

The Political Sociology of Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj

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At first glance, Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj may appear to be a publicist who addressed only the specific issues of his country during his own time. A reading of his works soon reveals, however, that he was a social and political thinker of stature who, in the process of discussing the vital issues of Ukrainian life, developed a substantial sociological theory of the state and of nationbuilding.

Lypyns'kyj's political sociology is set forth mainly in his book *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv* (Letters to fellow farmers), originally written between 1919 and 1926. His *Religija i cerkva v istoriji Ukrajiny* (Religion and church in the history of the Ukraine; 1925) also contains relevant ideas.¹ Much of Lypyns'kyj's private correspondence contains theoretical or historical arguments and thus provides supplemental material. Lypyns'kyj reportedly finished a book-length manuscript, entitled "Teorija pravlinnja" (Theory of rule), the whereabouts of which is unknown.

Lypyns'kyj's writings do not present a systematic, unified approach to theory development. Rather, his work consists of a set of essays, each focusing on specific issues of nationbuilding. He intermixes theory with historical illustrations, social criticisms, and ideology. The theory per se has, therefore, to be reconstructed by pooling together ideas from these essays. A logical whole does emerge, one that communicates an excitement about the issues discussed by conveying the strong feeling with which Lypyns'kyj wrote and his style of making unequivocal statements with few qualifications.

It is difficult to trace the intellectual influences on Lypyns'kyj accurately. He was not a scholar in the strict sense of the word, and, as a rule, he made few references to other thinkers. Yet, Lypyns'kyj can be placed within certain intellectual contexts.

Lypyns'kyj's political sociology can be discussed in the context of at least three theoretical approaches prevalent in his time. First, and perhaps most important, are what have been known as the early social conflict

¹ Vjačeslav Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv, pro ideju i organizaciju ukrains'koho monarxizmu*, 3rd ed. (New York, 1954); idem, *Religija i cerkva v istoriji Ukrajiny*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1956).

theories. These have their roots in Hegel and Marx. At the turn and beginning of the twentieth century they were developed by such thinkers as Ludwig Gumplowicz, Gustav Ratzenhofer, and, especially, Franz Oppenheimer.² Among the basic premises of this school of thought was a distinction between society and state, according to which society is the passive or static principle and the state is the active principle of social organization. According to this approach, the state developed as a result of conflict, conquest, and coercion, evolving from a primitive through a feudal to a constitutional form. Conflict within society follows the vested interests of groups, many of which are centered around the individual's relationship to work. Lypyns'kyj's work incorporated all of these ideas.

The second approach relevant to Lypyns'kyj's thought is the reaction against nineteenth-century rationalist thought that emerged in Western Europe at the very end of that century. This trend took several directions. One was an emphasis on the subjective aspects of human life, as exemplified by Freud (and even Max Weber), which paid attention to the importance of irrational, subconscious tendencies. One of the most original thinkers of the day was Georges Sorel, who criticized the intellectual rationalistic dogmas of liberalism, secularism, and individualistic democracy while upholding the importance of deep-rooted sentiments in groups of people as forces for collective action. Lypyns'kyj makes reference to Sorel more than to any other writer.³ Yet Sorel's influence on Lypyns'kyj did not help form all his social thought. Certainly Sorel's syndicalism and his vision of a socialist society are diametrically opposed to Lypyns'kyj's views, and Lypyns'kyj explicitly disassociated himself from them. Instead, Lypyns'kyj took from Sorel things which were directly useful to him. Sorel produced sharp insights and critiques of democracy, the intelligentsia, Marx, and the socialist movement, and it is these that Lypyns'kyj adopted in his own critique of democracy and the intelligentsia. Sorel may have had a more substantive influence on Lypyns'kyj's idea of the importance of irrational desire as a factor in nationbuilding.

