

The Religious Programme of the Union of Brest in the Context of the Counter-Reformation in Eastern Europe

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The history of the Union of Brest, relations between Catholicism and Orthodoxy preceding the conclusion of that union, the policy of the pope and the Polish state toward Orthodox believers, the history of the Uniate church and its role in the political and cultural development of national self-consciousness—these are topics that continue to spark heated discussion and debate.

The reasons for lengthy discussions of the history of the Union of Brest are clear, for the issue bears directly on national relations. The history of the Uniate church encompasses a great many dramatic pages, of which the most complex are those written in the twentieth century. Scholars who study the movement must, therefore, constantly strive for objectivity.

There are two important sets of questions concerning the history of Orthodox and Slavic relations in the fifteenth to the sixteenth century and the history of the Union of Brest. The union was concluded in 1596, during a time of fierce struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in Europe. What, then, is the link between the Union of Brest and the emergence of the Uniate church, on the one hand, and the Reformation and Counter-Reformation, on the other? Why did previous efforts to restore Catholic and Orthodox unity fail? The second set of questions concerns the Uniate programme per se. What were the Uniates striving for? What exactly did they intend to accomplish? How successful were they in realizing their programme?

Relations between Orthodoxy and Catholicism took shape in the East Slavic world during the eleventh to the fifteenth century (i.e., the period

between the baptism of Kievan Rus' and the unions of Florence and Brest). It was long believed that these relations were consistently marked by deep animosity. Frequent references were made to sharp, unfair Orthodox attacks on Catholics and to the Latin world's profound contempt for the East Slavs. In recent times, however, it has become clear that until the fourteenth century, at least, the attitude toward Latins in the East Slavic world was far from being as hostile as traditionally believed.¹ The Greek clergy who came to Rus' tried to engender hatred for the Latin West among members of the local society. Greek writings that abounded in insults to Catholics and the most absurd accusations were translated into Church Slavonic. Today we know that such hatred of the Roman church was not shared by the majority of East Slavic clergy nor by other strata of society. It was only in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries that a wave of Latinophobia began to mount. Then the phenomenon was linked to the development of religious and national consciousness, on the one hand, and to political conflicts, on the other.

Relations between Catholic and Orthodox believers in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Kingdom of Poland, too, were certainly not as hostile as some scholars have assumed.² This is evident from attitudes toward the Union of Florence (1439). Although that attempted reconciliation did not take root deeply in the Ukrainian-Belarusian lands (scholarly opinion differs as to why), it was not accorded a hostile reception, nor did it lead to acute conflicts. An altogether different situation existed in the Muscovite state, where Metropolitan Isidore, who had concluded the union, was not only severely criticized, but imprisoned and subsequently exiled to Rome. Although the Union of Florence was decisively and irrevocably rejected by the Muscovite authorities, they did not treat Catholics as enemies. In Russia, adherents of the Roman church were viewed as dispassionately as before—that is, as erring rivals rather than as heretics. Instances of cultural contact and cooperation continued to occur.³

This situation prevailed until the late sixteenth century, when it became evident that any attempt to conclude a universal, all-Christian union was doomed to fail. The futility of such efforts became absolutely clear to the papal legate, Antonio Possevino, following a visit to Moscow during the reign of Ivan the Terrible. Possevino proposed abandonment of the idea of a universal union for the time being. He urged, instead, the conclusion of a regional union between Catholics and Orthodox in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which, by this time, included the Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian lands.⁴ That proposal was implemented in 1596.

Was, then, the establishment of the Uniate church the result of the

policies of the papacy and the Jesuit Order? By no means. If we look attentively at the events that preceded the Union of Brest, we discover that the initiative came from the Orthodox bishops of Ukraine and Belarus, whereas the Jesuits played a far-from-major role in negotiations for the union and the unification of the two churches.⁵

The Union of Brest was begotten by developments within Ukrainian society and Belarusian society in the Commonwealth during the sixteenth century. First, there occurred a deep crisis within the Orthodox church of the Commonwealth, precipitated not so much by the pressure of Catholicism on Orthodoxy as by society's increasing expectations vis-à-vis its church and by its more sophisticated and strict religious requirements.⁶ The situation reflected the European-wide process that led to the Reformation and to Catholic reform in Europe during the sixteenth century.

