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# Russia's Ukrainian Policy (1847–1905): A Demographic Approach

## I

Although for most of the first half of the nineteenth century Russian officials and the majority of educated Russians tended to approve of Ukrainian culture,[1] in the second half of the century the imperial authorities turned against it. Three decrees encapsulated their policy. In May 1847, after a three-month investigation of the Kiev-based 'Kirillo-Methodian Society', the head of Nicholas I's Third Department instructed 'teachers and writers' not to give 'love of their motherland [*rodina*: in this case, Ukraine] precedence over love of their fatherland, the Empire'.[2] In July 1863 P. A. Valuev, Alexander II's Minister of Internal Affairs, banned the publication of all books in Ukrainian other than those that belonged 'to the sphere of artistic literature'.[3] In May 1876 Alexander II sanctioned the closure of a Kiev newspaper, the imposition of strict controls on the importation of Ukrainian books from abroad, the introduction of additional constraints on publishing in Ukrainian, and the prohibition of the use of Ukrainian in the theatre.[4] Eased in 1881,[5] tightened up in 1884, 1892 and 1895,[6] the decree of 1876 remained in force until 1905.

Officials applied these edicts with enthusiasm. When, for example, the Kiev Historical Commission sought in 1853 to publish an edition of the eighteenth-century Ukrainian chronicler Hrabianka, the local censor argued on the basis of the decree of 1847 that instead of publishing 'materials which demonstrate the distinctive historical identity of Little Russia [a contemporary term for Ukraine], the commission ought to be highlighting 'the presence of a Russian element in the provinces returned from Poland'.[7] Although, up to a point, Ukraine-orientated intellec-

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tuals succeeded in expressing themselves in print in the first few years of the reign of Alexander II, bureaucrats still interfered extensively in the literary activities of, among others, Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish and Danylo Mordovets'-Slipchenko.[8] Because of the way in which St Petersburg applied the decree of 1863, Kostomarov lamented in 1871 that Ukrainian literature had 'ceased to exist' within the confines of the Russian Empire.[9] Two months before the decree of 1876, imperial censors were still enforcing its predecessor.[10] In 1892 knowledge of Ukrainian was a consideration in the recruitment of a new member of staff to the St Petersburg Censorship Committee.[11] 'In 1896 the Kiev censors rejected 42 per cent of the Ukrainian manuscripts they examined'.[12] The Main Press Administration generated massive annual files on the vetting of manuscripts in Ukrainian at the turn of the century.[13] Even in 1905 the authorities could not bring themselves to repeal the third of the decrees officially. The Main Press Administration conceded in 1907 that, in view of the general press reforms of 24 November 1905 and 26 April 1906, it 'must be considered at the present time not subject to application',[14] but publishing in Ukrainian never became easy.[15]

Why St Petersburg constrained Ukrainian culture so severely is unclear. Many non-Russians suffered from the late tsarist regime's pursuit of cultural uniformity, but Ukrainians were the only group whose written language was more or less wholly suppressed. Even well-placed insiders sometimes found the policy puzzling. In 1859, the rather conservative head of the legal department of Alexander II's personal chancery, Dmitrii Bludov, took strong exception to the refusal of the censorship to permit the re-publication of a celebrated anonymous history of Ukraine called the *Istoriia Rusov*. Aware that the work's particularism 'might once have produced an unfortunate impression', Bludov argued that the time when it could have done so was long past.[16] In the first half of 1863, an official in the Ministry of Internal Affairs criticized two governors-general of the Russian Empire's western provinces for opposing primary education and the publication of books in languages other than Russian. Such activities were not thought to be politically threatening, he said, in the Baltic provinces of the empire, for teaching was permitted there in both Estonian and Latvian; various countries in Western Europe, moreover, were politically stable despite the fact that their inhabitants spoke a mixture of languages.[17] In July 1863, Aleksandr Golovnin wrote

from the Ministry of Education to the Ministry of Internal Affairs to object to the second of the three edicts. '[T]he reason for forbidding or sanctioning this or that book,' he believed, 'is not the language or dialect in which it is written but its essence, the ideas it espouses, and the overall teaching it disseminates'.[18] In 1881 two governors of Ukrainian provinces echoed and enlarged upon the minister's sentiments.[19] In 1900 an official of the Main Press Administration wrote that the case for retaining the edict of 1876 was about as strong as the case for banning matches because of fires.[20] In 1905, a commission of the Imperial Academy of Sciences wondered why the regime greatly restricted the use of the Ukrainian language in print when it did not prohibit the use of Polish, German, Latvian, Lithuanian, Georgian, Hebrew or Tatar.[21]

The two standard explanations of St Petersburg's hostility to Ukrainian culture in the second half of the nineteenth century are that it was afraid of subversion of the empire's Ukrainian community by non-Ukrainians and that it was determined to stamp out the proto-nationalist activities of a handful of ethnically conscious Ukrainian intellectuals. S. N. Shchegolev emphasized the first argument, Fedir Savchenko the second.[22] Both approaches have much to recommend them. With regard to the first, it is undeniable that in the mid-nineteenth century Poles sought to attract the Russian Empire's Ukrainian inhabitants to their cause. In the 1840s the leader of the conservative wing of the Polish emigration, Adam Czartoryski, maintained an agent in Constantinople whose dreamturned out to be the re-creation of a Ukrainian Cossack State under Polish suzerainty.[23] In the 1840s and 1850s the Polish scholar Michał Grabowski influenced Panteleimon Kulish.[24] In the late 1850s and early 1860s Poles tried to encourage Ukrainians to become literate in the Roman rather than the Cyrillic alphabet.[25] Poles endeavoured to persuade Ukrainian inhabitants of the provinces of Kiev, Volyn' and Podillia to join them in the rebellion of 1863.[26]

No sooner had the Russian authorities succeeded, by the use of strong-arm tactics, in bringing the Polish menace within bounds, than they had to confront a second sort of non-Ukrainian interest in Ukrainians. When Vienna permitted the Ukrainians of the Habsburg Monarchy greater freedom of action than Ukrainians possessed in the Russian Empire, the tsar was bound to be suspicious.[27] When east Galicia came to be called 'the Ukrainian Piedmont',[28] the implications for the stability of the Russian Empire's south-western frontier were alarming. It was hardly

surprising that St Petersburg's anti-Ukrainian decree of 1876 explicitly forbade the importation into the Russian Empire of Ukrainian literature from abroad.

Thus, the first of the standard explanations of St Petersburg's Ukrainophobia can be readily supported. So can the view that the regime suppressed publication in Ukrainian because it believed Ukrainophile intellectuals were diverging unacceptably from the high standards of political loyalty it required of its subjects. The 1847 decree stemmed from what to the authorities was subversion. The memorandum Valuev wrote to persuade Alexander II of the need for the edict of 1863 made reference both to the prosecution of people who had belonged to a secret society in Kharkiv and to the large number of Ukrainian activists who had fallen foul of the Golitsyn Commission (a body set up in 1862 to investigate 'seditious appeals' throughout the empire).[29] The process which led to the edict of 1876 began with the denunciation by a Russophile inhabitant of Ukraine of the supposedly separatist intentions of Ukrainian activists in the Kiev section of the Imperial Geographical Society.[30]

It seems, therefore, that both the standard explanations of Russia's late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ukrainian policy rest on firm foundations. Since, furthermore, neither excludes the other, a third approach appears to be unnecessary. Yet the mainstream arguments leave something to be desired. Despite their attractions, they contain internal flaws; they seem not to be enough to explain why St Petersburg treated Ukrainians more severely than certain other imperial minorities; and they do not take account of all the lines of argument suggested by the sources.

