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Author(s): Chris Gilley

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CHRIS GILLEY

Introduction

WESTERN historians writing on the political thought of the Ukrainian emigration in the 1920s have characterized the developments of this period as a 'turn to the right'. Before 1917 most members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia had advocated a dual national and social revolution and the realization of Ukrainian national goals inside a federation with Russia. After 1920 it became a commonplace in the émigré community that class and party differences had condemned the attempt to create a Ukrainian state to failure and that such differences should be subordinated to the interests of the nation. A national executive should embody the will of the nation and lead an unrelenting struggle for an independent Ukrainian state. This new dogma laid the foundation for the collaboration between the Ukrainian Far Right and the Nazis during the Second World War.¹ However, in the 1920s some Ukrainian émigrés actually reaffirmed the socialist side of their thought. They began to argue for reconciliation with the Bolsheviks and return to the Ukraine. These included the historian and president of the Central Rada Mykhailo Hrushevskyy, the leading Social Democrat and envoy of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UNR) in Berlin Mykola Porsh, and the UNR foreign minister Andrii Nikovskyy. However, the first to take up such a position was the writer and Social Democrat Volodymyr Vynnychenko, who, in June 1917, had been appointed head of the General Secretariat of the Central Rada and in November 1918 had set up the Directory which overthrew Skoropadskyy's government. Following his emigration from the Ukraine in 1919, he adopted a pro-Soviet stance and in 1920 travelled to Moscow and Kharkov to negotiate with the Bolsheviks. An understanding of Vynnychenko's motivation for initiating these talks and an appreciation of the causes of their

Chris Gilley is writing a doctoral dissertation on Ukrainian Sovietophilism at Hamburg University.

¹ See Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right*, New York, 1980; Frank Golczewski, 'Die Ukrainische Emigration', in id. (ed.), *Geschichte der Ukraine*, Göttingen, 1993, pp. 224–40, and 'Politische Konzepte des ukrainischen nicht sozialistischen Exils (Petljura-Lypynskyy-Donzow)', in Guido Hausmann and Andreas Kappeler (eds), *Ukraine. Gegenwart und Geschichte eines neuen Staates*, Baden-Baden, 1993, pp. 100–17.

failure is essential in order to comprehend the nature of Ukrainian Sovietophilism in the 1920s.

Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951) was one of the most prominent writers of fiction of his generation. Not only was he the first Ukrainian writer to support himself only through his literary work, he was also the first to achieve some international recognition in his own lifetime. He was also an important member of the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party and, as mentioned above, played a leading role in the Ukrainian Revolution. However, his reputation in the emigration was long tainted by the memory of his Sovietophilism. Ivan Rudnytsky portrayed Vynnychenko's support for the Bolsheviks as a symptom of the poverty of his social and political thought, which he typified as utopian and simplistically egalitarian.² However, two authors, Hryhorii Kostiuk and Melanie Czajkowskyj, have sought to recapture Vynnychenko for the Ukrainian national pantheon. Kostiuk argued that the writer returned to the Ukraine in order to achieve the independence and unification of the Ukraine and, though he suffered terrible privation, never once compromised his ideals for personal gain,³ whereas Czajkowskyj portrayed him as an adamant and sharp critic of the Soviet state.⁴ Both of these interpretations are flawed. They misrepresent Vynnychenko's aims in travelling to Moscow and Kharkov, overemphasizing the national at the expense of the social. They portray his comments as overwhelmingly critical, when in fact one of his most notable characteristics at this time was his preparedness after every humiliation to seek reconciliation with the Bolsheviks. They both uncritically accept Vynnychenko's portrayal of his own importance to the Bolsheviks, which distorts an analysis of the motivations of leading members of the RKP (Russian Communist Party). Moreover, neither sought to portray the event in the context of Vynnychenko's journalistic writings of the period, which were published in the newspaper he edited, *Nova Doba* (The New Era), or in that of the activity of the émigré group he led, the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

At the beginning of the 1917 revolution the Bolsheviks had enjoyed little support in the Ukraine. Very few Bolsheviks in the Ukraine were ethnic Ukrainians and the party was strongest in the industrial, Russian east of the country. Consequently, the three Soviet governments

² Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko's Ideas in the Light of His Political Writings', in id., *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History*, Edmonton, 1987, pp. 417–36.

³ Hryhorii Kostiuk, 'Misiia V. Vynnychanka v Moskvi i Kharkovi 1920 Roku', in id., *Volodymyr Vynnychenko ta ioho Doba*, New York, 1980, pp. 210–15 (pp. 224–25).

⁴ Melanie Czajkowskyj, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko and his Mission to Moscow and Kharkiv' (hereafter, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko'), *Journal of Graduate Ukrainian Studies*, 3, 1978, 2, pp. 3–24 (p. 23).

created during the revolutions were based in Kharkov and not in the cultural capital of the Ukraine, Kiev. Between 1917 and 1920 the Bolsheviks required several attempts to bring the country under their control. The first Soviet Ukrainian government was set up in December 1918. Though the Ukrainian Bolsheviks took Kiev with the help of the Red Army in January 1918, they were driven out by the Germans after the independent Ukrainian government signed a separate peace with the Central Powers. An attempted uprising against the German-sponsored regime of Pavlo Skoropadskyy in August under the Kiev-born Russian Gregorii Piatakov ended as a fiasco. At the end of 1918 a Provisional Soviet Government of the Ukraine was formed in Kharkov headed by Piatakov. Again, the Red Army conquered Kiev. Because of the unpopularity of the Skoropadskyy regime, the Soviet government was at first welcomed. However, the government introduced requisitioning in order to feed the towns, started creating collective farms and began eliminating independent centres of power. A wave of peasant revolt spread through the Ukraine and the Bolsheviks were forced to leave Kiev by Denikin's Volunteer Army. This failure forced the Bolsheviks to rethink their policies in the Ukraine. In December 1919 the Russian politburo issued a resolution which condemned Great Russian chauvinism, asserted the need actively to support Ukrainian culture and proposed policies to win over the peasants to the side of the Soviet government. These slogans helped the Bolsheviks conquer the Ukraine in a third campaign in 1920 and a Ukrainian Soviet Republic headed by the Bulgarian-Rumanian Khristian Rakovskii was created with its capital in Kharkov. Though the new state was in theory independent and ruled by its own branch of the Bolshevik party, both were in fact subordinate to Moscow.⁵

Vynnychenko's change of position was in part a response to these developments. At the same time, the causes and failure of Vynnychenko's mission to Moscow and Kharkov were also symptomatic of a problem which had always faced Ukrainian Marxists: to reconcile the demands of international revolution with Ukrainian national aspirations. For example, the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP), which was founded in 1900 by Ukrainian Marxists and nationalists, was not able to satisfy both wings of the party. In 1902 those who believed national independence was a more pressing task than social liberation left to form the Ukrainian People's Party. Three years later another group split off from the RUP to form the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Union (the Spilka). They condemned nationalism as a

⁵ James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemmas of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine, 1918–1933*, Cambridge, MA, 1983 (hereafter, Mace, *Communism*), pp. 23–37.

bourgeois ideology and joined the Russian Social-Democratic Party. Following the departure of the left, the RUP renamed itself the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (USDRP). The new party hoped to synthesize the nationalist and the socialist causes.⁶ However, following the outbreak of the 1917 revolution further splits emerged. During the German occupation of the Ukraine in 1918, a left wing emerged in the USDRP calling for the transformation of the UNR into an independent, Soviet government. In January 1919 at the Sixth Congress of the USDRP, the group failed to pass a resolution on this matter and it abandoned the USDRP. Those who had left became known as the *Nezalezhnyky* (Independents). The new party was also critical of the KP(b)U (the Communist Party [bolshhevik] of the Ukraine), charging it with Russian chauvinism and failure to understand the national question in the Ukraine. They believed that the Ukraine required its own revolutionary centre and socialist republic, which would enter into a close alliance with the other Soviet republics. The group at first openly fought the KP(b)U by organizing a rising with the help of the ataman Zelenyi. Following the collapse of this insurrection they changed their tactics. In January 1920 they renamed themselves the Ukrainian Communist Party (UKP — following these initials the party became known as the *Ukapysty*). They began petitioning Comintern for admission as the sole representative of the Ukrainian proletariat. Nevertheless, they remained firm critics of Bolshevik policy within the Ukraine.⁷

Vynnychenko, too, experienced the conflict between the national and social goals of the Ukrainian movement. In 1917 he wrote in the organ of the USDRP, *Robitnycha Gazeta*, that the time for a social revolution had not yet come. The Ukrainian nation had not yet fully developed and as a consequence strong class antagonisms did not exist within it. The absence of these antagonisms promoted national unity and created favourable conditions for the achievement of Ukrainian national goals. To try to conduct a revolution under class slogans would split the Ukrainian movement and threaten the national revolution.⁸ The loss of Kiev to the Red Army at the beginning of 1918 forced Vynnychenko to rethink this. He came to the conclusion that the Central Rada's concentration on the national question had hindered the solution of important social problems, especially that of the redistribution of the land. Consequently, the Ukrainian working masses

⁶ See Jurij Borys, 'Political Parties in the Ukraine', in Taras Huncuak (ed.), *The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution*, Cambridge, MA, 1977, pp. 128–58 (pp. 132–34, 140–41), and Paul Robert Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine*, Seattle, WA, 1998, pp. 378–79.