Second, there was a need to curtail the dissemination of heresy and Protestantism among the Orthodox faithful.⁷ Nearly all the documents and writings that accompanied the conclusion of the Union of Brest testify to the need to protect the Orthodox church from heretics.

Third, church-state relations became more complicated in the second half of the sixteenth century. In 1589, Moscow established its own patriarchate, an institution that could claim jurisdiction over the Orthodox church in the Commonwealth. Furthermore, although the patriarchs of Constantinople were entirely dependent on Turkish sultans and utterly unable to assist the Orthodox church in Ukraine or Belarus, they intervened in its affairs. Church confraternities made up of laymen came into existence among the Ukrainian and Belarusian Orthodox. They secured broad autonomy and independence from local bishops by placing themselves directly under the patriarch of Constantinople. Indeed, they themselves sought to gain control over not only schools and printing houses, but even the activities of local bishops. The Polish Catholic church, having repelled the Protestant offensive, vigorously launched a variety of activities and constantly worked to consolidate its influence in the Orthodox regions of the Commonwealth. Contrary to the widespread belief that the Union of Brest resulted from the polonization of Ukrainian and Belarusian territories, it was actually conceived to stand in opposition to the onslaught of Roman Catholicism, to ensure the independent existence of the Ukrainian-Belarusian church, and to restore that church's former role in Ukrainian-Belarusian society.

The fourth development was the growth in national-religious consciousness among the Orthodox inhabitants of the Commonwealth during the sixteenth century, especially its second half. That development required appropriate changes in church life and practice.⁸

Under pressure from all these circumstances, and after consultations with representatives of the Catholic hierarchy, the Orthodox bishops, led by Ipatii Potii and Kyrylo Terletsy, approached Rome with the request that the union be concluded. Instead of the expected outcome—reconciliation of Orthodox and Catholics—or concerted work to overcome the crisis in the church, the union produced the completely opposite result: a heightening of national-religious conflicts in the Commonwealth. To some extent, then, its conclusion contributed to the upheavals that took place in the middle of the seventeenth century.

The first question posed at the beginning of this article concerned the link between the Union of Brest and the European Counter-Reformation. The Union of Brest was not the continuation of the unionizing tendencies of medieval European Christianity, but the product of a special stage in the history of Christianity in Europe, including the history of the Orthodox church. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are rightly characterized as the epoch of the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, but that is hardly a formal definition. The Reformation and the Counter-Reformation resulted in a deep transformation of Western Christianity, a process to which Roman Catholicism contributed no less than Protestantism.

The connection between the Union of Brest and the papacy's Counter-Reformation policy in Eastern Europe is, today, clear enough. From the end of the sixteenth century, the papacy undertook a series of actions to bring under submission to Rome the churches of the Christian East, including those of the Balkan and East Slavic region.⁹ The connection between the Union of 1596 and other aspects of the European Counter-Reformation remains unclear, however. In particular, the connection between the Union of Brest and the cultural-historical and ideological aspects of the European Counter-Reformation has received very little study.

That issue turns our attention to the nature and character of the Counter-Reformation in Europe and, particularly, in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the second half of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century. What significance should we attribute to the Counter-Reformation movement and the Counter-Reformation in general? Among Soviet scholars, the Counter-Reformation was characterized most often as a Catholic reaction to or fierce offensive against the reform movement and as the appropriate policy of the papal curia, embodied most vividly in the activities of the Jesuits and the measures taken to implement the decisions proclaimed by the Council of Trent. The Inquisition, the *Index of Prohibited Books*, militant monastic orders with

"Jesus' hosts" at their head, pervasive violence combined with perfidious political intrigue—these were viewed as the main weapons of the Counter-Reformation. Such an interpretation of the Counter-Reformation is both one-sided and inconsistent with Western historiography. The Counter-Reformation was by no means a marginal episode in the history of Europe. It played a vast role in the historical development of European society. Particularly significant was its influence on social development in the countries of Eastern Europe, including the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, comprising Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian lands.

