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## The Greek Catholic Church in Galicia, 1914–1944

BOHDAN BUDUROWYCZ

*Introduction: A survey of the most important primary and secondary sources for the history of the Church during World War I, the interwar period, and the years of World War II.*

A definitive study of the history of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia during the period since 1914 requires unimpeded access to the archival repositories of Ukraine and the Holy See as well as to the records of the Przemyśl (Pere-myshl) eparchy and the Lemko Apostolic Administration on Polish territory. The archives of the Latin archdioceses of Lviv in Lubaczów and of Cracow could also shed light on some controversial problems. Generally speaking, primary and secondary sources for the study of the period from the beginning of World War I until the suppression of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia are many and varied, but at the same time fragmentary and not easily accessible. Among the materials are the official publications of the Greek Catholic eparchies, such as the monthly *L'vivs'ki Arkhyeparkhiial'ni Vidomosti*, the *Vistnyk Stanyslavivs'koï Eparkhii*, and the yearbooks of individual eparchies (schematisms). One of the richest sources of information for the interwar period is the Ukrainian press, especially the influential daily *Dilo* (1922–1939), which devoted considerable attention to Church affairs, the semiweekly *Nova Zoria* (1926–1939), published in Lviv under the auspices of Bishop Hryhorii Khomyshyn, the weeklies *Beskyd* (1926–1933) and *Ukraïns'kyi Beskyd* (1933–1939), financially supported by Bishop Iosafat Kotsylovs'kyi, and the weekly *Meta* (1931–1939), which usually reflected the opinion and sentiments of the circles close to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi. Several series of polemical articles by Osyp Nazaruk, which originally appeared in *Nova Zoria*, were later published in book form, among them his *Hreko-katolyts'ka Tserkva i Ukraïns'ka liberal'na inteligentsiia* (Lviv, 1935).

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Similarly, Bishop Khomyshyn's articles "Problem ukraiński," first published in the journal *Nasza Przyszłość*, appeared in the Polish original in Warsaw in 1933 and were later translated into Ukrainian and issued under the title *Ukrains'ka problema* (Lviv, 1935). The Polish press, too, widely discussed the affairs of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland, and its editorial opinion (especially that of the Lviv dailies) is occasionally of considerable interest.

Documentary materials that throw much light on the period under discussion can be found in such publications as *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, edited by Theophil Hornykiewicz (4 vols.; Philadelphia, 1966–1969); *Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 1918–1922*, edited by Taras Hunczak (2 vols.; New York, 1983); and, for the period of World War II, *Le Saint Siège et la situation religieuse en Pologne et dans les Pays Baltes (1939–1945)*, published in the series *Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale* (2 vols.; The Vatican, 1967). The developments of the war years in Galicia, including Ukrainian affairs and the role of the Greek Catholic Church, are also discussed in the reports received by the Polish government-in-exile in London, *Sprawozdania sytuacyjne z kraju* (mimeographed, 7 vols.; London, 1939–1944). The collection of eyewitness accounts and other materials dealing with the first Soviet occupation of Galicia, *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy IX. 1939–VI. 1941* (New York, 1958), edited by Milena Rudnyts'ka, while often highly subjective, contains some valuable information about the ordeal of the Greek Catholic Church, its clergy and its faithful during that brief but momentous period. The Soviet collection of documents, *Pravda pro uniiu: Dokumenty i materialy* (2nd ed., enlarged; Lviv, 1968), is tendentiously selective, but nevertheless of some use.

While the pastoral letters of Metropolitan Sheptytskyi and those of other Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia were published in some Ukrainian newspapers and usually appeared as separate brochures, it is difficult to locate them in the fragmentary files of the press available in the West. Thus, one must be grateful for such extremely helpful publications as *Tvory Sluhy Bozhoho Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho* (vol. 1; Toronto, 1965), which presents documents from the period 1899–1901, and which also includes a solid scholarly introduction by Anatol Bazylewycz, discussing in thematic groups Sheptytskyi's pastoral letters and other writings over his entire forty-six-year career. For the years of World War II, we have the indispensable *Pys'ma-poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsii* (Yorkton, Sask., 1961) and its continuation, *Pys'ma-poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho ChSVV z chasiv nimets'koï okupatsii* (Yorkton, 1969). Other collected works by Sheptytskyi include his *Pastyrs'ki poslannia do dukhovenstva i virnykh Stanyslavivs'koï Eparkhii*, published by the Lviv Theological Academy in 1935; and a second edition, *Holos Pastyria: Pastyrs'ki lysty, naukovi i populiarni rozvidky, statti i promovy* (vol. 1; Lviv,

1935), which was edited by Petro Dzedzyk for the Biblos printing house. The Ukrainian Catholic University in Rome published two volumes of Sheptyts'kyi's writings: *Tvory (asketychno-moral'ni)* in 1978, and *Tvory (moral'no-pastoral'ni)* in 1983. Proceedings and resolutions of various Church conferences conducted under Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's leadership can be found in such publications as *Diiannia i Postanovy L'vivs'kykh Arkhyieparkhiial'nykh Soboriv 1940–41–42–43* (Winnipeg, 1984) and “Konferentsii Archyiereiv Ukraïns'koï Hreko-Katolyts'koï Tserkvy, 1902–1937,” edited by Andrii Kravchuk, in *Logos: A Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 35 (Ottawa, 1994).\*

There are several monographs on Sheptyts'kyi, most notably Stepan Baran's *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist'* (Munich, 1947); Cyrille Korolevskij's *Métropolitte André Szeptycky, 1865–1944* (Rome, 1964); and Gregor Prokoptschuk's *Der Metropolit: Leben und Wirken des grossen Förderers der Kirchenunion Graf Andreas Scheptyzkyj* (Munich, 1955)—all of them excessively laudatory, and Edward Prus's *Władyka świętojurski: Rzecz o arcybiskupie Andrzeju Szeptyckim* (Warsaw, 1985), which is, in effect, an anti-Ukrainian denunciation of the metropolitan's ecclesiastical and political career. Sheptyts'kyi also figures very prominently, though obviously in a negative light, in such scurrilous propaganda publications as Serhii Danylenko's *Dorohoiu han'by i zrady: Istorychna khronika* (Kyiv, 1970) and Vladimir Dobrychev's *V teni sviatogo Iura* (Moscow, 1971). One should also mention the collective volume *Tsars'kyi viazen'* (Lviv, 1918), detailing Sheptyts'kyi's detention in Russia, and Mykhailo Marunchak's brief but substantial account of the metropolitan's travels in Western Europe and the Americas, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi na Zakhodi, 1920–1923* (Winnipeg and Edmonton, 1981). Much helpful data on one of Sheptyts'kyi's proudest achievements, the founding of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv, and on related matters can be found in *Svityl'nyk istyny: Dzherela do istorii Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Bohoslovs'koï Akademii u L'vovi 1928/29–1944* (3 vols.; Toronto and Chicago, 1973–1983). The most comprehensive single volume dealing with Sheptyts'kyi and with the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia under his stewardship is *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, edited by Paul R. Magocsi with the assistance of Andrii Krawchuk (Edmonton, 1989) and based on the proceedings of the conference “Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: His Life and Work,” organized by the Chair of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Toronto on 22–24 November 1984. Among books on other Greek Catholic Church leaders in Galicia one should mention Petro Mel'nychuk's useful *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn: Patriot-misionar-muchenyk* (Rome and

\* The editors are grateful to Andrii Krawchuk for supplementing the documentary sources on Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and for his assistance with the bibliographic introduction to this article.

Philadelphia, 1979), though some parts of it belong to the realm of hagiography rather than to that of history, and Irynei Nazarko's succinct *Iosafat Kotsylovs'kyi ChSVV: Iepyskop peremys'kyi 1916–1946* (Toronto, 1954).

Of great importance for the study of the period under discussion are memoirs of some of its most prominent religious and political personalities. They include Evlogii Georgievskii's *Put' moei zhizni: Vospominaniia mitropolita Evlogiia* (Paris, 1947), which details his efforts to convert Galician Greek Catholics to Russian Orthodoxy; Ivan Kedryn's *Zhyttia-podii-liudy: Spomyny i komentari* (New York, 1976), providing useful background information about political developments in Galicia from the early 1920s until the great exodus of 1944; and Kost' Pan'kivs'kyi's indispensable *Vid derzhavy do komitetu* (New York and Toronto, 1957) and *Roky nimets'koï okupatsii* (New York-Toronto, 1965), shedding much light on the history of the Greek Catholic Church during the dramatic years of 1941–1944.

A number of publications on the Catholic Church in Poland during the interwar period, often including much information about the Greek Catholic Church, have appeared in that country since World War II, including Wiesław Mysiek's *Kościół katolicki w Polsce w latach 1918–1939* (Warsaw, 1961) and *Z problemów polityki wschodniej Kościoła katolickiego w Polsce w latach 1918–1939* (Warsaw, 1967); and Jerzy Wiślocki's *Konkordat polski z 1925 roku: Zagadnienia prawno-polityczne* (Poznań, 1977) and *Uposażenie Kościoła i duchowieństwa katolickiego w Polsce 1918–1939* (Poznań, 1981). In addition, one should mention brief studies dealing specifically with the Greek Catholic Church (some of them tendentious and containing serious factual errors), such as Tadeusz Śliwa's "Kościół greckokatolicki w Polsce w latach 1918–1939" in *Kościół w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Lublin, 1981), as well as Edward Prus's "Cerkiew greckokatolicka w okresie wojny i okupacji hitlerowskiej," published in the journal *Śląskie Studia Historyczne* (vol. 1, 1975). The relationship between the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish state is also discussed in more general terms in Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek's *Sprawa ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922–1926* (Cracow, 1979) in Andrzej Chojnowski's *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939* (Wrocław, 1979), and in Ryszard Torzecki's *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy 1933–1945* (Warsaw, 1972) and *Kwestia ukraińska w Polsce w latach 1923–1929* (Cracow, 1989).

Beginning with the late 1980s, scholars gained new access to archives in Poland and in Ukraine, and the archives of the Vatican also gradually became more available.\* The past fifteen years have seen a resurgence of Church scholarship both in Ukraine and in neighboring Poland.

\* Section on post-1991 publications authored by Liliana Hentosh, Senior Research Associate of the Institute for Historical Research, National University of Lviv.

The bulk of the new materials consist of archival sources, particularly regarding the work of Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi. The most important Ukrainian publication on this topic is the multivolume *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist'*; *Dokumenty i materialy, 1899–1944* (Lviv, 1995–), edited by Andrii Krawchuk and published jointly by the Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi Foundation (*Postuliatsiia*) and the Central State Historical Archives of Ukraine in Lviv (TsDIAL). Two volumes (in three books) have appeared to date. The first volume, *Tserkva i tserkovna iednist'* (1995), comprises documents from Ukrainian (State Archives of Lviv Oblast, TsDIAL, and the Lviv Stefanyk National Library) and Russian archives (State Archives of the Russian Federation [GARF] and the Central State Historical Archives of St. Petersburg). All of them pertain to the metropolitan's ecumenical activity and his attempts to establish a dialogue with the Orthodox world. The second volume, *Tserkva i suspil'ne pytannia*, is published in two books: book 1, *Pastyr's'ke vchennia i diial'nist'* (1998), consists of pastoral letters and documents from various Lviv sources; book 2, *Lystuvannia* (1999), presents correspondence that, with only a few exceptions, had never been published before. In Krawchuk's analysis, Sheptyts'kyi's social thought consisted of two major components: the political, which related primarily to Church-state relations, and the social, which dealt with the Church in its relations with society. Both aspects are represented in the second volume.

The collection of documents *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi i hreko-katolyky v Rosii*, book 1, *Dokumenty i materialy, 1899–1917* (Lviv, 2004), aims to continue the work of the series *Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist'* and is published by TsDIAL in Lviv. These documents, many appearing in print for the first time, address conceptual problems grounded in questions of ecumenism and the recovery of the lost unity of the Universal Church. Presented in a way to complement and explain each other, they give a comprehensive picture of historical events and are the result of meticulous scholarly work. The collection is accompanied by an in-depth introduction by its editor, Iurii Avvakumov, scholarly annotations, and an index of names augmented by short but very useful biographical notes.

A third collection, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Dokumenty i materialy, 1941–1944* (Kyiv, 2003) brings together documents that were discovered by Zhanna Kovba in the Central State Archives of the Higher Agencies of Government of Ukraine (TsDAVO). Compiled by Kovba, edited by Andrii Krawchuk, and published by Dukh i Litera in Kyiv, these materials concern the work of the metropolitan's ordinariate and illustrate the efforts of the Church leadership to deal with the complex political circumstances of the German occupation, and then the second Soviet occupation, of Western Ukraine. In addition to presenting newly discovered material, this book was the first post-Soviet publication on Sheptyts'kyi to be produced in eastern Ukraine.

Some materials have also been published in Poland. Józef Wołczański compiled and edited *Nieznana korespondencja Arcybiskupów Metropolitów Lwowskich*

*Józefa Bilczewskiego z Andrzejem Szeptyckim w czasie wojny Polsko-Ukraińskiej, 1918–1919 roku* (Cracow, 1997), comprising archival documents on the relations between the Catholic Churches of different rites during Ukrainian-Polish military confrontations in Galicia. The work is preceded by Wołczański's informative, if rather unobjective, introduction.

A number of important conferences were organized during the 1990s in Ukraine and Poland, and their proceedings subsequently appeared in print. Among them are *Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki: Studia i materiały* (Cracow, 1994), edited by Andrzej A. Zięba (from the conference "Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi and the Spiritual Culture of East-Central Europe") and the second volume of the Church history scholarly series *Kovchek* (Lviv, 2000), edited by Borys Gudziak, Ihor Skochylias, and Oleh Turii (from the Ukrainian conference dedicated to the 50th anniversary of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's death). *Kovchek*, a publication of the Ukrainian Catholic University's Institute of Church History, has become a serious forum where questions of Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) history are discussed. Its most recent volume appeared in 2003. Also, in the 1990s the Southeastern Research Institute in Przemyśl published a series of collections entitled *Polska—Ukraina: 1000 lat sąsiedztwa* (vols. 2–4, Przemyśl, 1994–1996), where the majority of articles are devoted to the history of the UGCC on the territory of contemporary Ukraine and Poland. They are all highly informative, well balanced, and scholarly.

During the period from 1991 to 2006, a number of monographs on the history of the UGCC were published in Ukraine and abroad. Bohdan Bociurkiw, in his insightful *Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and the Soviet State (1939–1950)* (Edmonton, 1996), described the complicated and tragic relationship between the UGCC and the Soviet regime. Andrii Krawchuk's monograph *Christian Social Ethics in Ukraine: The Legacy of Andrei Sheptytsky* (Edmonton, 1997) is an important contribution to our understanding of the social teaching and practice of the UGCC in the twentieth century. Among other things, the book addresses controversies around the position of the UGCC vis-à-vis the German and Soviet occupation regimes during World War II.

The Polish scholar Adam Kubasik's *Arcybiskupa Andrzeja Szeptyckiego wizja Ukraińskiego narodu, państwa a cerkwi* (Lviv and Cracow, 1999) is yet another attempt to describe Sheptyts'kyi's views on the Ukrainian nation, state, and Church. However, the author's bias and lack of professionalism make this book far from flawless. Liubov Voloshyn, a longtime researcher of the works of Ukrainian artist Oleksa Novakivs'kyi, has published a groundbreaking work about the artist's relationship with Sheptyts'kyi—*Kniazhyi darunok velykoho metsenata: Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi u zhytti i tvorchosti Oleksy Novakivs'koho* (Lviv, 2000).

Liliana Hentosh's monograph *Vatykan i vyklyky modernosti: Skhidnoievropeis'ka polityka papy Benedykta XV ta ukraïns'ko-pol's'kyi konflikt u Halychyni (1914–1923 rr.)* (Lviv, 2006) examines the Eastern European politics of Pope Benedict XV in light of the the Ukrainian-Polish conflict. For Hentosh, the Vatican's position during the Ukrainian-Polish war in Galicia (1918–1923) is an example of the Holy See's adaptability to the challenges of the modern world.

## I

*The impact of World War I on the Galician Ukrainians and the Greek Catholic Church. Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's Memorandum of 15 August 1914 and his proposals to restructure Church organization in Ukraine. The Russian occupation of Eastern Galicia: the temporary disappearance of Greek Catholic hierarchy and the attempt of occupying forces to spread Russian Orthodoxy. The retreat of the Russian army from Galicia. Bishop Khomyshyn's unsuccessful attempt to introduce the Gregorian calendar in his eparchy. Sheptyts'kyi's return from Russia and his attempts to influence political developments in Galicia and Dnieper Ukraine.*

The outbreak of World War I seemed to open for the Ukrainian people the great historic opportunity for which many Ukrainian patriots had been waiting for over two centuries: a possibility of the downfall of the tsarist empire, presumably leading, in one form or another, to the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. However, while Ukrainian political leaders in Galicia had decided as early as 1912 to throw their unqualified support behind the Habsburg Empire in the event of an Austro-Russian conflict, their ideas about the future of Ukraine after its liberation remained vague and somewhat confused.<sup>1</sup> Under these circumstances, it was rather surprising that it was the head of the Greek Catholic Church, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, who as early as 15 August 1914 submitted to the Austrian Foreign Ministry a detailed memorandum, amounting to a far-reaching, though less than realistic, attempt to solve the Ukrainian problem by transforming Ukraine into a national territory completely independent from the tsarist empire.<sup>2</sup> According to Sheptyts'kyi, this objective could be best accomplished by reviving the historical traditions of the country, including the restoration of the offices of the hetman and of other military and civil dignitaries of the old Cossack state, and by introducing the Austrian code of laws in Ukraine. It was, however, with regard to Church-related matters that Sheptyts'kyi proposed to make a complete break with the past and to place the Ukrainian ecclesiastical organization within the Catholic orbit. This revolutionary change could be most expeditiously accomplished by replacing recalcitrant Russian bishops with pro-Ukrainian and pro-Austrian sympathizers and by freeing the Ukrainian Church

from the authority of the St. Petersburg Synod. If circumstances required it, Sheptyts'kyi was prepared to take upon himself the leadership of the whole Ukrainian Church as its metropolitan.

For the time being at least, Sheptyts'kyi's plans had to be postponed, since the anticipated triumphant march of the Austro-Hungarian armies into Russia did not come to pass. Badly routed in several border battles, Austrian troops retreated in disorder, leaving most of Galicia and Bukovyna to the victorious Russians. Although Greek Catholic bishops joined other Ukrainian leaders in urging their flock to prove their loyalty to the Habsburg Empire, and although Galician Ukrainians fought valiantly both in the ranks of the regular army and in those of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen, rumors about "Ruthenian treason" spread widely as Austrian troops suffered one humiliating defeat after another and their commanding officers began looking for a convenient scapegoat.<sup>3</sup> The Polish administration of Galicia, including the viceroy Witold Korytowski, eagerly endorsed this view, even trying to represent Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi as a "weakling," surrounded and dominated by Russophiles and Russian agents.<sup>4</sup> It is not surprising that in an atmosphere permeated with war hysteria these accusations were taken seriously and that, in the first weeks of the war, thousands of Ukrainians from all social strata, including scores of priests, were arrested for their alleged pro-Russian sympathies, tried by military tribunals and, in many cases, executed. Thousands more were interned in concentration camps (notably Thalerhof in Styria, among whose inmates Greek Catholic priests constituted 7 percent), where they were subjected to abuses and various other forms of harassment by both the military guards and the civilian staff.<sup>5</sup> In the meantime, the hostilities, during which battlefronts crisscrossed most of Galicia's territory, resulted in a widespread devastation of the country; many church buildings, too, were destroyed, damaged, or desecrated. Greek Catholic bishops were unable to effectively help their flock, for Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was interned on 19 September 1914 and deported to Russia, where he was kept under strict supervision until his release in March 1917, and did not return to his see until September of that year.<sup>6</sup> Bishop Khomyshyn, too, was absent from his eparchy until the retreat of the Russian armies in the spring of 1915, while Bishop Chekhovych was cut off from any contact with the faithful of his diocese during the long siege of Przemyśl and died soon after the capture of that key fortress by the Russians in March 1915, leaving his flock without any spiritual guidance until the installation of his successor, Iosafat Kotsylovs'kyi, in September 1917.

This situation seemed to be highly propitious for reclaiming the recalcitrant Galician Uniates for Orthodoxy, which had been the religion of their ancestors until the end of the seventeenth century. With victorious Russian armies in control of most of Galicia, the Greek Catholic hierarchy decapitated, and the local clergy depleted by arrest, deportations, and flight, the Russian Orthodox

Church had an almost unlimited opportunity to use its emotional appeal to attract the largely leaderless and disconcerted Uniate faithful. To be sure, Count Georgii Bobrinskii, the military governor-general of Galicia, assured the representative of both Catholic rites of his tolerant attitude toward all religions; at the same time, however, he stressed that he would not tolerate any anti-Orthodox propaganda and reaffirmed that Galicia was a part of a single great Russia, where Russian language and laws would gradually be introduced.<sup>7</sup> Thus, while Russian troops generally treated Greek Catholic clergy with deference and did not interfere with their activities, the Holy Synod on 10 September 1914 entrusted Evlogii Georgievskii (1868–1946), the former bishop of Chelm (Kholm) and now archbishop of Volhynia, with the spiritual care over the Orthodox Church in Galicia. On 15 November he arrived in the Galician town of Brody, where a welcoming ceremony in his honor was organized; however, only nine out of fifty invited Greek Catholic priests agreed to meet him.<sup>8</sup> After his arrival in Lviv, Evlogii issued a pastoral letter to the “Galician-Russian people and clergy,” in which he referred to the glorious past of their country that had once been united with the rest of Rus’ by a single Greek Orthodox faith, and urged them to return to the Orthodox fold.<sup>9</sup> However, according to the stringent regulations (later somewhat relaxed) issued by Count Bobrinskii, Orthodox priests could be sent only to those villages where three-quarters of the population requested their services, or to the parishes whose pastors had either abandoned them or been removed because of suspected disloyalty to Russia.<sup>10</sup>

Evlogii’s two visits to Lviv and his journeys through the Galician countryside proved to be disappointing. He felt that the Orthodox Church would face an uphill struggle in Galician cities and towns where the Ukrainian population was more “Latinized,” but that it would be able to gain support among Greek Catholic villagers who regarded themselves as “Orthodox.” Among various measures being considered at that time in order to strengthen the Orthodox faith in occupied Galicia were the suppression of the Jesuit and Basilian orders, the reestablishment of the monastery at Maniava (an Orthodox stronghold until its closure by the Austrian authorities in 1785), and the extensions of the authority of the future Orthodox metropolitan of Halych over all united “Carpatho-Russian” eparchies, including Bukovyna.<sup>11</sup> However, Russian officials and Church experts overestimated the irresistible impact of militant Orthodoxy on the Galician Greek Catholics. In spite of an energetic campaign for the “return to the ancestral faith” conducted by Evlogii with the assistance of the archbishop of Kharkiv, Antonii Khrapovitskii, and the bishop of Krem’ianets, Dionisii Valedinskii (who after World War I became the metropolitan of Warsaw), and notwithstanding some material incentives offered to the converts, by 1 March 1915 no more than 81 out of 1,874 Greek Catholic parishes in the occupied area (including some Uniate parishes scattered through the mostly Orthodox Bukovyna), or approximately

4 percent of this total, joined the Orthodox fold.<sup>12</sup> Most of these parishes were located in the eastern part of the Lviv archeparchy, bordering on Volhynia, and in the northeastern part of the Przemyśl eparchy, adjacent to the Chełm province; on the other hand, not a single parish in the Stanyslaviv eparchy joined the Orthodox Church.<sup>13</sup> Even so, the returning Austrian army (especially some of its Hungarian units) summarily executed a number of Greek Catholic priests and many of their flock for their alleged Russophile sympathies. At the same time, the retreating Russian troops took with them some prominent Greek Catholic priests as hostages (including, for example, Ieremiia Lomnyts'kyi, the first rector of the Greek Catholic seminary in Stanyslaviv, who died in exile), while some Uniate clergymen, several of whom had embraced Orthodoxy, left Galicia voluntarily to seek refuge in Russia.<sup>14</sup>

The serious crisis suffered by the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia as a result of the war and its attendant miseries was complicated by the calendar controversy in the Stanyslaviv eparchy. On 15 February 1916, Bishop Khomyshyn issued a pastoral letter entitled "About the Mission of the Ukrainian People in the Catholic Church," in which he decreed that, starting with the feast day of the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary (25 March) of that year, all religious holy days in the eparchy would be celebrated according to the Gregorian calendar. The reasons that prompted the bishop to make this decision were purely pastoral: as he explained in his letter, he was deeply concerned over the fact that manual and white-collar workers of Greek Catholic faith were forced to work during their religious feast days and thus became gradually alienated from their Church and their nation. Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi was at that time confined in a Russian monastery and could not be consulted, but Khomyshyn expressed his hope that all bishops of the Halych Province would soon follow his lead in calendar reform.<sup>15</sup>

In view of the fact that the Gregorian calendar was never popular with the Greek Catholic faithful and that the act of the Church Union of 1596 expressly allowed the Uniates to continue to use the Julian calendar, it is not surprising that Khomyshyn's initiative met with a strong and outspoken opposition. In his second pastoral letter, dated 25 March 1916, he stated that whereas his calendar reform was, on the whole, favorably received by the mass of the faithful, the reaction of community leaders was decidedly negative. In fact, a delegation of the County Committee of the General Ukrainian Council asked him on 27 February 1916 to postpone the reform "until an appropriate time," since the proposed measure would become an irritant for the conservative-minded majority of the Ukrainian people in Galicia, would violate the existing "state of truce" within the Ukrainian public, and would create an unnecessary barrier between the Galician Ukrainians and their compatriots in eastern Ukraine.<sup>16</sup> Although Khomyshyn rejected these arguments as unconvincing, he was unable to prevail against determined opposition and eventually had to revoke his controversial decision.

