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Review Essay

The Ukrainian Idea in the Second Half of the 19th Century

John-Paul Himka

Aleksei Il′ich Miller, *"Ukrainskii vopros" v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX veka)*. St. Petersburg: Aleteiia, 2000. 282 pp. ISBN 5-89329-246-4.

Anatolii Kruhlashov, *Drama intelektuala: Politychni idei Mykhaila Drahomanova*. Chernivtsi: Vydavnytstvo "Prut," 2000. ISBN 966-560-008-7.

When in 1654 Hetman Bohdan Khmelnyts′kyi led his Cossack host under the protection of the tsar's "high hand," two peoples came into contact who had some things in common, while others markedly differentiated them. Turning their backs to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Cossacks made a point of emphasizing what they shared with the people of the Muscovite state. They both called themselves Rus′ and they confessed the same Holy Orthodox faith. But both understood that they were far from identical. The Muscovites translated Cossack documents, even when written in what was supposed to be the same Church Slavonic language that they used. The spoken vernaculars were much more distant. The two versions of Orthodoxy met each other uneasily. The Cossack officers and their churchmen were influenced by Polish and Latin culture and thought politically in terms of the *pacta conventa* and the republican constitution of the Commonwealth. The Muscovites knew little of the Western learning, and autocracy lay at the base of their political culture.

Over the next century and a half, the Cossack population was more thoroughly integrated into the Russian polity. The Cossacks' churchmen worked out a conception of how they fit into this enlarged Russia: they were the Little Russians, and the people who formed the core of the state which they entered were the Great Russians – together they made up all Rus′. The Little Russian churchmen dominated the Orthodox hierarchy and did much to homogenize the religious culture of the two branches of Rus′. In the latter half of the 18th century, Catherine II, rationalizing the administration of her huge realm, dismantled all the vestiges of Little Russian autonomy. With the destruction of both the Crimean Khanate and Poland-Lithuania, she no longer needed the Cossacks. They could serve the state like any other Russian subjects.

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The passing of the old Cossack order provoked a wave of nostalgic regionalism. A travesty of the *Aeneid* in the Little Russian vernacular, with Cossacks taking the place of Vergil's Trojans, filled with local lore and local humor, was an instant success when it was published in 1798. It touched off a lively literary movement in the vernacular, which flourished especially in the region just east of the main Cossack territories, in so-called Sloboda Ukraine, a place where Cossacks had settled under Muscovite rule even before 1654. Here in Sloboda Ukraine, in Kharkiv, a university was founded in 1805, so there was a concentration of intellectuals who could breathe life into the new movement. They put out literary almanacs and periodicals with titles like *Ukrainskii al′manakh*, *Ukrainskii sbornik, Ukrainskii vestnik*, and *Ukrainskii zhurnal*. The "Ukrainian" in these titles indicated that they were based in Sloboda Ukraine, but soon the word caught on to describe the new Little Russian movement as a whole.

Roughly at the same time, in 1793–95, as a result of the second and third partitions of Poland, Russia acquired the Right Bank of the Dnipro, where the Little Russian vernacular was also spoken and where Cossacks had also once held sway. From here the greatest exponent of the Ukrainian movement hailed – the painter, freed serf, and national poet Taras Shevchenko. He gravitated towards the newly founded St. Vladimir University in Kyiv, as did other intellectuals of the same persuasion. The Russian government looked favorably on their activities. It was felt that their regional Little Russian movement could be an effective antidote to Polish agitation in the Right Bank. Indeed, the Poles had erupted in rebellion in 1830–31, and the university in Kyiv was founded in 1834 precisely to combat their influence.

The atmosphere in Kyiv was politically charged, and the Ukrainian activists also began to discuss political questions. Shevchenko wrote some powerful and politically *risqué* poetry. His friend, the historian Mykola Kostomarov, drafted a manifesto clearly inspired by a Polish messianic text, which predicted that Ukraine, tormented by its neighbors, would one day rise up to renew in all of Slavdom the spirit of liberty and equality. Kyiv would become the capital of a Slavic federation. One member of the group denounced the others to the police, and they were arrested as the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood in 1847. Except in the case of the poet Shevchenko, whose verse contained some insulting remarks directed at the tsar and his family, the members of the Brotherhood received relatively light sentences.

The Ukrainian movement lay low for a while, but with the great reforms of the 1860s it entered the cultural and political arena again. The latter half of the 19th century was a critical period in its fortunes. For the Ukrainophiles, as they were now known, it was a time of self-definition and of conceptualization; but it was also a period when the Russians, in government and in society, discussed and

defined their own attitude to the movement. The contours of the Ukrainian question were becoming more evident.

