherland rhetoric did not go unchallenged. His political opponents, while denouncing the partition of Ukraine, often blamed most of Ukraine's current misfortunes on the hetman and his policies. The Tatar-backed Hetman Petro Sukhovii, one of Doroshenko's challengers, and his entourage also stood against the Truce of Andrusovo. On 7 October 1668, a group of officers supporting Sukhovii's claim to the hetmancy issued an appeal to the Ukrainian nation (the "pseudo-Sukhovii" manifesto, 7 October 1668): "[...] I am here to inform you that during

<sup>40</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii. Sobrannye i izdannye arkhograficheskoi kommissiei*, vol. 12 (St. Petersburg: Tip. Panteleevykh, 1882) 221–223.

<sup>41</sup> This letter is signed by Iakiv Lyzohub, colonel of Lubny regiment, Mykola Raevs'kyi, Ivan Vervyts'kyi and Ihnat Shul'ha, colonels in charge of the Cossack cavalry, and Ivan Pryhara, the colonel of Chernihiv regiment. See *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 9: 181–184.

the many years of my life of sorrow in the Muscovite state, I continued to remember my orphaned mother, [our] mutual fatherland [...] [I am aware of its current decline] because of the treachery of secret agreements and intentions [...] [done by the Poles and the Muscovites] in order to divide Ukraine and to take her into their grip.”<sup>42</sup>

The extent to which the “Ukrainian fatherland” rhetoric had penetrated Ukrainian political discourse can be seen by the pronouncements of another challenger to Doroshenko, Hetman Mykhailo Khanenko. Khanenko, too, had been one of the officers who signed the 1659 manifesto that contained the first recorded appeal to a Ukrainian fatherland. But as a pro-Polish hetman, he would have been obliged to recognize the “common fatherland” of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. However, Khanenko also talked about a “Ukrainian fatherland.” For example, in his letter to the pro-Muscovite hetman Mnohohrishnyi (July–September 1669), who split from Doroshenko and recognized the authority of the tsar, Khanenko wrote: “[...] I have [already] written to you several times revealing to everyone the canniness of Doroshenko, who plotted to place Ukraine, our fatherland, under the Turkish yoke [...]”<sup>43</sup>

In fact, Khanenko’s followers not only accepted the Ukrainian fatherland formula but challenged Doroshenko’s moral right to appeal to it. During a campaign at Ladyzhyn in November–December 1671, Doroshenko issued an appeal to the followers of Khanenko to change sides. Unfortunately, Doroshenko’s manifesto appears to have been lost. However, historian Dmytro Doroshenko located the bitterly sarcastic response on the part of Khanenko’s Cossacks, dated 9 December 1671:

We learned from your lordship’s letter that you, your lordship, wish us good health. We wish you likewise with our letter, if not with our heart. You write to us that your lordship’s good wishes for the fatherland and the entire Zaporozhian Host is obvious and does not need to be stated in letters. However, even if true, we would never have learned about this if not for this letter coming from your lordship. Now, when we learned that your lordship, despite bad timing and with losses due to the winter [conditions] wage war on your archenemy, your hereditary king, and us, the Zaporozhian Host (who do not want to be in alliance with the heathens and under the protection of the pagans and remain loyal to our hereditary lord, the Christian monarch, our king), then we have to admit—you are truly the protector and father of our bewailed fatherland, Ukraine: indeed, everybody can see your grief over the fate of the fatherland! While only marginally thinking about its unity, but mainly—about retaining your hetmancy, you, as we learn from your lordship’s letter, have brought numerous [Tatar] hordes and turn it [the fatherland] to ruins. [...] And if your lordship has even a modicum of fear before God, we advise you: sever the pagan protection and kneel before the king, your hereditary lord, remaining genuinely loyal

<sup>42</sup> *Tysiacha rokov ukrains'koi suspil'no-politychnoi dumky*, vol. 3.1 (Kyiv: Dnipro, 2001) 470.

