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Whose History is "Our" History? The Influence of Naval Power in
Sevastopol's Reconstruction, 1944-53"

Karl D. Qualls

With the approval of Admiral Oktriabrskii (Commander of the Black Sea Fleet), Sevastopol's governing body (the Municipal Executive Committee or Gorispolkom) issued temporary instructions on 4 December 1944 that forbade all activity by the civilian municipal government on naval territory without the consent of the Fleet or the People's Commissariat of the Navy.¹ Only six months after Sevastopol's liberation from a two-year German occupation, even as the war continued, the navy thus delineated its sphere of influence in the city. The navy did not, however, reciprocate; military and naval officials played a seminal role in the redesign of the civilian sectors of the city as well. Two days after Gorispolkom's order, with most of the city in ruins, the Military Council of the Primorskaia Army presented a proposal to Gorispolkom for a museum at Sapun Gora, which had been the site of a major battle during the liberation of the city, as well as for improvements around monuments throughout the city. With construction resources already overburdened, the city government directed municipal and naval officials to provide materials and services to fulfill the proposal.² With factories and homes still in rubble, why did the city government approve the diversion of vital resources to memorialize military feats of the near and distant past? What does this decision tell us about priorities in a city devastated by war, and what can we learn about municipal-military cooperation and contestation? To anticipate, the navy was about to undertake a concerted effort to restore an urban biography and refashion an "imagined community."³

Perhaps the most common popular association between the military and cities is how much damage the former has caused the latter. While this has admittedly been the case in times of war, the relationship has been more complex in times of peace. A military base is an essential part of a local community's economic, cultural, social, and political identity. The Soviet Union was no different in this sense, even though some Cold War studies have suggested that institutions other than the party rarely mattered. In Sevastopol, which was the home of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet (and today the Russian and Ukrainian fleets), the military--and the navy in particular--significantly influenced life in the city. As was common in the Soviet Union, spheres of responsibility and authority often overlapped and it was not always clear to which organs one had to report. This vagueness created conflict but also cooperation when two or more agencies shared the same agenda.

The navy was part of, and helped to create, a unique urban biography. In addition to fighting, all branches of the military were political organizations and sought to maintain wartime popularity through self-promotion. Because this coincided with the municipal government's desire to maintain the city's privileged status, the two institutions often cooperated in redesigning the destroyed city as a monument to naval feats.

During World War II German forces quickly cracked through the newly incorporated territories of the Soviet Union and into Russia. The path of the blitzkrieg left fields, factories, houses, and hospitals in flames. Everywhere one looked, the urban landscape had been transformed into wasteland; the German army systematically destroyed or expropriated the conveniences and basic necessities of life. From bakeries and city squares to water-treatment plants, only the shells of buildings greeted inhabitants as they returned to their homes after the German retreat.

Forests lay charred. Historic monuments and national treasures were defiled. Once-fertile soil was pocked with dugouts, trenches, and anti-tank defenses.

After the lightning-quick, destructive Nazi attacks against Sevastopol in November and December 1941, mythmakers in the Soviet press began to link these battles with the heroic defense of the city during the Crimean War (1854-1855).⁴ On 11 November and again on 17 December 1941, German forces failed to capture the city, but after the month-long bombardment of 7 June to 4 July 1942 Soviet forces retreated. The dramatic image of stalwart urban defense against invading barbarians then found additional resonance during the nearly two-year occupation (4 July 1942-9 May 1944) of the city by German forces.

Both during the war and the reconstruction afterwards, many used Sevastopol's history of sacrifice and perseverance to create or refashion an image of the city. The navy became both a stable image, from which residents derived an understanding of place, and an active creator and preserver of the city's image. As the largest and most prominent institution in the city, the navy was visible and powerful, and it used its presence to enhance Sevastopol's identity not only as a naval city, but also as the defender of the gateway to the Motherland--a "City of Glory" and a hometown (rodnoi gorod) to heroes who had sacrificed for a great cause.⁵ The navy was, in many ways, the locus of the city's modern history and tradition. Given the presence of large numbers of sailors in Sevastopol and their places on numerous municipal commissions, naval officials, sought to secure the navy's place in the city's past, present, and future. Their intent was not only to improve the navy's own image and power, but also to contribute to what it perceived as the city's interests.

