



The Politics of History and the Second World War in Post-Communist Ukraine (1986/1991-2004/2005)

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Source: *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge, Bd. 54, H. 1, Themenschwerpunkt: Gespaltene Geschichtskulturen? Zweiter Weltkrieg und kollektive Erinnerungskulturen in der Ukraine (2006), pp. 50-81

Published by: [Franz Steiner Verlag](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41051583>

Accessed: 16-12-2015 04:19 UTC

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The Politics of History and the Second World War in Post-Communist Ukraine (1986/1991–2004/2005)

Ukraine was one of the main theaters of the Second World War in Europe, its population victim to some of the worst crimes perpetrated by German military and civil occupation authorities.¹ This wartime experience, an existential matter for the Ukrainian state and Ukrainian society, is still directly felt by Ukrainians today, as is reflected in eye-witness accounts and stories passed down from one generation to the next. In independent Ukraine, honoring the memory of the Red Army's victory in the "Great Patriotic War" on "Victory Day," a legal holiday observed on 9 May, belongs to the country's most important traditions.² In the eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, as well as in parts of central Ukraine, Soviet rituals and traditions still dominate the memory of the war without fully giving way to past practices. The picture in the Galicia and Volhynia regions of western Ukraine is different. There, the memory of the underground struggle of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) shapes the official culture of remembrance and monuments.³

The heroic narrative of the "Great Patriotic War" was one of the Soviet Union's basic legitimizing myths. The maintenance, modification, and national re-evaluation of this myth since the end of *perestroika* (Ukr. *perebudova*) number among the most controversial issues in Ukrainian debates over the past. This essay analyzes the function and the changing meaning of the view of history (*Geschichtsbild*) of the Second World War in post-Soviet Ukraine. At the heart of this analysis is Ukraine's politics of history within the context of regional differences in cultures of remembrance. The Ukrainian example, the thesis here, shows that one-sided conclusions about one or the other form of remembrance culture can be misleading when it comes to collective identity and political culture: Soviet influenced commemoration of the war, for example, does not necessarily entail looking backward to an imperial fatherland shared with and dominated by Russia⁴; in fact it can actually flow into a national-Ukrainian identity.

* I would like to thank for constructive criticism and comments Ray Brandon, Frank Golczewski, Heorhii Kas'ianov, and Dieter Pohl.

¹ DIETER POHL. Schlachtfeld zweier totalitärer Diktaturen – die Ukraine im Zweiten Weltkrieg, in: Österreichische Osthefte (2000) no. 3–4, pp. 339–362, here p. 361. Around 3 million – 4 million inhabitants of Ukraine perished during the war and at least 1.4 million Red Army soldiers from Ukraine fell in battle against the German Armed Forces. The number of victims is still contested and could be much higher.

² For an overview, see JUTTA SCHERRER Ukraine. Konkurrierende Erinnerungen, in: MONIKA FLACKE (ed.) Mythos der Nationen. 1945 – Arena der Erinnerungen. Band 2. Berlin 2004, pp. 719–736, here pp. 722–725.

³ During the war, the UPA saw as its main enemies everything Soviet, German occupation authorities, and the Poles. It continued its struggle until the mid-1950s. Cf. CATHERINE WANNER Historical Narratives, Personal Narratives: Ethnographic Perspectives on Nationness in Post-Soviet Ukraine, in: The Harriman Review 9 (Spring 1996) no. 1–2, pp. 11–15, here p. 14 as well as CATHERINE WANNER Burden of Dreams. History and Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine. Philadelphia 1998.

⁴ This is implied in ROMAN SERBYN Borot'ba za istorychnu pam'iat' ukrains'koho narodu, in: FEDIR PIHIDO-PRAVOBEREZHNYI "Velyka Vitchyzniana Viina". Spohady ta rozdzumy ochevydtsia. Kyïv 2002, pp. 208–224, here p. 224.

Theoretical Premises

The nationalist re-evaluation of the history of the Second World War is a central element in constructing an anti-Soviet, Ukrainian national history. This national history belongs above all to the politics of history, which is aimed “at the public constructions of views of history and identity.” It takes place by means of discourse, rituals, and symbols and uses the past to provide political legitimation and to mobilize.⁵ Commemoration days and national symbols are used as instruments in the politics of history as much as schoolbooks and history curricula.⁶ The politics of history as a part of “societal identity policy”⁷ has become a key field of policy in the post-Soviet transformation process.⁸ It is not limited to the rhetorical production of what is national in content, rather it involves concrete and collectively binding decisions. Establishing a day of commemoration and awarding heroes state orders can justify social and political privileges for certain groups and so serve as instruments for securing loyalty.⁹ National symbols, such as coats of arms, flags, and anthems, provide basic functions for nationalism. They recall a national past in its essence and in a selective form and so contribute to the polarization of people and thus the mobilization of a political movement. The myths and views of history that lie at the core of these national symbols provide legitimation and serve the integration of the nation and state.¹⁰

Debates over national history can also be understood as a post-socialist “discourse of the national”. Post-socialism is “produced ethically and morally” and juxtaposed with the “a-historic, amoral, and a-ethical realm” of socialism. A reconstructed historical memory is created as “true history” and equated with “national history” and then contrasted with “false Soviet history”.¹¹ This ideologically driven cultural re-evaluation of given societies can be understood by a slight modification of Graham Smith’s formulation of three tendencies – essentialization, historicization, and totalization – with the transformation of relative differences into absolutes (e.g. religion and language) shored up by “national history.”¹²

⁵ PETRA BOCK, EDGAR WOLFRUM Einleitung, in: PETRA BOCK, EDGAR WOLFRUM (eds.) *Umkämpfte Vergangenheit. Geschichtsbilder, Erinnerung und Vergangenheitspolitik im internationalen Vergleich*. Göttingen 1999, pp. 7–14.

⁶ ALEIDA ASSMANN, UTE FREVERT *Geschichtsvergessenheit, Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945*. Stuttgart 1999, p. 312.

⁷ WOLFGANG KASCHUBA *Geschichtspolitik und Identitätspolitik. Nationale und ethnische Diskurse im Kulturvergleich*, in: BEATE BINDER, WOLFGANG KASCHUBA, PETER NIEDERMÜLLER (eds.) *In-szenierung des Nationalen. Geschichte, Kultur und die Politik der Identitäten am Ende des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Köln, Weimar, Wien 2001, pp. 19–42, here p. 20 (= *alltag & kultur*, 7).

⁸ Cf., for example, MICHAEL URBAN *The Politics of Identity in Russia’s Postcommunist Transition: The Nation against Itself*, in: *Slavic Review* 53 (1994) pp. 733–765.

⁹ CLAUS LEGGEWIE, ERIK MEYER “Ein Ort, an den man gerne geht.” *Das Holocaust-Mahnmal und die deutsche Geschichtspolitik nach 1989*. München, Wien 2005, p. 18.

¹⁰ JOHN BREULLY *Nationalismus und moderner Staat. Deutschland und Europa*. Übersetzt und herausgegeben von Johannes Müller. Köln 1999, pp. 288ff. (= *Kölner Beiträge zur Nationsforschung*, 6).

¹¹ PETER NIEDERMÜLLER *Der Mythos der Gemeinschaft: Geschichte, Gedächtnis und Politik im heutigen Osteuropa*, in: ANDREI CORBEA HOISIE, RUDOLF JAWORSKI, MONIKA SOMMER (eds.) *Umbruch im östlichen Europa. Die nationale Wende und das kollektive Gedächtnis*. Innsbruck [etc.] 2004, pp. 11–26, hier pp. 11ff. (= *Gedächtnis – Erinnerung – Identität*, 5).

¹² GRAHAM SMITH [et al.] (eds.) *Nation-Building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands. The Politics of National Identities*. Cambridge 1999, pp. 15–16.

The Soviet Legacy: The Collective Myth of the "Great Patriotic War"

In the successor states of the former Soviet Union, the expression "Great Patriotic War" defines the period of the Second World War from National Socialist Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 to the unconditional surrender of the German Armed Forces on 9 May 1945 in Karlshorst. The heroic narrative of the defense and liberation of the "Soviet land" by the Red Army and Soviet partisans, which underlies this expression and draws from Russia's "Patriotic War" against Napoleon in 1812, was popularized by Stalin and his entourage in addresses and newspaper articles not long after the German attack.¹³ In the propaganda of the "Great Patriotic War," russocentric Soviet "patriotism" was given a nationalist boost. So as to mobilize the population's will to hold out, Soviet officials allowed the heroic, primarily Russian-national past to be revived.¹⁴ Actual work on the myth of the "Great Patriotic War" began primarily in the Brezhnev era. In 1965, "Victory Day," the official day of commemoration, became a legal holiday and, as a result, was connected with anniversaries of the Great October Revolution. Thus the patriotic myth of the war took its place next to the myth of the socialist revolution as a second basic legitimizing myth of the Soviet Union.¹⁵

The basis of the Soviet-Ukrainian view of history was also derived from the national-Russian dominated myth of "Great Patriotic War." The idea of a "reunification of all Ukrainian lands in one Soviet-Ukrainian state" in September 1939 became crucially important to this view of history. The precondition of "reunification" was the secret annex to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, which was kept secret in the Soviet Union until 1989, and the subsequent partition of Poland by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. After 1945, the Red Army's entry into the Ukrainian and Belarusian territories of the shattered Polish state on 17 September 1939 came to be celebrated in the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic (UkSSR), and especially in western Ukraine, on round anniversaries as a mythically transfigured "Golden September."¹⁶ Crowning the "reunification" narrative under Soviet auspices were the "liberation of Ukraine from fascism" and the realization of the "reunification of the Ukrainian people in a Soviet-Ukrainian state" in October 1944. On the one hand, the slogan "reunification" was to articulate an expression of gratitude to the Red Army and the "leader

¹³ Cf. the sources used in ERWIN OBERLÄNDER *Sowjetpatriotismus und Geschichte. Dokumentation.* Köln 1967 (= *Dokumente zum Studium des Kommunismus*, 4).

¹⁴ HELMUT ALTRICHTER „Der Große Vaterländische Krieg.“ *Zur Entstehung und Entsakralisierung eines Mythos*, in: HELMUT ALTRICHTER, KLAUS HERBERS, HELMUT NEUHAUS (eds.) *Mythen in der Geschichte.* Freiburg i. Breisgau 2004, pp. 471–493, here p. 479. Several new orders named after famous Russian army leaders were created during the war, for example, the Suvorov and Kutuzov order.

¹⁵ HELMUT ALTRICHTER „Der Große Vaterländische Krieg“ p. 481 and the seminal work by NINA TUMARKIN *The Living and the Dead. The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia.* New York 1994. LARS KARL *Der „Tag des Sieges“ in der Sowjetunion. Inszenierung eines politischen Mythos.* Unpublished Master's thesis. Tübingen 1999, pp. 22ff., printed in full in: JÜRGEN DANYEL, LARS KARL, JAN-HOLGER KIRSCH (eds.) (in Kooperation mit dem Deutsch-Russischen Museum Berlin-Karlshorst) *Die russische Erinnerung an den „Großen Vaterländischen Krieg.“* in: *Zeitgeschichte online*, Mai 2005, URL: <http://www.zeitgeschichte-online.de/md=Russische-Erinnerung-Beitraege>.

¹⁶ VLADYSLAV HRYNEVYCH *Ukraïna na pochatkomu etapi Druhoï svitovoiï viiny*, in: VOLODYMYR KUCHER, VLADYSLAV HRYNEVYCH, VIKTOR KOVAL' (eds.) *Politychna istoriia Ukraïny. XX st.: U shesti tomakh. Tom 4: Ukraïna u druhiï svitovii viini (1939–1945).* Kyïv 2003, pp. 63–128, here pp. 69ff. On Soviet war mythology as well as post-Soviet Ukrainian memory with different emphasis: VLADYSLAV HRYNEVYCH *Gespaltene Erinnerung. Der Zweite Weltkrieg im ukrainischen Gedenken*, in: *Osteuropa* (2005) no. 4–6, pp. 88–102.

of nations” Comrade Stalin, while the slogan “Stalinist friendship between nations” was to revive a socialist sense of community among the Soviet Ukrainian population. On the other hand, the instrumentalization of the Ukrainian territory’s unity formed the basis for an expression of modern nationalism and served as counterpropaganda against the idea of an independent and “united Ukraine” (*soborna Ukraïna*) popularized by the anti-Soviet UPA in western Ukraine.¹⁷

During the war, important heroes from the Ukrainian tradition were fed into the Soviet-Ukrainian view of history.¹⁸ The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolved on 10 October 1943 to create a medal named for Ukrainian Cossack Hetman Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi (1595?–1657). The decision to create this medal was made at the Soviet center; however, the medal in question was the only award whose inscription and content was in the language of the titular nation of a non-Russian republic.¹⁹ In the middle of the medal, which read, in Ukrainian, “Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi,” was a portrait of the hetman, who in the central Soviet-Ukrainian party press was glorified as a “great son of the Ukrainian people,” statesman, and military leader. The medal served not only to mobilize Ukrainians in the war, but to legitimize historically Ukraine’s inclusion in the Soviet Union: Khmel’nyts’kyi embodied not only the “social and national liberation of the Ukrainian people” in the Cossack Uprising against Poland in the mid-17th century, but also the reunification of Ukraine with Russia in the treaties concluded between the Cossacks and the tsars of Moscow in 1654 at Pereiaslav. With this interpretation, however, the wartime myth came to be accompanied by a positive promotion of Zaporizhzhian Cossacks and certain princes of Kievan Rus’, construed to be Ukrainian, as well as by the integration of Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko.²⁰ Thus during the war, a Soviet-Ukrainian myth was created that was compatible with the imperial Soviet culture of remembrance, whereby Ukrainian intellectuals within the cultural establishment of the UkSSR sometimes stressed the Ukrainian components more than the Soviet ones.

Even after the Zhdanovshchyna, the period of ideological purification (1947–1951), which was particularly harsh in rooting out the “national deviations” of Soviet Ukrainian historiography, traditional Ukrainian elements of the Soviet-Ukrainian view of history from the war were not completely swept aside. The Soviet-Ukrainian view of history was officially canonized in 1954 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav by the “Theses on the Reunification of Ukraine with Russia,” which were passed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine (CPU) and still influenced by Stalinist politics of history.²¹ The premises of reunification and Russian dominance were cemented, but the peoples and nations involved remained in place as the main actors in the

¹⁷ On the historical and political presentation on the part of the Communist Party of Ukraine since October 1944, see VLADYSLAV HRYNEVYCH *Nimets’ko-radians’ka viina 1941–1945 rr.*, in: KUCHER, HRYNEVYCH, KOVAL’ (eds.) *Politychna istoriia Ukraïny*, tom 4, pp. 129–304, here pp. 196–197, 206ff.

¹⁸ SERHY YEKELCHYK *Stalin’s Empire of Memory. Russian-Ukrainian Relations in the Soviet Historical Imagination*. Toronto, Buffalo, London 2003, p. 23.

¹⁹ DMYTRO TABACHNYK (ed.) *Nahorody Ukraïny. Istorii, fakty, dokumenty*. Tom 2. Kyïv 1996, pp. 272–275.

²⁰ Even in the late Soviet era, the mass distribution of works by Shevchenko (e.g. *Kobzar*) to soldiers on the front remained a favorite subject in the veterans’ memoirs popularised on days of commemoration. On their significance in wartime propaganda, see HRYNEVYCH *Nimets’ko-radians’ka viina 1941–1945 rr.*, p. 194.