⁷ Mace, *Communism*, pp. 74–79.

⁸ V. F. Soldatenko, 'Evoliutsiia suspilno-politychnykh Pohliadiv V. K. Vynnychenka v dobu Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii', *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, 1994, 6, pp. 15–26 (hereafter, 'Evoliutsiia') (p. 18).

had not been drawn into the revolution. The resolution of the social question now became the precondition for the achievement of national goals and Vynnychenko rejected the idea of a united national front.⁹ This 'turn to the left' was evident following the Directory's takeover of power when Vynnychenko unsuccessfully called for the creation of a Ukrainian Soviet government. The cleft between Vynnychenko and his colleague in the Directory, Petliura, who was more interested in building a Ukrainian state than introducing social reforms, rapidly widened. Vynnychenko's importance within the Directory waned as Petliura's rose. Finally, Vynnychenko was excluded from the government in order to allow the Directory to make an alliance with the Entente against Bolshevism. Having been removed from the leadership of the Ukrainian revolution, Vynnychenko left the country.¹⁰

Vynnychenko's reassessment of the Ukrainian revolution

Vynnychenko abandoned the Ukraine not because the Bolsheviks had driven him from the country, but rather due to an argument with his party colleagues in the Directory. Though he had begun to advocate the creation of a state based on worker, peasant and soldier soviets, he continued to oppose the Bolshevik party. This would, however, change during his first year as an émigré.

By the middle of March 1919, Vynnychenko was in Austria. In his diary entries at this time he portrayed himself as being torn between a desire to stay out of politics and the wish to help his country in its moment of need. He maintained an interest in the development of revolution in Europe and it was Béla Kun's takeover of power in Hungary which first inspired Vynnychenko to consider re-entering active political life. On 28 March Vynnychenko received a telegram from two Ukrainian emissaries in Budapest asking him to go to the Hungarian capital to undertake talks with the Russian and Ukrainian Soviet governments. Kun hoped to unite Hungary with the two other Soviet republics. Ukrainian support was central as a bridge between Russia and Central Europe. Vynnychenko agreed to go, but he had doubts about negotiating with the Bolsheviks. In his diary he asked whether the Bolsheviks' victory and the creation of the socialist order, 'the birth of which I welcome with ecstasy in my soul', would also mean defeat in the Ukrainian question. This suggested an alternative course of action:

⁹ Ibid., pp. 22–23.

¹⁰ V. F. Soldatenko, 'Evolutsiia suspilno-politychnykh Pohliadiv V. K. Vynnychenka v dobu Ukrainskoi Revoliutsii', *Ukrainskyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, 1995, 1, pp. 13–22 (pp. 13–15). On Vynnychenko's critique of Petliura and the Directory, see Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk. Tom pershyi 1911–1920*, ed. Hryhorii Kostyuk, Edmonton and New York, 1980 (hereafter, *Shchodennyk*), pp. 305–07, 310, 313–14; on his reaction to leaving the Directory, see *ibid.*, p. 322.

'don't allow the initiative of power to fall from Ukrainian hands. Let there be Bolshevism, let there be reaction, let there be moderation, let there be any form of power so that it is *ours*, national.'¹¹ Though Vynnychenko did not write that this was the line he intended to take, only a month later he had clearly ruled out such a stance. He came to rest his hopes for the Ukraine on the victory of revolution in the rest of the world.

On 30 March Vynnychenko arrived in Budapest with another Social Democrat, Iurii Tyshchenko, and he met Kun on the same day. He set out five conditions for talks with Moscow, the main points being the independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine, the formation of a Ukrainian national government including the *Nezalezhnyky* and the left-wing SRs and a military union against hostile powers. Kun assured him that Lenin had already accepted these conditions, although he preferred to leave the question of the composition of the government open. Nevertheless, Vynnychenko remained convinced that the Soviet Ukrainian government, which had so recently renounced Ukrainian sovereignty, would not agree.¹² On 3 April his fears were confirmed when they received a telegram saying that Rakovskii had refused Vynnychenko's conditions, despite Moscow's attempts to get the Ukrainian government to consent. Vynnychenko wrote that he doubted that the Russian Communists loved socialism enough to overcome their prejudices.¹³ However, the Hungarians continued to hope that an understanding could be reached. Vynnychenko remained pessimistic, but could not convince the Hungarians of the Russian Bolsheviks' imperialism and nationalism.¹⁴ They waited for a whole week before Moscow answered again. On the 11th the Hungarians decoded the answer received the day before. The telegram stated that Moscow was prepared to act as a mediator between Vynnychenko and the Soviet Ukrainian government, but he must tell them on which forces it was possible to rely and which parties should be included in the government. Vynnychenko repeated the conditions he had set out more than ten days before and told Kun that he intended to leave for Vienna, where he would await Moscow's answer. This was a sign of his exasperation. 'As a result of Mongolian negligence', he wrote, 'the matter is right at the beginning after ten days. But whether it will plod on in the same way, we will see.'¹⁵

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 323–28. The quotation is on p. 328.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 328, 330.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 335. His distrust of the Bolsheviks can also be seen in that while he was in Budapest he continually referred to them as *moskali* or *kazapy*, the derogatory Ukrainian words for Russians.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 348–49. The quotation is on p. 349.

Despite the disappointment in Budapest, Vynnychenko increasingly became interested in coming to an agreement with the Bolsheviks. He read Lenin's *State and Revolution* and was impressed by the Communist leader's call for the destruction of the state.¹⁶ He had become captivated by the prospect of the spread of revolution to the rest of Europe. 'Old Europe is distantly rumbling', he wrote in one diary entry at the end of May: France was on the brink of revolution and he felt that the rest of the world would follow. Vynnychenko became determined to be part of this movement. On 20 May he sent a letter to the Central Committee of the USDRP calling on them to end their reliance on the Entente and put their faith in the victory of the world revolution. He was highly critical of their failure as socialists: 'their dogged hostility to Communism is simply provincial. And with regards to a socialist position their sin is without doubt absolute. Now is really the moment when the struggle for socialism can be conducted directly, concretely.' On the same day he had received news from the UNR diplomat in Budapest, M. Shapoval, that there were rumours that Moscow had agreed to Vynnychenko's five conditions; no doubt this had encouraged him.¹⁷

Vynnychenko's change in mood also influenced his position on the Bolsheviks. He stopped calling them *moskali* or *kazapy* in his diary. On 6 July he wrote, amid jubilation that the hoped-for revolution in France was coming, that the only way to achieve socialist revolution was to correct the mistakes made by socialists and not to fight them. 'Do not send', he wrote, 'emissaries to the Polish nobility with requests of reconciliation as the Petliurite Directory did. Rather send emissaries to the Bolsheviks, to the only real, tenacious enemies of all nobility, reconcile with them.' The victory of the world revolution, at that time unfolding in France, would be the triumph of the Ukraine. Bolshevism, even in its Russian form, had no inherent reason to attack the Ukrainian nationality. On the contrary, it aimed to destroy the state and thereby remove the tool of national as well as social exploitation.¹⁸

Certainly, scepticism about the Bolsheviks' aims continued to surface in Vynnychenko's diary. At the beginning of July he reported rumours that the Bolsheviks were getting ready to make peace with the Poles in order to divide up the Ukraine.¹⁹ However, he now felt that any opposition to the Bolsheviks had to be socialist opposition. The Ukrainians should not be used by the Western powers to weaken the revolution. On 27 July, after sending a letter to the TsK (Central Committee) of his

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 350.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 351.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 356–57. The quotation is on p. 357.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

party calling on them again to take the side of the revolution, he mused about what should be done if the Bolsheviks did not place the Soviet government in the Ukraine into Ukrainian hands. He concluded that one should 'fight with them to the end, but fight with one's own forces, fight in order to expose the chauvinism and imperialism of the Russian Communists'.²⁰

Indeed, one powerful argument for Vynnychenko in favour of the Bolsheviks were rumours that Petliura was ready to ally with Denikin. This provided Vynnychenko with a further example of the bankruptcy of the leader of the Directory. Vynnychenko wrote that an alliance with the White general and the landed aristocracy would drive the Ukrainian peasants, on whom the Ukrainian idea had to rest because the Ukraine was a peasant nation, away from the Ukrainian national cause. In comparison, an agreement with the Bolsheviks was much more favourable, even if in return the Ukraine only received autonomy and not independence. Autonomy would still give the Ukraine a tool to bring about the rebirth of their nation. In contrast, the White generals would crush the Ukraine completely. The idea of the Ukraine represented a greater threat to them than did even Bolshevism: it challenged the very existence of Russia, whereas Bolshevik Russia remained Russian nonetheless.²¹

Between 9 and 14 September a meeting of the USDRP in emigration took place in Vienna. The conference saw a split between those members of the party, for example M. Porsh and B. Matiushenko, who supported the line taken by Petliura's government and those like Vynnychenko who opposed it. According to Vynnychenko, one of the main differences between the two camps was that Porsh and Matiushenko remained committed to parliamentary government and did not understand the principle of labourers' soviets advocated by the opponents of the Directory. Following this disagreement a number of Social Democrats (including V. Levynskyi, S. Vikul, H. Palamar, I. Kalynovich, H. Piddubnyi, Iu. Hasenko, P. Chykalenko and Vynnychenko himself) left the party. They would go on to found the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the weekly newspaper, *Nova Doba*.²²

Vynnychenko now began to think seriously about returning to the Ukraine. On 25 September 1919 Vynnychenko discussed the question of travelling to Moscow with Semen Mazurenko, who was at that time involved in negotiations with the Bolsheviks. Vynnychenko felt that

²⁰ Ibid., p. 363.

