

# The Galician Triangle

## Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews under Austrian Rule

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The Austrian crownland of Galicia does not have the best reputation in literature. In Jaroslav Hašek's famous novel *The Good Soldier Švejk*, Major General von Schwarzenberg "had a mania for transferring officers to the most unpleasant places. On the slightest pretext, an officer was already saying goodbye to his garrison and was on his way . . . to some drink-sodden, forlorn outpost in the filthy wilds of Galicia." Unpleasant it may have been, but Galicia was not insignificant in East Central Europe; with a territory of almost 80,000 square kilometers and a population exceeding eight million in 1914, it was the single largest province in the lands and kingdoms represented in the Reichsrat. It took its name from the medieval Ukrainian principality of Halych (Galich in the Old Rus' language), situated north of the Carpathians in the westernmost extension of Kievan Rus'. Austria acquired the territory in the first partition of Poland in 1772. The Austrian crownland included not only much of old Galician Rus', but also some ethnically Polish territories in the west that had never been connected with the historical Galicia of the Middle Ages. In Austrian Galicia, Poles and Ukrainians each accounted for over 40 percent of the population and Jews for over ten percent. There was also a small German minority in the crownland and, historically, an Armenian minority, which had basically assimilated to Polish nationality by the nineteenth century. In Eastern Galicia, which corresponded more to the historical Galicia, Ukrainians made up about 65 percent of the population, Poles about 20 percent, and Jews well over 10 percent.

The following sketch focuses on the relationships between the three major nationalities of Austrian Galicia, that is, the Poles, Ukrainians, and Jews, with respect to the social, political, religious, and cultural dimensions of these relations. The limning of this triangle should not be taken as an attempt to outline the entire history of Galicia under Austrian rule, because the full picture is much more complex. A fuller picture would demand abandoning the relative simplicity of the triangular form for a multilateral and multidimensional approach. Each of the three sides of the triangle was fundamentally divided. Polish society was rent by a profound cleav-

age between nobles and peasants. The Ukrainians for much of the Austrian period were sundered into two opposing camps over the question of their national identity. Among the Jews religious and cultural disagreements between conservative and reformist currents ran so deep that it led to the poisoning of a rabbi in 1848. Although these divisions find mention in the essay that follows, they do so only to the extent that they have relevance to the restricted problem of the interaction of the three nationalities. Moreover, readers should be mindful that none of the three nationalities was confined to Galicia. The majority of Poles, Ukrainians, and *Ostjuden* lived outside Galicia, mainly in the Russian empire. The Galician branches of these three peoples interacted not only with each other, but also with their conationals elsewhere; unfortunately, the latter dimension cannot be developed here. Thus much that is important in terms of general Galician, Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish history is necessarily omitted, although within the limits stated I have tried to present as full and balanced an account of the Galician triangle as space permits.<sup>1</sup>

Galicia belongs to that curious belt of East Central Europe, extending from Lithuania to Transylvania and composed of the eastern reaches of historical Poland and historical Hungary, where there has traditionally been a high degree of congruence between nationality and position in the socioeconomic structure. This is also a zone where serfdom profoundly shaped the human environment, most evidently the system of social divisions, but also the deep structures of the psychology, culture, and politics of the region. Moreover, serfdom left the region economically backward and impoverished. The social antagonisms that permeated Galicia were all the more bitter owing to the poverty of the land. Compromises come easier when there is a surplus to share and when a few coins, some timber, or even an acre or two of land do not make all the difference in the world.

The gentlemen of Galicia were Poles. They owned most of the landed estates throughout the province, sharing a bit only with the Jews around the turn of the twentieth century. Of the three major Galician nationalities, they were always politically the most powerful and culturally the most assertive. There was also, however, a substantial Polish peasant population, mainly concentrated in Western Galicia. Poles also inhabited the cities and towns of Western Galicia and the larger cities of Eastern Galicia; the urban Poles included artisans, merchants, and professionals. The Ukrainians—or Ruthenians, as they called themselves for most of the Austrian period—were largely a peasant nation, with a thin layer of clerical and (by the 1840s) secular intelligentsia. The Jews, neither lords nor peasants, occupied the interstices of the feudal economy, intermediary positions between seignior and serf, as well as positions in the money economy, which remained marginal until the 1860s.

The three nationalities constituted, then, different socioeconomic communities, with different cultural levels and interests. But there was more to it than mere difference; these were antagonistic societies whose economic interests frequently

collided. The main axis of antagonism was the landlord-peasant relationship. The Polish-style serfdom that existed in Galicia until 1848 was based on the coercion of labor-rents from the peasantry. Like any system of forced labor, it depended on the systemic exercise of violence against the laborers. Every manor had a prison, often in the stables, for recalcitrant peasants who refused to work on the estate or otherwise fell afoul of the landlord; and when imprisonment did not seem to suffice, the landlord could call in officials to beat offending peasants with cudgels to a limit determined by an attendant surgeon; and if the officials thought it warranted, they in turn could call in soldiers. Such a system, of course, engendered profound hatred of the landlord class on the part of the peasantry. And for their part, the landlords constructed for themselves an image of the peasants as mere brutes, made for agricultural labor, devoid of intelligence, to be beaten as often as necessary to ensure docility and diligence. The emotional energy engendered in this epoch seems to have been accumulated, as if on a flywheel, to be released in deadly spurts over the course of the next century. The landlord-peasant conflict did not completely abate after 1848. Seigniors and their former serfs struggled bitterly for a decade and a half over possession of forests and pastures. And until the very collapse of the empire, peasants continued to feel the whip on their back when they worked their former masters' demesnes for wages.

The bad feeling between lord and peasant accrued primarily to the Polish-Ukrainian relationship. Not only did the Polish manor confront the Ukrainian cottage in Eastern Galicia, but Ukrainian nationalism embraced the social antagonism in a way that Polish nationalism never could. From the point of view of the Polish national movement, the antipathy between the gentry and the people was an obstacle, an embarrassment, even a tragedy. This was particularly evident in the insurrection-turned-jacquerie that broke out in Western Galicia in 1846. On the one side stood the flower of the Polish gentry, ready to unite with and liberate their serfs in the name of a common struggle against national oppression; on the other side were skittish and resentful Polish peasants who exploded into ferocious violence against their class oppressors, their would-be-liberators and noble brothers. Contemporary Polish patriots found this movement so difficult to accept that they created legends to explain it away. They blamed outside forces—Metternich and his agents—for stirring up the peasants. Many also said that the peasants who had attacked the nobles were not really Poles, but Ukrainians.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, in the Ukrainian national mythology, peasant rebellions were exalted; the national poet, Taras Shevchenko, even glorified the cruelty of the *haidamaky* who slaughtered the Polish nobility in the late eighteenth century as well as social bandits who killed them still in the nineteenth (for example, “Varnak”).<sup>3</sup> From the very first, from 1848, Ruthenian political leaders did not hesitate to integrate the peasantry, with its grievances and aspirations in the socioeconomic sphere, into the national movement. With the blessing of their national leaders, the Ukrainian peasants of Galicia (but not their Polish

counterparts) solemnly commemorated every year in May the anniversary of their emancipation from serfdom; virtually every Ukrainian village in Eastern Galicia erected a cross in a conspicuous place in memory of liberation. The bloody shirt of serfdom was kept in clearer view in Ukrainian Galicia than in Polish Galicia.