²¹ PAUL ROBERT MAGOCSI *A History of Ukraine*. 3. ed. Seattle 1998, pp. 647–648.

narrative.²² The theses therefore do not necessarily amount to a russification of the Soviet-Ukrainian view of history.²³ The Soviet-Ukrainian components of the Soviet war myth, with its references to the enormous human and material losses during the war and the occupation regime, enforced the integration of a politically and culturally heterogeneous country in the Soviet Union where the experience of war had pushed aside memories of the nation-building efforts made between 1917 and 1921 and the experience of annihilation during the Great Famine of 1932–1933.²⁴

The genesis of the Soviet-Ukrainian view of history illustrated the significance of the institutionalization of nationality and the national definition of the republics described by Brubaker.²⁵ No justification for real political autonomy in the UkSSR were connected with this view of history, but the national elements of this view of history, which were then resuscitated by historians and intellectuals from the 1960s movement between 1956 and 1972, formed the symbolic basis for the first steps toward the republic's sovereignty.

Enlisting the Second World War in the National View of History during Perestroika

The de-legitimation of the myth surrounding the "Great Patriotic War" and the integration of a re-evaluated view of the war into the national view of history got underway in Ukraine only towards the end of perestroika. Re-evaluating the wartime myth, after all, was connected with openly calling into question the Soviet system and UkSSR's place in the union.²⁶

As in the Baltic states, the de-legitimation of the war myth began in the UkSSR with the prehistory of Soviet occupation from 1939 to 1941. A decisive stage was the organization of a human chain stretching from L'viv to Kiev on 21 January 1990 to commemorate the anniversary of the unification of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) with the West Ukrainian People's Republic. Several hundred thousand Ukrainians joined together, blue and yellow flags in hand, to form a chain and demonstrate on behalf of Ukraine's integral unity (*so-*

²² ERNST LÜDEMANN Zur „Lösung der nationalen Frage“ in der sowjetukrainischen Geschichtsschreibung nach 1956, in: *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* 40 (1986) pp. 229–395, here pp. 250, 260.

²³ N. N. LYSENKO *Metodyka vykladannia istorii ukrains'koï RSR. Vydannia druhe, pereroblene i dopovnene*. Kyïv 1985, pp. 244ff., p. 255. In textbooks for teaching the history of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the chapters "The Struggle of the Working Population of the West-Ukrainian Territories for Reunification with Soviet Ukraine" and "The Realisation of the Reunification of the Ukrainian Territories in a Soviet-Ukrainian State" were a central element of UkSSR history, which was taught in Soviet-Ukrainian classrooms within the framework of regional studies (*istorychne kraieznavstvo*).

²⁴ AMIR WEINER *The Making of a Dominant Myth: The Second World War and the Construction of Political Identities within the Soviet Polity*, in: *Russian Review* 55 (1996) pp. 638–660.

²⁵ ROGER BRUBAKER *Nationhood and the National Question in the Soviet Union and its Successor States: An Institutional Account*, in: *IDEM Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. New York 1996, p. 24.

²⁶ Cf. in detail the discussion of the war from 1986 on in WILFRIED JILGE *Nationale Geschichtspolitik während der Zeit der Perestroika in der Ukraine*, in: HELMUT ALTRICHTER (ed.) *Gegenerinnerung. Geschichte als politisches Argument im Transformationsprozeß Ost-, Ostmittel- und Südosteuropas*. München 2006, pp. 99–128 (= *Schriften des Historischen Kollegs, Kolloquien* 61) [forthcoming]. A key role in constructing a nationalist view of history of the Second World War was played by parts of the Ukrainian émigré community in North America. This, however, cannot be addressed in detail here.

bornist').²⁷ At the same time, the action reminded a large part of the public that the *sobornist*' achieved in 1919 and not the "reunification" of 1939 and 1944 could serve as the true historical and judicial argument for Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity. This notwithstanding, Ukrainian intellectuals and historians never questioned the legality of the "reunification" of the Ukrainian territories in September 1939 despite their condemnation of the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact.²⁸

Characteristic for 1990 was a growing polarization in both the confrontation between main opposition group Rukh and the CPU and within the population. The political and historical issue acting as catalyst for this polarization was the debate over Ukrainian national symbols. As early as Rukh's founding congress in September 1989, its delegates had advocated the renaissance of Ukrainian national symbols (blue-yellow flag, the trident, and the anthem "Ukraine is Not Dead Yet").²⁹ During the perestroika phase, and above all after 1991, Ukrainian national symbols aroused hostile reactions in parts of central Ukraine and especially in the overwhelmingly russophone eastern and southern regions. Many citizens in these regions associated the colors blue and yellow or the trident with the activities of the Banderites, a wing of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists led by Stepan Bandera (1909–1959), and above all with an aggressive, anti-Russian, nationalist ideology.³⁰ These

²⁷ IAROSLAV HRYTSAK *Narys istorii Ukraïny. Formuvannia modernoi ukrains'koï natsii XIX–XX stolittia. 2-e vydannia.* Kyïv 2000, p. 297.

²⁸ DMYTRO PAVLYCHKO *Pakt Molotova-Ribbentropa i vozz'iednannia Ukraïny 1939 roku*, in: *Literaturna Ukraïna*, no. 1, 4 January 1990, p. 2.

²⁹ Cf. Resolution "Pro natsional'nu symboliku", in: *Literaturna Ukraïna*, no. 42, 19 October 1989, p. 7.

³⁰ The program of the OUN, founded in 1929, was based on rightwing authoritarianism and integral, anti-democratic nationalism. The organization in early 1940 split into two factions named for their leaders, Andrii Mel'nyk and Stepan Bandera, OUN-M and OUN-B. At different times and to different extents, both wings cooperated with the Germans, with the motives and extent being disputed to this day. The main goal of both factions, however, remained the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state, which ran counter to the interests of the German occupation authorities. In Ukrainian discussions, the extent of the OUN's participation in the murder of Ukraine's Jews remains largely taboo (e.g. the role of the militia set up by the OUN and the Wehrmacht in the anti-Jewish pogroms of June–July 1941 in western Ukraine). Cf. JOHN A. ARMSTRONG *Ukrainian Nationalism*. 3rd revised edition. Englewood, Col. 1990; RYSZARD TORZECKI *Die Rolle der Zusammenarbeit mit der deutschen Besatzungsmacht in der Ukraine für deren Okkupationspolitik*, in: *Okkupation und Kollaboration (1938–1945). Beiträge zu Konzepten und Praxis der Kollaboration in der deutschen Okkupationspolitik*. Werner Röhr [comp.] Berlin, Heidelberg 1994, pp. 239–272; H. V. KAS'IANOV *Ideolohiia orhanizatsii ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv*, in: S. V. KUL'CHYTS'KYI (ed.) *Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv i ukrains'ka povstans'ka armiiia. Istorychni narysy*. Kyïv 2005, pp. 445–478. Similarly complex and controversial is the history of the UPA, which above all, starting in spring 1943, gained significantly in importance. The most important leadership positions in the UPA were held by OUN-B figures, but the UPA and the OUN-B were not identical. Primarily because of its underground struggle against the Soviets, the UPA gained considerable popularity among large parts of the west Ukrainian population. It conducted a fierce struggle not only against the Soviets but also the German occupiers and the Polish Home Army (*Armija Krajowa*). During the UPA-AK conflict ("the Volhynian tragedy"), some 80 000–100 000 Poles were killed. The number of Ukrainian victims is estimated at 15 000–20 000 people. The figures are contested. This was not a military conflict but an ethnic cleansing operation coordinated by OUN-B-leadership and deliberately aimed at the Polish civilian population. Even within OUN-B there were voices critical of the ethnic cleansing of Poles. Against the backdrop of these actions, it appears practical to interpret the post-1943 "democratic" and "liberal" modifications of the OUN-B and UPA programs as primarily tactical. Cf. IHOR ILIUSHYN *Boiovi dii OUN i UPA na antipols'komu fronti*, in: KUL'CHYTS'KYI (ed.) *Orhanizatsiia ukrains'kykh natsionalistiv i Ukrains'ka povstans'ka armiiia* pp. 222–302; TIMOTHY SNYDER *The Reconstruction of Nations. Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus', 1569–1999*. New Haven, London 2003, pp. 168–169. For a thought-

attitudes are without a doubt also a consequence of Soviet or, until around 1989–1991, a continued Soviet-Ukrainian propaganda³¹ that branded and persecuted manifestations of the trident and the blue and yellow flag as symbols of Ukrainian “bourgeois nationalism” or as signs of “fascist collaborators.” During the Second World War, both factions of the OUN as well as the UPA did in fact contribute a great deal to the popularization of Ukrainian national symbols for an independent state to be won in battle.

After the national-democratic opposition won majorities in city and county councils throughout western Ukraine in 1990 in the first free elections, the Lenin monuments began falling as a consequence of resolutions passed by several of the newly elected councils. In addition, Galician city councils in the summer of 1990 began renaming streets with Soviet names after leaders of the OUN and the UPA. In towns across the L’viv region, for example, Victory Street became Bandera Street and Komsomol’ Street was renamed for UPA commander Roman Shukhevych.³² On 30 June 1990, several thousand people formed a *viche* (assembly)³³ to mark the 49th anniversary of the OUN-B’s proclamation of the foundation of a Ukrainian “state” under German protection. (The “state” and its “government” was immediately dispersed by the Germans). In the village of Iaseniv, L’viv Oblast, a monument was erected in honor of the Ukrainian volunteers for the SS Grenadier-Division Galicia, which the SS raised in 1943 to fight the Red Army. Thus a new national topography of preserving memory directed against the Soviet culture of remembrance was created.³⁴ The new topography contained a radical national re-evaluation of the Soviet way of viewing the Second World War and unmistakably connoted demands for independence. The confrontations over the OUN and the UPA increased the number of parliamentary confrontations between the national-democratic opposition on the one hand and the communist majority and the republic leadership on the other.³⁵ In an official statement from June 1991, Rukh members of parliament called for the “political rehabilitation of OUN-UPA.”³⁶ Parliamentary commissions were set up to investigate the activities of the OUN, the UPA, and “SS-Halychyna.” As a result, parliament’s Commission for Legal Order and the Fight against Organized Crime had the Institute of History in the Academy of Sciences prepare an expert opinion. In the expert opinion presented in July 1991, historian Viktor Koval’ drafted a sweeping apologetic view of the history of the OUN and the UPA, presenting at the same time not only a debasement and de-legitimation of the myth of the “Great Patriotic War” but of the

provoking and critical view regarding the UPA, see YAROSLAV HRYTSAK *Tezy do dyskusii pro UPA*, in: IDEM *Strasti za nacionalizmom. Istorychni eseï*. Kyïv 2004, pp. 90–113.

³¹ Resolution of the Commission for Patriotic and International Training and National Relations in the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR, “Pro natsional’nu symvolyku,” in: *Radians’ka Ukraïna*, no. 156, 7 July 1989, p. 3.

³² OLEKSANDR BOIKO *Ukraïna v 1985–1991 rr. Osnovni tendentsii suspil’no-politychnoho rozvytku*. Kyïv 2002, pp. 159ff.

³³ A *viche* was a city assembly that existed in ancient Rus’ until the 15th century. In this case, the “democratic” traditions of medieval Ukraine-Rus’, construed to be national in character, were juxtaposed with the OUN’s struggle for independence and freedom so as to show continuity.

³⁴ The forms of monument complexes that also became bearers of the traditional national-state symbols for Ukrainians drew on the traditions of the OUN and UPA underground in the 1940s and 1950s and older national (or Cossack) traditions.

³⁵ The state prosecutor’s office of the UkSSR called for harsh punitive measures against the “nationalists” in west Ukraine for violating the law on the protection of monuments.

³⁶ Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the UkSSR no. 1185-Ch-P, 11 June 1991, “Pro zaiavu hrupy narodnykh deputativ Ukraïns’koï RSR,” in: *Vidomosti Verhovnoi Rady Ukraïns’koï Radians’koï Socialistychnoi Respubliky* 30 (1991) p. 840.

entire Soviet era since 1917. At the heart of the document stood the OUN's struggle, especially that of the OUN-B and the UPA, against the Stalinist regime and for the freedom and independence of Ukraine. The author stressed the "democratic program" of the OUN and the UPA, which he called the "first dissidents" and thus placed in direct connection with the Soviet dissident movement of the 1960s. Koval's concept, which was rejected by the communist majority in parliament, is a good example of the moral presentation of the nation. It pointed in the direction of the nationally affirming conduct of argumentation of the 1990s. Koval equated national history with the "true" memory of the (repressed and therefore morally superior) Ukrainian people: Thus Bandera's followers could not have come out against the population or the people, because they were themselves a part of the people. Their brutality was directed only against "traitors," that is to say "agents" of the anti-national Stalinist regime. Koval's arguments could only be published in 1992, after independence.³⁷ Within the historical and political work of the Institute of History at the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR, whose semi-official view of history tried mostly to legitimize a sovereign UkSSR within the Soviet Union, Koval's position remained an exception.

The polarization in the discourse of the national in content contributed without a doubt to the further alienation of *Rukh* in Ukraine's eastern and southern regions,³⁸ where the national movement never enjoyed widespread support to begin with.³⁹

*Integrating the Memory of the Nationalist Underground
in the Semi-Official National View of History*

After the demise of the Soviet Union, Leonid Kravchuk, who became the first elected president of Ukraine in December 1991, the post-Soviet nomenklatura, and a part of *Rukh*'s members for the most part adopted the national symbols propagated by the national movement and their underlying view of history for the legitimation of the state and nation.⁴⁰ In the state *duma*, an advisory body created by Kravchuk in 1992 and based in the president's office, officials were in the meantime considering a concept promoting Ukrainian national culture built on historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi's national-historical ideas.⁴¹ The president proclaimed the "return of national traditions" and recalled in his speeches the pre-revolutionary historians and "heroes" of Kievan Rus', the Cossack era, and the Ukrainian People's Republic, so as to justify the state and his own position in the post-socialist era. He was clearly more reserved with regard to references to the "heroes" of the anti-Soviet

³⁷ VIKTOR KOVAL' Pid chervono-chomymy praporamy. Ts'oho roku vypovniuiet'sia 50 rokov Ukraïns'kii povstans'kii armiï, in: *Vitchyzna* 9 (1992) pp. 73–82.

³⁸ HRYTSAK *Narys istorii Ukraïny* p. 294. Furthermore, parts of *Rukh*'s leadership – especially those from the ranks of the former informal organisations such as the Ukrainian Helsinki Union – also promoted the OUN's historical legacy. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union, for example, was made up of people from different generations and political ideologies. Among some of them, there were still ties to the tradition of the OUN and UPA's underground struggle against Soviet power.

³⁹ ANDREW WILSON *The Ukrainians. Unexpected Nation*. New Haven, London 2002, p. 162.

⁴⁰ Cf. Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine. "Pro Derzhavnyi Herb Ukraïny," 19 February 1992, in: *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukraïny* 40 (1992) p. 592.