²¹ Ibid., pp. 369, 371.

²² Ibid., pp. 390, 417. See below.

he could not travel there while a number of questions remained unanswered. However, he had come to the decision that in principle it was his duty to go to Moscow because, in his words, 'if I *really* want to serve the people, its subjugated and oppressed class, if I really am a socialist and genuinely, honestly and consistently want a new life for the people, the destruction of its dirt and impurity, then I have to go to those who struggle for it'.²³ On 10 November the old émigré Social Democrat Petro Diatliv visited Vynnychenko with a proposition from the representative of the Russian Soviet Republic in Berlin about resuming negotiations. Vynnychenko repeated his preconditions: independence, a national Ukrainian government, an independent army and struggle for Galicia. These were sent to Berlin in order to be relayed on to Moscow.²⁴

Though Vynnychenko was already convinced of the Bolsheviks' importance as the leaders of the socialist revolution, up till now he had continued to criticize their failings towards the non-Russian nationalities. However, towards the end of 1919 he became gradually more convinced that the Russian Communists were making improvements in this area. On 1 October he wrote in his diary that it was 'increasingly clear that in the national matter the Bolsheviks are immeasurably more favourable towards the Ukraine than is Denikin'.²⁵ In December Vynnychenko welcomed the decision by the TsK of the RKP and a speech by Trotskii, both of which recognized the independence of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. 'All this shows that it seems there must be a different Bolshevik course in the Ukraine', he concluded.²⁶

These developments in Vynnychenko's thought were more systematically presented in his history of the Ukrainian revolution, *Vidrodzhennia Natsii* (The Rebirth of the Nation). He had started writing the three-volume work in summer 1919 and by February it was completed.²⁷ The book's main argument reaffirmed one of the pre-war commonplaces of the Ukrainian intelligentsia: 'the matter of *national* liberation is inevitably bound up with the *social* question, with the interests of the Ukrainian working masses'.²⁸ For Vynnychenko the interconnectedness of these two aspects had determined the course of the revolution and the failure of both Russian and Ukrainian leaders to appreciate that it had led to their downfall. The Ukrainian politicians in the Central Rada, including Vynnychenko himself, had

²³ Ibid., pp. 396–97. The quotation is on p. 397.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 409.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 398.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 410.

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 358, 364, 374–77, 411.

²⁸ Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia Natsii. Chastyna*, 3, Kiev and Vienna, 1920; repr. Kiev, 1990 (hereafter, *Vidrodzhennia*, 3), p. 11.

stressed the national at the expense of the social. They had not been sufficiently socialist or revolutionary to lead the oppressed Ukrainian masses. One cause of this was that they had feared the most revolutionary class in the Ukraine, the urban proletariat, because it was made up of Russians and Russified Ukrainians: 'instead of going with its proletariat, even though they were not completely nationally aware, instead of awakening it and absorbing its social decisiveness and courage, instead of going with it *socially*, leading it nationally, we shrank back from it, we were frightened of it, [and] even of the peasantry which went with it. This was our basic mistake and error.'²⁹ Lacking any revolutionary spirit, the Central Rada sought to create a bourgeois state. The working masses of the Ukraine saw this and compared it unfavourably to the Bolsheviks' achievements in overthrowing the bourgeois order in Russia. The Ukrainian people were alienated from their own government. Consequently, in the war between the Central Rada and the Bolsheviks the masses turned to the Bolsheviks. This guaranteed victory for the Russian Communists.³⁰ Only during the Directory's rising against Skoropadskyi were Ukrainian politicians able to unite the national and social revolutions. However, this opportunity was lost through the rejection of Vynnychenko's suggestion to turn the UNR into a Soviet republic and the transfer of power within the Directory to Petliura. According to Vynnychenko, the petty bourgeoisie and counter-revolutionaries once again came to dominate the Ukrainian government.³¹

Vynnychenko also criticized the Bolsheviks for making the opposite mistake of the Central Rada: 'they did not understand that without national liberation there cannot be social liberation, that national exploitation is a form of social exploitation.' Vynnychenko was extremely critical of the first two Bolshevik governments set up in the Ukraine. They had misunderstood the national revolution, displayed Great Russian chauvinism and sought to exploit the Ukraine's economic resources for Russia. As a consequence the Ukraine's statehood and culture were attacked.³² Just as the Central Rada had tainted the idea of Ukrainian national liberation with bourgeois liberalism and hostility to the socialist revolution, now the Bolsheviks drove Ukrainians away from socialism. This made counter-revolutionary propaganda against the Bolsheviks easier, led to a wave of risings against the

²⁹ Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia Natsii. Chastyna*, 2, Kiev and Vienna, 1920; repr. Kiev, 1990 (hereafter, *Vidrodzhennia*, 2), pp. 89–97. The quotation is on p. 97.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 110, 129–30, 215–17.

³¹ *Vidrodzhennia*, 3, pp. 133–36, 184–85, 195.

³² *Vidrodzhennia*, 2, pp. 262–71. The quotation is on p. 265.

Communist party and resulted in the downfall of the first two Bolshevik governments in the Ukraine.³³

Despite this criticism, Vynnychenko defended the Bolsheviks against many of the charges commonly levelled at them by Ukrainians. He blamed the wars between the UNR and the Bolsheviks on the attempt by the Central Rada and Directory to follow 'bourgeois' or 'counter-revolutionary' policies. According to Vynnychenko, Petliura had provoked a popular rising through his reactionary actions. He was deprived of mass support and this allowed the Bolsheviks to take power: 'the Russian Soviet government did not drive us from the Ukraine, but rather our own people, without whom and against whom, I say once more, the Russian Soviet army could not have occupied a single province of our territory.'³⁴ Vynnychenko also justified the force used by the Bolsheviks in dismissing the Provisional Government in Russia. All classes, he wrote, use violence to assert their rule over other classes. However, unlike these other classes, the Bolsheviks did so with a just goal, namely to destroy the rule of the bourgeoisie and the exploitation of the working masses: the Bolsheviks 'used violence and inequality in order to introduce equality and destroy any kind of violence'.³⁵

He concluded *Vidrozhennia Natsii* by arguing that only the Soviet republic set up by the Bolsheviks could guarantee the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation. He echoed the remarks made in his diary by claiming that the RKP's resolutions of 6 December 1919 showed that the Bolsheviks had recognized the mistakenness of their policy in the Ukraine.³⁶ In contrast, Petliura had made an alliance with Piłsudski at the price of giving up Ukrainian territory to the Poles. This provided Vynnychenko with further proof that one could not achieve Ukrainian national liberation through the creation of a bourgeois state. 'Therefore, from this it is clear', he wrote, 'that the "more left-wing" the socio-political regime in the Ukraine is, the more favourable it is for the national rebirth of our people.' Of all the regimes that could exist in the Ukraine, the most favourable to Ukrainian national rebirth was a soviet republic.³⁷ However, the mutual dependence of national and social liberation also meant that 'any consistent, active Communist of any nationality, even a former ruling one' would increasingly have to intervene in the national question in order to ensure the future development of the revolution.³⁸ Vynnychenko then stressed that the

³³ Ibid., pp. 272–79; *Vidrodzhennia*, 3, p. 304n.

³⁴ *Vidrodzhennia*, 2, p. 135; *Vidrodzhennia*, 3, pp. 201–04. The quotation is on p. 204.

³⁵ *Vidrodzhennia*, 2, pp. 186–90. The quotation is on p. 188.