Jews were also affected by the peasantry's grudge against the manor, since they sometimes managed or leased estates from the nobility and in the late nineteenth century even began to buy them. Although at most a few thousand Jews leased or owned estates in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, peasants emphatically identified Jews with the manor.

The Jewish tavernkeeper, prominent in almost every Galician village and the source and referent of stereotypes, became the object of complex animosity. Since the tavernkeeper had to lease his right to purvey alcoholic beverages from the manor, he acted and was perceived as a subordinate and agent of the landlord. The Polish and Ukrainian clergy, and later populist and nationalist activists, accused him of promoting demoralization, and anti-alcohol campaigns often assumed an anti-Jewish coloration. Furthermore, the tavernkeeper, in his primary role as well as in subsidiary capacities (moneylender, storekeeper), represented the new money economy that was changing the village, creating both opportunity and dislocation.

The money economy that gathered force after the 1860s exacerbated socioeconomic tensions between Jews, on the one hand, and Poles and Ukrainians, on the other. There were two aspects to this. First, the Jews were the foremost representatives in Galicia of the money economy, in both its relatively neutral manifestations (for example, commerce) and those that the peasantry experienced negatively (for example, moneylending resulting in the loss of land). Second, under serfdom, Poles and Ukrainians had never been economic rivals of Jews, since their respective places in the economy were so rigidly defined and discrete; but in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a rivalry did develop, particularly as Poles and Ukrainians entered commerce. Non-Jewish storekeepers appealed to national solidarity to attract customers and frequently urged the boycott of Jewish-owned businesses.

Socioeconomically based animosity toward Jews was fanned by both the Ukrainian and Polish national movements. This was particularly important in the Polish case, since the Jews, as estate-lessees, moneylenders, and tavernkeepers, made excellent scapegoats. They could deflect the socioeconomic antagonism that might otherwise be directed at the landowning Polish gentry and thus retard the formation of an integrated Polish nation.

For their part, Jews formed a stereotype of the "clumsy and stupid peasant who was commonly an object of contempt"<sup>4</sup> and, one might add, of fear. This stereotype affected many Jews' image of Galicia's preeminent peasant people, the Ukrainians, as a whole.

The first nation to think and act politically in Galicia was the Poles. Their politics consisted of efforts to restore the recently lost Polish statehood, at first by

alliance with Napoleon and later, in the 1830s and 1840s, by a series of insurrectionary conspiracies. The Poles' activities, particularly the conspiracies of the 1830s, influenced the fledgling Ukrainian movement in Lviv (the so-called Ruthenian Triad).

From the middle of the nineteenth century (the revolution of 1848–49, the start of the constitutional era in the 1860s), all three nationalities were drawn into politics. During the revolution of 1848–49 the Poles, with the exception of the Polish peasantry and the most conservative elements of the aristocracy, allied themselves with the revolutionary forces in Europe and the empire. Although they sympathized with the Hungarian insurrection, the fresh impact of the events of 1846 instilled them with caution. They formed a National Council to represent the Galician population and were unpleasantly surprised to confront a rival representative body, the Supreme Ruthenian Council, established by the Ukrainians and supported by figures in the Austrian government. The Ukrainians during the revolution formulated their first and surprisingly mature political demand, the division of Galicia into separate eastern and western provinces, in which Ukrainians and Poles, respectively, would be dominant. The Supreme Ruthenian Council collected hundreds of thousands of signatures on petitions to partition Galicia and pursued Ukrainian political and socioeconomic aims in the Austrian parliament and court of public opinion. The Poles were genuinely surprised by the political force of the Ukrainian movement, which had been marginal and largely cultural prior to 1848, and explained its intrusion onto the political scene as a result of the intervention of reactionary Austrian politicians. Galician Governor Franz Stadion, it was said, invented the Ruthenian nationality as part of the traditional Austrian policy of *divide et impera*. However, in reality, although the Ukrainian movement in 1848–49 did benefit from the patronage of the imperial authorities, this was not the source of the energy that astonished contemporaries. The source was the newly emancipated peasantry that perceived the Polish National Council as the landlords' institution and the Supreme Ruthenian Council as theirs. The Ukrainian leadership instinctively and wisely supported the peasantry's aspirations, particularly its demand for a large share of the forests and pastures whose ownership was in dispute. In terms of all-European and Hapsburg politics, the Ukrainian movement was counter-revolutionary, but in terms of the concrete situation in East Central Europe it had a remarkably radical socioeconomic program. It was in the course of the revolution that the image was born of the Hapsburg-true Ruthenians, the Tyroleans of the East. But this reputation was the product of the peculiar constellation of interests that emerged during the revolution. It had little political meaning thereafter.

Politics as such disappeared for a decade after the suppression of the revolution, until the defeats of 1859 and 1866 forced Austria to reform its political structures. In the constitutional wrangling of the 1860s, the Ukrainian-Polish conflict of 1848 revived. Ukrainians still championed the partition of Galicia and saw in the German centralists their natural allies. Polish political parties, however, all insisted upon the integrity of Galicia. The Polish democrats wanted this large province to

enjoy formal autonomy along the lines of the Hungarian kingdom, with Polish political hegemony. By the late 1860s, after demonstrations organized by the democrats and the appearance of a new and imaginative Polish conservative party, the *Stańczyks*, the status of Galicia was settled: it was to be a unified province with far-reaching but informal autonomy under the solid control of the Polish gentry. Vienna's position was understandable. The Polish gentry constituted the only stratum in Galicia with the necessary cultural and material prerequisites for the exercise of power. But Ukrainian political leaders felt betrayed by this settlement, especially in light of their loyalty to the dynasty during the recent revolution, and many began to look to Russia to champion their interests. The Russophile tendency was dominant in Ukrainian politics from the 1860s through the 1880s; among its hallmarks was an uncompromising antipathy to anything Polish.

The Poles for their part turned the pro-Russian sympathies of a large part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to what seemed to be their own advantage. As Austro-Russian relations deteriorated in the 1870s and 1880s, Polish political leaders pointed to the Russophile Ukrainians as a dangerously disloyal element in a particularly dangerous location, along the Russian border. They made the case in Vienna that they, the Poles, were the only reliable element in the crownland and that the erstwhile Tyroleans of the East had become traitorous irredentists. In the 1880s the Polish authorities in Galicia conducted a major offensive against Ukrainian Russophilism, which in 1882 alone included prosecuting leading Russophiles on charges of high treason and purging suspected Russophiles in the Ruthenian higher clergy.

The persecution of the Russophiles accelerated the rise of another Ukrainian political movement, national populism (*narodovstvo*). Inspired by Ukrainian activists from the Russian empire, the national populists held no sympathies for the Russia that persecuted the Ukrainian movement within its boundaries; instead, they championed the concept of a completely separate Ukrainian nationality and worked hard and effectively to acquire a solid base among the peasantry. This dynamic movement became hegemonic in Galician Ukrainian politics by the end of the 1880s and remained so until after the collapse of the empire. Although at first national populism was not so fanatically anti-Polish as Russophilism, the very dynamism of the movement, particularly its expanding network of organizations in the countryside, was recognized as a threat by the conservative gentry of Eastern Galicia, the Podolians. Already by the early 1890s the influential Podolians decided that the waning Russophile movement was the lesser of two evils, and the Galician lieutenants (governors) Leon Piniński (1898–1903) and Andrzej Potocki (1903–8) deliberately supported the Russophiles as a counterweight to the flourishing Ukrainian movement proper, national populism.