By means of the print media and newsreels, the navy created an image of and for Sevastopol. During the 1941 and 1942 sieges, naval officers wrote about the city and the valor of its defenders, military and civilian alike, and they linked these efforts to a century-long heritage of stalwart defense in the face of overwhelming odds. Since the fifth century BCE, the region surrounding present-day Sevastopol had served as a trading port for Greeks, Jews, Tatars, Russians, and others. In 1783, Catherine established the city on the site of the ancient Greek city of Khersones as a Russian naval outpost against the Turks. But before World War II, Russians, Turks, and Europeans remembered Sevastopol foremost as a battleground of the Crimean War. This war of attrition, which was waged as much against disease as enemy fire, remained the focal point of the city's identity in another war nearly a century later.

During the Second World War, newsreel producers and journalists served not only as transmitters of the day's news, but also as propagandists and mythmakers.⁶ When, in the early days of the war in Sevastopol, Soviet propagandists revived the image of the "City of Glory," they provided naval and municipal planners in the postwar period with a powerful set of images from which eventually to redesign and rebuild the city. In the course of the war, correspondents and filmmakers began the task of memorializing the city and constructing a distinct urban biography, which recalled past trials and tribulations as inspirations for a population that was facing privation and sacrifice in order to survive and rebuild their devastated lives. From Ivan the Terrible to Pushkin, heroes of the Russian past, whose images had been revived in the 1930s in an attempt to place Russia atop the hierarchy of the Soviet brotherhood of peoples, now served wartime propagandists as they emphasized Russia's historical ability to overcome hardship.⁷ The military found the heroes of its own past, such as Aleksandr Nevskii, Aleksandr Suvorov, and Mikhail

Kutuzov, minted on new decorations for heroism and outstanding military service.

War correspondents, both civilian and military, conveyed the plight of the Soviet soldiers and citizens to domestic and foreign audiences. With remarkably little substantive editing, Soviet presses translated for foreign audiences stories that had been written for party and military newspapers. It was important for foreign and domestic consumers to receive the same message, that despite great odds the Soviet Motherland was resolute in its defense against the "fascist German invaders." For Soviet citizens and sailors, this message was to provide assurance that everyone was rallying to a common cause, even though this was not always true. For foreign allies, the same message was a signal that the Soviets not only had their hearts in the battle, but also desperately needed assistance against Hitler. The message was effective. In his speech marking the start of the Cold War in 1946, even Winston Churchill noted the feats of the "valiant Russian people" in the destruction of Nazism.⁸

Although it remains unclear how much direct influence military officials enjoyed in the creation of wartime newsreels, officers wrote a great deal during the war for the foreign and domestic press.⁹ Vice-Admiral F. S. Oktiabrskii, who was in charge of Sevastopol's defense, began the process of constructing a mytho-historical identity for the city when he reminded his readers in 1942 that "these deeds of the numberless heroes of the Second Defense of Sevastopol will in good time be woven into a brilliant fabric of legend, poem, verse and song by the Soviet people and its poets."¹⁰ He signaled that the Second World War ("the Second Defense") was to be linked with the Crimean War ("the First Defense"). He noted that in the last decade of the nineteenth century, naval, municipal, and imperial officials had commissioned statues and monuments to the "great defense" of Sevastopol, which had demonstrated the power of

a strong fortress and population. Oktiabrskii also noted that a new generation of war heroes would become the foundation of the city's history after the present war. Like their predecessors during the Crimean War who fell to superior forces, Oktiabrskii's own troops were fighting hard and would, he incorrectly insisted, repel the invaders. In this way, the admiral sought to appropriate the history of nineteenth-century Sevastopol for the sake of the twentieth-century city.

In other media, too, heroism, resistance, and self-sacrifice became synonymous with Sevastopol. Political officers and war-correspondents soon echoed the same themes in stories about suicide bombers, snipers, and civilians who refused to abandon their posts. Professional writers meanwhile focused on the acts of the civilian population. According to one article about everyday life in the city, a "woman with flowers" walked with "amazing calmness and concentration" past soldiers to her husband's grave, as shells fell all around; thus, she became a "symbol of the faithfulness of [soldiers'] wives, of the friendship of their sisters, of the solicitude of their mothers."¹¹ An old teacher prepared a New Year's tree for students in her underground school. Another civilian, a Stakhnovite, left her underground factory only long enough to have her severed hand treated, before she returned to her norm-busting work.¹² Although the heroic feats of women and workers remained staple themes in this literature after the war, ethnic uniformity soon became the norm. During the war observers noted that Sevastopol was "many tongued, many tribed, yet united more staunchly than ever."¹³