³⁶ *Vidrodzhennia*, 3, pp. 481–87.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 498–99. The quotation is on p. 499.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 500.

outcome of the revolution in Russia and the Ukraine rested on the triumph of international socialism. He emphasized Russia's leadership of this movement: it had introduced Communism first and it posed the greatest threat to the capitalist order.³⁹

The Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party and 'Nova Doba'

In February 1920 Volodymyr Vynnychenko re-entered active political life by forming the Foreign Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party. The group was made up of the members of the USDRP in emigration who had left the party at the conference in September. After Vynnychenko, one of the most important figures in the new group was Volodymyr Levynskyi, who had helped found the Galician Social-Democratic party and edited two of its newspapers before the war. Another prominent individual was Petro Diatliv, a Social Democrat who had emigrated from Russia in 1908 and taken part in the League for the Liberation of the Ukraine during the First World War. The name of the party is indicative of their understanding of the ideological change which they had gone through: a transition from Social Democracy to Communism. However, this did not mean that the group saw itself as a branch organization of the UKP in the Ukraine. As Vynnychenko wrote in a letter to the UKP's Central Committee in March 1920, the group had not yet decided which of the Communist parties in the Ukraine, the UKP or the KP(b)U, they wanted to join, because they did not know enough about the conditions in the country or about the structure of the two parties to make this choice.⁴⁰

In the same month the group met the representatives of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries abroad, which at this time also stood on a platform of reconciliation with the Soviet Ukraine. The two groups formed the 'Soviet-Revolutionary Bloc' in February 1920. The Bloc aimed to create an independent Ukrainian socialist Soviet republic within its ethnic boundaries and to introduce the dictatorship of the proletariat as the means of achieving socialism. They refused to make any concessions or agreements with bourgeois powers.⁴¹

The Foreign Group expounded their position in the weekly newspaper *Nova Doba*, which first appeared at the beginning of March 1920. Many of the articles in *Nova Doba* were republished as separate booklets as part of the '*Nova Doba* library'. Above all, the paper's support of Soviet Russia was based upon the commitment of the group to the

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 500–04.

⁴⁰ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv hromadskykh obednan Ukrainy (hereafter, TsDAHO), f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 8. Fond 8 of TsDAHO (the former Communist party archive in Kiev) represents the archive of the UKP and the Foreign Group of the UKP.

⁴¹ *Nova Doba* (Vienna) (hereafter, *Nova Doba*), No. 1, 6 March 1920, p. 4.

world socialist revolution. One of the commonplaces of the paper was that as a result of the crises facing Europe caused by the First World War, the continent was on the verge of a cataclysmic confrontation between capital and revolution. According to Levynskyi, every Ukrainian who felt himself to be bound up with the fate and suffering of the working and poor peasant masses need not hesitate when deciding on which side to stand: the choice was between world socialist revolution, which would bring about the liberation of all peoples and nations, and counter-revolution, which was for the reinforcement of the tyranny of capital.⁴² The leader of the world revolution was Soviet Russia. As Hryhorii Palamar wrote, Russia was 'the first great socialist power in the history of mankind [. . .] she destroyed the capitalist order [in her own country] and by introducing socialism in practice, gave a beginning to the final struggle of the labouring masses of the whole world for the complete liberation of mankind from the terrible yoke of debauched capital'.⁴³ She was, therefore, no longer the Russia of the tsars but, rather, to quote Palamar, 'the Mecca and Medina to which fly the thoughts of the subjugated and oppressed and from which they await their saviour'.⁴⁴ Consequently, the bourgeoisie lived in fear of Soviet Russia. 'Nothing threatens it [bourgeois capitalism] at the moment', wrote Levynskyi, 'like the existence, the stubborn and powerful existence, of the proletarian (Soviet) Russian republic'.⁴⁵ The leading role of Russia was reflected in the fact that almost every issue of *Nova Doba* contained a section entitled 'From Soviet Russia', which contained short notices describing developments in the country.

The Foreign Group of the UKP attacked their former party comrades for abandoning the side of revolution for that of reaction. Vynnychenko wrote of the USDRP that 'it called itself "worker" and "socialist", but in reality it was the party of the petty bourgeoisie with democratic slogans and counter-revolutionary realpolitik'. The only genuine workers in the party had left it to join the *Nezalezhnyky*.⁴⁶ In this way, 'the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Party went the way of its sisters

⁴² V. Levynskyi, *Sotsiialistychna Revoliutsiia i Ukraina*, Vienna and Kiev, 1920 (hereafter, *Sotsiialistychna Revoliutsiia*), pp. 3–6, 11. The same argument can be found in V. Vynnychenko, *Vsesvitaia Revoliutsiia*, Kiev and Vienna, 1920, pp. 1–10 and V. Vynnychenko, *Lyst V. Vynnychenka do kliasovo-nesvidomoi ukrainskoi Intelligentsoi*, Kiev and Vienna, 1920 (hereafter, *Lyst*), pp. 5–6.

⁴³ Hr. Palamar, *Kapital, kolonialni Narody i Bolshevizm*, Kiev and Vienna, 1920 (hereafter, *kolonialni Narody*), pp. 6–7.

⁴⁴ *Nova Doba*, No. 2, 13 March 1920, p. 1. Thus the slogan that Russia was the centre of the world proletarian movement did not originate in 1926 with Stalin; in the early 1920s it was a commonplace among Ukrainian Sovietophiles.

⁴⁵ *Nova Doba*, No. 1, 6 March 1920, p. 2.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

— of the whole Social-Democratic world'.⁴⁷ A number of analyses of other Social-Democratic parties were published in *Nova Doba* which made the same argument.⁴⁸ Other articles were devoted to the errors of non-Communist socialism. Piddubnyi attacked those who felt that the world was not ready for revolution by arguing that capitalism had reached its highest point.⁴⁹ He also criticized 'opportunists', like Karl Kautsky and Ramsey MacDonald, who claimed that the best way to achieve socialism was through 'evolution'. Piddubnyi argued that only following the overthrow of capitalism could socialism be constructed and pointed to the failure of Social-Democratic parties in other countries to create a socialist state.⁵⁰

The group also sought to prove that Communism benefited Ukrainian national aspirations. In *Lyst V. Vynnychenka do kliasovo-nesvidomoi ukrainskoi Intelligentsoi* (V. Vynnychenko's Letter to the class-unconscious Ukrainian Intelligentsia), Vynnychenko told those members of the intelligentsia who had not yet acquired a class consciousness that they should become sincere Communists because Communism was against all forms of tyranny, including national oppression.⁵¹ Vynnychenko expounded the benefits of Communism for the Ukrainian nation more fully in the pamphlet *Ukrainska Derzhavnist* (Ukrainian Statehood). He argued that the very structure of the Ukrainian nation meant that Communism was the only political doctrine upon which Ukrainian statehood could be based. The Ukrainian nation was almost exclusively made up of peasants. There was no Ukrainian bourgeoisie; rather this social class was made up of other national groups which were hostile to Ukrainian culture. Thus, both a Ukrainian monarchy or democracy were impossible because they required a bourgeois social base. Soviet socialism, however, aimed at the destruction of the bourgeois class and based power on the proletariat and the poor peasants. In doing so it created the prerequisites for the rebirth of the Ukrainian nation: 'Ukrainian statehood in the given moment can only be that which the Ukrainian nation itself is, that is worker-peasant.' He also stressed that the socialist doctrine of the Bolsheviks made them allies of Ukrainian statehood. The RKP saw their own state as merely a tool for the implementation of the socialist task of the proletariat. They therefore did not view Ukrainian statehood as a threat to their own state interests, unlike the Russian reactionaries. Indeed, he continued, all socialists saw the

⁴⁷ *Nova Doba*, No. 12, 22 May 1920, p. 2.

⁴⁸ For example, see *Nova Doba*, No. 14, 5 June 1920, pp. 3–4, which deals with the Polish Social-Democratic Party.

⁴⁹ *Nova Doba*, No. 4, 27 March 1920, p. 2.

⁵⁰ *Nova Doba*, No. 20, 17 July 1920, pp. 4–5.

⁵¹ V. Vynnychenko, *Lyst*, pp. 4–5.

state only as a temporary phenomenon, to be used for the destruction of class domination. Consequently, for any consistent Communist the strengthening of the Ukrainian worker-peasant state was necessary as a means of pursuing the struggle against the Ukrainian bourgeoisie.⁵²

In *Ukrainska Derzhavnist*, Vynnychenko did admit that much of the proletariat in the Ukraine was Russian or Russified, and that they were indifferent or hostile to the Ukrainian resurgence. However, he described this as 'traces and scars' of the past order. The Communists had seen the need to combat these. Equally, he felt that although the Soviet regime had lacked a Ukrainian character when it took power in the Ukraine, 'one has already become aware of this mistake in Russia, and one can also observe that it is being corrected'. In contrast to bourgeois exploitation, which is part of the very character of that class, Soviet exploitation had been caused by fear for the survival of the revolution and was therefore temporary. This must also end because, Vynnychenko repeated, the proletariat in essence was against subjugation of all kinds. Similarly, they were always in favour of the development of the national culture of the working masses as this was the best form of organizing the struggle against capitalism.⁵³ Vynnychenko argued that it was possible to see this change in direction in the policy of the Bolsheviks: 'We see how the Russian Soviet government all the more and more is taking up positive activity in the Ukrainian national question, how great attention is devoted to national culture.' Whereas Denikin and the Russian bourgeoisie destroyed Ukrainian schools, replaced the word 'Ukrainian' with 'Little Russian' and arrested and executed Ukrainians, the Russian socialists were delivering the independence of the Ukraine, introducing punishments for violence against Ukrainian culture and showing great energy in guaranteeing the national development of the Ukrainian working people.⁵⁴ The examples of Soviet Russia's support for the Ukrainian nation were necessarily vague because at this time there were very few such examples to point to. However, one can see that Vynnychenko's criticism of the Soviet regime was far weaker than that in *Vidrozhdeniia Natsii*. The Foreign Group was beginning to adopt the belief that any condemnation of the Soviet republics by Communists would provide counter-revolution with material with which it could attack the leaders of the world revolution.