The flaw in the argument that claims St Petersburg acted malevolently towards Ukrainians because it feared they might make common cause with the Poles is that influential Russians knew perfectly well that Ukrainian intellectuals were much less interested in assisting Poles than in combatting them. One of the reasons the Russian educational official Nikolai Pirogov encouraged Ukrainian students to open the Russian Empire's first Sunday School in Kiev in 1859 was that he believed they could serve as 'a powerful moral support for the Russian and Little Russian elements, openly counteracting both explicit and covert Polish propaganda'.[31] To judge by the protests levelled at Ukrainian Sunday School teachers by Polish landowners,[32] Pirogov's belief was well-founded. In an otherwise anti-Ukrainian letter of

March 1863, Nikolai Annenkov, the Governor-General of the provinces of Kiev, Volyn' and Podillia, conceded that 'The idea of a federation with Poland can hardly be attributed to adherents of the Little Russian party,' for 'on the contrary, it strives to counteract Latino-Polish propaganda'.[33] Even the virulently anti-Ukrainian Mikhail Katkov admitted, in the course of a press battle with Kostomarov in the summer of 1863, that his opponent was 'not in any kind of relationship with the Polish insurrectionists' and had goals which were 'quite different' from theirs.[34]

When, therefore, certain Russians argued that hindering the development of Ukrainian culture was necessary because Ukrainiana were pro-Polish, they were probably pretending. Although the argument made it easier for them to get what they wanted, their real reason for worrying about Ukrainians lay elsewhere. They may not have seen as clearly as Kostomarov that the notion of solidarity between Ukrainians and Poles was 'very funny, if it were not so offensive',[35] but they knew that Ukrainians were unlikely to go over to the Polish camp. To judge by the regime's willingness, in 1876, to give ground to Austria on Balkan matters only just after promulgating the third of the anti-Ukrainian decrees,[36] it was also not very offended by the relative generosity with which Ukrainians were treated by Vienna. The question of the relationship between Ukrainians in the Habsburg Monarchy and the Russian Empire became problematic in dealings between Austria and Russia immediately prior to the First World War,[37] but it was not problematic enough to complicate dealings between St Petersburg and Vienna at the time Russia's hostility to Ukrainian culture was at its peak.

It is equally doubtful whether Russia believed Ukrainian intellectuals had the capacity to mount effective conspiracies. The Third Department concluded in 1847 that the Kiev-based circle whose exposure occasioned the first of the anti-Ukrainian edicts possessed only three real members and fell apart in 1846.[38] The arrests to which Valuev referred in making the case for the second of the three edicts took place not immediately before he composed his memorandum but in 1860 and 1862. No-one was arrested at the time of the third decree in 1876. When the Governor-General of the provinces of Kiev, Podillia and Volyn' argued for the removal of the constraints on Ukrainian-language publishing in 1881, he rested his case on the proposition that 'Ukrainophile activity in the sense of political separatism' was trivial and had no

chance whatever of attracting mass support.[39] With the exception of the newspaper closed down by St Petersburg in 1876, none of the decrees banned 'high-brow' Ukrainophile publications (the sort potential 'conspirators' wrote for each other). Katkov saw nothing reprehensible in Ukrainian-language novels like Kulish's *The Black Council* (*Chorna rada*) as he believed 'no-one reads them and even those that do don't understand them'.[40] In the 1880s and 1890s, when the authorities' scrutiny of publications in Ukrainian was at its most attentive, educated Ukrainians succeeded in publishing the Russian-language journal *Kievskaia starina*, one of the most significant of all Ukraine-centred historical periodicals. Whatever the three decrees may say to the contrary, St Petersburg seems to have understood that the political ideas of educated Ukrainians in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire did not greatly threaten the empire's unity.[41]

Thus there seems to be a gap between the severity of Russia's Ukrainian policy and the explanatory power of the two customary ways of looking at it. Bridging the gap is the purpose of the remainder of this article.

A third approach to Russia's Ukrainian policy may be teased out of a document in the file on the edict of 1876.[42] Entitled 'On the damage caused by the literary activity of Ukrainophiles and ways of averting it' ('O vrede literaturnoi deiatel'nosti Ukrainofilov i merakh k ego otvrashcheniiu'), this unsigned and undated memorandum may be attributed on the basis of internal evidence to the Main Press Administration. Although, up to a point, the document confirms the two customary approaches to the explanation of Russia's late nineteenth-century Ukrainian policy, it also suggests an approach which I call 'demographic'.

'One of the most important tasks of the censorship', the memorandum began, 'is to guard the state against the encroachments on its unity and existing structure which can crop up in the sphere of the printed word.' Encroachments of this kind were 'indirect' and took the form of 'various doctrines which superficially contain nothing political and seem to relate only to the sphere of purely academic and artistic interests'. The 'literary activity of the so-called Ukrainophiles, which is centred at present in Kiev', was a case in point. Enthusiasts for Ukrainian culture appeared to want nothing more than to educate 'the Little Russian common people'. In pursuit of their goal they published Ukrainian-language readers. 'In addition, they express the desire to raise this dialect of

the common people to the level of a literary language.' Writing in Ukrainian was not new, but the latest authors differed from their predecessors in that 'the notion of separating Little Russia from the rest of Russia' was 'not just an undercurrent' in their work, but found 'open expression' in it. The separation that Ukrainophiles envisaged would prove to be not merely cultural but political, 'for nothing divides people as much as differences in speech and writing. Permitting the creation of a special literature for the common people in the Ukrainian dialect would signify collaborating in the alienation of Ukraine from the rest of Russia'.

Ukrainophiles justified their actions, the memorandum went on, by comparing themselves with devotees of the Provençal and Breton languages in France. The comparisons were inappropriate, however, for three reasons: Breton was unrelated to French (whereas the author of the memorandum believed that Ukrainian was a dialect of Russian); Provençal had once had a rich literature; 'and . . . the population of Brittany and . . . [Provence] . . . is far from constituting such a significant percentage of the overall population of France as Little Russians make up of the overall total of the Russian people'. Elaborating on this third reason, the author of the memorandum said that the emergence of literature in Latvian, 'for example', posed no threat to the integrity of the Russian Empire because there were only just over a million Latvians; 'but to permit the separation (*obosoblenie*) . . . of thirteen million Little Russians would be the utmost political carelessness, especially in view of the unifying movement which is going on alongside us among the German tribe'.

The author of the memorandum then turned to developments on the Russian Empire's frontier with Austria. He believed that an additional reason why the activities of Ukrainophiles in Kiev were dangerous was that they coincided with the activities of Ukrainophiles in east Galicia. The latter

> . . . speak constantly of the fifteen-million-strong South Russian people as if it were something distinct from the other branches of the Russian trunk, something whose destiny is going to be special (*chemu predstoiat v budushchem osobye sud'by*). Sooner or later this opinion will drive the Galician Ukrainophiles, and subsequently ours, into the arms of the Poles, who are right to see in the separatist aspirations of Ukrainophiles a movement which is in the highest degree useful for their own 'Polish business'.

In the light of these arguments, the author of the memorandum

proposed five steps: a ban on the import of Ukrainian-language popular readers published by Galician Ukrainophiles; prohibition of the publication in the Russian Empire of all books in Ukrainian designed for the common people; prohibition of translations from Russian into Ukrainian; the introduction of a requirement that Ukrainian-language books aimed at sections of the Ukrainian community other than the common people be printed in the Russian rather than the Ukrainian variant of Cyrillic; and rejection of the notion of employing the Ukrainian language in teaching 'any subjects whatever' in Ukrainian primary schools.

In that this memorandum of 1876 took the 'literary activity of the so-called Ukrainophiles' as its point of departure and argued that the 'separatist aspirations of Ukrainophiles' assisted the Poles, it confirms the two customary interpretations of Russia's late nineteenth-century Ukrainian policy: St Petersburg deplored the proto-nationalist activities of Ukrainian intellectuals and feared subversion of the empire's Ukrainian community by non-Ukrainians. The memorandum also reveals, however, that the regime feared Ukrainians because of their number. Whereas publication in Latvian could be permitted because Latvians were few, popular reading matter in Ukrainian had to be prohibited because Ukrainians were many. The point of banning books in Ukrainian designed for the common people, and making sure that Ukrainian was not employed as a medium of instruction in primary schools, was to prevent Ukrainians at large from developing a sense of their ethnic identity.

In other words, Russia's hostility to Ukrainian culture in the second half of the nineteenth century derived at least in part from the authorities' fear of the empire's Ukrainian community as a whole. To explain why St Petersburg had cause to be frightened, the next section takes the form of a demographic and social profile of Russia's Ukrainians. The final section returns to the educational dimension of the anti-Ukrainian edicts. The chain of argument implies that St Petersburg thought of demographic weight and education as a particularly explosive mixture.

## II

Ukrainians were the Russian Empire's second-largest ethnic group. The census of 1897 gave their number as 22,380,551, or

17.81 per cent of the total imperial population. Russians, the largest group, made up 44.31 per cent of the population; Poles, the third-largest, only 6.31 per cent.[43] In view of the fact that the census defined ethnicity by native language rather than self-identification, the percentage of Russians was almost certainly too high, the figure for Ukrainians too low. Modern investigators have estimated that the true number of Ukrainians ruled by St Petersburg in 1897 was not 22.4 but 25.3 million.[44]

Ukrainians were not only numerous but geographically concentrated. Table 1 shows that nearly three-quarters of them lived in eight contiguous provinces to the north of the Black Sea (the 'Ukrainian heartland'). Each of these eight provinces, and no others, contained an absolute majority of Ukrainians, at least a million Ukrainian-speakers, and at least 5 per cent of the total number of the Russian Empire's Ukrainian inhabitants. Nearly two-thirds of the empire's remaining Ukrainians lived in the twelve provinces with which the heartland had borders (the 'Ukrainian borderland'). Fewer than 10 per cent of the Ukrainians enumerated in 1897 lived in regions other than the heartland and the borderland, and more than two-fifths of these lived in the Kuban', which abutted on the borderland.