Sevastopol's three principal newspapers also reminded their readers consistently, both during and after the war, of the city's heroic history and tradition. On the day before liberation in May 1944, Krasnyi Chernomorets, the newspaper of the Black Sea Fleet, ran an article entitled simply "Sevastopol." It not only detailed the fierce fighting in

and around the city, but also retold the city's ancient Greek and Turkic origins and dwelt on the importance of Prince Potemkin-Tavrisheskii's selecting the city as the site of Catherine the Great's Black Sea port.¹⁴ In the days following liberation, as the first sailors and residents made their way back to the rubble of the city, the same newspaper described the "glory of the Russian soul." It fused stories of Crimean War heroes, including admirals P. S. Nakhimov and V. A. Kornilov, the sailor Petr Koshka, and nurse Dasha Sevastopolskaia--the Russian counterpart to Florence Nightingale--with the new heroes of the second defense, such as Ivan Golubets, Liudmilla Pavlichenko, the Five Black Sea Men, and others.¹⁵ Despite the emphasis on the city's multiethnic traditions, these heroes of Sevastopol's two great defenses were nearly always Slavs.

Even in the unlikely event that residents who had been evacuated to the rear had not heard about the city's heroic defense, the official memory of the event greeted them upon their return. Local heroes were held up as examples of something typically "Russian" or Slavic, although still "Soviet," by focusing on their connection with pre-Revolutionary heroes. The effort to educate residents about the heroic history of the city continued into 1945 and beyond. For example, the fleet presented a lecture entitled "The Historical Past of Sevastopol" to the families of new and returning servicemen, which was followed by the docudrama film on recent events, entitled "Battle for Sevastopol."¹⁶ As late as 1948, the local newspaper still reminded its readers of the glorious history of the city and its heroes in articles entitled "The Glorious Revolutionary Tradition of Sevastopolians and Black Sea Sailors" and "City of Russian Glory," both of which linked the present with pre-1917 heroes.¹⁷

Newsreels of the era dwelt on Sevastopol's recent past and echoed the themes set forth by print stories. They also contested Nazi images of

the city. Whether Nazi or Soviet, the visual images of warfare in Sevastopol had showed an endangered city. Nazi newsreels emphasized the power and destructiveness of a "superior" culture, while amid the ruins, Soviet filmmakers honored the heroes and martyrs who later became immortalized in city planning. Nazi newsreels emphasized German virility, capturing images of sweaty, bare-chested young men as they loaded shells into long-barreled, rail guns, which then ravaged their targets.¹⁸ Soviet filmmakers, by contrast, showed the destruction of the city's monuments, as well as the serenity and sacrifice of its soldiers and sailors.

Soviet newsreels lacked sophistication in the first years of the war, but by the time the Red Army liberated Sevastopol, the film industry and other cultural organizations had created symbolically powerful tales of heroism and victory.¹⁹ The most striking difference between Nazi and Soviet depictions of the German offensive of June 1942 was that the Soviets took pains to show the destruction of their territory and soldiers. In the opening scene of the battle for Sevastopol in the newsreel, "The Thirteenth of June, 1942" a statue of Lenin stands near the wharf, pointing into the distance as smoke wafts behind him.²⁰ A young, attractive Russian soldier on lookout, with a medal prominently displayed on his chest, peers around the corner of a destroyed wall. Scenes of massive explosions and the city on fire then give way to Soviet counterattacks by land and sea. Immediately after a marine receives a mortal wound, his compatriots jump from the trenches and charge the enemy. The Soviet films created heroes and martyrs. They also humanized their subjects. In the same newsreel, Soviet soldiers in Sevastopol rest in the woods by a tranquil stream, cooking, eating, sleeping, writing letters, reading newspapers, and playing with a puppy. The juxtaposition between this and a previous scene of destroyed stores and litters full of the wounded created a powerful impression of the soldiers' humanity, and it

reinforced the image of the peaceful Soviet citizen, whom the German invasion had roused to war and self-defense.

The narration enhanced the images of sacrifice and heroism. The Soviet newsreel "Battle for Sevastopol," which appeared in 1944, chronicled the liberation of the Crimean Peninsula.²¹ The narrator, the popular radio personality Iurii Levitan (1914-1983), begins the film by describing Sevastopol as a "City of ancient glory. Sevastopol, the legendary city. A city of Russian glory. A hero-city." He repeats the same phrases throughout the thirty-five-minute chronicle, interspersed with invocations of "Our Sevastopol." The most symbolic scenes occur at the end of the film. After violent scenes of fighting in the rubble, a Soviet soldier climbs the Panorama of the Defense of 1854-1855 (the large museum dedicated to the Crimean War), where in 1942 the Nazis had raised their flag, and he raises "the flag of victory on the cupola." Quickly thereafter, the audience sees men of the Soviet military standing atop the neo-classical gates of the Count's Wharf, the first major pier in the city and the entryway into the city, firing their guns in celebration. The soldiers and sailors stand directly above the inscription "1846," the date of the wharf's construction. The fact that they stand overlooking the city suggests the hierarchical relationship between city and military.

