

20. The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine

On the eve of World War II the bulk of what is today Ukraine constituted the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. This was a polity with little control over its own affairs, especially after the intensification of centralization under Stalin. Although the Bolsheviks promoted Ukrainian language and culture in the republic in the 1920s, the 1930s saw a retreat from Ukrainization and the arrest, exile, and execution of Ukrainian writers, artists, and other cultural workers. In the course of collectivization, extraordinarily large grain requisitions were imposed on the Ukrainian republic. When the local officials responsible for collecting the grain saw that famine was breaking out, they hoped that the requisitions could be lowered. Stalin interpreted their reluctance to collect all the grain as nationalist resistance; he massively purged the Ukrainian party and ordered the ruthless expropriation of food from villages to meet the assigned quotas. The result was a famine that killed about three-and-a-half million citizens of the Ukrainian republic in 1932–33. Although famine raged in all the grain-growing regions of the Soviet Union, excess mortality was the most intensive in Ukraine and in the Ukrainian-inhabited regions of the Kuban (in the Russian republic). Since 1988 Ukrainians have referred to this famine as the Holodomor, and it occupies an important place in Ukrainian historical narratives. A major paroxysm of political murder also occurred in 1937 as part of the Great Terror that affected the entire Soviet Union.¹

In the prewar and war era, the Crimea was not part of Ukraine, as it is today, but part of Russia. Other parts of today's Ukraine were accumulated in the course of World War II. Poland had a large ter-

ritory that would later be annexed by the Soviet Union, namely the regions of Galicia (or Eastern Galicia) and Volhynia. The Ukrainians of Galicia had fought a bitter war with the Poles in the aftermath of World War I to keep Galicia out of Poland. In the interwar period the Polish authorities did little to mollify the Ukrainian population and much to antagonize it. Polish policies fed an ever more radical nationalism, which took institutional form in 1929 as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). The OUN engaged in acts of terrorism against Polish officials as well as against Ukrainians who sought to compromise with the Polish government. It also fell increasingly under the influence of the Central European radical right, particularly Italian fascism and German national socialism. The OUN split in 1940 between a wing led by Stepan Bandera (younger, strong in Galicia) and a wing led by Andrii Melnyk (older, strong in emigration and in Bukovina). After Germany had basically defeated Poland, the Red Army invaded Galicia and Volhynia (17 September 1939), and these territories were incorporated into the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. They remained under Soviet rule until the German invasion of the USSR in the summer of 1941. The Soviets reconquered them in the summer of 1944. The reimposition of Soviet rule was difficult, since the Soviets faced armed resistance from the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (known by its Ukrainian acronym UPA); the insurgency was not defeated until 1950. Smaller Ukrainian territories that were not part of Ukraine before the war were Transcarpathia and northern Bukovina. Transcarpathia was incorporated into Czechoslovakia after World War I, but it fell to Hungary after the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. After the Red Army conquered Hungary, it retained Transcarpathia. Northern Bukovina had been part of Romania until Stalin demanded it from King Carol in June 1940. Romania reconquered it in the aftermath of the German attack on the Soviet Union, and the Soviets took it back in 1944.

The territorial situation was no less complicated during the war itself. Hungary held Transcarpathia, and Romania held northern Bukovina. Romania also occupied a large strip of territory north of Odessa that it called Transnistria (not to be confused with the breakaway Slavic republic in present-day Moldova). The Germans occupied the rest of Ukraine but in different administrative-territorial arrange-

ments. In August 1941 Galicia was incorporated as the Distrikt Galizien into the General Gouvernement (the rump of the former Poland). Volhynia and most of pre-1939 Soviet Ukraine were incorporated into the Reichskommissariat Ukraine.² Crimea and the easternmost parts of Ukraine, including Kharkiv, were never incorporated into the Reichskommissariat but remained directly under military administration. Dispersed among different administrations, Ukrainians did not have a common experience of the war. In independent, postcommunist Ukraine the population remains divided regionally over the politics of memory with regard to the Second World War. There is even a division of nomenclature. Some Ukrainians refer to “World War II,” which started in 1939 with the German invasion of Poland, and others to the “Great Patriotic War,” which started in 1941 with the German invasion of the Soviet Union.

The total population of Ukraine’s present territory on the eve of the war is estimated at 41.2 million.³ The great majority of that population was of Ukrainian ethnicity, but there were also significant populations of Russians, Poles, Jews, and other nationalities. The Jews were more thickly settled in the west of Ukraine, where they made up about 10 percent of the population, than in the east. Many western Ukrainian towns had a Jewish population accounting for a third to a half of the population. In the west there were Jews also living in villages. There were probably about 2.5 million people whom the invading Germans would have deemed Jews. Under a million were evacuated east when the Germans attacked. About 1.5 million Jews were murdered in the Holocaust.⁴

Most of the Jews who perished in Ukraine were shot and buried in ravines and mass graves. The shooters were primarily Einsatzgruppen C and D, Romanian troops, and German and Ukrainian police. Little effort was made to keep the shootings secret, and many non-Jews voluntarily or involuntarily witnessed the executions or the fresh mass graves. In western Ukraine Jews were also deported to death camps in Auschwitz, Bełżec, and elsewhere.

Of particular importance for understanding the reception of the Holocaust in postcommunist Ukraine is an account of how the non-Jewish population of Ukraine, and especially the ethnic Ukrainians, related to the Jews during the Catastrophe. It has become the prac-

tice in Holocaust studies to organize our knowledge using the categories victim, perpetrator, and bystander as well as collaboration, rescue, and resistance. The more scholars explore the details of how the Holocaust transpired in Eastern Europe, the more they realize how fluid these categories are, or rather, they realize the inadequacy of imposing such order on a complicated, dynamic past. For example, a Red Army soldier, maltreated and malnourished in a German POW camp, watching his comrades succumb one by one, could be offered a chance to live if he entered German service as a guard at a labor, concentration, or death camp. In this capacity the erstwhile victim could transform into a heinous perpetrator. But there were also the rare cases in which such a person might later become a rescuer, selling arms to the Jewish resistance and escaping together with Jews whose flight he facilitated.⁵ During the pogrom in Boryslav in July 1941, Ukrainian police massacred many, many Jews, but there are a few survivors of that pogrom who owe their lives precisely to rescue by Ukrainian policemen.⁶ Rescuers could change, too. They might begin by hiding Jews, but overcome by fear of the consequences, they could denounce them to the police, or overcome by greed for the Jews’ property, they might kill them themselves.

Jewish survivors, on the whole, remember the ethnic Ukrainians as hostile. Many have retained strong anti-Ukrainian feelings as a result of their wartime experiences, even in cases where they were actually rescued by Ukrainians.⁷ Perhaps to some extent this reflects a Jewish stereotype of brutal Ukrainian peasants, but it is more likely a response to the deep sense of betrayal felt by Jews who understood that too many of their Ukrainian neighbors were ready to acquiesce in or participate in their murder. Dieter Pohl, a scholar who knows a great deal about the Holocaust in Ukraine, estimates that roughly thirty thousand to forty thousand Ukrainians took part in the murder of Jews.⁸ There were also those—and they were many—who never killed directly but in one way or another contributed to the process. Many ethnic Ukrainians benefited from the destruction of the Jews.