<sup>43</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 9: 44.

to him [...] Then both the holy faith and the beloved fatherland will better prosper through their freedoms [...].<sup>44</sup>

Although the pro-Khanenko Cossacks were bitter about how Doroshenko was “caring for the unity of our beloved fatherland,” there is no question that they and Khanenko himself accepted the idea of a united “Ukrainian fatherland” as the highest ideal, even though as a pro-Polish faction, they should have embraced the concept of the “common fatherland” of the Commonwealth.

Hetman Ivan Samoilovych, who seized the Left-Bank hetmancy from Mnohohrishnyi in 1672, was very much dependent on the Muscovites. After all, in exchange for their support of his coup against Mnohohrishnyi, he was required in 1673 to deliver two of his sons to Moscow as guarantors of his loyalty.<sup>45</sup> Samoilovych believed that it was only through Muscovite power that Ukraine would be pacified and united. He followed a policy of complete loyalty to Moscow but took every step possible to enhance his power internally, to subvert the Andrusovo Truce, and to annex the Right Bank. His best opportunity availed itself when the Ottoman Empire forced the Buchach Peace (1672) on Poland by which Poland renounced its claims to the Right Bank, thus putting into question the Andrusovo Truce. In 1674 Samoilovych persuaded the Muscovites to support an invasion of the Right Bank and to remove Hetman Doroshenko from office. During this operation, a council of colonels of the Right Bank, in the presence of Muscovite diplomats, elected Samoilovych “hetman of both banks of the Dnipro.”<sup>46</sup> The incursion, however, was beaten back by Doroshenko and his Tatar allies. Furthermore the Poles renounced the Buchach Peace with the Ottomans and made it very clear that they would consider any Russian incursion on the Right Bank as a violation of the Andrusovo Truce.<sup>47</sup> Samoilovych failed in this attempt to become hetman of both banks of the Dnipro. Not even Doroshenko’s surrender to Samoilovych in 1676 and his passing of the official regalia of office to Samoilovych allowed Samoilovych to become hetman of both banks.

<sup>44</sup> Doroshenko, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko* 384–385; 387. Dmytro Doroshenko quoted this document from the Archiwum Zamoyskich (AZ), cod. 1807, 129; this document may have been destroyed or lost during World War II.

<sup>45</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 12: 26. Regarding Samoilovych’s election see also “The Eyewitness Chronicle,” 116.

<sup>46</sup> *Akty, otnosiashchiesia k istorii Iuzhnoi i Zapadnoi Rossii* 12: 956; Valerii Shevchuk, *Kozats'ka derzhava: etyudy do istorii ukrains'koho derzhavotvorennia* (Kyiv: Abrys, 1995) 134.

<sup>47</sup> Sergei M. Solov'ev, “The Reign of Tsar Alexis. Poland, Turkey, and Ukrainian Cossacks, 1667–1674,” in *History of Russia*, vol. 22, edited by Cathy J. Potter (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 2002) 20–22; Doroshenko, *Hetman Petro Doroshenko* 511–517; Shevchuk, *Kozats'ka derzhava* 133.

Samoilovych, nevertheless, continued to hold to his claim of being “hetman of both banks.” Subsequently, through population transfers and constant warfare, the Right Bank became a wasteland. Samoilovych, however, was never reconciled to Polish control of the Right Bank. In a letter to the Polish king, Samoilovych wrote that, “although these lands are now barren they still belong to us and should be ours.”<sup>48</sup> His continued de facto rejection of the Andrusovo Truce contributed to his removal and arrest in 1687. In the denunciation of the hetman a major charge was that “he [Samoilovych] spoke about the lands on the other side of the Dnipro fiercely: it will not be as the Muscovites and the Poles have determined in their treaties. We will act in accordance to our needs.”<sup>49</sup>

