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## Ukraine and Russia in the 1930s

HIROAKI KUROMIYA

After 1917 Ukraine became for Moscow the most significant non-Russian republic among the lands of the former Russian Empire. Its importance was dictated not only by its geographic size and large population, but also by its rich natural resources (agriculture, mineral deposits). Moreover, its location was of strategic significance: it bordered on the countries which Moscow regarded as advanced posts for aggression by Western capitalist countries. The history of Ukraine also haunted Moscow. Once relieved of Moscow's tutelage in 1917, Ukraine had immediately become unruly. The revolution and the civil war in Ukraine were hardly comforting: the borderland had to be subdued by force. From Moscow's point of view, Ukraine, a strategic republic, had to become its most important ally, yet Ukraine was potentially Russia's most unwilling partner. The history of Ukrainian-Russian relations in the 1930s illuminates this dilemma and presents a complex picture. Recent findings from archives have resolved many questions, but have raised many more.

One of the most important events in the history of Ukraine in the 1930s was the famine of 1932–1933. Many historians consider the famine a man-made disaster, a genocide premeditated by Moscow to root out the danger of Ukrainian nationalism. Moscow suspected the Ukrainian peasantry of providing the social basis for Ukrainian nationalism, and wished to punish them, thereby eliminating the very root of Ukrainian separatism.<sup>1</sup> According to one Western historian, "Against them [Ukrainians] the famine seems to have been designed as part of a campaign to destroy them as a political factor and as a social organism."<sup>2</sup> Other historians see the famine as a result of drought and mistaken agricultural policy, aggravated by Moscow's enmity toward the petit-bourgeois peasantry in general.<sup>3</sup> Available evidence supports neither view conclusively. However, my research suggests that ethnic issues did play a central role in Russian-Ukrainian relations in this critical decade.

The famine struck not only Ukraine but Russia, Kazakhstan, and other areas of the country as well. It is arguable whether Ukraine was hardest hit by the famine (Kazakhstan lost many more lives proportionally than did Ukraine)<sup>4</sup>, but there is no doubt that the famine deprived Ukraine of millions of lives. The collective farms, created by the brutal collectivization and dekulakization drive to secure state procurement of agricultural produce, particularly grain, had not been living up to the expectations of the party leaders. The fortuitous bumper crop of 1930 was followed by poor harvests in subsequent years. 1932 and 1933 were hungry years everywhere. Moscow directed its brutal attack not

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only against the individual farms (“remnants of capitalism”) but also against the collective farms. The Kuban’ and Ukraine, the bread basket of the country, bore the brunt of this fierce attack.

Moscow knew what it was doing: it mercilessly took grain from the peasantry. Grain production in the country had declined from 76 million tons in 1930 to 61.8 and 61.1 million tons in 1931 and 1932, respectively, but state procurements increased from 28.2 percent of grain production in 1930 to 32.8 percent in 1931 and were projected to rise to 40–50 percent in 1932. To make matters worse, Moscow continued to export grain in 1931–1932. In the summer of 1932, Molotov returned from Ukraine and reported to the party Politburo that “We are indeed faced with the spectre of famine, and in rich grain districts to boot.”<sup>5</sup> Clearly, Stalin was not daunted by this spectre of famine.

When famine forced Ukrainians to seek food in the north (Russia and Belarus), Moscow ordered in January 1933 that the exodus be halted, claiming that it was “organized by the enemies of the Soviet government, SRs and Polish agents, to agitate, ‘through peasants,’ in the northern areas of the Soviet Union against the collective farms and the Soviet government.” The OGPU was mobilized to stem the exodus.<sup>6</sup> By the beginning of March 1933, 219,460 people had been detained; of them, 186,588 were returned home, and the remainder were put on trial.<sup>7</sup>

Some historians have referred to this border closure as the most devastating evidence of Moscow’s anti-Ukrainian genocide. Yet other historians maintain that similar measures were taken elsewhere outside Ukraine to shield the cities from hunger. Moreover, it is not known exactly what kinds of borders were closed. The Russian-Ukrainian administrative borders did not clearly match the ethnic borders: on both sides of the borders Ukrainians and Russians lived intermixed. It is not known whether the Ukrainian villages just north of the border fared better than the Russian villages just south of the border; nor is it known whether the border guards scrutinized the ethnicity of the border crossers.