² Ludwig Gumplowicz, *Rasse und Staat* (Vienna and Mainz, 1875), *Der Rassenkampf* (Innsbruck, 1883), *Grundriss der Soziologie* (Vienna, 1885). Gustav Ratzenhofer, *Wesen und Zweck der Politik* (Leipzig, 1893), *Die soziologische Erkenntnis* (Leipzig, 1898), *Soziologie* (Leipzig, 1908). Franz Oppenheimer, *Das Grundgesetz der Marxschen Gesellschaftslehre* (Berlin, 1903), *Der Staat* (Frankfurt-am-Main, 1908).

³ Lypyns'kyj refers to the following works of Sorel: *Vues sur les problèmes de la philosophie* (1911); *La décomposition du marxisme* (Paris, 1908); *Les illusions du progrès* (Paris, 1908); *Réflexions sur la violence* (Paris, 1908); *Matériaux d'une théorie du prolétariat* (Paris, 1919).

The third approach relevant to our study of Lypyns'kyj's thought encompasses the theories of elites of Robert Michels, Gaetano Mosca, and Vilfredo Pareto. Again, it is difficult to assess their specific influence. Lypyns'kyj gives odd references to Michels, and in one letter he accurately summarizes Pareto's theory of the circulation of the elites without any specific reference to him.⁴

Of course, Lypyns'kyj was concerned with the issue of nationbuilding in its relation to the Ukraine. He read widely, and he assimilated the ideas of many thinkers of his day. Yet, save for the basic theoretical framework of the conflict approach, it does not seem that the theory of any one thinker influenced him in a systematic way.

Basic Assumptions of Lypyns'kyj's Thought

In developing his political sociology Lypyns'kyj made a number of assumptions about social reality, five of which will be discussed here. The first is the distinction between social and material base versus ideological superstructure. The latter is the product of theoretical thinking formed under the influence of various theories existing at any given time. The former is the way of life and work of any specific group. This way of life and work in turn determines the ideology that is integral to any political structure.⁵ The separation is much like the familiar Marxist distinction between infrastructure and superstructure, or the basic premise of social materialism. On closer examination, however, there is an important difference between Lypyns'kyj's and Marx's formulation of this premise. Lypyns'kyj's concept of ideology is much more narrow. It does not refer to all the "products of consciousness." Rather, it is limited to ideologies of political movements, such as those of nationalism, socialism, populism, etc.

Lypyns'kyj's concept of the material base includes not only the abstract relation to production or ownership of its means, but a total relation to work, including style of life. In other words, it includes at least some of the elements of culture and thought which in the Marxist distinction would be included under the products of consciousness. His concept of the material base is therefore much closer to the notion of status group (*Stand*, estate) than it is to the concept of class (*Klasse*). This may be the reason Lypyns'kyj has some difficulty in consistently using one term to refer to

⁴ Lypyns'kyj refers to Robert Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie* (1911); his references are to the French translation. On similarity to Pareto, see Lypyns'kyj's *Lysty do bratv-xliborohiv*, p. 188.

⁵ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborohiv*, p. 5.

such groups, or avoids designating them by concepts altogether. In relation to determinacy, he quite often speaks of the “inner,” “spiritual” realm as determining the material, especially about moral degeneracy leading to material decay.

The second assumption of central importance in Lypyns'kyj's thought is that the social order and its stability can exist only when the pursuit of the general common good coincides or is made to coincide with the pursuit of natural vested interests. Thus the ideal of securing justice and rights for the masses is pursued best when it is pursued for oneself, and when the class organizing the process for others pursues it for its own benefit. By pursuing its own interests that class also benefits the interests of the masses.⁶ This philosophy of enlightened self-interest may identify Lypyns'kyj with the conservative intellectual tradition of the nineteenth century. Yet here again, Lypyns'kyj's specific understanding of the issue is different from the typical Western concept of it as represented by such thinkers as Herbert Spencer. The Spencerian concept of enlightened self-interest includes evolution and the survival of the fittest, from which emerge an emphasis on *laissez-faire*. No such notions are implied in Lypyns'kyj's thought. On the contrary, for him social order is created by the conscious activity of man, wherein the statebuilders may be pursuing their own class interests, but because these interests naturally require the organization of work which includes the masses, they necessarily also pursue the general common good. This idea, resembling eighteenth-century aristocratic conservatism, underlies Lypyns'kyj's theory of what he called classocracy.