⁴¹ Interview with MYKOLA ZHULYNS'KYI "Treba vsim vpriahatysia v tsiu vazhku kolisnytsiu..." in: *Ukraïna* 7 (1992) pp. 18ff.; Zhulyns'kyi was the director of the Shevchenko Institute of Literature and, during perestroika, a leading member of *Rukh* and a leading figure in the debates concerning discussions of the national past. Cf. also GEORGII KASYANOV *Sovremennoe sostoyanie ukrainskoi istoriografii: metodologicheskie i institutsional'nye aspekty*, in: *Ab Imperio* 2 (2003) pp. 491–519.

Ukrainian underground struggle during the Second World War. He interpreted the national symbols as bearers of Ukrainian tradition, but using ambiguous formulations, he occasionally tried to put some distance between the symbols and the *Banderivtsi*, who were controversial for parts of society.⁴²

The dispute over the OUN and the UPA was not only domestically controversial, it also overlapped with foreign policy quarrels in relations with Russia (e.g. the possession of the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol' and the status of the Crimean peninsula). Nevertheless, in the first years after independence, a relatively quick solution to the individual and legal dimension of the UPA problem was found. In the law "On the Status of Veterans and Guarantees of Their Social Protection," which was passed on 22 October 1993, "fighters of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army who took part in combat against the German-fascist conquerors in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine in the years 1941 to 1944 and committed no crimes against peace and humanity" were expressly recognized and thus received official veteran status.⁴³

The political dimension of this historical issue, which lay at the root of calls for the rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA as fighters for the "freedom and independence of Ukraine," remained highly controversial. Since 1991, these demands had been repeatedly raised by the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (KUN, a successor organization to the OUN-B), the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN, successor to the OUN-M), and representatives from Rukh and the national-democratic parliamentary group. The Organization of Veterans of Ukraine (the representative body of the Red Army) as well as certain left-wing parties (especially the communist parliamentarians and parts of the Socialist Party of Ukraine) saw in the OUN and the UPA only "traitors of the Ukrainian people" and collaborators of the German fascists (and often still see them as such to this day). Unsurprisingly, they categorically rejected this demand.⁴⁴ As early as autumn 1992, a bill "On the Question of the Activity of the OUN-UPA" was introduced in the Ukrainian parliament, but it passed only on 1 February 1993.⁴⁵ The establishment of a commission aimed at "an all-around and objective solution to the question of the activity of the OUN-UPA." Different ministries (among them justice and defense) and the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NANU) were to examine the question and present legally and historically based

⁴² LEONID KRAVCHUK "Our Goal – a Free Ukraine." Speeches, Interviews, Press-conferences, Briefings. Kiev 1993. Cf. Speeches from 1992, pp. 116, 122, 129, 135, and 137. Kravchuk, a native of Volhynia, sometimes told how as a child he had taken food to UPA soldiers.

⁴³ Law of Ukraine Nr. 3551-XII, 22 October 1993 "Pro status veteraniv viiny harantiï ikh zachystu," in: Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukraïny 45 (1993) p. 425. This law is interpreted differently by the various regional and rayon authorities. In Western regions UPA veterans receive social benefits while those living in other regions receive none at all. It is still unclear how OUN or UPA veterans active after 1944 are to be treated.

⁴⁴ STANYSLAV KUL'CHYTS'KYI Promizhnyi zvit robochoï hrupy dlia pidhotovky istorychnoho vysnovku pro diial'nist' OUN-UPA. Istorychnyi vysnovok pro diial'nist' OUN-UPA (Poperednii variant). Kyiv 2000, pp. 3ff. In the wake of the 50th anniversary of the UPA's founding, both sides organised conferences without discussing their respective standpoints with one another or making the first steps toward a dialogue.

⁴⁵ Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine Nr. 2964-XII, 1 February 1993 "Do pytannia pro perevirku diial'nosti OUN-UPA," in: Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukraïny 14 (1993) p. 130. The first project, apparently withdrawn, dates from 14 October 1992. The author is grateful to the employees of the archival data bank of the Parliamentary Library of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine in Kiev for the reference.

rulings. All of this, however, came to naught.⁴⁶ Nevertheless, during Kravchuk's tenure as president, the Ukrainian state's politics of history tried to some extent to provide official recognition to the UPA's soldiers.⁴⁷ The commemorative medal "50 Years of the Liberation of Ukraine," which was created for "the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Ukraine from the fascist conquerors" and adorned with the blue and yellow national colors, was expressly intended not only for Soviet veterans of the war but for UPA fighters as well.⁴⁸

Perceptible changes in the interpretation of the Second World War in state school books could be seen emerging early on after independence.⁴⁹ The paradigm shift in interpreting the Second World War was actually consummated by Fedir Turchenko in his schoolbook *Modern History of Ukraine for the 10th Grade, First Part, 1917–1945*, which appeared in Ukrainian in 1994 and was "recommended," by the Ukrainian Ministry of Education for classroom use.⁵⁰ Turchenko's book fit the new curriculum for the history of Ukraine and soon found use in numerous schools. In the chapter for the years 1939–1945, Turchenko used the term "Second World War," while the narrative term "Great Patriotic War" was nowhere to be found. As in Soviet-era schoolbooks, the terror of the German occupation authorities against Ukrainians, the detention in concentration camps, and the suffering of the eastern workers sent to Germany were highlighted. The role of Ukrainians among the Soviet partisans is discussed in detail, while the participation of Ukrainians in the Red Army is pushed into the background.⁵¹

In sharp contrast to Soviet-Ukrainian school books, the OUN and the UPA are depicted as the sole bearers of Ukrainian autonomy, culture, and identity as well as fighters for integral unity of Ukraine (*soborna Ukraina*). In Turchenko's schoolbook and in the works of nationalist historians, the OUN's expeditionary groups, teams of propagandists and organizers that followed in the wake of the German army as it advanced into Ukraine, are presented as the phalanx for expanding OUN activity into all of Ukraine, including the Donbas region in the east and the Crimea, which was still part of Soviet Russia. There they were warmly

⁴⁶ Resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine Nr. 519/95-PV, 18 September 1995, "Pro prodovzhennia stroku vykonannia Postanovy Prezydii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukraïny vid 1 1 liutoho 1993 roku 'Do pytannia pro perevirku diial'nosti OUN-UPA,'" in: www.rada.gov.ua. Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, Nr. 372/96-VP, 13 September 1996, "Pro sklad tymchasovoï komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukraïny po spriianiu u vyvcheni pytan', pov''iazanykh z perevirkoïu diial'nosti OUN-UPA," in: www.rada.gov.ua. A 1996 commission made up of with representatives from all of Ukraine's parliamentary groups failed to reach a consensus in its concluding report.

⁴⁷ KOVAL' Pid chervono-chomymy praporamy p. 82. During an official visit to the United States in April 1992, Kostiantyn Morozov, the first Ukrainian defence minister, praised the UPA's historical services to the Ukrainian people and stressed its significance as a roll model for the new Ukrainian army.

⁴⁸ Cf. Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 77/94, 10 March 1994, "Pro zatverdzhennia Polozhennia pro pam'iatnyi znak, '50 rokiv vyzvolennia Ukraïny' ta Opysu pam'iatnoho znaka '50 rokiv vyzvolennia Ukraïny,'" in: www.rada.gov.ua.

⁴⁹ MYKHAILO BRAICHEVS'KYI Konspekt istorii Ukraïny. XXI. Druha svitova viina, in: *Starozhytnosti* 9 (1992) p. 14. The series began in the popular-science magazine *Starozhytnosti* in the first half of 1991. In the more liberal 1960s, Mykhailo Braichevs'kyi (1924–2001) ranked among the non-conformist intellectuals who were dedicated to cultivating national traditions and came into conflict with the Soviet Ukrainian authorities for their criticism of the semi-official Soviet-Ukrainian view of history.

⁵⁰ FEDIR TURCHENKO *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny. Chastyna persha. 1917–1945*. 10 Klas. Kyïv 1994. In independent Ukraine, the compulsory course History of Ukraine is taught separately from World History. Turchenko's book belongs to the first generation of new history schoolbooks in Ukraine.

⁵¹ See also JAN GERMAN JANMAAT *Educational policy and the response of the Russian-speaking population*. Utrecht, Amsterdam 2000. pp. 98–99.

welcomed by the local intelligentsia, peasants, and workers.⁵² The cooperation of these expeditionary groups with the Germans is justified by the goal of creating an independent Ukrainian state.⁵³ Furthermore, nationalist intellectuals from the war era are honored with biographies and presented as national roll models for their promotion of the Ukrainian culture and language.⁵⁴

Turchenko's book follows a monolithic narrative perspective at the heart of which stands a presentation of the OUN's and UPA's representatives as the new "positive heroes" and the avant-garde of the Ukrainian nation (of victims). The question of regionally differing attitudes toward the OUN among the partially russophone Ukrainian population in the former UkSSR or the situation of other social and national groups during the Soviet occupation of western Ukraine (pre-war eastern Poland) between 1939 and 1941 or during the German occupation are inadequately handled or completely ignored.⁵⁵ The OUN's overall weak position in the Ukrainian territories beyond Eastern Galicia and Western Volhynia is barely mentioned.⁵⁶

The "Act of the Declaration of the Renewal of the Ukrainian State of 30 June 1941" and the establishment of a "home government" under the leadership of Iaroslav Stets'ko, a high-ranking member of OUN-B, is positively treated in Turchenko as in other schoolbooks and in large parts of nationalist-tinted Ukrainian historiography as a key event in the nation-state view of history. Above all, the quick dispersal of the Stets'ko government by the Germans and the arrest of those involved in its formation is considered a major turning point in OUN-B's history. From that point on, the OUN underground fought not only the Soviet Union, its main enemy, in its struggle for freedom and independence but also Nazi Germany.⁵⁷ And, in this rendering of Ukrainian history, the OUN-B's underground resistance movement against German rule (or that of the UPA starting in late 1942) is ranked higher than the struggle of the Soviet partisans against the Germans.

That notwithstanding, as late as mid-August 1941, OUN-B leaders were still making pronouncements in favor of cooperation with the Germans – so long as the Germans accepted Ukrainian statehood.⁵⁸ Aspects and forms of OUN collaboration with the Third Reich are

⁵² TURCHENKO *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny* pp. 299–300, and VOLODYMYR SERHICHUK *OUN-UPA v roky viiny. Novi dokumenty i materialy*. Kyïv 1996, pp. 8, 55–56.

⁵³ TURCHENKO *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny* p. 299.

⁵⁴ For example, Olena Telyha, who was shot by the Germans at Babii Iar in February 1942, has been raised to martyr status in nationalist circles. See V. VLASOV, O. DANYLEVS'KA *Vstup do istorii Ukraïny. Pidruchnyk dlia 5 klasu zahal'noosvitnykh zakladiv. Dopushcheno Ministerstvom osvity i nauky Ukraïny*. Kyïv 2001, pp. 224ff, and TURCHENKO *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny* p. 299. That such persons endorsed German Rule in Kiev is left aside. Membership in the OUN-M, to which Telyha belonged, goes unmentioned, because this OUN faction's tactics in cooperating with the Germans does not fit the picture of an unblemished resistance struggle.

⁵⁵ Overall, the vast majority of schoolbooks from the 1990s present the Ukrainians as a homogeneous nation of victims without taking into account the differing treatment of Galician Ukrainians and central Ukrainians or Ukrainians and Russians in the Donbas region and Kharkiv, and without addressing the situation of other nationalities (Russians, Poles, Jews).

⁵⁶ WENDY LOWER *Nazi Empire-Building and the Holocaust in Ukraine*. Chapel Hill 2005, p. 38.

⁵⁷ TURCHENKO *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny* p. 299.

⁵⁸ KAREL C. BERKHOFF, MARCO CARYNNYK *The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Its Attitude toward Germans and Jews: Iaroslav Stets'ko's 1941 Zhyttiepys*, in: *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 23 (1999) 3/4, pp. 149–184. The Stets'ko government also foresaw a special status for Jews.

simply not up for discussion in the state-fixated national view,⁵⁹ even if the attempt to found a state under German hegemony was to be the high-water mark of political collaboration. The same goes for the affinities between OUN's ideology and National Socialism, especially with regard to its anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism, which facilitated cooperation with the Germans. Another largely taboo topic in Ukrainian schoolbooks and historiography remains the role of the OUN-B and the Ukrainian militia it set up and dominated in the pogroms that broke out against the Jewish population after the Red Army's retreat from western Ukraine in the summer of 1941.⁶⁰ Catalyst for this, among other things, was the discovery of the bodies of thousands prison inmates (mostly but not exclusively Ukrainian) who had been murdered by the Soviet secret police before it evacuated. This served to fuel the already existent false identification of Jews with communists. The anti-Jewish stereotype identifying Jews and Russians took anchored in the ideology OUN and its predecessor the Ukrainian Military Organization back in the mid-1920s. In the eyes of parts of the eastern Galician population, events during the first Soviet occupation appeared to confirm belief in this association.⁶¹ In 1940–1941, anti-Semitism moved into the centre of OUN ideology and policy and remained a key element of OUN political thought even after June 1941.⁶² Unlike the versions of history provided by some Ukrainian émigré circles after the war, Ukrainian historians living in the country today no longer disregard unmistakable references in the sources to collaboration or anti-Semitism when addressing the events surrounding the “state act” of 1941; these references, however, are not presented as a problem in interpreting organized nationalism.⁶³

The fact that Ukraine became a major killing site during the Holocaust is treated as marginalia. Turchenko mentions in one sentence that members of “different nationalities, mostly Jews,” were regularly shot at Babii Yar (ukr. Babyn Iar), and he gives a total of 850,000 Jews murdered in the first months of the occupation. That is progress vis-à-vis Soviet

⁵⁹ The same goes for the functional collaboration or cooperation of Ukrainian communal and civil authorities with the Germans in District Galicia, Reich Commissariat Ukraine, and the military-administered territories. DIETER POHL *Ukrainische Hilfskräfte beim Mord an den Juden*, in: GERHARD PAUL (ed.) *Die Täter der Shoah. Fanatische Nationalsozialisten oder ganz normale Deutsche?* Göttingen 2002, pp. 205–234.

⁶⁰ DIETER POHL *Nationalsozialistische Judenverfolgung in Ostgalizien 1941–1944*. München 1996.

⁶¹ FRANK GOLCZEWSKI *Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine*, in: CHRISTOPH DIECKMANN, BABETTE QUINKERT, TATJANA TÖNSMEYER (eds.) *Kooperation und Verbrechen. Formen der “Kollaboration” im östlichen Europa 1939–1945*. Göttingen 2003, pp. 151–182.

⁶² JOHN PAUL HIMKA *Ukrainian Collaboration in the Extermination of the Jews During the Second World War. Sorting Out the Long-term and Conjunctural Factors*, in: JONATHAN FRANKEL (ed.) *The Fate of the European Jews 1939–1945: Continuity or Contingency?* New York 1997, pp. 170–189; BERKHOFF, CARYNNYK *The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists*. In one meeting of the Council of Seniors, a body set up to advise the Stets'ko government, Stepan Lenkav's'kyi, the OUN-B propaganda chief, openly endorsed the German methods used against the Jews and their annihilation. Regarding the meeting, see *ibidem* p. 154.

