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Source: *American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Feb., 1951), pp. 38-49

Published by:

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2491745>

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# UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

JOHN S. RESHETAR

EASTERN ORTHODOXY, unlike Roman Catholicism, is organized on the principle of autocephalous national churches—each constituting an independent administrative entity. This fundamental difference between Eastern and Western Christianity causes the thinking Orthodox Christian to be confronted with a dilemma. He wants the Church to be close to the communicant and the clergy to teach him and pray in his own language, and yet if he desires that the whole Church be able to perpetuate itself and propagate the faith, he must grant to it a sufficiently centralized organization and at the same time combat all fissiparous tendencies. Thus, on the surface at least, there appears to be a conflict between Christ's injunction that there be "one fold and one shepherd" (John 10:16) and the actual establishment of national churches which can easily render unto Caesar what may be correctly regarded as "things that are God's" (Matthew 22:21).

While the communicant may ponder over this dilemma, there is in the last analysis little that he can do to reverse centuries of historical development which have led to the woefully loose organization of the present day. The titular head of the Eastern Orthodox Church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, is but *primus inter pares* in his relations with the other patriarchs and branches of the Church. Individual ecclesiastical jurisdictions do not extend across political frontiers, and as a result the national churches have rarely been able to oppose secular rulers. The development of each new national movement in the Orthodox world of Eastern and Southeastern Europe has been accompanied by a demand for a separate national church and has accentuated this divisive tendency.

While the Orthodox Balkan peoples were acquiring ecclesiastical independence prior to World War I, the Orthodox Ukrainians living in the Russian Empire were denied the national status which would enable them to establish their own church and, instead, were regarded as Little Russians. Studies of the Orthodox Church made at that time by Western scholars contain no reference to its Ukrainian branch since it did not even enjoy a limited autonomy but was regarded as an integral part of the Russian Orthodox Church.<sup>1</sup> The

<sup>1</sup> See Adrian Fortescue's *The Orthodox Eastern Church*, 2nd ed. (London, 1908), pp. 285 ff. That the Orthodox Church in Ukraine exercised considerable influence on the Russian Church is made amply evident in the ponderous study by Constantine V. Kharlampovič, *Malorossijskoe Vlijanie na Velikorusskuju Cerkovnuju Žizn'* (Kazan, 1914), which deals with the period beginning in the middle of the sixteenth century and ending in 1762.

development of a Ukrainian historiography during the nineteenth century caused some of the nationalist intellectuals, many of whom were sons of priests, to discover that the Orthodox Church in Ukraine did not originally regard itself as bound by the protectorate which Muscovy assumed over the Ukrainian Cossacks as a result of the Perejaslav Treaty of 1654. By 1686, however, the influence of the Muscovites was so great among the Cossacks that the Orthodox Churches of Ukraine and Muscovy were merged on the basis of internal independence; the Cossacks retained the right to elect their metropolitan archbishop but pledged nominal subordination to the Patriarchate of Moscow, which had been established less than a century before, in place of their traditional tie with the Constantinople Patriarchate.

The domain of the Cossacks was gradually incorporated into the Russian Empire, and by the nineteenth century the metropolitan archbishops of Kiev were being appointed by Moscow. Many of these were not natives of Ukraine and had little in common with the local population, whose spiritual needs were ministered to by natives who entered the priesthood of the Russian Church. They employed the archaic Church Slavonic language in the performance of Church offices, but in many parishes sermons were delivered in the peasant vernacular which in the twentieth century was to serve as the basis for the development of literary Ukrainian. By the turn of the century Bishop Parfeny Levyc'kyj of the diocese of Podollia was himself delivering sermons in Ukrainian, and encouraging priests to do so, until he was transferred to the Russian diocese of Tula. The Orthodox seminaries in Kiev and Poltava were hotbeds of Ukrainian nationalist and revolutionary socialist agitation prior to the revolution.<sup>2</sup>