The first wave of killing in which ethnic Ukrainians participated was the pogroms of the summer of 1941 in the immediate wake of the Germans’ attack on the USSR. Throughout the cities and towns of western Ukraine (and also western Belarus and the Baltic states), mobs

plundered, humiliated, beat, and killed Jews. The gentile town population in western Ukraine was mixed Polish and Ukrainian, and both nationalities took part in the violence. The Ukrainians, however, were more prominent. The militias and Sich organizations of the Bandera wing of the OUN spearheaded these pogroms, but others took part, including professional criminals and thrill seekers. An angry mood prevailed in the cities because of a shocking Soviet crime that had just been discovered. Unable to evacuate all the prisoners in Lviv, Zolochiv, and elsewhere, the NKVD killed the political prisoners lest they help the Germans. Thousands of bodies were found in the basements of NKVD prisons and elsewhere throughout western Ukraine. Germans and Ukrainian militiamen rounded up Jews and made them lay the decomposing bodies out in rows for all to see, and to smell. The gentile population was paraded through these grisly sites on the pretext that they might recognize their relatives. This was the context in which violence against the Jews was incited. Some who did recognize their loved ones among the dead turned their anger against the Jews employed in the exhumation. In these urban pogroms hundreds or thousands of Jews were murdered. This was killing at close range, often fueled, furthermore, by alcohol.

Victims of Soviet terror were rarely uncovered in villages, but pogroms occurred there as well. Although most were not as spectacularly violent as the one in Jedwabne, they were still often deadly. Here too, armed units of the banderite OUN sometimes organized the murder. Others, however, also killed Jews and took their quilts, their jewelry, their provisions, loading up for the lean years that they knew war would bring. The pogromists moved into the dead Jews' houses. At least dozens, but perhaps several hundred, of such incidents occurred. Many Jews from villages fled to nearby cities for protection (and vice versa). Those who remained in the countryside after the initial violence were soon systematically rounded up by the Germans and Ukrainian police and put into ghettos, eventually to be shot or deported to death camps. After these *Aktionen*, the homes of the Jews were plundered and the buildings divided up among the population. The disappearance of the Jews from the villages represented a long-standing goal of the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia.⁹

Young men with guns formed a threat to the Jewish population

in Ukraine during the Holocaust. The OUN organized militias in many localities and also infiltrated the Ukrainian auxiliary police and *Schutzmannschaften* set up by the Germans.¹⁰ From the OUN's perspective, the police force represented an opportunity for Ukrainians to acquire arms and training. Of course, there were many who joined the police for nonideological reasons, but they could well become indoctrinated during the course of their service. There was no lack of volunteers for the police force, and Dieter Pohl estimates that a hundred thousand Ukrainians served in the auxiliary police or fire brigades.¹¹ The Ukrainian police were routinely used to round up Jews and sometimes to shoot Jews. There was considerable fluidity between the police and militias on the one hand, and armed Ukrainian nationalist units on the other. For example, the nationalist legions in German service, Roland and Nachtigall, were dissolved at the end of 1941 and incorporated into the Schutzmannschaft battalion 201, which was engaged in antipartisan activities in Belarus. Roman Shukhevych, formerly the highest-ranking Ukrainian officer in Nachtigall, also remained an officer in the battalion. In spring 1943 he became the commander of OUN's military forces; in fall 1943 he became supreme commander of UPA. The military backbone of UPA at the time of its formation in spring 1943 was composed of thousands of Ukrainian policemen who had just deserted the Germans. In 1942 they had collaborated in the extermination of the Jews of Volhynia. This experience proved useful training for the UPA's ethnic cleansing project directed against the Poles of Volhynia.¹² An officer in Roland, Yevhen Pobihushchy, also later served as an officer both in battalion 201 in Belarus and in the Waffen-SS Division Galizien set up by the Germans in the spring of 1943. The participation of various Ukrainian nationalist units in the murder of the Jews remains a controversial topic because of so much contradictory evidence and the interference of several different political agendas. UPA killed Jews routinely while murdering Poles in Volhynia and Galicia, and in the winter of 1943–44 it systematically hunted and killed survivors in Volhynia, then did the same in Galicia in 1944–45. Although a Ukrainian SS unit might seem to have been deeply implicated in the Holocaust, in fact the Galizien division as such played only a very marginal role. (Many former policemen, however, joined the division.) Occasionally members of

the division were used in smaller anti-Jewish actions, and they probably also liquidated Jewish partisans.¹³

In addition to men with guns, there were dangerous men with pens. The Germans launched a tremendous propaganda effort to create an atmosphere in which the murder of Jews was condoned. They recruited many representatives of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to depict Jews as responsible for Bolshevik crimes, as exploiters of the Ukrainian people, as corrupters of morals and conspirators, as a vicious enemy that had to be destroyed. Many of these anti-Semitic propagandists were men and women who achieved prominence both in prewar Ukrainian life and in the Ukrainian diaspora after the war. Not everyone who was approached to engage in such propaganda agreed to do so, but enough did that they succeeded in poisoning the moral atmosphere in the Ukrainian public sphere.¹⁴

Bearing all this in mind, it is also important to realize that there were Ukrainians who resisted the murder of the Jews and rescued them.¹⁵ The penalty for doing so was death, and sometimes entire families were executed. Rescue was difficult as well as dangerous. In most cases, rescue had to be kept secret from neighbors in a village or in an apartment house, and secrecy was not easy to maintain. Some ethnic Ukrainians rescued Jews out of Christian charity. The most famous instance was the rescue of dozens of Jews, mainly children, by the head of the Greek Catholic church, Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, and his brother, Father Klymentii.¹⁶ Some saved Jews out of friendship, out of love, out of gut-level compassion. They were not able to save many.

Anti-Semitism did not abate immediately after the war. Although we know of no incident as deadly as the Kielce pogrom, the kind of diffused antagonism to surviving Jews that Jan Gross has described for Poland also existed in Ukraine. In particular, there was a pogrom-like atmosphere in Kyiv in 1944 as evacuated Jews returned to claim their apartments, pogroms broke out in Dnipropetrovsk in summer 1944 and in Kyiv in September 1945, and the NKVD investigated rumors in Lviv in June 1945 that Jews were committing ritual murders of children in their synagogue.¹⁷ The situation of Jews was particularly complicated in western Ukraine, where the UPA insurgency raged for years after the reinstallation of the Soviet regime.

During the war, the Soviet media did sometimes take note of the particular fate of the Jews.¹⁸ But during the next four decades of communist rule in Ukraine, discussion of the Holocaust was largely stifled, even though there was a great deal that called for public reflection. The Soviets were unwilling to single out the Jewish Holocaust from the general sufferings of the Soviet citizenry. They were also unwilling to publicize to what extent the Soviet population had been enticed into collaboration with the German occupiers. There were few local Jews left, especially in western Ukraine, to insist on an airing of their grievances. Expressions of particular concern with the fate of the Jews during the war could be interpreted as Zionism and could entail unpleasant consequences. Many postwar communist officials came from the masses and shared their anti-Jewish prejudices. Ethnic Russians and Ukrainians occupied the urban spaces and professions that had once been filled by Jews. They were not eager to raise the issue of the Holocaust, which, along with the murder and resettlement of the Poles, resulted in their social advancement. Thus the Holocaust was largely dissolved into the general memory of war, insurgency, counterinsurgency, and their accompanying atrocities.

An exception to a general policy of silence was efforts by the Soviets to discredit Ukrainian nationalists in the overseas diaspora. Many of the Ukrainians who came to North America and Australia after World War II had been associated with the nationalist camp and/or had collaborated with the Germans in some capacity. Soviet propagandists and their Ukrainian allies in the communist movements in North America unleashed a campaign against war criminals living in the United States and Canada. Particularly active were the Ukrainian American Mike Hanusiak, under whose name the pamphlet *Lest We Forget* (1973 and subsequent editions) was published, and a Ukrainian publicist who wrote under the name of Valerii Styrikul, author of a number of works in the 1980s with titles like *We Accuse*, *Lackeys*, and *The ss Werewolves*. These works appeared in English and were intended for foreign consumption. The Soviets sent materials to communists of Ukrainian origin in North America to aid them in the campaign to publicize nationalist crimes during World War II.¹⁹ The Soviets also circulated a list of persons whom they identified as

Ukrainian war criminals living in the United States and Canada. This information was also picked up by noncommunist Nazi hunters and contributed to the series of hearings and trials conducted with reference to Ukrainians who were suspected of having covered up a criminal past in German service. This publicity campaign was directed almost exclusively to an audience outside the Soviet Union. At the same time it was being conducted, the emphasis within the Soviet Union was on anti-Zionism.