The rise of national populism meant the penetration of the Ukrainian national idea and political consciousness to the broad masses of the East Galician population. But a similar process was also taking place in Polish society. Until the end of the

1880s Polish politics in Galicia was largely the monopoly of two conservative gentry parties, the Kraków-based *Stańczyks* and the Lviv-based Podolians. The democrats, prominent in 1848–49 and in the 1860s, were pushed to the margins of Galician political life. At the end of the 1880s, however, a Polish populist movement emerged, inspired by an emigrant from the Congress Kingdom, Bolesław Wysłouch.<sup>5</sup> In 1890 a Polish social democratic party was founded. The Galician social democrats were ideologically close to Piłsudski's wing of the Polish Socialist Party, that is, they combined socialism with Polish nationalism. In 1905 right-wing Polish nationalists founded the Democratic-National Party, which was particularly popular among the Polish minority in Eastern Galicia. In short, Polish nationalism and political consciousness was permeating new layers of Polish society, below the gentry and intelligentsia.

By the turn of the century both Ukrainian and Polish society in Galicia consisted of mobilized, politicized nations, with the result that national antagonisms intensified. The Ukrainians had developed to the point that they were increasing their demands: they wanted not only the partition of Galicia, but independent statehood if possible; they wanted, like the Czechs, their own university in the capital city of their province; they wanted too a proportional share of seats in the parliament and the diet. Polish political parties of almost all stripes felt that the Ukrainians were pushing too far too fast and held on to as much as they could of what they had traditionally possessed, their *stan posiadania*. From the late 1890s on, Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia broke out into sporadic violence: a shot fired at the Ukrainian writer Ivan Franko, the killing of Ukrainian peasants during elections, rioting and gunplay at the university and the assassination of Lieutenant Potocki by a Ukrainian student in 1908. Both Ukrainian and Polish political parties, on the left even more than on the right, fostered paramilitary training of the youth and prepared the cadres who would confront each other in the Polish-Ukrainian war that broke out in 1918 within weeks of the collapse of Austro-Hungary.

Although conflict formed the main content of Polish-Ukrainian political relations in Galicia, there were also some moments of compromise that deserve mention. Around 1870 the national populists, when they were still a minority movement in Ukrainian Galicia, sought an accommodation with the more progressive of the Polish democrats. But as an unpopular alliance of political marginalities it bore no fruit. From 1890 to 1894 Ukrainian national populists came to an understanding with the Polish Club. But this "new era" ended in mutual recriminations, with the Ukrainians feeling the Poles were making only superficial concessions and the Poles feeling the Ukrainians were making unrealistic and radical demands. With world war in the air, Vienna sought to make peace between the leading nationalities of its easternmost province and in 1914 did in fact engineer an important compromise between Poles and Ukrainians which increased Ukrainian representation in the Galician diet and pledged the creation of a Ukrainian university. But this compromise

was blown apart along with the empire in the course of the war. From the late 1870s, when they first appeared in Galicia, Polish and Ukrainian socialists tried to work together. Their relations were at best stormy; they formed separate socialist parties and quarreled about as much as they cooperated, with relations deteriorating over time.

Jewish politics began with a struggle for emancipation during the revolution of 1848–49 and the reforms of the 1860s. During the revolution and the sessions of the Galician diet of 1866–68, Jewish political leaders allied themselves with the Polish democrats and, in the late 1860s, also with the modernizing wing of the conservative gentry, the *Stańczyks*. Only these two Galician political currents, however inconsistently and incompletely, supported the Jews' efforts to achieve legal equality with the Christian population. Opposed to Jewish emancipation were those political currents that had remained impervious to the liberal ideas coming to the fore in Austria in that era: the older generation of Kraków conservatives, the Podolians of Eastern Galicia, and the Ruthenians. In the latter case, the strong identification with the peasantry (indeed, some of the Ruthenians' political representatives *were* peasants) also inclined them to oppose Jewish emancipation, particularly with regard to Jews' participation in municipal government and ownership of land. By 1868, however, the Jews achieved formal emancipation.

For most of the nineteenth century, the Jews allied themselves unequivocally with the Poles against the Ruthenians. In 1848–49 Jewish political leaders supported the Polish National Council; in the 1860s they supported the movement for a Polish-dominated autonomous Galicia; and in elections to parliament and the diet (with the sole exception of the 1873 elections to parliament)<sup>6</sup> they supported the Polish candidates over Ruthenian candidates in Eastern Galicia. This alliance with the Poles was determined by a multiplicity of factors.

For one thing, the Jews were a small, vulnerable minority in a region where the Poles, especially after 1867, were the dominant element politically, culturally, and socially. For the Jews to hitch their wagon to the politically marginalized, oppressed, and plebeian Ruthenians made no sense, even had the latter been well disposed toward them. But the Ruthenians were anything but Judeophiles. Not only was there the social antagonism between peasants and Jews, but the Ruthenian political leadership had long lacked the sophistication to understand the Jewish question in ways more consonant with the liberal thinking that had emerged even in some Polish circles. Moreover, until fairly late in the nineteenth century, the leadership of the Ruthenian movement consisted overwhelmingly of priests, and their importance at the local level continued into the twentieth century. This clerical influence on the Ruthenian movement did not foster a more enlightened attitude toward the Jewish population. Furthermore, in the formative decades of the period from the 1860s to the 1880s the Ruthenian movement was dominated by Russophiles, whose admiration for Russia reinforced their antipathy toward and alienation from the Jewish community. Characteristically, when the Galician authorities launched their major

assault on the Russophile movement in 1882, many East Galician Jews, horrified by the pogroms across the border in the previous year, informed against suspected Russophiles, and in turn the Russophile press raged against them.

Aside from the circumstance that the Poles were powerful and the Ruthenians weak and hostile, the Jewish-Polish political alliance in nineteenth-century Galicia was also determined by the peculiar electoral practices of that place and time. The dominance of the Polish gentry in Galician politics derived partly from the ability of Polish noblemen to be elected by peasants, of both Polish and Ruthenian nationality, with whom, however, they stood in an objectively adversarial relationship. That this was possible at all was a consequence of the electoral law, which divided the electorate into curiae more or less corresponding to social classes; in the peasant curia, the franchise was indirect, so that in the final stage of the electoral process only a small number of peasant electors had to be influenced to vote for the gentry's candidate. These were, very simply and unabashedly, bribed to vote for the gentry candidate; and where the political consciousness of the peasantry was too developed to allow the purchase of votes with vodka, sausage,<sup>7</sup> money, or access to woods and pasture, various forms of electoral chicanery were employed, including the theft of the electors' legitimation cards. In all these operations, Jews, especially the more influential tavernkeepers and lessees and managers of estates and forests, were almost indispensable instruments of the Polish gentry. This not only worked to cement the Polish-Jewish alliance, but drove the wedge between Jews and the Ruthenian national movement deeper. However, there is a greater import to this pragmatic alliance; it objectifies the larger social fact that often those Jews who enjoyed influence in their own community in virtue of their exalted social position—and tavernkeepers and manor Jews enjoyed such influence—were dependent for their status on the favor of the Polish landlords. Competition to lease the right of propination (that is, to run a tavern) and competition to lease and manage estates were both extremely fierce; one cannot imagine a tavernkeeper or lease-holder risking the seignior's good will by refusing to do his part to ensure the election of the appropriate candidate.