Ukrainians grew in number more rapidly than many other peoples of the Russian Empire. Even without taking into account the fact that Russia annexed millions of Ukrainians from Poland in the partitions of 1772, 1793 and 1795, the Ukrainian percentage of the empire's total population increased to a greater extent in the eighteenth century than the percentage of any other ethnic group.[45] Ukrainians' rate of increase continued to be high in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Whereas, for example, the total population of the empire went up 36.9 per cent between 1897 and 1917 (from 125.6 million to 172 million), the number of Ukrainians went up 38.6 per cent (from 22.4 to 31.0 million).[46] Whereas the rate of natural population growth in the empire west of the Urals but excluding Poland and the Caucasus was 18.4 per cent between 1897 and 1906 and 15.4 per cent between 1907 and 1916, in left-bank Ukraine (the provinces of Chernihiv, Poltava and Kharkiv to the east of the river Dnieper) the equivalent growth rates were 20.6 per cent and 17.6 per cent. In right-bank Ukraine (the provinces of Kiev, Volyn and Podillia to the west of the river Dnieper) the rates were somewhat lower at 19.5 per cent and 15.4 per cent, but only the second of these figures failed to

**Table 1**
**Geographical Distribution of Ukrainians According to the Census of the Russian Empire, January 1897**

| Province or larger locality | Total population | Number of Ukrs | Ukrs as % local population | Ukrs as % total number of Ukrs |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Empire as a whole | 125,640,021 | 22,380,551 | 17.81 | 100 |
| **Ukrainian heartland** | | | | |
| Chernihiv | 2,297,854 | 1,526,072 | 66.41 | 6.82 |
| Katerynoslav | 2,113,674 | 1,456,369 | 68.90 | 6.51 |
| Kharkiv | 2,492,316 | 2,009,411 | 80.62 | 8.98 |
| Kherson | 2,733,612 | 1,462,039 | 53.48 | 6.53 |
| Kiev | 3,559,229 | 2,819,145 | 79.21 | 12.60 |
| Podillia | 3,018,299 | 2,442,819 | 80.93 | 10.91 |
| Poltava | 2,778,151 | 2,583,133 | 92.98 | 11.54 |
| Volyn' | 2,989,482 | 2,095,579 | 70.09 | 9.36 |
| *Total* | 21,982,617 | 16,394,567 | 74.58 | 73.25 |
| **Ukrainian borderland** | | | | |
| Bessarabia | 1,935,412 | 379,698 | 19.62 | 1.70 |
| Don | 2,564,238 | 719,655 | 28.07 | 3.22 |
| Grodno | 1,603,409 | 362,526 | 22.61 | 1.62 |
| Kursk | 2,371,012 | 527,778 | 22.26 | 2.36 |
| Lublin | 1,160,662 | 196,476 | 16.92 | 0.88 |
| Minsk | 2,147,621 | 10,069 | 0.47 | 0.46 |
| Mogilev | 1,686,764 | 3,559 | 0.21 | 0.02 |
| Orel | 2,033,798 | 4,174 | 0.21 | 0.02 |
| Siedlce | 772,146 | 107,785 | 13.96 | 0.48 |
| Smolensk | 1,525,279 | 1,374 | 0.09 | 0.01 |
| Taurida | 1,447,790 | 611,121 | 42.21 | 2.73 |
| Voronezh | 2,531,253 | 915,883 | 36.18 | 4.09 |
| *Total* | 21,779,384 | 3,840,098 | 17.63 | 17.16 |
| **Other parts of the empire** | | | | |
| Kuban' | 1,918,881 | 908,818 | 47.36 | 4.06 |
| Remainder of empire west of Urals[1] | 66,453,599 | 912,183 | 1.37 | 4.08 |
| Siberia[2] | 5,758,822 | 223,274 | 3.88 | 1.00 |
| Central Asia[3] | 7,746,718 | 101,611 | 1.31 | 0.45 |
| *Total* | 81,878,020 | 2,145,886 | 2.62 | 9.59 |

*Source*: *Obshchii svod* (n. 43), II: 20, 37–8, 55.

*Notes*: [1]Fifty provinces (everywhere west of the Urals and north of the Persian and Ottoman Empires apart from the twenty-one provinces already dealt with). The figures in the first two columns on this line were arrived at by adding together the relevant figures for the Ukrainian heartland, the Ukrainian borderland and the Kuban', and subtracting the results from the relevant totals given in the census but not adduced here for 'European Russia', the 'Vistula provinces' and the Caucasus, the three macro-regions into which the presenters of the census data divided the empire west of the Urals.
[2]Nine provinces.
[3]Nine provinces.

exceed the figure for the larger area.[47] 'Within the boundaries of the Russian Empire of the 1720s the proportion of Ukrainians went up by almost two-fifths from 1719 to 1917, from 12.9 per cent to 17.7 per cent.'[48] Taking the boundaries of the late nineteenth century rather than those of the 1720s as the basis for geographical comparison, the proportion of Ukrainians in the total population of the empire went up from 16.4 per cent in 1719 to 17.3 per cent in 1917.[49]

Ukrainians had a well developed propensity to move outwards from their heartland. When Kliuchevskii made his celebrated remark that 'The history of Russia [i.e. the Russian Empire] is the history of a country which is colonizing itself',[50] he failed to point out that many of the colonizers were non-Russian. Between the 1720s and the 1770s Ukrainians established themselves in Kherson, Katerynoslav, Voronezh, and the lower Volga.[51] At the end of the eighteenth century they began to penetrate the North Caucasus. Former Zaporozhian Cossacks and migrants from provinces east of the river Dnieper established a Ukrainian near-majority in the Kuban' shortly after it was designated 'The Land of the Black Sea Host' in 1792. Ukrainians constituted 2.4 per cent of the total population of the North Caucasus in 1795, 18.6 per cent in 1858 and 33.6 per cent in 1897.[52] In the last twenty years of the imperial period, Ukrainians migrated in significant numbers to Kazakhstan, Siberia and the Far East. In 1917 they constituted more than 40 per cent of the population of the two provinces nearest to the Pacific Ocean (Amur and Primor'e).[53] Whereas only 0.03 per cent of the total population of Siberia was Ukrainian in 1859, 9.39 per cent of Siberians were Ukrainian in the year the Romanovs fell.[54] To say that Russians 'overwhelmingly predominated' in migration to the peripheries of the Russian Empire between 1861 and 1917[55] is to obscure the facts that between 1897 and 1916 Poltava ranked first among imperial provinces as a source of migrants and Ukrainians constituted more than a third of all those who left their homes to settle elsewhere.[56]

It is true that, from the point of view of the maintenance of a Ukrainian ethnic identity, migration appears on the negative as well as the positive side of the ledger. Departures reduced the ethnic cohesion of the Ukrainian heartland. In the mid-eighteenth century Belorussians and Russian Old Believers took the place of native migrants in northern parts of left-bank Ukraine.[57] As the Russian administration consolidated its hold on central Ukraine—