Another important assumption in Lypyns'kyj's thought is the notion that all social units, all collectivities, are made up of two types of elements: passive or static elements, and active or dynamic ones. The active element is always the minority of the population, and the passive, the majority. The active minority possesses an inherent tendency to rule, lead, or organize others. The passive majority, in turn, may or may not accept the rule or leadership or form of organization given by the active minority. But if it does not accept it from one specific active minority, it will have to accept it from another active minority stronger than the one whose rule, leadership, or form of organization it has rejected.⁷

A corollary to this assumption is another—the third of our five—about the strength or weakness of the active minority. The active minority derives its strength from within itself, and the process of ruling or leading others ultimately depends on this inner strength. As Lypyns'kyj puts it, “the inner

⁶ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, pp. 59–60.

⁷ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, p. 186.

strength of the stronger rules the inner weakness of the weak." By the same token, when this inner strength of the ruling minority collapses, their rule over the majority will invariably also collapse. Lypyns'kyj's idea of the "inner strength" of the ruling minority is distinguished from what we can call the ruling minority's "outer strength." Outer strength is purely material power, i.e., control of means of coercion. This control, according to Lypyns'kyj, is itself insufficient to insure any permanence for the rule of the active minority. The "inner strength" also required is authoritative-ness, which is rootedness and subordination to one law accepted by and equally binding to both those who are strong and those who are weak, i.e., the active minority and the passive majority.⁸ Here we have the basis for Lypyns'kyj's theory of the ruling elite, in particular, the question of the ruling elite's legitimacy, about which more will be said.

The fourth assumption underlying much of Lypyns'kyj's thought holds that the history of any nation is to a large extent moved by two types of processes: the constructive process of building and uniting, and the destructive process of disrupting and dividing.⁹ The fate of a nation is determined by whichever process of the two becomes dominant at any given time. The periods in history when a nation experiences a "golden age" are the periods when the constructive process is the most intense. On the other hand, at certain moments in history the destructive process may emerge with tremendous force. The basis for the disruptive process lies in the inherent contradiction between the egotistic, separate, and direct interests of individuals or groups of individuals and the direct, general, and common interests of the national collectivity as a whole. The existence of a nation as a nation is predicated upon the victory of the constructive process. If there is a number of groups with narrow interests competing with each other for power and if none is able to win over the others, then the nation declines, collapses, or dies. If, however, one of these groups wins, it has the potential of becoming the national aristocracy. But whether it actually does become such an aristocracy depends upon its ability to transcend narrow interests by subordinating them to the general and common interests and hence pursuing them indirectly.

Let us compare this notion of history with that of some other thinkers who saw history as a process of conflict. For Hegel, history was a conflict of states; for Marx, a conflict of classes; for Gumplowicz, a conflict of races; and for Oppenheimer, a conflict of states and existing elites. For Lypyns'kyj, who fits into the same intellectual tradition as all these, history

⁸ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborohiv*, pp. 185–96.

⁹ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborohiv*, p. 132.

is a conflict of actual and potential elites. Especially important about Lypyns'kyj, however, is that although the determining actors in history are the elites, his emphasis is very much on the process or processes themselves. The actors somehow either get on top of these processes or are submerged by them. They may never reach the point of complete stability or complete destruction (Lypyns'kyj very much feared the latter). They are, however, in constant movement toward one or the other.