Within Ukraine the lid on the Holocaust began to be lifted with the Gorbachev reforms, which began to have an impact on Ukraine in the aftermath of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster of April 1986. By 1989 a national democratic revolution of sorts was underway in the country. Although many feared ethnic violence in Ukraine, none occurred. After the failed antidemocratic coup of August 1991, Ukraine declared independence from the Soviet Union (24 August) and then confirmed this decision by a large margin in a referendum (1 December). A free or relatively free press allowed public discussion of the country's past. Over the following years, the Holocaust began to emerge from obscurity, but its enormity has yet to be appreciated in Ukrainian society. There are many inhibitions about full disclosure. Among them is a strong tendency, mainly in the west and center of the country, to condemn Soviet crimes more roundly than Nazi crimes and to lionize the wartime and postwar Ukrainian nationalists. The narratives of the famine of 1932–33 and the massive repressions in western Ukraine under Soviet rule compete with the narrative of the Holocaust and sometimes are used to justify the wartime nationalists' animosity toward Jews. Moreover, it is difficult to adulate OUN and UPA and simultaneously take a close, honest, and empathetic look at the Holocaust in Ukraine.

Public Debates about the Holocaust since 1989

Although the debates over the Holocaust have been nowhere near as frequent or as intense as in neighboring Poland, some of the same patterns that have been noticeable there can also be discerned in Ukraine. In particular, there is a polarity that might be termed traditionalism versus renewal.

This division affects not only the historiography of the Holocaust

in Ukraine but also the historiography of modern Ukraine more generally. Heorhii Kasianov has described the situation well:

A line of interaction, interesting in form and not so interesting in content, is being constructed between two approaches to Ukrainian history. One approach postulates that one can produce Ukrainian history outside of ideological constructions and outside the standard patriotic rhetoric of "national" historiography. The other demands strict adherence to its canons, especially in cases when that which is "sacred" is concerned. One strives to speak the language of scholarship, the other—the language of ideological standards. On the one side we see a stance toward history as the struggle of texts, discourses, and versions; and on the other side we see history understood as a means to educate and to achieve an ultimate truth. Both approaches exist and co-exist quite peacefully in open, pluralist systems, or else they come into conflict in closed or transitional systems.²⁰

Kasianov does not label this observed difference as a split between traditionalists and their opponents. Indeed the split is more complex than any shorthand can comprehensively grasp. One might also refer to it as a split between nationalists and liberals or between nativists and cosmopolitans. The traditionalists usually do not know Western languages and know little of Western scholarship. They rely on Ukrainian-language sources and on methodologies that might be characterized as nationalist and post-Soviet. The antitraditionalists cite English- and German-language literature and have considerable experience at universities abroad; some of the antitraditionalists have emigrated to North America or were even born there. Here I will concentrate on the dichotomy between the innocent, sacred nation of the traditionalists and the complicated, disturbing narrative of their opponents.

The traditionalists imagine an immaculate, or almost immaculate, nation, free of sin, or at least freer from sin than its aggressive neighbors. An interesting example of the traditionalist declaration of innocence is the memoirs of the late Yevhen Nakonechny. Nakonechny wrote a memoir of the Holocaust in Lviv specifically intended to counter claims by Polish and Jewish "Ukrainophobes" that OUN in particular and Ukrainians more generally were complicit in the Holocaust.²¹ The work is remarkable for several reasons, but here the most

important point to underscore is that it genuinely mourned the murder of Lviv's Jews. Nakonechny had lived in a Jewish neighborhood, and it was his childhood friends and neighbors who perished in the Catastrophe. As far as I know, there is no other work in Ukrainian letters or historiography, traditionalist or antitraditionalist, that mourns the murdered Jews as this book does. I underscore this because of a key sentence in Jan Gross's *Fear*: "As long as Polish society was unable to mourn its Jewish neighbors' deaths, it had either to purge them or live in infamy."²² Hence Nakonechny's ability to mourn marked him as not just another traditionalist.

Yet at no point in his memoirs did he admit the possibility that OUN could have been involved in any way or at any time in the destruction of the Jews. Nor could he admit that OUN was in any way anti-Semitic. For example, he rejected the very possibility that OUN had been involved in the deadly pogroms of 1941. His argument was partly based on an OUN resolution from April 1941 that he cited:

The Jews in the USSR are the most dedicated bulwark of the reigning Bolshevik regime and the advance guard of Muscovite imperialism in Ukraine. The Muscovite-Bolshevik government exploits the anti-Jewish attitudes of the Ukrainian masses in order to deflect their attention from the genuine perpetrator of the evil and in order to direct them in the hour of upheaval into pogroms of the Jews. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists fights against the Jews as the bulwark of the Muscovite-Bolshevik regime, while simultaneously making the popular masses aware that Moscow is the main enemy.²³

Nakonechny saw nothing anti-Semitic in this resolution. As he wrote elsewhere in his memoirs, "Ukrainian political circles in Galicia constantly displayed an attitude toward the Jews of exceptional understanding. There was no Ukrainian political party that preached anti-Semitism, including OUN."²⁴ Instead, he read the resolution, with its rejection of anti-Jewish pogroms, as proof that OUN could not have been involved in the pogroms that took place several months later, after the outbreak of the Soviet-German war. This is exactly the same reading as one finds in another prominent exponent of the traditionalist trend, the historian Volodymyr Viatrovych.²⁵

Nakonechny wrote positively of the Ukrainian militia in Lviv,

organized by OUN and later dissolved by the Gestapo and replaced by the Ukrainian auxiliary police.²⁶ He did not consider that the militiamen might have been involved in the pogroms, although this is what Holocaust scholars generally think. Similarly, Viatrovych denied that any source indicates that the OUN militia took part in the Lviv pogrom.²⁷ There are eyewitness testimonies that describe perpetrators of the Lviv pogrom with the characteristic blue-and-yellow armbands of the nationalist militia. Neither Nakonechny nor Viatrovych considered this evidence. In his memoirs Nakonechny recounted that he actually witnessed pogromists plundering a Jewish home in Lviv. Although they wore blue-and-yellow armbands, they spoke broken Ukrainian with unmistakable Polish accents. In fact, he concluded, they were just Polish criminals using the pogrom as a pretext to rob houses. According to Nakonechny, these were the main perpetrators of the Lviv pogroms—Polish thugs, not Ukrainians, let alone members of OUN.²⁸

In general, in Nakonechny's account, Russians, Poles, and even Jews behaved badly during the war, but the Ukrainian nation remained unsullied. Other, neighboring nations have to live with a dark past, but not the Ukrainians.