Two fine books have appeared dealing with the development of the Ukrainian national idea in the latter part of the 19th century. One is by Aleksei Il′ich Miller, who divides his time as a teacher and researcher among the Institute for Scientific Information in Humanities of the Russian Academy of Sciences (INION), the Institute of Russian History of the Russian State Humanities University (RGGU), and the History Department of the Central European University in Budapest. The other is by Anatolii Kruhlashov, head of the Department of Political Sciences and Sociology in the Faculty of History at the Iurii Fed′kovych National University of Chernivtsi. Miller's book concerns the policies of the Russian government, local as well as imperial, towards the Ukrainophile movement, particularly in Kyiv, from the early 1860s through the early 1880s, that is, roughly coinciding with the reign of Alexander II; it also examines the closely related issue of the reaction to the Ukrainian movement in the Russian periodical press. Kruhlashov's book is about a leader of that movement, Mykhailo Drahomanov, who was active from the early 1860s until his death in 1895. He was a man at odds with the Russian authorities, so much so that he left the country in 1875 and never returned. He also frequently found himself at odds with Russian public opinion of all stripes. Miller's and Kruhlashov's books are about antagonists. Each writes with a scholarly, and often critical, sympathy towards his subject.

Miller's book is influenced by Western scholarship, not so much the scholarship on his particular subject, which is not so distinguished in the West, but by literature with wider implications. Not just cited, but integrated into his study are theoretical works on nationalism, English- and German-language studies of Russian, Soviet, and Ukrainian history, and modern historical and socio-scientific classics on related themes. Authors he cites include Immanuel Wallerstein, Anthony Smith, Ronald Suny, and Roman Szporluk. This is a book that connects Russian scholarship with trends in North American and European scholarship.[1] At the same time, this book also relates to post-Soviet reflections about what constitutes the Russian nation. The last sentence of Miller's monograph is: "The history we have narrated, of the project of a large Russian nation and its failure, is over, but echoes of these ideas and topics, in new conditions and in new forms, can be clearly discerned even today" (239).

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[1] For a summary of the methodological premises underlying his work, see Alexei Miller, "Shaping Russian and Ukrainian Identities in the Russian Empire during the Nineteenth Century: Some Methodological Remarks." *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 49: 2 (2001), 257–63.

Kruhlashov's book is even more firmly rooted in the present-day concerns of his environment.[2] Kruhlashov cites Western authors, but only those who wrote directly on Drahomanov.[3] He does not refer explicitly to the modern literature on nationalism, although it is clear from the way he presents certain points that he is familiar with it. His framework is the set of concerns of intellectuals in post-Soviet, independent Ukraine.

Miller's *Ukrainskii vopros* is partly a book about the nationalization of the mind of Russian civil servants. He quite rightly notes that European dynasties in general only slowly and usually reluctantly accommodated themselves to nationalisms that came from below, and the Romanovs in particular took the whole 19th century to nationalize. The "official nationalism" that emanated from the top had connections with Russian nationalism as a social movement, but they were distinct phenomena, sometimes reinforcing each other, sometimes conflicting (11–12). The confusion that existed at the highest levels was reflected in local Russian officialdom as well. Some civil servants thought in national terms, while others did not. There's a good illustration of this point in Miller's book. The minister of internal affairs, Petr Aleksandrovich Valuev, issued a circular in 1863 (text in Miller, 240–41) that placed some restrictions on the publication of works in the Little Russian language.[4] The minister of education, Aleksandr Vasil′evich Golovnin, tried to have the circular repealed, arguing, among other things, that russificatory measures taken with relation to the Finns in the 1840s had produced negative consequences. For Valuev, the very act of comparison between the Finns and the Little Russians showed how little Golovnin understood about the state's interests. For Valuev the issue was who was to be included in the Russian nation and who was not; for Golovnin this was not an issue that registered (116–17).

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[2] Kruhlashov publishes on current Ukrainian affairs, especially Ukraine's place in international relations. See, for example, Anatolii Kruhlashov, "Intehratsiini oriientyry Ukrainy: Deklaratsii ta realii," in *Ievropa: Idei ta protsesy. Materialy naukovoho sympoziumu 4–5 chervnia 1998 r.*, ed. Iu. I. Makar et al. (Chernivtsi: Vydavnytstvo "Prut," 1998), 8–23; Anatolii Kruhlashov, "Spokusy ta nebezpeky rehionalizatsii," in *Rehiony Skhidnoi Ievropy: Intehratsiini ochikuvannia ta konfrontatsiini nebezpeky. Materialy Mizhnarodnoi naukovoi konferentsii, Chernivtsi, 18–19 veresnia 2000 r.*, ed. Iu. I. Makar et al. (Chernivtsi: Bukrek, 2000), 14–23.