As in the early newsreels, those made toward the end of the war honored the Soviet dead as well as past heroes, in order to emphasize the struggle and sacrifice needed for victory and liberation. Scenes of mile-long columns of German POWs were followed by images of Soviet women weeping over their dead sons, husbands, and brothers. Larger groups of dead Nazi soldiers, however, left no doubt about the victor. Filmmakers also paid homage to the Black Sea itself. In one of the final scenes of "Battle for Sevastopol," sailors and soldiers are shown standing near German corpses as a Nazi flag floats offshore. The Soviet heroes remove

their hats as the waters of the Black Sea lap the coast, and the ships of the fleet once again drop anchor in Sevastopol's bays. The headless statue of General Eduard Ivanovich Tottleben (1818-1884), the designer of the city's defenses during the Crimean War, once again guards the city as the camera pans down to the inscription at its base, which reads "Defense of Sevastopol."

Filmmakers moved the heroic images of the war correspondents from paper to celluloid. They cast sailors and soldiers in the central roles and showed only fleeting images of Lenin. Whereas military personnel often wrote about the war, we know less about their direct influence on newsreels and films. In some cases, for example in "Battle for Sevastopol," a military consultant was listed. A military historian, Major-General S.P. Platonov, supervised the film shot by frontline film crews. Nonetheless, the staging and filming of massive battle scenes and the shots of real wartime demanded the commitment of military resources.²² Thus, even if the military did not conceive the projects, it helped to shape and deliver the final form.

Naval and municipal officials were hardly prepared to abandon a key element of persuasion once victory was at hand. In their directives for postwar reconstruction, they preserved the navy's prominence and the city's identification with heroism and sacrifice. As one architect involved in Stalingrad's rebuilding noted, postwar plans sought "to develop a series of architectural-planning tasks in connection with [the city's] historical and social significance."²³

Local naval officials were determined to enhance the presence of naval history throughout the city's built environment, and the navy's presence on numerous planning boards made the task easier. In 1945 Vice-Admiral Oktiabrskii recommended that "the naming of squares and main

streets of Sevastopol take into account the historical events and names of the organizers and heroes of the two defenses of Sevastopol."²⁴ He thus extended the prediction he had made in 1942, that the city's heroic past would be transmitted in "legend, poem, verse, and song." His vision anticipated George Mosse's portrayal of World War I memorials as reflections on "saints and martyrs, places of worship, and a heritage to emulate."²⁵ Soviet urban planners worked under the assumption that it was, as a leading member of the Academy of Architecture noted in this organization's journal, "impossible to ignore the historical appearance of a city when planning restoration" or "to ignore our [Russian] national heritage."²⁶ When reinforced by the directives of Oktiabrskii, who was the most senior military official in the city, this planning policy yielded predictable results. In April 1946 a prominent Moscow architect rejected plans that would be inconsistent with the "distinctive, customary, and most memorable places in Sevastopol":

These places entered literature; all the history of the city is connected with these places, even the city's heroic defenses are connected with them. To change the city's appearance means fully to destroy it, to make a new city, a different city, a city not having a continuous connection with the old Sevastopol.²⁷

The emphasis on the city's unique local, naval heritage became the norm. Sevastopol's planners thus used the city's infrastructure to trigger memory and create myth.²⁸

The scarcity of funds for building materials throughout the ravaged western half of the USSR shaped the planning of reconstruction. Even in the bleakest years of the war and its aftermath, however, architects proposed grandiose and costly plans, in which restoration and tradition were central and the focus was on an idealized past. Because of the

shortages, the local planning board, on which military officers figured prominently as engineers, changed little of the physical layout of the city center, preserving place-identification. Street patterns in the city center remained basically unchanged, so travel through the rubble was less disorienting for the thousands of residents who returned from evacuation. The preservation of prominent buildings, even long-closed churches, made the battered city appear more familiar. These measures invoked "nostalgic memory" of the prewar period--even of pre-Revolutionary days.²⁹ However, all of the major streets and squares contiguous to the central hill carried new names, which signaled a change in local identification with the past.