**Table 2**
**Ukrainians in Towns According to the Census of the Russian Empire, January 1897**

| Province or larger locality | Total in towns | Ukrs in towns | Ukrs in towns as % total in towns | Ukrs in towns as % Ukrs in locality | Non-Ukrs in towns as % non-Ukrs in locality |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Empire as a whole | 16,828,395 | 1,256,387 | 7.47 | 5.61 | 15.08 |
| **Ukrainian heartland** | | | | | |
| Chernihiv | 209,453 | 102,184 | 48.79 | 6.70 | 13.90 |
| Katerynoslav | 241,005 | 65,166 | 27.04 | 4.47 | 26.75 |
| Kharkiv | 367,343 | 198,774 | 54.11 | 9.89 | 34.91 |
| Kherson | 788,960 | 135,862 | 17.22 | 9.29 | 51.36 |
| Kiev | 459,253 | 129,354 | 28.17 | 4.59 | 44.58 |
| Podillia | 221,870 | 72,188 | 32.54 | 2.96 | 26.01 |
| Poltava | 274,294 | 156,752 | 57.15 | 6.07 | 60.27 |
| Volyn' | 233,847 | 46,060 | 19.70 | 2.20 | 21.01 |
| *Total* | 2,796,025 | 906,340 | 32.42 | 5.53 | 33.82 |
| **Ukrainian borderland** | | | | | |
| Bessarabia | 293,332 | 46,214 | 15.75 | 12.17 | 15.88 |
| Don | 318,693 | 20,958 | 6.58 | 2.91 | 16.14 |
| Grodno | 254,591 | 5,925 | 2.33 | 1.63 | 20.04 |
| Kursk | 221,527 | 25,544 | 11.53 | 4.84 | 10.63 |
| Lublin | 160,824 | 7,652 | 4.76 | 3.89 | 15.89 |
| Minsk | 224,945 | 1,559 | 0.69 | 15.48 | 10.45 |
| Mogilev | 147,187 | 1,157 | 0.79 | 32.51 | 8.68 |
| Orel | 244,008 | 767 | 0.31 | 18.38 | 11.98 |
| Siedlce | 117,699 | 2,681 | 2.28 | 2.49 | 17.31 |
| Smolensk | 120,895 | 1,238 | 1.02 | 90.10 | 7.85 |
| Taurida | 289,316 | 30,197 | 10.44 | 4.94 | 30.97 |
| Voronezh | 169,632 | 28,687 | 16.91 | 3.13 | 8.72 |
| *Total* | 2,562,649 | 172,579 | 6.73 | 4.49 | 13.32 |
| **Other parts of the empire** | | | | | |
| Kuban' | 221,208 | 72,560 | 32.80 | 7.98 | 14.72 |
| Remainder of empire west of Urals | 9,828,376 | 81,363 | 0.83 | 8.92 | 14.87 |
| Siberia | 485,767 | 7,881 | 1.62 | 3.53 | 8.63 |
| Central Asia | 934,370 | 15,664 | 1.68 | 15.42 | 12.02 |
| *Total* | 11,469,721 | 177,468 | 1.55 | 8.27 | 14.16 |

*Source*: *Obshchii svod* (n. 43), II: 56, 73–4, 91.

a feature, above all, of the second half of the eighteenth century[58]—some of the Ukrainians of the heartland began showing a tendency to identify themselves as Russians. Russians constituted only 2.2 per cent of the population of left-bank Ukraine in 1719, but 12.8 per cent in 1917.[59] Ukrainians constituted 95.9 per cent of the population of left-bank Ukraine in 1719, but only 81.6 per cent in 1917. Over the same 200-year period Ukrainians on the right bank of the Dnieper declined from 86.0 per cent of the local population to 77.8 per cent.[60]

These developments, however, need to be set in context. About 1.4 million Ukrainian inhabitants of the tsarist empire seem to have 'russified' between the 1860s and the 1890s.[61] This was a small figure by comparison with the total number of the empire's Ukrainian inhabitants. A remarkable feature of Ukrainian communities outside the Ukrainian heartland was their capacity to retain their Ukrainian identity. The Soviet dissident Anatolii Marchenko, whose grandfather moved from the province of Kharkiv to Siberia not long before the revolutions of 1917, said that the inhabitants of his Siberian village considered themselves to be Russians by the 1960s, but that 'residents of nearby villages still taunt [them] with the epithet *khokhly*, the Ukrainians'. The neighbours could justify their point of view by observing that the language of Marchenko's village remained 'a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian'.[62]

Whatever the extent to which russification acted on the Ukrainians of the Russian Empire, it acted less powerfully on them than polonization acted on the Ukrainians of Austria–Hungary. In east Galicia, the prime location of Ukrainian subjects of the Habsburgs, the Ukrainian proportion of the local population declined from 78.6 per cent in 1800 to 58.8 per cent in 1931. A specialist on the demographic history of the region discusses the possibilities that the natural growth rate of Ukrainians in east Galicia was smaller than that of their ethnic competitors, and that a disproportionate number of Ukrainians emigrated, but concludes that the major reason for the reduction in the Ukrainians' share of the local population was a tendency on their part to opt for non-Ukrainian cultures.[63] Ukrainian inhabitants of the Russian Empire adopted the ethnic identity of their rulers at a slower rate than their Galician cousins.

It can be argued, therefore, that, from the point of view of numbers, geographical concentration, growth rate and migration

patterns, Ukrainians had the potential to become a thorn in the Russians' side. On the other hand, the social composition of the Ukrainian community suggests that it ought to have been strongly susceptible to Russian management. Even in the provinces where Ukrainians were numerically preponderant, they carried little weight in centres of administrative, economic and cultural activity. Table 2 indicates by province and larger locality how few of them lived in towns at the time of the census of 1897. Although, at the end of the nineteenth century, Ukrainians constituted more than one in six of the Russian Empire's total population, they represented fewer than one in thirteen of its town-dwellers. Kharkiv and Poltava were the only provinces in which more than 50 per cent of the inhabitants of towns were Ukrainian. About one in three of the town-dwellers of the Ukrainian heartland was Ukrainian, but only about one in eighteen Ukrainians of the heartland was a town-dweller. Ukrainian town-dwellers preferred small towns to big ones. 'Poltava, a town of very localized social and economic influence, was the only city with over 50,000 inhabitants and the only provincial capital in which Ukrainians constituted a majority.'[64] Towns in Ukraine embodied the culture not of Ukrainians but of Russians, Poles, Jews, Germans, Greeks and Armenians.

Nearly nineteen out of every twenty Ukrainian inhabitants of the late nineteenth-century Russian Empire lived in the countryside. The 1897 census recorded that, by the criterion of legal estate, about 91 per cent of Ukrainians were peasants. A slightly smaller percentage were peasants by occupation, but both percentages were significantly higher than the equivalent percentages for Russians, Poles or the total population of the empire. Only 0.46 per cent of the tsar's subjects who identified themselves as Ukrainian-speakers in 1897 were hereditary or personal gentry. It is hardly surprising, in the light of these figures, that Ukrainians' educational attainments were meagre. At 18.9 per cent, the proportion of their number over the age of ten who could read in 1897 was more than ten percentage points lower than that of Russians, more than twenty points lower than that of Poles, and more than seventy points lower than that of Estonians. In 1897, only 0.36 per cent of the Russian Empire's Ukrainian inhabitants had progressed beyond primary school.[65]

Thus, whatever the number of Ukrainians, whatever their geographical concentration, reproductive capacity and physical

mobility, they appeared to lack the attributes—urban presence, social differentiation, education—which might have put them in a position to challenge their rulers. Nevertheless, Ukrainian peasants posed the authorities many problems. In the provinces of Kiev, Volyn' and Podillia in 1848 they took strong exception to the 'inventory reform' of D. G. Bibikov.[66] In the province of Kiev in 1855 they tried even harder than peasants in other parts of the empire to put self-serving interpretations on an edict which called for volunteers to fight in the Crimea.[67] The main collection of documents on peasant disturbances in the nineteenth-century Russian Empire refers to the provinces of Podillia and Chernihiv more frequently than any others in its volumes for the years from 1859 to 1901.[68] After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861, Ukrainian peasants in Poltava displayed an almost perverse reluctance to sign the agreements which entitled them to acquire gentry land.[69] In 1874, a peasant in the Chyhyryn district of the province of Kiev told the populist revolutionary Ekaterina Breshko-Breshkovskaia that the way to deal with the authorities was 'to write a charter and distribute it throughout the country, to bring about a mass uprising'.[70] Three years later, he was almost proved right. By circulating a forged 'Golden Charter' in Chyhyryn, the Ukrainian populist Iakiv Stefanovych attracted more peasants to his banner than any contemporary political activist. The prosecution which resulted at Kiev in June 1879 was the only populist trial at which peasants constituted a majority in the dock.[71] By the end of the nineteenth century, the peasants of Poltava were discovering how misguided they had been to respond obstructively to the emancipation statutes of 1861. Their obstructionism and the increase in their numbers made land in the province ever harder to obtain. A modern enquiry into the adequacy of peasant landholdings in fifty provinces of the Russian Empire in 1905 puts Poltava second from bottom.[72] In 1902 Poltava turned to violence. The 'miniature revolution' there and in Kharkiv alarmed the empire's central authorities to such an extent that they made empire-wide changes in their handling of rural affairs.[73] When the changes proved counter-productive and widespread agrarian disturbances took place in 1905, Ukrainian peasants again figured prominently.[74] Peasant status, therefore, did not prevent Ukrainians from giving the regime many headaches.