The most important text championing renewal is an article that Sofia Grachova published in the liberal review *Krytyka* in 2005.²⁹ Grachova is a young Ukrainian historian who served as a research assistant for the American historian of the Holocaust, Omer Bartov; later she entered the doctoral program at Harvard University. She wrote her groundbreaking article in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in a mixture of hope and concern—hope that now previously taboo topics could be broached frankly, and concern lest xenophobic Ukrainian nationalism grow stronger. The main focus of her article was the anti-Jewish pogroms of June and July 1941, which she called "not only one of the blackest pages of Ukrainian history, but also one of its whitest spots." (Ukrainians, like Poles, use the term "white spot" to refer to historic episodes that have not yet been described.) Grachova did not hesitate to write about "the wide diffusion of anti-Semitic attitudes among the Ukrainian population of that time." She did not downplay Ukrainian and specifically OUN participation in the Zolochiv pogrom, in which hundreds of Jews perished: "In this [pogrom] it was

not just representatives of various subdivisions of the German army who ‘distinguished themselves,’ but also the local non-Jewish population (lacking firearms, they used pitchforks, axes, and ironclad clubs) and, especially, members of a detachment of the so-called ‘Ukrainian Self-Defence,’ which the local center of the OUN-Bandera organized.”

Grachova did not see anything to fear in this openness. “How can it harm our contemporaries to know about what happened over sixty years ago? How will it hurt the Ukrainian national project to admit to the sins of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in ethnic cleansings against the Poles or to publish anti-Semitic documents that derive from the OUN environment? Surely this is not what Ukrainian identity is based on? Surely from such an admission the radiant ideal of a Ukrainian national state will not fade?” Along the same lines, she called for a more nuanced understanding of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky, who rescued many Jews during the Holocaust, but who also expressed views that were anti-Semitic. She believed that studying and publishing the full range of Sheptytsky’s attitudes toward Jews “would not in the least diminish the heroism of this historical actor’s deeds, but would only make it possible to better understand his positions within the context of a concrete historical time. In other words, this would give us the opportunity to comprehend Sheptytsky as a historical person, and not as a timeless model for identification.”

This antitraditionalist impulse to disclose the entire dark past is largely justified by ethical arguments. The antitraditionalists see bringing the dark past to light as a way to combat increasing anti-Semitism and forms of Holocaust denial in Ukraine. They link their historical revisionism also with the question of honesty. As Grachova wrote: “The attitudes of the OUN leadership to the Nazis’ anti-Jewish policies and the participation of its rank-and-file members of the organization in its implementation demand *scrupulous and honest investigation*” (emphasis added). Silence about these issues dishonors the nationalists’ victims. It is especially egregious that while the victims are erased from memory, “the criminals continue to be venerated as heroes.” On the site of the Drohobych ghetto, she noted painfully, stands a statue to Stepan Bandera.³⁰

Krytyka invited me, among others, to contribute a response to Grachova. I took the opportunity to expand on the moral argument,

although I limited my remarks to the situation in the Ukrainian diaspora: “I believe that morality is about how we treat the other. All too often in the diaspora, however, there is the opposite tendency—morality is about how others treat us. This is the ethnocentrism so well diagnosed by Sofia Grachova. It is a vestige of the nationalist ideology of the 1930s and 1940s which ridiculed Christian morality as a form of weakness. We in the diaspora nurse every grievance we have over injuries we ascribe to the Russians, Poles, or Jews, but we ourselves almost never engage in an examination of conscience. As a result we are stunted in our moral growth.”³¹ Serhiy Bilenky also contributed to the discussion and broadened the moral concerns, arguing that the historical debate was secondary—the first order of business was to fight the general xenophobia of contemporary Ukrainians.³²

Traditionalists spend less time on ethical arguments to buttress their position because they locate the sources of moral difficulties outside their nation and understand them as primarily political rather than ethical.

For Nakonechny, it was “various Ukrainianophobes” who manufactured tales about Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust. Anti-Ukrainian ideology is more important for them than historical truth.³³ Viatrovych in a recent interview quite explicitly blamed Russia. “Historical memory is an arena of the information war. . . . Russia wages an information war against us.”³⁴ What anti-Semitism existed in Ukraine was inspired, according to Nakonechny, by foreign occupiers in order to divert “the anger of a subjugated, humiliated people from its true oppressors.”³⁵ Grachova, by contrast, insisted that xenophobia and anti-Semitism have to be understood as “our own” problem, not something “imposed from the outside.”³⁶

From the perspective of the traditionalists, those within the nation who question the character of the nationalists are traitors and enemies. Both Nakonechny and Viatrovych pointed to communists and others indoctrinated with Soviet stereotypes as the kind of persons who would be interested in blackening the reputation of OUN and UPA.

In sum, the traditionalists aim to protect the reputation of the nation and reject notions that Ukrainians also participated in the destruction of the Jews during World War II. In particular, they want to protect the reputations of OUN and UPA. They find it diffi-

cult to imagine a complex narrative that would include dark spots and shadows; they want a radiant past for the nation. The advocates of renewal are willing to risk that more complex narrative. They see a frank “coming to terms with the Holocaust” as a task that Ukrainian scholars and intellectuals should undertake.

The proponents of renewal work in a very hostile environment. In Ukraine under President Yushchenko (2005–10) OUN and UPA were made into national heroes, and institutions under his control, especially the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, actively denied Ukrainian nationalist complicity in the Holocaust, even to the point of deliberately misleading the public.³⁷ The historical establishment in Ukraine is quite traditionalist in outlook, and it is easier to champion renewal from North American and European universities. The conservatism of the Ukrainian scholarly establishment in general, and not just with regard to the Holocaust, has been a factor in the exodus of young humanists from Ukraine to other countries. More progressive scholars who remain in Ukraine generally rely on Western funding and validation, since they find it difficult to rise in their native academic structures.

The Holocaust in the Educational System

In the Soviet period there was no place at all for the Holocaust in the curriculum. At the end of the Soviet era and in the first years of Ukrainian independence, schoolchildren were occasionally taught about the particular fate of the Jews during the Second World War, but it was not until 1993–94 that the Ministry of Education formally introduced Holocaust themes into the curriculum.³⁸ As of 1996 the course in the history of Ukraine was mandated to include lessons on the German occupation of Ukraine and the course in world history was to include lessons on “the Jewish Holocaust in Europe.” These themes were at first presented to secondary school students in the tenth grade, and later were transferred to the eleventh grade. The legislation of 1996 did not bear much fruit until about 2000, when new textbooks appeared that incorporated the Holocaust into the historical narrative. However, an analysis of the relevant textbooks by Johann Dietsch showed a tendency to evade the subject of the Holocaust in the history of Ukraine course and to treat the Holocaust in

the world history course as something that happened in Germany and Poland. Little was said about the history of the Holocaust on Ukrainian territory.³⁹ To remedy the situation, the director of the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies in Kyiv published a hundred-page illustrated text specifically devoted to the Holocaust in Ukraine for the use of students in the tenth and eleventh grades.⁴⁰

Teaching the Holocaust has not been very effective at the high school level. Olena Ivanova used discourse analysis to study Kharkiv high school students’ knowledge of and attitudes toward the Holocaust. She concluded: “Despite the very scant, fragmentary, and even distorted information in some of the history textbooks, most students were informed about the Holocaust. But their knowledge was superficial, if strongly tinged with emotion.”⁴¹

The situation in the universities is not much better. In 2000 the Ministry of Education and Science permitted a special course on the history of the Holocaust. It has been taught in the history departments at universities in Chernivtsi, Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Lutsk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, Symferopol, Zaporizhzhia, and elsewhere.⁴² Again Ivanova studied students’ knowledge of the Holocaust, this time in Lviv, Kharkiv, and Poltava. Her conclusion was: “In general the content of the students’ collective memory about the Holocaust is very poor, not much informative and rather strange to them.”⁴³

Ukraine is not a member of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance, and Research. However, two local bodies work to improve Holocaust education in the country, the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies in Kyiv and the Tkuma All-Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies in Dnipropetrovsk. Both centers have offered courses to upgrade teachers’ knowledge, and since 2006, both also have organized Ukrainian teachers to participate in pedagogical-methodological seminars at Yad Vashem. The Swedish embassy sponsored a seminar together with Ivan Franko National University in Lviv on Holocaust education.⁴⁴