Can the Counter-Reformation be equated with a Catholic reaction? If that reaction is taken to mean a return to the medieval forms of Catholicism, the equation is not valid. Although different from humanism and Protestantism, the Counter-Reformation responded to the same call for religious renewal as the humanists and reformers, albeit in its own way. The Counter-Reformation was not merely a negation, but rather a surmounting of Protestantism and humanism: it preserved and assimilated much of what those two movements had achieved. This was expressed in the Counter-Reformation's administrative and political programmes, in its educational, artistic, and intellectual activities, and in the renovation of cults and beliefs reinvigorated by the decisions of the Council of Trent. It is a paradox that the Counter-Reformation achieved the renewal of Catholicism without sacrificing any of the latter's dogmas, rites, or institutions. Note the conservative spirit of all the decisions made at Trent, which did not make a single concession to the Protestants or reformers.

New religious requirements were satisfied along traditional lines, without the destruction of existing cults or organizational structures. The Counter-Reformation breathed new life into the old cults of saints, created new ones, and filled sacraments and rituals with a content new to believers. To a certain extent, it bridged the gap between popular and institutional Christianity by organizing regular preaching, pursuing missionary work, and encouraging the study of scripture. It created a network of schools and colleges, adapted itself to the new intellectual and aesthetic climate created by Baroque culture, and responded in its own way to the contradictions of the time. The result was a Catholicism renovated and strengthened in all its aspects.

Polish Catholicism, along with European Catholicism, acquired a special character and a new image.¹⁰ Its characteristic features were internal discipline, integration, political influence, material power, and expressiveness through use of the artistic media of Baroque culture. With the help of resplendent processions, religious pilgrimages, and the

rejuvenated cults of icons and relics, the Jesuits were able to "conquer the soul of man through his eyes." Also, certain unique features were acquired by Polish Catholicism as a whole and by its new local variants, as regional characteristics continued to develop in the separate lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. The latter was achieved through use of the resources of popular culture (i.e., local religious holy days, local folklore, local cults of saints, etc.). Finally, we can point to the social conformism of post-Tridentine Polish Catholicism, which quickly adapted itself to the peculiarities of the Polish gentry's political culture and social views, without losing contact with popular moods and ideas.

The means by which Catholicism prevailed over the Reformation in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and secured a practical monopoly in society did not exclude methods of direct coercion (political, judicial, administrative), fanaticism, pogroms, and the manipulation of mob anger and hatred. Promoting the influence of Catholicism on the body politic was not, however, confined solely to these phenomena. We must also keep other factors in mind: the creation of a new system of education and of a network of specialized educational establishments; broad reliance on written propaganda; peaceful missionary activity; daily dissemination of scripture; renewal of parish life; and the education of a new clergy more disciplined and responsible than their fifteenth- and sixteenth-century predecessors. In other words, victory was secured largely through peaceful, non-violent tactics and relatively honest rivalry with Protestantism, although the power of the state could be brought to bear when necessary. The Commonwealth's Diet guaranteed certain conditions of religious tolerance that made it impossible to rely on violence alone.

The Counter-Reformation was thus a distinct epoch in the development of the Commonwealth that did not abdicate many achievements of the preceding period but reworked them in conformity with its own aims and programme. The Union of Brest was doubtless a product of the papal, the Polish, and the Ukrainian-Belarusian Counter-Reformations. If we regard the union as something broader and deeper than a Catholic reaction (i.e., as a regional variant of the Counter-Reformation that occurred among the Ukrainian and Belarusian peoples), it can be seen in a somewhat different light than that of traditional historiography. Even in the eyes of the Latin hierarchs, the Jesuits, and the Polish Catholics, the idea of the union was not reducible to the subordination of the Orthodox church. Among the initiators and promoters of the union among Eastern Christians, this goal was even less important.

What, specifically, was the Uniate programme? There were, in fact, several programmes for church union. Konstantyn Ostrozky had one vision, Ipatii Potii another, and Kyrylo Terletsky a third. Today, it is

apparent that the early Uniate leaders (i.e., those of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries) did not stand aloof from the religious and social questions of their time. To a certain extent, owing to the Latin school system, they were familiar with humanism, Protestantism, ancient culture, and Renaissance philosophy.