In the meantime, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's internment by the tsarist authorities came to an unexpected and dramatic end when, after the February Revolution of 1917, the Provisional Government ordered his immediate release.<sup>17</sup> Taking advantage of his regained freedom, he tried feverishly to make up for the lost two and a half years. He traveled to Petrograd, where he was received by several leaders of the new regime, including Prime Minister Georgii L'vov, and established personal contacts with the representatives of the local Ukrainian colony. In Petrograd, and even more so during his subsequent visit to Kyiv, Sheptyts'kyi emphasized the need for national solidarity among all Ukrainians, which, in his opinion, could not be achieved without the cement of religious unity.<sup>18</sup> These views, which harked back to the metropolitan's memorandum of August 1914, remained essentially unchanged until the end of his life and were to be expounded again in his letters to the Ukrainian Orthodox bishops and intelligentsia in the autumn and winter of 1941–1942 (see below). However, the reaction of the leaders of the Central Rada, like that of the metropolitan's correspondents a generation later, was noncommittal, and the only concrete result of Sheptyts'kyi's efforts was the founding of several Greek Catholic parishes in Dnieper Ukraine. He also appointed the Reverend Mykhailo Tsehels'kyi as apostolic vicar in Kyiv.<sup>19</sup>

Having left Russia by the way of neutral Sweden, Sheptyts'kyi proceeded to Switzerland, anxious to meet Pope Benedict XV and report to him both about his personal experiences and the situation in Galicia, about which he had been briefed by Ukrainian parliamentary leaders. After this plan was thwarted by the French intelligence service, Sheptyts'kyi crossed the Austrian frontier and, having been received in a personal audience by Emperor Charles I, returned on 10 September 1917 amidst a tumultuous welcome to his metropolitan seat, which he had left three years earlier as a prisoner.<sup>20</sup> His unbounded energy found its outlet in far-reaching political activities, ranging from an unsuccessful attempt to convene a meeting of all Ukrainian parliamentarians from Galicia and Bukovyna aimed at consolidating their policies on the eve of the unfolding critical events that were to determine the outcome of the war,<sup>21</sup> to a speech to the Austrian House of Lords (Herrenhaus) on 28 February 1918, in which he, without mentioning President Wilson by name, endorsed the latter's principle of the self-determination of peoples and advocated a speedy ratification of the peace treaty signed on 9 February of that year at Brest-Litovsk by the Central Powers and the Ukrainian National Republic.<sup>22</sup> In a way, the metropolitan had a personal stake in this document that placed the Chełm region under the jurisdiction of the reborn Ukrainian state, the independence of which had been formally proclaimed only a month earlier. While on the way to his Russian exile, Sheptyts'kyi, using the discretionary powers conferred on him by Pope Pius X, had consecrated in Kyiv the former rector of the Theological Seminary in Lviv, Iosyf Botsian, as the bishop of Lutsk in Volhynia, which he was expected to bring to the Catholic

fold. Now, it seemed, another opportunity beckoned in the neighboring eparchy of Chełm, the last stronghold of the Union to be destroyed by the tsarist government, which, together with Volhynia, could become a formidable redoubt of Greek Catholicism within Ukraine even if Galicia remained, for the time being, outside its borders.

It was also at that time that Sheptyts'kyi displayed at least a passing interest in the possibility of becoming a candidate for the patriarch of the autocephalous Ukrainian Church—a position that would have finally enabled him to realize his plans of bringing the whole of Ukraine into the fold of Rome. However, the All-Ukrainian Church Council in Kyiv decided to defer the question of autocephaly indefinitely and voted instead to recognize the spiritual authority of the patriarch of Moscow.<sup>23</sup>

## II

*The role of the Greek Catholic clergy in the liberation struggle of the Galician Ukrainians. The Greek Catholic Church in Galicia during the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–1919 and its support for the Western Ukrainian government-in-exile. Sheptyts'kyi's travels to Rome, Western Europe, North and South America, and his diplomatic activities on behalf of the Ukrainian cause.*

The end of World War I brought about the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, in spite of aberrations in 1914–1915, was on the whole rather benevolently disposed toward the Greek Catholic Church and its faithful, and was in return treated by them with loyalty and respect. The proclamation of the Western Ukrainian National Republic on 1 November 1918 turned a new page in the history of Galicia, which, after close to six centuries of foreign domination, was again becoming an independent state. These developments, however, proved to be only a prelude to the Polish-Ukrainian War in Galicia, which lasted until mid-July of 1919 and once more turned much of the country into a theater of bitter fighting. Within days Lviv and Przemyśl, the seats of two bishops of the Greek Catholic Church, found themselves under the control of Polish troops, which put an end to any direct contacts between the Greek Catholic hierarchs residing in those cities and the Ukrainian authorities; at the same time Stanyslaviv, Bishop Khomyshyn's seat, became the provisional capital of the government of the Western Ukrainian National Republic. Unfortunately, the relationship between the bishop and the secular authorities was not free of disagreements, despite the fact that one of Khomyshyn's closest associates and later his auxiliary, Ivan Liatyshevskiy, headed the department of religious affairs in the State Secretariat of Religious Affairs and Education.<sup>24</sup> The bishop was to claim later that the main source of tension was the hostile or, at best, indifferent attitude toward the Church demonstrated by the anticlerical members of the Ukrainian Rada (the country's

parliament), which proposed to secularize Church property, as well as by some professional groups (notably teachers, who wanted to remove religious education from the curricula of elementary and secondary schools).<sup>25</sup> The conflict between the bishop and the government culminated in the publication of Khomyshyn's pastoral letter of January 1919 entitled "At a Turning Point in the History of the Ukrainian People," in which he openly criticized the new regime.<sup>26</sup> These developments, however, did not prevent many priests from actively participating in the Ukrainian Rada, in county councils, in various administrative positions, or from joining the Ukrainian Galician Army as chaplains. Meanwhile, in the Polish-occupied areas of Galicia many Ukrainian clergymen were accused of antistate activities and of fanning an "artificial hatred" against Poland.<sup>27</sup> This led to the arrest of hundreds of Greek Catholic priests and monks, many of whom were only released after the intervention of the papal nuncio with the Polish chief of state, Józef Piłsudski.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, Sheptyts'kyi's attempt to meet Piłsudski during the latter's visit to Lviv was thwarted by the local authorities.<sup>29</sup>

The Ukrainian-Polish War was followed by the Polish-Soviet conflict which, during the spring and summer months of 1920, once more put the fate of Western Ukrainian lands in doubt. The short-lived Galician Socialist Soviet Republic, which comprised approximately one-third of Galicia, did not last long enough to have any permanent effect on the Greek Catholic Church; however, the communist authorities began to nationalize the estates belonging to the Church and the monasteries, encouraged peasants to harvest on Church lands, and started a vigorous antireligious propaganda campaign. With the Red Army ready to storm the gates of Warsaw and approaching Lviv, the threat seemed enough to prompt Sheptyts'kyi to throw his support behind a plan to federate Galicia with Czechoslovakia, thus preventing its impending union with Soviet Ukraine.<sup>30</sup> This idea was apparently not given up by the metropolitan even after the end of the hostilities, when he reportedly endorsed the proposal of the Western Ukrainian government-in-exile to establish a buffer state, consigned to Czechoslovakia under a mandate of the League of Nations, which would include Galicia and other Western Ukrainian territories.<sup>31</sup>

In the fall of 1920, Sheptyts'kyi obtained the permission of the Polish government to pay an official visit to the Holy See and, having appointed Reverend Oleksander Bachyn's'kyi as his vicar, left the country on a trip of almost three years' duration. This kept him away from the day-to-day developments in Galicia, but at the same time enabled him to present the case of his war-torn and devastated Church province to the world at large.<sup>32</sup> The metropolitan's precarious dual role as a pastor in charge of relief work for the benefit of his flock and a skillful diplomat acting as a go-between for the Western Ukrainian government-in-exile came under the close scrutiny of the Polish intelligence service. Sheptyts'kyi's appointment as an apostolic delegate, and thus an official representative of the

Vatican, opened to him many doors that would have normally remained closed to an ordinary Church dignitary. World leaders whom he met included Popes Benedict XV and Pius XI, Prime Ministers Aristide Briand of France and David Lloyd George of the United Kingdom, and President Warren Harding, Secretary of State Charles Hughes, and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover of the United States. None of the metropolitan's predecessors had ever met such an illustrious array of statesmen and acquainted them firsthand with the problems of his Church and his country—and yet the final outcome of all these conversations was frustrating and disappointing, including that of the encounter with the chairman of the Council of Ambassadors, Jules Cambon, whom Sheptytskyi tried to persuade to change or postpone the Great Powers' decision to place Galicia under the sovereignty of Poland.<sup>33</sup> Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's efforts, which underscored the fact that the Greek Catholic Church shared and championed the national aspirations of Galician Ukrainians, were not entirely in vain, however, for they immensely enhanced his stature among his own people. In addition, the metropolitan's visits to the Ukrainian immigrant communities in Canada, the United States, Brazil, and Argentina reestablished the emotional ties between them and their ancestral country, which had been interrupted by the long war, and reaffirmed their spiritual unity with their mother Church.

Having been absent for a number of years, Sheptytskyi did not find immediate support for his visionary projects on his return, which reportedly included a plan to reorganize and Ukrainize the Greek Catholic Church by establishing a Ukrainian patriarchate and replacing Old Church Slavonic with Ukrainian in all Church services.<sup>34</sup> Feeling frustrated and suffering health problems, the metropolitan considered resigning his post and retiring to a monastery—a solution that may have appealed to the Polish government, which used plain chicanery to delay his return to Poland and then kept him confined for several weeks to the convent of the Sisters of Charity in Poznań before finally allowing him to travel to Lviv. This, however, merely served to increase Sheptytskyi's prestige in the Ukrainian community, in spite of the fact that, before returning to his see, he was forced to pay a visit to the president of Poland and take an oath of allegiance to the Polish state.<sup>35</sup>

### III

*The Greek Catholic Church in Galicia under Polish rule. The issue of celibacy of the clergy. The concordat of 10 February 1925 and its importance for the Church. Legal and economic status of the Greek Catholic Church within the Polish state. The "Eastern" and "Western" orientation among the Ukrainian Catholic hierarchy and clergy. Growth of the Greek Catholic hierarchy.*

One of the most crucial issues facing the Greek Catholic Church in Poland was its attitude toward the Polish state and its institutions. Originally, the Church

remained scrupulously loyal to the Western Ukrainian National Republic's government-in-exile led by Ievhen Petrushevych. Thus, in November 1922 the Greek Catholic bishops expressed, even in Sheptytskyi's absence, their strong objection against the holding of elections to the Polish parliament in Galicia, which they regarded as a violation of the special status of that territory;<sup>36</sup> nonetheless, only four months later, on 15 March 1923, the Council of Ambassadors decided to vest in Poland all administrative powers with regard to Galicia. The metropolitan, too, remained in close contact with the representatives of the Petrushevych government throughout his stay abroad in 1920–1923, while studiously refraining from any official or unofficial meetings with Polish diplomats; after the Council's fateful verdict, he persuaded the Galician leaders to accept the heavy blow with restraint and dignity.<sup>37</sup> Now, however, new circumstances demanded that the Church change its policy of defiance to one of at least reluctant loyalty and acquiescence. The conditions called for consummate skill and diplomacy on the part of those who dared initiate any rapprochement between the two nationalities, both of them outwardly professing the same Catholic creed albeit following two different rites, both deeply attached to their native country, and both emotional rather than rational in their attitudes and responses to any real or imagined challenge.

The internal situation of the Greek Catholic Church, too, was far from satisfactory. The spiritual devastation brought about by the war was, if anything, even worse than its physical consequences. The general loosening of morals and decline of ethical standards that usually accompany any prolonged hostilities were exacerbated by the fact that the Galician Ukrainians were on the losing side of the great conflict: the Habsburg monarchy, which for almost a century and a half was for them an embodiment of law and order, had collapsed, and their own aspirations for an independent existence in their own state had been brutally thwarted by history. The vicissitudes of the world war and of their own liberation struggle made them cynical and apathetic, and the very foundations of their religious beliefs were undermined, first by the attempt to impose Russian Orthodoxy on them and then by the new ideas of world revolution. The unprecedented upheaval that had uprooted the tsarist regime wrought havoc and confusion in many minds: the age-old, cherished conservative beliefs of their fathers crumbled. Even their religion, which regulated their daily existence down to the minutest details and gave them a feeling of safety in an uncertain world, no longer seemed relevant. The relationship between the clergy and the faithful also underwent considerable change, with older generations of priests finding it difficult to grasp that their condescending attitude toward parishioners was no longer acceptable. Under these circumstances, the Church's task to try to restore and rebuild shattered beliefs, to alleviate despair and frustration, and to heal rifts among its faithful was overwhelming.

In view of this situation, there were calls for discipline among the clergy to be

tightened, their moral fiber strengthened, and their dedication to their vocation enhanced. Thus, during the meeting of the Greek Catholic episcopate on 20 September 1919 it was unanimously decided to introduce compulsory celibacy of the clergy in all three eparchies of the Galician Church Province. However, the implementation of this controversial decision was only slow and gradual. While Bishop Khomyshyn took immediate steps to introduce celibacy and made it compulsory for the candidates for priesthood entering the theological seminary in Stanyslaviv in 1923, and while Bishop Kotsylovs'kyi followed in his footsteps two years later, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi adopted a more cautious attitude, and it was not until the late 1930s that students enrolling in the Theological Academy in Lviv had to declare formally their willingness to be ordained as celibates.<sup>38</sup>

The controversy that followed Khomyshyn's decision was bitter and acrimonious: it was he who, quite willingly, took upon himself the brunt of public discontent and resolutely stood his ground until the commotion subsided. The opponents of the reform claimed that one of the essential concessions made by the Holy See at the time of the Union of Brest was being wantonly abandoned, that an ancient tradition of the Eastern Church was being violated, and that the Ukrainian intelligentsia, whose ranks had been sorely depleted by the war, was to be biologically decimated, since it had been primarily the progeny of the priestly families that provided intellectual and political leaders for the Galician Ukrainians. The animated and at times intemperate discussion conducted on the pages of the newspapers, in public protest meetings, and in the lecture rooms of the seminaries, was exacerbated by the fact that a number of respected and influential priests of the older generation as well as some prominent laymen openly denounced the reform as unnecessary, untimely, and extremely harmful to the national interest and to the cause of Church unity. In 1922, a convention of the Society of St. Paul the Apostle decided to send to the Roman Curia a grievance against Khomyshyn, which was signed by a large number of priests.<sup>39</sup> In March 1923, Reverend Giovanni Genocchi, the apostolic visitor, was sent to all three eparchies and was handed a copy of the grievance; however, he was prevented from meeting representatives of students expelled from the theological seminary in Stanyslaviv for opposing Khomyshyn's reform, or the delegation of lay leaders planning to lodge a formal complaint against the bishop. At the same time, however, he received the delegates of the newly formed St. Josaphat's Society of Celibate Priests, who submitted to him a memorandum demanding the introduction of compulsory celibacy throughout the Galician Church Province.<sup>40</sup>

In 1924, the pamphlet *Vysvitlennia do istorii L'vivs'kykh synodiv* (The Clarification of the History of the Lviv Synods), jointly authored by six priests, was published and provided the opponents of celibacy with additional ammunition.<sup>41</sup> In March 1925, the students of the Stanyslaviv seminary organized a rebellion against celibacy, vowing not to return as long as the right of choice for the

candidates for priesthood to be married or to remain single was not restored; however the threat that their exemption from compulsory military service would come to an end if they lost their status as students of theology prompted most of the secessionists to return to the seminary.<sup>42</sup> At the same time, lay leaders in Przemyśl lodged a complaint with the Holy See against Bishop Kotsylovs'kyi, accusing him of violating the rights of the Greek Catholic Church guaranteed by the Union of Brest. However, this grievance was officially dismissed by a letter from the secretary of the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches dated 9 May 1927, which stated that, far from being an encroachment upon the privileges of the Church, Kotsylovs'kyi's decision strengthened it from within by favoring those who decided voluntarily and without any constraint to live as celibates.<sup>43</sup> In spite of this repudiation, the struggle against celibacy continued until the end of the decade, although it clearly began to lose steam. In the 1930s, the number of candidates for priesthood increased so dramatically (mostly because of the rampant economic depression which resulted in mass unemployment among the Ukrainian intelligentsia) that the seminaries were able to accommodate less than half of the applicants, and by 1935, the number of celibate and widower priests in the Stanyslaviv eparchy almost equaled that of the married clergy.<sup>44</sup>

Notwithstanding the reservations the Galician Ukrainians might have had with regard to the attitudes of some of their bishops, most of them regarded the Greek Catholic Church as the only national stronghold left to them after their struggle for independence ended in failure and after the decision of the Council of Ambassadors made their whole future appear foreboding. Thus, it was with understandable apprehensions that they followed the negotiations between the Warsaw government and the Vatican for a concordat, which, among other things, was to determine the status of their Church within the Polish state and to define its rights and obligations.

In its final form, the concordat of 10 February 1925 proved to be a mixed blessing to the Greek Catholic Church in Poland.<sup>45</sup> On the one hand, it legalized its position as an autonomous unit within the Catholic Church in that country, recognized as such not only by the Holy See but also by the Polish government. Thus, the Greek Catholic Ukrainians in Galicia could at least maintain and preserve their religious heritage without any interference on the part of the Polish authorities. In addition, their Church was able to retain its not inconsiderable material possessions, which assured it of financial independence quite apart from the nominal salaries that all members of the clergy were to receive from the government. On the other hand, however, the activities of the Greek Catholic Church outside Galicia were to be sharply curtailed, and its dreams of expanding its missionary work to Volhynia and the Chełm region—the areas where the Union had flourished before its suppression by the tsarist regime in the nineteenth century—were thwarted by the provision of the concordat that

placed all Greek Catholics outside the three Galician eparchies under the spiritual care and jurisdiction of local Latin-rite bishops. As a result, the concordat could be used as an important tool in the nationality policy of the Polish government, which was now free to restrict the Greek Catholic clergy to the three southeastern provinces of the country while sponsoring and actively supporting the influence of the Latin clergy *in partibus infidelium*, where they could promote both the Roman Catholic religion and militant Polish nationalism without any effective competition.<sup>46</sup> Moreover, since the concordat enumerated all existing dioceses within the Polish state, any attempt to enlarge the number of Greek Catholic eparchies, even on Galician territory, was automatically doomed to failure.<sup>47</sup> Finally, the concordat reaffirmed the right of patronage, which allowed local landowners (usually of Polish origin) to veto the appointment of pastors in villages under their jurisdiction.<sup>48</sup> These stipulations were not accidental; on the contrary, they were the result of careful planning by Poland's chief negotiator, Stanisław Grabski, whose anti-Ukrainian attitude was well known and whose views prevailed against the wishes of other members of the Polish delegation.<sup>49</sup>

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the conclusion of the concordat was viewed by the Ukrainian press in Galicia as being directed against Ukrainian interests and leading, in its ultimate consequence, to the liquidation of the Uniate Church. As deputy Serhii Khruts'kyi (himself a prominent layman of the Orthodox Church) argued during the plenary meeting of the Sejm on 23 March 1925 debating the ratification of the concordat, the deal concluded by the Polish government and the Holy See deprived the Greek Catholic Church of its historical mission and turned that mission over to the Latin rite.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, the concordat identified the interests of the Vatican with those of the Polish state and reduced the role of the Greek Catholic Church to that of a subsidiary of militant Roman Catholicism: it lost most of the rights it had acquired during the three centuries of its existence and its clergy were transformed into a tool of state administration.<sup>51</sup> This highly emotional discussion, which prevented the Galician Ukrainians from appraising the positive and negative sides of the concordat in a dispassionate manner, was also reflected in the daily press, which took an even more extreme stand: in the words of the prestigious daily *Dilo*, Ukrainian national dignity was not for sale and the Ukrainians would not allow Rome to dismantle their national church. If the Vatican persisted in its attempts to abolish the Union, it would do well to remember that while all roads led to Rome, all of them also led from it.<sup>52</sup>

In spite of all the restrictions imposed by the concordat, the material situation of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland was rather advantageous. It owned large landholdings in three southeastern provinces (Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Ternopil) as well as smaller properties in the provinces of Cracow, Lublin, Navahrudak (Nowogródek), and Vilnius (Wilno)—altogether (as of 1938) 143,582 hectares,

including 41,046 hectares of wooded areas.<sup>53</sup> In addition to the income from Church properties, individual priests were entitled to the so-called stole fees (*iura stolae*), paid for administering a sacrament or rite, while all members of the episcopate, pastors, vicars, monks, students, and professors of theological seminaries received monthly salaries, ranging from 54 to 1,460 zlotys (increased by 10 percent in 1927 and reduced again to previous levels in 1932).<sup>54</sup> In 1938, the Sejm decided to increase the state's financial support for the Latin rite, while leaving the money allotted to the Greek Catholic Church at the previous level.<sup>55</sup> Certain feudal practices (e.g., couples about to be married performing various services around the parsonage without remuneration) also survived during the interwar period in some parishes and contributed to the local priest's income.

In order to eliminate glaring disparities in the incomes of individual priests, Metropolitan Sheptytskyi decided in 1927 that the maximum endowment for each priest in the Lviv archeparchy must not exceed 80 hectares of land, bringing approximately 2 zlotys per hectare, or 160 zlotys per month, in addition to the priest's intake from stole fees. Priests enjoying larger endowments were obligated to return from their surplus 2 zlotys per hectare per month to the treasury of the archeparchy, which, in turn, was to use that money to subsidize priests with smaller incomes.<sup>56</sup> Similarly, the Stanyslaviv eparchy made an attempt to equalize the financial burdens and incomes of its priests, with pastors of well-to-do parishes receiving a lower salary and the surplus funds being used to subsidize candidates for priesthood studying abroad, to cover current administrative expenses, and to assist needy priests.<sup>57</sup>

A considerable portion of the landholdings of the Lviv archeparchy was parcelled out in the 1920s and 1930s. Metropolitan Sheptytskyi invested much of the money received from that transaction in the shares of the Ukrainian Land Mortgage Bank (*Zemel'nyi Bank Hipotechnyi*), while the remainder was used to subsidize such institutions as the Greek Catholic Theological Academy, the Ukrainian National Museum, the People's Hospital (*Narodnia Lichnytsia*), many shelters, orphanages, and nurseries, as well as to aid needy artists, students, and the unemployed.<sup>58</sup> On the other hand, the Stanyslaviv eparchy ran into considerable difficulties when, having parceled out a part of its lands in the early 1930s, it acquired several office buildings in Stanyslaviv and a large landed property in Bohorodchany (Bishop Khomyshyn's favorite summer residence). The amount due to the eparchy for the lands that had been parceled out was to be paid by individual buyers according to an installment plan, while the real estate in Stanyslaviv and Bohorodchany, purchased on credit, was to be paid for in a similar manner. However, the devaluation of the American dollar and the Polish currency law of 1934 seriously undermined the solvency of the eparchy and of the Land Mortgage Bank in which it owned 40 percent of shares, acquired mostly on credit. With the conditions of amortization for the Church lands radically changed

and with the Land Bank menaced with collapse, the income of the eparchy was sharply reduced while its expenditures and debts remained unchanged. The divergences between the eparchy of Stanyslaviv on the one hand and the archeparchy of Lviv and the Land Mortgage Bank on the other—exacerbated by the threat of foreclosure hanging over the head of the eparchy—eventually led to litigation, with Polish courts acting as an arbiter between the two Greek Catholic dioceses. Efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution of the difficulties, which had developed without the personal knowledge of either Bishop Khomyshyn or Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, were blocked by some of their advisers, and only the outbreak of the Second World War put an end to this deplorable situation.<sup>59</sup> Obviously, this state of affairs was not helped by the lack of empathy between the two brother bishops, whose backgrounds and personalities were so different, but who, in spite of their disagreements, shared the same basic objective—the continued growth and well-being of their Church.