Since 2003 schoolchildren throughout Ukraine have been visiting a traveling exhibition from the Anne Frank Museum in the Netherlands. Hundreds of these children served as guides to the exhibition.⁴⁵ Accompanying the Anne Frank exhibition is a supplementary exhibition on Jewish children who perished in the Holocaust in Ukraine.⁴⁶

Scholarship on the Holocaust

The first scholarly publications on the Holocaust appeared in Ukraine in 1991, but research on the topic is still marginalized. Few ethnic Ukrainian scholars show any interest in the topic, although they publish a great deal about World War II, particularly (and usually favorably) on the nationalists. Most of the scholars who work on the Holocaust are of Jewish origin themselves. The Holocaust is so peripheral to mainstream Ukrainian historiography that a thousand-page volume on the political history of Ukraine in the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, prepared by two institutes of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, did not see fit to mention it.⁴⁷

The several general surveys of the Holocaust in Ukraine that have been published are more like prolegomena to the study of the Holocaust than summaries of extensive research. A few documentary collections on the Holocaust in Ukraine as a whole have appeared, as well as several collections of papers from conferences specifically devoted to the Holocaust or closely related topics. A few general reference works have also appeared.⁴⁸

Most of the work on the Holocaust in Ukraine has concentrated on what transpired in particular regions. The two regions with the largest bodies of literature are the Holocaust in western Ukraine, where the Ukrainian nationalist movement was strong, and the murder of the Jews in Babi Yar on the outskirts of Kyiv. Yakov Khonigsmann has produced a book-length survey of the destruction of the Jews in Galicia, Bukovina, and Transcarpathia⁴⁹ as well as shorter monographs on individual topics. Ilia Levitas, who heads the Jewish Council of Ukraine, has published much material on Babi Yar, and Vitalii Nakhmanovich and Tatiana Estafeva compiled a thick collection of documents and materials; the plan was to publish five such volumes, but only one has appeared, in 2004.⁵⁰ Other scholars who have focused on particular regions include Mykhailo Tiahly (Crimea), Iu. M. Liakhovitsky (Kharkiv), Maksym Hon (Rivne region), and Faina Vinokurova (Vinnytsia oblast).

The publication of memoirs began in earnest at the end of the 1990s. The historian and survivor Boris Zabarko has been particularly active in publishing memoir collections, which have appeared also in German and English translations.⁵¹ Other important memoirs

are those of Yevhen Nakonechny, which have already been discussed above, and of Borys Arsen, a Jewish survivor from western Ukraine very critical of the Ukrainian nationalists.⁵²

A few recent developments from outside may stimulate more scholarly interest and research. A French Catholic priest, Father Patrick Desbois, has been traveling across Ukraine gathering testimony of witnesses to the Holocaust.⁵³ In early October 2007 the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in Washington organized a conference on the Holocaust in Ukraine at the Sorbonne in Paris. A number of scholars from Ukraine were in attendance.⁵⁴ A week later the USHMM also organized, together with Chernivtsi National University, a conference on the Holocaust in Transnistria and Bukovina.⁵⁵ The site of the conference, Chernivtsi, had been a rich cultural center, especially for Jews, in the first three decades of the twentieth century, and because so many survivors from Transnistria and Bukovina gravitated to it after Soviet reoccupation in 1944, it had in that year a Jewish population of over 40 percent.⁵⁶

Four institutes in Ukraine are concerned with the Holocaust. Two are in Kyiv: the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, headed by Anatolii Podolsky, and the Judaica Institute, headed by Leonid Finberg.⁵⁷ Both have publications and sponsor conferences and seminars. The Judaica Institute, of course, has a wider mandate than Holocaust studies. The Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies, an NGO with very limited government support, works closely with Dutch partners, particularly the Anne Frank House, and also works with Yad Vashem and the USHMM. The center publishes a journal of Holocaust studies, *Holokost i suchasnist'*, with contributions in Ukrainian and Russian. The other two institutes in Ukraine are Tkuma (Rebirth) in Dnipropetrovsk and the Kharkiv Holocaust Museum, "Drobitskii Yar."⁵⁸ Tkuma is more active as a scholarly institution than Drobitskii Yar. It, too, like the center in Kyiv, sponsors conferences and seminars. There is some rivalry between the centers in Kyiv and Dnipropetrovsk, which partially results from different profiles. The Kyiv center is primarily Ukrainian-language in orientation, while Tkuma uses mainly Russian. Tkuma is also more deeply embedded in the Jewish community than the center in Kyiv.

The Holocaust in Culture

The Holocaust has figured hardly at all in Ukrainian cultural production. Two works, however, stand out: the oratorio *Requiem-Kaddish “Babi Yar”* (*Rekviiem-Kaddysh “Babyn Jar”*) and the film *Spell Your Name* (*Nazvy svoie im’ia*).

The seven-part oratorio *Requiem-Kaddish “Babi Yar”* was composed by Yevhen Stankovych; the libretto was written by the poet Dmytro Pavlychko. The oratorio premiered in Kyiv in the fall of 1991 in connection with the commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the mass execution of Jews in Babi Yar. It is a very powerful piece of music.⁵⁹ A revised version of the oratorio was premiered on 23 June 2006 in Kyiv.⁶⁰

The collapse of communism freed the Ukrainian film industry from the ideological constraints that had dogged it since the 1930s, but it also meant the end to large state subsidies and competition with Hollywood productions. As a result, cinema has been relatively stagnant in the country. One documentary film was made about the Holocaust, however. *Spell Your Name* was directed by Sergei Bukovsky, produced by the Shoah Foundation Institute for Visual History and Education at the University of Southern California, and presented by the famous American director Steven Spielberg and the Ukrainian billionaire Victor Pinchuk.⁶¹ The film is largely composed of video testimonies of survivors and rescuers collected in 1994–99 by the Shoah Foundation Institute. In addition, the director interviewed some of the young women who were transcribing the testimonies and also visited the site of Babi Yar.

The film premiered in Kyiv on 18 October 2006 with President Yushchenko, Spielberg, and other dignitaries and celebrities in attendance, and it was shown on STB television on 8 May 2007.⁶² *Spell Your Name* has been screened in secondary schools in Ukraine. The response to the film in the Ukrainian press has been positive.⁶³ A young Ukrainian who helped with the film, Mykhailo Tiahly, was so moved by the experience that he switched his field of study from medieval art history to the history of the Holocaust.⁶⁴ He since has produced several publications on the history of the Holocaust in Crimea and serves as editor of the journal *Holokost i suchasnist’*.

Of course, there are other isolated instances in which the Hol-

ocaust appears in culture. For example, the Ukrainian rock group Vii, in its album *Khata skraiu sela* contains a song (“Pisnia pro Zhydiv”), in which someone sheds a tear for the crucified Christ, it mixes with the blood of a murdered Jew, it rolls to the feet of Christ, and saddened, Christ follows “the long path to nowhere” that the Jews had taken.