This may be seen in the notices section at the end of the paper. A regular feature of *Nova Doba* was a section entitled 'from the Soviet

⁵² V. Vynnychenko, *Ukrainska Derzhavnist*, Kiev and Vienna, 1920, pp. 8–13, 22. The quotation is on p. 22.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp. 13–19. The quotation is on p. 16.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20. The quotation is on p. 19.

Ukraine', in which short articles, often drawn from Soviet newspapers, described events in the Ukraine. Naturally, given the orientation of the paper, this information portrayed the regime in a good light. The first issue of *Nova Doba* is representative. It described how the Ukrainian SSR was in negotiations with its Russian counterpart on a union between the two, thereby giving the impression that the Ukraine was an independent entity. A further account presented the Soviet regime as having the support of the Ukrainian population by recounting how a council of Ukrainian parties in Kiev, which were not named, had agreed on adopting the Soviet form of government in the Ukraine. Under the title 'The land question in the Ukraine', the paper reported on a law passed by the All-Ukrainian Revolutionary Soviet giving land held by large landowners to peasants. The aim of this was said to be to win the trust of both poor and middling peasants in the Ukraine. It was also stressed that the building of the Soviet economy would take the interests of the peasants into account.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, despite the prominence given to the Ukrainian question, the *Nova Doba* group was determined to prove its internationalism. One can see this most clearly in Levynskyi's article, *Komunizm z Takyky* (Communism out of Tactics). The article was written in response to a letter from a group of Galician Ukrainians, who had expressed their support for the paper despite the fact that they did not agree with its Communist programme. Levynskyi said that he understood why the Galician petty bourgeoisie would look to Communism for liberation from Polish oppression. However, he reminded the reader that the petty bourgeoisie hoped to take the place of the Poles, not bring about social revolution. They had not renounced the idea of private property and sought to convince Ukrainian peasants that Communist revolution was unnecessary. He therefore warned that one should be cautious of those petty bourgeois who temporarily sympathized with Communism. Levynskyi also addressed himself to the petty bourgeoisie. He told them that 'Communism is not a costume which can be put on and discarded according to weather and whim'. Any members of the petty bourgeoisie sympathizing with Communism must 'say to themselves frankly, honestly, without lies, whether they can discard all the rags of their petty-bourgeois world view and are ready to stand strongly, firmly, without vacillation, in our ranks, in the ranks of international Communism'.⁵⁶ Thus, Levynskyi highlighted a point only implicit in Vynnychenko's *Lyst do kliasovo-nesvidomoi ukrainskoi Intelligentsoi*: it was valid to support the Bolsheviks' attack on national exploitation, but one must adopt all of its tenets and change one's own *Weltanschauung*.

⁵⁵ *Nova Doba*, No. 1, pp.7-8.

⁵⁶ V. Levynskyi, *Sotsialistychna Revolutsiia*, p. 12f. The quotation is on p. 14.

Indeed, many of the articles appearing in *Nova Doba* and many of the pamphlets published in the *Nova Doba* library did not touch upon the national question at all. For example, Hryhorii Palamar's *Kapital, koloniialni Narody i Bolshevizm* (Capital, the Colonial Peoples and Bolshevism) described how Soviet Russia aimed to free the colonial peoples from capitalism and imperialism. Significantly, it did not count the Ukraine as being a colonial people and in fact the country was only mentioned three times. Where the Ukraine did appear in the text, it only did so as a supporter of Soviet Russia's crusade to liberate the Asian countries occupied by West European powers. It was, therefore, calling on Ukrainians to ally with Moscow not for the sake of their own emancipation, but rather that of the peoples of Afghanistan, Turkistan, Persia and so on. The tone was, therefore, thoroughly internationalist and was not directed at national concerns at all.⁵⁷ Almost every issue of *Nova Doba* reported on the Communist and workers' movements in other countries. They published both detailed analyses of developments in individual countries⁵⁸ and a separate section of short notices giving an overview of events in several countries.⁵⁹ The documents of different branches of the Communist movement were also published, for example an appeal by the bureau of the Third International in Amsterdam calling for a strike.⁶⁰ Other brochures did not deal with current events at all but rather expounded Marxist theory to Ukrainians in their own language. *Khto taki Komunisty i choho vony khochut?* (Who are these Communists and what do they want?) explained concepts like capital, the dictatorship of the proletariat and nationalization in language clearly aimed at people with little education.⁶¹ Levynskyi wrote an analysis of socialism's understanding of science and religion⁶² and a description of how capitalism engendered imperialism.⁶³ The Foreign Group clearly saw one of their tasks in emigration as the propagation of Communist doctrine and the raising of class consciousness among the Ukrainian community abroad. In particular, the Foreign Group sought to reach Ukrainian prisoners of war, who had been imprisoned in Germany and Austria-Hungary during the First World War, and the soldiers of the ZUNR and UNR interned after the defeat of their armies. At the end of March 1920, *Nova Doba* called on Ukrainian

⁵⁷ Palamar, *koloniialni Narody*.

⁵⁸ For example, see the description of the Spartacist rising in *Nova Doba*, No. 3, 20 March 1920, pp. 2–3.

⁵⁹ The first of these was 'From the revolutionary movement', *Nova Doba*, No. 2, 13 March 1920, pp. 2–4.

⁶⁰ *Nova Doba*, 17 April 1920, pp. 1–2.

⁶¹ Hr. Khymentko, *Khto taki Komunisty i choho vony khochut?*, Vienna and Kiev, 1920.

⁶² V. Levynskyi, *Religia, Nauka i Sotsializm*, Kiev and Vienna, 1920.

⁶³ V. Levynskyi, *Kapitalizm i Imperializm*, Kiev and Vienna, 1920.

POWs to 'cross over to the side of your brothers, of the Bolsheviks, of the peasants and workers of the Soviet Ukraine'.⁶⁴

This analysis of the activity of the *Nova Doba* group shows that although an apparent change in the Bolsheviks' nationalities policy had enabled the Ukrainian émigrés to adopt a Sovietophile position, the propaganda which the Foreign Group of the UKP used to justify this new stance was more directed towards internationalist concerns. Indeed, by failing to look at Vynnychenko's activity within the *Nova Doba* group, both Kostiuk and Czajkowskyj overestimated the importance of the national at the expense of the social when describing Vynnychenko's reassessment of the Bolsheviks and the Soviet system.

Vynnychenko's mission to Moscow and Kharkov

At the end of March 1920, Vynnychenko started making preparations to travel to Moscow and the Ukraine. He wrote to Manuïlskyi promising that his group could mobilize the Ukrainian internees in Czechoslovakia to help the Red Army in the war against Poland. Vynnychenko also suggested that the Bolsheviks make the Foreign Group the official representatives of the Soviet Ukraine in Germany and Austria.⁶⁵ His diary did not reflect this optimism, as can be seen in a typically melodramatic entry from 30 April: 'The road to Golgotha is set. It is necessary to drink again from the chalice of humiliation, insult, fear, struggle [...] With a word, I flee quiet, shelter, calm, solitude, serenity for uncertainty, disquiet, suffering, exhaustion, to grief from calm.'⁶⁶ On 5 May a meeting of the Foreign Group of the UKP was held. They decided that the aim of Vynnychenko's mission was to bring about a unification of the UKP and KP(b)U.⁶⁷ Vynnychenko left Vienna the next day. He was accompanied by his wife, Jaromir Nechos, a Czech Social Democrat, and Oleksander Badan, a young Galician whom Vynnychenko had met in Prague at the beginning of that year. The party travelled to Moscow via Berlin on Czechoslovak diplomatic passports and finally arrived in the Russian capital at the end of the month.⁶⁸

Vynnychenko came to Moscow at a time when the Polish-Soviet war was raging on Ukrainian soil. The Poles were allied with the UNR government and the Bolsheviks therefore feared that the Ukrainian peasantry would support Piłsudski and Petliura. Consequently, the Bolsheviks were seeking to establish connections with Ukrainian socialists.

⁶⁴ *Nova Doba*, No. 4, 27 March 1920, p. 4.

⁶⁵ TsDAHO, f. 8 op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 2-3.

⁶⁶ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, p. 415.

⁶⁷ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 43, ark. 1.

⁶⁸ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 414-15, 427-30.