When the Imperial regime collapsed in February of 1917 and was replaced by the Provisional Government, a multitude of functional congresses met in Kiev to give voice to the economic and social objectives of the revolution, and to demand political autonomy for Ukraine. At the same time, they did not neglect to advocate reorganization of the Orthodox Church. Initially their demands were modest, but by the time of the November Revolution the nationalists were asking for an autocephalous Ukrainian Church which would be independent of the State in its internal administration and provide for the use of the Ukrainian language in the celebration of the divine liturgy. Since this was a period in which soviets, or councils, were being formed as political institutions, it is not surprising that there was considerable sentiment in favor of

<sup>2</sup> This is admitted even by a sworn enemy of everything Ukrainian. See A. Carinnyj, *Ukrainskoe Dviženie* (Berlin, 1925), p. 134.

adopting a conciliar form of government for the proposed church. Despite the enactment of many resolutions calling for ecclesiastical independence, little real progress was made during 1917, primarily because other matters of a more immediate nature, especially the agrarian problem and the demand for peace, absorbed public attention. Among other obstacles there was the hesitancy of many priests to challenge the established religious order and the lack of forthright support from the Ukrainian Central Council (*Ukrainska Central'na Rada*) which was the recognized representative body attempting to govern Ukraine at the time.

When the government of the Central Council was replaced by that of Hetman Paul Skoropads'kyj in April of 1918 the official attitude toward the organization of a separate church became more sympathetic. A Ministry of Religious Cults was established under the direction of Professor Basil Zin'kivs'kyj, a philosopher and psychologist who taught at the University of Kiev. Plans were made to convoke a *sobor*, or general church conclave, but before this could be done it was necessary to select a new metropolitan archbishop of Kiev to succeed Metropolitan Vladimir, who had been murdered in February while the city was under Bolshevik rule. According to established procedure the metropolitan was to be elected at a diocesan congress, but Zin'kivs'kyj wished to depart from this practice and have all of the Ukrainian dioceses participate in the electoral meeting. His reason for making this request was that the Metropolitan of Kiev is regarded as the ranking hierarch in Ukraine and not merely as the head of another diocese.

However, the Church administration, which was in Russian hands at the time, proceeded to call an ordinary congress of the Kiev diocese thus ignoring Zin'kivs'kyj's proposal. In view of the nature of the Congress' membership it is not surprising that Metropolitan Anthony Khrapovits'kyj of Kharkov was elected. This did not please the Ukrainian nationalists because Anthony had forbidden the clergy of the Kharkov diocese to read the Gospel in Ukrainian, which he termed "a language of the market place." Zin'kivs'kyj wrote in vain to His Holiness Tikhon, Patriarch of Moscow and all Russia, requesting that Anthony's election be set aside. The new Metropolitan immediately made plans for his journey to Kiev with the intention of arriving there in the morning, but railway workers, who were aware of the hierarch's anti-nationalist views, delayed the train for nearly ten hours and prevented a ceremonial welcome planned by his supporters.<sup>3</sup>

The German-sponsored Skoropads'kyj Government continued to lend its support to the convocation of the All-Ukrainian *Sobor*

<sup>3</sup> Dmytro Dorošenko, *Istoriija Ukraïny* (Užhorod, 1930), II, 322.

which met on June 20. Metropolitan Anthony as senior bishop was elected to the honorary presidency of the *Sobor*, but Bishop Pimen of the Balta diocese presided over the sessions. A national church did not emerge from these meetings because its adherents controlled no more than a third of the votes. The *Sobor* contented itself with requesting the Government to recognize Anthony as Metropolitan of Kiev and Galicia, which meant that it wished to have the parishes in Ukraine remain part of the Russian Orthodox Church. On July 9, it enacted a statute for the provisional administration of the Church in Ukraine which granted to the Patriarch of Moscow the right to confirm the election of the Metropolitan of Kiev, hear complaints directed against him and other Ukrainian bishops, bless the convocation of Ukrainian *sobors*, and be prayed for in the performance of every liturgical office in every Ukrainian parish. In effect, the statute provided for autonomy and not the autocephalous status which the nationalist clergy desired.