Memorialization Projects

The most important site of the Holocaust in Ukraine is Babi Yar (in Ukrainian, Babyn Yar), a ravine in Kyiv where 33,771 Jews were shot on 29–30 September 1941. Over the course of the war, over a hundred thousand people are said to have been shot at the ravine, including many non-Jews. Although the Soviets were reluctant to commemorate the massacres at Babi Yar in general, and the massacre of the Jews in particular, there was much public pressure to do so. In 1959 the writer Viktor Nekrasov protested plans to turn the site into a park and soccer stadium. The poet Evgenii Evtushenko wrote a poem on Babi Yar (1961), which opened with the words “Above Babi Yar there are no monuments.” Shostakovich included the poem in his Thirteenth Symphony, and Anatolii Kuznetsov was able to publish a powerful “document in the form of a novel” about Babi Yar in 1966, although in a censored version. All through the 1960s intellectuals of different nationalities gathered at the site on the anniversary of the mass execution of the Jews.⁶⁵ The Ukrainian critic Ivan Dziuba, later imprisoned by the Soviets and later still minister of culture in independent Ukraine, delivered a speech there in 1966 designating what happened in Babi Yar to be the common tragedy of all humanity, but first and foremost the tragedy of the Jewish and Ukrainian peoples.⁶⁶

In 1965 the authorities announced a competition to design a monument for the site, but a monument was not erected and unveiled until 1976. The text on the monument did not specifically mention the Jewish victims at Babi Yar. It read: “To the Soviet citizens and soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army who were prisoners of war, shot by the German fascist invaders in Babi Yar.”

After the proclamation of Ukrainian independence, a new monument was unveiled on 29 September 1991—a bronze monument in the shape of a menorah. Since then, crosses have also been added to the site to commemorate Ukrainian nationalists and churchmen murdered by

the Germans.⁶⁷ A new bronze monument, based on Kuznetsov's documentary novel, was dedicated on 29 September 2009. At the same time, a wooden cross commemorating OUN victims was restored, having been vandalized several months previously.⁶⁸

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, which became active in Ukraine again in the 1990s, was involved since 2000 in plans to build a memorial complex, including a Jewish community center, at Babi Yar. This proposal was divisive within the Ukrainian Jewish community because some felt it was inappropriate to have a park and community center on the territory of this mass grave. Then the intervention of non-Jewish Ukrainians further interrupted the Joint's plans. Ukrainians contested memorializing Babi Yar as a primarily Jewish place of memory.⁶⁹ Controversies between Jews and non-Jews over Babi Yar are analogous to those that have accompanied memorialization at Auschwitz, that is, disputes over the presence of Christian symbols and the balance in the memorialization of Jewish and non-Jewish victims. The Lviv writer Iurii Vynnychuk expressed the view of nationally minded Ukrainians: "Many more Ukrainians and Russians perished at Babi Yar, and therefore the Jews have no right to privatize Babi Yar and to build a memorial dedicated to a single nation."⁷⁰

The government of Ukraine has sponsored large commemorations of the victims of Babi Yar. At the first, held on the fiftieth anniversary of the shooting in 1991, the president of the Ukrainian parliament, who was about to become the first president of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk, addressed a large gathering that included guests from abroad, also from Israel. He said: "This was genocide, and the guilt lies not only with the Fascists but with those who didn't stop the murderers. Part of it we take on ourselves. . . . To speak words of repentance is never easy, but we do this because it is very important, especially for Ukrainians themselves, that we recognize our errors."⁷¹ During the commemoration, an exhibition devoted to Jews who were heroes of the Soviet Union was installed on Kyiv's main street, Khreshchatyk.⁷²

On the sixtieth anniversary, which was commemorated a few weeks after the attack on New York's World Trade Center in 2001, President Leonid Kuchma interpreted the murders at Babi Yar as a manifestation of terrorism, which had not yet disappeared since the time of the

Nazis.⁷³ Official commemorations at Babi Yar continue. On 27 September 2006 the presidents of Ukraine, Israel, Croatia, and Montenegro placed flowers on the site to mark the sixty-fifth anniversary of the mass shooting. In 2007 President Yushchenko, after a moment of silence commemorating all the victims, placed flowers near the cross commemorating members of OUN who were shot there.⁷⁴

The Jewish Council of Ukraine has been collecting the names of Jewish victims and of rescuers at Babi Yar. They have published lists of both victims (with names, ages, and addresses) and rescuers.

There are large monuments to the victims of the Holocaust in several other major Ukrainian cities: Donetsk, Lviv, Kharkiv, and Odessa. And there are smaller monuments and places of remembrance throughout Ukraine. Handfuls of aging survivors meet annually at some execution sites to commemorate their loved ones who perished there. They wonder what will become of these sites and their memories when they pass away.⁷⁵

A particularly problematic case is the former Galicia, where the local population has erected monuments to commemorate victims of the NKVD murders of 1941 without at the same time remembering the Jewish victims of the subsequent pogroms. Also, members of OUN and UPA are commemorated as heroes without considering the dark side of their legacy. Synagogues and other monuments of Jewish culture are rapidly deteriorating throughout the region. The neglect and erasure of the Jewish heritage had begun in the Soviet period.

Holocaust memorials have been vandalized throughout Ukraine: in Feodosiia, Autonomous Republic Crimea (2006), Ivankov, Kyiv oblast (2002), Lviv (2006), Kyiv (Babi Yar, 2003 and 2006), Odessa (2007), Oleksandriia, Luhansk oblast (2007), Sevastopol (2006, twice), and Zhytomyr (2002).⁷⁶ Some Holocaust sites are endangered by commercial encroachments; for example, Jewish leaders have protested the construction of a shopping mall over mass graves in Odessa.⁷⁷

There are modest Holocaust museums in Kharkiv⁷⁸ and Dniprope-trovsk, connected with the Holocaust studies institutes. There had been one planned for Kyiv at Babi Yar as part of the aborted Joint plans discussed above. The Holocaust does not figure at all in the otherwise thoroughly de-sovietized National Historical Museum in Kyiv.⁷⁹ The National Museum of the Great Patriotic War has two

exhibit galleries devoted to “the Nazi occupation regime, Regime of terror and plunder in Ukraine.” When I visited the museum in 1976, there was no mention at all of the persecution of the Jews. I have not visited the museum since then, but I note that the official website of the museum does not mention the word “Jew” in its description of exhibits.⁸⁰ In 2001, however, the museum and the Jewish Council of Ukraine jointly organized an exhibition on Babi Yar.⁸¹

The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, created in 2006, has hosted a series of conferences and roundtable discussions on World War II in Ukraine, none of which have been devoted to the fate of Jews or other minority groups in Ukraine. A primary interest of the Institute is the famine of 1932–33 (Holodomor). It promotes international recognition of the famine as a genocide. It operates with an inflated number of victims, ten million, although scholars think the number is more like a quarter to a third of that. The other main interest of the institute is “the national-liberation movement,” and it promotes a tendentious, whitewashed image of OUN and UPA. The institute does not include the Holocaust in the national memory, except to deny that Ukrainian nationalists had any part in it.

Overseas Diaspora Narratives

I have written extensively about the Ukrainian diaspora and the Holocaust elsewhere,⁸² so here I will just sketch the most important points.

The majority of those who consider themselves to be part of the Ukrainian community in Canada, the United States, Britain, and Australia are the descendants of persons who emigrated after World War II and came predominantly from Galicia. The original émigrés were recruited disproportionately from Ukrainians who one way or another had been in German service during the war, and they were of a predominantly nationalist outlook. In their collective memory the Holocaust hardly figured at all. It was only when outsiders accused them of having collaborated with the Germans that they engaged, defensively, with the issue of the Holocaust. At such moments they represented themselves, externally as well as internally, as freedom fighters against both the Nazis and the Soviets. This was more difficult for members of the Waffen-SS Division Galizien, but they insisted on their own subjective view that they only entered German service

after it was clear that Germany would lose the war, that they did so to receive military training in order to fight eventually for an independent Ukraine, and that they directed their arms only against the Red Army and communist partisans, not against any part of the civilian population. Members of OUN and UPA denied complicity in the Holocaust altogether and justified the murder of Polish civilians as retaliation for Polish atrocities.