The final, fifth assumption in Lypyns'kyj's thought to be discussed here is the social, psychological postulate that inherent in the human instinct to live and survive is also an elemental, driving desire to broaden one's life, yet to remain oneself.¹⁰ This desire underlies two important social forces. For one thing, in a social collectivity which is united by the material and moral conditions of a common community life, it develops into a non-rational desire or will to have one's own organized society or one's own nation. Without this desire there can be no nation. The desire can, however, remain dormant in the collectivity for even hundreds of years. At a certain point in history a part of the collectivity may become conscious of its own latent but previously unconscious desire. From then on, the group which was previously passive becomes active, and its unconscious desire becomes a conscious will capable of nationbuilding. Lypyns'kyj's entire theory of nationbuilding is predicated on the assumption of the existence of this desire.

The second social force deriving from the elemental drive for self-expansion and identity preservation results in the religious aspects of social life. According to Lypyns'kyj, in the process of struggling to survive and to expand one's life there emerges a desire to strengthen oneself by a union with powers stronger than human ones. These are powers whose presence, according to Lypyns'kyj, each human being intuitively feels in one way or another. This feeling of union, the basis for mysticism, gives man the greatest encouragement to stable, energetic, and constant work with the hope of victory in his struggle. This mystical feeling induces man to devote his reason, his self-discipline, and his energy to causes which are higher than himself and which are in accord with the Higher Powers in whom he has faith. This same mysticism, Lypyns'kyj maintains, is part of all faiths, regardless whether it is religion—that is, irrational (in the sense that it goes beyond reason) faith in God—or whether it is some rationalistic doctrine based on faith in laws governing humanity that are discoverable by human reason.

¹⁰ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratv-xliborobiv*, pp. 116–17. Lypyns'kyj, *Religija i cerkva*, pp. 21–22.

Mysticism thus, according to Lypyns'kyj, is one of the strongest powers that man can apply in his struggle for existence. It becomes the moving force of human culture and civilization, which are essential for the development and growth of a collectivity such as the nation.¹¹ Mysticism, however, has its own inherent dangers. It can be turned by human pride into a force having destructive potential for society. Hence, it has to be socially controlled and disciplined. It is the church which, through its own rational organization, fulfills this function. This assumption forms the basic principle of Lypyns'kyj's political sociology of religion.

These, then, are the five theoretical assumptions that form the premises for Lypyns'kyj's sociological thought. This is not to imply that they are the only assumptions underlying Lypyns'kyj's thought. Nevertheless, they do provide the key principles for most of his theoretical arguments. What, then, are the main arguments of his theory? That is, how does he conceive the social structure in terms of its dynamic relation to the essential sociological problem of social order?

*Nationbuilding: Social Classes and
the Legitimacy of Power*

Lypyns'kyj's concept of social structure reflects, naturally enough, the European and especially the East European societies as they existed up to the turn of the twentieth century. The components of social structure—or, if you will, the actors in the internal history of society—are classes or status groups, defined in terms of relation to the life of work. The productive classes comprise the agrarian class, the producer-bourgeoisie, and the proletariat. The non-productive classes are the intelligentsia, the capitalist-financial and commercial bourgeoisie, and the clergy.

He discusses aspects of each of these classes, but not systematically: his main interest lies in the agrarian class and in the intelligentsia. His approach to these classes is not uniformly objective. Clearly at play is his highly negative orientation toward the financial and commercial bourgeoisie. His critique of democracy is based on that orientation, and, in part, on a disaffection with the intelligentsia.¹²

Any academic discussion of social classes is, however, of no interest to Lypyns'kyj. His main concern is practical: how to build the Ukrainian nation. Only in the process of answering this question does he develop a political sociology. For this reason, also, do his theoretical statements

¹¹ Lypyns'kyj, *Religija i cerkva*, pp. 22–26.

¹² Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratuv-xliborobiv*, pp. 150–54.

continually refer to the facts of Ukrainian history with, in many cases, comparisons to the history of other societies. Many of his abstract concepts are fully comprehensible only if one is familiar with the specific historical facts to which they are applied. Thus, for example, to understand his critique of democracy in general, one has to understand his argument about why democracy has not or will not work in the Ukraine. Similarly, to understand why at a time when monarchies were declining and democratic governments were on the rise throughout Europe, Lypyns'kyj insisted that monarchy was the most stable form of government and the best protector of the rights of workers as well as those of the producers, one has to understand the historical nature of political instability and the social base for dictatorship in Eastern Europe.