The statute also conferred upon Patriarch Tikhon of Moscow the right to reject any of its provisions, and the head of the Russian Church did not hesitate to do so. In a letter written to Metropolitan Anthony on September 26, 1918, the Patriarch expressed his willingness to accept the statute, but only if the Orthodox dioceses in Ukraine were to remain "an inseparable part of the one Russian Orthodox Church" on an autonomous basis, and accept decisions of the All-Russian Church *Sobors*. He also insisted upon the right to send his own representative to Ukrainian *sobors* and confirm the ruling hierarch in every Ukrainian diocese.<sup>4</sup> The Patriarch's conditions were not calculated to endear him to the advocates of a national church. Their dissatisfaction found expression in the address which Hetman Skoropads'kyj's new Minister of Cults, Alexander Lotockyj (1870–1939), delivered before the All-Ukrainian *Sobor* on November 12, when it reconvened in Kiev. In no uncertain terms he attacked the Patriarch's autocratic methods and flatly stated that the Government favored an autocephalous church for Ukraine.

However, the conflict remained unresolved because of the collapse of Hetman Skoropads'kyj's regime as a result of the withdrawal of the German army of occupation in conformity with the armistice provisions which had been negotiated in the West. As the Germans withdrew, the Red Army invaded Ukraine and attacked the newly-organized armed forces of the Directory Government, the troops commanded by Symon Petljura. Many of the members of this new Government which succeeded that of Skoropads'kyj were republican socialists who had been prominent in the Central Council (*Rada*) of 1917. While many of these men were secularists

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*; Appendix 11 contains the text of the Patriarch's letter.

and opposed to the perpetuation of the close relationship between Church and State which had existed under the Hetman's regime, they nevertheless thought it best to recognize the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and did so in a law enacted on January 2, 1919. In the two years of anarchy and civil war which followed, little could be done to further the actual establishment of the Church. The Directory Government's diplomatic envoy in Constantinople, Alexander Lotoc'kyj, attempted in vain to obtain recognition of the Church by the *locum tenens* of the Constantinople Patriarchate in order to assure its canonical status. Metropolitan Dorofej, who was serving as *locum tenens* at the time, refused to decide on recognition, since he was convinced that only a patriarch could take such a step.<sup>5</sup> Lotoc'kyj's efforts had been hampered in Constantinople by the émigré Russian hierarchs, including Metropolitan Anthony and Metropolitan Platon of Odessa, who had found refuge there from the Bolsheviki. They ultimately established themselves as the Russian Orthodox Church Abroad with headquarters in the Yugoslav city of Sremski-Karlovtsi. Their departure from Ukraine, however, meant that the opposition to the national church would be diminished to a slight degree.

Thus in 1920 there commenced to function effectively in Kiev an All-Ukrainian Church Council which was a synod composed of priests and deacons. It had the task of promoting the organization of parishes for the new Church and also served as its highest administrative organ. The Russian bishops whom Metropolitan Anthony had left in charge prior to his departure expressed their opposition to this Ukrainian "sectarianism" and forbade the members of the Ukrainian Church Council to celebrate the liturgy. However, the new Church retained control of four of the largest houses of worship in Kiev, including historic St. Sophia's Cathedral, and held the usual Eastern Orthodox religious offices, but conducted them in the Ukrainian language instead of in the archaic and not easily understood Church Slavonic which is the liturgical medium of the Russian Church. Other parishes left the Russian Church and attached themselves to the Ukrainian Church Council, and it soon became evident that this new branch of Eastern Orthodoxy would have to obtain its own episcopate. No bishop of the Russian Church was willing to join the Ukrainians, and when they requested several of them to consecrate two Ukrainian priests as bishops they met with refusals. It was in such an atmosphere of frustration that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor* convened in the Cathedral of St. Sophia on October 14, 1921.

The *Sobor*, in a final, futile attempt to seek a reconciliation with

<sup>5</sup> Alexander Lotoc'kyj, *V. Carborodi* (Warsaw, 1939), pp. 92 f.