While the Greek Catholic hierarchy and clergy presented a united front as far as the defense of the rights and privileges of their Church was concerned, this unity was more apparent than real. Although the metropolitan was the nominal head of the whole Galician Church Province, his real authority extended only over the Lviv archeparchy and his brother bishops enjoyed complete autonomy within their respective eparchies. Conferences of bishops took place to establish joint policy in matters of common concern, but their decisions were not necessarily binding on individual participants, who could—and often did—postpone their implementation or even hold them in abeyance. As a result, the faithful of each eparchy had to come to terms with the decisions of their ordinary and to lead their spiritual lives in accordance with his personal interpretation of the Church's teachings. In addition to these administrative divisions, the individual members of the hierarchy differed sharply on such basic problems as the relationship between the Church and the Polish state and their own attitude toward the Ukrainian national movement and its various manifestations.<sup>60</sup> This lack of solidarity tended to weaken the Church's position in its dealings with the Polish authorities, who were well aware of this internal dissension and used it to their best advantage. The government circles, at both the provincial and ministerial levels, divided the bishops into friends and opponents of the regime and treated them accordingly.

One of the most important ideological issues that divided the hierarchy and clergy as well as a considerable number of the laity was the struggle between the Easternizers and Westernizers, or, as they were sometimes referred to, "Byzantinists" and "Latinizers." Byzantinism, according to its adherents, could be defined as an ecclesiastical and cultural trend taking its inspiration from the old Byzantine civilization and looking within it for elements that could bring about a revival of the Greek Catholic Church and its culture. While anxious to

assimilate the best of Western culture, they also wanted to enrich it with lost and forgotten Eastern Christian values. According to them, the Byzantinism of the Ukrainians was a reaffirmation of the fact that from the geographical, ethnic, religious, and cultural points of view they belonged to the East. Therefore, they should foster their own, original ecclesiastical culture, which had characterized the Ukrainian Church and the Ukrainian people for almost a millennium, and continue to develop it, trying to create a harmonious synthesis of Byzantine and Western European values. This explained the high regard that the Byzantinists had for old Church rites and their negative attitude toward Latinization, which they defined as the totality of concepts, customs, and rites that grew on a completely alien spiritual ground. The resurgence of Byzantinism was especially visible in the return to ancient liturgical traditions and practices, without, however, compromising loyalty and commitment to the Catholic Church. In addition, the Ukrainian Byzantinists maintained that the return to the old Eastern forms of worship would minimize the confessional differences between the Catholic and Orthodox Ukrainians, thus raising the possibility of winning over the latter for the Union, while at the same time reversing the trend toward Latinization, with all its unforeseeable religious and political consequences.<sup>61</sup>

The opponents of Byzantinism did not deny the profound influence of Byzantine civilization on Ukrainian culture; although, regarding it as a completely negative force, they deplored its harmful effects. To them, Byzantinism was the total sum of distorted principles and views on ecclesiastical and religious matters that developed in Byzantium and eventually led to the schism, caesaropapism, and the Church's servile attitude toward secular authorities. It also overemphasized the importance of external forms of worship, devoid of any content or deeper spiritual meaning, and tended to magnify out of proportion the significance of the national element while ignoring the principle of the universality of the Church. Thoroughly fossilized, it was especially ill suited for the modern age because of its lack of flexibility and inability to adapt to new circumstances.<sup>62</sup>

The controversy between the Byzantinists and the Westernizers grew in intensity during the interwar period, with Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi taking a stand as the foremost champion of Byzantinism in a number of pastoral letters and speeches (notably in his pastoral letter "About Ritual Matters" of 13 April 1931), in which he stressed that it would be counterproductive to try to win over the Eastern Christians by treating with disrespect or even ridiculing their cherished traditions, which they inherited from their ancestors and which thus were their birthright. Such an attitude could turn them away from Christianity itself and could also result in the complete alienation of those who valued their rite and their culture more highly than their religious beliefs.<sup>63</sup> Similar views were voiced by Sheptyts'kyi's closest collaborators, including his future successor, Iosyf Slipyi, then the rector of the Greek Catholic Academy in Lviv, whereas

the pro-Western camp was entrenched especially firmly in the Stanyslaviv and Przemyśl eparchies, with Bishop Khomyshyn acting as its chief promoter. In order to stimulate the religious faith of his flock, Khomyshyn proceeded to implement services, devotions, and practices borrowed from the Latin Church, such as the Holy Hour, novenae, supplications and litanies to the Sacred Heart, to the Virgin Mary, St. Joseph, and St. Josaphat, rosary, etc. This, in turn, met with objections on the part of some priests and many faithful, who regarded these innovations as alien to the spirit of the Eastern Church and also opposed such changes in the liturgy as the replacement of the word *pravoslavnyi* (which, in Ukrainian, could be construed as referring to the Orthodox Church) with its approximate equivalent *pravovirnyi* and the addition of the name of St. Joseph to the dismissal formula (*otrust*) of the liturgy.<sup>64</sup>

The opposite tendency was represented by Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, who in order to purify Greek Catholic liturgical texts from improper changes, distortions, and accretions that had accumulated over the centuries and to restore the Byzantine rite as practiced in Ukraine to its pristine form, convoked in 1928 the Intereparchial Liturgical Commission, consisting of the representatives of all Greek Catholic eparchies in Europe and overseas, whose task was to verify the existing liturgical rubrics and texts and to determine their standard version. The findings of the commission were formally submitted in 1936 to the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches, which, in 1942, initiated the publication of a new edition of liturgical books to be used by all Greek Catholic eparchies.<sup>65</sup> This development frustrated the efforts of the Latinizers, although some of the innovations introduced by them managed to survive in individual parishes. Not surprisingly, when the commission completed its work, some Polish circles expressed their apprehension that Sheptyts'kyi and his supporters would use its recommendations to weaken any creative opposition within the Greek Catholic Church and to vanquish the most determined foe of Byzantinism, Bishop Khomyshyn.<sup>66</sup> This was most unfortunate, they asserted, since Sheptyts'kyi, in his attempt to bring the East into the orbit of the Catholic world, made a fatal mistake by choosing the method of Orientalization rather than that of Occidentalization. Therefore, the results of his experiment proved to be quite opposite to those that he had hoped to achieve: he succeeded only in undermining the strength of Catholicism on the peripheries of Eastern Europe and failed to register any gains for the cause of the Church Union.<sup>67</sup>

In the meantime, the Greek Catholic hierarchy in Galicia began to grow in numbers.<sup>68</sup> When Iosyf Botsian (1879–1926), consecrated by Sheptyts'kyi as the bishop of Lutsk in Volhynia, was unable to take over his see because of the refusal of the Polish authorities to recognize the legality of his appointment, he became the auxiliary bishop of the Lviv archeparchy and remained in that position until his death.<sup>69</sup> Similarly, when Bishop Nykyta Budka (1877–1949)

left Canada in 1927 (where he had been looked at askance since his appeal in 1914 to the Ukrainian Canadians to support Austria-Hungary's war effort), he was assigned to the same archeparchy as a vicar general.<sup>70</sup> In 1926, Hryhorii Lakota (1883–1950) was nominated and consecrated as auxiliary bishop of Przemyśl,<sup>71</sup> and his appointment was followed three years later by those of Ivan Buchko (1891–1974) and Ivan Liatyshevs'kyi (1879–1957) as auxiliary bishops, respectively, of Lviv and Stanyslaviv.<sup>72</sup> In 1931, Mykola Charnetskyi (1884–1959) was named apostolic visitor "for the Slavs of Byzantine rite outside of the Ruthenian eparchies in Poland" and took up his residence first in Warsaw and subsequently in Kovel in Volhynia; however, after the outbreak of World War II, he was unable to carry out his duties in the vast area assigned to him and resided mostly in Lviv.<sup>73</sup>

Special problems developed in connection with designating a prospective successor to Sheptyts'kyi. In 1924, when the metropolitan was in poor health after his return from the West and the concordat between Warsaw and the Holy See was still being negotiated, the Polish authorities were apprehensive that Bishop Kotsylovs'kyi of Przemyśl, a forceful personality whom they regarded as a convinced Ukrainian nationalist and who, being fluent in Italian, was quite popular in the Vatican, might be appointed to succeed Sheptyts'kyi; indeed, Aleksander Cardinal Kakowski, the archbishop-metropolitan of Warsaw, used that possibility as an argument in favor of a speedy conclusion of a binding treaty that would give Poland the right to veto that nomination.<sup>74</sup> Later, the Polish press mentioned occasionally the candidacy of Bishop Khomyshyn as one most acceptable to Poland in the position of metropolitan. This touchy subject emerged again as the topic of discussion between Poland and the Holy See in April 1938, when Count Jan Szembek, the undersecretary of state in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, informed Msgr. Felipe Cortesi, papal nuncio in Warsaw, that President Mościcki would veto the rumored appointment of Iosyf Slipyi as an auxiliary bishop for the Lviv archeparchy with the right of succession. The justification given was Slipyi's purported close association with the organization of Ukrainian nationalists and political activities, which, according to Szembek, would have a negative effect on Polish-Ukrainian relations. The nuncio assured Szembek that he had no official or private reports about Slipyi's nomination; he stated, moreover, that the "undesirable" situation in Galicia could be improved by appointing as bishops persons whose loyalty to the Polish state was irreproachable.<sup>75</sup> Under these circumstances, Slipyi's candidacy, strongly supported by Sheptyts'kyi, had to be held in abeyance until the beginning of World War II, when on 25 November 1939 he was formally appointed archbishop-coadjutor *cum iure successionis* and was then duly consecrated in a secret ceremony on 22 December of the same year; however, his elevation to the episcopate was not formally announced to the Greek Catholic faithful until two years later.<sup>76</sup>

## IV

*The social and cultural activities of the Greek Catholic clergy during the interwar period. The Catholic Action and the organizations of Ukrainian Catholic laity. The associations of the Greek Catholic clergy. Ukrainian Catholic press and publishing. Religious and monastic life. Religious education, theological seminaries, and the founding of the Greek Catholic Theological Academy. The involvement of the Greek Catholic hierarchy and clergy in work for the Church Union. The introduction of the Byzantine-Slavic rite and its repercussions. The creation of the Lemko Apostolic Administration.*

The network of Greek Catholic parishes spread over all three eparchies not only provided religious care but also played an important part in the cultural, social, and even political life of the faithful. Indeed, it was generally assumed by laymen—and often reaffirmed by the clergy—that the priests had a moral duty to act as leaders and organizers of secular activities involving their parishioners, as mediators between them and the state authorities, and as ever-ready helpers and advisers in all matters concerning their welfare.<sup>77</sup> As a result, Greek Catholic priests often displayed initiative in founding enlightenment societies, reading circles, entertainment groups, cooperatives, and other organizations and institutions, which, strictly speaking, were outside the realm of religious life. They were occasionally actively engaged in arousing the national consciousness of their flock and in urging them to become involved in the struggle for the political rights of their oppressed nation. This was the role that many Greek Catholic priests continued to play during the interwar period, though with some important modifications. The new political and intellectual climate, which caused many organizations to swerve their orientation to the far left or right, made it inopportune for the members of the clergy to participate actively in their work, all the more so since some of their lay members resented such behavior as encroachment of their own rights. Secondly, the emergence of a number of new groups and associations, sponsored by the Catholic Action and strongly supported by the Church hierarchy, made them the object of special attention on the part of the clergy.

To be sure, the term “Catholic Action” was rather vague and subject to various interpretations. Defined by Pope Pius XI in his encyclical “*Ubi Arcano Dei*” (1922) as “the participation of the laity in the apostolate of the Church hierarchy,” it tended to assume different forms in various countries, ranging from strictly authoritarian, regulated and supervised by the local bishop, to looser and more liberal, giving considerable leeway to the initiative of lay members. It is not surprising, therefore, that similarly divergent attitudes prevailed also in the Galician Church Province, where the paternalistic tendency was represented by Bishop Khomyshyn and the liberal one by Metropolitan Sheptytskyi. In order to

make the movement more attractive to those who espoused nationalist ideology, it was pointed out that the uncompromising attitude of the Catholic Church in the matters of faith and morals, its dogmatic inflexibility, hierarchical administration, and organizational efficiency could prove very helpful in strengthening the moral fiber of the Ukrainian people, thus enabling them to withstand the dangers of Polonization and Russification. At the same time, however, the promoters of the Catholic Action in the Lviv archeparchy felt that the creation of separate Catholic organizations, analogous to those already in existence, could lead to chaotic conditions and undermine the whole organizational structure of the Ukrainian community in Galicia. Even so, it was argued, the members of Catholic Action could contribute to raising the level of spiritual life by assisting local priests in their work, by combating the growing influence of various religious sects, by trying to prevent the alienation of the younger generation from the Church and Church-sponsored organizations, and by generally exerting a constructive influence on public life.<sup>78</sup>

The first association of Ukrainian Catholic laity to come into existence was the Ukrainian Christian Organization (since 1930 known as the Ukrainian Catholic Organization), established in 1925. It derived its strength from the unqualified backing it received from Bishop Khomyshyn and his followers, and its ideological platform reflected the views of its sponsors. It had, as its primary objective, the spreading of the teaching of the Catholic Church to all aspects of public life and took a firm stand against both communism and extreme nationalism.<sup>79</sup> In 1926, it threw its support behind the newly founded weekly (later semiweekly) *Nova Zoria*, which became the chief and most effective mouthpiece of its ideology. Encouraged by the generally favorable reception of that paper by the reading public, the leaders of the organization concluded that the differentiation of Ukrainian political life had reached a stage that called for the formation of an independent party reflecting the ideological and political aspirations of Ukrainian Catholics. Accordingly, they proceeded to found, on 24 September 1930, the Ukrainian Catholic People's Party (UKNP), which in 1932 changed its name to Ukrainian National Renewal (UNO). The program of the new party was drafted by Stepan Tomashiv'skyi, a noted historian. Like the Ukrainian Christian Organization, the UKNP was based on conservative Catholic ideology. It took a dim view of the existing Ukrainian political parties because of their ideological heterogeneity and their generally liberal tendencies; it was also critical of the fact that they looked at the Catholic Church from a purely utilitarian point of view, which sometimes led to their interference in the Church's internal affairs and caused them to value empty ritualistic forms more highly than the ideological content of the Catholic faith. In addition to stressing its commitment to the idea of Catholic education and its opposition to communism, the Ukrainian National Renewal rejected the negative attitude of Ukrainian nationalists toward Poland and tried to replace

it with a more constructive approach, advocating a territorial autonomy for all Ukrainian lands within the Polish state.<sup>80</sup> On the whole, the influence of the new party on the political life of the Ukrainian minority in Poland was marginal. In 1935, during the heyday of the so-called normalization, it succeeded in electing one deputy and one senator to the Polish parliament, but this was accomplished on the basis of a deal with the executive of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance (UNDO) rather than because of any inherent strength of the party.<sup>81</sup>

Another organization based on Catholic ideology was the Ukrainian Catholic Union (UKS), the activities of which were limited to the Lviv archeparchy. It was established in January 1931, after the constitutional statute of the Catholic Action had been formally approved by the Greek Catholic episcopate, with Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's personal blessing and in response to his call to redefine the nation's political, social, and cultural objectives in the light of Christian ethics and morals. Accordingly, it aimed at imbuing all aspects of life with true Christian spirit and tried to enhance the quality of education and raise the level of public life by enriching them with Christian principles.<sup>82</sup> While it had no political ambitions of its own, it generally supported the policies of the UNDO, whose prominent member, Volodymyr Kuzmowych, was editor-in-chief of the weekly *Meta*, published since 1931 under the auspices of the UKS. Other cognate organizations were the Catholic Action of the Ukrainian Youth (KAUM), established under the sponsorship of all bishops of the Galician Church Province after the "Ukrainian Youth for Christ" festival in 1933;<sup>83</sup> the youth organization Orly (The Eagles); and the association of Ukrainian Catholic students Obnova (The Renewal), founded in 1930, the avowed objective of which was to deepen the Christian commitment of its members and to follow the guiding principle of the Catholic Action "to renew all things in Christ."<sup>84</sup>

A special position among these organizations was occupied by the reading association Skala (The Rock), founded in 1934 by Bishop Khomyshyn with the purpose of "helping, expanding, and defending the education and culture of the Ukrainian people and their religious and moral life on the basis of the teachings of the Holy Catholic Church."<sup>85</sup> Often at odds with Ukrainian secular organizations, whose approach to various problems of contemporary life did not meet with his approval, Khomyshyn aimed primarily at creating an effective counterpart to the network of the popular Prosvita (Enlightenment) reading houses, which would be supervised and controlled by the Church and thus remain immune to any harmful influence of non-Catholic ideologies. While Skala was basically apolitical, its members were encouraged to join political parties that were guided in their activities by the teachings and rules of the Catholic Church, notably the Ukrainian National Renewal.<sup>86</sup> In his pastoral letter of 22 July 1935 addressed to the clergy of his eparchy, Khomyshyn urged them to establish Skala reading houses in all parishes and to actively promote their growth.<sup>87</sup> Two years later, he

went a step further by forbidding his clergy to belong to any secular organizations, with the exception of those in which priests participated *ex officio* and which were either subsidized by the Church or had as their primary objective the support of the Church and its teachings.<sup>88</sup> While this decision was widely criticized in the Ukrainian press as running counter to national interests and seriously weakening the organized life of the Ukrainian community, the papal nuncio Cortesi sent the bishop a congratulatory letter, praising him for following the exhortations and instructions of the Holy See.<sup>89</sup>

In January 1936, the Greek Catholic hierarchy in Galicia issued a joint pastoral letter in support of the Catholic Action.<sup>90</sup> Originally, it had been decided that the Catholic Action in the Galician Church Province would be directed by the General Institute of the Catholic Action, which was to coordinate the activities of all organizations involved in the secular apostolate.<sup>91</sup> In practice, however, each eparchy continued to follow the guideline drawn by the local ordinary and jealousy guarded its autonomous status. Lacking the traditions of a strong and healthy Catholic lay movement, the Church-sponsored organizations were able to make only slow headway against the seeming indifference of the mass of the faithful.<sup>92</sup> To be sure, Church brotherhoods had a long and proud history in Galicia, but after the Polish Sejm in 1674 forbade them to maintain any contacts with the patriarch of Constantinople, they became completely subordinated to local bishops, and, after the official introduction of the Union in 1700, they were effectively deprived of any remaining influence.

In any case, the activities of Ukrainian Catholic lay organizations did not reflect to any appreciable degree the real power wielded by the Church and its unique position in Ukrainian society in Galicia. As the Ukrainian Catholic press frequently complained, even the practising Catholics among the intelligentsia usually limited themselves to demonstrating their religious convictions in Church, were apologetic rather than aggressive in defending them, and felt no need to spread them to their environment. As a result, the Catholic movement itself had no firm ideological foundations and lacked even an effective methodology of community work, lagging far behind its Western European models in both the scope and in the intensity of its work.<sup>93</sup> Accordingly, its achievements during the interwar period were rather modest and consisted chiefly in asserting itself against the suspicious or indifferent attitude of the public and in winning the loyalty of a comparatively small but enthusiastic group of adherents.

In addition to the organizations sponsored by, or connected with, the Catholic Action, there existed scores of other Catholic lay associations—some of them of purely local significance, limited to individual eparchies or even groups of parishes, most of them dedicated to either charitable or devotional activities (the Society of St. John the Almsgiver, the Apostolate of Prayer, etc.).<sup>94</sup> The Greek Catholic clergy, while playing an active part in the lay organizations, also had

its own associations in all eparchies. Though their aims varied, their programs generally stressed the deepening of a contemplative spirit and piety among the clergy and the faithful, assistance for the Catholic press, and charitable work. The oldest among them, the Society of St. Paul the Apostle (founded in 1897), became deeply involved in the struggle against compulsory celibacy in the Stanyslaviv and Przemyśl eparchies and was eventually dissolved in 1925 for lodging a protest with the League of Nations against the persecution of Ukrainian priests by the Polish authorities.<sup>95</sup> Its successor was the St. Andrew's Society, founded in 1930 as a result of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's initiative, to which over 80 percent of the priests of the Lviv archeparchy belonged.<sup>96</sup> It stood firmly behind the traditionalistic approach to all matters of worship and Church discipline, while its counterpart in the Stanyslaviv eparchy, St. Josaphat's Society of Celibate Priests (founded in 1922), was the staunchest supporter of Bishop Khomyshyn's policies and sponsored the publication of the semiweekly *Nova Zoria*.<sup>97</sup> A special position was occupied by the Theological Learned Society (*Bohoslovs'ke Naukove Tovarystvo*), established in 1923 to foster theological scholarship and to publish theological monographs and periodicals. It embraced members from all three eparchies and sponsored the publication of the quarterly *Bohosloviia* (17 vols. by 1939) as well as the series *Pratsi BNT* (13 vols.) and *Vydannia Bohoslovii* (23 vols.).<sup>98</sup>

While the actions of Greek Catholic lay organizations in Galicia sometimes appeared sluggish and ineffective, the Ukrainian Catholic press was, on the whole, strong and vigorous, and exhibited a considerable degree of variety and sophistication. Its network expanded greatly during the interwar period and comprised a string of general-informative, devotional, and scholarly newspapers, journals, and other serial and non-serial publications for children, young readers, adults, the intelligentsia, and the clergy. Although there was no Ukrainian Catholic daily, this gap was partly filled by the semiweekly *Nova Zoria*, founded in 1926 as the organ of the Ukrainian Christian Organization and reflecting the views of Bishop Khomyshyn. It was at first published under the editorship of the Reverend Tyt Halushchyn'skyi, OSBM, and after 1928, under that of Osyp Nazaruk, a brilliant, astute, and farsighted writer and journalist. From the very beginning of its existence, it became an articulate and often aggressive critic of the negativist attitude that seemed to dominate the life of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. Controversial but intellectually stimulating, it took an uncompromising stand against both communism and extreme nationalism, while trying to promote a realistic policy of accommodation between the Ukrainians and the Polish government. At the same time, it also advanced the Catholic point of view in social and cultural life, advocating social, economic, and educational reforms in accordance with the teachings of the Catholic Church, and staunchly defended the policies of the Holy See and its official representatives, even when they seemed

to collide with Ukrainian national interests.<sup>99</sup> Its sister publication, the popular weekly *Pravda* (started in 1927), was aimed primarily to peasant audiences and, in addition to surveying current political and religious developments, provided good coverage of economic and business affairs.<sup>100</sup>

The weekly *Meta*, the organ of the Ukrainian Catholic Union that began publishing in 1931, was closely connected with the circles around Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi. Rather staid and uninspired when compared to the lively *Nova Zoria*, it often engaged in ideological disputes with its opponents from the nationalist and liberal camp and tried to work out guidelines for the Ukrainian Catholic movement. *Meta* sponsored the publication of the popular biweekly, *Khrystos Nasha Sylva*, which appeared as its supplement, and of the literary and scholarly magazine *Dzvony* (1931–1939), appealing to the taste of a more sophisticated reader. Ideologically close to these publications was the monthly *Nyva* (1904–1939), sponsored by the Society of Catechists and devoted to Church and social affairs. Other noteworthy Catholic newspapers and periodicals included the weekly *Beskyd* (1926–1933) and its successor, *Ukrain's'kyi Beskyd* (1933–1939), both published in Przemyśl with the financial support of Bishop Kotsylov's'kyi, the monthlies *Dobryi Pastyr* (Stanyslaviv), *Katolyts'ka Aktsiia* (published by the General Institute of Catholic Action), *Misionar Presviatoho Sertsia Khrystovoho* (published by the Basilian Fathers in Zhovkva), *Nash Pryiatel'* (for children), and *Ukrain's'ke Iunatstvo* (for young readers). Finally, one should mention the non-periodical scholarly series *Analecta Ordinis S. Basilii Magni*, published since 1924 by the Basilian Fathers in Zhovkva and devoted to the history of the Church and the history of Ukraine.<sup>101</sup>

The organizations of the laity and the clergy and the Catholic press formed an important link between the Church and the mass of the faithful, on whose active support it depended for its very survival. At the same time, however, it drew much of its inner strength and inspiration from the work of its elite corps—the monastic orders and congregations. The foremost and most numerous among them was the Basilian Order of St. Josaphat (the name formally approved by Pope Pius XI in 1932), which before World War II counted 378 monks in its Galician province (out of a total 686). Combining their traditional life of prayer with an active apostolate, they were engaged in education, scholarship, and parochial and missionary work. The order maintained theological and philosophical schools for novices in Lviv, Lavriv, Dobromyl, and Krystynopil, directed a boys' high school in Buchach and the pontifical Ukrainian College of St. Josaphat in Rome, and operated a large publishing center in Zhovkva. Having been reformed by the Jesuit order, the Basilians retained an occidental outlook and were among the most eager supporters of westernizing tendencies in the Greek Catholic Church. Two of the Galician ordinaries, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and Bishop Kotsylov's'kyi, came from the ranks of the Basilians, but Sheptyts'kyi's penchant

for reviving old Byzantine traditions later caused him to transfer his sympathies to the Studite order. In 1931, the Reverend Dionysii Tkachuk (1867–1944) was elected by the general chapter held at Dobromyl as the first archimandrite of the Basilians and took up residence in Rome, from where he directed the activities of the order throughout the world.<sup>102</sup>