⁶³ See SERHIICHUK *OUN-UPA v roky viiny*. Cf. the volume of sources published by the Hrushevs'kyi Institute for the Study of Ukrainian Archives and Sources at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (NANU). YAROSLAV DASHKEVYCH (ed.) *Ukraïns'ke derzhavotvorennia. Akt 30 chervnia 1941. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv*. L'viv, Kyïv 2001. In the introduction (p. XLII) it is said that Jews saw in communist Russia the only salvation from the German terror, “took upon themselves the role of collaborators,” and thus ended up in a certain way appearing to fulfill anti-Jewish stereotypes of “Jewish bolshevism.” As in most schoolbooks, nothing is said here of the fact that not only Ukrainians and Poles but also Jews were hard hit by the Sovietization of the economy, organized repression, and deportations during Soviet rule in western Ukraine between 1939 and 1941.

schoolbooks, where special mention of the murder of the Jews was completely suppressed. However, in the new schoolbooks, the Holocaust stands in no connection to “national history.”⁶⁴ This should not lead to swift conclusions about the culture of remembrance in the Ukrainian public as a whole. In September 1991, on the 50th anniversary of the massacre at Babii Yar, the government of the newly independent Ukrainian state recognized the memorial site as a “symbol of Jewish martyrdom,” and in 2001, the National Museum of the Great Patriotic War together with the Central Council of the Jews of Ukraine organized a special exhibition on Babii Yar.⁶⁵

Raising the goal of a Ukrainian state to an absolute forces questions regarding OUN-UPA collaboration with the Germans or their authoritarian-nationalist ideology into the background. Fixation on the state and extremely functionalist arguments also make it possible to incorporate certain military and paramilitary formations fighting on Germany’s side during the Second World War in a tradition of a “national army” and include them in the nation-state view of history.⁶⁶ In the process, the central argument of the Ukrainian nationalists that an army was a precondition of independence, an argument that held sway until the mid-20th century, also becomes useful for post-Soviet commemoration policy. Turchenko points out that the OUN-B saw in the Ukrainian battalions Nightingale and Roland the nucleus of a future Ukrainian army.⁶⁷ These two units marched into Ukraine with the Germans in the summer of 1941 and, in the eyes of national-minded historians, freed certain territories from Soviet occupation. Pupils learn nothing about the role German military intelligence played in the origins of these units or the highly likely participation of soldiers from Nightingale in the murder of Jews in late June and early July 1941.⁶⁸

The most important elements in building a military tradition and creating the prototype for a future Ukrainian state are the UPA and their presentation as a unified organizational structure. Their fighters are depicted as the descendants of the Ukrainian Cossacks and the preservers of their traditions, and they are integrated into the continuity of the national view of history.⁶⁹ As a “third force,” it is told, the UPA uncompromisingly fought the German and Soviet occupiers. In the process, the UPA’s “democratic principles,” as established by the OUN, are emphasized. Roman Shukhevych (1907–1950), the UPA commander in chief, is described in one school book as a statesman who not only stood up for Ukrainian independence but also for a “democratic, pluralistic society.”⁷⁰ As in the OUN’s case, most of the

⁶⁴ This is why schoolbooks usually make no mention of the numerous examples of Jews saved by courageous Ukrainians who undermine the sweeping generalisation of “anti-Semitic Ukrainians.” For a differentiated view, see FRANK GOLCZEWSKI *Ukrainische Reaktionen auf die deutsche Besetzung 1939/41*, in: WOLFGANG BENZ, JOHANNES HOUWING TEN CATE, GERHARD OTTO (ed.) *Anpassung – Kollaboration – Widerstand. Kollektive Reaktionen auf die Okkupation*. Berlin 1996, pp. 199–211.

⁶⁵ SCHERRER *Ukraine. Konkurrierende Erinnerungen* p. 727.

⁶⁶ See, for example, YAROSLAV DASHKEVYCH *Istoriia ukrains’koho viis’ka 1917–1995*. L’viv 1996.

⁶⁷ TURCHENKO *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny* p. 298.

⁶⁸ IVAN PATRYLIAK *Istoriia spetsial’noho Batal’ionu ‘Nakhtihal’ u svitli biohrafiï nevidomoho bitisia*, in: *Moloda Natsiia 1* (2000) pp. 265–270, here pp. 267–268.

⁶⁹ VLASOV, DANYLEVS’KA *Vstup do istoriï Ukraïny* p. 228. In this book, the pupil is told a fictitious story of a UPA fighter, a descendent of a Ukrainian Cossack who fought with Hetman Mazepa against Peter the Great of Russia.

⁷⁰ S. V. KUL’CHYTS’KYI, IU. I. SHAPOVAL *Novitnia Istoriia Ukraïny (1939–2001)*. Pidruchnyk dlïa 11 klasu zahal’noosvitnikh navchal’nykh zakladiv. Rekomendovano Ministerstvom osvity i nauky Ukraïny. Kyïv 2005, p. 36. In other historical works and textbooks appearing after 1991 the “democratic and progressive character” of the principles of the Ukrainian Main Liberation Committee, which was founded by the UPA in June 1944, is often stressed.

textbooks are silent about the UPA's dark side and the aspects of its cooperation with the Germans in 1944,⁷¹ so as to maintain the myth of an untainted UPA that always fought against totalitarian powers and for freedom and independence.

Turchenko's schoolbook met with a great deal of criticism from veterans of the Second World War, representatives of left-wing parties, and parents of school children. An official inquiry launched by left-wing parliamentarians resulted in the Institute of History of the NANU establishing a commission to investigate the criticisms leveled against Turchenko's book. The commission concluded that the schoolbook had departed from the ideological schema of the Soviet school of history, but was not a falsification of history. A part of the criticism directed at the schoolbook certainly drew from the tradition of Soviet propaganda stereotypes. However, the commission's verdict conspicuously failed to express an opinion on the unmistakably one-sided presentation of the OUN and the UPA.⁷²

Turchenko's schoolbook was consequently reprinted with a few modifications and remains to this day one of the most important schoolbooks for teaching modern history of Ukraine. Many elements of this national view of history regarding the war, and above all the view of the OUN-UPA, are still found – somewhat modified – in other textbooks and schoolbooks as well as national discourse.⁷³ Nevertheless, since 1994, monographs and textbooks that critically examine the new “white spots” of Ukrainian history during the war with a muted criticism but are not necessarily intended for classroom use have also been published.⁷⁴ In other schoolbooks, the positive re-evaluation of the OUN and the UPA has gained wide acceptance. In some schoolbooks, however, it was watered down and supplemented by Soviet-Ukrainian elements of tradition building.⁷⁵

⁷¹ On Wehrmacht-UPA cooperation starting in the spring of 1944, see GOLCZEWSKI *Die Kollaboration in der Ukraine* pp. 175–177. For at least one example of cooperation between UPA units and Wehrmacht in the murder of Jews in hiding, see also FRANK GOLCZEWSKI's essay in RAY BRANDON, WENDY LOWER (eds.) *The Shoah in Ukraine* (forthcoming). On the “dark sides” of UPA see fn. 30, p. 56.

⁷² EKATERINA KRYLACH, STANISLAV KUL'CHYTS'KYI *Die Diskussionen in der Ukraine über die Schulbücher zur vaterländischen Geschichte*, in: ISABELLE DE KEGHEL, ROBERT MAIER (eds.) *Auf den Kehrlichthausen der Geschichte? Der Umgang mit der sozialistischen Vergangenheit*. Hannover 1999, pp. 161–169.

⁷³ Cf. frequently reprinted O. D. BOJKO *Istoriia Ukraïny. Posibnyk dlia studentiv vyshcheykh navchal'nykh zakladiv*. Kyïv 1999 [Rekomendovano Ministerstvom Osvity Ukraïny].

⁷⁴ YAROSLAV HRYTSAK *Narys istoriï Ukraïny. Formuvannia modernoi Ukraïns'koï natsii XIX–XX stolittia. 2-vydannia* Kyïv 2000. This textbook, which was first published in 1996 and was approved by the Ministry of Education, is aimed at pupils in university preparatory schools as well as students in history departments at university. References to Ukrainian collaboration in the murder of Ukraine's Jews can be found between the lines in I. T. MUKOV'S'KYI, O. IE. LYSENKO *Zvytiaha i zhertovnist'. Ukraïntsi na frontakh druhoï svitovoï viiny*. Kyïv 1996.

⁷⁵ VLASOV, DANYLEVS'KA *Vstup do istoriï Ukraïny* p. 224, and VIKTOR MYSAN *Opovidannia z istoriï Ukraïny. Zatverdzheno Ministerstvom osvity Ukraïny iak pidruchnyk dlia 5-ho klasu serednoi shkoly*. Vydannia druhe, vypravlene ta dopovnene. Kyïv 1997, p. 189. For example, the meaning of the Soviet tinted holidays (such as 9 May) are especially stressed as is the Ukrainian participation to the victory of the USSR. The changed political atmosphere with regard to society and history of the Kuchma-era may have made itself felt in other schoolbooks that appeared toward the end of the 1990s. In the schoolbook by Shevchuk et al., which was published in the south-eastern city of Zaporizhzhia, the activities of the OUN are viewed more critically, while Kuchma's speech on 9 May 1999 and the 2000 law passed by parliament “On perpetuating the memory of the victory in the Great Patriotic War,” which sums up the forms of commemorating the “Great Victory” printed as sources. See V. P. SHEVCHUK, M. H. TARANENKO, F. L. LEVITAS, O. V. HISEM *Istoriia Ukraïny. 11 klas. Navchal'nyi posibnyk dlia 11 klasu sred'noi zahal'noosvitnoi shkoly*. Rekomendovano Ministerstvom osvity Ukraïny. Zaporizhzhia 2000, pp. 75–76.

The Myth of the "Great Patriotic War" as the Basis of National Consolidation

With the election of former Ukrainian Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma to president of Ukraine in July 1994, the national re-evaluation of the Soviet past began to lose momentum – cautiously at first. This was in line with candidate Kuchma's policy toward symbolism during the presidential campaign, which was aimed at the majority of Russian-speaking voters in the eastern and southern regions of the country.⁷⁶ Kuchma had promised to deepen relations with Russia and to make Russian a second official language.⁷⁷ Not least due to these goals, Kuchma was presented by the nationalists and a part of the national democrats as a danger to independence. Furthermore, the media claimed that Kuchma allegedly planned to amend the blue and yellow flag, as had been adopted by parliament, with the color red, which was interpreted as an attempt to offer the eastern and southern regions something to identify with as well.⁷⁸ The economic and foreign policy programs on offer in the 1994 presidential campaign actually differed much less than the contrast presented during the campaign of a "nationalist" Kravchuk against the "internationalist" Kuchma.

In the book "Alternatives of Progress," which summed up the conceptual tendencies of state's politics of history after 1994, the new president's political advisors for historical matters modified the ethno-cultural view of history taken over by the national movement Rukh in terms of pushing back symbols that were controversial in Russian-Ukrainian relations.⁷⁹ The repression of the Stalin era as well as the "artificial famine" of 1932–1933 (in the meantime ranked as a genocide against the Ukrainian people) were condemned; the "white spots" of wartime history, however, were removed from the critical assessment of Stalinism. The memory of the Soviet Union's victory and the liberation of Ukraine from fascism were in fact only mentioned in one place in "Alternatives of Progress" and used there as a historical argument to repudiate the "disassociation from the entire Soviet past" that had been promoted by the nationalist and national-democratic forces during the first half of the 1990s. Overall, the concepts of "integration," "strong state," and "state nation" were emphasized and a more territorial-oriented national identity endorsed as opposed to a linguistic-cultural one. The president was to be the guardian of harmony in a country marked by different regional traditions.⁸⁰

The historians behind this concept were socialized in the academic and political institutions of Soviet Ukraine and, as apologists for a nationally modified Soviet-Ukrainian view of history, had defended elements of the Soviet-Ukrainian state symbols in the end phase of perestroika against Rukh.⁸¹ Under Kuchma, the historical institutes of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine re-established themselves as a legitimizing authority in matters of state

⁷⁶ ALEXANDER OTT *Parteien und Machtstrukturen in der Ukraine von 1991 bis 1998*. Köln 1999, pp. 24–27.

⁷⁷ Revealing examples are provided by the Ukrainian publicist IURII LUKANOV *Tretii Prezydent. Politychnyi portret Leonida Kuchmy*. Kyïv 1996, pp. 67ff.

⁷⁸ Conversation with the Ukrainian writer IURII ANDRUKHOVYCH (Ivano-Frankivs'k) in August 2005. For sceptics and opponents, the color red was presented as "raspberry" and then "Cossack" red.

⁷⁹ VASYL' KREMEN', DMYTRO TABACHNYK, VASYL' TKACHENKO *Ukraïna: Al'ternatyvy postupu*. Kyïv 1996.

⁸⁰ *Ibidem* p. 522.

⁸¹ The then head of Kuchma's presidential administration, Dmytro Tabachnyk, was a historian at the Institute of History-NANU and worked together with his institute colleague Vasyli' Tkachenko as an advocate for the blue-yellow-red flag as well as the softly modified Soviet Ukrainian view against the national symbolism promoted by Rukh in the debate over the flag.

symbols and state's politics of history and pushed aside the representatives from the Writers' Union and Rukh who had been responsible for political aspects of issues of symbols and culture under Kravchuk.⁸²

The official symbolic forms and preparations for commemorating the 50th anniversary of the victory in the "Great Patriotic War," which was celebrated in 1995 with great pomp in Ukraine, certainly recalled Soviet traditions and rituals still deeply rooted in everyday life of Ukrainians. In the run-up, Kuchma used the memory of the victory over fascism as well as the Ukrainians' privations and sacrifices during the war as a symbolic resource for "consolidating the entire people of Ukraine."⁸³

Taken together, the pride, courage, and strength to overcome the political and economic crises of the transformation were to be created from the memory of victory.⁸⁴ This was accompanied by the state falling back on the set pieces of the Soviet-Ukrainian war myth. Recalling one's own contribution to the glorious victory was well suited to relativizing the experiences of Soviet repression and modifying the national view of the Soviet past. According to Kuchma, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians, those who had been deeply affected by the forced collectivization, terror, repression, and "holodomor," went on to demonstrate great patriotism and spirit of sacrifice in defending the fatherland.⁸⁵

The official commemoration of the "50th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War" was primarily aimed at the culture of remembrance of veterans who served with the Soviet armed forces and Soviet partisans, the great majority of veterans.⁸⁶ The majority of the 5 million veterans in Ukraine at the time advocated a Soviet or Soviet-Ukrainian style of remembrance culture and at the same time represented a significant potential in terms of votes.⁸⁷ On the occasion of Victory Day, the government and president decided to raise state financial assistance or provide a one-time payment and other material support to veterans. The newly elected president was thus presented as a socially sensitive statesman who,

⁸² Characteristic, for example, was the nature of appointments to the post of deputy prime minister, which was responsible for humanitarian affairs and culture. The people assigned this portfolio had held leading positions within the NANU since Soviet times. Under Kuchma, the office was first held by Ivan Kuras (1994–1997), who was until 1991 director of the Institute for Party History, Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, and after 1991, director of that institute's successor, the Institute for Political and Ethno-Political Studies-NANU. Later (1997–2000), the deputy prime minister's office was taken over by Valerii Smolii, director of the Institute of History-NANU.

⁸³ Press Service of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Shchob hidno vidsviakovaty 50-richchia pere-mohy, in: *Uriadovyi Kur'ier* (1995) no. 41, 18 March 1995, p. 1.