In March 1920, 4,000 Borotbisty had joined the KP(b)U. Maksymoych, head of the Foreign Bureau of the KP(b)U, had written at the end of that month to the Central Committee of the UKP calling for joint action to establish contacts with Ukrainian Communists abroad.⁶⁹ The party leadership in the Ukraine had also been showing interest in Vynnychenko. At the beginning of April, Rakovskii wrote an article in *Komunist* in which he described how Vynnychenko had left the SDs and joined the Communists. This, he said, was a sign of the collapse of the Directory. In the same month articles by Vynnychenko from *Nova Doba* were republished first in the Kievan local party newspaper and then in *Komunist*. According to Mykola Sappa, Rakovskii announced at a gubernatorial congress of soviets at the beginning of May that Vynnychenko was the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet government in Vienna.⁷⁰ The RKP was also prepared to talk to Vynnychenko. On 4 May Lenin wrote to Rakovskii saying 'regarding Vynnychenko we agree in principle'.⁷¹ The indications were that the Bolsheviks would be willing to co-operate in some way with Vynnychenko's mission.

Despite these promising signs, the foreboding which Vynnychenko had felt before leaving Vienna developed into despair soon after his arrival in the Russian capital. Relations with the Bolshevik leaders started badly. Vynnychenko was terribly offended that no one had met him and his party at the railway station or prepared lodgings for them, despite the fact that the Petrograd Commissariat had telegraphed Moscow about their arrival. He was also disappointed by the state of Communism and the national question in the country. In the first diary entry he made in Moscow Vynnychenko complained that the idea of socialism had been forgotten in Soviet Russia and that the old Russian nationalism was rearing up once more. This was most evident in the Ukrainian question. Those responsible for Ukrainian affairs denied that there was any Ukrainian question whatsoever because everyone in the Ukraine spoke Russian.⁷²

He had received these impressions through his initial conferences with the Bolshevik leaders. In his diary he described the appointment with Radek as 'haphazard and superficial'. Though their relationship had started out comradely, 'tension, coolness and near hostility emerged and have continued to this moment'. Chicherin proved to be an even greater disappointment. Vynnychenko called him 'the wall' on account of the Bolshevik's responsiveness. Vynnychenko complained

⁶⁹ TsDAHO f. 8, op. 1, spr. 44, ark. 7-10.

⁷⁰ Mykola Sappa, 'Vynnychenko i Rakovskiy', *Vitchyzna*, 11, 1990, pp. 131-43 (pp. 133-35).

⁷¹ Quoted in Czajkowskyj, 'Volodymyr Vynnychenko', p. 8.

⁷² Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, p.430.

that when he had begun to talk of how ‘the Foreign Group sent me to give all my strength for the revolution, words which for the Group and for me sounded so real, so sincere and so full of content, were for the “wall” simply prattle which is so often spouted at any meeting for the revolution. For him it was more interesting to find out with what concrete proposals I had come. What about the Don basin, the Kuban? To whom should they belong?’. Vynnychenko felt that these questions showed that in Russia faith in Communism had weakened. In a worldwide socialist federation, he wrote, the question of who owns this or that basin is senseless for the whole world owns the basin and no part can use its wealth only for itself. Moreover, the world federation would be organized according to the principle of ethnicity, not economics. Obviously the Donetsk basin was in Ukrainian ethnic territory, thus solving the question of which part of the federation it should belong to.⁷³ The incident is indicative of the cleft separating Vynnychenko and the Bolshevik leaders. The leader of the Foreign Group had returned full of vague gallantry about sacrificing himself for the revolution. For the government in Moscow, which was faced with the practical difficulties of running an enormous country in an unprecedented state of chaos, such empty heroics can only have been a nuisance. The sudden collision of Vynnychenko’s idealism with the realities of the Soviet state also helps explain why Vynnychenko was moved to such despair during his stay in Moscow.

Consequently, as early as 3 June, in his very first diary entry after coming to Moscow, he wrote that he wanted to return abroad. However, he felt that he would not be allowed to do this: ‘For Russia this would not be advantageous. What kind of impression would this make abroad, and especially on Ukrainians? It would strengthen Petliurism!’⁷⁴ The quotation highlights another hindrance to negotiations between the Ukrainian writer and the Bolsheviks: Vynnychenko was convinced of his own importance to the revolution in the Ukraine. He believed that his entry into the Ukrainian government would attract the sympathy of national elements to the Soviet regime and thereby redefine the conflict in the Ukraine. What had been a war between Russia on one side and Poland and the Ukraine on the other would become a war between a Russo-Ukrainian socialist alliance and the bourgeois, counter-revolutionary union of Poland and the Ukraine. Vynnychenko put forward these ideas in a letter to Lenin, which he wrote on the third. He demanded that Rakovskii be removed as head of government, as a symbol of the non-Ukrainian character of the Bolshevik government in the Ukraine. Only then would Vynnychenko

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 431.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 433.

enter the government. Unsurprisingly, the demand was ignored. Despite his confidence that his literary talent ensured him the sympathy of the Ukrainian people, it is difficult to accept Vynnychenko's certainty that he was so important. He had left the Ukraine following a dispute within his own party, in which he had been shown to be the weaker. His emigration was a sign of his entry into the political wilderness. He had no political following in the Ukraine. Even the *Ukapisty*, as will be seen, could not abide him. However, convinced of his own value, Vynnychenko could only understand Chicherin's refusal to make him head of the Ukrainian government as an expression of Russian nationalism.⁷⁵ He did not see the naivety of an émigré, banished to the political backwoods, turning to a ruling party with the demand that he be put in charge of the state.

In light of this, it is not surprising that the Bolsheviks refused to give Vynnychenko the posts or respect he felt was his due; rather, it is astonishing that the Bolsheviks were prepared to offer Vynnychenko positions in the government at all. On 3 June Vynnychenko received instructions that he should go to Kharkov, where Rakovskii would tell him what to do.⁷⁶ Three days earlier the Ukrainian Politburo had decided to name Vynnychenko their ambassador abroad. On 2 June they wanted to offer him even more impressive positions, namely commissar for foreign affairs and deputy head of Sovnarkom.⁷⁷ However, there does seem to have been some disagreement between Moscow and Kharkov on the posts which Vynnychenko should be offered. The Ukrainian government was especially concerned about giving Vynnychenko too much influence. In a telegram to Stalin, Rakovskii counselled against appointing Vynnychenko as head of the people's commissariat for military affairs in the Ukraine because if he held this post it would be impossible to limit Vynnychenko's powers to propagandistic functions and would give him administrative authority. Rakovskii was even scared of offering Vynnychenko the commissariat for education as the Ukrainian might become the focus for the 'Prosvitans' (i.e. Ukrainian nationalists; after the 'Prosvita' educational societies). He was, however, willing to give Vynnychenko the posts of commissar for foreign affairs, deputy head of Sovnarkom and chairman of the revolutionary military Soviet.⁷⁸

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 432–34. The quotation is on p. 434. Perhaps the most indicative quotation comes from the diary entry for 5 August, in which Vynnychenko laments 'the poor Ukrainians, they placed too many hopes on my entry into government'. See *ibid.*, p. 477.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 433.

⁷⁷ TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 7, ark. 22–23. Fond 1 of TsDAHO contains the decisions, minutes and materials of the Ukrainian Politburo.

⁷⁸ Tsentralnyi derzhavnyi arkhiv vyshykh orhan (TsDAVO) f. 4 op. 1 spr. 564 ark. 4. This document comes from a file on Vynnychenko which mainly deals with the period after he emigrated a second time.

On 9 June, Chicherin, Kamenev and Trotskii suggested that before he leave for Kharkov, Vynnychenko should travel to Petrograd for two weeks to speak before the proletariat there. Vynnychenko agreed to go. However, he was then visited by what he described in his diary as a group of old Russian Communists, who advised him that the system in the Ukraine did not correspond to his aims and only at the centre, in Moscow, could this be changed. This convinced him that he should not leave the capital and he did not travel to Petrograd.⁷⁹ The incident indicates that Vynnychenko was wholly reliant on the reports of the Communists with whom he talked for information on the state of the Bolsheviks' nationalities policy. The extreme fluctuations in Vynnychenko's feelings towards the Bolsheviks can partially be explained by the fact that while he was in Russia and the Ukraine he was receiving contradictory information from different sources.

Instead, Vynnychenko wrote a document entitled *Doklada zapiska* (A Detailed Note), the aim of which was to force the Central Committee of the RKP to state whether it was in favour of the resolution of December 1919 or a 'one and indivisible' Russia. The letter stressed his commitment to federation, but noted that the Communists had not put their programme on the national question into practice. He set out his plans according to which this could be remedied. This involved, for example, refuting the charges of counter-revolution against the RKP, reducing the powers of the Moscow commissariats inside the Ukraine and working out a federal constitution. Only under such conditions could Vynnychenko be of any use in the Ukraine: by polarizing the class struggle, as mentioned above. He ended by calling for clarity in the position of the RKP.⁸⁰ Vynnychenko was not optimistic about the letter's chances of success. He felt that national forces in Russia were against a federation, despite Lenin's support for it. Vynnychenko's pessimism was reinforced when an aide close to Lenin failed to get in contact. Vynnychenko understood this as a sign that the suggestions in his note had been rejected.⁸¹

By 15 June his mood had improved. In his diary he wrote that Ukrainian elements were pressing the Russians, forcing them to change their policy. Evidence for this was a note from Kamenev saying that his *Dokladna zapyska* had been received favourably. On the previous day he had been visited by a Communist from Halych called Paliiv who claimed that half of the Communist party opposed centralism and though inertia reigned among the higher echelons, the provinces were growing in strength every day. This greatly encouraged Vynnychenko.