The order of the Studites was reestablished by Sheptyts'kyi with the purpose of reviving the ancient monastic traditions of the Christian East. He personally compiled their rule book (typicon) and headed them as their archimandrite. In 1919, they moved from Sknyliv near Lviv to Univ, where they opened a monastery. They engaged in agriculture and manual work, ran orphanages and residences for students, a painting school, a bookbinding shop, and a library called Studion in Lviv. By 1939, they had 8 monasteries and 3 missionary stations with 225 monks, among them 22 ordained priests.<sup>103</sup> The metropolitan also played an important role in giving an impetus to the activities of the eastern branch of the Congregation of Redemptorist Fathers, who arrived in Galicia from Belgium in 1911 at his invitation. They settled first in Univ and then in Zboiska near Lviv, where they opened a secondary school with a residence for students. They maintained a philosophical and theological school in Holosko Velyke near Lviv, and monasteries in Lviv, Stanyslaviv, Ternopil, and Kovel in Volhynia. Until 1933, their Galician viceprovince was administered by their chief organizer and first protohegumen, Joseph Schrijvers (1876–1945). Bishop Mykola Charnetskyi (appointed apostolic visitor for the Slavs of Byzantine rite in Poland in 1931) was a member of the congregation. In the 1930s, the eastern branch of the Redemptorists had 9 monasteries and 151 monks (96 in Galicia).<sup>104</sup>

The most numerous monastic congregation for women was that of the Sister Servants of Mary Immaculate. As of 1938, it had 22 houses (convents) in the Lviv archeparchy, 35 in the Przemyśl eparchy, and 30 in the Stanyslaviv eparchy, with 389 sisters (out of 628 worldwide). Their activities embraced such diverse occupations as doing domestic work and managing business affairs in theological seminaries; maintaining kindergartens, orphanages, elementary, vocational, and home economics schools for girls; supervising workshops, convalescent homes and resort houses; providing catechetical instruction for children and adults; working with women in individual parishes, giving them corporal and spiritual assistance; and trying to alleviate such social problems as destitution, poverty, sickness, and so forth.<sup>105</sup> The second-largest congregation was that of the Basilian Sisters, which in 1938–1939 had 26 houses and over 300 nuns. Their work centered mainly on running kindergartens, elementary, vocational, and secondary schools for girls, and shelters and orphanages.<sup>106</sup> Among other congregations, the Josephite Sisters (25 houses and close to 100 nuns, chiefly in the Przemyśl eparchy) took care of the aged and the sick, while the Studite Sisters (with a motherhouse in Iakhtoriv and homes in Hai near Ternopil, Lviv,

and Pidhaitsi) engaged in agricultural work, sewing, making liturgical vestments, running nurseries, kindergartens, and orphanages.<sup>107</sup>

As the above outline indicates, practically all monastic orders and congregations were deeply involved in education, which was also one of the chief concerns of the secular clergy and of the Church as a whole. According to the provisions of the concordat of 1925, compulsory religious instruction was to be provided in all elementary, secondary, and vocational schools,<sup>108</sup> and Greek Catholic pupils attending schools where the students belonging to the Latin rite formed the majority had the right to receive that instruction from their own priest. The program of religious education offered by secondary schools (especially in the so-called gymnasia) was rather extensive and included such subjects as Biblical history, history of the Church, liturgics, dogmatics, and ethics, and usually organized groups, circles, and societies aimed at enhancing the students' religious commitment, the most popular among them being the Marian Sodality (*Mariis'ki Druzhyntsi*).<sup>109</sup> Chaplains were also appointed to take care of the spiritual needs of university students, and some of them participated actively in the ideological struggle between the adherents and opponents of extreme nationalism, which deeply split the ranks of the Ukrainian academic youth (see, for example, the Reverend Mykola Konrad in a series of articles published in the weekly *Meta*).<sup>110</sup>

In order to encourage promising candidates to enter theological seminaries and also to assist students who, because of their involvement in underground activities, were barred from completing their secondary education in state-supervised schools, Metropolitan Sheptytskyi founded, under the auspices of the Greek Catholic Church, the so-called minor seminaries in Lviv and Rohatyn, the graduates of which were readily accepted by foreign institutions of higher learning, even though their matriculation diplomas were not recognized by Polish universities.<sup>111</sup> Candidates for the priesthood attended the theological seminaries that existed in each eparchy. The oldest among them was the seminary in Lviv (founded in 1783), which counted among its graduates over 50 bishops, archbishops, and metropolitans as well as some 8,000 priests.<sup>112</sup> In 1928, Sheptytskyi raised its status by transforming it into the Greek Catholic Theological Academy (with a five-year course of study) as the first step toward the creation of a Ukrainian Catholic university. The solemn opening of the Academy took place on 6 October 1929.<sup>113</sup> The need for a school of that type became especially urgent during the interwar period, since the Polish government abolished the existing Ukrainian chairs at the University of Lviv and never carried out its promise to found a Ukrainian university. Under the leadership of its rector, Iosyf Slipyi, the Academy soon gained international recognition. It had two faculties, those of theology and philosophy (the latter opened in 1932), staffed by some of the most outstanding scholars in the Ukrainian community, but the plans to establish a faculty of

law and possibly a medical school based on the Ukrainian National Hospital (*Narodnia Lichnytsia*) were disrupted by the outbreak of World War II as well as by the hostile attitude of the Polish government, which was concerned about the possibility of the Academy's expansion into a full-fledged university and made representations to the Holy See to prevent this from happening.<sup>114</sup> The Academy was forced to close its doors during the Soviet occupation of 1939–1941, but was reopened with the permission of the German authorities during the years 1941–1944.<sup>115</sup> In addition to the Academy, Greek Catholic candidates for the priesthood were trained in the theological seminary (established in 1907) and theological lyceum in Stanyslaviv (both with a four-year course of study) and in the theological seminary in Przemyśl, which began to offer a complete course of study only in 1921. Promising undergraduate and graduate students of theology from all three eparchies were sent to study abroad, mostly in the pontifical universities in Rome and at the universities of Munich and Innsbruck. In 1932, the Pontifical Seminary of St. Josaphat was opened in Rome to accommodate Greek Catholic students from European countries and overseas.<sup>116</sup>

One of Sheptyts'kyi's most cherished dreams, to which he devoted much of his energy and which apparently always preoccupied his mind, was the idea of bringing the Christian East back into unity with the Catholic Church. It was primarily to realize that idea that he, a humble Basilian monk, accepted the episcopal office. Subsequently, while serving as the metropolitan of his Church province, Sheptyts'kyi was constantly waiting for a great historical opportunity that would enable him to bring his dream closer to fulfillment. At times the hour of destiny seemed to be tantalizingly close, but in the end his hopes always turned to ashes. Thus, during his stay in Petrograd after the February Revolution of 1917, Sheptyts'kyi chaired the first Russian Catholic synod, which elected Leonid Fedorov (1879–1935), a Studite monk, as the exarch of the Russian Catholic Church, but the latter was able to carry out his functions only until his imprisonment by the Soviet authorities in 1923.<sup>117</sup> Also typical of Sheptyts'kyi's grandiose planning was the fact that after the Soviet occupation of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus he appointed, using the powers vested in him by Pope Pius X in 1907, some of his closest collaborators as exarchs for the whole territory of the USSR, allotting Great Russia and Siberia to his brother Klymentii; Volhynia, Polissia, and Podlachia to Bishop Mykola Charnets'kyi; Dnieper Ukraine to Iosyf Slipyi; and Belarus to the Reverend Antonii Niemancewycz, S.J.<sup>118</sup> The metropolitan's special powers were rescinded by Pope Pius XII on 30 May 1940 and replaced with more limited prerogatives.<sup>119</sup> However, the Holy See confirmed his appointment of exarchs, although this became a dead letter because of the military and political developments of World War II and its aftermath.<sup>120</sup>

Even before World War I, Sheptyts'kyi was one of the most enthusiastic and dedicated organizers of the Union congresses at Velehrad in Moravia. These were

aimed at removing the prejudices and mistrust that had accumulated over the centuries between the Christian East and West and brought together representatives of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches (mostly from Slavic countries) in a free, unconstrained atmosphere of ecumenical rapprochement. Although the tense political situation prevented the metropolitan from attending the fourth (first postwar) congress in 1924, he was invited to chair the fifth congress in 1927, which was also attended by Bishops Kotsylovs'kyi and Lakota. During the subsequent two congresses, the Greek Catholic hierarchy was represented by Bishops Kotsylovs'kyi (in 1932) and Charnets'kyi (in 1936), with Rector Iosy Slipyi acting as Sheptyts'kyi's proxy.<sup>121</sup> The Greek Catholic clergy also actively participated in the six Union conferences held in Pinsk in Polissia between 1930 and 1937.<sup>122</sup> However, the most impressive contribution of the Galician Church Province to the cause of the Union was the First Union Congress in Lviv, held on 22–25 December 1936 to commemorate the 300th anniversary of the death of Metropolitan Veliamyn Ruts'kyi. The congress, which brought together about 150 participants from all eparchies, was formally opened by its host, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, and was attended by Bishops Buchko, Budka, Charnets'kyi, and Liatyshev'skyi. Its program, prepared by the rector Slipyi, emphasized the fact that the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia embodied the idea of the Union and was itself the best proof of that idea's feasibility and viability. A series of resolutions adopted by the congress stressed, among other things, the relevance of Ruts'kyi's ideas for the further development of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, including that of a Kyivan patriarchate, and asked the Holy See to create a separate eparchy of the Byzantine-Slavic rite in Poland and to use its influence to enable Ruts'kyi's spiritual heirs—the Greek Catholic clergy—to participate freely in missionary work among the Orthodox population of that country.<sup>123</sup>

The action to spread the Union in the mainly Orthodox areas of Volhynia, Polissia, and Poland's northeastern provinces had been initiated in 1923 by the Roman Catholic bishop of Siedlce, Henryk Przeździecki.<sup>124</sup> In 1931, a jurisdiction of the Eastern rite embracing these territories was created under the authority of local Latin bishops, with Bishop Mykola Charnets'kyi, CSSR, appointed as apostolic visitor "for the Slavs of Byzantine rite outside the Ruthenian eparchies in Poland."<sup>125</sup> The new Byzantine-Slavic rite grew very slowly, however, and on 1 June 1938 counted only 43 parishes with 16,644 faithful and 51 priests, of whom 22 declared themselves as Ukrainians; in addition, 29 candidates for priesthood studied in the pontifical Oriental seminary at Dubno in Volhynia.<sup>126</sup>

The situation of the Byzantine-Slavic rite was somewhat improved after the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches on 27 May 1937 issued its instruction "Pro cura pastorali Orientalium" to all Roman Catholic ordinaries of Poland, specifying that they must not, without express permission of the Holy See, introduce any changes in Eastern rites and discipline. It was also specified that

a separate parish of the Eastern rite had to be established in every locality where the number of Uniates exceeded one hundred and that the parishioners' native language had to be used both in sermons and in religious instruction.<sup>127</sup> Even so, the Polish authorities took an unfriendly attitude toward the priests and the faithful of the new rite, exposing them to constant harassment and chicanery, and the Warsaw government rejected the proposal of the Holy See to create a Byzantine-Slavic eparchy, with the Volhynian city of Kovel as its center, that would embrace all eastern territories of Poland with the exception of the metropolitan see of Halych.<sup>128</sup>

A similarly controversial situation developed in the southwestern corner of the Przemyśl eparchy, known as the Lemko lands, where the Orthodox Church and the Old Ruthenian movement were still able to maintain a tenuous hold over a part of the local population. In the summer of 1933, a delegation of Old Ruthenians from that area approached the papal nuncio in Poland, Msgr. Francesco Marmaggi, and the primate of Poland, August Cardinal Hlond, with a request that the Holy See create a new episcopal see for the Lemko lands because of the dissatisfaction of the faithful with Bishop Kotsylovs'kyi's pro-Ukrainian policies. This petition was inspired, or at least supported, by Polish authorities, who wanted to separate the thus far politically dormant Lemkos from the "disruptive" influence of Galician Ukrainians.<sup>129</sup> As a result of this initiative, the Sacred Congregation for Oriental Churches issued on 10 February 1934 its decree "Quo aptius consularet," establishing the Lemko Apostolic Administration, comprising 9 deaneries of the Przemyśl eparchy (Buków, Dukla, Dynów, Gorlice, Grybów, Krosno, Muszyna, Rymanów, and Sanok), with 121 parishes and approximately 130,000 faithful.<sup>130</sup> This area was to be separated from the eparchy and, for all practical purposes, became an independent administrative unit, although the jurisdiction of the bishop of Przemyśl was formally only "suspended," and the fiction of the integrity and indivisibility of the eparchy could thus be maintained. The decision was explained in detail in the nuncio's letter to Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi as having been taken in accordance with the maxim "salus animarum suprema lex est." As Marmaggi claimed, the intensification of Orthodox propaganda in the Lemko area called for urgent countermeasures in order to stop that movement, to restore Catholic unity, and thus remove the danger to which the "beloved Lemko faithful" had been exposed.<sup>131</sup>

Not surprisingly, the Central Committee of the Ukrainian National Democratic Union in its resolution of 10 March 1934 deplored the creation of the apostolic administration as a "political act, directed against the religious and ecclesiastic integrity and national unity of the Galician Province."<sup>132</sup> To complicate matters for the Holy See, the first appointee to the position of apostolic administrator, the dean of the Greek Catholic chaplains of the Polish army Mykola Nahorianskyi (Nagórzański), declined that dubious honor.<sup>133</sup> The second nominee, Vasył

Mastsiukh, himself of Lemko origin, stressed in his pastoral letter of 2 March 1935, written in “the Ruthenian-Galician language,” the differences between the Lemkos and the Ukrainians and praised Poland’s national tolerance, which had permitted the Lemkos to survive to the present as an ethnic entity.<sup>134</sup> After Mastsiukh’s untimely death on 12 March 1936, Iakiv Medvets’kyi, a professor of the theological seminary in Stanyslaviv and well known for his Old Ruthenian sympathies, became the new apostolic administrator and held that office until his death on 27 January 1941.<sup>135</sup> On 30 April 1938, the seat of the apostolic administrator was transferred from Rymanów-Zdrój to Sanok.<sup>136</sup> A plan to transform the Lemko administration into a regular eparchy was considered by the Holy See and the Polish government, but the coming of the war prevented its realization.<sup>137</sup> Moreover, the establishment of the Lemko administration was followed by demands in the Polish press to create a similar administrative unit for the Hutsul area, whereby 6 deaneries with 129 parishes would be separated from the Stanyslaviv eparchy.<sup>138</sup>

The Old Ruthenian orientation fostered by both Mastsiukh and Medvets’kyi prevailed without any change even under the German occupation and resulted in a series of conflicts between the Lemko administrator and the Ukrainian National Council in Sanok representing the interests of the Ukrainian group.<sup>139</sup> In August 1940, Medvets’kyi, incapacitated by a serious illness, appointed as his vicar general Oleksander Malynovs’kyi, a well-known Ukrainian patriot. At first, Malynovs’kyi was unable to make much headway against the Old Ruthenian sympathizers in the consistory in Sanok, but after a renewed intervention by the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow, he began to run the administration without too much interference. After Medvets’kyi’s death, the intervention by the Ukrainian Central Committee with Msgr. Cesare Orsenigo, the papal nuncio in Berlin, frustrated the efforts of the consistory to regain control, and on 1 February 1941 Malynovs’kyi was formally appointed by the Holy See as full-fledged apostolic administrator.<sup>140</sup> He reversed the Old Ruthenian tendencies of his predecessors and initiated a strongly pro-Ukrainian trend. However, after the beginning of the resettlement of the Lemkos to Soviet Ukraine in the fall of 1945, he was forced to abandon his position and left his deputy, Andrii Zlupko, to preside over the dissolution of the apostolic administration during the deportation of the Lemko population from its native region to remote areas of Poland.<sup>141</sup>

## V

*The attitude of the Greek Catholic Church toward the Polish State. The expansion of the OUN and its repercussions. The pacification of 1930: Sheptyts’kyi’s intervention with the Polish government and the pastoral letter of the Greek Catholic hierarchy. The problem of the young generation and the Church’s*

*attempt to wean it from extreme nationalism. Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter of 1932 and the "Ukrainian Youth for Christ" festival of 1933. The Church's denunciation of political terrorism and its support of the "normalization" of 1935. The threat of communism and Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter of 3 August 1936.*

While trying to render unto Caesar those things that are Caesar's, the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia ran into difficulties during the two world wars and the uneasy peace between them, if only because its sympathy for the Ukrainian national cause tended to call into question its professed allegiance to the secular authorities, who, notwithstanding several changes in jurisdiction during those three decades, invariably expected and demanded the Church's loyalty, if not submissive compliance. In addition, of course, the Church's support of the national aspirations of its faithful was circumscribed by its even deeper commitment to the Catholic doctrine and its obligation to follow the policies of the Holy See, even if they seemed to contradict Ukrainian national interests. Not surprisingly, this precarious situation occasionally led, especially among the lower clergy, to split loyalties or to a simplistic view whereby the welfare of the nation became automatically identified with that of the Church.

The concordat of 1925, while granting the Church various rights and privileges, demanded some reciprocity on its part, specifying that both the hierarchy and the clergy would not participate in any activities harmful to the state and would take an active interest in its welfare.<sup>142</sup> In addition, the Church's attitude had to be governed by the Catholic view that all authority ultimately derived from God and that, consequently, all citizens, regardless of their nationality, were obliged to be loyal to the state in which they lived. Obviously, this did not prevent the Ukrainians in Poland from defending their national rights, but their struggle had to be legal and exclude any means incompatible with Christian ethics.

Some members of the Greek Catholic hierarchy, notably Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and Bishop Kotsylovs'kyi, never went beyond a grudging acceptance of the fact that their sees were now under Polish sovereignty and that, accordingly, they had to bow to the inevitable and try to find some kind of *modus vivendi* with the Warsaw government. Obviously, this attitude of studied coolness, combined with a persistent refusal to acknowledge any benefits of Polish rule, was far from satisfactory from the Polish point of view. After all, as a Polish deputy was to remind Sheptyts'kyi in the Sejm, he and his brother bishops could carry out their functions only thanks to the protection of the Polish army, which alone prevented the incorporation of Galicia into the Soviet Union with all its attendant consequences.<sup>143</sup> Indeed, similar sentiments were expressed even by Bishop Khomyshyn, who, in his pastoral letter of 23 February 1931, openly took issue with the policies pursued by the Ukrainian parties in Poland, claiming that the Ukrainians never had wise and circumspect political leaders and that their persistent attitude of stubborn resistance had brought them to the edge of an

abyss. In Khomyshyn's words, it was not the Council of Ambassadors but Divine Providence that placed a part of the Ukrainian people under the sovereignty of Poland, and they had no choice but to accept that fact of life. Even if the Poles left Galicia, he argued, the Ukrainians there would be unable to establish their own state, for Polish rule would be replaced by the Soviet regime. That regime, Khomyshyn continued, would destroy all their national accomplishments, liquidate or deport their clergy and intelligentsia, and introduce a system of state-administered serfdom, under which peasants would be deprived of their land and the fruits of their labor. Galician Ukrainians, he said, had been carried away by the idea of an independent and united Ukraine, which had now become an unrealizable aspiration; they should rather try to consolidate their scattered forces and strengthen their potential in their own home province. Ukrainians in Poland, Khomyshyn advised, though a minority, could become an important factor in internal Polish politics: they should become loyal citizens of the Polish state, which, in turn, should reciprocate by fulfilling their rightful national and cultural aspirations. This loyalty, according to Khomyshyn, was to go beyond simply carrying out one's duties toward the state, for a good Christian ought also to be a model citizen of the state and strive to make it strong and impregnable.<sup>144</sup>

Not surprisingly, while Khomyshyn's views were hailed by the Polish side as an expression of political sagacity, the Ukrainian press was bitterly critical of his concept of "active loyalty" toward Poland.<sup>145</sup> While many admired the bishop for his civil courage, others accused him of attempting to initiate a policy of appeasement that could only lead to a situation in which the Galician Ukrainians would remain forever second-class citizens of an alien state, selling their birthright for a bowl of pottage, treated with condescension and contempt by their masters, and grateful for whatever handouts they deigned to bestow on them.

In a way, the problem of the relationship between the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish authorities was inextricably connected with another fundamental issue: the Church's attitude toward Ukrainian nationalism in its most militant and aggressive form, the upsurge of which during the interwar period posed the boldest challenge to the Church's moral and spiritual supremacy. In 1929, the Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO), an elitist, paramilitary group engaged in sporadic anti-Polish terrorist activities, was transformed into a mass movement, consisting to a large extent of secondary school and university students, with a liberal sprinkling of peasant and working-class youth. The ideological basis for the new underground party, known as the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), was provided by Dmytro Dontsov, the editor of what had once been one of the most respected Ukrainian journals, *Literaturno-Naukovyi Vistnyk*. Dontsov proceeded to make the journal into the platform of an extreme and intolerant brand of nationalism, rejecting all moral and ethical constraints and glorifying ruthlessness and violence as long as they were employed for the good

of the nation.<sup>146</sup> His doctrines negated the very essence of Christianity—indeed, some nationalist militants seemed to reject the Church as a dangerous competitor in their struggle for the spiritual allegiance of the younger generation, over which they wanted to exercise full and undivided control. In their opinion, the Ukrainian nationalist movement could achieve its objectives only by making its ideology into a quasi religion and by replacing God with the nation as the absolute truth.<sup>147</sup> Dontsov's disciples were only too eager to follow his precepts by engaging in largely counterproductive anti-Polish terrorist activities and by using strong-arm tactics within the Ukrainian community itself to coerce its leaders into abandoning any attempt to reach accommodation with the Warsaw government.<sup>148</sup> Under these circumstances, the Church was forced to take an unequivocal stand against an ideology that not only undermined its teachings, but made religion itself appear meaningless and irrelevant.

One of the most explosive problems to confront the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia at that time was the so-called pacification of 1930 and its long-lasting impact on Polish-Ukrainian relations. This repressive action, taken by the government in response to hundreds of acts of terrorism by the OUN directed against Polish private and public property, involved sending punitive expeditions consisting of military and police units into regions where arson and sabotage activities were especially rampant.<sup>149</sup> A relentless application of the principle of collective responsibility resulted in widespread damage inflicted on Ukrainian cultural institutions and cooperative stores as well as in a liberal use of corporal punishment against many Ukrainian activists, including a number of Greek Catholic priests. The auxiliary bishop of the Lviv archeparchy, Ivan Buchko, traveled widely through the areas affected by the pacification to comfort its victims.<sup>150</sup> In this almost desperate situation the representatives of Ukrainian political parties approached Metropolitan Sheptytskyi with a request to intervene personally with the leaders of the Polish government in order to put an end to the draconian measures directed against the Ukrainian community.<sup>151</sup> The metropolitan made two trips to Warsaw during which he failed to obtain an audience with Marshal Piłsudski, then the Prime Minister of Poland, or with President Mościcki; he succeeded, however, in meeting other Polish dignitaries, among them Deputy Prime Minister Beck and Minister of the Interior General Sławoj-Składkowski. In spite of their assurances that the repressive action would be curtailed and that the government had no intention of destroying the cultural and economic achievements of the Ukrainian minority, the pacification continued unabated for several more weeks.<sup>152</sup> The two-faced attitude of the Polish leaders induced all Greek Catholic bishops of Galicia to issue, on 13 October, a joint pastoral letter to their flock, in which they condemned all acts of terrorism but also deplored the measures directed against the innocent population. When the bishops refused

to tone down the language of their letter, its publication was blocked by the Polish authorities.<sup>153</sup>

The pacification and its aftermath forced the Greek Catholic episcopate to examine and reassess the problem of the younger generation, which, thwarted in its attempts to find personal fulfillment, joined the ranks of the nationalist and, to a lesser extent, the communist underground in large numbers. The Ukrainian Catholic press (notably *Nova Zoria* and *Meta*) had from the very beginning condemned Dontsov's brand of nationalism, which placed the vague slogan "the good of the nation" above all religious dogmas, as a grave and fatal error, the consequences of which could prove tragic to the whole nation—bringing it discord, ruin, and death.<sup>154</sup> It also complained that, in their attempt to achieve total control over the Ukrainian youth, nationalist militants were trying to discredit the Greek Catholic Church at any cost, accusing it of backwardness, obscurantism, and subservience to a foreign authority.<sup>155</sup> This alienation of the youth, coupled with growing religious indifference among the intelligentsia and the working class, did not augur well for the future of the Church as the leading spiritual and moral force of the Ukrainian community in Galicia.