Lypyns'kyj was not primarily a historian. Because of his specific and dynamic concern with nationbuilding, he was primarily an ideologue, then a social and political theorist, and only then a historian. This, of course, places him in the company of many other social theorists, including Comte, Marx, Spencer, and a host of others whose aim was to accomplish social change.

What did the concept of nation mean to Lypyns'kyj? He makes reference to the slogans of the nationalist ideology that claimed a state can be established only after there is a nation: "through nation to statehood." Lypyns'kyj transposed the formula: "through state to nation." For him this was no mere slogan. In fact, for Lypyns'kyj no statement was ever a mere slogan; each was justified by much thought and analysis. For the nationalists, the word "nation" was practically synonymous with the concept of people, the peasants in particular, self-aware and self-conscious. For Lypyns'kyj the concept of nation was distinct from that of the people. The state is the leadership that activates the people; it is the active principle that moves the passive masses. Nation, on the other hand, is the rational organization that the leadership provides after it has mobilized the people, creating it in such a way as to unite all the different sectors of society without destroying their unique autonomies. For Lypyns'kyj, therefore, nation is an organic concept based on the idea of both unity and diversity.

In defining nationbuilding, Lypyns'kyj begins by pointing out that the starting point must be a strong and authoritative group of people around whom the rest of the people could unite. The problem of organizing such a group must be both theoretically analyzed and practically approached. Lypyns'kyj began with theoretical analysis.

As already stated, every social group that aspires to organize the entire society must draw its strength from within itself. It is this "inner strength" which becomes, as it were, the group's shareholders' weight, attracting

others in society and influencing them. This inner strength is made up of two elements: a common economic interest, and a common tradition. Lypyns'kyj defines tradition as the sum total of a group's historical experience, gained by its preceding generations in their struggle for existence and transmitted "with mother's milk," as it were, to succeeding generations.¹³ Tradition, then, is a sum of social values that have justified themselves in the struggle for existence. A group who has such tradition is a carrier of culture, and no nation can exist without culture.

The combination of common economic interests and tradition gives a group its strength and its authoritativeness. These two characteristics, Lypyns'kyj argues, are not held by the intelligentsia. The only class possessing them is the agrarian class.

The natural structure of the agrarian class always had at the pinnacle of power a monarchy, which was also the sole personifier of the tradition of the people. It is for this reason that Lypyns'kyj believes that the only form of the state able to unite all other groups in the Ukraine without being a dictatorship is the monarchy. Because he is, so to speak, physically rooted in the tradition of the people, the monarch alone can command the respect of all as the unquestionably legitimate ruler. Anybody else can only be an "otaman," a temporary usurper of power, who can be replaced tomorrow by somebody else representing another group.

This formulation of the problem of power is at the center of Lypyns'kyj's theory. He saw the question of the legitimacy of power as the primary issue in building the Ukrainian nation and as the basic problem of Ukrainian history. The only alternatives to legitimate power are either absolute dictatorship or complete political and social instability.

In the early conflict school of social thought, virtually no thinkers made the legitimacy of power the nucleus of their theory. Most rather naively assumed it to be an issue indistinct from the problem of the use of power itself. That is, those who wield power have been assumed either to have legitimacy by the same token or else to enjoy legitimacy through constant manipulation of people and popular symbols. This has been true of Marx, Sorel, Gumpłowicz, and even Oppenheimer. On this issue, then, Lypyns'kyj stands apart not only among Ukrainian thinkers, but also among Western thinkers. Of course, one outstanding Western thinker not of the conflict school, the sociologist Max Weber, made legitimacy the basic problem of his political sociology. It seems, however, that Lypyns'kyj did not know his work.

¹³ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do bratīv-xliborobiv*, p. 70.