[3] The most important Western publication on Drahomanov remains Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Mykhailo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings* (New York: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1952).

[4] An English translation of the Valuev circular can be found in Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 369–70.

The second half of the 19th century was the time of transition. When the authorities repressed the Cyrillo-Methodian Brotherhood in the 1840s, they still thought that they were dealing with last vestiges of "Little Russian particularism," not with the beginnings of modern Ukrainian nationalism (58).[5] This misunderstanding would become less common by the 1860s. The catalyst that accelerated the process of mental change was the Polish agitation and then insurrection of 1861–64: the government was learning to respond in national terms. Public opinion was quicker to understand things nationally than officialdom was. The publicist Mikhail Nikiforivich Katkov was an important intermediary in this regard. He readily cooperated with those Russian officials who were interested in exposing the dangerous potential of Ukrainophilism. In 1863, while Russia was at war with Polish insurgents, Katkov publicly implied that the effort to create a separate Little Russian literary language was much more dangerous than even the Polish rebellion (108). As Miller puts it, "in 1862–63 the conflict [with the Ukrainophiles] was for the first time conceptualized in national categories, not within the narrow circle of the members of the Cyrillo-Methodian society and high Petersburg bureaucrats, but within a wide spectrum of public opinion" (111).

As Miller sees it, the Valuev circular of 1863 did not do too much damage to the Ukrainophile movement. Publishing was slowed down, to be sure. In the seven years following the circular, as many books appeared in Ukrainian as had appeared in 1862 alone. The years 1865–66 were particularly bad, with no Ukrainian books at all published in the empire (137). A few activists were also exiled from Ukraine at this time (130). Yet some of the most prominent Ukrainophiles, namely Panteleimon Kulish and Vasyl′ Bilozers′kyi, were working for the government in this same period, restoring order in Poland after the suppression of the insurrection; others, such as Mykola Kostomarov and Drahomanov, were also invited into government service in Warsaw at this time, but were uninterested.

The Ukrainophiles became very active again in the 1870s. Key moments were a lively discussion in the St. Petersburg and provincial press, initiated by Drahomanov in *Vestnik Evropy* in 1872, about whether the restrictions on Ukrainian publishing should be lifted; also the formation of a branch of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society in Kyiv in 1873, which quickly became a

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[5] This first political manifestation of Ukrainophilism attracted attention among Ukrainian scholars in both the homeland and the diaspora in the early 1990s. In late-Soviet Ukraine a substantial collection of sources on the Brotherhood was published: P. S. Sokhan′ et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs′ke tovarystvo*, 3 vols. (Kyiv: Naukova dumka, 1990). In Canada a survey with a selection of translated sources appeared: George S. N. Luckyj, *Young Ukraine: The Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius in Kiev, 1845–1847* (Ottawa and Paris: University of Ottawa Press, 1991).

hotbed of Ukrainophilism; and in 1875 the Ukrainophiles, and Drahomanov in particular, gained control of a daily newspaper, *Kievskii telegraf*. The opponents of the Ukrainophiles, who included some officials, journalists associated with Katkov and some influential Little Russians, reacted forcefully to this revitalization of Ukrainianism. The campaign against the Ukrainophiles was conducted with particular vehemence in the summer of 1874 against the background of mass arrests of participants in the "movement to the people." The Ukrainophiles were also tarred with the revolutionary populist brush, one opponent even claiming that their agitation would result in a Cossack-style popular insurrection (175). The response of the government was harsher and more effective than it had been in 1863. Drahomanov was fired from his post at Kyiv University and driven into emigration. The Ems *ukaz* of 1876 (text in Miller, 242–44) placed more serious restrictions on publication in and other public usage of the Little Russian dialect.[6] Although this was not a total ban on Ukrainian-language publication, it was severe enough to drive much of Ukrainian publishing activities abroad, mainly to the Habsburg monarchy, where Ukrainians also lived, but also to Switzerland, where Drahomanov made his base in the late 1870s and 1880s.