While the Catholic press was engaged in a frontal attack against extreme nationalism, Metropolitan Sheptytskyi chose a more subtle approach. In a special statement addressed to the Ukrainian youth in May 1932, he extolled its deep patriotism and readiness for self-sacrifice, but at the same time criticized its lack of tolerance, a contemptuous attitude toward those who did not share its views, and its rejection of the authority of its elders.<sup>156</sup> The Church's attempt to regain its influence among the younger generation culminated in the religious festival "Ukrainian Youth for Christ," held in Lviv on 6–7 May 1933 to mark the nineteenth-hundredth anniversary of the institution of the Sacrament of the Eucharist and Christ's Passion and Resurrection. Although the celebration was to be devoid of any political character, it was generally regarded as an affirmation of the bonds between the Greek Catholic Church and the Ukrainian national idea and, as such, as an opportunity to demonstrate the strength of the Ukrainian community in the Galician Church Province. In addition, as its organizers stated, it was to be a public protest against the undermining of the religious foundation of the Ukrainian national life in Galicia as well as against militant atheism in Soviet Ukraine. The spiritual rally attracted close to one hundred thousand participants, mostly from the Galician countryside, who manifested their religious and patriotic convictions in an impressive homage to Metropolitan Sheptytskyi.<sup>157</sup>

Although mass celebrations in Lviv demonstrated that the Greek Catholic Church could still muster considerable strength, it was also obvious that the nationalist underground was not mollified by any persuasion and continued to expand its terrorist activities. Thus, when the assassination of Bronisław Pieracki,

Poland's minister of the interior, by a member of the OUN in June 1934 was followed a few weeks later by the murder of Ivan Babii, a widely respected educator and the principal of a prestigious gymnasium in Lviv, for his alleged collaboration with the Polish police, Sheptyts'kyi abandoned his conciliatory attitude toward the militants in the OUN and forcefully condemned both the instigators and the perpetrators of the crime as madmen and enemies of the people who were using Ukrainian children to kill their parents.<sup>158</sup>

The metropolitan's views about nationalism were expounded rather fully in May 1935 in his interview with the Polish weekly *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*. He regarded contemporary nationalism, especially its extremist version, as being akin to paganism in its tendency to substitute the nation or state for the highest religious values, and felt that the Catholic Church had to defend itself against its encroachments. At the same time, however, he thought that it was often in the Church's best interest not to reject everything that was connected with nationalism, since a wholesale condemnation of the nationalist doctrine by the Church or its individual representatives would preclude any chance of a future reconciliation between the two and would make it virtually impossible to win over nationalist sympathizers. Thus, while the Church had to denounce unconditionally all terrorist acts committed by the nationalists, it should not castigate the youth for fostering the national idea. Moreover, while nationalism was harmful from the Church's point of view, it could also play a positive role as a unifying force within the Ukrainian community.<sup>159</sup>

One way in which the nationalist underground could be rendered comparatively harmless was through an accommodation between the Ukrainian minority and the Polish authorities—a solution first proposed by Bishop Khomyshyn and formally endorsed in the summer of 1935 by the Central Committee of the UNDO, the most influential Ukrainian legal party in Poland. The attempt to reconcile Poland's security concerns with the legitimate aspirations of the Ukrainian community, generally known as the "normalization," was supported by Sheptyts'kyi and other members of the Greek Catholic episcopate, although the practical gains that it brought for the Ukrainian side were far from spectacular.<sup>160</sup> However, whereas the metropolitan and other bishops were anxious to back forces of moderation in order to minimize the influence of nationalist extremists, they were equally determined to mobilize their faithful against what they regarded as the deadliest enemy of the Church and of the Ukrainian people alike—the Soviet Union and the international communist movement.

The uncompromising stand of the Greek Catholic episcopate against communism had been expressed unequivocally in its joint statement, "Ukraine in the Throes of Death," issued to all "people of goodwill" on 24 July 1933, as well as in its pastoral letter of 17 October 1933 on the subject of the famine in Soviet Ukraine.<sup>161</sup> Now, however, the rising influence of communism began to be felt

in Galicia itself, especially when the bloody communist-inspired riots of 16 April 1936, which shook the city of Lviv out of its complacency, were followed by violent confrontations in Nastasiv, Nahuievychi, Brody, and other places.<sup>162</sup> The intensification of the struggle between the forces of the left and the right in various European countries, which culminated in the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in July of the same year, seemed to bring the moment of a general conflagration closer; indeed, that conflict served as a catalyst, with the Ukrainian nationalist and Catholic press enthusiastically supporting General Franco and denouncing Spanish Loyalists as communists.<sup>163</sup> The tense international situation was complicated by a determined effort by the parties of the left to create antifascist popular fronts, and Sheptyts'kyi felt that at this critical moment the Church's stand in the unfolding ideological struggle between the supporters and enemies of communism had to be restated in the strongest possible terms. Thus, in his pastoral letter of 3 August 1936 (which actually preceded a similar letter issued by the Polish episcopate on 25 August), he tried to give a general critique of Marxist ideology and communist practice, accusing the communists of scheming to “destroy” and “obliterate” the Ukrainian people and criticizing their Radical and socialist allies for helping them in their nefarious activities. The letter, which specifically condemned those who organized popular fronts as traitors of their motherland, also defended “national parties” in various European countries against the label of fascism liberally applied to them by the communists and their supporters. The metropolitan's appeal suggested that only an alliance of all religious and national-minded Ukrainians could save the country from the impending danger, thus implying the possibility of reconciliation between the Church and the nationalist underground.<sup>164</sup>

## VI

*The exacerbation of the relationship between the Greek Catholic Church and the Polish government. Repressive measures against the Greek Catholic clergy for the “Ukrainization” of surnames. The question of mixed marriages. The Old Ruthenians in the Greek Catholic Church. The issue of Greek Catholic Poles and the state-sponsored attempts to convert Greek Catholics to the Latin rite. Personal attacks against Sheptyts'kyi in the Polish Sejm. The problem of “post-Uniate” Church lands. Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter protesting against the destruction of Orthodox churches in the Chełm region. The celebration of the 950th anniversary of the Christianization of Kyivan Rus'. The Carpatho-Ukrainian issue and the “second pacification” of 1938. The visit of the papal nuncio to Eastern Galicia and his call for Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation. The mission of Iosyf Slipyi to Warsaw. The celebration of the fortieth anniversary of Sheptyts'kyi's consecration. The outbreak of World War II and the metropolitan's*

*declaration of loyalty to the Polish state. The Galician Church Province comes under Soviet occupation.*

In the meantime, the policy of “normalization,” originally supported by the Greek Catholic hierarchy, was running into considerable difficulties, and after the forces opposed to any concessions to national minorities gained ascendancy in the Polish government, the chances for regulating Polish-Ukrainian relations became more remote than ever.<sup>165</sup> In view of this situation, the circles around Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi decided to dissociate themselves from the UNDO faction backing the normalization, although Bishop Khomyshyn and his adherents continued, at least for the time being, a policy of restraint in their dealings with the government.<sup>166</sup> The Polish administration, however, particularly at the local level, was hardly in a conciliatory mood, as was amply proven by a series of trials of Greek Catholic priests of all three eparchies charged with “forging” birth and baptismal certificates by entering their parishioners’ family names in their Ukrainian form rather than following the original Polonized spelling (e.g., “Lewyc’kyj” rather than “Lewicki”). Greek Catholic priests also had to abandon the use of Ukrainian in their monthly and quarterly statistical reports submitted to the county authorities (*starostwa*) and were in many cases fined heavily for noncompliance.<sup>167</sup> Moreover, many members of the clergy were accused of disloyalty because of their alleged failure to pray publicly for the prosperity of Poland and its president, as specified in the concordat of 1925, and of engaging in various kinds of antistate activities.<sup>168</sup> The measures taken against some of the defendants included, in addition to fines and jail terms, expulsion from their parishes, especially if the accused happened to live in the so-called border belt, which was 30 kilometers wide and covered some 28 percent of the territory of Poland.<sup>169</sup>

In spite of living in an almost perpetual state of tension with the government, the Greek Catholic Church in Poland grew in numbers during the interwar period and by 1938–1939 had 2,491 parishes with 3,660 churches, 2,284 priests, and 3,587,000 faithful, thus comprising over 10 percent of the country’s population.<sup>170</sup> At the same time, the Church faced serious internal problems, which, under normal circumstances, could have been easily overcome by a dynamic institution, but which, because of the unfriendly attitude of the state authorities, tended to become increasingly acute and remained practically insoluble.

In addition to losing many of its members as willing or forced converts to the Latin rite, the Greek Catholic Church was weakened as a result of mixed Ukrainian-Polish marriages. Operating in a country with a heterogeneous population, the Church had been forced to deal with this unavoidable phenomenon for centuries and, under the auspices of the Austrian government, had developed certain time-honored practices, which, however rigid and mechanical, helped to

alleviate the most delicate issue of all: that of religious loyalty of the offspring of these marriages. With the boys being baptized in the rite of their fathers and the girls following the confession of their mothers, at least some elementary fairness and internal balance were assured; however, these common-sense principles were no longer operable in a situation where inflamed national passions and antagonisms seemed to preclude any reasonable compromise and where mixed marital unions often set the stage for national conflicts and confrontations within the respective families. Under these circumstances, even some comparatively minor issues, such as the use of two different calendars by the marriage partners, could lead to serious misunderstandings in which the Greek Catholic spouse often sacrificed the loyalty to his or her rite for the sake of marital harmony. An additional difficulty was created by the fact that the relationship between the Greek Catholic and Latin clergy was seldom amicable: more often, they were acting as competitors, with Latin priests sometimes using their clout with the administrative authorities to persuade Greek Catholic partners to convert to the rite of their spouses and have all their children baptized in Latin-rite churches. Thus, while close to 20 percent of all marriages entered upon by Greek Catholics in Galicia were mixed Ukrainian-Polish unions, it was estimated that approximately 70 percent of their offspring were lost to the Greek Catholic Church and, consequently, to the Ukrainian national cause.<sup>171</sup>

Paradoxically, it was during this period of tension and confrontation that the “nationalization” of the Greek Catholic Church occurred as the Ukrainian national element firmly and irrevocably took over the control of its affairs. While this development was welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the Greek Catholic faithful, it alienated those groups which did not share its national allegiance. A special problem was presented by the Old Ruthenian movement, which was in a state of general decline but still exercised control over its two main strongholds, the National Home and the Stauropegian Institute in Lviv, and maintained some strength in a few rural areas (notably the Lemko lands). At one time, the Old Ruthenians wielded considerable influence in the Greek Catholic Church, and two of their sympathizers, Andrei Bilets'kyi and Oleksander Bachyns'kyi, carried out the functions of Sheptyts'kyi's vicars during his absence from Lviv in 1914–1917 and 1920–1923; however, their power waned through attrition as their most prominent representatives either retired or died and were usually replaced by dedicated Ukrainians.<sup>172</sup> Now the creation of the Lemko Apostolic Administration seemed to give them a new lease on life, since the first two administrators appointed by the Holy See had definite Old Ruthenian leanings and surrounded themselves with advisors who shared their views.<sup>173</sup> The Polish government, too, was favorably inclined toward this group, which it regarded as a useful counterpoise to Ukrainian nationalist extremists. In spite of their numerical weakness, the Old Ruthenians were quite articulate, and when Apostolic Visitor Jan Hudeček

arrived in Lviv in November 1934, a delegation from the Stauropegian Institute presented him with a long list of complaints, including the alleged violation of the Institute's patronage rights; arbitrary changes in liturgical books, services, and rites of the Greek Catholic Church; reading of the Gospels and Lessons in the "artificial" Ukrainian language; the singing in churches of secular songs with political content; the misuse of sermons for political propaganda; the persecution of the Old Ruthenian clergy and faithful; the introduction of compulsory celibacy; the sale of Church lands and the use of returns for secular purposes, and so on.<sup>174</sup> Indeed, the Old Ruthenian newspaper *Zemlia i Volia* not only protested against the supposedly preferential treatment given to Ukrainian priests over their Old Ruthenian counterparts, but also demanded the appointment of a Ruthenian bishop for the whole of Galicia and the division of Greek Catholic consistories into Ukrainian and Ruthenian.<sup>175</sup> The Old Ruthenian priests felt that the strongest discrimination against them was taking place in the Lviv archeparchy, where, as they claimed, they were sometimes forced to resign their positions under political pressure. While the Ukrainian press generally took a sharply critical and intolerant attitude toward the Old Ruthenians, regarding them almost as traitors of the Ukrainian national cause,<sup>176</sup> the semiweekly *Nova Zoria* adopted a more enlightened view, urging a moderate and understanding approach to the group which had preserved many enduring values for the Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian culture.<sup>177</sup>

A similar and yet potentially more dangerous situation arose with regard to another group that did not share the national allegiance of most Galician Greek Catholics—the Polish.<sup>178</sup> It is difficult to give any precise information about their numerical strength, for while the Polish press tended to inflate their numbers to close to 450,000, or approximately 15 percent of all Greek Catholics in Poland,<sup>179</sup> the Ukrainians were inclined to deny their existence as a separate community,<sup>180</sup> although Metropolitan Sheptytskyi early in his career published a special pastoral letter to them, assuring them that he respected their national convictions and had no intention of imposing "Ruthenian patriotism" on them.<sup>181</sup> The monthly *Polak Greko-Katolik* (published originally in Cracow, then in Lviv), which purported to represent the interests of this group, demanded the creation of special divisions in all Greek Catholic theological seminaries for candidates regarding themselves as Poles, the appointment of an ordinary in Przemyśl and an auxiliary bishop in Lviv of "Greek Polish" persuasion, and a preferential treatment in filling all Church vacancies for candidates from their ranks.<sup>182</sup> In addition, plans were under way to expand the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Galicia, represented by the archbishop of Lviv with his auxiliary bishop and the bishop of Przemyśl, by creating a new bishopric in Stanyslaviv and by making Ternopil the seat of an auxiliary bishop.<sup>183</sup> At the same time, the Polish press claimed that, as a result of assimilation, as many as 1.2 million persons of Polish descent became

Ukrainized and eventually should be reclaimed by the Polish nation.<sup>184</sup> Accordingly, sporadic and organized attempts to persuade Greek Catholics to convert to the Latin rite, in which some units and chaplains of the Polish army played an active part, assumed unprecedented proportions, focusing especially on the members of the petty gentry in the Carpathian region, who were urged to return to the fold of the Polish nation by severing their ties with their Church.<sup>185</sup> These appeals became increasingly vocal during the last years of the interwar period, thus serving as a barometer of worsening Polish-Ukrainian relations. Indeed, even the more moderate Polish circles criticized the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia for serving primarily the political interests of one group and of gradually losing one of the basic attributes of the Catholic Church, mainly its universality, while assuming instead the characteristics of a national Church, completely subordinated to the Ukrainian *raison d'état*.<sup>186</sup>

This explosive situation became even more exacerbated as a result of a personal attack against Sheptyts'kyi in the Polish Sejm on 3 February 1938 by the deputy representing the electoral district of Stryi, Bronisław Wojciechowski. He accused the metropolitan of having deliberately rejected the request of military authorities to allow the official participation of some units of the Polish army in the celebration of the feast of the Epiphany at the marketplace of Lviv, thus violating both his oath of allegiance to Poland and the provisions of the concordat. Wojciechowski also claimed that, under Sheptyts'kyi's direction, the Greek Catholic Church had become a stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism in which the pro-Polish sentiments of moderate Ukrainian and Old Ruthenian priests were ignored and where militantly chauvinistic elements were holding sway. This deplorable situation was allegedly brought about as a result of the lax regulations of the concordat of 1925, which allowed the Greek Catholic hierarchy full control over the Church's property and which, therefore, would have to be changed in accordance with the interests of the Polish state.<sup>187</sup>

In the meantime, the Polish government and the Holy See were engaged in negotiations concerning the so-called post-Uniate lands, once owned by the Uniate Church in Poland and later confiscated by the tsarist authorities and placed under the administration of the Russian Orthodox Church—altogether approximately 47,000 hectares, out of which close to 40,000 had been already parceled out, mostly to the veterans of the Polish army.<sup>188</sup> On 20 June 1938, a preliminary agreement was signed by Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck and the papal nuncio, which left in the possession of the Roman Catholic Church lands and church buildings that had remained under its provisional control. At the same time, the Holy See gave up its claim to the remaining post-Uniate lands in return for 3.5 million zlotys, to be paid for in bonds and obligations.<sup>189</sup> This agreement was bitterly attacked by the Ukrainian parliamentarians, who stated that neither the Polish state nor the Roman Catholic Church had any right to the

lands owned by the former Uniate Church, to which the only legitimate heir was the Greek Catholic Church.<sup>190</sup> The Vatican, too, was criticized by the Ukrainian press for having played the role of an accessory in a questionable deal directed against the interests of both the Orthodox Church in Poland (most of whose faithful were Ukrainian) and of the Ukrainian people.<sup>191</sup> Accordingly, the Ukrainian deputies in the Sejm, most of them Catholics, voted against the ratification of the agreement—a fact which the Polish government was to use later in its attempt to discredit the Greek Catholic Church in the eyes of the Holy See.<sup>192</sup>

The issue of the post-Uniate lands was closely connected—at least in the opinion of many Galician Ukrainians—with the destruction or transfer to the Roman Catholic Church of many allegedly unused Orthodox churches and chapels, especially in the Chełm region, where over a hundred houses of worship were closed, sealed, destroyed, or burned down.<sup>193</sup> The feelings in the Ukrainian community in Galicia against both the Polish government and the Vatican were running so high that Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, in his pastoral letter of 2 August 1938 (which was censored in its entirety by the Polish authorities but circulated widely in illegal copies and leaflets), tried to exonerate the Holy See from any suspicion of wrongdoing, while at the same time condemning the perpetrators of misdeeds in the Chełm area as “secret enemies of the Universal Church and Christianity” and expressing his deep sympathy for the “persecuted Orthodox brethren,” who were connected by blood ties to Galician Ukrainians.<sup>194</sup> In this way Sheptyts'kyi acted not only as the head of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland but also played, in a subtle yet unmistakable manner, the role of leader and chief defender of the rights of the whole Ukrainian minority in that country. The metropolitan's message was followed on 10 September 1938 by Khomyshyn's statement to the clergy and the faithful of his eparchy, in which he left unspecified “recent events” to the judgment of God and history. He described as purely coincidental the fact that negotiations between the Holy See and the Polish government were taking place at the same time as the excesses in the Chełm region. He further deplored and tried to dispel the widespread feelings of alienation and mistrust directed against the Vatican and the papal nuncio among the Greek Catholic faithful in Galicia by asserting that the pope, who in any case had an inalienable right to dispose of all Church property in the whole Catholic Church as he pleased, had spent enormous sums of money to subsidize various projects beneficial to the Ukrainians.<sup>195</sup>

It was amidst such a somber atmosphere of uncertainty and suspicion that the Ukrainians of Galicia celebrated the 950th anniversary of the introduction of Christianity in Kyivan Rus'. The honorary committee of the “Festival of Christian Ukraine,” formed under the protectorate of the Greek Catholic hierarchy to organize the ceremony, published a special manifesto to the faithful. However, the joint pastoral letter issued by the Greek Catholic Bishops of the Galician

Province to mark this supposedly joyful occasion was pessimistic in tone, deploring the lack of unity among contemporary Ukrainians and tracing its roots back to the times of Volodimer the Great. "From internecine feuds in princely families to the present day split into parties," the message stated, "our whole history has been marked by the same sad sign . . . Domestic discord, like a black thread, extends from one century into another."<sup>196</sup>

In the meantime, Polish-Ukrainian antagonism in Galicia reached an even higher degree of intensity as a result of the Czechoslovak government's creation of an autonomous Subcarpathian Rus' (later known as Carpatho-Ukraine), which was regarded by many as a step toward establishing an independent Ukrainian state. Ukrainian marches and demonstrations in Lviv and other cities of Galicia led to Polish counterdemonstrations and pogroms of Ukrainian institutions and communal enterprises, and the Warsaw government reacted to these developments with a series of repressive measures reminiscent of the pacification of 1930.<sup>197</sup> A solemn protest against the principle of collective responsibility, signed by Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi and other religious and political leaders of the Ukrainian community,<sup>198</sup> proved to be of no avail. The Greek Catholic hierarchy also found it difficult to remain aloof from the political turmoil south of the Carpathians and its reverberations in Galicia: thus, Sheptyts'kyi gave his moral support to Msgr. Avhustyn Voloshyn on the occasion of his appointment as premier of Carpatho-Ukraine, conferring at the same time his blessing on the government and the people of that province.<sup>199</sup> The metropolitan's preoccupation with the situation in Carpatho-Ukraine and its possible repercussions in his own see was also shown when, after the arbitration of Vienna of 2 November 1938, and especially after the occupation of the whole province by Hungary in March 1939, he tried to comfort his flock in the hour of "great national suffering" and also warned against any precipitous action that could prove disastrous not only to the Greek Catholic Church, but also to the whole Ukrainian community in Poland.<sup>200</sup>

The explosive situation in Galicia, which threatened at times to erupt into overt Polish-Ukrainian conflict, prompted Msgr. Felipe Cortesi, the papal nuncio in Warsaw, to pay a personal visit to the troubled province in December 1938. Indeed, from the Vatican's point of view it was both scandalous and tragic to watch two Catholic communities, living beside each other for centuries and linked by innumerable family ties, now bitterly confronting each other with an implacable hatred that seemed to extinguish any memories of past friendships and make a mockery of their professed Christianity. After his courtesy calls on Greek and Roman Catholic bishops in Lviv, Stanyslaviv, and Przemyśl, the nuncio issued an appeal for reconciliation, stressing that the Holy See looked with great anxiety at "divisions, antagonisms, and struggles into which the sons of this country have been drawn, which have already brought so much harm

and are threatening to bring even more,” and calling upon the faithful of both rites to seek a solution of all problems with “the arms of light, charity, and justice.”<sup>201</sup> Cortesi’s visit was widely commented upon in the Ukrainian press, which regarded it as a major event and used this opportunity to remind Rome of some important matters that concerned the Ukrainian Catholic faithful and that would eventually demand a satisfactory solution: the problem of the Lemko Apostolic Administration, the efforts to spread the Union on Ukrainian ethnic territories in Poland outside Galicia, and the necessity of creating a Greek Catholic patriarchate as a superstructure that would bring together Ukrainian Catholics in nine countries on two continents.<sup>202</sup>

Obviously, this was an inopportune moment for raising such concerns. The fall of Carpatho-Ukraine had a devastating effect on many Galician Ukrainians, who now regarded the Greek Catholic Church as their last and only stronghold. However, this attitude tended to create a siege mentality, which was not conducive to clear and rational thinking. The harsh measures of administrative authorities against the Ukrainian population prompted even Bishop Khomyshyn, his loyal attitude to the Polish state notwithstanding, to complain to the papal nuncio about these abuses.<sup>203</sup> At the same time Bishop Kotsylovs’kyi protested against the expulsion of a number of priests in his eparchy from their parishes without his having been informed about the reason for this draconic action, which constituted a violation of the concordat of 1925.<sup>204</sup> In a tactical countermove, the Polish government submitted to the Vatican’s Secretariat of State a memorandum accusing the Greek Catholic clergy of being remiss in their duties toward the state and of generally engaging in anti-Polish utterances and activities.<sup>205</sup> In order to defuse the situation, Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi made what was to be his last effort to improve Polish-Ukrainian relations by approaching the Warsaw government through his most trusted collaborator, Iosyf Slipyi. However, Slipyi’s conversations with Count Jan Szembek, the undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, remained inconclusive, though the Polish side showed some interest in continuing these contacts.<sup>206</sup>

Under these inauspicious circumstances, Sheptyts’kyi observed on 18 June 1939 the fortieth anniversary of his consecration as a bishop—a celebration from which the representatives of the Stanyslaviv eparchy, where he had entered his episcopal office, were conspicuously absent.<sup>207</sup> The occasion was solemnly marked by the faithful, for the reverence in which he was generally held had by now grown to immense proportions.<sup>208</sup> His portrait was painted by innumerable portraitists, his larger-than-life statue was erected in the garden of the Theological Academy,<sup>209</sup> his name was conferred on countless institutions, many of them founded and supported by himself<sup>210</sup>—and yet this acclaim now seemed strangely hollow in the face of the crucible awaiting his people and his Church.

The spring and summer of 1939 witnessed the unstoppable slide of the Euro-

pean continent into the abyss of war, with Poland slated to become the next victim of Hitler's aggression. The Greek Catholic Church could now play only a waiting game, while trying to persuade the nationalist underground to refrain from any actions that might provoke punitive measures by the Polish authorities. The German invasion of Poland on 1 September 1939 made the situation even more delicate. In accordance with his policy of restraint and moderation, Sheptyts'kyi joined Vasyl' Mudryi, leader of the UNDO and the deputy speaker of the Sejm, in issuing a statement of loyalty to the Polish state in its hour of trial and denying the reports that Ukrainian units were allegedly fighting on the side of Germany.<sup>211</sup> It seems likely that this timely intervention prevented the Polish population of Lviv and other cities of Galicia from venting its ire on the local Ukrainians, who were suspected of harboring pro-German sympathies.