Samoilovych made it very clear that the polity that he was attempting to control and administer was the Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland. For example, in his struggle with Doroshenko, Samoilovych issued a manifesto (6 November 1675) to the residents of the Chyhyryn Regiment, urging them to influence Doroshenko so that he would resign his office in favour of Samoilovych: “We urge you to advise [Doroshenko] that [...] if he wants our fatherland Ukraine to enjoy peace without bloodshed and calamities, then he must come to us [...] with an announcement of his allegiance to His Majesty and to us [...]”<sup>50</sup>

Samoilovych continued to use the fatherland theme in his writings throughout his administration. The extent to which he adopted the “Ukrainian fatherland” rhetoric as an official pillar of his administration can be gleaned from manifestos that he issued to the commander of his hired troops, Colonel Illia Novyts'kyi. The most striking occurred in June 1682 when Samoilovych instructs the colonel to ensure the administration of an oath of allegiance to the new monarchs Ivan and Peter to every member of the regiment (approximately 500 men):<sup>51</sup>

My amicable friend, your lordship colonel of horse regiment,

We are thankful to your lordship [together] with all senior and junior personnel of your regiment, that you, in deference to the explicit will of our Most Illustrious Great Majesties and to our [hetman's] directive, upon the arrival of our envoys, submitted the oath of loyalty to both of them, great majesties, the Tsars and the Great Princes Ioann Alekseevich and Petr Alekseevich, the monarchs of all Great, Little and White Russia, and dutifully carried out our, your commander's, will

<sup>48</sup> Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy* 293; 300–301.

<sup>49</sup> See Dmitrii N. Bantysh-Kamenskii, *Istochniki malorossiiskoi istorii*, edited by O. Bodianskii (Moscow: V Universitetskoi tipografii, 1858) 302. Also see Chukhlib, *Het'many i monarkhy* 302; Doroshenko, *Narys istorii Ukrainy* 98.

<sup>50</sup> *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv* 697.

<sup>51</sup> Oleksii Sokyрко, *Lytsari druhoho sortu. Naimane viis'ko Livoberezhnoi Het'manshchyny 1669–1726 rr.* (Kyiv: Tempora, 2006) 149.

promising to both monarchs as well as to us to keep [this oath] until the very end of your lives and to stand against any foe in service of the monarchs, and for the preservation of our fatherland, Ukraine [...].<sup>52</sup>

This oath reveals a hierarchy of loyalties: first and foremost to the tsars, then to the hetman, but also to the preservation of “our fatherland, Ukraine.” In another letter to Novyts'kyi, Samoilovych repeatedly emphasized that professional soldiers, who are always ready for battle, are important for the defence of the “beloved Ukrainian or Little Russian fatherland.” On 4 June 1685 he wrote:

We, your proud hetman, enjoy true affection for you owing to your honourable deeds, such as your honourable conduct in the past military campaigns, where you sacrificed your blood while facing the enemy, [but] also in times of peace [when] you have honourably obeyed the orders of your commander, as befits honourable warriors who take pride in honour. Among you there are those born here or who are the supporters of our beloved fatherland, Ukraine, for whose unity and for the preservation of the Orthodox Rus' Christian faith [...] you have made sacrifices [...].<sup>53</sup>

Samoilovych made similar points about the fatherland in manifestos to Novyts'kyi on 12 July 1685 and 1 March 1686.<sup>54</sup>

There was one more Ukrainian political player during the Ruin: the Lower Zaporozhian Host or the Sich Cossacks. These Cossacks, who provided Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi with the military backing for the 1648 uprising, continued to exist as a separate entity beyond (below) the Dnipro's rapids, thus acquiring the moniker of the Lower Zaporozhian Host. Khmel'nyts'kyi maintained control over the Sich Cossacks and considered the Sich territories as part of his newly-created Cossack polity. Subsequent hetmans were not able to maintain their control over the Sich Cossacks and they, under the leadership of the *koshovyi otaman*, became important independent political and military players in the southern steppe. Thus the Sich Cossacks de facto were not within the boundaries of the Hetmanate.