Yet there was still more to it than that. Many of the Jews who were involved in politics were genuine Polish patriots in the latter half of the nineteenth century. It was a peculiar conjuncture in the development of Jewish politics in Galicia. It was not until the very end of the nineteenth century that any form of *Jewish* national movement emerged, whether socialist or Zionist in form. Yet nationalism was already exerting a powerful attraction from the middle of the century, and those Galician Jews who because of their education or social position came under its spell quite naturally adopted the Polish variant, especially in this period when the exclusivity of Polish nationalism had not yet crystalized. Furthermore, since the early nineteenth century, the Galician Jewish elite had been exposed to the ideas of the Jewish Enlightenment emanating from Germany, the Haskala, which called for linguistic, cultural, and civic assimilation to the non-Jewish majority. Although at first

what this meant was assimilation to *German* culture, which was quite reasonable in Austrian Galicia, particularly before the 1860s, already by mid-century it tended to mean assimilation to *Polish* culture.<sup>8</sup> The 1880s were the heyday of the Polish assimilationist movement among educated Galician Jews. Especially in the neophyte phase, the Polish-oriented assimilationist movement included an adoption of Polish political goals.<sup>9</sup>

The ties binding Jews politically to the Poles began to come undone almost all at the same time around the turn of the century. One of the most powerful solvents was the extension of the franchise, first the introduction of the fifth curia, based on universal manhood suffrage, in 1896 and then the complete replacement of the curial system by universal manhood suffrage in 1907. Although these reforms extended only to parliamentary elections, while the curial system was retained in elections to the Galician diet, they altered the balance of political forces in Galicia, and for that matter all of Austria. The new electoral politics accelerated the politicization of the masses and broke the monopoly of power traditionally enjoyed by the Polish *szlachta*. The Ruthenians began to make palpable gains, Polish peasants finally entered politics, and even the Jewish masses entered political movements representing, for the first time, their specific interests. Of course, the coming of universal manhood suffrage should be understood not just as an event that caused change, but also as the culmination of a process of change that had been going on since at least the 1860s (the introduction of compulsory education, local self-government, civil freedoms, and representative assemblies with restricted franchise).

The turn of the century also saw a strong dose of anti-Semitism injected into Galician Polish political culture. Although there had always been anti-Jewish currents in Polish political circles, a new era began with the emergence of "national democracy," which proudly championed modern political anti-Semitism and considered it a component of Polish patriotism. Because of the Ukrainian-Polish antagonism these right-wing nationalists were hegemonic among the Polish minority in Eastern Galicia; in particular, the powerful East Galician gentry, the Podolians, supported them. The growing influence of virulent anti-Semitism in Galician Polish politics cooled the ardor of Polish-oriented assimilationists. While at the start of the constitutional era educated Galician Jews might be fervent Polish patriots but barely be able to speak the language, by the eve of World War I Jewish intellectuals all had a mastery of Polish, but fewer retained tender feelings for Poland.

In the early twentieth century the Ruthenian movement was also much different than it had been in the first decades of the constitutional era. It was now overwhelmingly Ukrainian in orientation; the Russophiles were not entirely gone, but they were politically insignificant and snubbed by conscious Ukrainians. Priests were leaders only at the village level; in fact, in the central leadership of the movement (in party executives and major editorial boards) anticlericals held sway.<sup>10</sup> Ukrainian politics had also gained experience and sophistication. It was now firmly placed on

the left side of the political spectrum, with liberal-democratic and socialist ideas prevailing. Moreover, modern political anti-Semitism was represented only in the fringes of Ruthenian politics, in the vestiges of the Russophile movement, where the influence of the Russian Black Hundreds could be felt, and in the miniscule Christian social party.

In these new circumstances the possibility finally emerged for political alliances between Ukrainians and Jews. In 1907 the Ukrainian parties and the Zionists entered into an electoral alliance, and Ukrainian and Jewish social democrats cooperated against the pretensions of Polish socialists to dominate Galician social democracy. When Austria collapsed and a Ukrainian-Polish war broke out over Lviv, the Jews declared their neutrality; the Poles, however, felt the Jews had in fact sided with the Ukrainians and punished them with two days of pogroms once they had driven the Ukrainian forces out of the city.

The three nationalities of Galicia represented, by and large, three separate religious cultures: Roman Catholicism, Greek Catholicism (Uniatism), and Judaism.<sup>11</sup> Relations among them were, and had been long before the Austrian period, acrimonious.

When Austria acquired Galicia, the Ruthenian Uniate church that existed there was to a considerable degree the product of an earlier conflict between Poles and Ruthenians and between Western and Eastern Christendom. The origins of Ruthenian Uniatism<sup>12</sup> go back to the end of the sixteenth century when, for a variety of reasons, the Orthodox hierarchy of the Belorussian and Ukrainian territories of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth decided to unite with the Roman Catholic church. In this first (incidentally, very creative) phase of Uniatism, in which the initiative toward church union sprang primarily from the Ruthenian side, Galicia did not participate, remaining a stronghold of Eastern Orthodoxy. The church union in the remaining Ukrainian lands was soon to be shaken to its foundations by the Cossack revolt under the leadership of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, which, among other goals, sought to suppress the union and restore Orthodoxy as the sole religion on Ukrainian territory. It was only after Poland lost Left-Bank Ukraine and the remnants of the Cossacks were suppressed on the Right Bank at the turn of the eighteenth century, that the union was extended to the western Ukrainian territories, including Galicia. The Uniate church in Galicia was thus a product of the Polish reconquista. It lacked the dynamism of the earlier Uniatism. In fact, it was just a politically safer form of Eastern Christianity, a church suited for the serf population of the eastern borderlands, and like its faithful, it was, in spite of the efforts of some outstanding bishops, poor, neglected, powerless, and ignorant.

Austria was in some ways like the handsome prince of fairy tales who rescues the poor relation from drudgery and subservience and restores her to an honorable place. The enlightened absolutists Maria Theresa and Joseph II, immediately upon

acquiring Galicia, set to work to elevate the status of the Ruthenian church. Maria Theresa rechristened it the Greek Catholic church to symbolize its full equality with the Roman Catholic church. Both she and her son established regular seminaries so that Greek Catholic priests could acquire as good an education as their Roman Catholic counterparts. They freed them and their children from all feudal duties and rents. Joseph II established regular salaries for them so that they were no longer so poor. Under old Poland, the Roman Catholic hierarch in Lviv was an archbishop and the Ruthenian only a bishop. Here, too, the Austrians established full equality and, in fact, in 1808 restored the Greek Catholic metropolis of Halych. These improvements in the affairs of the Ruthenian church were not greeted with sympathy by the Latin-rite hierarchy in Galicia; the Roman Catholic archbishop of Lviv, Wacław Sierakowski, fought tooth and nail against some of the reforms benefiting the Uniates, making representations to both Rome and Vienna. For its part, the Ruthenian hierarchy developed a great attachment to the Hapsburg dynasty. When in 1809 Polish insurgents occupied Lviv and tried to force the Greek Catholic metropolitan, Antonii Anhelovych, to swear an oath of loyalty to Napoleon, the metropolitan refused and fled the city. The insurgents caught up with him and arrested him, but in the end he received a decoration from the emperor for his steadfast conduct.

