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JOHN-PAUL HIMKA

Young Radicals and Independent Statehood: The Idea of a Ukrainian Nation-State, 1890–1895

An assumption common to many modern political theorists is that the nation-state is the natural goal of national movements. But for the submerged peoples of nineteenth-century Eastern Europe, the formulation of the goal of independent statehood required a leap in ideological development from essentially cultural and social to overtly political nationalism. In this article, I am interested in the ideological leap taken by the Ukrainians, particularly in the role played by the young intelligentsia in the formulation of the goal of a nation-state. My argument has three stages: a narrative account of events, designed to correct misconceptions in the existing historiography and to show that the goal of independence was put forward in the context of a generational conflict within the radical intelligentsia; an examination of the opposing ideas advanced by young and old radicals; and an explanation of why the young radicals could formulate the demand for Ukrainian statehood while their senior contemporaries could not.

Even in the best accounts, the genesis of the concept of independent Ukrainian statehood is traced back only as far as Iuliian Bachyns'kyi's pamphlet of 1895, *Ukraina irredenta*, and Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi's of 1900, *Samostiina Ukraina*.¹ In fact, however, Ukrainian statehood was advocated as early as 1890, and Bachyns'kyi's contribution to its formulation drew heavily on the work of his predecessor, Viacheslav Budzynovs'kyi. Both Bachyns'kyi and Budzynovs'kyi were young dissidents within an anticlerical and agrarian socialist party in Galicia, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. The origins of the demand for an independent Ukrainian state can only be understood within the context of the early history of the radical party, particularly of the conflict between "young" and "old" radicals.

Radicalism had first emerged as a political current in the mid-1870s, but a political party representing its principles was not founded until 1890. The intellectual father of radicalism and the mentor of the party in its first five years of existence until his death was Mykhailo Drahomanov. An outspoken champion of the rights of the Ukrainian nation, Drahomanov nonetheless stopped short of advocating the creation of a separate Ukrainian state; indeed, as an

1. Iuliian Bachyns'kyi, *Ukraina irredenta* (Lviv, 1895) (hereafter cited as *Ukraina irredenta 1895*) and Mykola Mikhnovs'kyi, *Samostiina Ukraina* (Lviv, 1900). Clearly, the most thoughtful presentation of the subject is Ivan L. Rudnytsky's "The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents," in Taras Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977). Rudnytsky calls Bachyns'kyi's and Mikhnovs'kyi's works the "earliest literary expressions" of "the separatist concept" ("Fourth Universal," p. 190).

anarchist and a federalist, he opposed the idea on principle.² Drahomanov lived abroad and guided the party through correspondence with two disciples, the leaders of the party in Galicia, Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Pavlyk. Both educated sons of the peasantry, Franko and Pavlyk were at that time in their late thirties or early forties, “old radicals” who had first been converted to socialism and imprisoned for their convictions in the late 1870s. On the national question, as on most other questions, they were of one mind with Drahomanov during the 1880s and 1890s.

In addition to this old radical leadership, the party intelligentsia also consisted of a number of students in their early twenties, who had first encountered the socialist movement and doctrines in the late 1880s. The initiative to found a political party had come in the first place from these “young radicals,” specifically from Budzynovs’kyi. Franko agreed to the formation of a party after some hesitation, and Drahomanov, who insisted that a party was still premature, reconciled himself to the *fait accompli* only with reluctance and in fact never formally joined the party. Conflict between the old and young radicals had preceded the formation of a party by two years, and it continued unabated until the party split three ways in 1899.³ Among the most prominent points of contention in this conflict was the question of independent statehood for the Ukrainian nation.

This demand was first raised at the founding congress of the radical party, held in Lviv on October 4–5, 1890. In a report on the economic situation of the Ukrainian nation under Austrian rule, the young radical Budzynovs’kyi⁴ argued that western Austria, particularly Vienna and Bohemia, exploited the eastern, Ukrainian-inhabited regions of the empire, destroying their economy and impoverishing their inhabitants. He therefore proposed that the party program

2. I have briefly summarized Drahomanov’s biography and the general thrust of his political thought in the *Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, vol. 10 (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1979), pp. 7–9. For a fuller discussion of his political ideas, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “Drahomanov as a Political Theorist,” in *Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings* (New York, 1952), pp. 70–130.

3. The early history of radicalism is examined in John-Paul Himka, “Polish and Ukrainian Socialism: Austria, 1867–1890” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1977). A revised version will be published by Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute under the title “Socialism in Galicia: The Emergence of Polish Social Democracy and Ukrainian Radicalism, 1860–1890.” I have also prepared a shorter account that carries the story through 1899 (see John-Paul Himka, “Ukrains’kyi sotsializm u Halychyni [Do rozkolu v Radykal’nii partii, 1899 r.],” *Journal of Ukrainian Graduate Studies*, no. 7 [Fall 1979], pp. 33–51). Other works on the subject include V. Levyns’kyi, *Narys rozvytku ukrains’koho robitnychoho rukhu v Halychyni* (Kiev, 1914) and Elżbieta Hornowa, *Ukraiński obóz postępowy i jego współpraca z polską lewicą społeczną w Galicji 1876–1895* (Wrocław, 1968).

4. Viacheslav Budzynovs’kyi (1868–1935) was born in Bavoriv near Ternopil, the son of a village school teacher. His father was Ukrainian, but not nationally conscious, and his mother was a patriotic Pole. He attended the Polish gymnasium in Lviv until 1886, when he switched to the Ukrainian gymnasium. He had become a socialist two years earlier after reading an antisocialist brochure by a Polish priest. In the mid-1880s he organized socialist reading circles among gymnasium students and helped edit the Polish socialist newspaper *Praca*. In 1888 and 1889 he was active in the leftist student movement at Lviv University. In the mid-1890s he wrote several influential pamphlets on agrarian relations in Galicia, and from 1907 to 1918 he sat in the Austrian parliament. Forever ahead of his time, he abandoned his socialist convictions in the late 1890s and evolved into a virulent nationalist of a type foreshadowing that of the 1930s. This evolution was reflected not only in his demonstrative political activity, but in a series of tendentious historical novels. In 1927, however, he was the founder of the short-lived, pro-Soviet Ukrainian Party of Labor.

include among its maximal demands the union of all Ukrainian territories in a single independent state. The minimal demands were to include the division of the crownland of Galicia into separate Polish and Ukrainian provinces. Budzynovs'kyi's proposal was vigorously opposed by Pavlyk and Franko, and Franko's authority decided the matter in the end. When it came to a vote, only Budzynovs'kyi himself voted for his proposal. Iuliiian Bachyns'kyi wanted to vote for it as well, but, as a gymnasium student, he did not yet have the right.⁵