Some evidence, now published, shows that depopulated Ukrainian villages were then repopulated by people brought in from Russia and Belarus.<sup>8</sup> Yet archival data show that Ukrainian and Kuban’ villages devastated by the famine were repopulated not only by Russians and Belarusians but also by Ukrainians, and that the Soviet authorities showed little interest in the ethnicity of the resettlers.<sup>9</sup>

Data are contradictory, but clearly the Ukrainian peasants were victimized by Moscow: Ukraine suffered more than Russia.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the fact that Moscow ferociously attacked the Kuban’, an area which retained close ethnic, historical, and cultural ties with Ukraine, also suggests that Ukrainians were targeted. One still cannot prove, however, that Ukraine and the Ukrainians were singled out for terror. The non-Cossack Ukrainians in the Kuban’ were not subjected to the same fate as the Cossacks. The terror in the Kuban’ may be attributed at least in part to Moscow’s suspicion of the Cossack heritage of the

Kuban'. Although Stalin dealt harshly with other grain-producing areas, causing serious famine there, the terror directed against Ukraine and the Kuban' seems to have been more extensive and more fierce, with the notable exception of Kazakhstan.<sup>11</sup> In some cases of neighboring villages, one village would hardly suffer from famine, while its neighbor would be almost wiped out, but it is not known whether the Russian villages in Ukraine were deliberately spared famine and the Ukrainian villages deliberately targeted.

The intensity of the famine may have been due at least in part to the existence of numerous prosperous peasants in Ukraine and the North Caucasus. In fact, the ethnically Greek and German villages in Ukraine, which tended to be more prosperous than Russian or Ukrainian villages, may have suffered more than the Ukrainian villages.<sup>12</sup> As was the case with Ukrainian villages, these villages, also depopulated, were said to have then been resettled by Russians. The diaspora nationalities stood even below the Ukrainians in the ethnic hierarchy in Ukraine: in Greek villages, for example, the Russian language became the tool of outright rule by Russians, while the Ukrainian language was used to transmit orders from Ukrainians to Greeks. As a result of the ethnic hierarchy, by the mid-1930s the ethnic situation in the Donbas was said to have become "explosive."<sup>13</sup>

All the same, there are reasons (such as those cited earlier) why one is tempted to believe that the Ukrainians were targeted for terror. At least to the extent that Moscow suspected the Ukrainians, particularly Ukrainian peasants, of harboring nationalist sentiments, and the prosperous peasants, particularly the Ukrainian peasants, of concealing inclinations toward capitalist restoration, Moscow must have been disposed to terrorize the Ukrainians rather than the Russians: whereas Ukrainians were potentially suspect simply for being Ukrainians, Russians were not politically suspect for being Russian. Again, despite newly available data, evidence showing that the 1932–1933 famine was a premeditated assault directed against Ukraine and the Ukrainians is inconclusive. To judge the intention by the consequence, as some historians of the famine have done, is dangerous logic. For example, "Why did it happen? We can only judge the tree by its fruit."<sup>14</sup> Much more research is needed.