The newly educated Ruthenian clergymen, the products of the Austrian enlightenment, became the first Ruthenian intelligentsia and, in the 1820s and 1830s, the first awakeners of the Ruthenian nationality. They also formed the political leadership of the Ruthenian movement during the revolution of 1848–49 and for some decades thereafter. Aside from their participation in the political aspects of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, whose contours have been sketched in the previous section, they were also principals in the more confessional dimensions of this conflict.

While doing the work typical of the first phase of national revivals, that is, researching their history and wrestling with problems of language and national identity, the Ruthenian clergymen quite naturally reflected upon the history and identity of their particular church, with its hybrid status between the Eastern and Western branches of Christianity. Many came to the conclusion that the most valuable elements of their Ruthenian church were those that derived from the Eastern heritage. They initiated a movement to purge their liturgical practices of Latin accretions that had accumulated over the long period of unequal coexistence with the Roman Catholic Poles. This movement first emerged in the 1830s, but it resurfaced more powerfully in the 1860s, by which time it had developed a politically motivated and categorically anti-Polish thrust. Easternizing priests, especially (but not only) those connected with the Russophile movement, modified existing practices to conform with a purer Eastern model, donned the headgear worn by Orthodox priests and erected the three-barred crosses commonly associated with Orthodoxy. These innovations (or, in the eyes of the Easternizers, restorations) were not only condemned

by Rome, but fiercely persecuted by the Polish administration in Galicia. Many villages in Eastern Galicia in the 1870s and 1880s witnessed confrontations between the parish and the civil authorities when the latter arrived to remove three-barred crosses from churches.

The Polish-Ukrainian confessional conflict reached a crescendo in the Chełm affair of the 1860s and 1870s. Uniatism had been suppressed in most of the Russian empire before mid-century. Only one Uniate eparchy survived, that of Chełm, which was situated within the boundaries of Congress Poland. Here the process of Latinization of the Uniate church had gone very far and the clergy was to a great extent Polonized. Many Chełm clergymen sympathized with Polish patriotic agitation in 1861 and the insurrection of 1863–64. The Russian government determined to combat Polish influence in the Chełm region and to this purpose recruited a few hundred Ruthenian teachers and clergymen from Galicia to purify the Eastern rite in Chełm of Latinizations and to instill in the Uniate population an anti-Polish, Ruthenian/Russian consciousness. Although economic motivations were important and perhaps even paramount in the emigration to Chełm, confessional-ideological factors also played a role; the Galician emigrants, a youthful group on the whole, were given the free hand they lacked back home to purify the Uniate ritual, and they could also vent their antipathy toward the Roman Catholic Poles while enjoying the benevolence of the authorities. Of course, the Poles, in Galicia and in the other partitions, were horrified by this anti-Polish collusion between Galician Greek Catholics and the czarist government. In 1875 matters went further than many of the Galician emigrants originally anticipated, because the Russian government carried things through to their logical conclusion by abolishing the union altogether in the Chełm diocese. The Galician emigrants faced the choice of entering the Russian Orthodox church or returning to Galicia. The majority chose to become Orthodox and remain in Russia.

The Chełm affair not only widened the chasm between Polish Roman Catholics and Ruthenian Greek Catholics in Galicia, but it also seriously compromised the latter in the eyes of the Vatican and of Vienna, which worried about the attraction that Russia exercised on the inhabitants of the eastern borderlands. When in 1882 the most radical of the Russophiles, the Greek Catholic priest Ioann Naumovych, encouraged a Ruthenian village to announce that it wanted to convert to Orthodoxy, the Polish political and ecclesiastical leadership of Galicia had no trouble convincing their superiors in Rome and Vienna that swift and decisive measures were necessary to sanitize the Ruthenian church and put an end to pro-Orthodox, pro-Russian proclivities. The Greek Catholic metropolitan and his closest advisors were forced to resign, the Ruthenian Basilian monastic order was given over to the tutelage of the Polish Jesuits, who were also entrusted with missions in the Galician countryside, Naumovych was excommunicated<sup>13</sup> and a new, carefully chosen hierarchy was appointed. All these and other measures did succeed in curbing the Russophile tenden-

cies in the Greek Catholic church, but they also exacerbated the resentment of the Ruthenians against Polish overlordship, which now seemed to have been extended to their church. Indeed, at the advice of Polish political and religious leaders, the Vatican took steps toward introducing celibacy into the traditionally married Greek Catholic clergy in the 1890s, and the metropolitans appointed at the turn of the century were a veteran of the Polish national guard of 1848 and a Polish count who changed from the Latin to the Greek rite in order to enter a Jesuit-controlled Basilian monastery. It is difficult to document, but it is not unreasonable to suspect that the wave of anticlericalism that swept Ukrainian Galicia in the 1890s and 1900s was partly the consequence of the Ukrainian intelligentsia's perception that their church was now controlled by the Poles.

The Polish count who occupied the metropolitan throne of Halych from 1901<sup>14</sup> until his death in 1944 became one of the outstanding figures of twentieth-century Ukrainian history: Andrei Sheptytsky.<sup>15</sup> The background to his appointment has never been researched, but it is likely that the Polish ruling circles in Galicia thought that they were putting their own man in at the head of the Ruthenian church.<sup>16</sup> In a sense, they were right. No Greek Catholic prelate knew the upper reaches of Polish society in the way that Sheptytsky did, and no Greek Catholic prelate ever took up the cause of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation with such deep personal conviction as he. But Sheptytsky also sincerely embraced Ruthenian nationality and did everything in his power to support those aspirations of his adopted people that he considered just and consonant with a Christian worldview. The result was that those Polish circles which had initially welcomed his accession to the Ruthenian metropolitanate, because he seemed to be "their man," soon came to hate him with that special hate reserved for renegades.

In the Sheptytsky era the Polish-Ukrainian confessional conflict was more overtly political than ever in the past. The Roman Catholic archbishop of Lviv, Józef Bilczewski, contributed to the national democrats' campaign to Polonize largely Ukrainian Eastern Galicia by establishing there an unprecedented number of new Roman Catholic parishes and chaplaincies. In the struggle over electoral reform, Polish and Ukrainian bishops stood on opposite sides of the barricades. In 1906 a leading spokesman of the Polish episcopate, Archbishop Józef Teodorowicz,<sup>17</sup> publicly opposed universal manhood suffrage for elections to parliament, while the three Ukrainian bishops traveled to the emperor in Vienna to lobby for it. In 1913 Bilczewski, Teodorowicz, and the rest of the Polish episcopate, opposed to concessions to the Ukrainians, scuttled the compromise then being worked out to reform elections to the Galician diet; the Ukrainian bishops not only supported the reform project, but Sheptytsky picked up the pieces of the shattered compromise and refashioned and promoted it until it was approved by a majority in the diet in 1914. In connection with the census of 1910 the Greek and Roman Catholic archbishops of Lviv issued circulars with blatantly opposing viewpoints; Sheptytsky held that all

Roman Catholics who spoke Ukrainian should be counted as Ukrainians, while Bilczewski said they should be counted as Poles. Bilczewski and Sheptytsky also clashed during the Ukrainian-Polish war that followed upon the collapse of the old order.