⁸⁴ LEONID KUCHMA "Zvemennia Prezydenta Ukraïny Leonida Kuchmy do Verhovnoi Rady Ukraïny," 4 April 1995, in: *Uriadovyi Kur'ier* (1995) no. 51–52, pp. 4–8, here pp. 7–8.

⁸⁵ Cf. the president's speech at a ceremonial meeting on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Ukraine from the fascist conquerors on 7 October 1994: LEONID KUCHMA *Velych podvyhu narodnoho*, in: LEONID KUCHMA *Viriu v ukraïns'kyi narod. Vybrani statti, vystupy*. Kyiv 2000, pp. 17–24, here pp. 18–19. Kuchma recalled with gratitude the solidarity of the fraternal republics in the liberation of Ukraine and the "heroic defense of Kiev" in autumn 1941, which as a result of strategic mistakes on the part of the Soviet leadership entailed a catastrophic loss of men.

⁸⁶ UKRINFORM *Ukraïna vshanovuie peremozhstiv*, in: *Uriadovyi Kur'ier* (1995) no. 68–69, 11 May 1995, pp. 3ff. (report on the ceremonies).

⁸⁷ Report of Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Parliamentary Commission on Questions of Defence and State Security A. V. Chikal on the occasion of the preparations for the 50th anniversary of Victory Day in the Great Patriotic War in the parliamentary session held on 17 December 1994, in: *Biuletën' Verkhovnoi Rady Ukraïny* N 46. *Druha sesii*, pp. 81–95, here p. 84.

against the backdrop of an economic crisis, took up the cause of a group highly respected by society.⁸⁸

The shift in emphasis in the content of the official view of the history of the Second World War became clear in an interview with Mykhailo Koval', a professor and historian from the Institute of History-NANU. The interview, which was published in the government paper *Uriadovyi Kur''ier* in January 1995, appeared on the occasion of a conference addressing the war organized by the NANU. Koval' provided an interpretation of the "Great Patriotic War" that served as a central element of a nationally modified Soviet-Ukrainian view of history, and that in places drew from Soviet terminology. Koval' underscored the military contribution of Ukrainians ("Ukrainian factor") to the victory.⁸⁹ Furthermore, he emphasized the confirmation of the state borders of the Soviet Union by the international community as a result of the Yalta Conference and stressed its significance for establishing independence in 1991.⁹⁰ With the incorporation of Carpathian Ukraine into the Soviet Union, the "centuries-long and lawful process of forming a united Ukraine (*formuvannia sobornoï Ukraïny*) was completed." The *sobornist'* of Ukraine that the nationalists had long dreamed of was realized in Koval''s view in the form of the reunification of Soviet Ukraine.⁹¹ The UPA's anti-Soviet underground struggle was forced into the background, even if Koval' acknowledged to some extent its struggle for independence.⁹² Koval''s interpretation of the Second World War eventually found its way into the relevant textbooks recommended by the Ministry of Education for pupils in higher grade levels and for students in institutes of higher learning as well as a state-supported popular series on Ukrainian history.⁹³

In accordance with Koval''s position, Kuchma, in his speeches, declared Independence Day, 24 August, and Victory Day, 9 May, the country's most important state holidays and brought them directly together in terms of content: Without the liberation of Ukraine in the autumn of 1944 and the Great Victory in May 1945, there could not have been a state with the name Ukraine.⁹⁴ Thus starting in the mid-1990s, the Soviet-Ukrainian interpretation of the "reunification of Soviet Ukraine" became an integral part of the state's politics of history. By shifting the date of the "liberation of Ukraine from fascism" from early October to 28 October, the date of the Soviet liberation of Carpathian Ukraine and with that the completion of the reunification of all west Ukrainian lands with the Soviet Union, the narrative

⁸⁸ Within the framework of the preparations for the commemorative celebrations on 9 May 1995, numerous letters to the editor by Red Army veterans were printed in *Uriadovyi Kur''ier*. The veterans criticised the insufficient social support for the veterans who were still alive. Representatives of the government and the president seized on this matter. Politics of history here justified material social-political decisions and served to secure the loyalty between the rulers and the ruled.

⁸⁹ Cf. V. ZHUKOVSKYI Viina: Pohliad cherez pivviku, in: *Uriadovyi Kur''ier*, 21 January 1995, no. 11, p. 6 [Interview with Mykhailo Koval'].

⁹⁰ Cf. *ibidem*.

⁹¹ Cf. MYKHAILO KOVAL' Total'na viina na znishchennia, in: *Istoriia Ukraïny. Nove bachennia. U dvokh tomakh. Tom 2. Kyïv 1996*, pp. 281–328, here p. 328.

⁹² Cf. ZHUKOVSKYI Viina.

⁹³ MYKHAILO KOVAL' Ukraïna v druhii svitovii i velykii vitchyzniansii viinakh (1939–1945rr.). Tom 12. Kyïv 1999 (= Ukraïna kriz' vïky). – *Istoriia Ukraïny. Navchal'nyi posibnyk. Rekomendovano Ministerstvom osvity Ukraïny. Vydannia 3-e, dopovnene j pereroblene. Kyïv 2002*.

⁹⁴ LEONID KUCHMA Velych podvyhu narodnoho, p. 17, and the speech given on the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the liberation of Ukraine on 20 October 1999: LEONID KUCHMA Prymnozhyho slavni dila voïniv-vyzvolyteliv, in: LEONID KUCHMA Viriu v ukraïns'kyi narod. Vybrani statti, vystupy. Kyïv 2000, pp. 431–438.

short-hand “reunification” was even more ukrainized.⁹⁵ The president had this position anchored in official commemorations: On 12 June 1995, he issued a decree on the “50th anniversary of the reunification of Transcarpathia with Ukraine,” in which he praised the “historical significance of the reunification of Transcarpathia with Ukraine on the way to expressing the will of its people.”⁹⁶ In 1999, Kuchma issued another decree commemorating the “60th anniversary of the reunification of the Ukrainian lands in a Ukrainian state,” an anniversary observed in 2000. This political and historical strategy here was completed by the official commemoration of the “50th anniversary of the inclusion of the Crimea into Ukraine,” the realization of which symbolically completed the official memory of the territorial unification of Ukraine under Soviet auspices.⁹⁷ This ukrainization, however, was accompanied by the preservation of one “white spot” in both the texts of the decrees and in the historical justifications provided afterward by NANU historians: The unification that took place under CPU leadership and NKVD protection had little to do with the “expression of free will”.⁹⁸

At the same time, the president used the celebrations for Victory Day to present himself as leader of a nation-state by means of establishing nation-state symbols. Shortly before 9 May 1995, *Uriadovi Kur'ier* informed the public that a system of presidential awards had been created.⁹⁹ No agreement on creating state system of orders of Ukraine had been reached since independence. Instead, after a highly emotional debate, the left-wing parliamentary majority decided to establish an Order of Khmel'nyts'kyi, which appeared as a new minting of the 1943 order. Kuchma promptly seized the initiative on 3 May 1995 to create a presidential medal Order of Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. In doing so, he neatly linked the memory of the “Great Patriotic War” with national traditions. On the one hand, the president took up an initiative of the Organization of Veterans of Ukraine for creating a Khmel'nyts'kyi Order and, on the occasion of the 9 May celebrations, awarded the new presidential medal to veterans for extraordinary services during the war. The recognition of the order by veterans lent the presidential medals authority, even among those parts of the population influenced by Soviet remembrance culture, and it acted as a foil against criticism from the communists.¹⁰⁰ On the other hand, the new Khmel'nyts'kyi Order was in aesthetic terms clearly different from its 1943 predecessor. The basis of the presidential medal was the Khmel'nyts'kyi fam-

⁹⁵ Cf. the information on the state of the preparations for the ceremonies provided by IVAN KURAS Hontuiemos' do vsenarodnoho sviata, in: *Uriadovi Kur'ier*, 8 April 1995, no. 53, p. 5.

⁹⁶ Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 434/95, 12 June 1995, “Pro vidznachennia 50-ï richnytsi vozz'iednannia Zakarpattia z Ukraïnoiu,” in: www.rada.gov.ua.

⁹⁷ Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 437/99, 27 April 1999, “Pro vidznachennia 60-richchia vozz'iednannia Ukraïns'kykh zemel' v iedynii Ukraïns'kii derzhavi,” in: www.rada.gov.ua. Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 110/2004, 30 January 2004, “Pro vidznachennia 50-ï richnytsi vkhodzhennia Krymu do skladu Ukraïny,” in: *Uriadovi Kur'ier*, 5.2.2004.

⁹⁸ IU. SLYVKA *Vozz'iednannia Ukraïns'kykh zemel' v iedynii derzhavi*, in: *Encyklopediia istoriï Ukraïny*. Tom 1. A–V. Kyïv 2005, p. 600. Slyvka even concedes priority “reunification” vis-à-vis the tradition of *sobornost'* of Ukraine. The entry on “reunification” points to the specific nature of an academy point of view. In the lexicon *Dovidnyk z istoriï Ukraïny* from 2001 (first printing in three volumes, 1993–1999), which was recommended by the Ministry of Education and put together with a great deal of participation on the part of historians from the west Ukrainian academic center of L'viv, there is no entry for “reunification.”

⁹⁹ Cf. the corresponding Decrees of the President of Ukraine, in: *Uriadovi Kur'ier* (1995) no. 67, p. 3–4. There was only one presidential award in Ukraine in 1994–1995. Until 2000, state orders could be established only by parliament.

¹⁰⁰ D. TABACHNYK *Nahorody Ukraïny. Istoriia, fakty, dokumenty*. Tom 3. Kyïv 1996, pp. 28ff., 134ff.

ily coat of arms. In using it, the new order formed a contrast to the symbolic traditions of the Soviet era and could be presented as part of the Ukrainian as well as the general European legacy of heraldry.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, additional presidential medals were introduced alongside the Khmel'nyts'kyi Order, for example, the medal Order of Prince Iaroslav the Wise or For Merit, which recalled figures of the national view of history, and whose design popularized national-state symbols that were still controversial in 1995.¹⁰²

Kuchma's advisors for matters of history and the leadership of the presidential administration presented the president as a "savior in the crisis over the orders" and set him apart from the national democratic forces on the one hand as well as the orthodox-restorative forces in an allegedly "destructive" parliament on the other hand.¹⁰³ The lively parliamentary debates over the Khmel'nyts'kyi Order in April 1995 were closely linked to interpretations of the Second World War. Left-wing representatives based their leaning on the 1943 order with the fact that participants in the liberation of Ukraine in the "Great Patriotic War" were to be awarded with it. National democratic parliamentarians mistrusted the legacy of the Khmel'nyts'kyi order because of the Ukrainian-Russian reunification rhetoric connected with it and saw in it an order of the no-longer existent totalitarian Soviet state.¹⁰⁴ All the same, the image of polarization presented by the presidential nomenklatura is one-sided: A part of the national democratic parliamentarians worked constructively with the president and supported his initiatives with regard to orders. At the same time, the debates showed that the non-party, non-left-leaning representatives did not reject the 1943 order out of hand and were prepared to make compromises. Ultimately, not all left-wing representatives reduced the order to its Soviet connotations.¹⁰⁵ The controversy surrounding the orders and the right

¹⁰¹ *Ibidem* p. 143.

¹⁰² *Ibidem* p. 209. The presidential awards were also supported by national-democratic parliamentarians and the Union of Writers of Ukraine and thus received the approval of former activists from the national movement. In 2000, the presidential orders were made state orders of Ukraine.

¹⁰³ Cf. interview with the chief of the presidential administration and chairman of the presidential commission on state orders of Ukraine DMYTRO TABACHNYK in: *Pamiat'ky Ukraïny 2* (1995). *Nahorody Ukraïny* pp. 26–40, here p. 28.

¹⁰⁴ *Biuleten' Verkhovnoi Rady Ukraïny N 50. Tretia sesia*, pp. 81–95 (Session on the Khmel'nyts'kyi Order in the Ukrainian Parliament, 26 April 1995). Even patriotic west Ukrainians and Kiev's specialists for coats of arms who created the national symbols for Rukh in 1990 did not reject the continuation of the Soviet Khmel'nyts'kyi order. Author's interview with Andrii Hrechylo, May 2003 in L'viv.

¹⁰⁵ The image of referee was based on a political confrontation over history based on the pattern of "nationalists" against "Soviet nostalgists." The president was in no way always interested in a serious and lasting resolution of this confrontation. This was also illustrated by the conflict over the decision of the states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to create, together with Ukraine, a joint medal bearing the Russian inscription "50 Years Victory in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945" and to have it produced in Moscow. President Kravchuk did not at first want to be a party to this decision. In the context of the run-up to the election in 1994 and under pressure from the organisation of veterans of the former Soviet armed forces, he ultimately signed the agreement. Beforehand, the president and parliament had already decided to create such a medal as a "state order" of Ukraine with blue and yellow ribbons. The annulment of the decision for the medal by the leftwing parliament led to protests not only from Rukh and the Union of Writers of Ukraine but also from veterans of the Red Army of Ukrainian origin. In a public declaration, Rukh announced that the existence of a joint CIS medal inscribed in Russian and produced in Moscow "de facto cast doubt on the participation of the Ukrainian people in achieving the victory over fascism" and ignored the struggle of Ukrainians in the Polish Army at the start of the war and the non-communist underground (i.e. UPA). At the same time, Kuchma did not take up a recommendation discussed in public to create a second "Ukrainian" medal. Cf. Rukh resolution on the medal, in: DMYTRO TABACHNYK *Nahorody Ukraïny. Istorii, fakty, dokumenty. Tom 3. Kyïv 1996*, pp. 100–101.

to award it was not only the consequence of a divided parliament but above all a political question of power and prestige. There is no doubt that basic issues of the legitimacy of independence were at stake, because orders are an essential element of the attributes of state. At the same time, however, the debate over orders was a question of the distribution of power between the institutions and the powers of the young state. The president used the debate over the Second World War and Ukraine's own orders to style himself as the referee above all regional and ideological fronts and to legitimize a strong presidential office at the top of the state.¹⁰⁶

Linking the commemoration of Ukrainian Hetman Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi with the formation of traditions concerning the "Great Patriotic War" in 1994 and in 1995 recalled the Soviet view of history deduced from the wartime myth in the 1940s and 1950s. At the same time, reviving the Soviet view of history in the first half of the Kuchma era remained limited to the instrumentalization of the great victory and was linked to a modified national-state view of history.¹⁰⁷ In a public speech, Kuchma recalled the central heroes of the nation-state view of history established by Rukh, from the princes of Kievan Rus' to Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi, as fighters for a Ukrainian state.¹⁰⁸ A moderate national view of history was cultivated in other fields. In 1999, the president, "in consideration of the great political and historical significance" of the unification of the UNR and the West Ukrainian People's Republic in January 1919, declared 22 January Day of Unity of Ukraine (*Den' sobornosti Ukraïny*) and made it an official annual day of commemoration.¹⁰⁹ On the occasion of the "80th anniversary of the independence of the UNR" in 1998 and the "80th anniversary of the unity of Ukraine," commemorative coins were issued by the National Bank.¹¹⁰ The Ukrainian Post Office supplemented these measures by issuing stamps and envelopes dedicated to these events and other heroes and symbols. Even if the state leadership as early as the end of the 1990s showed signs of selectively providing different regions with different ("national" or "Soviet") semi-official variations on the national view of history in the mass media,¹¹¹ the Ukrainian state and administration initially went to great efforts to establish important symbols in a non-Soviet tradition for the all-Ukrainian public realm and to popularize symbols of the nation-state.