These headaches, however, explain only part of St Petersburg's hostility to Ukrainian culture. Two arguments diminish their

importance. First, although the resistance of Ukrainian peasants to the activities of non-Ukrainian administrators was vigorous, it was declining. No disturbance in Russian Ukraine in the nineteenth century rivalled the uprising which took place in right-bank Ukraine in 1768 (when the region was in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth).[75] Second, very little Ukrainian resistance turned on a sense of ethnic difference. Although the Kiev peasants who tried to exploit the government's call for irregular troops in 1855 acted partly out of the conviction that the authorities were prepared to allow the re-emergence of Ukrainian Cossacks, the Kiev peasants who rallied to the cause of Iakiv Stefanovych twenty years later appear to have done so for economic reasons rather than because they felt antipathy towards Russians.[76] In September 1905, the British vice-consul at Mykolaiv concluded after a first-hand investigation of agrarian disorder in various Ukrainian provinces that 'The peasant cares for no political question other than the improvement of his own condition, and the movement is therefore only political in so far as it has been exploited for political purposes.'[77]

It is not essential, of course, to demonstrate that Ukrainian peasants were ethnically aware in order to argue that fear of the Ukrainian peasantry played a significant part in anti-Ukrainian edicts. Some evidence hints that the authorities believed Ukrainians' sense of their ethnic identity was better developed than it was. When Russians called Ukrainians 'Little Russians' they implied that the differences between the two peoples were slight, but when legislation was particularly important to them they adapted it to Ukrainian circumstances.[78] When they needed to eliminate or forestall the possibility of disorder, the more sensible among them took the trouble to explain government policy in Ukrainian.[79] Sometimes Russians even credited Ukrainian peasants with political awareness. In 1848, for example, officials mistakenly expected an excited reaction on the part of the Russian Empire's Ukrainians to the contemporary emancipation of Ukrainian serfs in Austria.[80] Thus, Russians could treat Ukrainian peasants as if they were different from Russians, even when the need to do so may not have been very great.

## III

Having shown (at the end of section I) that at least one significant Russian official thought the empire's Ukrainians had to be treated differently from other non-Russians because of their number, and having explained (in section II) why the size and nature of the empire's Ukrainian community rendered it potentially and actually troublesome, I return to St Petersburg's anti-Ukrainian edicts of 1847, 1863 and 1876. The notion that their unusual severity had less to do with Poles, Vienna and the supposedly conspiratorial activities of Ukrainian intellectuals than with an unusually high commitment on the part of the imperial regime to the maintenance of order among Ukrainians in general, receives support from the fact that all three decrees stemmed, in part, from the regime's determination to prevent Ukrainian intellectuals from facilitating the extension of Ukrainian primary education. One of the authorities' principal concerns in legislating on Ukrainian culture appears to have been preventing a Ukrainian minority from reaching out to the Ukrainian majority. Schools, and above all native-language schools, threatened to serve the minority's purpose.

In the course of investigating the Kirillo-Methodian Society in 1847, the Third Department discovered that its plans included disseminating 'the idea of freedom' among schoolchildren. The statute of the society urged 'the universal dissemination of literacy'. One of the society's members devoted special attention to the question of schools for Ukrainian peasants. Another proposed the composition of Ukrainian-language textbooks. An associate suggested that the publication of such books might be funded by public subscription.[81] The authorities found these interests disquieting. They thought that schools for the common people might become a conduit for 'criminal ideas'. Long before completing their enquiries, they transferred responsibility for schools in the Kiev educational district from the local educational hierarchy to the local governor-general.[82] The last general point in the police report on the Kiev circle was that its members threatened to 'implant depravity in the generation that is growing up and prepare the ground for future disturbances'.[83] Although educating Ukrainian peasants was only one of the Kirillo-Methodians' objectives, it is conceivable that it worried the authorities as much as the Kievans' better-known commitment to the abstract concept of Slavonic federalism.[84]

Impeding Ukrainian-language primary education was the central purpose of the edict of 1863. St Petersburg returned the schools of the Kiev educational district to the local educational authorities in 1856.[85] In the same year it embarked on a long process of reflection and consultation which eventually gave rise to the pan-imperial statute on primary education of July 1864. Whether to permit instruction in languages other than Russian was one of the questions which, in the course of this process, bureaucrats found difficult to resolve.[86] In October 1859 the Orthodox Church began rapidly expanding its network of parish schools in right-bank Ukraine.[87] In the same month, Nikolai Pirogov approved the foundation in Kiev of the Russian Empire's first Sunday schools.[88] Ukrainian intellectuals tried to profit from these developments. Panteleimon Kulish, Taras Shevchenko and others wrote native-language textbooks for use in primary schools.[89] Kostomarov started a campaign to raise funds for the publication of additional instructional literature in Ukrainian.[90]

Russians were critical. Within months of the appearance of Shevchenko's *South Russian Primer* in early 1861, the censors objected to the possibility of its widespread use in Ukrainian parish schools on the grounds that 'The publication both of this booklet and of others like it, i.e. works written in Little Russian for the common people of Little Russia, betrays an intention . . . to call back to life the Little Russian nationality'.[91] When attacking Kostomarov in the Moscow press in 1863, Katkov argued that because Ukrainians were so numerous their cultural development had to be monitored with great care; after literacy in a language other than Russian had been 'thrust upon eleven million people', the extirpation of the resultant 'evil' would require the use of force.[92] Valuev's intervention as Minister of Internal Affairs stemmed from a letter he received from the Kiev censors which objected to the plethora of Ukrainian-language schoolbooks they were being called upon to scrutinize.[93] The minister commissioned a paper on the question whether the regime's forthcoming law on primary schools would permit instruction in non-Russian languages.[94] Having learned from it that the question awaited resolution, he decided, in respect of Ukraine, to act unilaterally. The title of the memorandum he submitted to the tsar, 'On Books Published for the People in the Little Russian Dialect', made clear that what worried him about recent cultural developments in Ukraine was literature designed for use in primary schools.

Proponents of a distinctive Ukrainian identity, he said, were trying to publish works intended for the common people. 'The former Professor Kostomarov is even collecting donations in St Petersburg for the publication of cheap books in the south-Russian dialect.' It was unclear whether the forthcoming statute on primary schools would permit education in languages other than Russian. So far as Ukraine was concerned, action ought to be taken immediately. 'Artistic' (i.e. high-brow) literature in Ukrainian could continue to appear, but literature designed for use in primary education ought to be forbidden.[95] As Mykhailo Drahomanov said in the 1870s, it remained possible after 1863 to publish poetry and fiction in Ukrainian and even to translate Hegel into the language, but 'it became impossible to print what would have been real sustenance for the people'.[96]

The decree of 1876 appears at first sight to have been occasioned by high-brow rather than low-brow Ukrainophilism. Mikhail Iuzefovich denounced Ukraine-orientated intellectuals in the Kiev section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society and on the editorial board of the newspaper *Kievskii telegraf*.[97] Iuzefovich objected, however, not only to the high-brow but to the low-brow activities of Ukrainophiles. He deplored their enthusiasm for distributing 'tendentious publications' at 'trifling prices' (which put the publications within the reach of non-intellectuals as well as the sophisticated).[98] In suspecting that those whom he castigated wanted to forge links between themselves and unprivileged Ukrainians, he was right. Although the Ukrainophiles of the 1870s spent most of their time on the scholarly pursuit of Ukrainian ethnography, history, archaeology, music, literature and language, the underlying purpose of all their work and the explicit purpose of some of it was to benefit Ukrainians at large. In an attack on hostile Poles, Drahomanov wrote that 'what you call peasants (*khlopami*) we consider the foundation of our fatherland, and from this flow all our conclusions on social, national, domestic, and foreign affairs!'.[99] In emigration Drahomanov expressed particular regret that the edict of 1876 brought to an end the dissemination of the tens of thousands of cheap booklets he and his colleagues had made available to Ukrainian peasants in 1874 and 1875.[100]

Scrutiny of the bureaucratic process from which the 1876 edict emerged confirms the impression that what most agitated St Petersburg about Ukrainian intellectuals in the late nineteenth

century was their interest in promoting, by means of education, a specifically Ukrainian consciousness among Ukrainian peasants. Not only Iuzefovich but representatives of the Main Press Administration, the Third Department and the Ministry of Education sat on the commission which drew up the edict. We have seen already that, in the opinion of the Main Press Administration, one reason why Ukrainian culture had to be policed with care was the particularly significant danger that could arise from the exposure of an uneducated community of thirteen million to the views of their educated co-nationals. Since the Third Department's input into the 1876 process seems to have derived entirely from information it was collecting about a Ukrainophile activist who was giving away low-brow Ukrainian publications to peasants in the province of Volyn',[101] the attitude of the police may be said to have been similar to that of the censors. Although the Minister of Education made no written contribution to the deliberations of the 1876 commission (perhaps because he felt discretion was the better part of valour), he accepted the other members' insistence on the need for 'the most careful and scrupulous selection of teachers' in the southern part of the empire and agreed with their view that teachers who had received their training in the Kiev, Kharkiv and Odesa educational districts ought to be required to teach in provinces other than those in which they graduated.[102]

The final recommendations of the commission of 1876 included not only the four steps explicitly ordered under Alexander II's decree but also the surveillance of teachers in Ukrainian primary schools, the removal from Ukrainian school libraries of the sort of Ukrainian literature the government found reprehensible (i.e. literature designed to be accessible to peasants, since publications of an 'artistic' kind remained permissible), the formal investigation of the cultural allegiance of Ukrainian teachers and the substitution of teachers from Russia for Ukrainian teachers whose outlook was particularist.[103] Since the tsar approved all the commission's recommendations (not just those that found their way into the edict), the government clearly took the educational concerns of the 1876 investigators seriously.