After the congress, Budzynovs'kyi submitted the text of his presentation for publication in the radical party organ, *Narod*, but Pavlyk, who was the editor, refused to accept it. The text was eventually published in 1891 in the Russophile⁶ periodical *Halytskaia Rus'* and as a separate brochure entitled "The Cultural Poverty of Austrian Ruthenia."⁷ In it, Budzynovs'kyi argued that "every nationality, in order to live and develop in a normal fashion, absolutely must have political independence"; the Ukrainians "must demand neither more nor less than their own state-political organism, with at least the same measure of independence as Hungary."⁸ The brochure met with sympathy among the young and censure among the old radicals. Volodymyr Okhrymovych, then a student at Lviv University, considered it "a very valuable socio-political study . . . a program which many people will follow and which will interest even more." His only reservation was that the brochure was published by the Russophiles: "Budzynovs'kyi would more easily win for his program the young readers of *Narod* than the old, ossified readers of *Halytskaia Rus'*."⁹ Although the young readers of *Narod* might have been impressed, Franko certainly was not. In a review of the brochure, Franko accused its author of being doctrinaire, impractical, and ignorant.¹⁰

In the meantime, Budzynovs'kyi had been active among young radicals in Vienna, who, like him, were attending the university in the imperial capital. On December 18, 1890, they met to draft an open letter calling for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. The letter was signed by nine young radicals,

5. V. Budzynovs'kyi, "Ekshumatsiia i novyi pokhoron," *Dilo*, April 13/March 31, 1912, no. 82, p. 2.

6. Russophilism was a political and cultural orientation toward tsarist Russia. It first emerged among the Ukrainians of Galicia in the 1850s as a reaction to Polish domination. By the 1890s its significance had declined considerably, but vestiges of it survived into the interwar era. Russophilism was one symptom of an identity crisis experienced by the Ukrainians of the Habsburg empire. Another was in the terminology they used to designate their own nationality. At least until the turn of the century, the Eastern-rite, Ukrainian-speaking inhabitants of Austria-Hungary referred to themselves as "Ruthenians" (*rusy*) and to their conationals across the Russian border as "Ukrainians" (*ukraintsy*). As of 1900, nationally conscious Ukrainians in Galicia shunned this distinction and began referring to themselves, too, as "Ukrainians." The formulation of the goal of national statehood contributed to the terminological reorientation. For the purposes of this article I have retained the original terminology only in quotations from sources; otherwise I make use of a commonly accepted anachronism and call the "Ruthenians" "Ukrainians."

7. Viacheslav Budzynovs'kyi, "Avtobiografia. (Fragment iz posmertnykh paperyv)," in *Iak cholovik ziishov na pana* (Lviv, 1937), p. 13.

8. S. V[iacheslav] Budzynovskii, *Kul'turnaia nuzhda avstriiskoi Rusy*, 2 parts (Lviv, 1891), pp. 7 and 112.

9. V. Okhrymovych, "Kul'turnaia nuzhda avstriiskoi Rusy," *Narod*, October 22, 1891, no. 20–21, pp. 273–75.

10. Ivan Franko, "Shche pro nashu kul'turnu nuzhdu," *ibid.*, November 20, 1891, no. 23, pp. 309–12.

including Budzynovs'kyi and Ivan Hrynevets'kyi. Franko and Pavlyk refused to publish the letter in *Narod* on the grounds that it would expose the radical organ to confiscation. Instead, they replied to it in an article entitled "The Ruthenian Right to Statehood and the National Cause." Here they accused the Viennese students of basing their program "on the fiction of statehood and indirectly on the interests of those strata who would be the first to benefit from the eventual establishment of an independent Ruthenian state, whereas the fate of the working people in this independent state could even deteriorate."¹¹

Undeterred, Budzynovs'kyi and his associates decided to press the issue at the second radical party congress in 1891. They drafted a program, dated March 1, 1891 and signed by Budzynovs'kyi and Hrynevets'kyi, which they hoped would be adopted at the congress. It stated: "As a Ruthenian political party, we [the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party] must strive for the *political independence of the Ruthenian nation*, for its *organization in the form of a state* in the modern sense [that is, highly centralized], in as far as this is possible to accomplish by legal means, without infringing on the integrity of Austria."¹² Their draft was published anonymously in *Narod*, but at the party congress in October, in spite of promises to discuss program revision, the party leadership succeeded in evading the issue.¹³

The issue of independent statehood was raised again in 1893 by the young radical Iuliian Bachyns'kyi.¹⁴ He argued in much the same vein as Budzynovs'kyi that incorporation in the Austrian state was economically destroying the Ukrainian nation, which could only be rescued by political independence. His pamphlet, *Ukraina irredenta*, called for "a free, great, politically independent Ukraine, one and indivisible from the San to the Caucasus."¹⁵ Bachyns'kyi did not expect his manuscript to be well received by the party leadership, so at first he submitted only the introductory chapters for publication in *Narod* (early in 1893). These chapters did not completely reveal Bachyns'kyi's stance, and he deliberately gave them the misleading title "Apropos Emigration."¹⁶ The subterfuge worked; Pavlyk printed them, according to his own testimony, "without even knowing that the issue of a Ukrainian state would later be raised."¹⁷

11. [Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Pavlyk], "Ruske derzhavne pravo i narodna sprava," *ibid.*, January 1, 1891, no. 1, pp. 8–10.

12. V. Budzynovs'kyi and Ivan Hrynevets'kyi, "Materiialy do revizii prohramy rusko-ukrain-skoi radykal'noi partii," *ibid.*, May 1, 1891, no. 9, pp. 155–59; emphasis in the original.

13. "II-hyi ziizd ukr. radykaliv," *ibid.*, October 24, 1891, no. 20–21, pp. 266–67.

14. Iuliian Bachyns'kyi (1870–??) was a founder of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party in 1899. He traveled to Canada and the United States in 1905 and 1906 to study Ukrainian emigrant society and subsequently published a valuable account of it (*Ukrains'ka emigratsiia* [Lviv, 1914]). He returned to the United States in 1919 as the Washington representative of the West Ukrainian government. From 1921 to 1929 he lived in Germany. After spending a few years in Lviv, he emigrated to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1932. He worked in Kharkiv on the editorial board of the Ukrainian Soviet encyclopedia (which to this day contains no entry on him). In 1934 he was arrested and exiled. His exact fate is unknown, but he is presumed to have died somewhere in the Gulag.