This does not mean, however, that national factors did not matter in Moscow's treatment of Ukraine. As many studies of the famine emphasize, the contrary was the case. The famine crisis was also a political crisis which challenged Stalin's leadership: his collectivization drive did not prove the viability of the new agricultural order; his industrialization drive, benefiting little from the collectivization of agriculture, squeezed the nation to the limit. The 1932 challenge posed by the former Stalin supporter Martem'ian Nikitich Riutin is famous,<sup>15</sup> but his was far from an isolated case: a number of similar challenges to Stalin's leadership surfaced in the country at that time.<sup>16</sup> One ought not take these cases at face value, however, because the GPU was out to get enemies and often fabricated crimes. Yet Stalin was politically right in suspecting that discontent was mounting in the country at that time, and, as the

dictator, he duly made a move to eliminate opposition and deal preemptively with any possible challenge to his power. As was the case in previous crises (the civil war, the end of NEP), national groups became politically suspect almost by default because of their supposed separatism or nationalism.<sup>17</sup>

Moscow hit Ukraine hard. As Hryhorii Kostiuk wrote more than three decades ago, using published sources, and as Iurii Shapoval has recently shown based on archival material, in Ukraine in 1932–1934 at least six or seven major “counterrevolutionary” organizations were liquidated by the Soviet secret police: the Ukrainian National Center, allegedly headed by Mykhailo Hrushevskyi, the prominent historian and the former president of the Ukrainian Central Rada; the Union of the Kuban’ and Ukraine; the All-Ukrainian SR Center (Organization of the Ukrainian SRs); the Counter-Revolutionary Sabotage Organization; the Ukrainian Military Organization; the Polish Military Organization; and the All-Ukrainian Borot’bist Center.<sup>18</sup> More were to follow after Sergei Kirov’s murder in December 1934. As has often been said, the Great Terror began in 1933 in Ukraine.

As the news of famine reached the West, Ukrainian groups in the West and in Poland became vocal about the plight of their country. Moscow was concerned about their activity and its impact on Soviet Ukraine: in response to the famine crisis the Ukrainian groups might unite around the cause of nationalism. The Ukrainian Communist party leader Stanislav Kosior contended in November 1933 that nine out of ten “counterrevolutionary” organizations in Ukraine had adopted the slogans of Ukrainian nationalism.<sup>19</sup> The internal crisis was complicated by external factors, particularly the 1933 accession to power of Hitler in Germany. Moscow contended that this event encouraged and strengthened the anti-Soviet front of émigré organizations.<sup>20</sup> The police hunted for nationalist suspects even among rank-and-file workers. Moreover, those Ukrainians who were born or lived in the western border areas became politically suspect simply by that fact alone.<sup>21</sup> Many Western Ukrainian Communists who had emigrated to the Soviet Union were arrested as enemies.<sup>22</sup>

Important changes in Moscow’s nationality policy coincided with the famine crisis. This was, however, more than a mere coincidence. Stalin allowed for no possibility of organized resistance at a time of grave crisis. His attack on *korenizatsiia* (indigenization, or, in the Ukrainian context, Ukrainianization) is a good example. In December 1932, quite abruptly, Moscow decided to reverse at least some aspects of *korenizatsiia*. On 14 December Molotov and Stalin declared that in the Northern Caucasus (the Kuban’ area) the enemies of the Soviet government had used Ukrainianization as a legal form by which to organize resistance to Soviet government policies. The Kuban’ area was ordered to conduct government business, publication, and teaching in the Russian language.<sup>23</sup> The following day Stalin dispatched a telegram in which he ordered a halt to Ukrainianization in those areas in the Russian Republic, Central Asia, and Kazakhstan where Ukrainianization had been promoted previously. He quoted the same reason for this move as for that in the Kuban’:

Ukrainianization could only play into the hands of “bourgeois-nationalist elements who had been expelled from Ukraine as wrecking elements.”<sup>24</sup>

In the Ukrainian SSR, this political reversal was not complete. The tension between Ukrainianization as a tool to disarm nationalism and as a weapon to be used by nationalists to promote separatism had always been evident, but at this stage Moscow still believed that *korenizatsiia* could serve its purposes.<sup>25</sup> This did not mean that the attack on Ukrainianization in Ukraine was benign. It was indeed violent. Not only were “bigwigs” terrorized, but many teachers in the Ukrainian schools were fired and arrested as “enemies.” In 1933, as many as ten percent of them were said to belong to the enemy camp.<sup>26</sup> The attack against Ukrainianization inevitably meant an attack against the “national Communists” who had promoted Ukrainianization.<sup>27</sup> Already at this time, tried and tested Communists came to be branded not merely as “nationalists” but also as “Trotskyites and Fascists,” with Moscow making little distinction among them.<sup>28</sup>