After 1876 it took them more seriously than ever. By frequently referring to the 1876 recommendations in full,[104] bureaucrats showed clear awareness of their educational dimension. One of the two provincial governors who advocated reducing the constraints on Ukrainian-language publishing in 1881 excepted

instructional literature from his recommendations. 'The replacement of Russian by Little Russian in teaching,' he said, 'threatens innumerable complications and dangerous alterations in the state structure of united Russia'.[105] The 1895 codicil to the 1876 decree made explicit the point that was only strongly implied by the original ban—that books in Ukrainian designed for children were to be prevented from appearing in print 'even if their contents were essentially well intentioned'.[106] A Ukrainian grammar which had already been printed in an academic journal was prevented from appearing as a separate publication in 1900 'in view of the Main Press Administration's repeated instructions not to permit teaching books in the Little Russian dialect'.[107] The imperial authorities' refusal, in 1908 and 1909, to yield to pressure from members of the Third Duma for legislation to facilitate native-language education in Ukraine was just another expression of the line they had been pursuing for decades.[108]

Thus it seems reasonable to set the anti-Ukrainian edicts of the late tsarist period in three contexts rather than two. Although they issued in part from the government's fear of Poles and Ukrainian intellectuals, they also stemmed from St Petersburg's concern for the long-term cultural orientation of Ukrainians in general. Russians had demonstrated in the first half of the nineteenth century that they were not opposed to Ukrainophilia *per se*. What worried them was Ukrainophilia of a certain type. They were alarmed by the emergence among an educated Ukrainian minority of concern for the uneducated majority. In view of the size of the problem that St Petersburg would have had to face if Ukrainian peasants had proved receptive to the ideals of Ukrainian intellectuals, it is easy to understand why the regime thought suppressing low-brow literature in Ukrainian was particularly important. When, in the early 1920s, the Ukrainians of the former Russian Empire acquired the right to receive primary education in their native language, the consequences for the youthful Soviet Union were enormous. The process known as 'indigenization' transformed Ukraine within a decade.[109] Stalin arrested it, but in ways and at a cost no tsar could have imagined.[110]

## Notes

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1. See Vasyl' Sypovsk'kyi, 'Ukraina v rosiis'komu pys'menstvi: Chastyna I (1801–1850rr.)', *Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukrains'koi Akademii nauk*, 58 (1928), passim; A. I. Komarov, 'Ukrainskii iazyk, fol'klor i literatura v russkom obshchestve nachala XIX veka', *Uchenye zapiski leningradskogo universiteta, Seriia filologicheskikh nauk*, 4 (1939), 124–58; David Saunders, *The Ukrainian Impact on Russian Culture 1750–1850* (Edmonton 1985), esp. 145–230; and Paul Bushkovitch, 'The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals', *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 39 (1991), 339–63.

2. D. Bahalii, 'Novi dzherela pro Kyrylo-Metodiivs'ke bratstvo', *Nashe mynule*, 1918, no. 2, 179.

3. St Petersburg, Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv (hereafter RGIA), *fond* (hereafter f.) 775 (Central Censorship Administration), *opis'* (hereafter op.) 1, *delo* (hereafter d.) 188, *listy* (hereafter ll.), 13–14.

4. RGIA, f. 776 (Main Press Administration), op. 11, *god* (hereafter g.) 1876, d. 61b, *list* (hereafter l.) 1; Anon. (V. Naumenko), 'Do istorii ukaza 1876 roku pro zaboronu ukrains'koho pys'menstva', *Ukraina*, 1907 no. 5, first pagination, 150–1.

5. RGIA, *loc. cit.*, l. 87 (reduction of the constraints on acting in Ukrainian and concession of the right to publish Ukrainian dictionaries).

6. S. N. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie, kak sovremennyi etap iuzhnorusskogo separatizma* (Kiev 1912), 67–70 (prohibition of Ukrainian-language plays in the provinces of Volyn', Kiev, Podillia, Poltava and Chernihiv); RGIA, f. 776, op. 21, *chast'* (hereafter ch.) 1, g. 1900, d. 404, ll. 448–9 (prohibition of translations from Russian into Ukrainian and especially severe scrutiny of original works in Ukrainian in order to reduce their number 'simply for reasons of state'); ibid., f. 776, op. 11, g. 1876, d. 61a, l. 154 (prohibition of 'Little Russian books and miscellanies intended to be read by children').

7. RGIA, f. 777 (St Petersburg Censorship Committee), op. 1, g. 1853, d. 3210, l. 13.

8. I. Butych, 'M. I. Kostomarov i tsars'ka tsenzura', *Arkhivy Ukrainy*, 1967 no. 6, 60–70 (Kostomarov's battles with the censors between 1855 and 1863); RGIA, f. 772 (Main Censorship Administration), op. 1, d. 4619, and *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, ed. P. S. Sokhan' *et al.*, 3 vols. (Kiev 1990), III: 190 (the censors' refusal to let Kulish start a journal in 1858); P. Lobas, 'Ukrains'kyi literaturnyi zbirnyk v otsintsi peterburz'koi tsenzury', *Arkhivy Ukrainy*, 1968 no. 2, 74–80 (alterations required in a volume published by Mordovets'-Slipchenko in 1859).

9. M. Kostomarov, *Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia* (Kiev 1928), 246.

10. RGIA, f. 777, op. 3, g. 1876, d. 10, l. 17.

11. I. P. Foote, 'The St Petersburg Censorship Committee, 1828–1905', *Oxford Slavonic Papers*, n.s., 24 (1991), 94.

12. Daniel Balmuth, *Censorship in Russia, 1865–1905* (Washington 1979), 215.

13. The relevant files for 1898–1902 each contain about 400 folios: RGIA, f. 776, op. 21, ch. 1, g. 1898, d. 284; g. 1899, d. 343; g. 1900, d. 404; g. 1901, d. 479; g. 1902, d. 551.

14. RGIA, f. 776, op. 22, g. 1907, d. 14, l. 164.

15. On Russo-Ukrainian relations after the revolution of 1905, see Olga Andriewsky, 'The Politics of National Identity: The Ukrainian Question in Russia, 1904–12' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University 1991), 110–420.

16. RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, d. 4565, ll. 9–10.

17. V. Naumenko, 'K ukrainskomu voprosu', *Kievskaia starina*, 1905, no. 5, second pagination, 148–9.

18. RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, d. 188, l. 15; M. Lemke, *Epokha tsenzurnykh reform 1859–1865 godov* (St Petersburg 1904), 305.

19. RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, g. 1876, d. 61b, ll. 20–39; Anon., 'Naiblyzhchi vidhuky ukaza 1876 r. pro zaboronu ukrains'koho pys'menstva', *Ukraina*, 1907, no. 6, first pagination, 250–63.

20. K. Voenskii, 'Istoricheskaia zapiska . . . po voprosu ob ogranichitel'nykh rasporiazheniiakh, kasaiushchikhsia malorusskoi pis'mennosti', RGIA, f. 776, op. 21, ch. I, g. 1900, d. 404, l. 454.

21. Anon., *Ob otmene stesnenii malorusskogo pechatnogo slova* (Kiev 1914), 34, 41. Publishing Roman-alphabet works in Lithuanian had in fact been extremely difficult in the Russian Empire between 1865 and 1904: Andriewsky, 'The Politics of National Identity', 38–9.

22. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie*; Fedir Savchenko, *Zaborona ukrainstva 1876 r.* (Kiev 1930, repr. Munich 1970).

23. Marceli Handelsman, *Ukraińska polityka ks. Adama Czartoryskiego przed wojn Krymsk* (Warsaw 1937), 98–107, 122–8; Ievhen Rudnyts'kyi, 'Do istorii pol'skoho kozakofil'stva', *Za sto lit*, 1 (1927), 62–4; Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'Michał Czajkowski's Cossack Project During the Crimean War: An Analysis of Ideas', in idem, *Essays in Modern Ukrainian History* (Edmonton 1987), 173–86.