¹⁰⁶ IVAN IVANITSKII *Vlast' u togo, kto nagrazhdaet...*, in: *Nezavisimost'*, 28 January 1994.

¹⁰⁷ Kuchma skilfully realised and later repeatedly used this political combination of historical episodes, which was underscored by the commemorations surrounding Khmel'nyts'kyi's 400th birthday. It had already been initiated under Kravchuk. Furthermore, Khmel'nyts'kyi was celebrated in 1995 as a symbol of state independence. Cf. Kuchma's speech on 20 December 1995 on the occasion of Khmel'nyts'kyi Commemoration Day, LEONID KUCHMA *Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi – vydatna postat' Ukraïny*, reproduced in: IDEM *Viriu v ukraïns'kyi narod* pp. 107–117, here p. 107.

¹⁰⁸ LEONID KUCHMA *Nemaie bat'kivshchyny bez svobody i svobody bez bat'kivshchyny*, in: IDEM *Viriu v ukraïns'kyi narod* pp. 203–206, here p. 203.

¹⁰⁹ Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 42/99, 21 January 1999, "Pro Den' sobornosti Ukraïny," in: www.rada.gov.ua.

¹¹⁰ *Natsional'nyi Bank Ukraïny: Banknoty i monety Ukraïny*. Kyïv 2001, pp. 73, 76. The issuance of commemorative coins by the National Bank was coordinated with the deputy prime minister. Examples of the envelopes are in: UKRPOSHTA. *Kataloh poshtovykh markovanykh konvertiv Ukraïny 1991–2003 rokiv*. Kyïv 2004, pp. 50, 75.

¹¹¹ MYKOLA RIABCHUK *Dvi Ukraïny: real'ni mezhi, virtual'ni viiny*. Kyïv 2003, p. 136. According to Riabchuk, state leaders tried to pressure the television stations not to broadcast Kuchma's speech on the occasion of the anniversary of the reunification of UNR and the West Ukrainian People's Republic in the country's eastern regions.

Authoritarian Eclecticism (1998–2003)

Kuchma's approach to creating orders revealed an antipathy toward parliament that suggested the president harbored authoritarian tendencies, a pattern of behavior that became more apparent in 1998 and 1999 and ultimately manifested itself in a constitutionally dubious expansion of the presidential administration into an ersatz government.¹¹² The continued symbolic use of the Soviet war myth was joined by the revival of Soviet-Ukrainian and Soviet symbols in the state's politics of history.

In August 1998, Kuchma introduced the title Award of the President of Ukraine "Hero of Ukraine," which represented the highest state honor in the system of presidential orders.¹¹³ The award consists of two badges awarded for different fields of service. The Gold Star badge is a five-pointed star, patterned on the Soviet model, attached to a blue and yellow ribbon by means of clasp bearing an almost imperceptible "small coat of arms," i.e. trident. This symbol unmistakably recalls the title Hero of the Soviet Union in the Soviet system of orders and is awarded for "heroic deeds" (for example, military accomplishments).¹¹⁴ The title of Hero of Ukraine, however, was supplemented by the badge Order of the State, a gold trident on a blue and yellow ribbon, which is awarded for particular professional services. When it comes to awarding the distinctions, the Gold Star, reminiscent of the Soviet era, could be handed out to veterans of the Soviet armed forces, thus serving a particular group's collective memory.¹¹⁵ With the title Hero of Ukraine, Kuchma created for public remembrance culture in Ukraine an award that was linked by the symbolic reference to the Hero of the Soviet Union but at the same put a national touch on the memory of victory in the Great Patriotic War. In various school books, the high number of Ukrainians awarded the honorary title "Hero of the Soviet Union" is used to single out the exceptional role of Ukrainians in the victory over fascism.¹¹⁶

Starting in 1999–2000, Kuchma began reverting to Soviet and Soviet-Ukrainian commemoration days with ever greater frequency so as to shore up his presidency's legitimacy and popularity. On 30 October 2001, Kuchma set aside 22 September as an annual day of

¹¹² ELLEN BOS *Das politische System der Ukraine*, in: WOLFGANG ISMAYR (ed.) *unter Mitarbeit von MARKUS SOLDNER und ANSGAR BOVET Die politischen Systeme Osteuropas*. Opladen 2002, pp. 453ff., 476ff.

¹¹³ *Vidznaky Prezydenta Ukraïny. Ordeny, medali, nahorodna zbroia*. Kyïv 1999.

¹¹⁴ The highest Soviet honorary title, Hero of the Soviet Union, which was created in 1934, was awarded together with the Order of Lenin (the Soviet Union's highest order), the medal Golden Star, and a certificate from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. See ALEKSANDR KUZNETSOV *Entsiklopediya russkikh nagrad*. Moskva 2001, p. 363.

¹¹⁵ Cf. VOLODYMYR LYTUVYN *Ukraïna na mezhi tysiachlit'*. Kyïv 2000, p. 147 (= *Ukraïna kriz' viky*, 14). These manipulative tendencies were also visible in the publication of the final volume of the state subsidized series *Knyhy pam'iaty Ukraïny*, which, according to a presidential decree, was to present the facts surrounding "the contribution of the Ukrainian people to the victory over fascism in the Second World War." It was printed in two versions with different introductions. In the one version, the OUN and the UPA were denigrated as fascist Germany's henchmen; in the other, the passage was omitted. They were distributed selectively to different social groups. See ROMAN SERBYN *Borot'ba za istorychnu pam'iat ukrains'koho narodu* pp. 223–224 (cf. fn. 4, p. 51).

¹¹⁶ SHEVCHUK [et al.] *Istoriia Ukraïny* p. 72. This also goes for the stridently national oriented school book by Turchenko. See TURCHENKO *Novitnia istoriia Ukraïny* p. 308. Over 2200 Ukrainian soldiers received the award Hero of the Soviet Union. The emphasis on the Ukrainian role also forms part of the mythology. The Stalinist leadership in no way tolerated extolling the military achievements of any single nationality. Instead, it spoke of a "war of the people."

commemoration “for the support of veterans and with the goal of honoring at the all-national level the heroic deeds of partisans and underground fighters in the Great Patriotic War.” On the eve of the Day of Partisan Glory in 2002, President Kuchma, together with representatives of state and parliament, placed wreaths on the graves of the still popular Soviet-Ukrainian partisan commanders Oleksii Fedorov and Sydir Kovpak at the Baikovii Cemetery in Kiev. The commemoration ceremonies for the Soviet-Ukrainian partisans were given full coverage in Ukrainian TV and the print media, while stories about UPA fighters were relegated to local media at best.¹¹⁷

In independent Ukraine’s public culture of remembrance, the partisan myth forms the foundation of a post-Soviet unification myth aimed at reconciling nationalist and Soviet-Ukrainian memories of the war. The room dedicated to the Ukrainian resistance movement at the National Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War in Kiev forms a focal point of the permanent exhibition. The Soviet partisan movement is placed center stage, but it is augmented by presentations of Ukrainians in other European resistance movements and heroes and symbols of the OUN and the UPA. As in many Ukrainian history textbooks, the unification myth here is tied into the figure of Semen Rudnev (1899–1943), a Soviet-Ukrainian major-general and commissar in one of Kovpak’s units. In his diary, which is on display, Rudnev recognized the UPA’s struggle against the Germans and is said to have opposed a confrontation with the nationalist partisans, for which he was allegedly murdered by the NKVD. The theme “Commissar Rudnev allies with General Shukhevych” shows both partisan movements – in fact enemies – as two branches of one Ukrainian resistance directed against a common fascist foe. One encounters, on the one hand, the idealistic national view point, which is silent about not only the dark side of the UPA’s fighters but also that of the Soviet partisans.¹¹⁸ There is, on the other hand, the attempt to pay public tribute to the different wartime experiences.¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 1020/2001, 30 October 2001 „Pro Den’ partyzans’koï slavy.“ See also Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 202/99, 23 February 1999 “Pro Den’ zachysnyka Vitchyzny”, in: www.rada.gov.ua. The president made 23 February the Day of the Defenders of the Fatherland with the “goal of promoting the patriotic education of the youth.” This essentially revived the Day of the Soviet Army and Military Fleet, which had been created in 1918 as an annual day of commemoration in honor of the victory of the “newly created Red Army” over “German imperialists” at Narva and Pskov. Ukrainian patriots reject this day of commemoration not only because a Soviet day of commemoration lies at the heart of the matter, but because in 1918 the Bolsheviks also fought against the UNR, which was allied with the Central Powers of Germany and Austria.

¹¹⁸ In official speeches as early as 1994, Kuchma, drawing on the traditions of Soviet scholarship, exaggerated the Soviet partisans’ significance and numerical strength. Within the boundaries of Soviet Ukraine prior to the German invasion, Soviet partisans were neither a ubiquitous source of interference for the Germans nor a spontaneous mass uprising as Soviet research insisted. As a part of the total Soviet population that fell under German occupation, Ukrainians are clearly underrepresented in partisan units. That Soviet (and nationalist) partisans stole from the population when they deemed it necessary and murdered not only individuals considered to be traitors but their entire families is forgotten in the official, Ukrainian modified revival of the Soviet partisan myth. See critical on Soviet partisans KATRIN BOECKH *Stalinismus in der Ukraine. Die Rekonstruktion des sowjetischen Systems nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg* [university lecturing qualification, forthcoming 2006]. A. S. CHAYKOVSKYI *Nevidoma viina (Partyzans’kyi rukh v Ukraïni 1941–1944 r.r. movoiu dokumentiv, ochyma istoryka)*. Kyïv 1994.

¹¹⁹ L. V. LEHASOVA *Velykoï Vitchyznianoï Viiny 1941–1945 natsional’nyi muzei*, in: *Entsyklopediia istoriï Ukraïny*. Tom 1. A–V. Kyïv 2005, pp. 470–471. The museum was founded in 1974 and built anew on the banks of the Dniestr in 1981 as part of a large memorial complex that includes a monumental statue “Mother Homeland.” For this information, I thank the museum’s academic specialist Vira Fomina.

Moreover, the commemoration of Soviet-Ukrainian achievements in the Kuchma era was indirectly linked to the ambiguous figure of Khmel'nyts'kyi. Thus, during the highpoint of the parliamentary election campaign in 2002, the president on 13 March issued a decree on the 350th anniversary of the Cossack council at Pereiaslav.¹²⁰ In terms of form – using a round anniversary to introduce the commemoration day – the decree stood in the tradition of the 1954 “Theses” issued by the CPU and the extravagant state ceremonies marking the Treaty of Pereiaslav in 1954 and 1979. The decree was aimed primarily at the eastern regions, where Kuchma’s governing bloc “For a United Ukraine!” had its base, and where an interpretation of the treaty construed as “reunification” still numbered among the historic moments in the national past judged to be positive.¹²¹ The other function of such a day of commemoration was provocation. The decree drew protest and polemics from nationalist intellectuals and historians, veterans from among émigré Ukrainians and opposition politicians, all of whom declared that the decree jeopardized the legitimacy of Ukrainian statehood. Throughout the Kuchma era, the Ukrainian leadership repeatedly used such debates so as to present itself as a referee and integrating force. At the same, national-minded intellectuals often proved to be willing instruments in those debates.¹²²

The crucial precondition for this eclectic inconsistent policy of *divide-et-impera*, which tried to serve differing forms of remembrance culture, was the highly fragmented state of the Ukrainian media and the pressure placed on press and television by state censorship, which had been growing since 2000. While the memory of the nationalist underground was pushed into the background and the opposition was denigrated as “nationalists” and “fascists” on national television, Viktor Medvechuk, the chief of staff of the presidential administration (and *spiritus rector* of the state censorship), could go so far as to introduce himself on regional television in L’viv as the son of an OUN activist, who was repressed by the Soviet state in 1944.¹²³

The background for this increasingly aggressive politics of history, which was forced to rely on censorship, was the rise of the opposition in the wake of the domestic political crisis that ensued after the murder of Ukrainian journalist Heorhii Gongadze in September 2000 and the revelation of evidence that the country’s top leadership was involved in what was the greatest political scandal in the history of independent Ukraine. Out this affair arose the political mass movement “Ukraine without Kuchma” and a parliamentary, national-democratic oriented opposition under the leadership of Viktor Iushchenko. Iushchenko was

¹²⁰ Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 238/2002 13 March 2002 “Pro vidznachennia 350-richchia Pereiaslavs’koï kozats’koï rady 1654 roku”, in: www.rada.gov.ua.

¹²¹ YAROSLAV HRYTSAK National Identities in Post-Soviet Ukraine: The Case of Lviv and Donetsk, in: ZVI GITELMAN [et al.] (eds.) *Cultures and Nations of Central and Eastern Europe. Essays in Honor of Roman Szporluk*. Cambridge, MA 2000, pp. 263–277, here p. 271 (= *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 22 [1998]).

¹²² See the remarks on this by S. KUL’CHYTS’KYI Try Pereiaslava, in: *Zerkalo Nedeli* 31 August–6 September 2002, pp. 1, 19. The NANU simultaneously provided Kuchma’s decree a subtle “historical” justification as regards content that kept the presidential administration from being accused of endangering Ukrainian independence. It can also be read in parts as justification for Ukraine’s Russia policy.

¹²³ See the examples given in the booklet by DMYTRO CHOBIT Nartsys. *Shtrychy do politychnoho portreta Viktora Medvechuka*. Kyïv, Brody 2001, p. 4. Together with the fragmented print media, the lack of Ukrainian dailies printed in large numbers and available throughout Ukraine makes all-Ukrainian reporting difficult and facilitates the selective preservation of regional stereotypes and memory. One of the few newspapers with a high run that is regularly available in almost every region was the tabloid and presidential mouthpiece *Fakty i kommentarii* (Kiev). Under the rubric culture, this newspaper recalled primarily Soviet traditions. These included heroic stories of the “Great Patriotic War” or nostalgic tales from the everyday life of Soviet leaders.

a moderate Ukrainian patriot and pragmatic reformer who was in a position to threaten Kuchma's claim to being the "great integrator" and, by extension, the power of the president and his entourage.¹²⁴

Around 1998–1999, the eclectic falling back on Soviet-Ukrainian symbols ceased to be limited to elements modified in some way to make them more Ukrainian. With that, a trend toward the preservation of authoritarian traditions from the Soviet era emerged,¹²⁵ which was accompanied by an increasing lack of transparency in the implementation of state symbols and political monuments.¹²⁶

*Divided cultures of remembrance?
The debate over recognizing OUN-UPA (2002–2004/2005)*

During his presidency, Leonid Kuchma rarely said anything in official speeches or documents regarding the commemoration of the nationalist underground struggle. However, the topic of OUN-UPA was in no way officially "forgotten."¹²⁷ On 28 May 1997, the president ordered the establishment of a government commission to investigate the activities of the OUN and the UPA. The commission, which was chaired by the deputy prime minister of Ukraine, consisted of representatives from different ministries and state authorities. In addition, a working group from the Institute of History, NANU, was assigned the commission. This working group for research into special issues was made up of historians from the NANU and Kiev universities.¹²⁸ In 2000 and 2005, working group chairman and Institute of History deputy director Stanyslav Kul'chyts'kyi summed up the results of the group's research. This paper, however, did not necessarily reflect the views of all the historians involved in the group's work. With regard to the national discourse, the results contained some thoroughly innovative and self-critical interpretations (for example, regarding the radi-

¹²⁴ GERHARD SIMON *Neubeginn in der Ukraine. Vom Schwanken zur Revolution in Orange*, in: *Osteuropa* (2005) Nr. 1, pp. 16–33.