The Bolshevik Revolution had brought the extensive renaming of streets. "Catherine [the Great] Street" became "Vladimir Lenin Street" (which it remains today). In the Soviet obsession with making the revolution omnipresent, the three streets of the ring road took the names of Lenin, Marx, and Mikhail Frunze, a hero of the Civil War. During postwar replanning, the second two streets recaptured their prerevolutionary names, "Grand Naval Street" and "Nakhimov Prospect," respectively. This transformation heralded a new emphasis on local identity, historical tradition, and national pride. Frunze had been essential to Sevastopol's "liberation" from the Germans and the Whites after the revolution, but he was no local hero. Marx had no direct link to the city, other than its ruling ideology. Admiral P. S. Nakhimov, on the other hand, stood amid the pantheon of heroes of the Crimean War. Far more than Marx, "Grand Naval Street" conveyed the desired impression.

Reverting to prerevolutionary names did not clash, however, with socialist symbolism. The Soviet regime had already begun, in the 1930s, to compromise socialist goals in order to gain support. Differential pay-scales, new class distinctions, and the cultivation of consumerism were

designed to encourage stability, production, and a new generation of Soviet heroes, like Stakhanov. In the same spirit, the lessons of the Crimean War could be harnessed to the Soviet tropes of duty, sacrifice, and defending the Motherland. While the emphasis on local identity did not compromise Soviet identity, it did seem essential to the city's stability and rapid reconstruction, for it promised to resurrect a unique local identity, to which residents could attach their ideals and aspirations.

The names of the city's central squares likewise underwent a radical transformation. "Nakhimov Square" replaced the "Square of the Third International," which had been at first tentatively renamed the "Square of Parades." The name of the city's greatest admiral was clearly preferable to either an institution of world socialism or a designation that suggested the martial and functional nature of this square, which was situated closest to the sea. "Commune Square" (the pre-revolutionary "Novoselskaia") now honored another naval hero, Admiral Fëdor Ushakov. Even the Great October Revolution fell victim to Sevastopol's naval history. After World War II "Revolutionary Square" took the name of M. P. Lazarev, who had commanded the Black Sea Fleet at the end of the eighteenth century. Everywhere the military and naval traditions of the city took precedent, as the "territorialization of memory" proceeded in one of the USSR's "sacred places."³⁰

The design and construction process that led to the renaming of streets and squares, among many other things, was a complex and contested procedure. The standard method was to enlist a prominent architect in Moscow to provide the initial draft plans and then ask local, regional, federation, and all-Union institutions to comment. Ultimately Stalin and the Council of Ministers had final authority, but they generally followed

the recommendations of their Committee on Architectural Affairs (CAA), which in turn relied on a committee of engineering, sanitation, economic, architectural and other experts who reviewed each plan in Moscow. Thus, in its design, the planning process clearly placed local officials on the margins.

On 9 August 1944 the CAA requested that the Naval Central Planning Bureau aid the prominent Moscow architect, G. B. Barkhin, in a competition with one of the leading figures in Soviet architecture, M. Ia. Ginzburg, to draft a plan for Sevastopol's reconstruction.³¹ Although this Moscow-based naval institution initially agreed to cooperate with Barkhin, when provided with a viable alternative that better suited their interests, naval officials, especially those based in Sevastopol, abandoned Barkhin in order to pursue their own goals. Ginzburg's plan lacked so much detail that Barkhin won almost by default. However, the navy's representatives on the committee of experts also criticized Barkhin's plan to move shipping companies and warehouses away from the shoreline and his insufficient attention to the development of the bays.³² In essence, the planning bureau supplied Barkhin with the maps and geodesic materials he needed to begin his planning, but Barkhin apparently failed to address many of the navy's chief interests. Moreover, A. Ivanov and E. Lomagin, respectively the heads of the regional and local architectural administrations, stated that "Neither one of the proposed projects can be recommended for further reworking and approval" and that Barkhin had not accounted for existing buildings and structures.³³ The final report from the chair of the expert committee reflected these naval and local concerns when it criticized Barkhin for "ignoring the specifics of the city" and not accounting for the historical significance of the Count's Pier area.³⁴ The Count's Pier area included both the bay-shore development, which the

navy's representative on the committee had criticized, and the Square of Parades, which the navy deemed so valuable.

Just days after the end of the war, in May 1945, local officials increased the pace of construction. Two months earlier Lomagin had convinced the CAA to allow him to participate in designing the first order of construction under Barkhin's supervision although no general plan had yet been approved.³⁵ Both the city and regional administrators approved the construction plan nonetheless and asked a number of institutions, mostly local, to gather materials and sketches to expedite the process.³⁶ Five days later the chief of Gorispolkom, Vasilii Efremov, informed the Soviet and Russian architectural committees that a new local commission had been formed independently to aid Barkhin. The composition of this new group underlined the strength and prestige of the navy. Nearly half of its members were naval officers whose specialties ranged from engineering and sanitation to political education. Vice-Admiral Fadeev, the commander of the Crimean Naval Defense Region, headed the navy's contingent and figured as a leading member of the commission, along with the heads of the municipal government, the local party, and the chairman of the Crimean Council of Peoples Commissars.³⁷ In this way, local and naval officials jointly expedited the plan and moved ahead of slowly emanating plans from Moscow.