Their children by and large held to the same positions. It was more difficult for them in some respects. They were raised in Western societies and were affected by the resurgence of interest in the Holocaust in the late 1970s. They understood what the Holocaust had come to mean in the morality of the societies in which they lived. They were stung by the portrayal of Ukrainian complicity in and approval of the destruction of the Jews in the epoch-making television miniseries *The Holocaust* (1978). They felt that their parents’ reputations were being besmirched. Their parents had made great sacrifices for Ukraine and had overcome many hardships to make good in America—they were heroes, not the scoundrels that some said they were. Moreover, as the Jewish community in these Western countries, whose interest in the Holocaust had been reinvigorated, lobbied to have Nazi war criminals brought to justice, a number of aging Ukrainians became suspects and faced the prospect of deportation. The most publicized case was that of a Cleveland autoworker, John Demjanjuk. Arrests of suspected war criminals affected other Eastern European immigrant communities as well, but not all responded in the same way. For example, Mennonites from Ukraine and Russia who were detained on war crimes charges did not receive public support from their community. But in the Ukrainian community, leaders, the press, and organizations mobilized support for those accused. They felt that the search for war criminals among Ukrainians of their parents’ generation was a witch hunt motivated by anti-Ukrainian prejudice and Soviet intrigue. The war crimes issue did much to sour relations between the Ukrainian and Jewish diasporas and also to promote a victimization narrative among the Ukrainian community abroad.

In recent years, there have been three identifiable trends in the Ukrainian diaspora: (1) Representatives of the mainstream, who control the print media and large Ukrainian organizations, deny that

Ukrainians participated significantly in the Holocaust. They say that accusations to the contrary as well as accusations of anti-Semitism among Ukrainians are just manifestations of Jewish Ukrainianophobia. They feel that any Ukrainian participation in the Holocaust is overshadowed by Jewish complicity in Stalinist crimes against Ukrainian humanity. *OUN* survives as a major political and cultural force in the diaspora, and *UPA* is remembered only as having fought against two totalitarianisms for an independent Ukraine. (2) There is an extremist fringe, active primarily on the Internet, that denies or downplays the Holocaust and espouses many other standard anti-Semitic ideas (e.g., Jews control the press, politics, and economy). (3) There is a small liberal minority composed of middle-aged intellectuals and professionals born in the West and of younger people born in Ukraine and trained at graduate schools in the West. Their opinions are by and large excluded from the diaspora media.

Native Jewish Attitudes toward Developments

The last Soviet census, that of 1989, counted 487,000 Jews in Ukraine.⁸³ The only census since independence, that of 2001, counted only 103,600 Jews, less than a quarter of the 1989 population.⁸⁴ The number of Jews in Ukraine had been declining steadily since World War II as a result of low birth rates, intermarriage, and emigration, particularly after 1971. The precipitous decline after the fall of communism was a result of increased opportunities for emigration as well as the abolition of the nationality rubric in the passport—nationality was now subjectively chosen rather than legally inherited.

The Jewish community in Ukraine is far from united or monolithic. There have been very divisive struggles for leadership, especially between Chief Rabbi Yaakov Dov Bleich and businessman Vadim Rabinovich and between the head of the Jewish Council of Ukraine, Ilia Levitas, and his rival, Yosyf Zisels.⁸⁵ The majority of Jews, like most inhabitants of Ukraine, use Russian in their day-to-day activities, and some Jews affirm that the Jewish minority in Ukraine is a Russophone minority. There is, however, a minority of Ukrainianophone and markedly Ukrainianophile Jews.

Naturally, there are different viewpoints among Ukrainian Jews about Holocaust issues in Ukraine. My impression is that the major-

ity has wanted to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust without raising the issue of Ukrainian collaboration. Many have been made uncomfortable in recent years by the increase in anti-Semitic publications and actions and by President Yushchenko's all-out campaign to rehabilitate *OUN* and *UPA* without consideration of their role in the Holocaust. The degree to which they can express this discomfort depends on whether they live in Kyiv and the nationalist west or in the more post-Soviet regions of the east and south.

Although Jewish community leaders in Ukraine have worked with the World Jewish Restitution Organization to reach an agreement with the Ukrainian government about the restitution of former Jewish communal property, nothing has yet resulted from this.⁸⁶ The restitution issue in Ukraine is complicated because so much property of all kinds was nationalized under communism.

Holocaust Negationism and Anti-Semitism

To some extent, the presence of Holocaust denial and anti-Semitism in Ukraine is a legacy of communist rule, during which little or no discussion was permitted of the particular Jewish tragedy under Nazi occupation, but an anti-Semitic discourse thinly veiled as anti-Zionism was promoted by the state. Indeed, contemporary organized anti-Semitism in Ukraine has links with anti-Israeli Muslim states. But Holocaust negationism and anti-Semitism also have roots in the anti-communist nationalism of western Ukraine, which is permeated by what Michael Shafir has called “deflective negationism.” That is, these nationalists do not deny the Holocaust as such, just the participation of their nation in its realization.⁸⁷ Moreover, the western Ukrainian brand of nationalism has been marked from its origins by generalized anti-Semitism, in particular blaming Jews for the crimes of the communist era.

The revival of the perspective of “Judeocommunism” has found promoters in the contemporary Ukrainian scholarly community⁸⁸ and also in the Ukrainian government. In July 2008 the Security Service of Ukraine published on the Internet a list of nineteen perpetrators of the Holodomor (famine of 1932–33). Of these, eight were of Jewish nationality. This was an arbitrary and at the same time deliberate selection. The main decision makers in the Holodomor were

three individuals: Stalin, Lazar Kaganovich, and Molotov. Their orders were implemented by a vast array of other individuals in the administrative and party apparatus. These included officials in the organs of repression but also officials in economic planning and other branches of the Soviet system. They included officials near the summit of Soviet power, such as Anastas Mikoyan, but also officials at the republican, oblast, and raion levels, and many, many local implementers at the village level. It would be impossible to sort out all the perpetrators by nationality. Thus, the Security Service's list containing over 40 percent Jews was not a natural result. Moreover, following a well-established practice in Eastern European nationalist and anti-Semitic discourse, the Slavic names these perpetrators used as party officials were followed in parentheses by their original Jewish birth names.⁸⁹

The largest organization promoting anti-Semitism happens to be also the largest private institution of postsecondary education in Ukraine, the Interregional Academy of Personnel Management, better known by its Ukrainian abbreviation MAUP. At one time it had excellent relations with prominent figures in the Ukrainian government, but as MAUP gained more notoriety, these personalities withdrew their support. An exception has been Lev Lukianenko, a former dissident under Soviet rule, ambassador to Canada in independent Ukraine (1992–93), and a prominent member of Ukraine's parliament until his retirement in 2007. Lukianenko has made and written many anti-Semitic statements, in particular blaming Jews for perpetrating the Holodomor. In spite of his flagrant anti-Jewish pronouncements, President Yushchenko named him a "Hero of Ukraine" in 2005.⁹⁰

A poll conducted by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology in 2006 investigated the level of xenophobia among the population of Ukraine. It found that xenophobia rose during crisis periods, such as the 2004 Orange Revolution, and then tended to recede to a certain plateau. Not surprisingly, the poll found that people who were older, rural, and less educated tended to exhibit a higher level of xenophobia than others. The poll revealed an index of social distance of 1.91 to 2.36 for Eastern Slavs (Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians), with Jews following immediately afterward at 3.25. Americans had an index of 4.32; Poles, of 4.61; Negroes (*nabry*), of 5.58; and Gypsies (*tsybany*), of 5.85.⁹¹ Anti-Semitism is strongest in the western part of the coun-

try. For example, over 40 percent of western Ukrainian respondents to a sociological study undertaken in 2002–3 believed that God punished the Jews for crucifying Christ (compared to under 20 percent in eastern Ukraine).⁹² Overt anti-Semitism is not part of the public face of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, the largest religious organization in western Ukraine, but the church has been closely identified with Ukrainian nationalism and regularly takes part in commemorations of UPA. Perhaps as in all church groups, there is an anti-Semitic fringe that is vociferous in Internet discussion groups.⁹³ Occasionally, too, religion can mix with extreme xenophobia and anti-Semitism, as in the case of a priest who taught a child that "Muscovites and Jews crucified Christ."⁹⁴

President Yushchenko's support for deflective negativism and the anti-Semitic undertones of the work of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory have placed obstacles on Ukraine's path to Europe, just as the low prospects of incorporation into the European Union have contributed to the growth of nativism in Ukraine. Ukraine still has a long way to go before it acquires a perspective on the Holocaust more in keeping with that in the rest of Europe.