What did the Uniates view as their main religious-cultural task? It is usually presumed that their primary aim was to achieve rapprochement between, if not the full merger of, Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. At some stages in the history of the Uniate movement, and for some groups of the Uniate clergy, that may indeed have been perceived as the main task. But there was more to the Uniate programme. Like the Counter-Reformation throughout Europe as a whole, the Uniate movement endeavoured to consummate the Christianization of the rural population. This is well illustrated in a seventeenth-century manuscript containing an extensive address to its readers, i.e., the clergy. It sets out to list—with reference to decisions taken at the Council of Trent—the eight duties of the parish priest: (1) to be present in his parish at all times; (2) to conduct church services if not daily, then at least on Sundays and holy days, and to see to it that on each occasion all parishioners attended; (3) “to explain God’s word to the people” on Sundays and holy days; (4) to administer the sacraments not only when required by canon law, but also in accordance with the needs of the people; (5) to be a good role model for his flock; (6) to be a guardian of the poor and underprivileged and to care for them; (7) to visit the poor and the sick and to provide them with the sacraments; (8) to see to it astutely that, at least once a year, the faithful participated in confession and communion. If any parishioners grossly violated the final charge, they were to be punished or sent to the bishop. In another section, the same text states that a priest must constantly interpret for his parishioners the basic dogmas of the Christian faith, above all, the doctrine of the Trinity.¹¹

The need for priests to perform such duties was enormous. According to Lev Krevza, during the 1630s in the Siverianian land there were only thirty priests for every one hundred churches, so that many infants remained unbaptized and many people died without receiving the last sacraments.¹² Today, of course, we can scarcely say to what extent the Ukrainian and Belarusian population was Christianized by the seventeenth century, or determine what the Uniates contributed to the process. To judge from European analogies concerning the extent of Christianization among the masses, however, even the most pessimistic appraisal seems plausible.¹³

The urgency that the Uniates attached to freeing the church from secular control cannot be overemphasized. Lev Krevza’s viewpoint is

typical in this respect. He believed that the situation of the Orthodox clergy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was worse than in Muscovy and even worse than in Constantinople. In those places, the grand prince and the sultan interfered in church affairs, whereas "in our parts, every estate owner who has a priest on his land lords over him as he sees fit and even compels the priest to work for him. And some of them are so much obsessed by godless boldness that they may punish a priest for disobedience. Even in questions of divine service, he demands obedience, and if something is done without his permission, it is declared invalid."¹⁴ Krevza's judgements were, perhaps, overstated, but we well know from other sources how pitiful the position of the Orthodox clergy was in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In order to understand the Uniate programme, we must remember that the Uniates strove not just for privileges and Senate seats, but for consolidation of the clergy's social position. The last goal alone reveals that to the Uniates, the problem was not simply one of papal jurisdiction.

The Uniates strove to escape this crisis, to renovate and reform the Orthodox church, and to place it on a firm organizational foundation through closer ties with Rome. The old Soviet historiography, which saw the Uniates as a handful of renegades who sold the Orthodox church for thirty pieces of silver in exchange for seats in the Senate, adopted an *a priori* explanation and refused to look at the main motives of the Uniates, which were much more complex. Also, some Uniates did indeed adhere to the idyllic, Campanellan dream of reunifying all Christianity.

The last observation is substantiated in the polemical writings of Ipatii Potii.¹⁵ He belonged to a group of Uniate ideologists who were well educated, acquainted with sixteenth-century European religious culture, and, apparently, had no selfish motives in taking up the Uniate cause. Potii's programme for church union, although motivated by the same desire to protect the church from heresy, is not identical to that of the famous Jesuit leader of the Polish Counter-Reformation, Piotr Skarga.

Both Potii and Skarga argued the case for union on the premise of combatting the "heresies" that were spreading throughout the Orthodox territories of the Commonwealth. Why was unification with Rome necessary in order to destroy heresy? Because, according to Potii, "there are more heretics among the Greeks." The Orthodox church had proved ineffectual in crushing the Reform movement on its own. If the Protestants were to have their way in the Commonwealth, the Orthodox faithful would fall under their heretical sway.¹⁶ Hence, union with Rome could save the Orthodox church from the Reformation. Characteristically, Potii viewed the disagreements between Catholic and Orthodox in light of the threat posed to Orthodoxy by the Reformation: historically, it was none

other than the "heretics" who were responsible for the split in Christianity, and now, at the end of the sixteenth century, it was none other than these same "heretics" who were proclaiming the pope to be the anti-Christ and denying the existence of purgatory.¹⁷ To the Protestants, the differences between the Catholic and Orthodox faiths were inessential. In the Protestants' view, both churches betrayed Christ's commands.¹⁸ Therefore, according to Potii, the destruction of heresy and union with Rome were interconnected.