¹²⁵ By Order of the Cabinet of Ministers, the 85th birthday of former CPU First Secretary V. Shcherbyts'kyi was officially remembered, with Shcherbyts'kyi being described as an "extraordinary statesman." Many Ukrainians see in Shcherbyts'kyi a symbol of late-Soviet political repression and stagnation. See Order of the Cabinet of Ministers Nr. 372/2002, 11 July 2002 "Pro vidznachennia 85-richchia vid dnia narodzhennia V. V. Shcherbyts'koho," in: www.rada.gov.ua. Cf. also VLADIMIR KRAVCHENKO *Boi s ten'iu: sovetskoe proshloe v istoricheskoi pamiatii sovremennogo ukrainskogo obshchestva*, in: *Ab Imperio* 2 (2004) pp. 329–365.

¹²⁶ In detail, WILFRIED JILGE *Kulturpolitik als Geschichtspolitik. Der „Platz der Unabhängigkeit“ in Kiev*, in: *Osteuropa* (2003) Nr. 1, pp. 33–57. This article illustrates the politics behind the building of the monuments that have transformed Independence Square and the raising of the 60-meter tall Monument to Independence, which can be interpreted as a mixture of "Cossack-Ukrainian baroque," classical and imperial influences, eclectic and kitschy tendencies, and features imitative of Soviet-Ukrainian monuments. The remodelling of the entire square at once in 2000–2001, carried out largely without involving the public, did away with the population's most important public gathering place for protests and pushed the growing anti-Kuchma protest movement out of the city center.

¹²⁷ The implementation of the national-state symbols (the anthem and the great coat of arms), which overlapped with the debate over the activities of the OUN and the UPA in the Second World War, was encouraged by both president and government in the latter years of the Kuchma presidency. In spring 2003, the pro-president majority in parliament passed a controversial law on the text of the state anthem "Ukraine's glory hasn't perished, nor her freedom."

¹²⁸ Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers Nr. 1160–2001-p, 13 September 1997 "Pro Uriadovu komisiu z vyvchennia OUN-UPA," in: www.rada.gov.ua.

cally nationalist ideology of the OUN), backed away from one-sided heroization of the OUN and the UPA, and thus drew criticism from national-minded intellectuals, historians, and politicians. Nevertheless, the conclusions illustrated the task to serve an academically legitimizing function for the government. The OUN (above all the OUN-B) and the UPA were tied into a moderate, Ukrainian-centric view of history so as to justify government proposed legislation entitled “On the Renewal of Historical Justice with Regard to the Fighters for the Freedom and Independence of a Ukrainian State.” Thus the contrast between the OUN-B, always striving for independence, and the Germans was made definitive starting with the failure of the state formed on 30 June 1941, and cooperation between the OUN-B and UPA on the one hand and the German occupation authorities on the other categorically excluded for the period after 1943. The issue of collaboration in general is skirted and the question whether members of the OUN-B, individual military units dominated by the OUN-B, or the UPA participated in crimes carried out by the Germans in Ukraine simply rejected due to a lack of source material or only half-heartedly addressed. Altogether, the conclusions assess the UPA and the Red Army as combatants against the Germans and stress that there is no evidence that the UPA took part in a war against the “United Nations” on Germany’s side.¹²⁹

President Kuchma was cool to the commission’s work. In July 2002, during the run-up to the 60th anniversary of the UPA’s founding, the Kinakh government, with the president’s consent, began to push for the rehabilitation of OUN and UPA veterans so as to improve the government parties’ the loss in standing in western Ukraine as revealed by the parliamentary elections of March 2002. The Ukrainian government used Russian Foreign Ministry criticism of the intended rehabilitation of “nationalist forces” as a welcome opportunity to present the question of the OUN and the UPA as an internal matter of Ukraine and to show itself as the guardian of national interests.¹³⁰ To this day, no legislation on the rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA has even made its way onto the Ukrainian parliament’s agenda.¹³¹ There was the possibility of achieving a majority to this end, but it was not seriously pursued. The government feared too much resistance and a decline in its approval ratings in its eastern and southern voter strongholds.

Public debate in Ukraine continues to be shaped mostly by “apologists” and “anti-apologists” of the OUN and the UPA.¹³² Given the irreconcilable points of view between nationalist and some national-democratic politicians and UPA veterans on the one hand and left-wing politicians and Red Army veterans on the other hand, the theory of a “divided culture of remembrance” may well be justified. But even within the alliance of national-

¹²⁹ See INSTITUTE OF HISTORY-NANU *Promizhnyi zvit robochoï hrupy dlia pidhotovky istorychnoho vysnovku pro diial'nist' OUN-UPA (poperednii variant)*. Kyïv 2000. See also the final results of the commission: INSTITUTE OF HISTORY-NANU *Orhanizatsiia Ukraïns'kykh natsionalistiv i Ukraïns'ka povstans'ka armiia. Fakhovyi vysnovok robochoï hrupy istorykiv pry Uriadovii komisii z vyvchennia diial'nosti OUN-UPA*. Kyïv 2005.

¹³⁰ Cf. the report “MID: Reabilitatsiia voïnov UPA – vnutrennee delo Ukrainy,” in: *Korrespondent*, 16 July 2002. www.korrespondent.net

¹³¹ For this information, I thank Natalia Kharchenko of the Parliamentary Commission of Ukraine on Questions of Human Rights and National Minorities.

¹³² This according to the Kievan historian Heorhii Kas'ianov in a presentation held at the German-Ukrainian Historians’ Conference in Kiev in June 2005. The conference was organized by the GWZO Leipzig together with the Institute of History-NANU and the Kiev-office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation.

democratic parties and parliamentary party groups in Iushchenko's *Our Ukraine*, assessments of the OUN-UPA were never completely homogenous during 2002 and 2003.¹³³

Of course, the Galician and Volhynian regions in the west and regions such as Donets'k in the east clearly differ in their evaluation of the Second World War. However, when broken down by macro-regions, the picture for Ukraine as a whole is more complicated. According to poll results published by the Kiev-based Institute of Policy Studies in 2003, only 33 percent of those surveyed supported recognition of the UPA, while 38 percent were against it. The remaining 29 percent were undecided. This negative assessment of the UPA should not lead to any rash conclusions about an all-Ukrainian culture of remembrance and identity. In southern Ukraine (the regions of Odessa, Kherson, and Mykolaïv), recognition of the UPA is rejected by just under 50 percent of those surveyed. However, a similarly large majority takes a positive view of the national historian Mykhailo Hrushevs'kyi.¹³⁴ In central Ukraine, the advocates of recognizing the UPA are also in a minority, while about 79 percent of that macro-region considers Victory Day to be a significant holiday (in western Ukraine 28 percent, in eastern Ukraine 84 percent, and in southern Ukraine 70 percent).¹³⁵ Recalling the memory of the "sons of Ukraine" who fell in the cause of victory in the "Great Patriotic War" – a culture of remembrance still heavily influenced by the Soviet era – is now being joined by Christian themes and rituals alongside national connotations. In the process, stress is put on the significance of the Ukrainian role in the victory over fascism for the existence of independent Ukraine and its recognition by the international community.¹³⁶ Overall, the theory of a divided Ukrainian culture of remembrance is questionable, even in the case of the Second World War, and requires differentiation.¹³⁷ National and Soviet influences in Ukraine's memory culture do not always allow themselves to be assigned unequivocally to the east or west, but instead frequently overlap in given individual, milieu, or collective.

¹³³ Within the framework of the Ukrainian-Polish debate on the Volhynia conflict in 1943–1944, the Ukrainian parliament in April 2003 brought to the floor a draft joint statement by the presidents of Poland and Ukraine aimed at reconciliation. The presidents read it at joint ceremony only in July 2003. During the fierce debate, the parliamentary group led by Iushchenko took a position aimed at a settlement that was very close to that of President Kuchma. Looking back, the politics of history of the first years of the Kuchma-era differ only slightly from the politics of symbols practiced by the new president Iushchenko in 2005 so far. The new president, a native of Sumy in northeast Ukraine, has in his speeches appealed to inclusive symbols and heroes from the national view of history. Iushchenko has of course been involved in efforts to rehabilitate the OUN and the UPA, but he has also nurtured the traditions and symbols derived from the "Great Patriotic War". On the 60th anniversary of Victory Day, the Ukrainian president posthumously awarded Aleksei Berest, a native of Ukraine, the honorary title Hero of Ukraine for valor and heroism. It was Berest who raised the Soviet flag of victory over the Reichstag in May 1945.

¹³⁴ INSTYTUT POLITYKY Rehional'na Ukraïna. Kyïv 2003, pp. 14, 26.

¹³⁵ Cf. the representative poll of the sociological service of the Ukrainian Razumkov-Center for Economic and Political Studies in Kiev in January 2002. I thank Oleksandr Bychenko of the Razumkov-Center for sending me this material.

¹³⁶ Cf. examples from the Vynnytsia area in AMIR WEINER *Making Sense of War. The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution*. Princeton 2001, p. 385.

¹³⁷ On the special role of Ukraine in the context of post-socialist remembrance culture, see STEFAN TROEBST *Postkommunistische Erinnerungskulturen im östlichen Europa. Bestandsaufnahme, Kategorisierung, Periodisierung*. Wrocław 2005, pp. 15ff. (= *Berichte des Willy-Brandt-Zentrums für Deutschland- und Europastudien der Universität Wrocław*, 6).

The multi-layered view of remembering the war in Ukraine is not only a consequence of “post-totalitarian pluralism,”¹³⁸ i.e. an ambivalent attitude toward political value systems that is typically found in post-socialist societies, and that facilitates a process such as the unification of national and Soviet myths. This fragmented image of memory in Ukraine is also the result of very real contradictory historical causalities and contradictory experiences of individuals and ethnic and social groups. For nationalists, such contradictions have no place in a national view of history that aims to demoralize and devalue the Ukrainian public’s largely positive attitude toward the role and character of the Red Army’s liberation of Ukraine by selectively fixating on Red Army crimes, equating them with those of Nazi Germany, and extolling an “unblemished” heroic view of the history of nationalist organizations such as the OUN.¹³⁹

On the whole, it is questionable whether legitimate demands for the official recognition of UPA and OUN veterans will make national reconciliation possible if it is officially confirmed and legitimized by a “true” version of the past conjured up by historians using highly controversial formulae. In the intellectual and political discourse, participants frequently lose sight of the question whether the general, uncritical recognition of the OUN and the UPA can do justice to both the Ukrainian state’s independence and its democratic content. Referring to the fascist character of the OUN and Stets’ko’s pronouncements of solidarity with Hitler’s anti-Jewish policies, prominent Kievan cultural historian and Rukh co-founder Myroslav Popovych emphasized that the UPA’s rehabilitation could not mean the OUN’s rehabilitation, and that forgetting the OUN’s crimes would be unacceptable for a democrat.¹⁴⁰ The one-sided national re-evaluated view of the war’s history is represented by noted national intellectuals and nationalist and national-democratic parliamentary groups and parties; similarly, the general condemnation of the OUN and the UPA is also but one minority’s view of history. The public presentations of either of these views of history or their rejection serve above all to create scandals and mobilize west Ukrainian national minded or left-wing voters overall.¹⁴¹ In the last few years, intensified discussions of the Second World War have taken place with the aim of breaking free of both Soviet and nationalist myths.

The evolution of pluralistic tendencies has also been noted in Ukrainian schoolbooks and textbooks for the history of Ukraine during the past few years. These tendencies do not allow themselves to be divided into traditional categories of nationally modified Soviet-

¹³⁸ E. I. HOLOVAKHA *Postkommunisticheskoe razvitie Ukrainy i Rossii (sravnitel’nyi analiz sotsial’no-politicheskikh processov)*, in: T. I. ZASLAVSKAYA *Kuda idët Rossiya? Sotsial’naya transformatsiya post-sovetskogo prostranstva*. Tom 3. Moskva 1996, p. 51.

¹³⁹ See for an example, SERHII HRABOVSKYJ *Druha svitova viina: trahediia bez prykas*, in: *Telekrytyka*, 6 May 2005 [www.telekritika.kiev.ua].

¹⁴⁰ MYROSLAV POPOVYCH *Ukrainskaya ideya: vremya dlya tochek nad “i”*, in: *Den’*, 2 February 2002, no. 21, p. 5. MYROSLAV POPOVYCH *Reabilitatsiia UPA ne oznachaie reabilitatsiiu OUN*, in: *Den’*, 11 October 2002, no. 185, p. 4.

¹⁴¹ After his election in December 2005, President Iushchenko launched several initiatives to reconcile Red Army veterans and OUN-UPA veterans for the 60th anniversary of the war’s end. For the first time, there was to be no pompous military parade; instead the president was to host a banquet on the Khreshchatyk for veterans from both sides as a symbolic gesture of rapprochement. At the same time, the Ukrainian president called on the government to support the recognition of the OUN and UPA as combatants. The initiatives were not very warmly welcomed by the veterans. Instead, on the occasion of the planned march of UPA veterans on the 63rd anniversary of the UPA’s establishment, fights broke out between representatives of the Communist Party and the Progressive Socialist Party on the one hand and representatives of the OUN and national democratic parties on the other. See *Korrespondent*, 15 October 2005 [www.korrespondent.net].

Ukrainian or state-fixated nationalist views of history. Here, emphasis is placed on the allegedly “democratic program” of the UPA, the importance of the victory over fascism in the development of Ukrainian statehood, or critical comparisons of the extremist OUN ideology with the Bolshevik principle “who is not with us is against us.”¹⁴²

In liberal historian circles, a debate recently broke out on the “white spots” in the history of Ukrainian nationalist military formations, for example, general discussions of their involvement in anti-Jewish pogroms in western Ukraine in June–July 1941.¹⁴³ Nevertheless, linking the murder of Ukraine’s Jews with Ukrainian “national history” remains a taboo in most public debates. Instead, well-known Ukrainian intellectuals and historians interpret the 1932–1933 Great Famine, which hit Ukraine especially hard, as a “Ukrainian Holocaust,” so as to maintain a claim to the (morally higher) status of a victim nation caught between totalitarian powers.¹⁴⁴

The Radicalization of the Deployment of Soviet Symbols in the 2004 Presidential Campaign

During the 2004 presidential election, President Kuchma and his preferred candidate, Viktor Ianukovych, tried to monopolize Victory Day, which since 1995 had been presented as a symbol of “national harmony” and the memory of the “Great Patriotic War,” for party-political purposes and in doing so play to the Soviet influenced remembrance culture found in Ukraine’s southern and eastern regions.¹⁴⁵ The state commemoration of the “60th anniversary of the liberation of Ukraine from the fascist conquerors” on 28 October 2004 illustrated this strategy. The climax was a pompous military parade on Kiev’s main boulevard Khreshchatyk just before the election on 31 October 2004.