15. Bachyns'kyi, *Ukraina irredenta 1895*, p. 74.

16. Iuliian Bachyns'kyi, "Moi spomyny pro Drahomanova," *Vistnyk Soiuzu vyzvolennia Ukrainy*, August 15, 1915, no. 23–24, p. 13. "Po povodu emigratsii" was serialized in *Narod*, 1893, nos. 4–7 and 14.

17. Editorial note in M. P. Drahomanov, *Perepyska*, ed. M. Pavlyk (Lviv, 1901), p. 118. Vasyl' Hryshko is mistaken in supposing that the series of articles appearing in *Narod* in 1893 already

Nonetheless, when Drahomanov read the first of these chapters in *Narod*, he wrote to Pavlyk expressing his disapproval of these “*words, words, words.*”¹⁸ In the summer of 1893, Bachyns’kyi submitted the rest of his manuscript to *Narod*. Franko and Pavlyk both read it and decided it should not be printed, although Pavlyk agreed to publish selections from the last chapter. Since these selections dealt exclusively with emigration and not with political independence, Bachyns’kyi rejected the compromise.¹⁹ In 1894 he sought Drahomanov’s opinion of the manuscript, and for some months the two of them carried on a debate through correspondence. Drahomanov contested Bachyns’kyi’s methods and facts, but refrained from dealing explicitly with the question of statehood.²⁰ In the autumn of 1895, Bachyns’kyi had almost given up hope of publishing his book when he was approached by Denys Lukiianovych, editor of the series *Univerzal’na biblioteka*.²¹ *Ukraina irredenta* was published in this series in 1895 or 1896²² and proved extremely influential.

Bachyns’kyi also managed to bring about a revision of the radical party program along the lines Budzynovs’kyi had suggested in 1890 and 1891. The new program, adopted at the fourth party congress at the end of December 1895, explicitly called for “the political independence of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian nation,” the first step to which would be the division of Galicia into a Polish and a Ukrainian province (with the latter incorporating Ukrainian Bukovyna). Pavlyk, who saw in this an open break with the federalist principles of Drahomanov, at first opposed the adoption of the new program, but eventually bowed to the will of the party majority. The demand for political independence was accepted unanimously at the congress.²³

Even though Pavlyk and Franko agreed to the revision of the party program, they still held fast to Drahomanov’s principle of federalism and were not yet convinced of the need for a completely independent nation-state. As Pavlyk implied some years later, the exact formulation was crucial. He could agree, with reluctance, to the formula “political independence,” but

called for independent statehood (see Vasyl’ Hryshko, “Shliakh do sobornosti,” *Suchasnist’*, 1979, no. 1, p. 55).

18. The letter was dated March 28/17, 1893 and is quoted in Drahomanov, *Perepyska*, p. 118; emphasis in the original.

19. *Ibid.* Bachyns’kyi, “Moi spomyny,” p. 13.

20. Their correspondence is printed as an appendix to the third edition of *Ukraina irredenta* (Berlin, 1924) (hereafter cited as *Ukraina irredenta 1924*), pp. 177–237.

21. Bachyns’kyi, *Ukraina irredenta 1895*, p. 5 and Bachyns’kyi, “Moi spomyny,” p. 14.

22. The year in which the book actually appeared in print is difficult to determine. Volodymyr Levyns’kyi states that the book was published in 1896 (see Volodymyr Levyns’kyi, “Natsional’ne pytannia v Avstrii i sotsial’demokratiia,” *Dzvin. Zbirnyk*, vol. 1 [Kiev, 1907], p. 228). Corroborating this is Pavlyk’s recollection that the book had not yet appeared when the fourth congress of the radical party met in Lviv on December 28, 1895 (see his editorial note to Drahomanov, *Perepyska*, p. 120). But the title page of the book itself bears the date 1895, and Bachyns’kyi specifies in his memoirs that the book was printed in that year (see “Moi spomyny,” p. 14). Bachyns’kyi’s memoirs, however, are unreliable with regard to chronology. They refer to the periodical *Robitnyk* appearing in 1895, although the periodical was not founded until 1896. Franko’s review of *Ukraina irredenta* appeared in an issue of *Zhytie i slovo* dated 1895, but Bachyns’kyi writes about the review appearing “in 1896 . . . in the June issue” (“Moi spomyny,” p. 14).

23. Pavlyk’s editorial commentary in Drahomanov, *Perepyska*, p. 120. S. Danylovych, *Poisnenie prohramy rus’ko-ukr. radykal’noi partii* (Lviv, 1897).

could mean less by this than the young radicals meant.²⁴ What Franko and Pavlyk actually agreed to was made clear in Franko's review of *Ukraina irredenta*:

Of course, the term "political independence" need not be understood immediately to mean complete separation from Russia, the necessity to create a separate Ukrainian state. Political independence is also possible in union with Russia, given a federalist structure.²⁵

Franko and Pavlyk, in short, had made a superficial, tactical concession to the young radicals, but had not been won over to the program of national statehood.

Their change of heart came only five years later, a full decade after the idea of an independent nation-state had first been put forward by Budzynovs'kyi. The earliest expression of the change in their convictions was Franko's famous essay of 1900, "Beyond the Bounds of the Possible," which identified statehood as the ideal goal of the Ukrainian nation.²⁶ But in 1900, Franko was a latecomer. The idea of independence had already found widespread support among other sectors of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. In the previous year, two new Ukrainian political parties had emerged in Galicia — the national democratic and social democratic parties — and both had made independence part of their programs.²⁷ In 1900, before Franko's essay was written, the leading Galician Ukrainian newspaper, *Dilo*, had carried a series of articles arguing the case for Ukrainian independence.²⁸ Galician Ukrainian students as a whole (and not just those associated with the radical party) had adopted the cause and made this known in a number of publications and in a mass assembly held in Lviv on July 14, 1900.²⁹ Even in Russian Ukraine, the idea of independence had emerged, to be forcefully argued in Mikhnovs'kyi's brochure of 1900, *Samostiina Ukraina*.³⁰

24. Editorial commentary in Drahomanov, *Perepyska*, p. 120. Cf. Budzynovs'kyi's formula of March 1, 1891: "political independence" and "organization in the form of a state" (see above, p. 222).

25. Ivan Franko, "Ukraina irredenta," *Zhytie i slovo*, 4 (1895): 483. These lines were omitted by Bohdan Kravtsiv when he reprinted the review "without any changes, with minor omissions" in *Vyvid prav Ukrainy* (New York, 1964), pp. 115–38. For another example of how Kravtsiv distorted the thought of Ivan Franko by selective editing, see his collection *Ivan Franko pro sotsializm i marksyzm* (New York, 1966).