These repressive measures were, in Miller's view and in the view of a number of contemporary Russian officials as well, counter-productive. Writing in 1881, Aleksandr Mikhailovich Dondukov-Korsakov, governor-general formerly of Kyiv and then of Kharkiv, argued that the Ems *ukaz* only increased the authority of the Ukrainophiles, who could easily use it to buttress their case that Ukrainian culture was persecuted in Russia: after all, the *ukaz* even banned theatrical performances and songs in Little Russian. Its prohibitions on publication only succeeded in making Lviv, Chernivtsi, and Vienna the centers of Ukrainian publishing, and this not without the support of the Austrian government (210). Placing his study in a wide comparative context, especially comparing Russia with England and France, Miller argues that a modernizing assimilationist program would have been much more effective than these half-hearted repressions in creating a large Russian nation that included the Ukrainians/Little Russians. In his view the expansion of the railway system, the introduction of universal conscription in 1874, migration processes and urbanization were much more effective instruments of Russification than the repressive legislation of 1863 and 1876 (187–96). If modernization had been more rapid, if the state had been more penetrative (233–34) and, particularly, if the educational system had been expanded, in the Russian language of course (150–51), things could have turned out very differently. It was not so much that the Ukrainian movement succeeded, Miller concludes, as that the Russian assimilatory efforts failed (235). Drahomanov himself lends support to this hypothesis. As Kruhlashov points out,

[6] Abbreviated English translation in Magocsi, *History of Ukraine*, 372–73.

Drahomanov sometimes worried that the democratization of Russia, which he championed, would not aid the Ukrainian movement, that instead "Muscovite people" might find it easier in the new circumstances to assimilate more Ukrainians; Ukrainian culture would survive, but as a "country cousin" (Kruhlashov, 395). Although Drahomanov expressed himself largely in political rather than sociological terms, it is clear that he was thinking along the same lines Miller is.

The past is always much more messy than the sorted-out narrative which we historians, especially national historians, like to present. It is one of the virtues of Miller's book that it messes things up again. In the Ukrainian national narrative, the Valuev circular and Ems *ukaz* are presented as the results of an uneven conflict between a Russian government bent on suppressing the Ukrainian language and other manifestations of Ukrainian distinctiveness and the Ukrainians, struggling to preserve their nationality against difficult odds. In Miller's account, lines are not so clearly drawn.

For one thing, he shows that government officials were deeply divided over how to handle the Ukrainian question. As general governor of Kyiv in the 1870s, Dondukov-Korsakov was the patron of the Kyiv branch of the geographical society and a firm opponent of the Ems *ukaz*. In the 1860s, as we have seen, Minister of Education Golovnin had also opposed restrictions on publishing in the Little Russian language, as did later the curator of the Kyiv school district P. A. Antonovich. Most of the officials who prepared the recommendations that resulted in the Ems *ukaz* tried to make it milder, and only the last-minute intervention of the man who actually presented the report to the tsar made the Ems *ukaz* as repressive as it was (Miller, 178–80). In 1880, when the general governor of Kyiv, M. I. Chertkov, wanted to present a memorandum on the Ukrainian question to a *revizor* from St. Petersburg, he had it drafted by one of his staff, Ivan Rudchenko, who happened to be a convinced Ukrainophile, the brother of the eminent Ukrainian writer Panas Myrnyi. Needless to say, the Chertkov-Rudchenko memorandum recommended lifting the restrictions the Ems *ukaz* placed on Little Russian (206–7). There was hardly a united front in the Russian government. This was not just a matter of officials who thought in national terms and others who did not. Dondukov-Korsakov, who favored a flexible, liberal policy towards the Ukrainophiles, was nonetheless a convinced advocate of the assimilation of the Little Russians (210).

That there were ethnic Ukrainians among the opponents of Ukrainophilism is not a revelation, but Miller's book makes clear just how important their role was. The restrictions imposed on the Ukrainian language in 1863 were presented by Russian officials as emanating from the wishes of the majority of Little Russians themselves. The Kyiv censor committee first formulated an argument that was soon to be incorporated verbatim into the Valuev circular: that the very idea