Throughout the Austrian period Roman Catholicism and Greek Catholicism were engaged in a competition for adherents. Although the practice was forbidden by Rome, Ruthenian pastors tried to lure Roman Catholics to the Greek rite, while Polish pastors tried to lure Greek Catholics to the Latin rite. Such "soul-snatching," as it was called, had less to do with religion per se than with Ukrainianization and Polonization. In 1863 Roman and Greek Catholic bishops signed an agreement to stop this practice, the so-called Concordia; without this, soul-snatching would probably have been even more common than it was, but the Concordia cannot otherwise be considered an effective piece of ecclesiastical legislation.

Both the Roman and Greek Catholic churches in Galicia shared in the traditional Christian attitudes toward Jews. From the beginning of the Austrian period until well past the middle of the nineteenth century, Catholic bishops in Galicia issued pastoral letters that reflected medieval Christian prejudices against the Jews. The most notorious example emanated from the Roman Catholic bishop of Przemyśl, Franciszek Ksawery Wierchlejski, in 1860; when the Austrian government lifted the prohibition against Jewish households employing Christian servants, Wierchlejski reinstated the ban in a pastoral letter that also reminded the faithful that the Jews were Christ-killers.

Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century the Christian-Jewish conflict also took on more modern forms. Priests active in the anti-alcohol campaign often engaged in anti-Jewish agitation. As local activists of the national movements priests also tended to support the boycott of Jewish shops.

There seems to have been a difference in nuance, however, between anti-Jewish attitudes in the Roman and Greek Catholic churches. In the Greek Catholic church, which, much more profoundly than Galicia's Roman Catholic church, internalized the spirit of Josephinism, the social and economic aspects appear to have been more prominent than purely religious motives. As early as 1781, for example, the Greek Catholic consistory urged every parish to set up a school so that eventually Ruthenians could become "merchants and innkeepers instead of the Jews."<sup>18</sup> By the 1880s Polish Roman Catholicism had begun to identify the Jews as proponents of secularization and anti-Christian doctrines (especially socialism); the same attitudes penetrated into Greek Catholicism by the early twentieth century.<sup>19</sup>

In the early 1840s a German traveler remarked: "Whoever imagines Galicia to be an uninteresting country is very much mistaken. The mere contemplation of the influence of the different elements of the population upon each other cannot fail to be deeply interesting to every thoughtful mind."<sup>20</sup> Austrian Galicia was a rich crossroads of culture. Not only did Polish, Ukrainian, and Jewish culture come to-

gether here, but the region also enjoyed the strong presence of both Austro-German and Russian culture. The cross-cultural fertilization produced a vibrant cultural life and a great many interesting artists and intellectuals. The capital of Galicia, Lviv, boasts a unique collection of West and East European architectural monuments: here the Polish Gothic, Renaissance, baroque, and rococo rub shoulders with Austrian classicism and the Secession as well as traditional Byzantine-Ukrainian and even Armenian architecture.<sup>21</sup>

While social, political, and religious differences sharply divided the three major nationalities of Galicia, culture played a more ambivalent role. On the one hand, it did divide, in the obvious sense that the three nationalities had their own individual cultural worlds keeping them apart. On the other hand, there was both a constant process of borrowing and influence encouraged by cohabitation and, beginning in about the 1830s and accelerating in the 1860s, a general trend toward Europeanization and Austrianization that affected all three nationalities and created a new cultural common ground among them. The vast majority of Galician intellectuals were, after all, alumni of only two universities.

At the start of the Austrian period the three cultures were relatively isolated from one another. Both the Ruthenians and the Jews lived in deeply traditional, religiously structured cultures at some remove from general European cultural developments. Both of these nationalities spoke languages that were seldom, if ever, used in print. Of the three major Galician nationalities, only the Poles, and really only the Polish gentry, had a cultural life approximating that of the rest of Europe, with a strong secular component, a high literature on the European model, classical music, sculpture, even familiarity with the major languages of European culture—Latin, French, and later German. But even the Polish culture of the early Austrian period was relatively backward and isolated, sapped by the inward-looking Sarmatism of the gentry and cut off from the intellectual ferment that leavened what remained of Poland between the first and third partitions. German culture, also, of course, had a presence in the province. Even though it was a poor provincial relative of all-German culture and a minority culture in Galicia, it was fairly important in the early decades of Austrian rule, partly because of the “Germanization” policies of Joseph II and the influx of civil servants from Austria proper and Bohemia, but partly too because even in a stunted form it stood out in the cultural backwater of Galicia. Until the end of the empire and even after, Austro-German culture remained a factor in Galicia, and in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the region produced a number of notable writers in German, including Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, Karl Emil Franzos, and Joseph Roth. The development of professional theater might serve as a very rough indicator of the progress of Europeanization of the national cultures in Galicia. A German theater was established in Lviv in 1776, a Polish theater in 1809, a Ruthenian theater in 1864, and a Jewish theater (Gimpl’s Theater) only in 1889.

The process of the development of modern national cultures for the Ruthenians and Jews included in each case a transitional period during which the national elite was absorbed into one of the foreign but “higher” cultures of Galicia. In the case of the Ruthenians, this involved assimilation into linguistically-related Polish culture. In the first half of the nineteenth century, Ruthenian seminarians and clergymen spoke Polish among themselves and in general immersed themselves in the Polish cultural milieu. The beginnings of a national revival in the 1830s and 1840s, but particularly the revolution of 1848 and the constitutional struggles of the 1860s, put an end to this process of cultural Polonization and initiated the attempt to build a Ruthenian high culture equal in all respects to the Polish model with which all educated Ruthenians were intimately familiar. Indeed, it has been suggested that the emergence and break from the Polish cultural milieu was one of the factors leading to the hegemony of the Russophile orientation of the Ruthenian intelligentsia in the decades from the 1860s to the 1880s: “The rupture with Polish society was so difficult that the generation of Ruthenian intellectuals which had effected the break tended to lean to the opposite direction.”<sup>22</sup> In the case of the Jews, as has already been noted, their educated elite identified first with linguistically related German culture and then with Polish culture. Only toward the end of the nineteenth century, in conjunction with the emergence of modern Jewish politics, were there attempts at creating a modern Jewish culture.