the Russians, invited Metropolitan Michael (Jermakov), the Patriarch's exarch in Ukraine, to attend its sessions, but he countered by declaring it uncanonical. Thus the Ukrainians had no alternative but to establish a hierarchy by consecrating their own metropolitan. Such a consecration has generally been regarded as invalid since it is not effected by means of the "laying on of hands" by at least two bishops and is said to constitute disruption of the Apostolic Succession. Despite this the *Sobor* proceeded to elect the Very Reverend Basil Lypkiv's'kyj (1864–1938) as "Metropolitan of Kiev and the whole Ukraine," and arranged a unique form of conciliar consecration, which was performed in St. Sophia's on Sunday, October 23. The Metropolitan-elect was surrounded by a number of priests who laid their hands upon his head; the worshipers who filled the cathedral placed their hands upon one another's shoulders and those who stood immediately behind the consecrating priests touched their robed shoulders. In all other respects the consecration was Orthodox in form. The bishops whom Lypkiv's'kyj consecrated after assuming his office had their status challenged by the various Orthodox national churches which also refused to accept the Metropolitan's consecration as canonical.<sup>6</sup>

This did not prevent the Ukrainian Church from ordaining priests, acquiring additional parishes, and pursuing its program of reformed Orthodoxy. The new Church departed from tradition in permitting clergymen to appear in public wearing nonclerical dress when not performing ceremonial duties. Similarly it allowed them to cut their hair and not grow beards, although Metropolitan Lypkiv's'kyj retained the appearance of a bishop of the old school. Bishops were permitted to live in the married state, and Lypkiv's'kyj himself and all but a few of the persons whom he consecrated continued to live with their wives—a practice which the Orthodox Church does not condone. A bachelor consecrated as a bishop could marry, and priests (and presumably bishops) were allowed to divorce their wives and marry a second time.<sup>7</sup> The practice of allow-

<sup>6</sup> The Russian Church branded this whole procedure as "self-consecration" (*samosvjastvo*) and regarded all priests who were ordained by these hierarchs as apostates, and the sacraments performed by them as invalid and blasphemous. See the brief and biased account of the establishment of the Ukrainian Church in Nicholas Briančaninov, *The Russian Church* (New York, n. d.), pp. 159 ff. Reverend Lypkiv's'kyj's ordination into the priesthood had been canonical because he had served as a priest in the Russian Church since 1891 following his graduation from the Kiev Theological Academy. He had demonstrated ability at an early date, and in 1903 he was appointed to the directorship of an ecclesiastical normal school in Kiev. He was removed from this post because of his enthusiasm for the 1905 Revolution; he then accepted a pastorate in a Kiev suburb which he held until he assumed the leadership of the movement for a national church.

<sup>7</sup> See *Dijannja Vseukraïns'koho Pravoslavnoho Cerkovnoho Soboru v Kyjevi 1921 roku* (Frankfurt am Main, 1946), pp. 14 f.

ing bishops to be married at all resulted from a reaction which was general in Russia at the time amongst the "white" or married secular clergy against the monopoly which the "black" or celibate regular clergy held on practically all of the episcopal offices. The canons enacted at the 1921 *Sobor* specifically denied the regular clergy any privileges in obtaining bishoprics.

Liberalism also made itself felt in the administration of the Ukrainian Church, which was based on the principle of *sobornopravnist'*, a conciliar and democratic form of ecclesiastical government in which all members of the Church—bishops, priests, and lay representatives—participate co-equally in all of its organs. The *Sobor* of 1921 specifically denied that hierarchs meeting alone could represent the whole Orthodox Ukrainian population. It declared that the All-Ukrainian Orthodox Church *Sobor*, which was to meet at least once every five years, "possesses the highest religious, legislative, executive, judicial, and supervisory authority in the Ukrainian Church."<sup>8</sup> In the periods between *sobors* a smaller body, the Church Council, met semi-annually to serve as the highest executive organ and as an interim legislative body for the Church. Part of the Council met on a monthly basis to deal with more immediate matters. On the diocesan and district levels popular assemblies were to operate and each of the former was to elect its own bishop; the elective principle was also to prevail in the individual parishes, the members of which were empowered to select their own pastors with the consent of the diocesan council, a body elected by the diocesan assembly.

Another characteristic of the Ukrainian Church was its sense of social consciousness, although expressed within a national context. The canons declared that "who utilizes Church life for social, national, political or personal subjugation should be excommunicated from the Church."<sup>9</sup> They specifically condemned all who employed national sentiments in order to renew the rule of the wealthy classes of society. The Russian Church was charged with having betrayed Orthodoxy (*Pravoslavje*) and having become a bulwark of *caroslavje* and *panoslavje*—glorification of tsars and landowners. In this way the new Church attempted to find a place for itself in the new revolutionary order and gain widespread popular support.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 9. For French translations of some of the documents pertaining to the Ukrainian Church see "L'Église Orthodoxe Panukrainienne créée en 1921 à Kiev," *Orientalia Christiana*, No. 3 (June, 1923), pp. 73 ff.