As these cases suggest, the famine crisis marked the transition of enemy construction from the class enemy to the class-neutral enemy of the people.<sup>29</sup> The Great Terror was neither class-based terror nor solely ethnic terror, but clearly it contained elements of ethnic terror. From the famine years onward, numerous “Fascist cells” in German villages were uncovered and eliminated by the secret police. Likewise, from 1934 onward, many “Fascist German spy rings” were intercepted in the industrial Donbas. Then the Kirov murder in December 1934 seems to have triggered an explicit assault on Germans and Poles in Ukraine, particularly in the western border zones.<sup>30</sup> This was soon followed by more extensive deportations of Poles and Germans.<sup>31</sup> In 1937 the Chinese in Kyiv disappeared, clearly a wholesale deportation, just as the Koreans and Chinese were deported from the Far East.<sup>32</sup> In 1937 and 1938 Moscow specifically instituted terror against the Germans, Poles, Greeks, Latvians, Macedonians, Estonians, Finns, Iranians, and other ethnic minorities in Ukraine and elsewhere: because of their ethnic origins and alleged foreign connections, they appeared to Moscow as potential fifth columns.<sup>33</sup> (In The Donbas, the party chief said explicitly that the Donbas ought to get rid of the Germans: “We don’t need them.”<sup>34</sup>) One German collective farm near Khartsyzk, Donetsk Oblast’, lost all its men: they all were said to be “enemies.”<sup>35</sup> In 1937–1938, according to these orders, at least 3,029 Poles, 3,608 Germans, and 3,470 Greeks were shot in the Donbas (Donetsk Oblast’) alone.<sup>36</sup>

The Ukrainians were terrorized almost equally harshly.<sup>37</sup> However, there is no conclusive evidence that they were terrorized more than the Russians. No comprehensive data are available. My research suggests that the number of death sentences passed in the Ukrainian republic in 1937–1938, 122,237, was approximately 17.8 percent of those passed in the country as a whole (681,692).<sup>38</sup> This corresponds roughly to the proportion (17.7 percent) of the population of the Ukrainian republic to that of the Soviet Union as a whole.<sup>39</sup> It is not known whether in Ukraine and elsewhere disproportionately more

Ukrainians were repressed than Russians. The available data are probably incomplete, although how incomplete is not known. One could hypothesize that the Ukrainians were more vulnerable to terror because of their nationality, but that because Russians stood at the top of the hierarchy in Ukraine, they were at least as vulnerable to repression in Ukraine as Ukrainians. Another possibility is that the data have been systematically altered to hide Moscow's deliberate terror against Ukraine. How probable this version is also is not known.

Nor do available data on the Gulag population in 1937–1940 conclusively show that the Ukrainians were targeted for terror. In 1937 the Ukrainians accounted for 16.85 percent of the camp population, roughly the same as their proportion to the population in the USSR as a whole, 16.33 percent.<sup>40</sup> Again, these data may be far from complete. One could also put forth the hypothesis that Moscow believed that the dekulakization drive and the famine had largely eliminated the immediate threat of Ukrainian nationalism. Hence, one might infer, the Great Terror appeared to be only as intense in Ukraine as in the Soviet Union as a whole. That is not to say that certain areas in Ukraine were not hit particularly hard by the terror: witness the devastation in the Donbas with its large industrial centers.<sup>41</sup> Clearly, much more research is needed in this respect as well.