26. Ivan Franko, "Poza mezhamy mozhlyvoho," in Kravtsiv, *Vyvid*, pp. 139–52.

27. See Volodymyr Doroshenko, "Znachinnia 'Ukrainy irredenty' v istorii rozvytku ukrains'koi natsional'noi svidomosti," in Bachyns'kyi, *Ukraina irredenta 1924*, pp. xi–xii and Rudnytsky, "Fourth Universal," pp. 190–91.

28. Part of the series was reprinted as a separate brochure financed by Viacheslav Budzynovs'kyi. See Roman Stefanovych, *Samostiina Ukraina* (Lviv, 1900).

29. Already at the 1897 Shevchenko commemoration in Lviv, the head of the Akademichna hromada, Sydir (Izidor) Holubovych, proclaimed political independence to be the ideal of Ukrainian youth (see Bachyns'kyi, "Moi spomyny," p. 14). For the events of 1900, see Doroshenko, "Znachinnia," pp. xii–xiii and *Al'manakh "Molodoi Ukrainy"*. *Spohady pro himnaziini hurtky v Berezhnakh* (Berezhany, Munich, and New York, 1954). The most influential publication of the time was a brochure by Lonhyn Tsehel's'kyi, *Rus'-Ukraina i Moskovshchyna* (Lviv, 1901).

30. Originally published in Lviv in 1900, the brochure was last reprinted by Howerla publishers in New York in 1971.

As the foregoing account shows, to single out Bachyns'kyi's *Ukraina irredenta* of 1895 as the first program of Ukrainian independence is to ignore the activity of Budzynovs'kyi during 1890 and 1891 and thus to obscure the context the young radicals provided for the development and presentation of Bachyns'kyi's program. Previous historiography has also been imprecise with regard to Franko's attitude toward state independence. Over the course of Ukrainian history, he was indeed "an early supporter of the *samostiinist* concept."³¹ But in the crucial debates within the radical party, he opposed the idea for many years. A reexamination of the problem reveals that independent statehood was first proposed by young radical intellectuals and championed by them against the consistent opposition of their older colleagues. The ideological dispute over national statehood was thus a generational conflict as well. It is therefore necessary to look closely at the range of ideological issues dividing the young and the old radicals and, specifically, at the reasons the young radicals viewed the question of statehood differently than their elders.

The discord in the radical party between young and old revolved around two, related issues. One issue, of course, was independent statehood. The other was Marxism or — to use the terminology of that age — social democracy. What united young and old in the party was a common opposition to the politics of the other Ukrainian groups, the Russophiles and national populists, and a shared commitment to the cause of socialism. But from the beginning, the young radicals considered Drahomanov's brand of socialism outdated.³² They had entered political life at a time when social democracy was on the rise; Kautsky had founded *Die Neue Zeit* in the mid-1880s, and the end of the decade witnessed the formation of the Second International and the Austrian Social Democratic Party. The young Ukrainian radicals themselves had recently participated in the Marxist-oriented, Polish socialist movement in Lviv and shared the Polish social democrats' criticism of the radical party program. Against the opposition of Franko and Pavlyk, they insisted that the radical party should become social democratic both in name and in program and that it should become a constituent part of the Austrian Social Democratic party. Unable to force these changes on the party leadership, malcontent young radicals left the party in 1899 and formed the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Social Democratic Party.

The revolt of the young radicals, then, was two-pronged. In their own view at least, they were more advanced than their elders in their consideration of the national question and in the theory of socialism they embraced. In the late 1890s, these two aspects of young radical ideology became separate, so that in 1899 — when the consistent Marxists formed the social democratic party — the nationalists among the young radicals founded the Ukrainian National Democratic Party. But in the early 1890s, young radicalism was united. In this period, both Budzynovs'kyi, who later became a founder of national democracy, and Bachyns'kyi, who later became a founder of social democracy, still saw eye to eye. Both were Marxists who advocated the creation of an independent Ukrainian state.

31. Rudnytsky, "Fourth Universal," p. 190.

32. The young radicals' rejection of Drahomanov and preference for Marx went back to the late 1880s. See Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," p. 493.

Their writings on statehood were saturated with the catchwords of *fin de siècle* social democracy. In the course of arguing the case for independence, both young radicals felt it their duty to explain such concepts as the crisis of overproduction, the concentration of capital, and the anarchy of production. Both believed that the modern state was a product of capitalism and from this concluded that only an independent state could promote capitalist development in Austrian Ukraine. Both were emphatic in their economic determinism, and Bachyns'kyi's book in particular abounded in "iron necessities," "inevabilities," and "mere questions of time."

In their opposition to Budzynovs'kyi and Bachyns'kyi, the old radicals chose to emphasize the question of Marxism rather than the question of state independence. Thus, when Pavlyk refused to publish Budzynovs'kyi's manuscript in *Narod*, he did so on the grounds that it "reeked of Marxism."³³ When Drahomanov debated with Bachyns'kyi about the manuscript of *Ukraina irredenta*, he avoided the topic of statehood and focused instead on the work's methodological premises and historical arguments. "Unfortunately," wrote Drahomanov,

the Marxists — or, rather, the Engelsists — rarely investigate anything, but simply sketch out *a priori*, often quite fantastic historical and political configurations. This is what you do. I will not argue with you about your conclusions, only show you that your facts, in my opinion, are totally unreliable.³⁴

And when Franko reviewed *Ukraina irredenta*, his major complaint too was that, "following the lead of Engels and Kautsky," Bachyns'kyi used "ready formulas to explain the most complicated historical phenomena."³⁵

The line taken by the old radicals requires some examination. It was certainly consistent with views that Drahomanov, at least, had expressed before the young radicals appeared on the scene.³⁶ It was also quite justified by the disregard for facts that the young radicals displayed in their doctrinaire historical argumentation. But the debate over methodology and facts also had generational overtones. While the young radicals based their case on the latest developments in social theory and scorned the old-fashioned anarchism of Drahomanov and his followers, the old radicals picked out the errors in the youngsters' arguments to show how much they had to learn before they could speak with authority on Ukrainian politics. Other motives, too, may have led the old radicals to concentrate their fire on the method rather than the point of the argument, on Marxism rather than the goal of a nation-state. They may have considered the goal of an independent Ukrainian state too remote to warrant

33. Budzynovs'kyi, "Avtobiografia," p. 13.

34. Drahomanov to Bachyns'kyi, July 18/6, 1894, in Bachyns'kyi, *Ukraina irredenta 1924*, pp. 177–78.

35. Franko, "Ukraina irredenta," p. 482.

36. Drahomanov wrote in 1883: "Social democratic doctrine, also professed by many in Russia as a type of religion, . . . is more correct as a schematic outline . . . than faithful as a full representation of reality" (see "Vol'nyi soiuz — Vil'na spilka," *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii*, 2 vols. [Paris, 1905–6], 1:350n).

serious rebuttal. And they may have had unconscious misgivings about the outright rejection of national statehood. In the confrontation between the young and old radicals, however, only one aspect of Drahomanov's critique of Marxism came to the surface: his objection to what he considered a one-sided and formulaic interpretation of reality.