<sup>10</sup> The Ukrainian Church was not unique as a reformed group in the Russia of this period. A similar movement arose within the Russian Orthodox Church in the form of the "Renovated" or "Living" Church which also endeavored to break the monopoly of the monastic clergy on episcopal offices by permitting bishops to

This was not an easy task, although by March of 1923 the Church had more than three thousand parishes. These were cared for by priests who were ordained by the new Ukrainian hierarchy, since the vast majority of the pre-revolutionary clergymen who were with the Russian Church in Ukraine remained loyal to the Moscow Patriarchate and refused to join the new Church. During the spring of 1922 the Ukrainians, conscious of their *de facto* status, attempted in vain to effect a reconciliation with the other Orthodox churches and obtain recognition by inviting them to send delegates to a meeting in Kiev for the purpose of creating a league of Orthodox churches. The other churches refused to establish any contacts with a group which they regarded as having violated the canons of the Church, which require no less than two hierarchs to consecrate a bishop. Faced with such formidable opposition, the Ukrainian Church had no alternative but to attempt to pursue an independent course. However, before it could do so it needed a rationale for its method of consecration. This was provided by the Most Reverend John Teodorovyč, then Bishop of Vinnica and now Archbishop of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, in the form of a disquisition on the Grace of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church; he wrote it during the autumn of 1922.

The Grace of the Holy Spirit, according to Orthodox dogma, is the divine power which is necessary for salvation and which resides in the Church and is dispensed by it through the sacraments.<sup>11</sup> The dispute between the Ukrainian Church and the other Orthodox national churches resulted from contrary views regarding the role which should be granted to tradition as a source of divine knowledge. Archbishop Teodorovyč bases his argument largely on Scriptural writings and contends that the hierarchy or institution of the pastorate in the primary Church, which was established by Christ, was the Apostolate. This body of men, it is claimed, was not above or outside of the Church but was of the Church since Christ "called unto him his disciples: and of them he chose twelve, whom also he named Apostles" (Luke 6:13). Thus the Apostolate, it is argued, could not have been anterior to the Church, nor could it have created the Church, because Christ founded both and selected the Apostolate from the Church.<sup>12</sup>

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marry. It allowed clergymen to cut their hair and shave their beards and for a brief period in the mid-twenties preached the sinfulness of capitalism and temporarily won the support of the Soviet Government which hoped in this way to weaken the Moscow Patriarchate and the traditional Church.

<sup>11</sup> Rev. Frank Gavin, *Some Aspects of Contemporary Greek Orthodox Thought* (Milwaukee, 1923), p. 219.

<sup>12</sup> Archbishop John Teodorovyč, *Blahodatnist' Jerarkhii Ukraïns'koï Avtokefalnoï Cerkvy*, 3rd ed. (Regensburg, 1947), pp. 11 ff.

The act of conciliar consecration performed in Kiev in October of 1921 is justified on the grounds that the Ukrainian Church, although without its own bishops while under Muscovite domination from 1686 to 1921, never lost its Grace. Consecration is a bestowal of Grace which is a gift of God not subject to human control; what is granted by God, it is reasoned, cannot be withheld by any individual who has the task of laying on hands. Bishops alone did not at all times enjoy a monopoly of the right to consecrate since such a doctrine would exclude God who is the sole consecrator. The election of Reverend Lypkivs'kyj as Metropolitan was not a renewal of the hierarchy of the Ukrainian Church but rather a renewal of the traditional fullness of its structure. The Ukrainian Church continued to possess Grace even when its bishops were being appointed by Moscow. The *Sobor* of 1921, it is contended, merely renewed the function of the episcopacy; prior to that time the Church possessed pastors who were abiding by the instructions which Christ gave to teach and baptize. Apostolic Succession, it is argued, was preserved during the 1686–1921 period in the whole institution of the pastorate in Ukraine and not in the episcopacy alone since it is but one part of the whole hierarchy.