Where possible the three nationalities led separate cultural lives. They each had, for example, their own periodical press (the Jewish press came out in German, Polish, Hebrew, and Yiddish). There was, to my knowledge, only one journal in the history of Galicia that included prominent contributors from all three nationalities: *Przegląd Społeczny*, which Wyslouch published in Lviv in 1886–87.<sup>23</sup> Characteristically, it appeared in Polish, a language in which educated persons of all three nationalities could write; neither Ukrainian nor Yiddish or Hebrew could have served as a vehicle for an all-Galician meeting of minds. In fact, every all-Galician cultural institution had a largely Polish character. The University of Lviv is a case in point, although the Ukrainians preferred to have their own university and agitated vehemently for one from 1901 to 1914. The opera too was largely Polish. For the daughter of a Greek Catholic priest, Salomea Krusceniski, to be in a position to rescue Puccini’s *Madame Butterfly* at its reopening in Brescia, she initially had to serve an apprenticeship in Polish opera, first in Lviv and then in Warsaw.

Numerous individuals, of course, straddled or crossed cultures. A Jewish doctor, Polish patriot, and German poet could all be invited to dinner with only one place setting. The same, of course, could be said of a Polish count and a Ukrainian archbishop (Andrei Sheptytsky, incidentally, wrote letters in Hebrew to Galician Jews and in his mother tongue, French, to his family). The greatest Western Ukrainian poet, Ivan Franko, was known to the Polish and Austro-German reading public as a prolific and perceptive journalist; he also translated from Yiddish. Wilhelm

Feldman was a product of the Jewish ghetto who became a prominent Polish critic and author of what for long was the standard history of Polish political thought; he was, moreover, markedly Ukrainophile in his views. Roman Rosdolsky, who became not only an eminent historian of Josephine agrarian policy but a brilliant interpreter of Marx's economic theory, was a nationally conscious Ukrainian who, however, published all his major works in Polish and German; he also wrote a study on Marx, Engels, and the Jewish question and spent time in Auschwitz for aiding Jews in Nazi-occupied Kraków.

However, these were exceptions. The general tendency by the end of Austrian rule in Galicia was toward increasing cultural division. Whereas at the outset of the Austrian period the cultures of the three nationalities were isolated from one another as a result of long-term historical processes, at the close of the period they were isolated rather more by choice. The intensity and growing consciousness of social, political, and religious differences among the nationalities favored the rise of cultural nationalism and autarky.

Galicia was not the only setting for a Polish-Ukrainian-Jewish triangle. A similar national configuration existed across the Russian border in Right-Bank Ukraine. Here, however, the Poles were a definite minority, almost entirely gentry, without the equivalent of the Polish peasant population of Western Galicia. For this reason, and also because serfdom lasted longer and assumed a harsher nature under Russian than under Austrian law, the social antagonism between Ukrainians and Poles was even more acute than in Galicia (at least until the 1860s). The Ukrainians of the Right Bank had been predominantly Uniate before coming under Russian rule, but the Russian government largely suppressed Uniatism here in the 1790s and completed the process in 1839; thereafter the Ukrainians of the Right Bank were Russian Orthodox. Hence the religious difference between Poles and Ukrainians was more emphatic in the Right Bank than in Galicia; it was not a rivalry between different rites of the same church under the ultimate jurisdiction of Rome. But the most crucial dissimilarity between Galicia and the Right Bank lay in their respective political environments.

The Russian government persecuted all three nationalities. Although at first the Right-Bank Poles enjoyed considerable advantages in the cultural, especially educational, sphere, these were erased by the retaliatory measures taken by the Russian government after the defeat of the Polish insurrection of 1830–31. These measures also included arrest, exile, and confiscation of property for thousands of Polish nobles who had participated in the insurrection. (It was also in this context that the Uniate church was completely abolished in the Right Bank.) After the defeat of the 1863 insurrection, the Russian government launched an even more drastic anti-Polish policy in the Right Bank, which included executions, deportations, the abolition of all Polish organizations, and a ban on the Polish language. Certain ad-

vantages accrued to the Ukrainians of the Right Bank as a result of the government's vendetta against the Poles. As part of the "Russification" program of the 1830s and 1840s, institutions were established, notably Kiev University and the Archaeographical Commission in Kiev, that played a distinguished role in the Ukrainian revival in the Russian empire. Also, the Ukrainian peasantry in the Right Bank benefited from the coincidence that their emancipation from serfdom was regulated in the aftermath of the Polish insurrection of 1863; here the largely Polish landlords did not enjoy as favorable a reform as landlords did elsewhere in the empire. But overall Russian policy was anti-Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language was banned from print in 1863 and again, more thoroughly, in 1876; the ban lasted until 1905. The language was altogether prohibited in schools, churches, and government offices. Ukrainian activists, including the poet Shevchenko, a native of the Right Bank, were arrested and exiled, and others were forced into exile abroad. Ukrainian organizations of any sort remained illegal until 1905 and were still harassed by the police thereafter. As for the Jews, they were hemmed in by numerous legal restrictions, and the state authorities turned a blind eye to the activities of pogromists.

The contrast with Galicia is striking. Here, from the 1860s on, the Polish gentry enjoyed the favor of the central authorities, and the Ukrainians nonetheless had the right to use their language in all spheres of public life and to organize for their political, social, and cultural advancement, while the Jews were emancipated and their lives and property protected by the state. Seen in this context, the triangle in Austrian Galicia, for all its manifold antagonisms, appears relatively healthy.

The national antagonisms in Galicia increased over time during the period of Austrian rule, but much of the content of these antagonisms can be attributed to growing pains. In particular, the whole political dimension of these antagonistic relations, which was superimposed on existing socioeconomic and religious differences in the mid-nineteenth century, represented a tremendous advance for all three nationalities, even for the Poles. The increasing participation of all elements of the population in political life necessarily brought with it an exacerbation of national conflict, but this situation was far superior to that existing, say, in the Right Bank, where political life of the European type was virtually absent. Underlying Galicia's national-political antagonism was, in other words, a progressive democratization. The politicization of national conflict also meant a relatively orderly working-out of differences. Violent peasant rebellions and pogroms virtually disappeared in Galicia once conflict shifted to the political plane, where elections, newspapers, and organizations replaced sharpened, straightened-out scythes and thick sticks.<sup>24</sup>

Similarly, the Polish-Ukrainian antagonism would never have reached the pitch it did without the socioeconomic, ecclesiastical, political, and educational reforms instituted in Austria; these transformed the Ruthenian peasant folk into a well-organized, disciplined nation capable of pursuing its own interests. One need not even look across the Russian border for an apt counter-example; the Ruthenians of

Transcarpathia, in the Hungarian half of the empire, were cordoned off from this elevating process and, without political rights and education, remained a mere object of history until after the collapse of the Hapsburg monarchy. Transcarpathia thus escaped the tumult of Galician-style national conflict, but the stillness was that of the sickbed or worse.

Even the increase in socioeconomic antagonism to the Jews in the second half of the nineteenth century was largely the result of indisputably progressive measures, particularly the legal emancipation of the Jews (the right to own land, the lifting of restrictions on occupation) and economic reform (abolition of serfdom, fostering of a money economy).

Moreover, the march toward conflict was not inexorable. By the very last years of Austrian rule in the province there were signs that the nationalities were starting to work out a *modus vivendi*. Particularly noteworthy were the Polish-Ukrainian compromise of 1914, which might have laid the foundations for a reasonably peaceful coexistence in Galicia had war not intervened, and the beginnings of a Ukrainian-Jewish rapprochement.