After the Polish-German war and the Soviet invasion of 17 September 1939, the Galician Church Province was split into two, with the river San forming the boundary between the territories incorporated into the USSR and the German-occupied Generalgouvernement. Thus, on 9 December 1939, the auxiliary bishop of the Przemyśl eparchy, Hryhorii Lakota, informed the papal nuncio in Berlin that as of 25 September he resided in the city of Jarosław (Iaroslav) as Bishop Kotsylovs'kyi's vicar general, taking spiritual care of 216,910 Greek Catholics in 136 parishes with 195 priests, including 34 clergymen who had fled across the San from the Soviet-occupied area.<sup>212</sup> The stage was now set for the Church's uneasy coexistence with two totalitarian regimes from which, in the long run, it could expect neither forbearance nor tolerance.

## VII

*The impact of the Soviet invasion on the population of Galicia. The attitude of the Soviet authorities toward the Greek Catholic Church. The Church's effort to adjust to the secularization of Ukrainian society in Galicia. Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter of 9 October 1939 and his decision to keep the Church out of politics. The intensification of harassing techniques used against the Church and Sheptyts'kyi's request to Pius XII to designate him for a martyr's death. The metropolitan's attempts to expand the activities of the Greek Catholic Church to Soviet Ukraine and to combat the atheistic propaganda in Galicia. His appeal to the youth to desist from acts of terrorism and indirect contacts with the nationalist underground. The attempts to undermine the Greek Catholic Church from inside and to bring about its "reunion" with the Moscow Patriarchate. The beginning of the German-Soviet War and its repercussions on the Greek Catholic Church.*

The news about the Red Army's forthcoming occupation of Galicia was generally received with disbelief and foreboding by the Ukrainian and Polish population of

that area, although the handwriting on the wall had been clearly visible at least since the signing of the German-Soviet nonaggression pact of 23 August 1939. While the Soviet Union was Poland's next-door neighbor and shared with it a boundary that was over 1,400 kilometers long, the contacts between the two countries had been minimal, with only a negligible amount of trade and practically nonexistent personal interaction.<sup>213</sup> It is not surprising, therefore, that the collision of these two societies that occurred with the Soviet invasion of Poland resulted in considerable cultural shock for both sides. Thus, while it is not our purpose to detail the far-reaching changes brought by the Soviet occupation, it must be stated that they were so fundamental in their nature that Galician society, which had remained almost static since the end of World War I and its aftermath, was now forced to undergo within less than two years the most thorough and painful transformation in its history, one which profoundly affected almost all aspects of both personal and communal life.<sup>214</sup> Religious life was not exempted from these changes—on the contrary, the Catholic Church of both Greek and Latin rites was exposed to the occasionally still muted but at the same time obviously implacable hostility of the Communist Party and the Soviet state.

It soon became clear that the Greek Catholic Church, which had been regarded as particularly odious by the tsarist authorities, was unlikely to find more favor with their Soviet counterparts, who deemed it to be not only their most dangerous ideological opponent but also the chief bulwark of Ukrainian nationalism. Although the first official pronouncements of the Soviet government tended to emphasize the principles of the freedom of conscience and of worship enshrined in the constitution of the USSR, the actions of the new rulers made it impossible to take their words at face value.

Soon after the Red Army's occupation of eastern Poland and the signing of the German-Soviet "Friendship and Frontier Treaty" of 28 September 1939, which was to definitively delimit the spheres of influence of those two countries on Polish territory, Moscow set into motion preparations for the so-called "national assemblies" of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus that were to meet, respectively, in Lviv and Białystok to determine the future status of those territories. Carefully stage-managed by the Soviet authorities, both assemblies decided to ask the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to "accept the peoples of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus into the great family of Soviet peoples."<sup>215</sup>

Even before the National Assembly of Western Ukraine met in Lviv, the Soviet Ukrainian press published a number of articles highly critical of the role of the Greek Catholic Church in Poland, accusing its clergy of acting as tools of the Polish government in its policy of oppression and exploitation of the working masses.<sup>216</sup> These sentiments were also voiced in the speeches of some delegates during the meeting of the assembly, thus preparing the ground for the declaration adopted by that body on 27 October that decreed the nationalization

of all landed property belonging to large landowners, high state officials, and monasteries, including livestock, dead stock, and state buildings.<sup>217</sup> While this decree did not specifically refer to property owned by individual churches, parishes, and eparchies, it was obvious that sooner or later it would meet a similar fate: indeed, some of it had been seized even before the National Assembly adopted its declaration, and eventually all Church lands were first distributed among the villagers and then collectivized.<sup>218</sup> At the same time, punitive taxes were imposed on church buildings as well as on individual “servants of the cult,” exceeding in some cases several times the priest’s real income.<sup>219</sup> As the state stopped subsidizing the clergy with monthly stipends and the eparchies had no funds that could be used for that purpose, some priests and their families were reduced to extreme poverty, prompting Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi to urge the faithful to take care of the material needs of their pastors; he also warned that those who were depriving the Church of the means to support the parish priest were guilty of sacrilege and subject to excommunication.<sup>220</sup> Since Church discipline became lax under these abnormal conditions and some priests were abandoning their parishes or even leaving the territory of the archeparchy, the metropolitan’s chancery issued a severe reprimand censuring that practice as a violation of the regulations of canon law.<sup>221</sup>

The Church’s warmest compassion in these difficult times was reserved for the members of monastic orders, the most active and dedicated promoters of religious life in Galicia, who were deprived of their livelihood by the decree of the National Assembly.<sup>222</sup> Thus, in his letter of 13 March 1940 to the superiors of male monastic orders, Sheptyts’kyi described the Greek Catholic monks as victims of a grave injustice that at the same time represented a gross affront to the Church, made even more painful by the fact that those responsible claimed to represent “all the people,” not realizing that, filled with fear for their very lives, they were merely a blind tool in the hands of the enemy. For his part the metropolitan, in his capacity as the head of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia, expressed his solemn protest against this “outrage” and voiced deep distress at what he described as a prejudicial and unlawful act.<sup>223</sup>

Another blow dealt to the Church was the thoroughgoing secularization of a society that hitherto had been to a large extent Church-oriented and, in some instances, even Church-dominated.<sup>224</sup> All religious organizations and groups as well as Church-sponsored political parties were either dissolved or voluntarily ceased to exist; at the same time all printing presses owned by the Church and Church-related institutions were nationalized, all newspapers and periodicals appearing under its auspices had to stop publication, and all religious literature available in bookstores and libraries was either destroyed or removed from circulation.<sup>225</sup> In accordance with article 124 of the Soviet constitution, which specified that in the USSR the Church was to be separate from the state and the

school from the Church, religious instruction in all schools came to an end. The Church thus lost control over all educational institutions, from kindergartens and orphanages to theological seminaries, which were either placed under state jurisdiction or forced to close down.<sup>226</sup> Priests were barred from entering school premises and it was left to their ingenuity to find ways of reaching young people of school age. They were also forbidden to take confessions from patients in hospitals or to bring them communion, and so were forced to perform these functions in secret.<sup>227</sup> Finally, such religious symbols as crosses, statues, icons, and other holy images were removed from schools and other public places, while most of the roadside chapels and crosses that dotted the Galician countryside were either dismantled or destroyed.<sup>228</sup>

Deprived of its unique position in Ukrainian society in Galicia and subjected to persistent attacks in the Soviet press,<sup>229</sup> the Greek Catholic hierarchy found it difficult to come to terms with the new situation, although generally Church leaders accepted the diminution of their authority and painful material losses with considerable composure and equanimity.<sup>230</sup> Thus, for example, the hierarchy's very attempt to define their attitude to the Soviet regime in view of both the latter's overt hostility toward the Church and their own pressing need to establish, however reluctantly, a kind of *modus vivendi* with the regime that would allow their flock to practice their religion without too much interference, called for some pragmatic and unconventional thinking. These considerations prompted Metropolitan Sheptytskyi to issue on 9 October 1939 a pastoral letter to the clergy of his archeparchy, in which he showed his awareness of the unique significance of the moment, stating that "a page of history has turned" and "a new epoch has begun." All the priests were instructed to obey the authorities and comply with Soviet laws "as long as they do not contradict divine law"; at the same time, they were urged not to "meddle in politics and secular affairs," but to continue to work for the cause of Christ among their people.<sup>231</sup> This studiously apolitical stance was assumed by Sheptytskyi again in his pastoral letter of 9 December 1940, less than a week before the election to the local soviets in Western Ukraine, which he regarded as the "next opportunity" to carry into effect the principle of refraining from all kinds of politics: accordingly, he urged his clergy not to try to influence their parishioners by persuading them to vote or not to vote, while leaving to individual priests the freedom to decide for themselves whether they should cast the ballot.<sup>232</sup> In a similar vein, he forbade the hoisting of any "state, regional, or national flag" on church buildings or parsonages, because such a practice could bring harm to the church.<sup>233</sup> Another prohibition covered the singing in churches of the popular chorale *Mnohaia lita* (Many Years) in honor of any layperson.<sup>234</sup> Since this happened during the ascendancy of Stalin's personality cult in the USSR, it is likely that the metropolitan aimed, in his customary roundabout fashion, at preventing the churches under his jurisdiction from being forced to pay homage to the Soviet dictator.

In the meantime, the unrelenting pressure on the Church began to intensify and the members of the hierarchy themselves were continuously spied upon by the NKVD. The secret police searched the residence of Bishop Khomyshyn and took him away for interrogation, but later released him,<sup>235</sup> although a house servant was instructed to report on all the bishop's activities and eventually to poison him.<sup>236</sup> The complex of buildings on St. George's Hill in Lviv, where the metropolitan's residence and chancery were located, also came under the close surveillance of the NKVD, and some of Sheptytskyi's old acquaintances and members of religious orders who were imprisoned by the Soviet authorities were pressured to furnish incriminating evidence against him and his associates.<sup>237</sup> These actions were accompanied by many instances of petty harassment, such as the confiscation of desks, typewriters, cyclostyles, hectographs, and even the supply of paper in the chancery office, in order to prevent the metropolitan from communicating with his clergy and his flock.<sup>238</sup>

It is in this context that one should appraise Sheptytskyi's request to Pope Pius XII that he be formally designated to die as a martyr for the faith and the unity of the Church,<sup>239</sup> not surprisingly, the pope declined this unusual petition.<sup>240</sup> It is not entirely clear what the metropolitan hoped to achieve by this rather quixotic gesture, for its consequences for his Church and his flock would probably have been disastrous. By remaining at the helm of his Church, he could—and indeed did—perform a unique and vitally important function: after the utter rout of the Ukrainian political establishment in Galicia, he was widely regarded as the strongest link to the recent past and a symbol of resistance to the Soviet regime.<sup>241</sup>

In an undated pastoral letter to the Ukrainian youth written at approximately the same time, Sheptytskyi took leave of them since, in his words, he did not know whether God would allow him to continue to work and pray for them: he asked them, therefore, to regard that message as his testament and paternal blessing and urged them to pray for divine wisdom to distinguish between truth and falsehood and to remain faithful to the Church, the betrayal of which he described as a "repugnant crime."<sup>242</sup> Later, in the spring of 1940, when mass deportations of the population of Galicia to Central Asia, northern Russia, and other remote areas of the Soviet Union were in progress, the metropolitan informed his clergy that he intended to request the government of the USSR to allow him and ten priests appointed by him to take spiritual care of the deportees,<sup>243</sup> though, in view of his physical disability, he hardly would have been able to carry out that demanding task.

Having secured the appointment of his closest collaborator, Iosyf Slipyi, as his coadjutor with the right of succession,<sup>244</sup> and having made use of the special powers granted to him more than thirty years earlier by Pope Pius X to appoint exarchs for the whole territory of the Soviet Union,<sup>245</sup> Sheptytskyi proceeded to announce a competition for Greek Catholic parishes in Kyiv, Odesa, Vin-

nytsia, Kharkiv, and Poltava, while demanding that the candidates be ready to make all necessary sacrifices for the cause of the unification of Greek Catholic and Orthodox faithful and atheists, both baptized and unbaptized.<sup>246</sup> He also boldly stated in a letter to his clergy that, God willing, many of them might be privileged to preach in the churches of Dnieper Ukraine and as far as the Kuban, the Caucasus, Moscow, and Tobolsk.<sup>247</sup> These visionary projects coexisted with pressing current considerations, and the metropolitan had to turn his attention to matters of more immediate concern, instructing his clergy how to combat aggressive atheistic propaganda and how to deal with the Orthodox or formally nondenominational arrivals from Dnieper Ukraine and other parts of the Soviet Union who were seeking religious consolation in Greek Catholic churches.<sup>248</sup> In addition, a number of former Greek Catholics who had abandoned their rite under pressure from Polish authorities were now eager to rejoin their original fold, and Sheptyts'kyi outlined in detail the procedure to be followed in such cases.<sup>249</sup>

In his pastoral letters and addresses to the archeparchial synod,<sup>250</sup> Sheptyts'kyi made occasional references to the continuous persecution of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia, some of them couched in cryptic language, which, however, his audience could readily understand: thus, for example, in his closing address to the synod he mentioned "two of our fellow priests who died as victims of present-day conditions in Lviv." He also referred to the arrest of four of his closest associates as well as ten other participants in the deliberations of the synod and later made public the names of eighteen priests who had been arrested and not yet released, one of whom had been sentenced to six years in prison.<sup>251</sup> The activities of the Ukrainian nationalist underground, engaged in random hit-and-run attacks against the Soviet authorities and mercilessly hounded by the NKVD, were also deeply worrisome to the metropolitan. In an appeal to the clergy and the faithful issued on 31 October 1940, he turned his special attention to the young people, urging them not to cause their parents even greater grief than that which they were already experiencing and not to endanger the whole people by exposing them to "painful sorrow," especially since the suffering that they were so gratuitously bringing on themselves and their families could only result in immeasurable harm for everyone concerned.<sup>252</sup> In spite of these reservations, however, Sheptyts'kyi apparently maintained some indirect contact with the OUN, whose regional commander (*kraiovyi providnyk*), Ievhen Legenda (Ivan Klymiv), occasionally conveyed information to him through a trusted priest about the actions of the nationalist leadership and other matters that could be of interest to the metropolitan.<sup>253</sup>

Generally speaking, atheistic propaganda in Galicia proved to be singularly unsuccessful, especially among children and young people, although some intellectuals shunned the Church in order not to compromise their careers.<sup>254</sup> This, in turn, prompted the Soviet authorities to resort to other means in their endeavor to

undermine the authority of the Greek Catholic Church without formally suppressing it. One of their stratagems consisted in fomenting dissent among the clergy, trying to turn them against their superiors and promising support for attempts to secure more independence from their bishops;<sup>255</sup> in some cases the priests were encouraged to forsake their religious beliefs and to break all ties with their Church. However, while a number of them sought refuge in German-occupied Poland, the vast majority stayed with their parishes and even tried to expand their pastoral activities.<sup>256</sup> In addition, an unsuccessful attempt was made to sow distrust and discord among the Church hierarchy itself by persuading Bishops Khomyshyn and Liatyshevs'kyi to claim for their eparchy the district of Halych from which the metropolitan see of Galicia derived its name and which, though geographically closer to Stanyslaviv, had been for centuries connected with the archeparchy of Lviv.<sup>257</sup>

At the same time, the Russian Orthodox Church was eager to expand its proselytizing activities into the newly annexed territories of the Soviet Union. Thus, toward the end of 1940 Archbishop Nikolai Iarushevich was appointed as exarch of the Moscow Patriarchate for the western provinces of Ukraine and Belarus. After a visit to Lviv in February 1941, he suggested to Metropolitan Sergii of Moscow, the locum tenens of the patriarchal throne, that a bishop be appointed to further the “apostolic” work for the “reunion” of the Galician Uniates with the Russian Orthodox Church. A suitable candidate was found in the person of Panteleimon Rudyk, the archimandrite of the famous Pochaiv monastery in Volhynia, and in April 1941 he was duly consecrated in Moscow as the bishop of Lviv in a ceremony attended by representatives of the Orthodox hierarchy from Western Ukraine, Western Belarus, and the Baltic countries.<sup>258</sup> Because of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war two months later, he was unable to take charge of his see, which was to comprise only nine parishes; however, soon after the beginning of hostilities, on 15 July 1941, Archbishop Iarushevich himself was elevated to the “vacant” post of metropolitan of Kyiv and Halych and exarch of all Ukraine.<sup>259</sup> In another development that was taking place almost simultaneously, clandestine conversations were conducted by the Soviet authorities with some Greek Catholic priests who were known for their anti-Vatican sentiments in order to prepare the way for a “spontaneous” movement aiming at a “reunion” of the Greek Catholic Church with the Moscow Patriarchate.<sup>260</sup> However, this plan of action was not yet brought to fruition because of the Kremlin’s reluctance to antagonize the Ukrainian population of Galicia completely by launching a concerted attack against its most cherished religious institution on the eve of the Soviet Union’s impending confrontation with Nazi Germany.

Even so, the first days of the Soviet-German war were marred by some bloody incidents when the retreating Red Army soldiers and NKVD troops turned their ire against the Church and its servants, murdering or torturing to death a number

of priests and threatening Sheptyts'kyi's coadjutor, Iosyf Slipyi, Bishop Nykyta Budka, and several prominent clergymen from the metropolitan's entourage with summary execution;<sup>261</sup> in addition, thousands of other victims were found massacred in the prisons of many Galician cities and towns.<sup>262</sup> However, in spite of all these tragic losses and painful memories, the Church's prestige among the masses of the faithful was now in the ascendant: indeed, it seemed to have emerged from an unprecedented period of trial and adversity more vigorous and resilient than ever.<sup>263</sup>

### VIII

*The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union and the German occupation of Galicia. The Church's relationship with the German regime. Sheptyts'kyi's attempt to heal the split in the OUN and his role in the Council of Seniors (later known as the Ukrainian National Council). The metropolitan's letters to the Orthodox bishops and intelligentsia in Ukraine and his attempt to bring about religious unity among the Ukrainians. His ultimate disillusionment with the German regime. The Greek Catholic Church and the Jews. Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter "Thou Shalt Not Kill." The growth of the Church's political influence within the Ukrainian community. The efforts to spread the Church Union in Dnieper Ukraine. The attitude of the Church toward the Waffen-SS Division "Galicia." The state of virtual civil war and anarchy in Galicia in 1943–1944 and the Church's reaction. Sheptyts'kyi's role in the All-Ukrainian National Council. On the eve of the second Soviet occupation of Galicia.*

The outbreak of the German-Soviet war on 22 June 1941 represented both a threat and a major challenge to the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia. On the one hand, its rather dubious loyalty to the Soviet regime could easily provoke harsh, repressive measures threatening its very survival; on the other, a Soviet defeat could give it almost limitless opportunities in the East and a historical chance to spread the Church Union all over Dnieper Ukraine and beyond. In the ebullient atmosphere following the occupation of Lviv by Nazi troops, and in a rather unusual departure from the cautious policy normally pursued by the Catholic Church in such circumstances, Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi in his pastoral letter of 1 July 1941 openly welcomed the German army as "deliverer from the enemy." At the same time, he conferred his blessing on the "State Administration of Ukraine" headed by Yaroslav Stets'ko and delegated his archbishop-coadjutor, Iosyf Slipyi, to represent him during the installation ceremony of the new government.<sup>264</sup> Similarly, on 6 July Bishop Khomyshyn bestowed his benediction on the "Ukrainian independent state" and declared that he was praying for "the happiness, prosperity, and peaceful life of all citizens of Ukraine, regardless of their religious, national, and social differences."<sup>265</sup>

The enthusiasm displayed by the aging metropolitan and his most senior colleague was undoubtedly sincere: as they stated in their messages to the papal nuncio in Budapest, they and their clergy had just barely survived the Soviet occupation with all its attendant perils and miseries.<sup>266</sup> Still, it seems surprising that their understandable joy at their Church's unexpected deliverance should have made them oblivious of the horrors that began to unfold immediately after the arrival of German troops, including pogroms, mass executions, and other atrocities. It took some time for Sheptyts'kyi and his collaborators—men who thought in categories of the First World War—to realize the whole depth of depravity and brutality to which Germany, which they remembered as a stronghold of law and order and a seat of culture, had sunk under Hitler's regime.<sup>267</sup> The Germans, for their part, tried to maintain a correct, if distant, relationship with the Greek Catholic hierarchy, whose help they needed to urge the peasants to fulfill their delivery quotas and to encourage young people to volunteer for work in Germany. They also provided the clergy with small material benefits such as paying them monthly salaries of 50 Reichsmarks as "voluntary support," permitted the reintroduction of religious instruction into the curricula of elementary and secondary schools, and allowed theological seminaries, closed down during the Soviet interval, to reopen.<sup>268</sup>

Although Sheptyts'kyi's complex relationship with the OUN both before and during World War II has not yet been fully explored, it is obvious that he deeply deplored the split that had occurred within its ranks, which he regarded as an "intolerable national crime," and hoped to be able to heal it by appealing to the leader of one of the two warring factions, Colonel Andrii Mel'nyk, whom he knew well as the former chief inspector of the estates of the metropolitan see.<sup>269</sup> The breach, however, proved to be much more serious than Sheptyts'kyi realized, and he was finally forced to give up his conciliatory efforts. Similarly, his involvement in the work of the Council of Seniors (later known as the Ukrainian National Council), over which he assumed an honorary protectorate, turned out to be almost completely unproductive, although the metropolitan probably enjoyed a return to his customary role at the center of Ukrainian political life as its arbiter.<sup>270</sup> The sole right to represent the Ukrainians in the Generalgouvernement was now vested in the Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow, and the head of its Lviv branch, Kos' Pan'kiv'skyi, became Sheptyts'kyi's frequent visitor and confidant.

Frustrated by his unsuccessful attempts to influence political events, Sheptyts'kyi turned his attention to a more familiar and appropriate field—that of religion. In a series of messages to Ukrainian Orthodox Archbishop Ilarion Ohienko of Chełm (21 October 1941), to the Orthodox episcopate of Ukraine (30 December 1941), and to the Ukrainian Orthodox intelligentsia (3 March 1942), the metropolitan revived once more his dream of bringing about religious unity

among Ukrainians, which, in his words, would give them “a mighty impetus to achieve national unity as well.”<sup>271</sup> The arguments Sheptyts’kyi used in his plea were so self-evident and well known that, by now, they seemed almost trite; however, the replies he received, though invariably courteous, proved to be evasive and disappointing.