Nevertheless, the Sich Cossacks continued to be integrally intertwined with the Hetmanate and various hetmans attempted, at times successfully, to assert their authority over the Sich. The relationship of the Sich Cossacks with the Hetmanate was further complicated by the partitioning of Ukraine and the emergence of competing Right and Left-Bank hetmans with their opposing protectors and alliance systems. This gave the Sich Cossacks greater opportunities for independent action. Koshovyi Otaman Ivan Sirko, for example, manoeuvred between hetmans Doroshenko and Samoilovych. In the mid-1660s

<sup>52</sup> *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv* 783.

<sup>53</sup> *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv* 807–808.

<sup>54</sup> *Universaly ukrains'kykh het'maniv* 811, 821–822.

he supported Doroshenko's attempt to throw off Polish protection on the Right Bank and unify Ukraine. However, Sirko was an opponent of Doroshenko's 1668 Ottoman treaty and dealt a deathblow to Doroshenko's efforts by his attacks on the Tatars, forcing them to abandon Doroshenko. Sirko favoured a pro-Muscovite course.

Although the Sich Cossacks found themselves outside the boundary of the Hetmanate, Sirko acknowledged the duty of the Sich Cossacks to protect the Hetmanate, particularly from Tatar raids. In this context Sirko also adopted the rhetoric of the Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland, which was particularly evident in his letters to Muscovite officials, the tsar, and Samoiloivych. For example, in July 1677 Sirko wrote to Samoiloivych that, "it is well known to your lordship that we are waging war, our only craft, where it is necessary for the protection and unity of our bewailed fatherland Ukraine."<sup>55</sup> He did not hesitate to express similar views to either the tsar or to Muscovite officials. In one of his letters to Prince Grigorii Romodanovskii, Sirko employs the following formula: "Beseeching Your Princely lordship, our benevolent patron and His Majesty, I am asking for your kindness to our fatherland, Little Rus', and to us, the Zaporozhian Host [...]"<sup>56</sup> On 14 December 1677 Sirko wrote a letter to the Muscovite tsar, saying: "[...] Even though we concluded this truce during the infidels' attack on Ukraine, our fatherland, we believe that we have done no harm to anyone by taking this step, for it was a necessary one [...]"<sup>57</sup>

Thus by the late 1670s all the major contenders for the hetmancy, their supporters, and even the *koshovyi* of the Sich Cossacks were extolling the good of the Ukrainian fatherland as their main goal and motivation for action. Indeed promoting and defending the "Ukrainian fatherland" had become the primary political rhetoric of the Ruin.

#### CONCLUSION

Between the 1660s and the 1680s the Cossack elite underwent a major shift in group identity, as a Cossack Ukrainian/Little Russian polity replaced the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as their "fatherland." To some extent this shift was the logical outcome of severing the connection with the common fatherland of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The primary stimulus, however, seems to have been the division of Ukraine enshrined by the Truce of Andrusovo. It was this crisis that evoked the call to patriotism. The idea of a Ukrainian/Cossack polity as a fatherland was utilized by Briukhovets'kyi in justifying his revolt against the Muscovites and Doroshenko placed it at the centre of political

<sup>55</sup> *Lysty Ivana Sirka: Materialy do ukrains'koho dyplomatariiu*, edited by Iu. A. Mytsyk and M. V. Kravets' (Kyiv: NAN Ukrainy, 1995) 43.

<sup>56</sup> *Lysty Ivana Sirka* 16.