But Drahomanov, Pavlyk, and Franko had something else against Marxism, to which they did not allude in the course of the debate with Bachyns'kyi and Budzynovs'kyi. This was that Marx and his followers favored centralized states and opposed both anarchism and federalism. Marxism, it should be noted, especially the variety popularized by Kautsky,³⁷ was much better suited to serve as the ideological vehicle for national statehood than was the anarchic federalism of Drahomanov. Demanding a state of one's own, after all, presupposes a positive view of the state, which is present in Marxism, especially when compared with that in anarchism. The young radicals' Marxism could thus reinforce their advocacy of national statehood, and vice versa. In addition, a difference existed between the young and old radicals' interpretations of what Marxism implied about statehood and the Ukrainian nation. The old radicals grasped the essence of Marx's program for Eastern Europe: centralization within historical state boundaries and assimilation of the "nonhistoric," stateless nationalities (such as the Ukrainians). Though this was indeed Marx's own favorite solution to the nationality question east of the Elbe,³⁸ it was not the only one consistent with his premises. As Budzynovs'kyi and Bachyns'kyi demonstrated, Marxism could also be used to buttress the idea of statehood for the "nonhistoric" nations. If the centralized state was an ineluctable requirement of progress, then the Ukrainian nation had to choose between statehood and assimilation. It does not matter that Marx himself favored assimilation. What is important is the different ways the young and the old radicals responded to the alternatives posed by Marxian state centralism. It never occurred to the old radicals that if Marx were right about the state, then that could also be an argument for an independent *Ukrainian* state (as in the programs of the young radicals). Instead, the old radicals saw only the alternative of assimilation.³⁹ When confronted with the role ascribed to the state by Marxism, the response of the old radicals was concern that it meant their death as a nation. The young radicals responded by calling for the formation of a state. Clearly, the young and old radicals operated with very different assumptions about the Ukrainian nation's potential for statehood.

Confirmation of this can be found in what little the old radicals had to say about Ukrainian statehood as such. In the whole course of the debate with Budzynovs'kyi and Bachyns'kyi, the old radicals dealt openly with the question of statehood only once. Even then, although they brought another argument to bear as well, they primarily emphasized the impracticability of the project. In

37. See Kautsky's *Das Erfurter Programm* (Stuttgart, 1892), particularly the sections on taxes, socialist production, economic significance of the state, and socialism and freedom. There are numerous German editions of this textbook of social democracy and an abridged English translation entitled *The Class Struggle* (New York, 1971).

38. Roman Rosdolsky, *Zur nationalen Frage: Friedrich Engels und das Problem der "geschichtslosen" Völker* (Berlin, 1979).

39. See [Mykhailo Pavlyk], "Karol Marx," *Praca*, April 10, 1883, no. 6, p. 21. See also M. P. Dragomanov, *Istoricheskaia Pol'sha i velikoruskaia demokratiia* (Geneva, 1881), pp. 256–63, 266, 307.

Franko and Pavlyk's response to the open letter of the young radicals in Vienna, the central argument is the following:

In their theoretical impetuosity, the Viennese "Radicals" considered neither the forces at the disposal of our people nor the political boundaries cutting across our country. . . . The majority of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian nation lives in Russia; and the Messrs. "Radicals" of Vienna undoubtedly have not even considered the great difficulties which would be involved in the struggle for statehood of that majority. . . . In our times, political independence is an extremely costly undertaking.⁴⁰

Similar views were expressed by Drahomanov, though not in the course of debate with the young radicals. As Ivan Rudnytsky has pointed out, this was the pragmatic side of Drahomanov's (and his followers') renunciation of Ukrainian statehood; the ideological side, to which we now turn, must be regarded as analytically distinct.⁴¹

The ideological side of the question, of course, was that consistent anarchists must oppose the state as such, even a Ukrainian state. Statelessness to Drahomanov and his disciples was not only the condition of their nation. It was a political ideal. Drahomanov advocated the reorganization of civil society into a multiplicity of loose voluntary associations: individuals would voluntarily enter into association with other individuals to form communities; these communities would associate voluntarily with other communities of the same ethnic and linguistic composition; these larger, national associations would, in turn, enter into large regional associations. Only such a reorganization would allow the realization of Drahomanov's ultimate ideal: "total anarchy, the complete freedom of every individual."⁴²

It is more than curious that this ideological side was never given direct expression by the old radicals in the debate. Franko and Pavlyk, aside from underscoring the impracticability of a Ukrainian state, advanced an argument that implied the primacy of economics over politics. Independent statehood, they argued, was no guarantee in and of itself against the exploitation of Ukrainian peasants by the local upper classes or against the economic colonization and exploitation of Ukrainian territory by foreign capital.⁴³ This argument had nothing to do with anarchism per se. In fact, this line of argument later became associated with certain Marxist currents (Luxemburgism and dependency theory). The old radicals, then, for the entire duration of the conflict over independent statehood glossed over their anarchism and refused to engage in a critique of *Ukrainian* statehood from the standpoint of their avowed ideological

40. [Franko and Pavlyk], "Ruske derzhavne pravo," p. 9.

41. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, "Storichchia pershoi ukrains'koi politychnoi prohramy," *Suchasnist'*, March 1979, no. 3, pp. 104-105.

42. M. P. Drahomanov, "Perednie slovo do 'Hromady,'" *Vybrani tvory* (Prague and New York, 1937), pp. 118, 114-15.

43. See above p. 222. According to Franko and Pavlyk, "the extensive development of capitalism today makes political independence of small states almost a complete fiction ([Franko and Pavlyk], "Ruske derzhavne pravo," p. 9). The same argument was also advanced by Rosa Luxemburg and criticized by Lenin.

premises.⁴⁴ Even when Budzynov's'kyi tried to steer the debate in that direction and threw the gauntlet down before Drahomanov's "retrograde" anarchism,⁴⁵ the old radicals declined to discuss the issue. They would talk about Marxist dogmatism, incorrect facts, impracticability, and even the primacy of economics over politics, but refused to say a word about the evil of the state. These were polemical contortions, and one can sense that what the young radicals were saying made their elders uncomfortable.