When Barkhin published a summary of the plan in the local newspaper two days later, the influence of local government and naval officials was transparent. Barkhin announced that he would continue the "tradition of architecture of ancient cities" and highlight Sevastopol's heroic traditions. The main city square, at this point tentatively called the "Square of Parades," would contain a 120-meter monument to "Glory," four triumphal arches, and sculptures on "heroic themes."³⁸ On the square and its perimeter, Barkhin also planned a monument to Stalin, the headquarters

of the navy, and the naval museum and library. He proposed further to relocate Lenin's statue from the main square to a complex of buildings and monuments to the most recent war, where a memorial to the Crimean War had stood. This memorial was in turn to be relocated just outside the city center. This move would have marginalized the Crimean War from the center of the city's history and have granted this role instead to the recent defense and liberation of the city. Meanwhile, the monuments of Stalin and Lenin would also have placed the party symbolically at the center of the city's identity.

As the reworked plan again came under review in October, the local architects and naval representatives criticized the changes in the depiction of the city's tradition as too radical.³⁹ In an attempt to maintain a longer view of Sevastopol's naval history, Lomagin and the plenipotentiary of the Engineering Administration of the Navy broke their alliance with Barkhin and criticized, among other things, the scale of his Square of Parades and its grandiose monument, which, they argued, encroached on traditional places of leisure. The presence of an "outsider" designing a new mythology for the city encouraged municipal and naval officials to articulate their own vision. All plans for monuments and historical places, they suggested, should also be considered by the Russian Administration of Architectural Affairs, which was at that time championing the preservation of monuments and even churches. Specifically, they demanded that "monuments to Ushakov and Nakhimov must be accommodated in the central part of the city."⁴⁰ At the same time, a joint municipal and naval commission, which Admiral Oktiabrskii headed, also rejected the expansion of the Square of Parades and called for Barkhin to keep all the Crimean War monuments, including the Panorama, in their present locations. Oktiabrskii also suggested that squares and streets be named after the heroes of Sevastopol's two great wars.⁴¹

After the appointment of new municipal architect Iurii Trautman in October 1945, the concerted attack against Barkhin's vision gained strength. Throughout the November 1945 review process in Moscow, one expert after another echoed Trautman's and the navy's concerns and urged Barkhin to address local history and tradition more effectively.⁴² The following month, the CAA directed Trautman to replace Barkhin as the chief designer of the city's new face. With greater attention to the needs and desires of the navy and local population, Trautman guided the design to restore pre-Revolutionary street and square names and preserve the city's footprint, to embrace neo-classical architecture based on the nearby ruins of Kherstones, to highlight the city's heritage in the Crimean War and link it to the most recent victory in World War II.

During postwar reconstruction, local naval officials took an active role in redesigning the physical layout of the city, as well as in re-scripting the city's history. At the navy's urging, and with Trautman's aid, the Crimean War and Sevastopol's naval heritage eclipsed the party in prominence in the city center. Stalin never had his likeness raised above Sevastopol; Barkhin's grandiose Square of Parades was rejected in order to preserve the old scale of the area; modest monuments to naval heroes became common throughout the cityscape. One of Barkhin's last revisions before authorship was given to local architects concentrated most of the navy's administrative buildings on the high central hill of Sevastopol. Although the plan would have given the navy the place of greatest prominence, naval leaders fought it on the grounds that it would have made these buildings vulnerable to aerial assault. Instead, the navy took what it. In addition to ubiquitous naval monuments, the navy even took over the local mosque, which had been abandoned, when the Crimean Tatars were deported for alleged collaboration with the Germans during the war. After removing the minarets and erasing Koranic inscriptions from the façade,

the navy moved its new archive into the building.⁴³ Not only did the navy acquire another prominent building in the city center, but it also eliminated an ethnic "other" and a symbol of a chapter in the city's history that was now taboo. Sevastopol was to be a city of Slavic heroes, not traitors.