of using the Little Russian dialect in schools was something that made most Little Russians indignant and that the Little Russians themselves insist that "there was not, is not and cannot be a separate Little Russian language," that "their dialect, used by the common people, is the same Russian language, only corrupted by Poland's influence upon it" (109, 240–41). In the mid-1870s, the division between Ukrainophiles and their Little Russian opponents became very bitter. Deep personal animosities developed in the struggle for control over the geographical society, which both factions had entered at first. The anti-Ukrainophile forces gathered around the daily *Kievlianin*, which faced competition from the Ukrainophiles' *Kievskii telegraf*. The conflict was not only ideological, but financial: Kyiv could barely support two newspapers (161). *Kievlianin* attacked the Ukrainophiles intemperately, accusing them of separatist tendencies and hinting that they should be arrested (164–64). The Little Russian Nikolai Rigel′man took the anti-Ukrainophile polemics into the mainstream Russian press in 1875 with a long article entitled "Contemporary Ukrainophilism" in Katkov's *Russkii vestnik*. This was followed shortly thereafter by another exposé penned by Sil′vestr Sil′vestrovich Gogotskii (Hohots′kyi in transcription from Ukrainian).[7] It was these articles that attracted the attention of highly placed officials in St. Petersburg and set in motion the chain of events that led to the Ems *ukaz* (168–71). The main recommendations of the Ems *ukaz* were formulated by another anti-Ukrainophile Little Russian, Mikhail Vladimirovich Iuzefovich (174–75, 180).

One gets the impression from Miller's account that the Ukrainophiles constituted the more dynamic group within Kyivan educated society in the 1860s and early 1870s, but that their Little Russian opponents found stronger allies in Russian government circles. Hinted at, too, is that by the 1880s both groups of Little Russians were being left behind by a new generation that was more interested in populism than in national projects of any sort (220).

Both Miller and the historical actors he describes noted that the repressions in the Russian empire had the effect of transferring the focus of Ukrainian publishing and activism to Austria, and particularly to the crownland of Galicia, where about 3 million Ukrainians or, as they were then known, "Ruthenians" lived. This is a quite intriguing aspect of the development of the Ukrainian idea that Miller leaves out of his account here. Having worked fruitfully in the past

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[7] In 1859 Gogotskii had written to the author of a Ukrainian *bukvar′* expressing his concern that the primer seemed to imply some kind of Little Russian independence, when, in light of Polish intrigues, it was imperative to draw as closely as possible to the Great Russians. "Do not forget who are our enemies," he wrote: "the Poles and Rome!" (Miller, 73–74)

on Galician Ruthenian history,[8] he was well qualified to have pursued it. It is intriguing, because something seems to have happened to the Ukrainian idea while sojourning in Austria: it became more separatist, more exclusivist. The censor's office (*Glavnoe Upravlenie po delam pechati*), in a memorandum preparing the way for the Ems *ukaz*, had noted that the Ukrainophiles in Galicia speak about "a South Russian nation of 15 million as though it were something completely separate from the Great Russian tribe" (176). It does not seem that the Ukrainophiles in the Russian empire had quite the same conception of a complete separation.[9]

Take Drahomanov, for example. From the point of view of anti-Ukrainophile Russian officialdom and Little Russian publicists, there was perhaps no more audacious separatist than he (168–69, 181, 215). Yet in the early 1870s, precisely when he was the object of so many attacks from the anti-Ukrainophiles, Drahomanov held the view that Ukrainians should be bicultural, both all-Russian and Ukrainian. When he expressed that view in an article written for the Galician press, the editors sat on his manuscript for four years because they didn't approve of his conception of how Russian and Ukrainian culture interrelated (Miller, 158; see also Kruhlashov, 254). In this period, Kruhlashov characterizes him as "an all-Russian liberal with Little Russian peculiarities" who only later evolved into a fully Ukrainian activist (Kruhlashov, 293) But even in the later, more Ukrainian phase of his career, Drahomanov continued to write in the Russian language as well as Ukrainian and to become involved in all-Russian political projects. His Galician disciple Ivan Franko, who felt the need later in life to criticize his former mentor, accused Drahomanov of being always ready to subordinate Ukrainian interests to those of all-Russian democracy (Kruhlashov, 20). Integral nationalists in interwar Western Ukraine simply denounced Drahomanov as a Russophile (Kruhlashov, 41–44) There was something different about the way the Galicians understood Ukrainian nationality, as indeed something totally different from, exclusive of, Russian nationality, while Ukrainophilism in Russia was not so radically binary. The metamorphosis of

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[8] Alexey Miller, "Galicia after the Ausgleich: Polish-Ruthenian Conflict and the Attempts of Reconciliation," *Central European University History Department Yearbook* (1993), 135–43; A. I. Miller, "Ukrainskie krest′iane, pol′skie pomeshchiki, avstriiskii i russkii imperatory v Galitsii 1872 g.," in A. S. Stykalin, ed., *Tsentral′naia Evropa v novoe i noveishee vremia (Sbornik k 70-letiiu T. M. Islamova)* (Moscow: Rossiiskaia akademiia nauk, Institut slavianovedeniia, 1998), 175–80.