It is possible that Stalin entertained the temptation to deport many Ukrainians, if not all Ukrainians, from Ukraine. Before World War II Stalin did deport certain ethnic groups both in and outside Ukraine. During the war, Germans were deported wholesale as an enemy nation from Ukraine and from the Volga areas, while smaller nationalities were subjected to the same fate during and after the war.<sup>42</sup> It is not known whether Moscow had conclusive evidence that these nationalities were much less loyal to the Soviet government than Russians. Nor is there conclusive evidence that, save for the newly annexed Western Ukraine, which had never been part of the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, Ukrainians proved substantially less loyal than Russians. All the same, Moscow knew well that the Ukrainians, as was true of other nationalities and not true of the Russians, had a third political option: neither pro-Russian nor pro-German, but a pro-Ukrainian political orientation. During the war, this option provided a political alternative even in such highly Russified areas as the Donbas.<sup>43</sup>

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There was no administrative-territorial unit called Ukraine under the Tsarist regime. After the October revolution, the Soviet government in Moscow would not tolerate the independence of Ukraine and crushed the Ukrainian revolution. Moscow then recreated Ukraine as a legitimate, Soviet republic of an oppressed nation. In his recent provocative essay Yuri Slezkine has argued that Moscow's policy toward formerly oppressed nations in the country, at least

those “groups which had already [by the 1930s] had their own republics and their own extensive bureaucracies,” had been surprisingly consistent in promoting their “nationalism” (particularism). (By the end of the war Stalin realized the dream of Ukrainian nationalists, the unification of Ukrainian territory, if not in the form they had envisioned.) In fact, it is into these national republics that the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, finally realizing the rhetoric of Soviet policy—self-determination.<sup>44</sup>

The Ukrainian experience of the 1930s may warrant some revision of Slezkine’s thesis. The ideal Ukraine for Moscow was a loyal, junior partner. There had always been a danger of the junior partner rebelling against its senior partner. Moscow feared the danger and used both threat and patronage. Moscow was tempted to bully and terrorize Ukraine at the slightest sign or possibility of disloyalty. It cannot be proved conclusively whether or not in the 1930s, Moscow deliberately used fratricidal genocides to subjugate Ukraine. Whatever the rhetoric or the substance of its seemingly consistent policy toward nationalities, political terror was an option the Soviet government willingly used against non-Russian nationalities from the very beginning of its rule. (Ironically, it can be said that by using such terror Moscow promoted ethnic particularism.)

Whatever the intention of Moscow’s policy toward the national republics, Ukraine, like Russia, was not a nation-state but a multi-national state. Unlike Russia, however, Ukraine had had no imperial traditions and had fewer difficulties in developing its ethnonational identity.<sup>45</sup> The ethnic terror against some non-Ukrainian nationalities in the 1930s and 1940s and the Holocaust during the war contributed, to an extent, to the ethnic “purification” of the Ukrainian republic. The post-war years, however, witnessed no substantial Ukrainianization of the population in the republic. Ukrainians accounted for 78.2 percent of the republic’s population in 1937, but their proportion declined to 76.8 percent in 1959 and to 72.7 percent in 1989. Mainly at the cost of other minorities, the Russian population increased from 11.3 percent in 1937 to 16.9 percent in 1959 and to 22.2 percent in 1989.<sup>46</sup> This change was at least in part due to a conscious Russification policy pursued by Moscow. In any case, it is this multi-national state that declared independence in 1991.