Before and during the war, the navy's presence became the touchstone for a renewed Sevastopol. There are several possible explanations for this development. One is that the navy rightly sensed that the population looked toward the military, rather than to the Party, during wartime; and it used the moment to leverage political power. This reasoning does not, however, explain why the naval image in the city remained dominant well after the navy was relegated to a subordinate position vis-à-vis the party in the late 1940s. Another explanation is that the navy was bent on self-glorification and local power, but it did not seek to challenge central authority. This reasoning is plausible, because the navy's influence in municipal affairs remained strong even after the late 1940s. But why did civilian municipal officials not challenge naval hegemony, and why did the navy intervene to influence civilian construction? Local officials in several institutions agreed that Sevastopol's military heritage had to be emphasized and that it could coexist usefully with the city's non-naval heritage. By the war's end, Jews and Tatars had disappeared both physically and symbolically from the city, so their contributions to the heritage of the city and region could be expunged. Stalin's wartime regime also eliminated ethnic Greeks from the city, but there was no discussion of destroying the ancient Greek ruins at the Khersones Archaeological Preserve, because the Greek symbolism supported the façade of democratic participation, which was important to the regime. The same symbolism also documented the long history of art and culture in

Sevastopol. Unlike Karaite Jews and Tatars, Greeks had a "useable past," which punctuated the regime's message of advanced socialism.

Postwar reconstruction created both myth and physical reality. The reshaping of the city's urban biography was an attempt to rally the population for rebuilding, yet another great cause. The myths and the imagined community that they informed fed "Great Russian chauvinism." Giving Sevastopol a sense of place and identity was calculated to give its inhabitants a sense of inclusion and belonging. A stable population could better serve the navy, just as a stable and passive population made political and security tasks easier. Thus, the navy had a deep investment in creating a livable environment for Sevastopol's residents. The navy and the regime were interested in more than propaganda; they tried to meet the needs of the population, so that the population would be more inclined to sacrifice again and to work for the regime's goals when asked. A social contract emerged between institutions and the populace. The rapid reconstruction of the city, especially after planning and provisions came together in 1948, suggested that the contract achieved its purpose.

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1 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Goroda Sevastopolia (hereafter GAGS) f. R-308, op. 1, d. 4, ll. 12-15.

2 GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 10, ll. 49-56.

3 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 1983).

4 The most accessible source of press material on the battles for Sevastopol remains the collection of articles translated for foreign consumption: The Heroic Defense of Sevastopol (Moscow, 1942); Sevastopol: November, 1941-July, 1942: Articles, Stories and Eye-witness Accounts by Soviet War Correspondents (London, 1943). A cursory comparison shows these to be adequate translations of the original articles, which appeared in Pravda and Krasnaia Zvezda, among other newspapers.

⁵ "Sevastopol" is Greek for "city of glory." The translation of "rodnoi gorod" as "hometown" masks a more intimate relation. "Rodnoi" implies a deep, personal and affectionate relationship.

6 Matthew P. Gallagher, The Soviet History of World War II: Myths, Memories, and Realities (New York, 1963) argues that military men in the field rejected many of the musings of military theorists. This conclusion fits with Oktiabrskii's writings, which were filled with emotion and feeling rather than abstractions. On the wartime press see also Jeffrey Brooks, "Pravda Goes to War" in Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia (ed. Richard Stites, Indiana University Press, 1995), 9-27.

7 On increasing "Russianness" in the 1930s and after, see David Brandenberger, National Bolshevism: Stalinist Mass Culture and the Formation of Modern Russian National Identity, 1931-1956 (Cambridge,

2002); Karen Petrone, Life Has Become More Joyous, Comrades: Celebrations in the Time of Stalin (Bloomington, 2000).

8 Winston Churchill, The Sinews of Peace: Post-war Speeches (ed. Randolph S. Churchill, Boston, 1949).

9 Some films listed a military officer as a consultant, but this fact did not necessarily suggest control over the messages and images. However, all frontline camera crews were placed under the local military headquarters. See Peter Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917-1953 (Cambridge, 1992), chapter 9.

10 Heroic Defense, 14.

11 Sevastopol, 106.

12 Heroic Defense, 114. Stakhanovism refers to a group of hero-workers who allegedly exceeded production quotas and were thus hailed in the press. On this movement see Lewis H. Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity in the USSR, 1935-1941 (New York, 1988).

13 Heroic Defense, 100.

14 "Sevastopol," Krasnyi Chernomorets, 8 May 1944, 1.

15 Petr Sazhin and G. Pozhenian, "Solntse nad Sevastopolem," Krasnyi Chernomorets, 12 May 1944, 1. Their exploits are recounted and mythologized in Heroic Defense and a number of other works in several languages.