[9] On the issue of multiple loyalties and national exclusivism, see Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism* 16: 1–2 (1989), 45–62.

Ukrainianism in the Galician environment stands as an important topic[10] that as yet has not been researched at all.

As noted at the outset, Kruhlashov's book is quite different from Miller's even though it treats roughly the same period and concerns a person who has the most entries in Miller's index. This is because Kruhlashov's project is different. Miller was interested in exploding some comfortable topoi in the narrative of the Ukrainian question in Russia and also in rethinking the development of the Ukrainian national idea in terms of two competing projects: building a Ukrainian nation and building a large Russian nation that included the Ukrainians and Belarusians. But Miller's concerns are peripheral to what Kruhlashov aims to accomplish. At one level, Kruhlashov is doing very solid, traditional intellectual history. As he says in his introduction, not Drahomanov but his ideas are the heroes of this work (5). Throughout the book, readers familiar with Drahomanov will be impressed by the many hitherto unnoticed nuances of Drahomanov's thought Kruhlashov succeeds in bringing out. He calls his book "the drama of an intellectual," because he sees Drahomanov as engaged in a heroic struggle to put forward a vision of a new future while he runs into obstacle after obstacle: the inertia of social traditions, overwhelming political opposition, the fog of myth and custom, the force of an opposing state (11). Aside from this level, however, there is another, which frames the whole work and the kind of questions it pursues. What Kruhlashov is primarily engaged in is a major reassessment of Drahomanov from within the context of independent Ukraine. In particular, he is looking for a usable Drahomanov.

The book opens with a long (and valuable) account of the previous historiography on Drahomanov (16–101).[11] This sets the stage for the major corrective project that Kruhlashov undertakes. Although Kruhlashov differentiates his position from that of most of his predecessors, including Drahomanov's contemporaries and the greatest Western specialist on Drahomanov, Ivan L. Rudnytsky, he chiefly attempts to distance himself from Soviet historiography. The Soviet posi-

[10] See the interesting remarks on "Ukrainianhood" in Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), 331–36. Weiner deals with a confrontation between what might be considered the descendants of Galician and Russian-contexted Ukrainophilism, namely Ukrainian nationalism and Soviet Ukrainianhood.

[11] This is an excellent supplement to Elżbieta Hornowa, *Ocena działalności Michał a Dragomanowa w historiografii ukraińskiej, rosyjskiej i polskiej* (Opole: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna w Opolu, 1967).

tion on Drahomanov wavered a great deal,[12] but essentially between two poles. When out of favor, Drahomanov was depicted as a petty bourgeois nationalist who, in Lenin's immortal words, "expressed the views of a peasant … ignorant and sluggish … attached to his dung heap," a man "who richly deserved the fervent kisses" he received from the national-liberal Petr Struve.[13] In moments of greater tolerance, Soviet Ukrainian historians could write about Drahomanov in a more positive way, but then they had to remake him in a way that was useful for Soviet Ukrainian nationhood. This Drahomanov was a socialist, a firm opponent of Ukrainian nationalism, and a proponent of Russian-Ukrainian friendship. Aside from the fact that both of these Soviet constructions of Drahomanov are, to say the least, exceedingly tendentious, neither fits with the new post-Soviet Ukrainian nationhood that is still in the process of definition. Kruhlashov is painting a much more realistic portrait of Drahomanov, but one which can hang in the newly remodeled national pantheon.

Thus in the excellent section on Drahomanov's views on religion (180–212), Kruhlashov makes a point of demonstrating that Drahomanov was not a militant atheist. In his conclusions he calls Drahomanov one of the first Ukrainian or Russian social-political thinkers ever to promote the ideal of a civil society (458).

A major question for Kruhlashov, naturally, is: to what extent was Drahomanov a socialist? He shows that Drahomanov had little interest in or understanding of economic questions. They usually played an auxiliary role in his theories, in which social and political themes were much more prominent (102, 107). The point is that Drahomanov's socialism, such as it was, was not firmly grounded in economic theory. Drahomanov was indeed a self-proclaimed socialist (or *hromadivets′* to use the peculiar Ukrainian political terminology he invented), but Kruhlashov makes a convincing case that socialism should be understood as a phase in Drahomanov's development. Drahomanov was at his most socialist in the 1870s and early 1880s (130). With time, however, he used the word socialism with less and less frequency, instead employing euphemisms like social struggle, social progress, and social question. This linguistic distancing, Kruhlashov proposes, was linked to Drahomanov's distancing himself from the doctrine. He did not reject socialism outright, but as a goal he saw it receding into the distance (135). Towards the end of his life Drahomanov did not con-