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## NOTES

1. The best example is Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow. Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (Oxford University Press, 1986), chap. 18; and James E. Mace, "The Man-Made Famine of 1933 in Soviet Ukraine," in *Famine in Ukraine, 1932–1933*, ed. Roman Serbyn and Bohdan Krawchenko (Edmonton, Alberta, 1986). *Report to Congress. Commission on the Ukraine Famine* (Washington, D.C., 1988), less explicit on the deliberateness of the famine, concludes that the famine was Stalin's genocide against Ukrainians. A similar view was widely held in Ukraine at the time. In January 1934 the German consulate in Kyiv reported that there was a widespread belief among the population that the Soviet government had promoted the spread of the famine "in order to bring the Ukrainians to their knees [um die Ukrainer auf die knie zu zwingen]." See Dmytro Zlepko, ed., *Der ukrainische Hunger-Holocaust. Stalins verschwiegener Völkermord 1932/33 an 7 Millionen ukrainischen Bauern im Spiegel geheimgehaltener Akten des deutschen Auswärtigen Amtes* (Sonnenbühl, 1988), p. 261.
2. Mace, "The Man-Made Famine," p. 12.
3. Note J. Arch Getty's review of Conquest's book in *The London Review of Books*, 22 January 1977, and Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933," *Slavic Review* 50(1) Spring 1991, and Stephan Merl, "Golod 1932–1933 godov—genotsid ukraintsev dlia osushchestvleniia politiki rusifikatsii?," *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1995 (1).
4. See Zh. B. Abylkhodzhin, M. K. Kozybaev, and M. B. Tatimov, "Kazakhstanskaia tragediia," *Voprosy istorii* 1989 (7).
5. N. A. Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie (nachalo 30-kh godov)* (Moscow, 1994), p. 203.
6. Tsentral'nyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromads'kykh ob'iednan' (TsDAHO) Ukraïny, fond 1, opys 16, sprava 9, arkush 115–16.
7. Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie*, p. 204.
8. *Kolektivizatsiia i holod na Ukraïni 1929–1933. Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kyiv, 1992), p. 642; *Zoloti vorota* (Kyiv), 1993(4): pp. 107–108; and Vasył Marochko, "Natsional'nyi aspekt holodomoru 1932–33 rr. v Ukraïni," *Holodomor 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraïni. Prychyny i naslidky. Mizhnarodna naukova konferentsiia. Kyiv, 9–10 veresnia 1993 r. Materialy* (Kyiv, 1995), p. 73.
9. I owe this point to Terry Martin.
10. There is some disagreement on this. See the discussion by Robert Conquest and Mark Tauger in *Slavic Review* 53(1) Spring 1994: 318–19.

11. See Ivnitskii, *Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie*. See also articles (including Ivnitskii's) in *Holodomor 1932–1933 rr. v Ukraïni*.
12. It is said that in one Greek district, Donets'k Oblast', 30 percent of the population died of starvation. See 33-i: *holod. Narodna knyha-memorial* (Kyiv, 1991), p. 230. For an account of famine in a German village, see, for example, *Nimtsi v Ukraïni. 20–30-ti rr. XX st. Zbirnyk dokumentiv derzhavnykh arkhiviv Ukraïny* (Kyiv, 1994), p. 171, which says that only 18 of 103 families in the village Morozove, Khortytsia district, Zaporizhzhia Oblast' survived the famine. For the German and Greek peasants in Ukraine and their experience of collectivization and famine, see also B. V. Chyrko, "Natsional'ni menshnosti na Ukraïni v 20–30-kh rr.," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1990 (1): 59; L. D. Nasiedkina, "Hrets'ki natsional'ni sil'rady ta raiony v Ukraïni (Druha polovyna 20-kh–30-ti roky)," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1992 (6): 69, 71.
13. L. D. Nasedkina, "Grecheskie natsional'nye sel'skie sovety Ukrainy vo vzaimodeistvii natsional'noi i sotsial'noi politiki," in *Greki Ukrainy. Istoriiia i sovremennost'* (Donets'k, 1991), p. 126.
14. Mace, "The Man-Made Famine," p. 11. See also Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow*, p. 326. For the perilous similarity of this sort of inquiry to the Stalinist logic of terror, see Getty's review of Conquest (note 3, above).
15. See Martem'ian Riutin, *Na koleni ne vstanu* (Moscow, 1992).
16. The most prominent in the Donbas, for example, was the Nechaev affair in the autumn of 1932. See Derzhavnyi arkhiv Donets'koï oblasti (DADO), fond R-835, opys 1-sch, sprava 53, arkush 3–38.
17. The most notable case in Ukraine in the previous crisis was the 1930 SVU (*Spilka vyzvolennia Ukraïny*, The Union for the Liberation of Ukraine) trial in Kharkiv. See Hiroaki Kuromiya, "Stalinskii 'velikii perelom' i protsess nad 'Soiuzom Osvobozhdeniia Ukrainy,'" *Otechestvennaia istoriia* 1994 (1).
18. Hryhory Kostiuk, *Stalinist Rule in the Ukraine. A Study of the Decade of Mass Terror, 1929–1939* (New York, 1960), pp. 85–98, and Iu. I. Shapoval, *Ukraïna 20–50-kh rokiv. Storinky nenapysanoi istorii* (Kyiv, 1993), chaps. 5–10.
19. *Itogi i blizhaishie zadachi provedeniia natsional'noi politiki na Ukraine. Doklad t. Kosiiora i iz rechi t. Postysheva na noiabr'skom ob"edinennom plenume TsK i TsK KP(b)U* (Moscow, 1933), pp. 35–36.
20. See the November 1933 speech by Pavel' Postyshev in his *Stat'i i rechi* (Kharkiv, 1934), p. 287.
21. See testimonies in *The Black Deeds of the Kremlin. A White Book*, vol. 1., *Book of Testimonies* (Toronto, 1953), pp. 115–20.