24. P. Kulish, 'Neskol'ko slov ot izdatelia', in idem, *Zapiski o luzhnoi Rusi*, 2 vols. (St Petersburg 1856–7), II: 308; George Luckyj, *Panteleimon Kulish* (Boulder 1983), 14–15; *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, II: 58, 614 n. 158; Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 375; Anon, 'Do istorii ukaza', 138.

25. RGIA, f. 772, op. 1, d. 4840, and f. 797 (Chancery of the Procurator of the Holy Synod), op. 29, 1 *otdelenie*, 2 *stol*, d. 158 (files on the appearance in Ukraine of Roman-alphabet Ukrainian primers); P. Annenkov, 'Iz Kieva', *Russkii vestnik: Sovremennaia letopis'*, 1862, no. 25, 4, n. 2.

26. G. I. Marakhov, *Pol'skoe vosstanie 1863g. na pravoberezhnoi Ukraine* (Kiev 1967), 178 and passim.

27. The standard introduction to the Ukrainians of Austria-Hungary in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries remains Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Ukrainians in Galicia Under Austrian Rule', in Andrei S. Markovits and Frank E. Sysyn, eds, *Nationbuilding and the Politics of Nationalism: Essays on Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, MA 1982), 23–67 (first published in 1967).

28. See, for example, M. Grushevskii (Hrushevs'kyi), 'Ukrainskii P'emont', in idem, *Ukrainskii vopros: stat'i* (Moscow 1917), 61–6 (first published in 1906).

29. RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, d. 188, ll. 4–5.

30. Ibid., f. 1282 (Chancery of the Ministry of Internal Affairs), op. 1, d. 352, ll. 47–52; Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 368–72.

31. N. I. Pirogov, 'O voskresnykh shkolakh', in idem, *Sochineniia*, 2 vols. (St Petersburg 1887), II: 224.

32. Shchegolev, *Ukrainskoe dvizhenie*, 59.

33. G. Marakhov, ed., *Obshchestvenno-politicheskoe dvizhenie na Ukraine v 1863–1864 gg.* (Kiev 1964), 46.

34. M. Katkov, 'Neskol'ko slov v otvet g. Kostomarovu', *Sovremennaia letopis'*, 1863 no. 24, 1.

35. Kostomarov, *Pysannia*, 160.

36. George Hoover Rupp, *A Wavering Friendship: Russia and Austria 1876–1878* (Cambridge, MA 1941, repr. Philadelphia 1976), 134–51; *The Great Powers and the Near East 1774–1923*, ed. M. S. Anderson (London 1970), 88–92.

37. See, for example, the alarmist closing pages of Henry Wickham Steed, *The Hapsburg Monarchy* (London 1913), 288–95.

38. *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, III: 376.

39. RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, g. 1876, d. 61b, ll. 21–2; Anon, 'Naiblyzhchi vidhuky', 251–2.

40. Katkov, 'Neskol'ko slov', 3.

41. For the reluctance with which educated Ukrainians turned to the doctrine of political separatism, see Ivan L. Rudnytsky, 'The Fourth Universal and its Ideological Antecedents', in Taras Hunczak, ed., *The Ukraine 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution* (Cambridge, MA 1977), 186–219.

42. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 23–32.

43. N. A. Troinitskii, ed., *Obshchii svod po imperii rezul'tatov razrabotki dannykh pervoi vseobshchei perepisi naseleniia, proizvedennoi 28 ianvaria 1897 goda*, 2 vols (St Petersburg 1905), II: 2, 19.

44. S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, 'Dinamika i etnicheskii sostav naseleniia Rossii v epokhu imperializma (Konets XIX v. – 1917g.)', *Istoriia SSSR*, 1980 no. 3, 91.

45. V. M. Kabuzan, *Narody Rossii v XVIII veke: Chislennost' i etnicheskii sostav* (Moscow 1990), 252.

46. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Dinamika i etnicheskii sostav', 86–90.

47. Ibid., 81.

48. S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, 'Chislennost' i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa v XVIII – nachale XX v.', *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, 1981 no. 5, 22.

49. Ibid., 19. This calculation records a lower percentage of Ukrainians in 1917 than the census recorded in 1897 (see Table 1), but the same authors calculate elsewhere that the proportion of Ukrainians in the Russian Empire in 1917 was not 17.3 per cent but 18.1 per cent: Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Migratsiia naseleniia Rossii v XVIII – nachale XX veka (Chislennost', struktura, geografiia)', *Istoriia SSSR*, 1984, no. 4, 58.

50. V. O. Kliuchevskii, *Sochineniia*, 8 vols. (Moscow 1956–9), I: 31.

51. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Chislennost' i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa', 28; V. M. Kabuzan, *Zaselenie Novorossii (Ekaterinoslavskoi i Khersonskoi gubernii) v XVIII – pervoi polovine XIX veka (1719–1858 gg.)* (Moscow 1976), 71–123.

52. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Chislennost' i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa', 29.

53. Ibid.

54. V. M. Kabuzan, 'Zaselenie Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostika v kontse XVIII — nachale XX veka (1795–1917 gg.)', *Istoriia SSSR*, 1979, no. 3, 38.

55. S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, 'Dinamika chislennosti i rasseleniia russkogo etnosa (1678–1917 gg.)', *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, 1982, no. 4, 20.

56. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Dinamika i etnicheskii sostav', 83.

57. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Chislennost' i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa', 28.

58. See Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, MA 1988).

59. S. I. Bruk and V. M. Kabuzan, 'Etnicheskii sostav naseleniia Rossii (1719–1917)', *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, 1980 no. 6, 27.

60. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Chislennost' i rasselenie ukrainskogo etnosa', 20–1.

61. Bruk and Kabuzan, 'Etnicheskii sostav', 23.

62. Anatoly Marchenko, *To Live Like Everyone* (London 1989), 61. *Khokhol* (pl. *khokhly*) means the crest of a bird (*khokhlatyi zhavoronok*, 'crested skylark'); when applied to Ukrainians, the word refers to the top-knots sported by Cossacks.

63. N. V. Kabuzan, 'Ukrainskoe naselenie Galitsii, Bukoviny i Zakarpat'ia v kontse XVIII – 30-kh godakh XX v.', *Sovetskaia etnografiia*, 1985, no. 3, 85 and passim.

64. Steven L. Guthier, 'Ukrainian Cities during the Revolution and the Interwar Era', in Ivan L. Rudnytsky, ed., *Rethinking Ukrainian History* (Edmonton 1981), 157. Only four of the nineteen towns in Russian Ukraine which had a population of more than 100,000 in 1897 contained a Ukrainian element of more than 5 per cent: Andreas Kappeler, *Russland als Vielvölkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall* (Munich 1992), 327.

65. Kappeler, *Russland*, 328–9, 331; Henning Bauer, Andreas Kappeler and Brigitte Roth, eds, *Die Nationalitäten des Russischen Reiches in der Volkszählung von 1897*, 2 vols (Stuttgart 1991), II: 104, 178, 198.

66. *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1826–1849 gg.: sbornik dokumentov*, ed. A. V. Predtechenskii (Moscow 1961), 602–6, 609–30; M. N. Leshchenko *et al.*, eds, *Selians'kyi rukh na Ukraini 1826–1849rr.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev 1985), esp. 264–306.

67. M. N. Leshchenko *et al.*, eds, *Selians'kyi rukh na Ukraini 1850–1861 rr.: Zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev 1988), esp. 82–139; Serhii Shamrai, 'Kyivs'ka kozachchyna 1855 r. (Do istorii selians'kykh rukhiv na Kyivshchyni)' *Zapysky istorychno-filolohichnoho viddilu Vseukrains'koi Akademii nauk* 20 (1928), 199–324; I. O. Hurzhii, *Borot'ba selian i robitnykiv Ukrainy proty feodal'no-kriposnyts'koho hnitu (z 80-kh rokiv XVIII st. do 1861 r.)* (Kiev 1958), 135–8; and (for information on the disturbances of 1855 outside the Ukrainian heartland) David Moon, *Russian Peasants and Tsarist Legislation on the Eve of Reform: Interaction between Peasants and Officialdom, 1825–1855* (Basingstoke and London 1992), 113–64.

68. B. G. Litvak, *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v 1775–1904gg.: Istoriia i metodika izucheniia istochnikov* (Moscow 1989), 53, 55 (tabular analyses of the multi-volume *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii*).

69. P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Provedenie v zhizn' krest'ianskoi reformy 1861g.* (Moscow 1958), 254–5.

70. B. S. Itenberg, *Dvizhenie revoliutsionnogo narodnichestva: Narodnicheskie kruzhki i 'khozhdenie v narod' v 70-kh godakh XIX v.* (Moscow 1965), 325–6.