Aristocracy and Classocracy

For Lypyns'kyj, the question of the legitimacy of power was closely connected with the issue of aristocracy. Without an aristocracy, Lypyns'kyj believed, no state can be established. Even in democratic societies such as France or the United States, the principles of state rule were to a large extent created by the aristocracy.

Lypyns'kyj actually had two concepts of aristocracy. They seem to have existed side by side in his thought, although one concept appears more prominent in his earlier writings, namely, part 1 of the *Letters*, and the second emerges more distinctly later, in part 2, and is developed in detail in part 3. The early concept of aristocracy, although not spelled out in detail, emphasizes the hereditary character of the nobility. Like the monarch himself, the hereditary aristocracy is seen as the active carrier of tradition without whom a state cannot be built. Thus, the republics that have emerged as a consequence of revolution against the aristocratic monarchical order have persisted after the revolution only with the help of those parts of the old aristocracy that did not degenerate, but were able to revitalize themselves in new social forms.¹⁴ Hence, the Ukrainian agrarian-monarchical state also cannot be built without the involvement of the healthy, active remnants of the Russified or Polonized Ukrainian hereditary nobility.¹⁵

In his later formulation of the concept of aristocracy, the idea of the hereditary nobility or its remnants is incorporated into a more abstract definition. The idea of aristocracy as the active carrier of tradition is no longer emphasized. Rather, the basis for the aristocracy's legitimacy of power comes to be its abiding dedication to law and morality. The concept is still based on the assumption that all collectivities are divisible into passive majorities and active minorities. Aristocracy is that active minority which incorporates in its ranks the most active, the best members of presumably any social class, including the proletariat.

Having reformulated the question of aristocracy in terms of merit, without direct reference to heredity or tradition, Lypyns'kyj now faced the much more complex problem of defining what legitimation of this type of aristocracy is. The problem is particularly complicated because aristocracies continually regenerate—i.e., new, better elements from below replace the degenerate elements of an old aristocracy. To be effective and legitimate, a national aristocracy must have both material power and moral authoritativeness. To have material power, the aristocracy must have a

¹⁴ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 38–39.

¹⁵ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 76.

strong elemental desire for power. As Lypyns'kyj puts it, it must be "inherently imperialistic"; it must control the means of war, and it must control—directly or indirectly—the means of agrarian and industrial production.

On the other hand, its moral authoritativeness depends upon, first, the degree to which it possesses public morality, and second and very important, the degree to which those who are ruled can accept the forms of social organization the aristocracy creates. Both the material power of the aristocracy and the degree of acceptance of the various organizational forms varies from nation to nation. Hence the methods of organizing an aristocracy also vary from nation to nation. Lypyns'kyj distinguishes three such methods of organizing aristocracy, calling them *ochlocracy*, *classocracy*, and *democracy*. These become his three basic forms of political rule, or three basic forms of national development. They are, in effect, three stages of national development; *ochlocracy* represents the stage of underdevelopment; *classocracy*, the stage of high organic development; and *democracy*, a stage of degeneration or decay. The basis for the distinction is the extent to which society is clearly differentiated by social classes and races. Ochlocracy is rule over a yet undifferentiated mass of people, mainly by means of force and a tightly organized aristocracy, as is typical of nomads.¹⁶ Classocracy is the rule of an aristocracy over a well-differentiated class society in which each class directly commands the means of production while at the same time possessing strong traditions, its own definite style of work, and its own psyche deriving from its racial purity. Finally, democracy is rule in a society in which distinct classes have collapsed, become intermixed (as have the races), and in which material development has been not organic, but chaotic. In this system society is a conglomerate of presumably equal individuals who are estranged from one another, who continuously hate each other, and who are bound into a whole only by the remnants of the national and state organization developed under the rule of the former, now degenerated, classocratic or ochlocratic aristocracy.¹⁷

The form of political rule that was of most interest to Lypyns'kyj was the classocracy. This he regarded as the only viable form of aristocratic rule. He theorizes how classocratic rule develops historically, beginning with the conquest of one race of people by another. In the tradition of all conflict sociology, he believed that in such conquest lies the origin of all statehood. But the conquest is always of two kinds, external and internal, and the aris-

¹⁶ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 191–92.