Notes

I would like to acknowledge the assistance of Oksana Mykhed.

1. The best survey of twentieth-century Ukrainian history is Serhy Yekelchyk, *Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
2. Karel C. Berkhoff, *Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine under Nazi Rule* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2003).
3. Jacques Vallin, France Meslé, Serguei Adamets, and Serhii Pirozhkov, "A New Estimate of Ukrainian Population Losses during the Crises of the 1930s and 1940s," *Population Studies* 56, no. 3 (November 2002): 257.
4. In estimating the number of Jews, I have relied on, but modified with Transcarpathia and Crimea in mind, information from the online *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, s.v. "Holocaust" by Dieter Pohl, <http://www.encyclopediaofukraine.com/> (accessed 10 November 2009).
5. John-Paul Himka, "Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews during the Second World War: Sorting Out the Long-Term and Conjunctural Factors," in *The Fate of the European Jews, 1939–1945: Continuity or Contingency*, ed. Jonathan Frankel, *Studies in Contemporary Jewry*, 13 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 174.

6. Vladimir Melamed, "Organized and Unsolicited Collaboration in the Holocaust: The Multifaceted Ukrainian Context," *East European Jewish Affairs* 37, no. 2 (August 2007): 235.

7. See Shimon Redlich, *Together and Apart in Brzezany: Poles, Jews, and Ukrainians, 1919–1945* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002), 130, 133, 135; and Daniel Mendelsohn, *The Lost: A Search for Six of Six Million* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 145, 456.

8. Dieter Pohl, "Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden," in *Die Täter der Shoah: Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?*, ed. Gerhard Paul (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2002), 219.

9. John-Paul Himka, "Ukrainian-Jewish Antagonism in the Galician Countryside during the Late Nineteenth Century," in *Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Historical Perspective*, ed. Peter J. Potichnyj and Howard Aster (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1988), 111–58; Maksym Hon, "Ivreis'ke pytannia v Zakhidnii Ukrainsi naperedodni Druhoi svitovoi viiny (za materialamy hromads'ko-politychnoi periodyky kraiu)," *Holokost i suchasnist'*, no. 1 (2005): 12–16, <http://www.holocaust.kiev.ua/> (accessed 5 November 2007).

10. Martin Dean, *Collaboration during the Holocaust: Crimes of the Local Police in Belorussia and Ukraine, 1941–44* (New York: St. Martin's Press, published in association with the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2000), 74–75; Gabriel N. Finder and Alexander V. Prusin, "Collaboration in Eastern Galicia: The Ukrainian Police and the Holocaust," *East European Jewish Affairs* 34, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 95–118.

11. Pohl, "Ukrainische Hilfskräfte," 211.

12. Timothy Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 162.

13. Even while Berlin was falling, an article in the division's newspaper stated: "In Ukraine a punitive expeditionary regiment has been formed exclusively of Jews. The goal of the regiment is to punish the inhabitants of Ukrainian cities... because they were supposed to have taken part in the mass shooting executions of Jews. In reality the Jews are striving by all their rapacious methods to bring the population of Ukraine to extreme poverty and death by famine." "Zhydivs'ki karni ekspedytsii," *Do boiu!*, 28 April 1945.

14. Henry Abramson, "'This Is the Way It Was!': Textual and Iconographic Images of Jews in the Nazi-Sponsored Ukrainian Press of Distrikt Galizien," in *Why Didn't the Press Shout? American and International Journalism during the Holocaust*, ed. Robert Moses Shapiro (Jersey City NJ: Yeshiva University Press in association with KTAV Publishing House, 2003), 537–56; John-Paul Himka, "Krakivski visti and the Jews, 1943: A Contribution to the History of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations during the Second World War," *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 21, nos. 1–2 (Summer–Winter 1996): 81–95; John-Paul Himka, "Ethnicity and the Reporting of Mass Murder: Krakivs'ki visti, the NKVD Murders of 1941, and the Vinnytsia Exhumation," in *Shatterzone of Empires: Identity and Violence in the Ger-*

man, Habsburg, Russian, and Ottoman Borderlands, ed. Omer Bartov and Eric D. Weitz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).

15. Zhanna Kovba, *Liudianist' u bezodni pekla (Povedinka mistsevoho naselennia Skhidnoi Halychyny v roky "Ostatochnoho rozv'iazannia ievreis'koho pytannia")* (Kyiv: Biblioteka Instytutu iudaiky, 1998); Frank Golczewski, "Entgegen dem Klischee: Die Rettung von verfolgten Juden im Zweiten Weltkrieg durch Ukrainer," in *Nationalsozialistische Vernichtungspolitik 1939–1945: Neue Forschungen und Kontroversen*, ed. W. Benz and J. Wetzel (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1998).

16. Shimon Redlich, "Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, Ukrainians and Jews during and after the Holocaust," *Holocaust and Genocide Studies* 5, no. 1 (1990): 39–51.

17. "Special Report on Manifestations of Antisemitism in Ukraine," in *Documents on Ukrainian Jewish Identity and Emigration, 1944–1990*, ed. Vladimir Khanin (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 41–58; Amir Weiner, *Making Sense of War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 192; Mikhail Mitsel', *Obschiny iudeiskogo veroispovedaniia v Ukraine* (Kiev, L'vov: 1945–1981 gg.), Biblioteka Instytutu iudaiky (Kiev: Sfera, 1998), 154–55.

18. Karel C. Berkhoff, "'Total Annihilation of the Jewish Population': The Holocaust in the Soviet Media, 1941–45," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 10, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 61–105.

19. I have photos and photocopies of documents and excerpts from the Ukrainian-language press under the Nazi occupation that the Soviets supplied to Peter Krawchuk, the leader of the Ukrainian communist movement in Canada.

20. Heorhii Kas'ianov, "Déjà vu!" *Krytyka* 11, no. 3 (113) (March 2007): 22.

21. Ievhen Nakonechnyi, "Shoa" u L'vovi, 2nd ed. (Lviv: Piramida, 2006), 6. The traditionalists state that accusations of Ukrainian and Ukrainian nationalist complicity in the Holocaust are manifestations of Ukrainophobia. The proponents of renewal retort that the traditionalist arguments are redolent of xenophobia.

22. Jan T. Gross, *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz: An Essay in Historical Interpretation* (New York: Random House, 2006), 258.

23. Nakonechnyi, "Shoa" u L'vovi, 126.

24. Nakonechnyi, "Shoa" u L'vovi, 105.

25. Volodymyr V'iatrovych, *Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv: formuvannia pozysii na tli katastrofy* (Lviv: Vydavnytstvo Ms, 2006), 54–55.

26. Nakonechnyi, "Shoa" u L'vovi, 173.

27. V'iatrovych, *Stavlennia OUN do ievreiv*, 15.

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Bringing the Dark Past to Light

The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe

Edited and with an introduction by
John-Paul Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic

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