In the post-Austrian history of Galicia, outside interference was more decisive than any natural, internal Galician tendencies of development. When Galicia ended up, not without bitter resistance from the Ukrainians, in an independent Polish state, the balance between Poles and Ukrainians was tipped all the way in favor of the Poles. As a result, possibilities for a peaceful *modus vivendi* became slim if they existed at all. As for the Galician Jews, their miserable existence as pariahs in inter-war Poland came to a terrible end when Galicia was occupied by Nazi Germany. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Galicia destroyed the traditional Polish presence in the region and much else besides.

## Notes

1. This essay, in a somewhat different form, was originally presented at the conference "Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians in Galicia: 1772–1918," sponsored by the Institut für die Wissenschaften vom Menschen, Vienna, 26–28 June 1992.

2. Roman Rosdolsky, *Engels and the "Nonhistoric" Peoples: The National Question in the Revolution of 1848* (Glasgow: Critique Books, 1987), 57–64. The difficulty of coming to terms with 1846 is still evident in Polish historiography on the subject. Not so long ago a leading authority on modern Polish history, in a standard reference work, repeated as fact the preposterous claim of Polish nobles of the 1840s that Jakub Szela received a medal from the Austrian government for his leadership of the Galician jacquerie. See Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (Seattle, London: University of Washington Press, 1974), 135.

3. Shevchenko came from Right-Bank Ukraine and remained in the Russian empire all his life. But his poetry had a powerful influence in Galicia after his death in 1861. He was not

only the national poet, but the greatest hero in the national pantheon for all Galicians who identified with the Ukrainian movement.

4. Chone Shmeruk, "Jews and Poles in Yiddish Literature in Poland between the Two World Wars," *Polin* 1 (1986): 176–95.

5. Father Stanisław Stojalowski, an eccentric demagogue and anti-Semite, is also considered a forerunner of the Polish populist movement. He began his agitation among the peasantry in the mid-1870s.

6. The Jews and the Ruthenians were both allied with the German centralists in this election, not particularly with each other.

7. "Electoral sausage" (*Wahlwurst*, or *vyborcha kovbasa*) was a genuine item in the Galician political lexicon.

8. A characteristic transitional figure was Moritz Rappaport, a Jewish physician in Lviv and enthusiastic Polish patriot who, however, gained fame in the 1840s to 1860s for his poetry in the German language.

9. Characteristically, the exceptional 1873 elections to parliament, in which the Jews allied with the German centralists against the Poles, represented the last political act of the German-oriented assimilationist movement. Dr. Emil Byk of Shomer Israel, who played a major role in the 1873 elections, later evolved into a Polish-oriented assimilationist.

10. The editor of the leading literary review, *Literaturno-naukovyj visnyk*, was the well-known freethinker Ivan Franko. The head of the Shevchenko Scientific Society was Mykhailo Hrushevsky, a historian from Russian Ukraine who was antipathetic to the Uniate church. The first modern Ukrainian political party was the anticlerical Radical party, founded in 1890. Its right wing broke off in 1899 and formed the National Democratic party with Hrushevsky and the national populists; the National Democrats constituted the largest and most effective Ukrainian political party in Galicia. (It should be noted that the Ukrainian National Democrats were liberal, democratic nationalists and, except for the accident of their name, had little in common with the Polish National Democrats.)

11. There were, however, some Poles of the Greek rite (Marshal Rydz-Śmigły was one) and some Ukrainian-speaking peasants of the Latin rite (the so-called *latynnyky*). The vast majority of Poles, however, were Roman Catholic and the vast majority of Ukrainians Greek Catholic.

12. Here the term "Ruthenian" is used in a related but different sense than it has been used earlier. In reference to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, "Ruthenian" generally designates the entire Eastern Christian population, that is, both the Belorussians and Ukrainians.

13. In connection with this he wrote a classic exposition of the anti-Roman position of the Galician Easternizers: *Appelliatsiia k pape L'vu XIII russkago uniatskago sviashchennika mestechka Skalat (l'vovskoi mitropolii v Galitsii) Ioanna Naumovicha protiv velikago otlucheniia ego ot tserkvi po obvineniiu v skhizme* (1883). This appeal to Pope Leo XIII was also serialized, with some omissions, in the Russophile newspaper *Slovo*, nos. 119–37, (1882).

14. He was named metropolitan by Pope Leo XIII on 17 December 1900 and formally installed on 17 January 1901.

15. *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul Robert Magocsi (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1989). Andrei came from the same Sheptytsky (Szeptycki) family as the eighteenth-century bishops of Lviv, Atanasii and Leo. In the intervening century the family had gone over completely to the Latin rite.

16. Sheptytsky was only thirty-six when he was appointed metropolitan. In 1898 the ailing Metropolitan Sylvestr Sembratovych wrote to the Oriental Congregation in Rome about the

problem of succession. He recommended against Sheptytsky, who was “a bit young and immature” and enjoyed little sympathy among the Ruthenians.

17. He was archbishop of Lviv of the Armenian rite. In spite of the difference in rite, Teodorowicz was not only a member of the Polish episcopate, but an influential formulator of its stance on political and moral issues. Interestingly, one of the most energetic figures among the Podolian gentry was Dawid Abrahamowicz, also a Pole of Armenian extraction.

18. Julian Pelesz, *Geschichte der Union der ruthenischen Kirche mit Rom von den aeltesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart*, vol. 2 (Würzburg-Vienna: Leo Woerl, 1881), 677.

19. Andrzej Kudłaszyk, *Katolicka myśl społeczno-polityczna w Galicji na przełomie XIX i XX wieku*, Prace Naukowe Instytutu Nauk Społecznych Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 24; Seria: Monografie, 14 (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Wrocławskiej, 1980), 154. From a pastoral letter of the Ruthenian episcopate: “The supreme leaders [of the socialists] are Jews and masons who directly conduct a war with Jesus Christ and his holy church” *Posłaniie pastyrśke Andreia Sheptyts’koho . . . Konstancyina Chekhovycha . . . Hryhoriia Khomyshyna . . . do Virnykh svoikh eparkhii o vyborakh do parlamentu* (Zhovkva: Pechatnia oo. Vasyliian, 1907).

20. J. G. Kohl, *Austria, Vienna, Prague, Hungary, Bohemia, and the Danube: Galicia, Styria, Moravia, Bukovina, and the Military Frontier* (London: Chapman and Hall, 1844), 442.

21. For an appreciation, see Karl Schlögel, “Lwow war Lemberg oder eine Reise an den Pol des Zweifels,” *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* no. 82 (8 April 1989).

22. Ivan L. Rudnytsky, “The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule,” in his *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, ed. Peter L. Rudnytsky (Edmonton: Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, 1987), 330. In confirmation of this thesis one might note that the most extreme of the Russophiles, Ioann Naumovych, had sided with the Poles in 1848.

23. Contributors included the Poles Ludwik Krzywicki and Zygmunt Balicki, the Ukrainians Mykhailo Drahomanov and Ivan Franko and the Jews Wilhelm Feldman and Alfred Nossig. Wysłouch’s newspaper, *Kurjer Lwowski*, also had Ukrainian and Jewish contributors in the 1880s and 1890s.

24. An exception was the wave of pogroms in Western Galicia in 1898. Although it had its roots partly in electoral agitation, it involved one of the least politicized strata of Galician society, the Polish peasantry.