⁷⁹ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 434–35.

⁸⁰ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 49–50.

⁸¹ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 435–37.

He wrote that Paliiv had entirely changed his understanding of the situation and he looked forward to having the chance to actually do something. 'Therefore', Vynnychenko surmised, 'it is possible, and necessary, to travel there [the Ukraine].'⁸² The incident is small in itself, but it is symptomatic of something that both Kostiuk and Czajkowskyj missed: Vynnychenko was encouraged by even the smallest indications that reconciliation with the Bolsheviks on his terms was possible. Such moments spurred him on to further negotiate with the Soviet governments, despite the disappointments he had experienced.

Before leaving for the Ukraine, Vynnychenko had further meetings with leaders of the RKP. Again, these left him unsure of the use of his work in the Ukraine. On the one hand, he was concerned that Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke of the KP(b)U as if it was part of the RKP. At the same time, he reasoned that the Bolsheviks' attempts to woo him must signal that they would be willing to take Ukrainian elements into account. An audience with Trotskii left him even more uncertain. The Bolshevik told Vynnychenko that he would become the commissar in charge of the army and a member of the military soviet. However, when asked about what this work actually involved, Trotskii answered vaguely and Vynnychenko concluded that he was not being offered meaningful positions, but was rather being used as a figure-head. Trotskii also avoided answering Vynnychenko's demand that the Central Committee of the KP(b)U be reformed, which convinced the Ukrainian writer that no changes in party policy would come about. He told Trotskii that under these circumstances he did not think his taking up a position in government would bring any benefit. Trotskii's attitude convinced Vynnychenko that he could not bring about any changes to policy at the centre. Therefore he should abandon the political sphere, and either go to the Ukraine or return to emigration to conduct literary work.⁸³

Nevertheless, at the end of June, Vynnychenko travelled to Kharkov for talks with the Ukrainian government. Vynnychenko did not keep a record of these negotiations in his diary. However, an account of them can be found in the report which he sent to the Foreign Group following his re-emigration to the West. He wrote that in the Ukrainian capital he had been 'fooled around' and that Rakovskii was not interested in his *Dokladna zapyska*. Instead he was offered a number of posts, firstly in the commissariat for education,⁸⁴ and then as inspector for the revolutionary tribunal in Revvoensoviet. He turned both down, claiming

⁸² Ibid., pp. 438–39. The quotation is on p. 439.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 439–42.

⁸⁴ This was despite the fact that Rakovskii had warned Stalin against giving Vynnychenko such a post. It is quite possible that Moscow was more keen to bring Vynnychenko into government than were the authorities in Kharkov.

that the former did not have any responsibilities and that the latter position did not exist. Rakovskii then proposed that Vynnychenko become commissar of foreign affairs. Again, Vynnychenko rejected this, claiming that it was also an empty title because the commissariat lacked its own ministerial apparatus. Vynnychenko left the Ukraine for the Russian capital convinced that there was nothing for him there and that the government was not Ukrainian, but rather a form of occupation, seeking to recreate a 'one and indivisible' Russia.⁸⁵ The description was written after Vynnychenko had left the Soviet republics and the knowledge that the negotiations had finally failed probably coloured the negative portrayal of the talks with Rakovskii. Vynnychenko's supposition that Rakovskii wanted to limit his powers is clearly true, as can be seen in the telegram from the head of the Ukrainian government to Stalin mentioned above. Nevertheless, perhaps Vynnychenko underestimated the responsibilities involved in the positions offered to him. At this time, the Ukrainian commissariat for foreign affairs, for example, was setting up its own missions abroad. These conducted negotiations with foreign powers on trade and other issues. Later in the 1920s the commissars for education Shumskyyi and Skrypnyk used their commissariat to implement Ukrainianization.

By 11 July Vynnychenko was again in Moscow certain that his mission had failed. 'I do not see a way out', he wrote, 'because there are only two ways out: either to renounce being a Ukrainian and then be a revolutionary; or to break completely with the revolution and then it is possible to be a Ukrainian.' He said he could do neither, both options meant death, but 'to unify the one and the other [being a Ukrainian and a revolutionary] is not possible, history does not allow it'.⁸⁶ Vynnychenko here again voiced the dilemma which occupied many Ukrainian socialists: the weighting of the national and socialist aspects of their political programme. In emigration, it had been easy to claim that social liberation would inevitably lead to national rebirth. However, the nature of Bolshevik rule in the Ukraine forced Vynnychenko to question this assumption.

Vynnychenko spent the rest of July and the first half of August in Moscow. His diary entries from this period are full of attacks on the Soviet system. Federation did not exist between Russia and the Ukraine: 'there are no separate countries, but rather a one and indivisible Russia, which is represented by a one and indivisible RKP'.⁸⁷ He was convinced that the Soviet republics were threatened through war, economic failure, famine, the bureaucracy and centralism of

⁸⁵ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 43, ark. 28.

⁸⁶ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, p. 445.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 452.

government and the failure to draw the Ukrainian masses into the revolution: 'taking all these conditions into consideration, it is not possible to believe in the victory of the revolution with much certainty.'⁸⁸ He was in Moscow during the Second Congress of Comintern and was shocked by the pomp associated with the opening of the meeting. Given the precarious situation which he believed the revolution was in, he felt that this pageantry was 'decorative, false and counterfeit'.⁸⁹ He wrote that lying had become ingrained into the Bolsheviks, and they did so even in situations where it was completely unnecessary. As a consequence, workers always viewed any proclamation made by the Bolsheviks with scepticism and people who would otherwise have sympathized with Communism were put off it.⁹⁰ He longed, therefore, to return abroad, and petitioned Radek and Chicherin to allow him to travel to America as a representative of the Third International. This plan did not materialize, but he was granted permission to leave the country.⁹¹

On 30 July, Vynnychenko wrote a letter addressed to the Ukrainian workers and peasants, which should be read out at the next party congress of the UKP following his departure from Russia. He said he had rejected the posts offered to him because they had not represented any real responsibility and because the Bolsheviks had hoped to use him as a figurehead. He then turned to the situation in the Soviet republics. Above all, he accused the RKP of centralism and treating the Ukraine like a colony. Only the healthy, natural force of the Ukrainian working classes, represented by the UKP, resisted this, forcing the Russians to make concessions.⁹² Despite this attack on the Bolsheviks, Vynnychenko was not hostile towards the party: 'it is necessary to remind every Ukrainian Communist, and also every member of the UKP, that *there can be no hostility towards the KP(b)U*; this is *our* comradely brother, which on account of different objective and subjective reasons has made mistakes.' He stressed 'the great role' which the RKP had played in the Communist revolution. Ukrainian Communists had to make the Russians aware of their mistakes, but they should also support Soviet power, enter its institutions and help in the organization of the Red Army and the rebuilding of the economy.⁹³ Thus, an improvement in the situation in the Ukraine would come about through the organs of the existing government. The UKP must organize itself and the Ukrainian working class in order to create a force which would

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 447–50. The quotation is on p. 450.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 447.

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp. 453–34.

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 446, 453.

⁹² TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 24–30. The quotation is on ark. 26.

⁹³ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 32.

compel the Bolsheviks to realize their own aims. Indeed, he claimed that many members of both the RKP and KP(b)U saw the failings of the system and wanted to change them because they were consistent Communists.⁹⁴ The speech is interesting because it shows that despite the scathing criticism to be found in his diary, Vynnychenko maintained his belief that Ukrainian socialists should stand on the side of the world revolution led by the Bolsheviks. Moreover, he wrote it believing that he would soon leave Russia; the letter would only be made public when he was already in the West. It is therefore definitely not the case that he toned down his criticism of the Bolsheviks for fear of repercussions.

On 3 August Vynnychenko and his party were ready to depart from the Russian capital, but they were taken from the train before it set off. The official explanation was that the war with Poland was complicating travel.⁹⁵ Two days later Vynnychenko wrote to the Central Committee of the UKP informing them of his failure to leave Moscow and asking them to return the letter he had sent to be read out at their party conference. He stressed that he was against the publication of the letter because since he had written it the situation had changed. At the end of July it had seemed as if Poland would make peace with the Soviet republics. In such a situation it was right to criticize the Bolsheviks. However, the renewal of the war with Poland meant that any criticism of the Soviet system could harm its chances of survival. He presumed that he would not be able to get out of Russia in the near future, but if he did, he would not publish the letter in the West.⁹⁶

Unable to leave Russia for the West, Vynnychenko once again thought about going to the Ukraine. On 12 August he began making preparations for this and he left Moscow for Kharkov five days later.⁹⁷ Back in the Ukraine, he felt that the situation was explosive with the discontent of the Ukrainian masses turning into violence. Makhno was exploiting this. He was increasingly being celebrated as a 'national hero'. Vynnychenko wrote that it was necessary to calm this popular dissatisfaction, but that the government also had to meet it by introducing Ukrainianization. Unfortunately, 'Ukrainianization' was only a phrase for the Bolsheviks. They preferred to follow a policy of the dictatorship of Russian culture.⁹⁸

In the Ukraine Vynnychenko met leaders of the UKP. The argument over Vynnychenko's letter to workers and peasants had already

⁹⁴ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 30.