The polemical uses to which Drahomanov put his anarchism help identify the reasons behind the position of the old radicals. Drahomanov's hostility to the state was most in evidence when he debated with Russian and Polish socialists about the existing Russian state and a potentially restored Polish state. Whenever Russian or Polish socialists even implied that Ukrainian territory, after the socialist revolution, would find itself in Russia or Poland, both Drahomanov and Pavlyk would wave their anarchist credentials and reprimand the Russians and Poles for being "Jacobins" or "centralists."⁴⁶ When confronted with Ukrainian "centralists," however, they swept their anarchism under the rug.

This is not in the least to imply any conscious duplicity on the part of the old radicals. Long before anyone else had raised the question in public, Drahomanov pondered, in print, whether the Ukrainians should strive to form a state. True to his anarchist principles, he decided that statehood should not be sought, even by a stateless nation like the Ukrainians.⁴⁷ And when, much later, he was actually faced with advocates of Ukrainian statehood, he and his followers argued with them and tried to suppress their writings. There is a certain consistency in all this, but one note continues to ring false: the theoretical weapons of anarchism, which the old radicals were quick to wield against Russians and Poles, were not used during the conflict with the young radicals. The old radicals were anxious to close off debate before it started and to argue vehemently about every point but the substantive one. Their curious behavior is symptomatic of a contradiction in their minds between the motivations of their theoretical principles and the use to which they now were supposed to put them.

All his life, Drahomanov was keenly aware of and disturbed by the suppression of the Ukrainian nation by the Russian state, which he felt would eventually lead to the disappearance of the nation through assimilation. He saw only two ways to counteract this tendency: either separation from the Russian state or dismantlement of the oppressive state apparatus. Drahomanov, of course, favored the argument for the dissolution of the state, which appears in his political thought under the guises of anarchism, federalism, liberalism, and

44. See, however, Budzynov's'kyi's description of his meetings with Drahomanov in Vienna. On these occasions Drahomanov did advance anarchist arguments (V. Budzynov's'kyi, *Ishly didy na muky* [Lviv, 1925; New York, 1958], pp. 33–34).

45. Budzynovskii, *Kul'turnaia nuzhda*, p. 18.

46. "We, rather, believe that, although ever since Herzen and Bakunin the words *federation* and even *anarchy* are sacred words for the Russian socialists, the first practical form of their activity will be Jacobinism and not the sort of federalism we described above" (M. Dragomanov, "Der kleinrussische Internationalismus," *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, 1, pt. 2 [1880]: 430). "But we are able already at this time to observe a difference between the Polish and Ruthenian socialists: the latter are anarchists, the former — centralists," M[ykhailo] T[kachuk] [Pavlyk], "Klein-Russland," *ibid.*, 1879, p. 311.

47. Rudnyts'kyi, "Storichchia," pp. 98–99.

democratization. Drahomanov speaks of the choice between assimilation, on the one hand, and separatism or dismantlement, on the other, in several passages in his works. In 1877, he expressed it thus: "Our patriots have two paths before them — either to go ahead and wrest themselves and their people from under the control of the Russian state, as well as the Austrian and Hungarian state, . . . or to take advantage of every progressive measure of these states and communities, with which our people are connected, especially to take advantage of all democratic institutions and currents."⁴⁸ In the 1890s, he wrote in response to a right-wing critic:

If we were to concede that the policy of Russification is an outflow of the "spirit," the "character," and so forth, of the Great Russian people [in which case federalism would be out of the question], then only the choice between two alternatives would be left to us. The first alternative: resolutely to embrace separatism, either by forming an independent state or by seceding to another state. The other alternative would be to fold our hands and to look forward to our death, if we were to decide that separatism is beyond our will and strength.⁴⁹

Drahomanov could not use his anarchism against the first programs of Ukrainian statehood because he recognized both his anarchism and the young radicals' separatism as legitimate programs to ensure the survival of the nation. "I will say nothing," he wrote in 1877, "against those who in deed — and not in words, private words at that — begin to move in the direction" of separatism.⁵⁰ And in his response to the right-wing critic of the 1890s, he said: "I would even be happy if my opinion in this matter could be refuted with facts, but meanwhile I have to say openly that I nowhere see the force, the foundation, for a policy of separatism."⁵¹

In sum, Drahomanov's ultimate reason for objecting to Ukrainian statehood was that he considered it an unrealistic alternative. Anarchism as such had little to do with it, because both the old radicals' anarchism and the young radicals' separatism were simply different means to the same end. The task now is to explain why people of different ages, but living at the same time and concerned with the same reality, preferred these different means.

Although young radicalism was a revolt against Drahomanov and his ideas, Drahomanov, in a sense, broke the ground for the advocacy of independence. He was the first spokesman of the Ukrainian movement to think politically.⁵² And, as his own writings showed, once the Ukrainian question was put in a political context, the idea of Ukrainian statehood had to be raised, at least as a theoretical possibility. It was he, then, who started discussion of a Ukrainian

48. Ukrainets [Drahomanov], "Opiznaimo sia," *Druh*, 1877, no. 1, p. 13.

49. Drahomanov, *Chudats'ki dumky pro ukrains'ku natsional'nu spravu*, cited in Rudnytsky, "Fourth Universal," pp. 200–201.

50. Ukrainets [Drahomanov], "Opiznaimo sia," p. 13.

51. M. P. Drahomanov, "Chudats'ki dumky pro ukrains'ku natsional'nu spravu," *Vybrani tvory*, p. 305.

52. For the sense in which this is true, see Rudnyts'kyi, "Storichchia," pp. 91, 96–97.

nation-state; the young radicals were only first to *advocate* it. By openly saying “no” to statehood, Drahomanov focused attention on the issue to which others would say “yes.”

The younger generation’s call for statehood cannot be explained simply as a propensity of the young to say the opposite of their elders. Such an explanation does not tell us, among other things, why it was the youth of the 1890s who first rebelled and not the youth of the 1880s or 1900s. And a revolt against the intellectual authority of Drahomanov could have taken several forms besides the advocacy of national statehood — a return to purely cultural nationalism, for example, or the creation of a conservative, elitist ideology. The revolt took the form it did when it did partially as a result of the climate of ideas to which the youth of the 1890s were exposed. The young, after all, who are less encumbered with a past and for whom all ideas are new, tend to be more receptive to new intellectual trends than their elders.