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[12] See: Zh. P. Kh[ymka], "Drahomanivs′ka spadshchyna s′ohodni," *Suchasnist′*, no. 6 (1974), 83–90; Roman Solchanyk, "*Literaturna Ukraina* on M. P. Drahomanov: The First Step Towards Rehabilitation?" *Radio Liberty Research*, 27 October 1981 (RL 425/81); Roman Solchanyk, "Ukrainian Writer Calls for More Clarity on 'Controversial' Historical Figure," *Radio Liberty Research*, 16 July 1986 (RL 278/86).

[13] V. I. Lenin, "The Right of Nations to Self-Determination," in *Lenin: Selected Works in Three Volumes* (New York: International Publishers, 1967), 1: 634.

sider the socialist ideal to be on the agenda for either his generation or for the generation of his disciples. In light of this, Kruhlashov asks, can Drahomanov be blamed (or congratulated) for inspiring the socialist movement in Ukraine at the end of the 19th and early 20th century? (138).

Kruhlashov devotes a special brief section to Drahomanov's attitude towards Marxism (139–41), an easy topic, since Drahomanov had little use for it. As to revolution, Drahomanov favored it in the 1870s, particularly after his exile from Russia, but overall his thought was dominated by evolutionary solutions. Like many men of his time, Drahomanov considered Darwin's evolutionary theories to be the most important scientific discoveries of the 19th century, and he felt they also applied to progress in human society. He distrusted quick, all-encompassing solutions to the major problems of the state and society (148–80). In his political theory and practice, ethics played an unusually large role. In particular, he opposed the idea that the ends justify the means. A good cause demands cleans hands, he used to say. In Kruhlashov's opinion, the history of the 20th century has proven Drahomanov right on this score (352).

After extricating Drahomanov from the historical stream that led to Bolshevism, Kruhlashov turns his attention to the problem of Ukrainian nationalism. Drahomanov was definitely one of the people in late 19th-century Russia who thought in national terms. He believed in the reality of nations. To him they were not artificial constructions or creations of the imagination. They were historical actors, subjects in the creation of human history (223). He had a generally positive attitude to the awakening of nationalities, which he considered part of humanity's evolution towards liberty and enlightenment (233). He recognized that nationalists could be stupid and aggressive, but nonetheless, he reasoned, "with regard to the main problem, political liberty, every nationalist is a liberal" (Kruhlashov wryly notes that this was an optimistic assessment) (243). Kruhlashov in the main approves of Drahomanov's liberal nationalism. He does, though, question a statement Drahomanov made about the superiority of "cosmopolitanism" to "nationalism" (253). He deals at some length with Drahomanov's interest in the Slavic Idea (256–91), which Kruhlashov defends as an indispensable and fruitful phase in the formation of the Ukrainian national ideology (257). Even when Drahomanov was most enthusiastic about Slavic mutuality, Kruhlashov says, Drahomanov thought as a Ukrainian, not as a Russian (274), and with time and experience he moved away from the Slavic Idea to focus more on the Ukrainian Idea in particular (288–90). Kruhlashov also defends Drahomanov against the charge of "Little Russian ambivalence" (*rozdvoienist'*), i.e., that he did not sufficiently differentiate himself as a Ukrainian from the Russians. Quite the contrary, says Kruhlashov: in his essays on Russian topics, Drahomanov more than once emphasized that he was not a Russian, but a

Ukrainian (344–45). (On the very next page, however, in a totally different connection, Kruhlashov quotes Drahomanov referring in 1879 to "Rus′ people, Muscovite as well as Ukrainian" [*rus′kykh liudei, moskovs′kykh, iak i ukrains′kykh*].)

Kruhlashov has more work to do when it comes to explaining Drahomanov's record on the issue of Ukrainian independent statehood. Kruhlashov puts it delicately: "Indeed, he was not among those whom without qualification we can name as a prophet of Ukrainian independent statehood in as much as Drahomanov defended the idea of the federative statehood of Ukraine" (434). Kruhlashov devotes special sections of his monograph to Drahomanov's federalism (413–34) and to answering the question: Why did Drahomanov not become an ideologue of Ukrainian independence? (434–50). Of course, these are issues of considerable importance in a country that has been independent for only ten years. Does Drahomanov belong among the intellectual progenitors or not?