¹⁷ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 192.

ocracy does not truly become the society's elite until it has accomplished the internal conquest.

Here Lypyns'kyj comes back to the problem of the legitimacy of elites, but now his argument shifts to describing the process by which the elite, originally the conquerors, come to be institutionalized in the conquered society. The argument is presented in general, abstract terms; in it Lypyns'kyj talks about the "yellow" and the "black" races as the active and the passive elements in this process, respectively. The process is ultimately, but gradually, accomplished through intermarriage and a kind of organic amalgamation, producing an elite with a new tradition, drawn on the traditions of the yellow and the black peoples, that constitutes a new, distinct, aristocratic class.¹⁸

Implicitly, through his generalized example of the yellow and the black races Lypyns'kyj is retracing the social history of the Polish *szlachta* in the Ukraine. His political sociology thus becomes the sociology of ethnicity or ethnic group relations. To bolster his arguments, he refers to theories of race which, from today's perspective, are of dubious value.¹⁹

The Intelligentsia

Concomitant with Lypyns'kyj's interest in aristocracy is his interest in the intelligentsia. He sharply criticized the role of the intelligentsia in society in general, and the Ukrainian intelligentsia in particular. The main theme of his critique is based on the assumption that the natural role of the intelligentsia is the mediation between social classes through cultural and intellectual work, but not statebuilding—or the wielding of political power.

In his overall critique of the role of intelligentsia, Lypyns'kyj makes reference to Sorel, specifically to his analysis of the role of the socialist intelligentsia in France. Sorel saw a contradiction in the fact that the socialist-democratic parties were led by people who invoked a "scientific" approach to social justice and who spoke in the name of the proletariat. They claimed that the proletariat would win only if it undertook sole responsibility for the organization of economic production. But the leaders themselves had no relationship to any economic production whatsoever. Rather, they were "attorneys without cases, physicians without patients and without learning, students of billiards, commercial travelers and other commissionaires of business, . . . journalists of small presses . . . who find an

¹⁸ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 225.

¹⁹ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 191.

outlet and a career for themselves in the International."²⁰ Lypyns'kyj regarded these words as an apt characterization, too, of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of his time, both socialist and nationalist.

According to Lypyns'kyj, all intelligentsias try to turn their ideology into a type of myth or utopia in order to justify their wish to govern over others. An intelligentsia supports its claim to rule by "the suggestion that in the struggle [for social or national justice] only they have the secret of using the supernatural forces [of the mind] and only they have the access and the ability to steer these forces in the desired direction."²¹ Whether this "secret" is "scientific socialism" or anything else is irrelevant. For his argument Lypyns'kyj adduces another quotation from Sorel: "The person who has manufactured a utopia to make humanity happy considers himself the rightful owner of that invention. He thinks that there is nobody better than himself to put his system into practice. He would think it very unreasonable if his literature failed to bring him a position in the government."²²

Those members of the intelligentsia who take part in ideological movements see themselves as future leaders who will fill one or another post in a new government. Lypyns'kyj explains the dynamics of ideological movements led by the intelligentsia. This is not the intelligentsia's natural role in society, he maintains. Rather than creating ideological movements, the intelligentsia's natural role is mediating between the other social classes. Ideological movements only alienate one class from another, whereas the intelligentsia's role should be to bring the classes together and to unite them by developing a general, national culture.

The problem of the Ukrainian intelligentsia has its roots also in sources specific to the history of Ukrainian society. The Ukrainian intelligentsia has long played the role of middleman between the Russian state and the masses of Ukrainian people, particularly the peasants—here Lypyns'kyj is referring to the intelligentsia of the Eastern Ukraine. The role even became the basis for the intelligentsia's material existence. The consequence was not only a monopolization of this political role by the intelligentsia, but also the emergence of a conception of the Ukraine not as an independent country, but as an autonomous unit within the Russian state. This induced the intelligentsia in the Eastern Ukraine to be interested more in the ideologies of social democracy than in those of independent statehood.