⁹⁵ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, p. 457.

⁹⁶ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 56–57.

⁹⁷ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 461, 488.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 463.

soured his relations with the party and this seems to have been the root of the disagreements between the two. The UKP once more refused to give back the letter. They also argued over the question of the appropriate form of opposition to the Bolsheviks. Vynnychenko said that this must be fitting to the situation, that is, whether there was war or peace, echoing the sentiments he had expressed in the letter of 5 August. However, he also complained that the UKP had been so intimidated by the Bolshevik regime that they no longer held a clear line on the national question and only aped the RKP.⁹⁹ Following this meeting, on the 23rd Vynnychenko again wrote to the UKP's Central Committee. This letter reflected his anger. He protested against the Central Committee's refusal to give back the document. Their actions had disillusioned his perception of the party. He accused them of holding the same views as the KP(b)U on the national question and declared them to be an anachronism.¹⁰⁰ Two days later the UKP's Central Committee replied, rejecting Vynnychenko's attack on their beliefs and suggested that the real reason he wanted the letter to remain unpublished was his inability to leave Russia and fear of repercussions. They declared they viewed the missive as a historical document and would therefore preserve it in their archive.¹⁰¹ It is difficult not to share the UKP leadership's suspicions in this matter, even if Vynnychenko's account of the incident in his diary is consistent with that set out in his correspondence.¹⁰² However, despite this fact, one must remember that even when he thought he was about to escape to the West, Vynnychenko warned that any criticism of the Bolsheviks should not harm the Soviet system. Even if he was later thinking of his personal safety, Vynnychenko's argument remained true to that set out in the original letter to Ukrainian workers and peasants.

Vynnychenko's analysis of the situation in the Ukraine at this time was extremely pessimistic. As the war against Poland worsened so the unsavoury side of the Soviet regime became more apparent: 'the old Russian national trait of hypocrisy, brutality, inexcusable violence, the old habit of belief in the providential role of Russia — all this runs as a clear stripe through all the politics of Communist Moscow. The belief in force and the necessity for the fist of the single [party] line, the belief in the all-saving power of bureaucratism, in the utter obedience of the masses' were all clearly evident.¹⁰³

Despite this condemnation, Vynnychenko once again began to consider entering the Soviet Ukrainian government. On 31 August,

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 463–64.

¹⁰⁰ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 58.

¹⁰¹ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 59.

¹⁰² Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 471–73.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 467.

he talked with Rakovskii and Manuïlskyi about his desire to leave the country. They brought up the matter of his becoming a member of the KP(b)U. Vynnychenko again asked himself whether he was ready to join the revolution and put aside his doubts about the national question, or whether it was better to follow his own interests, keep his hands clean of the mistakes made by the Bolsheviks and return to exile, where a quiet, peaceful life would await him. Once more he chose the former path which he, in the histrionic style of which he was fond, described as meaning his certain destruction. In his diary Vynnychenko returned again and again to this dilemma during his negotiations with the government in Kharkov.¹⁰⁴

On 4 September Vynnychenko was asked to submit a declaration to the Politburo of the KP(b)U outlining his position on the present Ukrainian state. If this declaration was acceptable, he would be allowed to join the KP(b)U and offered the positions of deputy head of Sovnarkom and head of the commissariat for foreign affairs.¹⁰⁵ Manuïlskyi, who according to Vynnychenko was the Bolshevik most interested in his participation in government, even began to change the writer's opinion of the Soviet system: 'apparently, Manuïlskyi is utterly, sincerely convinced in the *Ukrainian* course of the KPU. So sincerely that I am really being persuaded that I was mistaken in my conclusions, made primarily under the influence of information from the UKP and the federalists.'¹⁰⁶ It was typical of Vynnychenko that he wavered between abundant hope and utter despair during the negotiations. On 5 September he described his course as being like the path to Golgotha; however, on 8 September, the day he submitted his declaration to the Politburo, he optimistically stated that he could enter the government with a clear conscience and predicted that in between six months and a year the Russifiers would be gone.¹⁰⁷

In the declaration Vynnychenko stated that the Ukraine did not yet have a genuinely socialist government, but that 'only people with a beggarly reason, knowledge and experience or demagogues without a conscience, enemies of the workers, could blame the ruling Communist party or Soviet power for this'; rather, the legacy of the world and civil wars, internal sabotage and attacks by imperialism and counter-revolution had prevented this construction. The same factors had

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., pp. 473-74. According to the decisions of the Politburo from 1 September, it was Vynnychenko's declaration that he was willing to enter the party which started the negotiations with Rakovskii. See, TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 7, ark. 69.

¹⁰⁵ TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 7, ark. 72.

¹⁰⁶ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, p. 476.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 477-78.

prevented the creation of a state, although these were being overcome and a worker-peasant state inside a world socialist federation was being built. Moreover, he praised the KP(b)U's 'genuine, sincere activity', aimed at forming an independent Ukrainian centre. Not even the UNR had created as many opportunities for the Ukrainian working classes as the Soviet regime had done. He said that the relations between the RKP and the KP(b)U, like the mutual status of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR, were not yet clarified. He added that the RKP, as the centre of the world revolution, had a leading role in the intellectual development of all young Communist organizations, and therefore while the KP(b)U did not have its own tried forces, the party stood under the leadership of the Russians. The more quickly that Ukrainian national forces took an active part in the organization of the workers' movement, the more possible it would be for the Ukrainians to take the construction of the socialist state in their country into their own hands. He ended by declaring his intention to join the KP(b)U and that he would be followed by the rest of the Foreign Group of the UKP.¹⁰⁸ Clearly, Vynnychenko's criticism of the Soviet system was even softer in this statement than it had been in his *Dokladna zapyska*.

The Central Committee accepted the fundamentals of the declaration, but entrusted Rakovskii with the task of getting Vynnychenko to explain the sections on 'kulakism and the national state', by which they may well have meant the section calling on the inclusion of Ukrainian national elements in the Soviet government. For all intents and purposes, however, he was accepted into the party. This decision was published in the Soviet press.¹⁰⁹ The announcement turned out to be premature because when Rakovskii talked to Vynnychenko, the author refused to change his declaration. He portrayed this in his diary as being a matter of principle.¹¹⁰ The Politburo met again on 9 September and refused to allow him into the party or the government.¹¹¹ This was the last attempt from either side to come to an agreement. By the 16th Vynnychenko was again in Moscow and on the 21st he left the Russian capital to enter exile for the second time since the outbreak of revolution in 1917.¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ TsDAHO, f. 8, op. 1, spr. 45, ark. 60-2zv.

¹⁰⁹ TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 7, ark. 73.

¹¹⁰ Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 478-79.

¹¹¹ TsDAHO, f. 1, op. 6, spr. 7, ark. 75.

¹¹² Vynnychenko, *Shchodennyk*, pp. 481-82.

Conclusion

Following his return to emigration, Vynnychenko and the rest of the *Nova Doba* group began a campaign against the Soviet system in Russia and the Ukraine. They criticized its centralism, bureaucratism, hostility to Ukrainian national interests and lack of Communist principles. They declared that they were now part of the UKP. However, not all the members of Vynnychenko's group accepted the new stance. V. Mazurenko and the former SR Tolmachiv opposed the attack on the Soviet regime, as did the members of the group living in Berlin. They continued to argue that it was possible to change the Bolsheviks' errors by working with the Soviet government and that excessive criticism of the Soviet republics would only help counter-revolution. Many members of the Foreign Group of the UKP returned to the Ukraine, including Mazurenko, P. Diatliv, Z. Vysotsskyi, S. Vikul and M. Bardakh. When the UKP heard of the attacks on the Bolshevik regime which the Foreign Group was making in its name, they wrote to Vynnychenko calling on him to cease publication of *Nova Doba*. They felt that the ferocity of his criticism had removed him from the revolutionary camp. The UKP made a public denunciation of the Foreign Group. It became impossible to continue publishing the weekly paper and the Foreign Group announced its dissolution.

Vynnychenko's mission to Moscow and Kharkov failed because of his obstinacy when negotiating with the Bolsheviks. However, the episode also highlights the difficulty of uniting Ukrainian national goals with support for a world revolution led by a party which was frustrating these desires. Vynnychenko's faction was split and his reputation among émigré Ukrainians reached a new low. Other groups, such as the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries, which also made a 'turn to the left', experienced similar problems. They were divided over the question of reconciliation with the Bolsheviks and many returned to the Ukraine. This fundamentally weakened the Ukrainian left in emigration and thereby contributed to the 'turn to the right' described by Motyl.