We have already seen that one “new” intellectual current, Marxism, played an important role in the young radicals’ thinking. It is true that Marxism was born even before Franko and Pavlyk, and in this sense it was not new. But as an intellectual fashion, it first became prominent in the era of the Second International. In the 1870s, when the old radicals formed their political ideas, it was no sin against the spirit of the time to sympathize with Proudhon and Bakunin rather than with Marx and Engels. The young radicals, however, were consistent with the mood of the Central European Left in the 1890s when they viewed Marxism as the only serious theory of socialism. Marxism was an important ideological catalyst in young radical thinking. It not only viewed statehood more positively than did orthodox radicalism, but it provided a theoretical framework for arguing the practicability (and, in Bachyns’kyi’s case, the inevitability) of Ukrainian statehood. More than this, Marxism called attention to problems that had not sufficiently concerned Drahomanov. Drahomanov thought primarily in political and social terms, and he ignored the purely economic side of the Ukrainian question. For him, the political liberty of Austria-Hungary made the state organism relatively tolerable. When he conceived of separatism he had in mind, first of all, the situation of the Ukrainian nation under tsarist despotism. The Marxist young radicals, however, were obsessed by economic considerations. They saw an urgency in the need to separate from Vienna that Drahomanov could never see. They believed that industry could not develop in Austrian Ukraine as long as it had to compete with the economically advanced regions of the Habsburg empire, Bohemia and Vienna. They also believed that without industrial development the already desperate situation of the Ukrainian peasantry would continue to deteriorate.

Another source for young radical thought was the autonomist movements of other Habsburg nationalities, particularly the Czechs and perhaps the Croats,⁵³ in the 1890s. Of course, both the Czech and Croatian autonomist movements of the 1890s were based on historical legitimacy, which the Ukrainians could not claim to the same effect. The heightened political nationalism of the Czechs and Croats, however, was infectious and helped set the tone for Budzynovs’kyi and Bachyns’kyi. The old radicals, in fact, considered the young

53. Bachyns’kyi cites the example of the struggle for the “Triune Croatian Kingdom” (see *Ukraina irredenta 1924*, p. 77).

radicals to be mere mimics of the Young Czechs. Franko and Pavlyk chided Budzynovs'kyi for putting forth a "Ruthenian *Staatsrecht* . . . a poor copy of the Young Czech program . . . a nationalist program resembling that of the Young Czechs."⁵⁴ Ostap Terlets'kyi, another old radical, criticized Budzynovs'kyi at the party congress for proposing a program that "smells of the *Staatsrecht* of the Young Czechs; and that's a very unpleasant party."⁵⁵ Drahomanov also stated in 1891 that Budzynovs'kyi's concept was "a copy of the Czech formula."⁵⁶ The young radicals looked to the Young Czechs as models and as potential allies in the struggle to dissolve the bonds of Austrian centralism.⁵⁷ Thus the Young Czech movement had a dual significance for the young radicals: in the purely ideological sphere, it provided an example of a nation claiming its "right to statehood"; it demonstrated simultaneously that the national aspirations of the Ukrainians coincided with the aspirations of other Austrian nationalities and that therefore the prospect of national statehood was not as impracticable as it appeared to Drahomanov, Franko, and Pavlyk.

Both social democracy and the Young Czech movement were political currents that played their part in the genesis of the idea of a Ukrainian nation-state. The idea also owed much to an incident, the Degen affair,⁵⁸ that occurred in 1889, just a year before the founding of the radical party and the first formulation of the statehood program. The Degen affair began in July 1889 when the Austrian vice-consul in Kiev warned the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that some Russian students were coming to Galicia to incite the Ukrainians against the Polish nobility. The information so alarmed the Galician authorities that when Sergei Degen and several other students from Russian Ukraine appeared in Galicia, they were arrested along with over a dozen local Ukrainians, including Franko, Pavlyk, Bachyns'kyi, and Okhrymovych (Budzynovs'kyi was then in Zurich). Usually in cases like this, Galician prosecutors contented themselves with charges of disturbance of the peace or membership in a secret organization. But this time they threatened the accused with the gallows and prosecuted them for high treason. The specific charge against the alleged conspirators was that they planned to wrest the Ukrainian nation away from the Habsburg and tsarist empires and establish an independent Ukrainian state. One of the accused, Okhrymovych, recalled some years later an exchange between himself and one of the prosecutors:

"The charge against you," [said the prosecutor], "is that you along with others want to separate Galicia from Austria and Ukraine from Russia in order to establish a Ukrainian-Ruthenian state called 'the Kievan Kingdom.'⁵⁹ What do you have to say to this charge?" I answered with the

54. [Franko and Pavlyk], "Ruske derzhavne pravo," pp. 8–10.

55. Budzynovs'kyi, *Ishly didy na muky*, p. 28.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

57. The Young Czechs are not mentioned by name in the programs of Budzynovs'kyi and Bachyns'kyi, but see Budzynovskii, *Kul'turnaia nuzhda*, p. 121 and Bachyns'kyi, *Ukraina irredenta 1924*, pp. 41–42.

58. The affair is described in Himka, "Polish and Ukrainian Socialism," pp. 493–95 and V. I. Kalynovych, *Politychni protsesy Ivana Franka ta ioho tovaryshiv* (Lviv, 1967), pp. 120–34.

59. The use of this term shows that the Galician police were aware of Eduard von Hartmann's article of 1888 suggesting the creation of a "Kievan Kingdom" to weaken Russia ("Russland in Europa," *Die Gegenwart* [Berlin], 33, no. 3, January 21, 1888, pp. 37–38). The article is discussed

blessed naïveté of a second-year philosophy student: "To this I must say that it would be very good if such a thing came to be, but it is not as easy to accomplish as you seem to think it is. . . ."

"Well, then surely you talked about this matter with your Kievan colleagues?"

"No, I did not talk about this, because, unfortunately, the matter never occurred to us."⁶⁰

Because of the complete absence of evidence, the accused in the Degen affair were released from prison after several months.

The obvious significance of the Degen affair is that an overreaction by the police helped push the young radicals in the direction of political separatism. Less obviously, when outsiders looked at the Ukrainian movement in 1889, they also saw it heading in the direction of national statehood. Neither social democrats nor admirers of the Young Czechs, the Galician police did not share the ideas of the young radicals. Yet they, too, believed a struggle for Ukrainian statehood was on the agenda. This suggests that more than a favorable ideological conjuncture was at work, that the idea of Ukrainian statehood had some basis in social reality. If the suggestion is correct, then one must look for a social basis that the young and outsiders could see much earlier than could veterans of the Ukrainian movement, including its radical variety.