The organizational and ideological crisis of the Orthodox church in Ukraine and Belarus during the second half of the sixteenth century was apparent to contemporaries—above all, to the Orthodox hierarchs. Potii realized that Protestants and Catholics were fully justified in their accusations that the Orthodox clergymen were ignorant, gain-seeking, and indifferent to ecclesiastical and pastoral needs. In his own view, the Orthodox priests were neglecting their chief duty—"to take care of the flock and to do everything for it, so that the wolves and other beasts do not devour and pilfer it."¹⁹ Yet the higher clergy, too, were wholly inert, not caring for the salvation of their own souls, much less for the souls of their flock. They did not care for the translating, transcribing, collecting, or study of patristic books, nor did they read theological literature. Instead, they submitted passively to secular authorities on ecclesiastical questions. Potii appealed to the Orthodox hierarchs "to stave off wrongdoing...by advice, teaching, and through their writings."²⁰ He did not hesitate to cite as an example the Protestants themselves, who used the living word, printing presses, church synods, polemics, and church services to convert people to their faith and to maintain order in their church.²¹ He called on the Orthodox clergy to deprive their opponents of any cause to accuse the Rus' church of stupidity, ignorance, illiteracy, and lack of teaching. That would require translation of biblical and patristic texts into the vernacular, increasing the number of sources by turning to Western models, and separating Orthodox books from heretical texts (on the model of the papal *Index of Prohibited Books*).²² For Potii, church union was a means of outwitting the heretical "wolves" who were carrying off victims from the Orthodox flock, of overcoming the internal crisis of the church and the negligence of the clergy, of ensuring better order and efficiency in the Orthodox church, and, finally, of freeing it from the dictates of secular authorities.²³

Unlike Skarga, Potii did not conceive a union as a cardinal reorganization of internal church traditions and rites. Although Potii agreed with papal authority, the doctrine of purgatory, the Catholic dogma concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, and the need to free the clergy from secular control, he disagreed with Skarga's demands for the renun-

ciation of the Slavonic liturgy, for the adoption of universal celibacy among the clergy, and for the introduction of Latin liturgical rites.²⁴

Whereas Skarga's programme called for universal religious-cultural unity, Potii refused to support any such idea.²⁵ It was not his task to justify or defend the pope from reproach, Potii maintained: that was the task of Catholic scholars.²⁶ He emphasized the distance separating the Uniates from the papal throne and withheld any expression of approval for the pope's unlimited authority over patriarchs, bishops, archbishops, synods, tsars, and princes. He insisted that contemporary popes had no more authority than God, the saints, or their predecessors on the papal throne. Whereas Skarga gave little attention to Orthodox worship, Potii devoted considerable attention to the matter: Skarga drew from Latin writings on the subject, whereas Potii deliberately relied on Greek patristic sources. Potii perceived obstacles to the union in questions concerning the procession of the Holy Spirit, purgatory, papal supremacy, and the Gregorian calendar: he proposed that in the creed, the procession of the Holy Spirit be described as "through the son" (*per filium*) rather than "from the son" (*filioque*) in an attempt to strike a compromise between the Orthodox and Catholic positions. He also saw other fundamental obstacles. He strove to emphasize that the pope was humble in relation to God and heaven, and did not prohibit the invocation of saints through prayers. He insisted on the veneration of icons in the churches, and said that he himself revered "as many saints in heaven as there are sculptures and painted icons on earth."²⁷ The last statement reflects Potii's desire to combine Catholic religious customs with Orthodox tradition, in contrast to Skarga, who tended to level them.

Compromise was especially evident in Potii's accommodation of the Catholic doctrine of purgatory with Orthodox teachings. In his view, the widespread Orthodox custom of offering prayers for the departed had no meaning if the existence of purgatory was denied: in reality, purgatory is identical with "what our people call *suffering* (*mytarstvo*; Potii's emphasis)."²⁸ Thus, Potii's programme for church unification, which fully respected the Eastern tradition, can hardly be identified with Skarga's levelling approach.