This contention is based on the assumption that the bishops alone cannot be identified with the Apostles since in the primary Church the terms “presbyter” or elder and “bishop” were apparently employed interchangeably in referring to the Apostles. The distinction in rank between the episcopacy and the priesthood, it is argued, was developed later by man. Thus the institution of the pastorate, which includes priests as well as bishops, proceeds from the Apostolate established by Christ. By this logic priests must be regarded as successors of the Apostles no less than bishops are since all of the Apostles were equal in the Grace which they enjoyed. As proof of this, Archbishop Teodorovyč cites Peter's reference to himself as an elder or presbyter (I Peter 5:1) together with Paul's Epistle to Titus; in the latter (Titus 1:5–6), qualifications for elders are laid down and without any apparent interruption in the train of thought the term “bishop” is then substituted for “elder” in the following verse indicating that the two terms were synonymous in the primary Church.<sup>13</sup> A bishop did not and does not enjoy a greater degree of Grace than did a presbyter (elder) or priest since the Grace which Christ bestowed upon the Apostles was of a uniform quality. Mortals cannot attempt to measure Grace. There is no evidence, says Archbishop Teodorovyč, to indicate that the sacrament of holy orders, which is now performed exclusively by bishops, is

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 50 ff. Also see Paul's Epistle to the Philippians 1:1.

of greater magnitude or requires more Grace than the other six sacraments which are performed by all priests.

It is claimed that the differentiation which now exists between a bishop and presbyter or priest lies not in the degree or quality of Grace which each enjoys, but only in the functions which each performs. Yet when the Ukrainian Orthodox Church re-established itself in 1921, it did not abolish the episcopacy or argue in a presbyterian manner that the episcopacy has no place in the Church. It merely argued that the exclusive right of bishops to administer the sacrament of holy orders (ordination and consecration) developed as a result of the actual needs of Church life and not on the grounds that bishops possess a greater degree or higher quality of Grace. The Church itself, it is contended, is the source of the differentiation in functions performed by bishops and presbyters or priests. Administrative necessity and the need for unity and stability alone caused the Church to grant to bishops the exclusive right to ordain and consecrate. This right is a purely canonical matter and is therefore, unlike religious dogma, not immutable. It is a practice developed by the Church, and it is consequently possible for the Church to redistribute functions at any time, as its Ukrainian branch did in 1921 when it became necessary to obtain a truly Ukrainian episcopate. This was a drastic step, and it was accompanied by an appeal to the Lord, the Supreme Pastor, before whom the Ukrainians laid their faith, hopes, and prayers.<sup>14</sup>

Under Metropolitan Lypkiv's'kyj's leadership thirty-five bishops were consecrated in the traditional Orthodox manner, and the new Church appeared to be prospering. The Soviet Government had done little to prevent its establishment but within a few years commenced a campaign of gradual suppression. In 1924 and during each of the three succeeding years Metropolitan Lypkiv's'kyj was placed under arrest. In 1927 he was compelled to resign and a *sobor* elected Nicholas Borec'kyj to succeed him. The new Metropolitan governed the Church until 1930 when it was implicated in the alleged plot of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (*Spilka Vyzvolennja Ukraïny*). This clandestine organization was accused of promoting separatist tendencies and desiring to restore private property. Vladimir Čekhiv's'kyj, a Social Democrat who had been premier of the anti-Bolshevik Directory Government early in 1919, was charged with having headed the Union's religious section. During the trial of the forty-five leaders of the Union in March and April

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 100 f. Archbishop Teodorovyč (pp. 124 ff.) has cited considerable evidence which indicates that consecration of bishops by a college of presbyters was a practice employed by the Church of Alexandria for more than two centuries preceding the convocation of the First Ecumenical Council in 325 A.D.

of 1930 the prosecution alleged that the Church held secret requiems for Symon Petljura, the émigré nationalist, following his murder in Paris.<sup>15</sup> The Ukrainian Church never recovered from the setback which it suffered as a result of the trial. During the 1930's all of the bishops were arrested, and with the advent of World War II there remained only Archbishop Teodorovyč in the United States, the sole surviving hierarch of the original thirty-five.<sup>16</sup>