16 "Segodnia," Krasnyi Chernomorets, 21 February 1945, 4. "Battle for Sevastopol" can be viewed at the National Archives, Washington, DC as Russian News (1944), No. 3A; Motion Picture 208-RN-59; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208.

17 "Agitator, provedi besedu na etu temu: Slavnye revoliutsionnye traditsii sevastopol'tsev i moriakov-chernomortsev," Slava Sevastopolia 7 December

1948, 1-2; "Agitator, provedi besedu na etu temu: gorod ruskii slavy," Slava Sevastopolia 10 December 1948, 1.

18 These images can be seen in the numerous newsreels in National Archives Collection of Foreign Records Seized, Record Group 242. National Archives, Washington, DC.

19 For a discussion of Soviet film during World War II see Peter Kenez, "Black and White: The War on Film," in Culture and Entertainment in Wartime Russia, 157-75.

20 "The Thirteenth of June, 1942," Motion Picture-111-M529-46. Records of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Record Group 111; National Archives, Washington, DC.

21 Russian News (1944, No. 3A); Motion Picture 208-RN-59; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208; National Archives, Washington, DC.

²² Newreels were often a combination of both real frontline footage and other material spliced in to create the intended message. See Kenez, Cinema and Soviet Society, chapter 9.

23 N. Poliakov, "Planirovka Stalingrada," Arkhitektura SSSR 6 (1944): 2.

24 Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GA RF) f. A-259, op. 5, d. 279, ll. 16-18.

25 George Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars, (New York, 1990), 7.

26 V.N. Semënov, "Osnovy planirovki, planirovki vosstanovlivaemykh gorodov," Problemy sovremennogo gradostroitel'stvo 1 (1947): 5-6.

27 Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Ekonomiki (hereafter RGAE) f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 243a, ll. 5-8; GAGS, f. R-308, op. 1, d. 21, ll. 28-31. Quotes from RGAE, f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 243a, ll. 8, 7. He used the plural "defenses" to link World War II with the Crimean War.

28 Karl D. Qualls, "Local-Outsider Negotiations in Sevastopol's Postwar Reconstruction, 1944-53," in Donald J. Raleigh, ed., Provincial Landscapes: The Local Dimensions of Soviet Power (Pittsburgh, 2001), 276-98. I follow Liebman and Don-Yehiya's definition of myth as "a story that evokes strong sentiments, and transmits and reinforces basic societal values." This definition does not mean that a myth is false. See C.S. Liebman and E. Don-Yehiya, Civil Religion in Israel: Traditional Judaism and Political Culture in the Jewish State, (Berkeley, 1983), 7 cited in Tim Cole, Selling the Holocaust From Auschwitz to Schindler: How History is Bought, Sold, and Packaged (New York, 2000), 4.

29 On "nostalgic memory" see Leo Spitzer, Hotel Bolivia : The Culture of Memory in a Refuge from Nazism (New York, 1998).

30 Serhii Plokyh, "The City of Glory: Sevastopol in Russian Historical Mythology," Journal of Contemporary History 35 (2000): 369-83. For example, Plokyh notes that Nakhimov, one of the most venerated figures in the city's history, was really a secondary figure. The public, however, created its own understanding.

31 RGAE f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 243, l. 1.

32 Ibid., ll. 21-3ob.

³³ RGAE f. R-9423, op. 1, d. 242, ll. 93-93ob.

34 RGAE f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 33, l. 154.

³⁵ RGAE f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 154, l. 126; GAGS R-308, op. 1, d. 10, l. 12.

36 GAGS f. R-308, op. 1, d. 12, ll. 8-9; RGAE f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 150-150ob.

37 GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 13, l. 71; RGAE f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 154, ll. 154-154ob.

38 G. Barkhin, "Proekt budushchego: pochetnoe zadanie," Slava Sevastopolia 18 May 1945, 1.

39 In October, the Russian Administration for Architectural Affairs appointed Iurii Trautman to replace Georgii Lomagin as chief municipal architect. See GA RF f. A-150, op. 2, d. 30, l. 17. On changes in the plan under Trautman's leadership see Qualls, "Local-Outsider Negotiations."

40 RGAE f. R-9432, op. 1, d. 243, ll. 42-3ob.

41 GA RF f. A-259, op. 5, d. 279, ll. 16-8.

42 The main archival caches that relate to this review are in RGAE f. R-9432, op. 1, dd. 32, 242, 243; GAGS, f. R-308, op. 1, d. 21; GA RF A-150, op. 2, d. 52.

⁴³ GAGS f. R-79, op. 2, d. 131, l. 88.