In style and poetic language, Potii's polemical writings reflect Ukrainian literature's early Baroque tendencies.²⁹ They also clearly reveal the influences of the humanist education cultivated in Latin schools of the period. Potii liked to quote the "famous poet Homer,"³⁰ to chide his opponents for their ignorance of Cato's works, to recall Pindar, Sappho, and Demosthenes, to cite Plato and Aristotle, and to quote from Latin proverbs and from Aesop's fables.³¹ He lauded Latin, not as the language of divine service, but as the language of European

education.³² For Potii, the sign of a Christian man's piety was his ability to explain contradictions in patristic texts by comparing them.³³ There is evidence of individualism in the *Antyryzys* and several of his other works. For Potii, the union was not simply passive submission to the Roman church, but a bold, personal act requiring energy, responsibility, fearlessness, unselfishness, and prowess. He declared that it was not gain-seeking that prompted him to take up the Uniate cause, and his biography gives us reason to believe him.³⁴ It was a sense of duty that turned him into "a pillar of support for the union" (as I. N. Golenishchev-Kutuzov put it):³⁵ "With love for the souls of the innocent, redeemed by the blood of Christ our God, for which, as the pastor having them in my care, I must give strict account, and it does not befit me to leave them, and as long as I live in this world I must discharge my duty insofar as I can."³⁶ Potii sincerely adhered to the principle "Talent is given to each so that, working hard, he may multiply his salvation."³⁷ These words echo the humanists' principle of personal self-assertion (i.e., *virtù*) and the need to serve an ultimate purpose. In arguing for ecclesiastical unity, Potii appealed not to the medieval conception of papal omnipotence, but to the experience of the Council of Florence and to the testimony of Bessarion of Nicaea, the Greek humanist who was a central figure at the council. Potii referred to Bessarion's famous *Dogmatics*, a text acknowledged to be one of the period's most vivid humanist works.

We may not choose to describe Potii as a religiously tolerant apologist—indeed, many of his works are imbued with intolerance. However, we cannot deny the irenic qualities of his works, especially the way he substantiated the ideal of union by interpreting it as "brotherly grace and unity." We should also note one interesting nuance of Potii's polemical reply to the "Ostroh cleric." His warm applause for those who travelled to Western Europe for education and out of curiosity ("who travel around the world in order to see good things and to learn what is worth learning")³⁸ undoubtedly echoed the humanist joy in "discovering the world" and a craving for new ideas.

Humanist traditions were not absent in the works of Ipatii Potii and other Uniate writers. Even the tendency to extremes, so profuse in Potii's works, was part of Renaissance and Baroque stylistics.³⁹ Of course, one example hardly suffices to document the spread of humanist ideas among the Uniate polemicists. However, the foregoing should prompt us to consider that the literature of the Uniate camp, like that of their Orthodox opponents, whose attachment to the humanist tradition is unquestioned, could indeed have served as a channel between Renaissance humanism and the Ukrainian and Belarusian Baroque.

The Counter-Reformation nature of the Union of Brest of 1596 and of the Uniate movement as a religious-social phenomenon lay not only in the link they established between the papacy and the Orthodox lands of Ukraine and Belarus. No less importantly, they resulted from attempts by the Orthodox and Catholic hierarchies to crush and eradicate the Protestant movement within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, to terminate the Orthodox church's internal crisis, to reform it internally, and to accelerate the process of Christianization among the East Slavic population (i.e., to bring popular Christianity closer to ecclesiastical standards). There was also a link, corresponding to the tenets of the Counter-Reformation, between the Uniate programme and the national self-determination of the Ukrainian and Belarussian population of the Commonwealth. Finally, notable differences in religious perceptions and beliefs separated Uniate ideologists such as Potii from Roman Catholic ones such as Skarga.