The parade, which was dominated by Soviet symbols, began with a T-34 tank, the backbone of the Soviet Red Army during the Second World War. Atop the tank fluttered the historical red flag of victory, which had been especially sent to Ukraine from Moscow for the festivities. Soldiers from the army and the navy dressed in historical Soviet uniforms marched along Khreshchatyk. Afterward, highly decorated Soviet veterans in jeeps were driven by the review stand, which was full of representatives of the Ukrainian state leadership. Also participating in the celebrations were Russian President Vladimir Putin and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev. On the evening before the parade, the Russian president ad-

¹⁴² See as one of several examples, I. V. RYBAK, A. IU. MATVIEIEV *Istoriia Ukraïny u problemnomu vykladi, v osobakh, terminakh, nazvakh i poniattiakh*. Vydannia druhe, dopovnene. Rekomendovano Ministerstvom osvity i nauky Ukraïny iak navchal’nyj posibnyk dlia studentiv vyshchyykh navchal’nykh zakladiv. Kyïv 2005, pp. 62–65.

¹⁴³ See the debate sparked by SOFIIA HRACHOVA in the Kiev-based journal *Krytyka* in April 2005. Another example are the debates in Poland and Ukraine over the bloody Ukrainian-Polish confrontation in Volhynia in 1943–1944 on the 60th anniversary of those events. Even if the public debate in Ukraine was limited largely to western Ukraine, some remarkable Ukrainian-Polish initiatives arose dedicated to the discussion of national concepts of enemies and the consequences of ethnic violence. See publication “Volyn’ 1943. Borot’ba za zemlju,” publication 28/2003 of the L’viv civil society organization Ī.

¹⁴⁴ For a discussion of this topic in greater detail, see WILFRIED JILGE *Holodomor und Nation. Der Hunger im ukrainischen Geschichtsbild*, in: *Osteuropa* (2004) Nr. 12, pp. 147–163, p. 161.

¹⁴⁵ Report in *Ukraïns’ka pravda: Vytik temnykiv. Pid prytsilom tsenzury – mizhnarodni sposterihachi ta “ekstremisty,”* in: *Ukraïns’ka Pravda* [www.pravda.com.ua], 19 October 2004. Using censorship, the government tried to cast the opposition in the media as the destroyer of this unity. In lists of topics (*temnyky*), the presidential administration instructed television and newspaper editorial boards to spread the accusation that the national-democratic opposition parties had spoken out against the parade.

ressed the Ukrainian people and used the memory of the “Great Patriotic War” to express support for Ianukovych.¹⁴⁶

The presence of leaders from the Commonwealth of Independent States recalled the common defense of the “fraternal Soviet peoples” under the leadership of Russia and thus served as justification of the government candidate’s campaign, which was aimed at eastern Ukrainian voters, e.g. closer alliance between Moscow and Kiev and the introduction of Russian as an “official language” next to the Ukrainian state language. Throughout the campaign, the alternative “west Ukrainian” memory of the underground struggle of the UPA disappeared from the Ukrainian leadership’s politics of history.¹⁴⁷

Commemorating the war in the capital two days before the election was not viewed as consolidating the people, as so often invoked by Kuchma, but instead made the opposition and parts of the capital’s electorate more distrustful of the Ukrainian leadership. Voters and the opposition also saw the continued presence of armed units not far from Kiev after the parade as an act of intimidation. Spokespersons for the opposition warned of a possible use of these forces against the peaceful population should protests erupt against the government.¹⁴⁸ The mistrust was well-founded. The commemoration on 28 October was traditionally observed without a parade, and the corresponding decrees issued by the Ukrainian president in April 2004 originally made no mention of a military parade.¹⁴⁹

Monopolizing the mythology of the “Great Patriotic War” was, however, only a precondition for instrumentalizing it against the political opposition. Above all in the overwhelmingly russophone territories of eastern Ukraine or on the Crimean peninsula, representatives of the opposition parties were branded as radical “nationalists” and “fascists” on the basis of historical formation of analogies from the Stalinist friend-enemy propaganda of the 1940s. These “nationalists” invaded “our region” [Donets’k, W. J.] just like “occupiers,” so they, as “capitalists bought off by American imperialism,” could destroy the economic basis of the people and uproot the Russian language and culture in Ukraine. The basis for this scenario, which was frequently presented during the main phase of the election campaign by Ianukovych’s forces in their eastern strongholds, was provided by the scandalous events surrounding the party congress of the opposition bloc Our Ukraine, which had been planned for 30 and 31 October 2003 in the Palace of Youth in Donets’k.

Upon their arrival, the opposition leaders were met by a riled crowd chanting in unison and waving signs with the slogan “There’s no place for Nazis in Donets’k.” Especially visible were large posters bearing the inscription “Iushchenko for the purity of the nation” with the letter S replaced by the lightning-bolt runes of the SS and Iushchenko himself shown in a SS uniform. Under such chaotic circumstances, Our Ukraine was forced to postpone the congress.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ VOLODYMYR SONIUK *Sviato soldats’koï shyneli*, in: *Den’*, 29 October 2004. Conversation with Dmytro Horbachov (Kiev) in June 2005. Even during this intensely Soviet parade, the government leadership did not refrain from using state symbols. The soldiers marching past the tribune are said to have sung the Ukrainian national anthem.

¹⁴⁷ In 2002, Anatolii Kinakh’s government prepared – albeit half-heartedly – a draft law on rehabilitating the OUN and the UPA on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the UPA. The bill was not passed.

¹⁴⁸ IURI TYSHKUN *Parad zakinchyvsia. Viiska zalyshylysia*, in: *Postup*, 29 October 2004, no. 247.

¹⁴⁹ Decree of the President of Ukraine Nr. 63/2004, 3 April 2004 “Pro vidznachennia 60-i vyzvolennia Ukraïny vid fashysts’kykh zaharbnykiv.”, in: www.rada.gov.ua.

¹⁵⁰ The operation was organised by the local pro-government authorities: Drunken students were ordered by the schools of higher learning to the anti-opposition demonstration. The use of administrative re-

Such campaigns against the “occupiers” and “nationalists” combined in October and November 2004 with anti-Western stereotypes and anti-Americanism. Shortly before second round of voting in the 2004 presidential election on 21 November, large numbers of anonymous brochures were distributed to households in Donets’k and other regions in which Iushchenko was depicted as an American Uncle Sam. The candidate was linked with chaos and civil war and presented as a threat to Ukrainian unity.¹⁵¹ The politics of symbols as wielded by the pro-presidential forces had finally been transformed into a Soviet style campaign of incitement.

*Orange Politics of History: Che Guevara and the UPA Fighters
as Ukrainian Revolutionaries*

The shaping of the politics of history by young artists and the opposition youth movement PORA! (It’s Time!), both catalysts in the mass protests against the government bloc’s election fraud, led to a stark change in the semantics of the national-democratic dominated opposition’s symbolic language. Young Ukrainians were largely free of Soviet stereo-types, and they hardly allowed themselves to be influenced by the government’s use of history for political ends and its disparagement of “fascist nationalists.” Instead, the re-Sovietizing use of symbols gave the opposition the chance to present Ianukovych’s team as the embodiment of a “2nd Soviet Union.”¹⁵²

Typical for the politics of history employed by PORA! were the emblems on two T-shirts distributed in large numbers by the group to young people. These shirts were a key element of the organization’s political symbolism. On one T-shirt is the portrait of the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara in a Ukrainian embroidered peasant shirt (*vyshyvanka*). The other T-shirt showed a young PORA! activist in the shadow of a UPA fighter in historical uniform bearing national Ukrainian symbols.¹⁵³ The left-wing Cuban revolutionary and the members of the anti-Soviet nationalist underground struggle in west Ukraine stood for different ideologies and were manifestations of extreme violence but they were presented here as part of a single national tradition and used as part of the Ukrainian youth movement’s peaceful struggle for democracy. According to PORA!, all three figures are connected by the courageous intervention for revolutionary change and freedom.¹⁵⁴ PORA! used the nationalist UPA mythology less as a means of demarcating national exclusivity but as a resource for an emancipating political program.¹⁵⁵ The basis for this approach is a new interpretation of this tradition and not an imitation of a tradition in the service of a supposed single truth.

sources in covering the city center with placards was unmistakable. See as well the report from 31 October 2003 in the Internet newspaper *Telekrytyka*, in: www.telekritika.kiev.ua. The smear against Iushchenko bordered on cynical, since the opposition leader’s father had fought against Nazi Germany in the Red Army and had been interned at Auschwitz. The incident in Donets’k was well documented by Ukrainian journalists in the video “Donets’k 30.–31.10.2003. A Chronicle of Events.” I thank Iushchenko’s campaign staff for providing me with a copy.

¹⁵¹ See the report on the distribution of anonymous brochures in the Internet newspaper OSTROV on 18 November 2004 in: <http://w1.obkom.net.ua/news/2004-11-18/1754.shtml>.

¹⁵² For an overview, see DANYLO IANEVS’KYI *Khronika “pomaranchevoi” revoliutsii*. Kharkiv 2005.

¹⁵³ Cf. the presentation of the symbols on the PORA! Web page: <http://pora.org.ua/content/blogcategory/100/118/>.

¹⁵⁴ Author’s interview with PORA! spokeswoman ANASTASIIA BEZVERKHA in January 2005 in Berlin.

¹⁵⁵ The party PORA, which emerged from PORA! after the second runoff was held in December, calls for the recognition of OUN-UPA and represents the traditional position of the national-democratic parties

An important precondition for the success of the symbolic presentation of political change was the occupation of public spaces with the orange-colored symbols, Iushchenko's political color. As part of Operation Orange Wave, opposition youth organizations organized a massive distribution of orange ribbons and clothes the day before the second round of voting in November.¹⁵⁶ Even before the student tent city was built on Khreshchatyk, young Ukrainian artists critical of the state were putting on avant-garde performances and filling squares in the city center with orange symbols. Buildings, monuments, and fountains were covered with yellow or orange cloth and orange geometric figures were set up.¹⁵⁷ Artistic freedom became an allegory for political freedom.¹⁵⁸ History was also present in the performances of Ukrainian artists. A week before the presidential election on 31 October, the "orange-colored artists," by means of an "orange-colored bird" and an installation, made Ukraine's totalitarian past a subject of discussion among passers-by on Khreshchatyk and ultimately drew the attention of the street police. The artists' innovative aesthetics made it possible to reflect on the national past, without – in contrast to the debates over history in the 1990s – being limited to merely reinterpreting "false Soviet history" into "true national history." Rather the visualization of the past was to encourage viewers to reflect on their own, without fully committing them to a deterministic view of history defined by heroes and certain events.¹⁵⁹

Alongside political symbols and artistic performances, music formed the third field in which political messages regarding nation and democracy were turned into topics of discussion on Independence Square. An almost programmatic example was provided by the rock group Tartak (Sawmill) with their revolution theme-song "I Don't Want To." In this song, Tartak declares that the "national ideal" has degenerated into a "means of speculation." At the same time, the song's text reveals the divide-et-impera policy of the regime in power: "In fact, it's easy to change life!... Simply take to the streets, pick up the trash, love your country, ...and feel yourself as part of one people... a society of independent people... without 'left-bankers' [Eastern Ukraine, W. J.] and without 'right-bankers' [Western Ukraine, W. J.]"¹⁶⁰

The imaginative new creations of symbols in the field of conflict between national tradition and modern pop culture and the transformation of public spaces into a "zone of political

in the struggle with the left-wing over the Second World War's legacy, see "PORA" trebuet zaprety KPU i PSPU, in: www.Korrespondent.net, 17 October 2005.

¹⁵⁶ VLADYSLAV KAS'KIV PORA – Avanthard Peremohy. A Case Study. Hromadians'ka kampaniia PORA ta pomarancheva revoliutsiia v Ukraïni. Vid pochatku do zavershennia. Kyïv 2005, p. 2.

¹⁵⁷ See the photo album Majdan Svobody. Kyïv 2005.

¹⁵⁸ After the fraudulent election became apparent, young artistic groups moved the National Union of Artists of Ukraine to appeal to the Ukrainian people to vote with the following words: "Support the right choice of Ukraine – Viktor Iushchenko! Support and organise peaceful protests by artists! Creativity is not possible without freedom!" For a look at the appeal, which was distributed by email, I would like to thank artist and Orange Square member OKSANA PLYSIUK.

¹⁵⁹ The author thanks OKSANA PLYSIUK for use of her extensive photo documentation of artists' activities in Kiev. From the artist group developed "Art Solidarity. Orange Square." in November 2004. The name plays on the work of Kazymyr Malevych, who was born in Kiev. Some artists see their roll model in the artistic avant-garde of Ukraine in the 1920s, which distinguished itself in its combination of national tradition and absorption of European trends.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. TARTAK "Ja ne khochu" (I don't want to) on the Internet sight "Ukrainian Songs" in: <http://www.pisni.org.ua>.

rock”¹⁶¹ had important political functions: It served on the one hand the cultural communitization of a highly mobilized young generation of voters in a given situation as part of “making a festival of modern life”¹⁶²; on the other hand, this symbolic new creation resulted in a political language for the opposition that was almost completely beyond the controlled discourse of the ruling state.

Conclusion

As in other societies where governance depends on a minimum level of democratic participation for legitimacy, Ukraine’s various cultures of remembrance must be taken into consideration in the state’s politics of history so that political symbols can fulfill their integrative function of securing power. In the first half of the Kuchma era, the presidential administration understood better than the traditionalist intellectuals of Rukh how to use a nationally tinted Soviet myth of the “Great Patriotic War,” to integrate symbolically Ukraine’s contradictory cultures of remembrance and the legacy of Soviet-Ukrainian identity into a semi-official view of history. In the last few years, this ambivalent, eclectic politics of history was increasingly linked with openly authoritarian connotations. As a result, the politics of history served to veil less-than-democratic patterns of behavior within the state elite and to secure the power of the post-Soviet nomenklatura. But even in this latter phase, the cultures of remembrance in Ukraine did not blindly follow the will of those in power. This use of this type of politics of history in the 2004 presidential election, which flowed into a re-Sovietizing campaign of incitement against the “fascist opposition,” failed, because it neglected the cultures of remembrance that were neither fully nationalist nor fully Soviet. As a consequence, in the partially russophone regions of Central Ukraine and in the parts of southern Ukraine that voted for the “nationalist” Iushchenko, a ukrainized commemoration of victory in the “Great Patriotic War” did not necessarily entail the existence of an authoritarian political culture nostalgic for the Soviet era or the acceptance of post-Soviet, anti-democratic patterns of behavior.

Summary

The meaning and commemoration of the Second World War as well as the use of the heroes and symbols that emerged from it are central topics of Ukrainian politics of history and key elements of remembrance culture in post-Soviet Ukraine. This essay analyzes the function and the transformation of the view of the Second World War’s history in post-Soviet Ukraine. The focal point of this essay is state politics of history from independence in 1991 until the “Orange Revolution” in 2004. It is shown that culture of remembrance in Ukraine cannot be reduced to the existence of two irreconcilable Soviet and nationalist views of history, and that the polarized public debates over the war’s meaning are not a sufficient indicator for the division of the country along remembrance-cultural or political lines.

¹⁶¹ The singer of the rock group Vopli Vidopliasova, Oleh Skrypka, whose song “Politrock” also became a classic of the Orange Revolution.

¹⁶² MICHAEL MAURER *Zur Systematik des Festes*, in: IDEM (ed.) *Das Fest. Beiträge zu seiner Theorie und Systematik*. Köln, Weimar, Wien 2004, pp. 55–80, here pp. 76–77.