²⁰ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 161.

²¹ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 160.

²² Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, p. 61.

For a long time this intelligentsia could not see itself in the role of builders of an independent Ukrainian state at all. Yet the idea of a Ukrainian state established not by them, but by some other Ukrainian class, was absolutely hostile and foreign to them.²³ The idea of independent statehood developed within this intelligentsia only after the Russian Empire had collapsed and the new Bolshevik government had disregarded the Ukrainian intelligentsia as representatives of the Ukrainian people. This turned its members onto the road toward independent statehood, but it did not change the Ukrainian intelligentsia's well-rooted political and ideological character.²⁴

The Roots of Anarchism

In addition to his study of the intelligentsia, Lypyns'kyj undertook to understand another element of Ukrainian society: the shifty, opportunistic social type referred to as the *xolop*. He also tried to understand the social basis for the Ukrainian social type known as the *otaman* and for the Ukrainian anarchist. He believed that the last two derived from the same defect in Ukrainian society: lack of legitimacy for one's own authority. In studying anarchism, Lypyns'kyj looked beyond social conditions to social psychological causes. Although he never developed this issue in his major works, his private letters contain passages that allow us to delve deeper into his thought on the causes of anarchism. Of particular interest is Lypyns'kyj's letter to one of his co-workers in the hetman association, in which Lypyns'kyj chides the man for resigning membership because he was not appointed to the association's council. If indeed he was offended by not being appointed to the council and left the association for that reason, writes Lypyns'kyj, his behavior is an example of precisely the type of Ukrainian anarchism which "we have to fight with all our strength." Lypyns'kyj goes on:

A person who would not even think of demanding a higher rank in the Russian army in which he served or in the German commercial institution in which he works suddenly feels offended by his own, Ukrainian institution. He feels offended solely because this institution has no material enforcement power and because all the power that this institution has is based exclusively on moral authority, which precisely this same person has given to this, his own, institution. . . .²⁵

²³ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 5–6.

²⁴ Lypyns'kyj, *Lysty do brativ-xliborobiv*, pp. 6–7.

²⁵ From Lypyns'kyj's letter to A. Bilopol's'kyj dated 8 January 1926, from Reichenau, now held in the archives of the W. K. Lypynsky East European Research Institute, Philadelphia.

Two factors, then, are at the root of Ukrainian anarchism: (1) lack of material strength in Ukrainian institutions, and (2) unwillingness to submit to one's own moral authority because this moral authority was established by oneself. A third element, not noted directly but implied by Lypyns'kyj's second factor, is lack of self-confidence. An individual does not take seriously the moral authority which he himself has established because he does not take himself seriously; in other words, because he has a feeling of inferiority. This brings us back to the main thesis of Lypyns'kyj's political sociology. Tracing the steps backwards: an individual has no self-confidence because he has no confidence in the moral authority of his own institutions. He has no confidence in these institutions because they have no physical power to enforce their rules and regulations, which they lack because they do not have the backing or support of a state with its own material and legal base. Thus, the circle becomes closed: on the one hand, the Ukrainian people have no state of their own because they have no self-confidence; on the other hand, they have no self-confidence because they have no state of their own.

Lypyns'kyj tried to understand the destructive capability of anarchy, which was often in evidence in the Ukraine and in Eastern Europe. His critique of democracy—although he frequently refers to France and the United States as historical examples—derives, to a large extent, from his own personal experience and awareness of the tremendous destructiveness of which uprooted people are capable. He feared this destructiveness. In one sense, his theory of classocracy was a method of organizing society so as to control or eliminate such forces. In this regard he stands out not only as an important figure among Ukrainian social thinkers, but also among European political sociologists of his day.

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