71. Daniel Field, *Rebels in the Name of the Tsar* (Boston 1989 [first published in 1976]), 113–207; N. A. Troitskii, *Tsarskie sudy protiv revoliutsionnoi Rossii: Politicheskie protsessy 1871–1880 gg.* (Saratov 1976), 338–90.

72. P. G. Ryndziunskii, 'K opredeleniiu razmerov agrarnogo perenaseleniia v Rossii na rubezhe XIX-XX vv.', in S. L. Tikhvinskii, ed., *Sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoe razvitie Rossii: Sbornik statei k 100-letiiu so dnia rozhdeniia Nikolaia Mikhailovicha Druzhinina* (Moscow 1986), 163–5.

73. The phrase 'miniature revolution' is from Geroid Tanquary Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1972 [first published in 1932]), 138. For the governor of Poltava's contemporary explanation of the events of 1902 see A. G. Sliusarskii, ed., *Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie v poltavskoi i khar'kovskoi guberniiakh v 1902 g.: sbornik dokumentov* (Khar'kov 1961), 79–82. For the effects of the events on government policy see Stephen G. Wheatcroft, 'Crises and the Condition of the Peasantry in Late Imperial Russia', in Esther Kingston-Mann and Timothy Mixter, eds, *Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia, 1800–1921* (Princeton, NJ 1991), 166–7, 170–2.

74. See, for example, Robert Edelman, *Proletarian Peasants: The Revolution of 1905 in Russia's Southwest* (Ithaca, NY and London 1987); for more information about Ukrainians' shortage of land prior to 1905, see M. Porsh, 'Iz statystyky Ukrainy', *Ukraina*, 1907 no. 7–8, first pagination, esp. 36–46, and idem, 'Statystyka zemlevolodinnia v 1905 r. i mobilizatsiia zemel'noi vlasnosty na Ukraini vid 1877 r. po 1905 r.', *Ukraina*, 1907 no. 11–12, first pagination, 145–80.

75. Jerome Blum calls the *Koliivshchyna* of 1768 'One of the bloodiest of all peasant risings': *The End of the Old Order in Rural Europe* (Princeton, NJ 1978), 344.

76. So, at least, Stefanovych implied in a debate with Mykhailo Drahomanov in 1878: M. P. Dragomanov, 'Ukrainskaia "Hromada" v retsenzii g. Stefanovicha', in P. B. Struve and B. Kistiakovskii, *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii*, 2 vols (Paris 1905–6), II: 226–30 (reprint of an article by Stefanovych).

77. London, Public Record Office, FO 65/1712, fos. 263, 289.

78. Two of the four local statutes that accompanied the General Statute on the emancipation of the serfs dealt solely with Ukraine: *Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii*, second series, 55 vols (St Petersburg 1830–84), XXXVI, pt. 1, 273–340 (no. 36,663 on the provinces of Chernihiv, Poltava and part of Kharkiv, and no. 36,664 on the provinces of Kiev, Podillia and Volyn', both 19 February 1861).

79. Good examples of the effectiveness of explaining legislation to Ukrainians in their native language are to be found in Shamrai, 'Kyivs'ka kozachchyna', 296–8, and K. Kushchin, 'Pis'mo k izdateliu', *Russkii vestnik: Sovremennaia letopis'*, 1862, no. 4, 32 (where a landowner congratulates the civil governor of Kiev on using Ukrainian when trying to persuade local peasants of the need to agree post-emancipation 'statutory charters' with their former masters).

80. A. S. Nifontov, *Rossiia v 1848 godu* (Moscow 1949), 73–4, 109–10. The disturbances in right-bank Ukraine in 1848 in fact derived almost entirely from Bibikov's 'inventory reform'.

81. *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, I: 25, 152, 267, 288–9, 388–90.

82. Ibid., I: 395, III: 286, 346–7.

83. Ibid., I: 76.

84. I make this case at greater length in 'The Kirillo-Methodian Society', *Slavonic and East European Review* 71 (1993), 684–92. The standard authority on the Kirillo-Methodian Society is P. A. Zaionchkovskii, *Kirillo-Mefodievskoe obshchestvo* (Moscow 1959).

85. G. I. Marakhov, *Sotsial'no-politicheskaia bor'ba na Ukraine v 50 – 60-e gody XIX veka* (Kiev 1981), 46.

86. V. Z. Smirnov, *Reforma nachal'noi i srednei shkoly v 60-kh godakh XIX v.* (Moscow 1954), 92, 130, 137, 141–2.

87. RGIA, f. 908 (P. A. Valuev), op. 1, d. 174, ll. 1–5 (an unsigned and undated memorandum on the progress of the expansion between 1859 and 1862).

88. Aleksandr Brezhnev, *Pirogov* (Moscow 1990), 352–3.

89. P. Kulish, *Hramatka* (St Petersburg 1857); T. Shevchenko, *Iuzhnorusskii bukvar'* (St Petersburg 1861); O. I. Stronin, *Azbuka po metode Zolotova dlia iuzhno-russkogo kraia* (Poltava 1861); O. Konys'kyi, *Ukrains'ki propysi* (Poltava 1862).

90. Kostomarov, *Pysannia*, 137–40, 164–7; idem, *Istoricheskie proizvedeniia: Avtobiografiia* (Kiev 1989), 595; Iu. A. Pinchuk, *Mykola Ivanovych Kostomarov* (Kiev 1992), 129–33; V. I. Borysenko, *Borot'ba demokratychnykh syl za narodnu osvitu na Ukraini v 60–90-kh rokakh XIX st.* (Kiev 1980), esp. 102–6.

91. F. Iastrebov, *Revoliutsionnye demokraty na Ukraine: Vtoraia polovina 50-kh – nachalo 60-kh godov XIX st.* (Kiev 1960), 283.

92. Katkov, 'Neskol'ko slov', 4; cf. idem, 'Po povodu ob"iasnenii g. Kostomarova', *Sovremennaia letopis'*, 1863 no. 26, 3.

93. RGIA, f. 775, op. 1, d. 188, ll. 1–3.

94. Ibid., ll. 9–10.

95. Ibid., ll. 4–8; Lemke, *Epokha*, 302–4.

96. M. Drahomanov, *Narodni shkoly na Ukraini sered zhyt'ta i pys'mennstva v Rossii* (Geneva 1877), 78. For a fuller discussion of the edict of 1863, see my article 'Russia and Ukraine under Alexander II: The Valuev Edict of 1863', forthcoming in *International History Review* 17 (1995).

97. Iuzefovich resigned from the Kiev section in March 1875 on the grounds of its 'local orientation': *Kievskii telegraf*, 4 April 1875, 3. For his denunciation of April 1875 (conceived as a newspaper article) see above, n. 30. For the lengthier indictment he wrote in March 1876 as a member of Alexander II's commission of enquiry see RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 3–22 (clerical copy), 34–42 (autograph original), and Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 372–81.

98. Savchenko, *Zaborona*, 379.

99. *Kievskii telegraf*, 30 July 1875.

100. Drahomanov, *Narodni shkoly*, 54–5.

101. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 59–62, 71–8, 82–4, 95–6.

102. Ibid., ll. 102–3; Anon, 'Do istorii ukaza', 147–8.

103. RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 104–5; Anon, 'Do istorii ukaza', 149. Savchenko (*Zaborona*, 381–3) reproduces only the commission's preliminary recommendations (RGIA, f. 1282, op. 1, d. 352, ll. 66–70).

104. See, for example, RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, g. 1876, d. 61b, l. 115; f. 776, op. 20, g. 1895, d. 1496, ll. 7–9; f. 776, op. 21, ch. 1, g. 1900, d. 404, l. 451.

105. Ibid., f. 776, op. 11, g. 1876, d. 61b, l. 39; Anon, 'Naiblyzhchi vidhuky', 262–3.

106. RGIA, f. 776, op. 11, g. 1876, d. 61a, l. 154.

107. Ibid., f. 777, op. 5, g. 1900, d. 3, l. 19.

108. On the question of the educational use of Ukrainian in 1908–9 see RGIA, f. 1276 (Council of Ministers), op. 4, d. 701; ibid., f. 1278 (State Duma), op. 2,

d. 2307; and Andriewsky, 'Politics of National Identity', 248–9, 260, 330, 346–8, 350, 362–3.

109. James E. Mace, *Communism and the Dilemma of National Liberation: National Communism in Soviet Ukraine 1918–1933* (Cambridge, MA 1983); George O Liber, *Soviet Nationality Policy, Urban Growth, and Identity Change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923–1934* (Cambridge 1992).

110. Robert Conquest, *The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet Collectivization and the Terror-Famine* (London 1986).

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