22. See Roman Solchanyk, "The Communist Party of Western Ukraine, 1919–1938" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973), pp. 310–13. One of these Communists survived the Great Terror and wrote a memoir: Volodymyr Gzhytsky, *Night and Day*, tr. from the Ukrainian by Ian Press (Edmonton, Alberta, 1988). For the fate of West Ukrainian intellectuals in the Soviet Union at that time, see O. S. Rubl'ov and Iu. A. Cherchenko, *Stalinschchyna i dolia zakhidnoukraïns'koï intelihentsii* (Kyiv, 1994), part 3.
23. *Holod 1932–1933 rokiv na Ukraïni. Ochyma istorykiv, movoiu dokumentiv* (Kyiv, 1990). pp. 291–94. For the abruptness of this change as well as a more extensive discussion of this process, see Martin, "The Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1923–1938," chap. 4. For social-economic contexts within which Ukrainianization came to be reversed, see George O. Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR, 1921–1934* (Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Bohdan Krawchenko, *Social Change and National Consciuousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine* (New York, 1985), chap. 3.
24. Shapoval, *Ukraïna 20–50-rokiv. Strorinky nenapisanoï istorii*, p. 110.
25. I owe this point to Martin, "The Soviet Nationalities Policy, 1923–1938."
26. V. P. Zaton's'kyi's remark in December 1933, quoted in Heorhii Kas'ianov, *Ukraïns'ka intelihentsiia 1920-kh–30-kh rokiv. Sotsial'nyi portret ta istorychna dolia* (Kyiv, 1992), p. 154. A month earlier, his estimate was even higher: 30–40 percent. See "Sozdavaia sem'iu narodov. O praktike reshennia natsional'nogo voprosa na Ukraine v 20–30-e gody," *Pod znamenem leninizma* 1989 (11): 53.
27. See James Mace, *Communism and The Dilemma of National Liberation. National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), chap. 8.
28. See for example Postyshev, *Stat'i i rechi*, p. 271.
29. This is one of the central themes of a book on the Donbas that I am completing. See also Hiroaki Kuromiya, "The Commander and the Rank and File. Managing the Soviet Coal-Mining Industry, 1928–1933," in *Social Dimensions of Soviet Industrialization*, ed. by William G. Rosenberg and Lewis H. Siegelbaum (Bloomington, Ind., 1993), p. 159.
30. Note particularly the Politburo secret order of 9 December 1934 in TsDAHO, fond 1, opys 16, sprava 11, arkush 294–5 and 323. For the preparation of these anti-German measures, see Ingeborg Fleischhauer and Benjamin Pinkus, *The Soviet Germans. Past and Present* (New York, 1986), pp. 34, 91.
31. M. F. Buhai, "Deportatsii naseleennia z Ukraïny (30–50-ti roky)," *Ukraïns'kyi istorychnyi zhurnal* 1990 (10): 34, and V. I. Paliienko,