As time progressed, the views of the metropolitan and the Greek Catholic hierarchy regarding the new occupiers became increasingly critical. On 14 January 1942, Sheptyts’kyi was one of five signatories of a letter to Hitler that criticized German policy in the occupied territories and the negative attitude of the German authorities to the political, social, and cultural aspirations of the Ukrainian people.<sup>272</sup> Later, in his letter of 29–31 August 1942 to Pope Pius XII, the metropolitan expressed his complete condemnation of the Nazi regime, which he regarded with a combination of horror and contempt as a “system of lies, deceit, and plunder” and a mockery of all notions of civilization and order. Even more dangerous was the corruptive influence of Nazi ideology, which removed all moral constraints, expunged all human decency, and seemed to give those in power the license to kill and plunder with impunity.<sup>273</sup>

It was in this context that Sheptyts’kyi viewed the so-called final solution of the Jewish question, which posed an immense moral and ethical problem for both the Greek Catholic and the Roman Catholic churches. For the first time in living memory, pogroms and mass murders were taking place in Galicia practically in the open, with one group of its citizens singled out for annihilation, and with the members of the two other communities either playing the role of passive spectators or, in some cases, active participants in the unspeakable crimes. In the past, the attitude of the Greek Catholic Church toward the Jews had been rather ambivalent, for although some members of the hierarchy and the clergy were known for their pro-Jewish sympathies, anti-Semitic statements were voiced occasionally even in the Catholic press, and individual priests and laymen did not always follow their bishops’ guidance in treating their Jewish fellow citizens with fairness and Christian charity.<sup>274</sup> Sheptyts’kyi’s personal relationship with Jews had always been correct, even cordial. In a gesture of respect, he would speak Hebrew to the leaders of the Jewish communities, who greeted him with the Torah during his regular pastoral visitations throughout Galicia. Thus, when he celebrated his seventieth birthday in July 1935, the executive and the council of the Jewish community in Lviv paid homage to him as a “real representative of culture and of the highest ethical values, who had always assumed an attitude of understanding and justice toward Israel.”<sup>275</sup> Now, at a time of the Jews’ greatest trial, the metropolitan offered sanctuary to numerous Jewish victims of Nazi persecution in his own residence at St. George’s and in a number of monasteries under his jurisdiction, especially the Studite Lavra in Univ.<sup>276</sup> In February 1942 he sent a personal letter to the Reichsführer of the SS, Heinrich Himmler, deploring

the mass extermination of the Jews and beseeching him to exempt the Ukrainian auxiliary police—members of Sheptyts'kyi's flock—from participating in these massacres.<sup>277</sup> Finally, in his most famous and, in many ways, most tragic pastoral letter, "Thou Shalt Not Kill," dated 21 November O.S./4 December N.S. 1942, the metropolitan condemned all forms of homicide. The text of the message did not indicate clearly whom Sheptyts'kyi had in mind—the Jews, hunted down by their tormentors; the Ukrainians and the Poles, locked in a relentless combat of mutual annihilation; or nationalist extremists, engaged in a fratricidal and self-destructive murderous spree. However, while not mentioning anyone in particular, the letter spoke in a powerful voice about the sacredness of human life and denounced those who, by shedding innocent blood, were placing themselves beyond the pale of human society.<sup>278</sup>

As various political groups and factions within the Ukrainian community were losing their following, the influence of the Greek Catholic Church seemed to increase.<sup>279</sup> Whereas during the first months of the German occupation the Church kept a comparatively low profile and allowed the military and political arm of the OUN to dominate the situation, it never lost its unique position among its faithful. Now that the efforts of militant nationalists proved to be counterproductive and seemed to be leading nowhere, the Church hierarchy tried to exercise a pacifying influence by reducing the intensity of the Ukrainian-Polish confrontation and by preventing, to the best of its ability, any extremist excesses.<sup>280</sup> Meanwhile, the regrouping of forces within the Ukrainian community enhanced the importance of Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi as a primary political factor. Indeed, even Polish underground circles acknowledged in a report to their government-in-exile in London that the metropolitan was showing great independence and civil courage and exerted a positive influence on his clergy.<sup>281</sup>

At the same time, the Greek Catholic Church did not abandon its hopes of spreading the Union in Dnieper Ukraine. After the Holy See confirmed the appointment of exarchs for the whole territory of the USSR (see above), Sheptyts'kyi urged young priests from his archeparchy to prepare for missionary work. As a result of these efforts, Greek Catholic parishes were founded in Kyiv, Zhytomyr, Vinnytsia, Kam'ianets-Podilskyi, Proskuriv, and other cities, and Ukrainian monastic orders (the Basilians, Redemptorists, and Studites) were also preparing themselves to preach the Gospel in the conquered areas of the East.<sup>282</sup> These endeavors were repeatedly thwarted by the negative attitude of the Nazi authorities. The clergy of the Latin rite regarded Sheptyts'kyi's missionary zeal as a purely political ploy without any chance of lasting success<sup>283</sup> and resented the failure of the Greek Catholic hierarchy to participate in conferences of the Polish episcopate in the Generalgouvernement, which were held regularly under the chairmanship of Archbishop Adam Sapieha of Cracow.<sup>284</sup> Ironically, at the same time the Ukrainian press in the Generalgouvernement, acting without the official

sanction of the Greek Catholic hierarchy, started a vigorous campaign aimed at persuading Latin-rite Catholics who were supposedly of Ukrainian origin and whose numbers were estimated at between 600,000 and 700,000, to return to the nationality of their ancestors.<sup>285</sup> However, these efforts remained largely unsuccessful, and some of the "Latins" (*latynnyky*), as they were popularly called, were later to pay with their lives for their failure to comply with that appeal.

The policy of the Nazi authorities from the very beginning aimed at embroiling the Poles with the Ukrainians, thus making it easier for themselves to control the country with a minimum of effort.<sup>286</sup> Small favors granted to one group were carefully balanced by those given to another community, but in such a way that neither of them would feel sufficiently strong or secure to challenge the supreme authority of their German overlords. Generally, of course, the Ukrainians, if only because of their numerical superiority in Galicia, enjoyed the more advantageous position, but deprived of any effective political leadership and split in their loyalties, they could hardly hope to create a counterpoise to the powerful military and administrative machinery of the occupying regime. Frustrated after their hoped-for independent state had once more been brutally and contemptuously thwarted, they were in a sullen and uncooperative mood, while the Polish community, more cohesive and disciplined, was never ready for any compromise with the enemy.<sup>287</sup> Nevertheless, as long as the Germans were able to continue their victorious march to the east, which during the summer of 1942 carried them to the Volga and the oil fields of the Caucasus, the Nazi administration was able to maintain at least a semblance of order in subdued Galicia and exercise an effectual control over the local population. However, the crushing defeat at Stalingrad radically changed the situation. After the aura of invincibility surrounding the Wehrmacht had dissipated, all open and secret enemies of the Third Reich as well as many opportunistic elements prepared themselves to fight, or at least to harass, the German army as it was slowly but relentlessly pushed back from Soviet territory.<sup>288</sup>

It was at that crucial moment that the governor of Galicia, Otto Wächter, presented to the leaders of the Ukrainian Central Committee in the General-gouvernement a proposal to form a Ukrainian military unit that would participate in Germany's struggle against the Soviet Union. The offer was highly controversial, although it seemed to fulfill a desire to play a more active role in the war that many Ukrainian spokesmen had voiced. Both factions of the OUN rejected this suggestion and urged their members not to participate in an undertaking that promised few concrete advantages to the Ukrainian side, while at the same time tainting the good name of the whole Ukrainian national movement by making it appear a loyal ally of the Third Reich. However, the leaders of the Ukrainian Central Committee felt that a disciplined and well-trained military formation could conceivably become the nucleus of a Ukrainian national army, which would

enhance the status of the Ukrainian cause in future peace negotiations and could also offer protection to the Ukrainian population of Galicia against the Polish underground.<sup>289</sup> The Greek Catholic hierarchy and clergy also played a certain role in the inauguration of the Waffen-SS Division “Galicia,” whose formation was marked on 29 April 1943 by a special liturgy celebrated by Archbishop Slipyi. Metropolitan Sheptyts’kyi himself appointed a number of priests, including his close collaborator, Vasyl’ Laba, as chaplains for the new military unit, but in spite of encouragements and statements of support for the Division that he reportedly made in private conversations with various individuals, he studiously refrained from issuing any written message or official proclamation welcoming its creation.<sup>290</sup> However, in their sermons many Greek Catholic priests praised the Division, which some regarded as a continuation of the traditions of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen and the Ukrainian Galician Army, and they urged the faithful to join its ranks and participate actively in the life-and-death struggle against the approaching danger from the east. At the same time, the attitude of the Church hierarchy toward the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which came into being with the avowed purpose of fighting both the Germans and the Soviets, was much more reserved, although some individual members of the Greek Catholic clergy willingly cooperated with it and endorsed its political objectives.<sup>291</sup>

The situation became more explosive during the summer of 1943, when Soviet partisan units managed to make an incursion into Galicia for the first time and to crisscross the whole province from the borders of Volhynia to the Carpathian Mountains. Although the military significance of this operation was limited, it set off a series of sabotages and terrorist attacks against the Germans and their collaborators. Moreover, the Polish-Ukrainian conflict erupted with renewed fury as the bloody confrontation between the two communities spread from the Chelm lands and Volhynia into Galicia, resulting in indiscriminate assassinations and, in some cases, mass murders. To make the situation even worse, the internecine feud festering within the Ukrainian nationalist movement led to new acts of violence, inevitably resulting in what Sheptyts’kyi described as the degeneration of the national conscience and the spirit of patriotism, eventually destroying all values and standards of human behavior.<sup>292</sup> While these misdeeds involved only a small percentage of the faithful, they scandalized the whole community and compromised its moral principles.

As the pastoral letters and public utterances of the Greek Catholic hierarchy and Sheptyts’kyi’s correspondence with Pope Pius XII indicate, he and his brother bishops were engaged in an agonizing self-examination at that time. They became painfully aware that in spite of their total dedication to the spiritual welfare of their flock they had not prepared and inured them adequately for this hour of trial. It seemed that the elaborate ritual and the rich liturgical heritage, so highly valued by their faithful, did not imbue them with Christian values, and that the

hierarchy and the clergy—their shepherds, who were supposed to guide them and watch over them—had somehow failed to convey the very essence of their religion—its gospel of brotherly love and human dignity. Indeed, the interwar years, in which the bishops had tried to build up the network of Catholic organizations and institutions and to foster Christian virtues, seemed strangely irrelevant in this new, apocalyptic age, in which all primitive instincts and passions were unleashed and where there was no place left for Christian charity or even for human understanding.

It was under these tragic circumstances that the Greek Catholic bishops of the Galician Church Province issued their joint pastoral letter of November 1943, warning their flock that utter darkness was about to descend upon their country, posing a deadly threat not only to the existing social order, but also to the very survival of the Ukrainian people.<sup>293</sup> As Sheptytskyi was later to observe in his address to the council of priests of the Lviv archeparchy, which held very productive sessions during the period of both the Soviet and the German occupations, an unprecedented historical catastrophe of the greatest magnitude was at hand, brought about not only by external developments, but also by the Ukrainians' own actions, and its repercussions could determine the fate of the Ukrainian people for centuries to come.<sup>294</sup>

In the existing situation, it was essential to prevent the growth of political extremism and social radicalism, which, if unchecked, could eventually turn against the Church itself. Generally, the metropolitan became more cautious in his pronouncements and, when asked by the German authorities to denounce the council of the Russian Orthodox Church (which on 8 September 1943 had elected Sergii Stragorodskii as the patriarch of Moscow and of the whole of Rus'), he refused to issue any official statement regarding that matter.<sup>295</sup> Also, in spite of pressure by Governor Wächter and the latter's deputy Bauer, Sheptytskyi did not include any anti-Soviet comments in the Christmas message to his flock that was broadcast in January 1944—most likely in order not to antagonize the Soviets, whose victorious armies had just crossed the prewar frontier of Poland.<sup>296</sup> As the Polish-Ukrainian clashes increased in intensity, the metropolitan reportedly made known his willingness to address a joint pastoral letter to the two warring communities, signed by himself and the Roman Catholic archbishop of Lviv, Twardowski; the latter, however, refused to cooperate, claiming that the Polish community bore no responsibility for that conflict.<sup>297</sup>

In early March 1944, the Soviet army entered the territory of the Galician Church Province and by September of that year brought most of it (with the exception of the Lemko Apostolic Administration) under its control. Thoroughly disgusted by the behavior of the German administration, now retreating, and horrified by the atrocities perpetrated by the Ukrainian and Polish underground forces, Sheptytskyi resigned himself to the inevitable return of the Soviet regime,

which, he hoped, would at least put an end to the state of absolute anarchy and chaos rampant all over Galicia.<sup>298</sup> At the same time, however, he reaffirmed his commitment to the idea of a sovereign and united Ukrainian state by agreeing to join the All-Ukrainian National Council as its first vice-chairman and by co-signing its declaration of 22 April 1944, which vowed to continue the struggle for the self-determination of the Ukrainian people against all odds.<sup>299</sup>

In the meantime, the advance of the Soviet army into Galicia set off a mass exodus of the Ukrainian population from that province, with most of those who had worked in any administrative capacity for the Nazi authorities being joined by many professionals, businessmen, and representatives of other occupations and social groups, including the clergy. With many pastors abandoning their parishes in order to escape the vengeance of the Soviet regime or to get away from unpredictable forays by Polish and Ukrainian underground units, the Lviv archeparchy was forced to forbid all priests under its jurisdiction to leave their posts without the metropolitan's express consent.<sup>300</sup> Yet, although Sheptytskyi deeply deplored the flight of so many members of his flock, which was undermining the position of the Ukrainian people in Galicia, he could hardly deny permission to leave to those who believed that their lives were endangered or whose moral fiber was not strong enough to cope with the coming ordeal.

As the Soviet armies, having broken through the German lines and crushed the Division "Galicia" in the battle of Brody, approached the city of Lviv in July 1944, the future of the Greek Catholic Church hung in the balance. Deserted by many of its faithful and its priests, deprived of the leading role that it used to play in the life of the community, and with its moral prestige and power weakened by accusations of association with the Nazi regime, it could hardly continue as the chief national institution of the Ukrainian people in Galicia, such as it had become under Metropolitan Sheptytskyi's stewardship. However, if it really was deeply rooted in the masses and represented their spiritual aspirations, it needed not regret the demise of the Ukrainian establishment in Galicia with which it had, perhaps imprudently, allied itself. Stripped of its privileges and material possessions and cleansed of those who had associated with it for purely opportunistic reasons, it could now demonstrate its vitality as a veritable Church of the people by surviving and adjusting to the new conditions. Rather than succumb to despair, the Church could prove its mettle by confidently taking up the challenge that loomed ahead.

## NOTES

1. See, for example, Kost' Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia vyzvol'nykh zmahani' halyts'kykh ukraïntsiiv z chasu svitovoï viiny*, pt. 1 (Lviv, 1929), 10–11.
2. The original German text of the memorandum is given in Theophil Hornykiewicz, ed., *Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914–1922, deren Bedeutung und historische Hintergründe*, vol. 1 (Philadelphia, 1966), 8–11; English translation in Osyp Kravcheniuk, *Veleten' zo Sviatoiurs'koï hory: prychnyky do biohrafii Sluhy Bozhoho Andreia Sheptyts'koho na pidstavi chuzhomovnykh dzherel*, Biblioteka Lohosu 34 (Yorkton, Sask., 1963), 121–24. For a detailed discussion of this document, see Petro Isaïv, “Memorandum mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho do uriadiv tsentral'nykh derzhav,” *Bohosloviia* 32 (1968): 30–76.
3. See, for example, Hornykiewicz, *Ereignisse*, 1:18–19.
4. *Ibid.*, 21.
5. For details, see M. H. Tsehlyns'kyi, *Halyts'ki pohromy: Tragichna storinka z zhyttia halyts'kykh ukraïntsiiv v chasy evropeis'koï viiny 1914–1915 rr.* (Cleveland, 1917); *Talergofskii al'manakh*, 4 vols. (Lviv, 1924–1932), reprinted as *Voennye prestupleniia Gabsburgskoi monarkhii 1914–1917 gg.: Galitskaia golgofa* (Trumbull, Conn., 1964); and Vasył Makovs'kyi, *Talerhof: Spohady i dokumenty* (Lviv, 1934).
6. See Dmytro Doroshenko, “Arest i ssylka mitropolita A. Sheptytskago (iz nedavniago proshlago),” *Na chuzhoï storonie* (Berlin) 13 (1925): 160–66; the collective volume *Tsars'kyi viazen'* (Lviv, 1918); and Ivan Muzychka, “Sheptyts'kyi in the Russian Empire,” in *Morality and Reality: The Life and Times of Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, ed. Paul R. Magocsi with the assistance of Andrii Kravchuk, 313–27 (Edmonton, 1989).
7. Mykhailo Kornylovych, “Plany ‘vozsoiedyneniia’ halyts'kykh uniiativ v 1914–1915 rr.,” *Ukraina* (Kyiv) 1, no. 4 (1924): 134–35. For details, see Ivan Petrovych, *Halychyna pidchas rosiis'koï okupatsii, serpen' 1914–cherven' 1915* (Vienna, 1915).
8. Kornylovych, “Plany ‘vozsoiedyneniia,’” 136 (the dates given according to the Old Style have been changed to the New Style).
9. *Ibid.*, 137.
10. *Ibid.* See also T. K., “Moskovski zamysly proty hr.-kat. Tserkvy v Halychyni v 1914 i 1915 rr.,” *Nova Zoria* (Lviv), 27 January 1935, 6.
11. T. K., “Moskovski zamysly,” 6.
12. Kornylovych, “Plany ‘vozsoiedyneniia,’” 138.

13. Ibid., 144.
14. "Narys istoriï Stanyslavivs'koï diietseziï," *Nova Zoria*, 28 April 1935, 9.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. See R. P. Browder and A. F. Kerensky, eds., *The Russian Provisional Government, 1917: Documents* (Stanford, 1961), 2:838.
18. Bohdan Budurowycz, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement after 1914," in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magocsi, 49.
19. Muzychka, "Sheptyts'kyi in the Russian Empire," 324.
20. See Levyts'kyi, *Istoriia vyzvol'nykh zmahan'*, pt. 3 (1930), 595–96.
21. Ibid., 652–53.
22. *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Herrenhauses des Reichsrates*, 22nd session, 28th Sitzung, 28 February 1918 (Vienna, 1918), 809–12.
23. V. O. Bunchenko et al., comp., *Pravda pro uniiu: Dokumenty i materialy*, 2nd rev. ed. (Lviv, 1968), 147–48; L'onhyn Tsehel's'kyi, *Vid legend do pravdy: Spomyny pro podii v Ukraini zv'iazani z Pershym Lystopadom 1918* (New York and Philadelphia, 1960), 193–94. See also Ivan Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istoriï Ukraïns'koï Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy*, vol. 4, pt. 1 (New York and Bound Brook, N. J., 1961), 45–47.
24. "Narys istoriï Stanyslavivs'koï diietseziï," 9.
25. See Hryhorii Khomyshyn, "Z ostannikh lit: Moï spomyny i reflieksiï," *Nova Zoria*, 3 November 1938, 1–2; and Petro Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn: Patriot-misionar-muchenyk* (Rome and Philadelphia, 1979), 115–16.
26. Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 116.
27. See the letter of General Tadeusz Rozwadowski, the commander of the Polish forces in Lviv, to Metropolitan Sheptyts'kyi, as quoted in Cyrille Korolevskij, *Métropolitte André Szeptyckyj 1865–1944*, Opera Theologicae Societatis Scientifiae Ucrainorum 16–17 (Rome, 1964), 407–8.
28. Iosafat Zhan [Josaphat Jean] and Bohdan Kazymyra, *Velykyi Mytropolyt* (Edmonton, 1954), 7–8.
29. Taras Hunczak, ed., *Ukraine and Poland in Documents, 1918–1922*, pt. 1, Shevchenko Scientific Society, Sources for the History of Rus'-Ukraine 12 (New York, 1983), 209–11.

30. Zhan, *Velykyi Mytropolyt*, 11–12.
31. See Hunczak, *Ukraine and Poland*, pt. 2, 311–12.
32. For a detailed account of Sheptyts'kyi's travels, see Mykhailo H. Marunchak, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi na Zakhodi 1920–1923* (Winnipeg and Edmonton, 1981).
33. Zhan, *Velykyi Mytropolyt*, 14–15.
34. Marunchak, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, 36.
35. Ibid., 39–45. See also Mirosława Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1922–1926* (Cracow, 1979), 198–200. Some scholars of the period, e.g., Liliana Hentosh, have questioned the information regarding Sheptyts'kyi's desire for retirement, noting a lack of documentary evidence for such a claim.
36. See Jerzy Wistocki, *Konkordat polski z 1925 roku: Zagadnienia prawno-polityczne* (Poznań, 1977), 127.
37. Zhan, *Velykyi Mytropolyt*, 14–15.
38. For details see Hryhorii Khomyshyn, "Katolytyzm chy subiektyvizm i psykhychna vdacha: 'Vinets' antytselibatnoi borot'by; Vidpovid' Ieremii Teol'ogovy," *Nova Zoria*, 15 September 1935, 1–3; 22 September 1935, 3–4; 26 September 1935, 3–4; and 29 September 1935, 3. See also "Narys istorii Stanyslavivs'koï diietsezii," 9–10; Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 247; and Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, 97–99.
39. See Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, 98.
40. Ibid. For details on Genocchi's Galician visit see Giovanni Choma, "La Visita Apostolica del Padre Giovanni Genocchi in Galizia (Ucraina Occidentale) nell'anno 1923 [pt. 2]," *Analecta OSBM*, ser. 2, sec. 2, vol. 3 (9), fasc. 3–4 (1960): 495–512.
41. "Narys istorii Stanyslavivs'koï diietsezii," 9–10.
42. Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 356.
43. Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, 98–99.
44. "Stanyslavivs'ka Diietseziiia v 1935 rotsi," *Nova Zoria*, 28 April 1935, 11.
45. For a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the concordat for the Ukrainians in Poland see Wistocki, *Konkordat polski*, 132–37; Edmund Przekop, "Der Griechisch-Katholische (unierte) Ritus im polnischen Konkordat vom Jahre 1925," *Ostkirchliche Studien* (Würzburg) 28, no. 2–3 (September 1979): 145–67;

and Andrzej Zięba, "Metropolita Andrzej Szeptycki," *Kwartalnik Historyczny* 92, no. 4 (1985): 895.

46. Wisłocki, *Konkordat polski*, 133.
47. *Ibid.*, 133–34.
48. *Ibid.*, 134.
49. *Ibid.*, 133–34.
50. See "Derzhava i tserkva: Promova pos. S. Khruts'koho na plenumi soimu z 24.III, z nahody ratyfikatsiï konkordatu," *Dilo* (Lviv), 31 March 1925, 1–2; 1 April 1925, 2–3; and 2 April 1925, 1.
51. *Dilo*, 2 April 1925, 1.
52. "Bez poludy na ochakh," *Dilo*, 2 February 1925, 2.
53. See table 6 in Jerzy Wisłocki, *Uposażenie Kościoła i duchowieństwa katolickiego w Polsce 1918–1939* (Poznań, 1981), 92.
54. *Ibid.*, 219.
55. *Ibid.*, 306.
56. *Ibid.*, 243.
57. Ioan Lutsyk, "Vidpovid' na dopys u 'Dili,'" *Nova Zoria*, 29 December 1938, 3.
58. See "Nechuvanyi vystup u soimi," *Meta* (Lviv), 13 February 1938, 4–5.
59. For a detailed account of these difficulties, see "Lyst Dr. Antona Pehintsia, advokata u Stanyslavovi," in Melnychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 345–53.
60. In this connection, see Papierzyńska-Turek, *Sprawa ukraińska*, 94–96, and Andrzej Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939* (Wrocław, 1979), 187–89.
61. For a concise discussion of the basic elements of Byzantinism see Ivan Kedryn, "Ostrakh pered povtorenniam istoriï (Shcho tse take vyzantynizm?)," *Meta*, 3 September 1933, 3.
62. For an articulate critique of Byzantinism, see Khomyshyn's pamphlet *Pro vyzantiistvo* (Stanyslaviv, 1931); and Tyt Halushchynskyi, "Osnuvannia i pochatky 'Novoi Zori,'" *Nova Zoria*, 6 January 1935, 5.

63. Andrei Sheptyts'kyi as quoted in Iosyf Slipyi, "Vyzantynizm iak forma kul'tury," *Meta*, 22 October 1933, 3.
64. See Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 149 and 315. These and other borrowings from the Latin-rite Church are conveniently listed in Victor J. Pospishil, "Sheptyts'kyi and Liturgical Reform," in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magocsi, 206–7.
65. For details, see Pospishil, "Sheptyts'kyi and Liturgical Reform," 218–21.
66. See, for example, *Słowo* (Vilnius), 5 June 1935, as quoted in Oko., "Novitnii tsezaropapizm (Z pryvodu vystupu 'spetsiv' u spravakh Unii)," *Meta*, 23 June 1935, 2–3.
67. *Słowo Narodowe* (Lviv), 19 December 1938, as quoted in "Endets'ki tezy v spravi Unii," *Dilo*, 21 December 1938, 4.
68. For details, see Tadeusz Śliwa, "Kościoł greckokatolicki w Polsce w latach 1918–1939," in *Kościół w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej* (Lublin, 1981), 153–55. Some of the dates given in that article differ from those in other sources, notably *Encyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, ed. Volodymyr Kubiiiovych [Kubijovyč], 10 vols. (Paris and New York, 1955–1984), and its updated English-language version, *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, ed. Kubijovyč [vols. 1–2] and Danylo Husar Struk [vols. 3–5], 5 vols. (Toronto, 1984–1993).
69. *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 1 (1984), 287.
70. *Ibid.*, 1:312.
71. *Encyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, vol. 4 (1962), 1255.
72. On Buchko, see Athanasius Velyky, "Buchko, Ivan," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 1:308; and Pavlo Senytsia, ed., *Svityl'nyk istyny: Dzherela do istorii Ukraïns'koï Katolyts'koï Bohoslovs'koï Akademii u L'vovi*, pt. 1 (Toronto and Chicago, 1973), 215–16. On Liatyshevskyy, see Atanasii Pekar, "Preosv. Ivan Liatyshevskyy vladyka-strazhdaľnyk," in *Al'manakh Stanyславivs'koï zemli: Zbirnyk materialiv do istorii Stanyславova i Stanyславivshchyny*, vol. 2 (New York, 1985), 381–83.
73. Atanasii Pekar, "Velykyi pravednyk—Vladyka Mykola Charnets'kyi ChNIZb (1884–1959)," in *Al'manakh Stanyславivs'koï zemli*, 2:379–81; and Senytsia, *Svityl'nyk istyny*, pt. 1, 286–89.
74. See Maciej Rataj, *Pamiętniki* (Warsaw, 1965), 202; and Wisłocki, *Konkordat polski*, 133–34.
75. *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka (1935–1945)*, vol. 4 (London, 1972), 122–23 and 281.