Notes

1. A. I. Sobolevsky, "Otnoshenie drevnei Rusi k razdeleniiu cerkvei," *Izvestiia Imperatorskoi akademii nauk*, 1914, pp. 95-102; L. Müller, "Das Bild vom Deutschen in der Kiever Rus'," *Deutsche und Deutschland aus russischer Sicht. 11.-17. Jahrhunderte*, D. Hermann, ed. (= *West-östliche Spiegelungen*, ser. B, vol. 1, L. Kopelev, ed. Munich, 1988), pp. 51-82.
2. V. B. Antonovich, "Ocherk otnoshenii polskogo gosudarstva k pravoslaviiu i pravoslavnoi tserkvi," *Monografii po istorii Zapadnoi i Iugo-Zapadnoi Rusi*, vol. 1 (Kiev, 1895); M. K. Liubavsky, "K voprosu ob ogranichenii politicheskikh prav pravoslavnykh kniazei, panov i shliakhty v velikom kniazhestve Litovskom do Liublinskoi unii," *Sbornik statei, posviashchennyi V. O. Kliuchevskomu* (Moscow, 1909), pp. 1-17; A. P. Gritskevich, "Istoriografiia istorii pravoslavnoi tserkvi v Belorussii XIV-seredina XVI v.," *Iz istorii knigi v Belorussii* (Minsk, 1976), pp. 122-39; W. Czermak, "Sprawa równouprawnienia schizmatyków i katolików na Litwie (1432-1563)," *Rozprawy Akademiji Umiejętności*, Wydział Historyczno-filozoficzny, 45 (1905); K. Chodynicky, *Kościół prawosławny a Rzeczpospolita Polska 1370-1632* (Warsaw, 1934); H. Jabłonowski, "Westrußland zwischen Wilna und Moskau," *Studien zur Geschichte Osteuropas*, vol. 2 (Leiden, 1961), pp. 44-55.
3. For instance, late in the fifteenth century, Archbishop Gennadii of Novgorod, having initiated a translation of the entire Bible into Church Slavonic, approached the Catholic Dominican monk Benjamin for assistance. The latter used the Latin rather than the Greek text of the Bible in preparing a number of translations. Apparently, the general attitude toward Catholics became implacably hostile only in the seventeenth century, following the events of the so-called Time of Troubles and the Polish invasion of Russia. In any case,

all these issues certainly require more thorough and exacting discussion.

4. O. Halecki, *From Florence to Brest* (Hamden, Conn., 1968); S. N. Plokhii (Plokyh), *Papstvo i Ukraina: Politika rimskoi kurii na ukrainskikh zemliakh v XVI-XVII vv.* (Kiev, 1989).
5. B. N. Floria, "Brestskie sinody i Brestskaia uniiia," *Slaviane i ikh sosedi*, no. 3: *Katolitsizm i pravoslavie v srednie veka* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 59-75; S. G. Iakovenko, "Pravoslavnaia ierarkhiia Rechi Pospolitoi i plany tserkovnoi unii v 1590-1594 gg.," *Slaviane i ikh sosedi*, no. 3: *Katolitsizm i pravoslavie v srednie veka* (Moscow, 1991), pp. 41-59; J. Krajcar, "Jesuits and the Genesis of the Union of Brest," *Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, no. 44 (1978), pp. 131-53.
6. O. Levitsky, "Vnutrennee sostoianie zapadno-russkoi tserkvi v Polsko-Litovskom gosudarstve v kontse XVI veka i uniiia," *Arkhiv Iugo-Zapadnoi Rossii*, pt. 1, vol. 6 (Kiev, 1884), pp. 1-182; M. S. Hrushevsky, *Istoriia Ukrainy-Rusy*, vol. 5 (Lviv, 1905), pp. 261-88, 459-507.
7. M. V. Dmitriev, "Pravoslavie i Reformatsiia," *Reformatsionnye dvizheniia v vostochnoslavianskikh zemliakh Rechi Pospolitoi vo vtoroi polovine XVI v.* (Moscow, 1990).
8. T. Chynczewska-Hennel, *Świadomość narodowa szlachty ukraińskiej od schyłku XVI do połowy XVII w.* (Warsaw, 1985). See also S. Gawlas and H. Grala, "Nie masz Rusi w Rusi," *Przegląd Historyczny*, vol. 27, no. 2 (1986), pp. 331-51; T. Chynczewska-Hennel, "Ruś zostawić w Rusi," *Przegląd Historyczny*, vol. 28, no. 2 (1987), pp. 533-46; S. Gawlas and H. Grala, "I na Rusi robić musi," *Przegląd Historyczny*, vol. 28, no. 3 (1987), pp. 547-56.
9. W. de Vries, *Rom und Patriarchate des Ostens* (Munich, 1963), pp. 74-88.
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