- “Nezakonni represii proty pol's'koho naselennia v Ukraïni u 20–30-kh rokakh,” *Za mizhnatsional'nu zlahodu proty shovinizmu ta ekstremizmu* (Kyiv, 1995).
32. See N. Korzhavin, “V soblaznakh krovavoi epokhi,” *Novyi mir* 1992 (7): 192.
  33. For these instructions, see, for example, Iu. Z. Daniliuk, “Masovi karal'ni aktsii orhaniv NKVS v konteksti politychnykh repressii v Ukraïni v kintsi 30-kh rokov,” in *Shosta Vseukraïns'ka naukova konferentsiia z istorychnoho kraieznavstva (m. Luts'k, veresen'–zhovten' 1993 r.)* (Luts'k, 1993). See also Oleh Bazhan and Viktor Voinalovych, “Viina proty vlasnoho narodu,” *Literaturna Ukraïna* 29 July 1993; Oleg Mikhailov, “Limit na rasstrel,” *Sovershenno sekretno* 1993 (7): 5; and Nataliia Gevorkian, “Vstrechnye plany po unichtozheniui sobstvennogo naroda,” *Moskovskie novosti* 1992 (25): 18–19.
  34. TsDAHO, fond 1, opys 7, sprava 517, arkush 132–33.
  35. Rossiiskii tsentr khraneniia i izucheniia dokumentov noveishei istorii (Moscow), fond 17, opis' 21, delo 5196, list 151.
  36. V. M. Nikol'skyi, ““Velika chystka,”” in *Pravda cherez roky. Statti, spohady, dokumenty* (Donets'k, 1995), p. 29.
  37. Note, for example, the devastation of Ukrainian studies in Ukraine in *Represovane kraieznavstvo, 20–30-i roky* (Kyiv, 1991).
  38. My calculation based on V. P. Popov, “Gosudarstvennyi terror v sovetsoi Rossii, 1923–1953 gg. Istochniki i ikh interpretatsiia,” *Otechestvennye arkhivy* 1992 (2): 28 (despite the title, the data covers the USSR) and Ivan Bilas, *Represyvo-karal'na systema v Ukraïni, 1917–1953. Suspil'no-politychni ta istoryko-pravovyi analiz*, vol. 1 (Kyiv, 1994), p. 379.
  39. My calculation based on *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia 1937 g. Kratkie itogi* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 45–47.
  40. J. Arch Getty, Gabor Rittersporn, and Victor N. Zemskov, “Victims of the Soviet Penal System in the Pre-War Years. A First Approach on the Basis of Archival Evidence,” *The American Historical Review* 98(4) October 1993: 1028.
  41. This observation is based on my work on the Donbas.
  42. The classic work is Aleksander Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples. The Deportation and Fate of Soviet Minorities at the End of the Second World War* (New York, 1978), and the recent work *Tak èto bylo. Natsional'nye repressii v SSSR, 1919–1952 gody*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1993).

43. See, for example, Ie. Stakhiv, "Natsional'no-politychne zhyttia Donbasu v 1941–1943 rr. (na osnovi osobystykh sposterezhen'), *Suchasna Ukraïna* 12 (26 August and 9 and 23 September 1956).
44. Yuri Slezkine, "The USSR as a Communal Apartment, or How a Socialist State Promoted Ethnic Particularism," *Slavic Review* 53(2) Summer 1994 (quotation on p. 445).
45. For Russia's identity problems, see Roman Szporluk, "The Eurasia House. Problems of Identity in Russia and Eastern Europe," *Cross Currents* 1990 (9).
46. *Vsesoiuznaia perepis' naseleniia*, p. 94, and *Natsional'nyi sostav naseleniia SSSR po dannym perepisi naseleniia 1989 g.* (Moscow, 1991), p. 12.

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