In the interwar era integral nationalists accused Drahomanov of imbuing the Ukrainian movement with federalist ideas, which resulted in a lack of clarity at a critical moment, i.e., during the revolution of 1917–20, and thus prevented the achievement of statehood. Kruhlashov rejects this exaggerated view outright. He makes the good point that Baltic and Czech national leaders were also federalists, but ended up with independent states after World War I (463–64). He also reminds us that Drahomanov was the first political thinker to define the ethnic borders of Ukraine (436); he was one of the first concrete imaginers of Ukraine, its mental cartographer. In the main, however, Kruhlashov takes another fruitful tack in explaining Drahomanov's preference for federalism over independent statehood. He shows the logic of the situation that led to the dominance of federalist thinking throughout the Ukrainian movement in the late 19th and early 20th century. As Drahomanov himself saw it, there were only two alternatives for the satisfaction of Ukrainian national demands: either dismantling the Russian and Austrian states enough to pry Ukraine away from them, or else working towards the federalization of these states. He considered the latter to be by far the more realistic alternative. The two states Ukraine would have to be wrested from were powerful empires. The Ukrainian movement was ideologically and organizationally weak, especially in Russia. As the evidence of the folk songs Drahomanov collected indicated, the Ukrainian popular masses longed for a vague freedom, but expressed no desire to establish their own state. Starting a separatist movement prematurely would simply result in the brutal suppression of the Ukrainian movement, crippling it for a long time to come. Moreover, as Ivan L. Rudnytskty pointed out, the last quarter of the 19th century was a time of peace and stability in Europe, not a favorable time for a separatist project.

Kruhlashov concludes that it is senseless to demand from a 19th-century thinker solutions appropriate to 20th-century situations (438–49).

In Kruhlashov's analysis, however, Drahomanov did have an exaggerated attachment to federalism. His ultimate ideal for all of humanity was a universal federation, although as he got older he wrote less and less about such distant goals and concentrated on more pragmatic politics (383–84). In his concluding assessment of Drahomanov, Kruhlashov says that in spite of his immense contributions to the Ukrainian movement and in spite of mitigating factors, his national politics were flawed by his dogmatic absolutization of federalism (462).

What results from Kruhlashov's efforts to find both the real Drahomanov and the Drahomanov suitable for independent Ukraine? Aside from the most reliable and most detailed account of Drahomanov's political thinking, we get a much more complex Drahomanov than had existed in the literature previously. A particularly successful aspect of Kruhlashov's investigation is his continual probing for changes in Drahomanov's views over time. More than any previous student of Drahomanov's thought, Kruhlashov is attuned to its evolution. In the conclusion to his monograph he brings together the insights on this topic scattered throughout the book. Drahomanov started out, he says, as a Little Russian patriot with Russian liberal and democratic ideas. In the 1860s and first half of 1870s, however, his views underwent both social and national radicalization. In his first years in emigration, i.e., in the second half of the 1870s, this radicalism went even further as Drahomanov experimented with anarcho-federalism and a more radical socialism. As of the 1880s Drahomanov's politics grew more temperate; he developed a synthesis of European liberalism and social democracy applied to specifically Ukrainian conditions. From the late 1880s on he worked up his own more original program, based on a liberal, democratic nationalism and supplemented with elements from European radicalism (466).

Both books move forward our understanding of the history of the Ukrainian idea in the late 19th century. They also open some new questions and suggest directions for the historiography. Miller's views are revisionist with regard to Ukrainian historiography, and they should provoke some rethinking or reaction from that quarter. Also, to return to a point already made, Miller's review of the history of the Ukrainian idea in Russia begs for a complementary study of the evolution of that idea in Austria. There exist numerous excellent works on the Ruthenian/Ukrainian national movement in Galicia,[14] but what is needed is a

[14] Recent studies of particular interest include: Ostap Sereda, "'Whom Shall We Be?' Public Debates Over the National Identity of Galician Ruthenians in the 1860s," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* 49: 2 (2001), 200–12; Oleh Turii, "Konfesiino-obriadovyi chynnyk u natsional′nii

study of how that idea itself changed when it moved outside the Russian environment. Kruhlashov's book on Drahomanov has succeeded in clarifying the content and evolution of his political thought. One would now like to see an equally successful biography of this interesting and influential figure. Kruhlashov has strewn through his monograph many insights into Drahomanov's personality and activities, but it awakens an appetite for something more substantial. Such a biography should include an exploration of Drahomanov's Ukrainianness in relation to his Russianness as an indication of the assumptions and content of Ukrainophilism in the mid-19th century.

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