The opportunity to renew the autocephalous status of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church came with the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. The movement was headed by Bishop Polikarp Sikors'kyj of the diocese of Lutsk in Volynia, who in February of 1942 re-established the Church at a *sobor* in Pinsk and consecrated several bishops. At the same time Bishop Polikarp succeeded in obtaining the support of his nominal superior, Metropolitan Dionisij of Warsaw, who had consecrated him in 1932 and ten years later elevated him to an archbishopric. Polikarp's consecration had been canonical since he had headed part of the autocephalous Orthodox Church of Poland, which was recognized by the Patriarch of Constantinople during the inter-war period. Thus the renewed Ukrainian Church was not plagued with the charge of "self-consecration" which served the enemies of the national church so well during the

<sup>15</sup> Nicholas Kovalevs'kyj, *Ukraina Pid Červonyin Jarmom* (Lviv, 1936), pp. 72 ff.

<sup>16</sup> The demise of the Church in Ukraine itself did not hinder the development of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Churches in the United States and in Canada. Many of the Ukrainian immigrants in both countries desired such a Church, and when the movement first manifested itself in the homeland they were quick to assume the initiative. As early as July 18, 1918, a group of 150 laymen held a church congress in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan. The participants were members of the Uniat Church, adhering to the Eastern Orthodox ritual but acknowledging the Papacy, who were dissatisfied with the arbitrary nature of its administration and the principle of personal episcopal ownership of all church buildings and parochial property. They also objected to the attempt of the Uniat Church to obtain control of the Peter Mohyla Institute, a Ukrainian educational institution in Saskatoon. When the Uniat bishop denied them the sacraments, they decided to establish a truly national and democratically governed church and return to the Orthodox faith of their forefathers. The new Ukrainian Greek Orthodox Church of Canada gained adherents from the Russian Orthodox Church which lost whole parishes composed of emigrants from Bukovina; many Uniats also joined the new Church which now has more than two hundred congregations although many of these are rural and small. The Canadian Church, unlike the movement in Ukraine itself, succeeded in obtaining recognition from a canonically consecrated Orthodox hierarch in the United States, the Syrian Metropolitan Germanos, who served as its acting bishop until Archbishop Teodorovyč succeeded him in 1924. The latter also assumed control over the numerically smaller Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the United States, but in 1947 he relinquished the leadership of the Canadian Church which now has a separate hierarch. It is significant that the Canadian Church did not accept the canons which were adopted at the Kiev *Sobor* in 1921, since it wished to be in a position to establish relations with the other branches of the Orthodox Church on the North American continent.

1920's. However, Archbishop Polikarp had placed himself under the Moscow Patriarchate in 1939 when his diocese was incorporated into the Soviet Union; he now had to bear the onus of disobeying Moscow and in May of 1942 was divested of all sacerdotal position *in absentia*. This did not prevent him from proceeding with the organization of the autocephalous church, although a rival movement for mere autonomy headed by Archbishop Alexei Hromads'kyj served to weaken the effort. When the Nazis retreated from Ukraine, Archbishop Polikarp and eleven other hierarchs obtained refuge in Germany with thousands of other Ukrainian displaced persons.

Two attempts in as many decades to establish an autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union have ended in failure with the believers reintegrated into the Russian Church on both occasions. The attempts, although abortive, were made possible by the vague unity of Eastern Orthodoxy which is not organized on the monarchical model. No patriarch is regarded as the head of the whole Church, for this distinction belongs exclusively to Christ (Ephesians 2:20, 5:23; I Corinthians 3:11). What unity the Church possesses is reflected not in its external organization but in the whole episcopacy in accordance with the principle of harmony and corporateness which is *Sobornost*. The autocephalous units of the Church agree on dogma, recognize each other's sacraments as valid, and engage in concelebrations of the liturgy on occasions of great importance. Yet once the principle of autocephaly is accepted it is only logical that there be as many distinct churches, albeit of the same confession, as there are nations and that the boundaries of religious and political jurisdictions coincide. It is a principle which, in the last analysis, leads to a limitation of the universality of Eastern Orthodoxy, since it isolates the various branches of the Church, spelling death to the notion of effective organic unity.