<sup>57</sup> *Lysty Ivana Sirka* 47–50 (on page 48).

discourse. Doroshenko and his entourage used it continuously in their efforts to bring Ukraine under a single hetmancy and to justify a very unpopular alliance with the Ottomans. All of Doroshenko's Ukrainian political opponents incorporated the phrase into their rhetorical arsenal. Samoilovych even required his hired troops to swear allegiance to the Ukrainian fatherland. By the 1680s the rhetoric of Ukraine or Little Russia as a fatherland became ubiquitous within the epistolary tradition of the political elite. Subsequently, the rhetoric of a Ukrainian fatherland was a major feature of the Cossack chronicles of the early eighteenth century and began appearing in belles-lettres, particularly poetry and panegyrics and, therefore, became a widespread and fully functioning component within the political culture and intellectual traditions of early modern Ukraine.<sup>58</sup>

The shift in identity and expressions of patriotism to the Ukrainian fatherland had major repercussions. It was indicative of the failure to accommodate Cossack Ukraine within the Commonwealth, despite the fact that the Commonwealth's composite state structure seemed to provide a basis for such an accommodation. This failure signals the end of the Commonwealth's expansion and the beginnings of its dismantling.

The construction of a Ukrainian/Little Russian fatherland as an ideal provided the Cossack elite with an important conceptual tool in its century-long efforts to both accommodate and resist Russian imperial integration and assimilation. It enabled that elite to argue that they were loyal servants of the tsar while still preserving "the Little Russian fatherland." The "fatherland" rhetoric was evoked for such major events as Hetman Ivan Mazepa's break with Peter I,<sup>59</sup> and also for more ordinary deliberations such as reforming the judicial system in the 1760s.<sup>60</sup> The concept of the Little Russian fatherland proved so persistent that even in the 1830s, long after the abolition of the Hetmanate, the elite considered the refusal by the Russian authorities to recognize some Cossack titles as qualifying for imperial nobility as an affront to "our fatherland."<sup>61</sup> In fact, *Istoriia Rusiv*, probably written in the first quarter of the nineteenth century could be considered as the last defence of the Hetmanate's

<sup>58</sup> For example, see a 1678 panegyric to Samoilovych in Ivan Velychkovs'kyi, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv. Dzygar tsilyi i napivdzygarok* (Kyiv: Dnipro, 2004) 9–10.

<sup>59</sup> Orest Subtel'nyi, *Mazepyntsi. Ukrains'kyi separatyzm na pochatku XVIII st.* (Kyiv: Lybid', 1994) 170; Tetiana Tairova-Iakovleva, *Ivan Mazepa i Rosiis'ka imperiia. Istoriia "zrady"* (Kyiv: Klio, 2012) 153–160. Tsar Peter I in his manifestos to the Little Russian nation claimed that he, and not Mazepa, was the true protector of the "Little Russian fatherland." See Plokhly, *The Origins of the Slavic Nations 277–280*.

<sup>60</sup> "Rech' o popravlenii sostoianiiia Malorossii," *Kievskaia starina* 10 (1882): 119–125.

<sup>61</sup> Zenon E. Kohut, "The Ukrainian Elite in the Eighteenth Century and its Integration into the Russian Nobility," *Making Ukraine. Studies on Political Culture, Historical Narrative, and Identity* (Edmonton and Toronto: CIUS Press, 2011) 108.

Little Russian nation and fatherland.<sup>62</sup> At the same time, *Istoriia Rusiv* became a primary text in a modern nation-building project.<sup>63</sup> Thus, the Cossack reconceptualization of “fatherland” in the 1660s to 1680s left its imprint not only throughout the eighteenth century but also into the modern era.

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<sup>62</sup> Frank E. Sysyn, “The Persistence of the Little Russian Fatherland in the Russian Empire: The Evidence from *The History of Rus' or of Little Russia*,” in *Imperienvergleich: Beispiele und Ansätze aus osteuropäischer Perspektive*, edited by Guido Hausmann and Angela Rustemeyer (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag, 2009) 39–49.

<sup>63</sup> Serhii Plokhy, *The Cossack Myth. History and Nationhood in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 47–65.