In the mid-1870s, the process of nation-building had barely begun in Galician Ukraine. Austria had only recently entered the constitutional era, and the Ukrainian movement there had yet to take full advantage of the opportunities afforded by freedom of association, assembly, and the press. A handful of intellectuals in the cities was involved in a cultural nationalism that had little connection with the overwhelming majority of the nation, the peasantry. Draho-manov pointed this out to the Galician intelligentsia and urged them to work to *raise the cultural level of the peasants and to establish an institutional infrastructure* for the national movement. Partly on Draho-manov's advice, but independently as well, the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the late 1860s and 1870s began the work generally referred to as nation-building. Popular educational societies were founded, as were newspapers for peasants, village reading clubs,⁶¹ voluntary artisan associations,⁶² and a host of related institutions. This task of nation-building became the entelechy⁶³ of the generation of the 1870s. As long as such a monumental task lay before them, as long as the nation itself existed primarily in the minds of intellectuals and not in social reality, the idea of a Ukrainian nation-state was bound to be perceived as a pipe dream.

and portions are reprinted in Dmytro Doroshenko, *Die Ukraine and das Reich* (Leipzig, 1941), pp. 154–57; there are a number of minor errors in Doroshenko's bibliographical information and reproduction of extracts.

60. Volodymyr Okhrymovych, "Moia pryhoda z shybenytseiu," in O. I. Dei, ed., *Ivan Franko u spohadakh suchasnykiv. Knyha druha* (Lviv, 1972), p. 78.

61. See M. Pavlyk, "Pro rus'ko-ukrains'ki narodni chytal'ni," *Tvory* (Kiev, 1959), pp. 416–549.

62. John-Paul Himka, "Voluntary Artisan Associations and the Ukrainian National Movement in Galicia (The 1870s)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*, 2, no. 2 (June 1978): 235–50.

63. The concept of a generation's entelechy and other sociological assumptions about generations are taken from Karl Mannheim, "The Problem of Generations," *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge* (London, 1952), pp. 276–322.

The project this generation undertook was still being pursued in the 1890s, and the men of the seventies, though time had passed, still thought in terms of the immense task before them. The young men who first came on the scene in the late 1880s and 1890s, however, did not remember a time when the Ukrainian movement consisted only of a small group of intellectuals. They took for granted the nation-building accomplishments of the previous two decades, and they saw enough of a nation constructed by the 1890s to begin thinking about building a nation-state. By the 1900s, the qualitative change in the Ukrainian nation was so great that even the old radicals recognized that a task of a different order was about to be initiated. The intelligentsia had made a nation, and the nation was beginning a struggle for statehood.

The progress of the nation in these decades is demonstrated by, among other things, the flourishing of the press. In 1875, there were fifteen Ukrainian periodicals, none of them appearing more than three times a week. By 1890, there were thirty-five, among them a daily newspaper, and in 1900, there were forty-one, two of them dailies.⁶⁴ Just in the years from 1885 to 1889, the number of issues printed of Galician Ukrainian political and social periodicals grew from 573,000 to 834,000.⁶⁵ There was a corresponding boom in the membership of national institutions, such as *Prosvita* (Enlightenment), a popular educational society founded by the national populists. As peasants joined *Prosvita* reading clubs in the villages, membership climbed rapidly. From 1868 to 1874, 38 new members joined annually; from 1875 to 1880 — 207; from 1886 to 1890 — 398; from 1891 to 1895 — 624; and from 1896 to 1900 — 1,098.⁶⁶ In 1874 there had been only 2 village reading clubs affiliated with *Prosvita*;⁶⁷ by 1908, there were 2,048.⁶⁸ The political consciousness of the peasantry also progressed commensurately over these decades. The peasant of the 1870s was obedient to his pastor and placed hope for justice in a benign monarch, either the Austrian emperor or the Russian tsar. The peasant of the 1890s, however, was questioning the authority of his parish priest, and, although he retained a sentimental devotion to the Austrian emperor, he was no longer expecting any monarch to intervene on his behalf.⁶⁹ The peasant of the 1900s was already participating in mass strikes and boycotts against the landed Polish nobility and demonstrating for universal suffrage.⁷⁰ In the words of the Eastern liturgy, the Ukrainian nation had been brought “from nonexistence into being.”

The goal of statehood presupposed the construction of a network of national institutions and the acquisition of political consciousness by the masses

64. V. Ihnatiienko, *Bibliohrafiia ukrains'koi presy 1816–1916* (State College, Pa., 1968).

65. *Rocznik Statystyki Galicyi*, vol. 3: 1889–1891 (Lviv, 1891), p. 124.

66. Mykhailo Lozyns'kyi, *Sorok lit diial'nosti “Pros'vity” (v 40–litnii iuvilei tovarystva)* (Lviv, 1908), pp. 35–36.

67. “Chleny tovarystva ‘Prosvita,’” *Spravozdanie z dilanii “Pros'vity” vid chasu zaviazania tovarystva — 26. lystopada 1868, do nainoviishoho chasu* (Lviv, 1874), pp. 26–32.

68. Lozyns'kyi, *Sorok lit*, pp. 46–47.

69. These problems are treated in John-Paul Himka, “Priests and Peasants: The Greek Catholic Pastor and the Ukrainian National Movement in Austria, 1867–1900,” *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, 21, no. 1 (March 1979): 1–14 and idem, “Hope in the Tsar: Displaced Naive Monarchism among the Ukrainian Peasants of the Habsburg Empire,” *Russian History*, 7, parts 1–2 (1980): 125–38.

70. Walentyna Najdus, *Szkice z historii Galicji*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1958–60), 1:259–86, 2:274–362.

of the nation. This is corroborated by the geography of the separatist idea. Ukrainian statehood was first championed in Galicia, where the constitution and the existence of a nationally conscious clergy permitted the sort of development described above. Where this development was lacking, as in Russian-ruled Ukraine, the great majority of the Ukrainian intelligentsia could not see beyond federalism, until war and revolution opened their eyes.⁷¹

The idea of a Ukrainian nation-state depended, then, on the existence of a Ukrainian nation as a functioning social organism. The debate between the young and old radicals was, finally, the expression of contrasting views as to whether such a nation existed. In the 1890s, the old radicals were in the position of parents who continue to regard their offspring as children, while others, who meet these offspring independently, consider them adults. The young radicals were these "others," announcing, in the vocabulary of social democracy and Young Czech-style nationalism, the maturity of the nation.

71. "As far as popular support is concerned, the idea of independent statehood had made headway only in Galicia prior to 1914. It is true that among the literary exponents of the separatist trend we find several natives of the Dnieper Ukraine: Mykola Mikhnovskyy, Viacheslav Lypynskyy, and Dmytro Dontsov. But they were unable to recruit more than a handful of followers among their compatriots in the Russian Empire" (Rudnytsky, "Fourth Universal," pp. 191–92).