76. On Slipyi's appointment and consecration, see Senytsia, *Svityl'nyk istyny*, pt. 1, 198–99.
77. See, for example, Iosyf Ostashevs'kyi, "Do pytan' hromadians'koï diial'nosti ukraïnskoho dukhovenstva," *Meta*, 25 February 1934, 2–3.
78. Volodymyr Kuz'movych, "Chy ukraïnskyi katolytsyzm sebe opravdav? (Do ioho hromads'koï problematyky)," *Meta*, 28 April 1935, 3. See also Tyt Halushchynskyi, "Katolyts'ka Aktsiia i polityka," *Nova Zoria*, 13 August 1936, 1–3; 16 August 1936, 4–5; and 20 August 1936, 6.
79. Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 210–11.
80. See "UNO," *Nova Zoria*, 11 August 1935, 1–2; and Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 293.
81. Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 318.
82. See Iuliiian Dzerovych, "Dumky pro praktychnu diial'nist' U.K.S.," *Meta*, 18 March 1934, 5; and 25 March 1934, 5. For more details consult "Statut Tovarystva Ukraïnskyi Katolyts'kyi Soiuz u L'vovi," *Meta*, 25 August 1935, 3; and 1 September 1935, 3–4.
83. See M. P., "K.A.U.M.," *Meta*, 27 October 1935, 4; and 3 November 1935, 4–5.
84. M. P., "Katolyts'ka Aktsiia i molod'," *Meta*, 17 November 1935, 2–3.
85. "Narys istorii Stanyslavivs'koï diietseziï," 10.
86. See "Pro organizatsiini osnovy katolykiv: Vidozva Preosviashchenoho Hryhoriiia Khomyshyna, Epyskopa Stanyslavivs'koho, do Vsech. Dukhovenstva Stanyslavivs'koï Eparkhii z pryvodu Pastyrs'koho Lystu pro Katolyts'ku Aktsiiu," *Nova Zoria*, 4 November 1934, 3; and 11 November 1934, 5–6.
87. Hryhorii Khomyshyn, "Natsional'na chy obiavlena vira, abo rozval chy shliakh tvorchosty: Pastyrs'kyi lyst . . . do dukhovenstva Stanyslavivs'koï eparkhii," *Nova Zoria*, 5 December 1935, 1–3; 8 December 1935, 4; and 12 December 1935, 4 (also published as a separate pamphlet). See also Osyp Nazaruk, "Uzasadnennist' 'Skaly,'" *Nova Zoria*, 3 May 1936, 3–6; and 7 May 1936, 3–4; Marko Gil, "'Skala' i natsionalisty: Za katolyts'kyi typ chytalen'," *Nova Zoria*, 20 August 1936, 1–2; and 23 August 1936, 1–2; Teofil' Kostruba, "'Skala' i nashi fashysty," *Nova Zoria*, 8 October 1936, 4; and Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 261.
88. This prohibition was published in no. 10–12 of *Vistnyk Stanyslavivs'koï Eparkhii* for 1937.
89. The text of Cortesi's letter was published in *Vistnyk Stanyslavivs'koï Eparkhii*, no. 1–3 (1938): 3–5; and in the article "Sviashchenstvo i organizatsii," *Nova Zoria*, 16

- January 1938, in which Khomyshyn reaffirmed his prohibition. For the reaction of the Ukrainian secular press, see "Zasluzhena pokhvala za dobryi uchnok," *Dilo*, 16 January 1938, 6; and "Katolyts'kyi pidkhid ta ukrains'ka diisnist' (Z pryvodu ingerentsii Apostol'skoi Nuntsiiatury v koryst' zaborony stanyslavivskoho vladky)," *Dilo*, 25 January 1938, 1–2.
90. For the text of the letter see *Meta*, 7 January 1936, 2.
  91. *Meta*, 11 November 1934, 6.
  92. See, for example, Volodymyr Kuz'movych, "Dumky na temu praktyky U.K.S.," *Meta*, 7 January 1936, 5–6.
  93. *Ibid.*, 5.
  94. See "Narys istorii Stanyslavivskoi diietsezii," 10; see also Iosyf Ostashevskyy, "Tserkovni bratstva," *Meta*, 27 March 1938, 3; and 17 April 1938, 3.
  95. "Society of Saint Paul the Apostle," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 4 (1993), 798.
  96. *Ibid.*, 797. See also "Zahal'ni Zbory stanovoi organizatsii sviashchenykyv," *Meta*, 27 January 1935, 1; and "Vid Tovarystva sv. Andreia—Zahal'ni Zbory," *Meta*, 24 July 1938, 5–6.
  97. "Narys istorii Stanyslavivskoi diietsezii," 10.
  98. See "Diial'nist' BNT v Halychyni vid 1923 r. do uv'iaznennia Mytropolyta Iosyfa 11 kvitnia 1945 r. (50-littia BNT)," in *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 2 (1976), 13–63.
  99. For details see A. Ch., "V 10-littia 'Novoi Zori,'" *Nova Zoria*, 6 January 1935, 2; Tyt Halushchynskyy, "Osnuvannia i pochatyky 'Novoi Zori,'" *Nova Zoria*, 6 January 1935, 4–5; "Rolia 'Novoi Zori' i sprava politychnoho otverezinnia ukrains'koho hromadianstva v Halychyni," *Nova Zoria*, 6 January 1935, 6–7; "'Nova Zoria' v 1939 rotsi," *Nova Zoria*, 29 December 1938, 1; and Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 210–18.
  100. Mel'nychuk, *Vladyka Hryhorii Khomyshyn*, 216–18.
  101. For details, see O. Ch. Ia., "Ukrains'ka katolyts'ka presa," *Meta*, 9 February 1936, 3–4; and entries for most of the above titles in *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna* and *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*.
  102. For details, see Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, "Basilians," in *The Modern Encyclopedia of Russian and Soviet History*, vol. 47 (Gulf Breeze, Fla., 1988), 60–65; Irynei Nazarko, "Basilian Monastic Order," in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 1:182–84; Isydor Patrylo, "Narys istorii Halyts'koi provintsii ChSVV," *Analecta OSBM* 17 (1982):

- 43–130; and Meletius M. Wojnar, “Basilians (Byzantine Rite),” *New Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. 2 (New York, 1967), 152–54.
103. B. K., “Studyty,” in *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, vol. 8 (1976), 3086. See also Ivan Khoma, “Studite Fathers,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 5 (1993), 83.
104. Volodymyr Malanchuk, “Redemptorysty,” in *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, vol. 7 (1973), 2481; and Wasył Lencyk and Volodymyr Malanchuk, “Redemptorist Fathers,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 4:327. See also “O.O. Redemptorysty v Stanyslavovi,” *Meta*, 18 March 1934, 3–4.
105. Oleksander Mokh, “Nashi Sestry Sluzhebnytsi P.N.D. Marii v 1938 rotsi,” *Nova Zoria*, 10 November 1938, 4–5; and 13 November 1938, 4–5. See also Mykhailo Vavryk, “Sestry Sluzhebnytsi Preneporochnoi Divy Marii,” in *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, 7:2783; and Ivan Khoma, “Sisters Servants of Mary Immaculate,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 4:719–20.
106. Mykhailo Vavryk, “Sestry Vasyliianky,” in *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, 7:2782–83; and “Basilian Order of Nuns,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 1:184–85.
107. See the entries for these congregations (“Sisters of Saint Joseph” and “Studite Sisters”) in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 4:719; and 5:84; and for “Iosyfitky” and “Studytky” in *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, vol. 3 (1959), 9–10; and vol. 8 (1976), 3086. Other Greek Catholic monastic congregations for women active in Galicia included the St. Josaphat’s Sisters (Iosafatky), founded in 1911, which in 1939 had 10 houses and close to 40 nuns, and the so-called Myronosytsi (Myrrh-Bearing Women), with 3 houses and 94 sisters. For details, see “Sisters of Saint Josaphat,” *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 4:719; and Ivan Korovytskyi and Isydor Patrylo, “Chernetstvo,” *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, vol. 10 (1984), 3711.
108. See article 13 of the concordat in Wisłocki, *Konkordat polski*, 264 (the French original) and 274 (the official Polish translation).
109. Irynei Nazarko, “Marii’ski Tovarystva,” in *Entsyklopediia ukraïnoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, 4:1466; and “Marian Societies,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, vol. 3 (1993), 311.
110. In this connection see “Ukraiń’skyi neonatsionalizm i katolytyzym,” *Meta*, 17 December 1933, 2; “Propovid’ dlia Akademichnoi Molodi,” *Meta*, 24 December 1933, 2; “Natsiia ponad use,” *Meta*, 14 January 1934, 3–4; and “Natsionalizm i katolytyzym,” *Meta*, 18 August 1934, 3–4.
111. See Ann Slusarczuk Sirka, “Sheptyts’kyi in Education and Philanthropy,” in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magocsi, 275–76.

112. "Apostol'skyi Nuntsii u L'vovi," *Meta*, 25 December 1938, 2.
113. See "Zasnuvannia Bohoslovskoi Akademii" in *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 1, 41–56.
114. See *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:488 and 494–95.
115. For details, see "Bohoslov'ska Akademia pidchas druhoi svitovoï viiny," in *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 2, 71–87.
116. See "Inshi dukhovni seminarii v XIX i XX st.," in *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 1, 36–38; and "Stanyslaviv'ska Diietseziia v 1935 rotsi," 11.
117. Muzychka, "Sheptyts'kyi in the Russian Empire," 322–24.
118. *Le Saint Siège et la situation religieuse en Pologne et dans les Pays Baltes*, pt. 2, 1942–1945, Actes et documents du Saint Siège relatifs à la seconde guerre mondiale, ed. Pierre Blet et al., 3 (Vatican City, 1967), 565–66.
119. *Ibid.*, 565.
120. *Ibid.*
121. For details, see "Velehrads'ki kongresy" in *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 1, 548–55.
122. See "Uniini konferentsii v Pyn'sku," in *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 1, 555–74.
123. "Uniinyi z'ïzd u L'vovi," *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 1, 574–92.
124. Wiesław Mysiek, *Kościół katolicki w Polsce w latach 1918–1939* (Warsaw, 1966), 540.
125. *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 929.
126. Mysiek, *Kościół katolicki*, 171.
127. See "Uniiia ne daie im spaty," *Meta*, 6 February 1938, 2.
128. *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:328, 330, 500, 502.
129. For details, see Vasyl' Lentsyk's unpaginated introduction ("Vstup") to *Shematyzm hreko-katolyts'koho dukhovenstva Apostol's'koï administratsii Lemkivshchyny*, 2nd ed. (Stamford, Conn., 1970); and Wisłocki, *Konkordat polski*, 131–32.
130. See "Apostol'skyi Administrator dlia Lemkivshchyny," *Meta*, 4 March 1934, 1; "Lemkiv'ska Apostol's'ka Administratura," *Meta*, 4 March 1934, 2; Wisłocki,

- Konkordat polski*, 132; “Lemkivska Apostol’ska Administratura,” in *Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva: Slovnykova chastyna*, 4:1280–81; and “Lemko Apostolic Administration,” in *Encyclopedia of Ukraine*, 3:76.
131. For the text of the letter see “Lyst I.E. Apostol’skoho Nuntsiia v Varshavi do I.E. Mytropolyta Andreia,” *Meta*, 25 March 1934, 1.
  132. “Rezoliutsii UND-a v spravi utvorennia Apostol’skoï Administratury na Lemivshchynu,” *Meta*, 25 March 1934, 6.
  133. “Apostol’skyi Administrator,” *Meta*, 4 March 1934, 1; Lentsyk, introduction to *Shematyzm*; and Wisłocki, *Konkordat polski*, 132.
  134. “Pershe Pastyr’ske Poslannie D-ra Vasylia Mastsyukha,” *Nova Zoria*, 14 March 1935, 5; and 17 March 1935, 5. See also Wisłocki, *Konkordat polski*, 132.
  135. See “Novyi Administrator Lemkivshchyny,” *Nova Zoria*, 16 July 1936, 1; and Lentsyk, introduction to *Shematyzm*.
  136. Lentsyk, introduction to *Shematyzm*.
  137. *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:327. See also Mykola Andrusiak, “Zakhidno-ukraïnske plemia lemkiw,” in *Lemkiv’skyi kalendar 1966* (Toronto, 1966), 126; and Lentsyk, introduction to *Shematyzm*.
  138. “‘Treba vyzvolity Hutsul’shchynu zpïd ukrain’skykh vplyviv’: Za Apostol’sku Administratsiiu dlïa Hutsul’shchyny” (an article in *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny* [Cracow], no. 161 for 1935, as quoted in *Nova Zoria*, 16 June 1935, 4).
  139. See Volodymyr Kubiiovych, *Ukrain’si v Heneral’niï Hubernïi 1939–1941: Isteriia Ukrains’koho Tsentral’noho Komitetu* (Chicago, 1975), 24 and 289–91.
  140. *Ibid.*, 290–91.
  141. Lentsyk, introduction to *Shematyzm*.
  142. See article 12 of the concordat in Wisłocki, *Konkordat polski*, 264 (the French original) and 274 (the official Polish translation).
  143. “Nastroï l’viv’skoï vulytsi u varshav’skomu soimi: Druha protyukrain’ska promova posla Voitsiekhov’skoho,” *Dilo*, 17 February 1938, 3; and “Ukrain’ska nich u varshav’skomu soimi: Prodovzhennia dyskusii nad budzhetom ministerstva vnu-trishnikh sprav,” *Dilo*, 18 February 1938, 7.
  144. For the abridged text of the letter, see “List pasterski ks. biskupa Chomyszyna,” *Sprawy Narodowosciowe* 5, no. 2–3 (May–July 1931): 274–79. See also “Dva vystupy stanslaviv’skoho vladyky v natsional’no-hromad’skykh spravakh,” *Dilo*, 22 and 24 March 1931, 1–3.

145. For a summary of these views see "Pislia poiavy Pastyrs'koho Lysta," *Dilo*, 25 March 1931, 1–2; "Politychnyi vystup stanslavivskoho vладыky v zerkali pol'skoi presy," *Dilo*, 27 March 1931, 1; "Z holosiv ukrainskoi presy," *Dilo*, 28 March 1931, 2–3. In this connection, see also "Vidnoshennia Epyskopa Hryhoriia Khomyshyna do Pol'skoi Derzhavy," *Nova Zoria*, 5 February 1935, 3 (an article by Henryk Łubieński originally published in *Czas* [Vilnius], 29 January 1935).
146. A detailed discussion of Dontsov's ideology is given by Mykhailo Sosnov'skyi in *Dmytro Dontsov: Politychnyi portret* (New York, 1974); see also Alexander Motyl, *The Turn to the Right: The Ideological Origins and Development of Ukrainian Nationalism, 1919–1929* (Boulder, Colo., 1980).
147. For a Catholic critique of Dontsov's ideology, see Osyp Nazaruk, "Dontsovshchyna," *Nova Zoria*, 15 May 1938, 2.
148. See Ivan Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy* (New York, 1976), 144–45 and 288–90.
149. For details, see Bohdan Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem, 1921–1939," *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 25, no. 4 (December 1983): 486–88.
150. Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, 436–37; see also Volodymyr Mats'kiv, "Patsyfikatsiia v Ternopil'shchyni," in *Shliakhamy Zolotoho Podillia: Regional'nyi zbirnyk Ternopil'shchyny*, vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1970), 120.
151. Stepan Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi: Zhyttia i diial'nist'* (Munich, 1947), 96–97.
152. For details of Sheptyts'kyi's intervention, see *Dilo*, 1 October 1930, 1; 2 October 1930, 4; 3 October 1930, 4; 4 October 1930, 4; 5 October 1930, 1; 7 October 1930, 1; 10 October 1930, 4; 11 October 1930, 3; and 14 October 1930, 4.
153. "Pislia konfiskaty pastyrs'koho lysta," *Dilo*, 21 October 1930, 4, and "Konfiskata pastyrs'koho lysta hreko-katolyts'koho epyskopatu," *Dilo*, 21 October 1930, 5.
154. See, for example, "Ukrains'kyi neonatsionalizm i katolytsyzm," *Meta*, 17 December 1933, 2.
155. "Manivtsi 'borot'by za volodinnia dushamy,'" *Meta*, 10 September 1933, 2.
156. "Slovo do ukrains'koi molodi," *Dilo*, 22 May 1932, 1.
157. For a detailed account of the festivities, see "Sviato U.M.Kh.," *Dilo*, 9 May 1933, 1–2.
158. "Holos Mytropolyta," *Dilo*, 5 August 1934, 3.
159. Interview conducted by J. Radzimiński, published in *Tygodnik Ilustrowany* (Warsaw), 5 May 1935, as reported in "'Shukaiemo mostu porozuminnia':

- Mytropolyt Sheptytskyi pro pol'sko-ukraïns'ki problemi," *Dilo*, 5 May 1935, 3; and in "Mytropolyt Kyr Andrei pro pol'sko-ukraïns'ke pytannia," *Meta*, 12 May 1935, 3.
160. For details on the "normalization," see Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, 252–58; and Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem," 490–92. The attitude of the Greek Catholic hierarchy to this policy is discussed in Ivan Makukh, *Na narodnii sluzhbi* (Detroit, 1958), 458 and 469–70.
161. See "Ukraiïns'kyi Katolyts'kyi Epyskopat Halyts'koi Tserkovnoi Provintsii v spravi podii na Vel. Ukraïni do vsikh liudei dobroï voli," *Meta*, 30 July 1933, 1; and 29 October 1933, 1.
162. See "Krovavi demonstratsii u L'vovi," *Dilo*, 17 April 1936, 5; and 18 April 1936, 1 and 5; "L'vivska nauka," *Nova Zoria*, 23 April 1936, 1–2; "V oblychchi komunistychnoi nebezpeky," *Nova Zoria*, 14 May 1936, 1–2; "Ubyvstvo komunaramy ukraiïnskoho diiacha v Nastasovi, pov. Ternopil'," *Dilo*, 3 September 1936, 1; Stepan Baran, "Iak tse bulo v Nastasovi?" *Dilo*, 4 September 1936, 2–4; "Nastasiv," *Dilo*, 5 September 1936, 1–2; "Odnym frontom proty komuny!" *Meta*, 13 September 1936, 2; and "Kryvava nedilia v Nastasovi," *Meta*, 13 September 1936, 3–4.
163. See, for example, "Prychyny i pidlozhe viiny v Espanii," *Meta*, 30 August 1936, 3.
164. "Pastyrs'kyi lyst Mytropolyta Sheptyts'koho proty komunizmu," *Dilo*, 8 August 1936, 3–4.
165. See Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem," 492–94.
166. Makukh, *Na narodnii sluzhbi*, 469–70.
167. See Denys Telishchuk, "V oboroni prav ukraiïns'koi movy," *Meta*, 23 February 1936, 2–3; and 22 March 1936, 4–5; "Masovi protsesy proty ukraiïns'kykh sviashchenykyv," *Dilo*, 22 December 1937, 7; Lev Hankevych, "Ukraiïns'ke prizvysheche v metrykal'nykh knykhakh i karne pravo," *Dilo*, 17 August 1938, 6–7; "Nikhto ne zakhytaie nashoho doviria i poshany do nashoho dukhovenstva," *Dilo*, 17 September 1938, 2–3; and Kost' Levytskyi, "'Novakovskyy' ta 'Novakovskiy,'" *Dilo*, 3 March 1939, 2. See also *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:614.
168. *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:614.
169. See, for example, the case of Father Badan, the Greek Catholic parish priest of Zavadka (the eparchy of Przemyśl), on whose behalf Msgr. Felipe Cortesi, the papal nuncio in Warsaw, interceded with Jan Szembek, undersecretary of state in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*ibid.*, 4:599, 610, 613).
170. *Ukraine: A Concise Encyclopedia*, ed. Volodymyr Kubijovyč, vol. 2 (Toronto, 1971), 193. According to the Polish biweekly *Wola i Czyn*, in 1938 there were on the territory of Galicia (i.e., in the Polish provinces [*województwa*] of Stanyslaviv

and Ternopil and in the part of the province of Lviv east of the river San) 2,121 Greek Catholic parishes, 2,160 churches, 1,030 mission churches and chapels, and 2,002 priests, while the Roman Catholics had in the same area 707 parishes, 730 churches, 1,032 chapels, and 1,018 priests (see *Nova Zoria*, 7 August 1938, 3).

171. See S. K., "Mishani podruzha v svitli chysel," *Meta*, 18 November 1934, 7; 25 November 1934, 7; 9 December 1934, 6; and 16 December 1934, 6. See also "Mishani podruzha," *Meta*, 23 January 1938, 2; "Pora zminyty iulians'kyi kaliendar" (an article in *Goniec Warszawski*, 7 March 1939, as quoted in *Dilo*, 9 March 1939, 4); "Fides ex necessitate esse non debet: Chy latynka, hryhoriians'kyi kaliendar i psevido-statystyka nablyzyt' dva narody?" *Dilo*, 11 March 1939, 3.
172. See Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, 25–26.
173. Kubiiovych, *Ukrainci v Heneral'ni Hubernii*, 24, 289–90.
174. "Kyrynia pid vydom 'oborony,'" *Meta*, 18 November 1934, 2. For other details of Hudeček's visit, see "Vidvidyny Bohoslovs'koï Akademii paps'kym vizytatorom Eksts, o. d-rom Ivanom Hudechkom Ch.N.Izb.," in *Svityl'nyk istyny*, ed. Senytsia, pt. 1, 592–95.
175. *Zemlia i volia* as quoted in "'Katolytsyzm' halyts'ko-moskvofil's'kykh vozhakiv," *Meta*, 23 December 1934, 3 and 6.
176. See, for example, "Pislia St. Grabs'koho Br. Voitsiekhovs'kyi: Z ukrains'koho dnia u soimi," *Dilo*, 20 February 1938, 7; "Myr chy viina z moskvofilamy?" *Dilo*, 1 April 1938, 1–2; "Chy mozha pomyrtytsia z moskvofilamy?" *Dilo*, 9 April 1938, 1–2; "Nashe stanovyshche v spravi 'myra chy viiny' z moskvofilamy," *Dilo*, 3 August 1938, 1–2; 4 August 1938: 1–2; and 5 August 1938: 1–2.
177. Osyp Nazaruk, "Velykodni vrazhinnia: Na ikh tli paru dumok pro zrizzuvannia Talierhofs'kykh khrestiv," *Nova Zoria*, 1 May 1938, 1–2.
178. I am grateful to Dr. Andrzej A. Zięba of the Polonia Research Institute, Jagiellonian University, for having made available to me his unpublished paper, "National Majority—Religious Minority: Polish Greek Catholics in the 20th Century."
179. See "Vidkryttia nespodivane i trokhy pidozryle: Iezuït pro Poliakiiv hreko-katolykiv [article by Rev. Jan Urban in the bimonthly *Oriens* for March–April 1938]," *Nova Zoria*, 15 May 1938, 3.
180. See "Hreko-katolyky 'poliaky,'" *Dilo*, 12 February 1939, 2.
181. Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, *Do Polaków obrządku grecko-katolickiego* (Zhovkva, 1904), 6, as quoted by Ryszard Torzecki, "Sheptyts'kyi and Polish Society," in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magosci, 77.
182. "Kul'tura novykh baktsyliy rozkladu (Z pryvodu poiavy novoï hreko-pol's'koï 'orientatsii')," *Meta*, 7 April 1935, 2.

183. *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:327, 492, 562–63, 598–99, 613.
184. See “Khochuť revindykuvaty 1.200.000 dush,” *Nova Zoria*, 3 November 1938, 3; and “Proty avtonomii Halychyny,” *Nova Zoria*, 4 December 1938, 2. The same problem is examined in “P. Novakovs'kyi bez rukavychok” [a discussion of Zygmunt Nowakowski's article “Milion dusz” in *Ilustrowany Kurier Codzienny*, 5 June 1939], *Dilo*, 7 June 1939, 3–4.
185. For details, see Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej*, 226–32, and Piotr Stawecki, *Następcy Komendanta: Wojsko a polityka wewnętrzna II Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1935–1939* (Warsaw, 1969), 188–99. See also “Khochuť pol'skykh tserkov ta zminy kaliendaria: Zizd ‘shliakhty zagrodovei’ v Stanyslavovi,” *Dilo*, 21 April 1938, 4.
186. Stanisław Starzewski, “Księgi stanu cywilnego,” *Dziennik Polski* (Lviv), no. 151 for 1938, as quoted in “Knyhy tsyvil'noho stanu,” *Nova Zoria*, 9 June 1938, 3.
187. See “Ataky na sv. Iur,” *Dilo*, 5 February 1938, 1–2; “Nechuvanyi napad posla Voitsiekhovs'koho na mytr. Sheptyts'koho,” *Dilo*, 5 February 1938, 8; “Istorychnyi dokument napasty na Mytropolyta: Avtentychnyi tekst nakhabnoi promovy posla Voitsiekhovs'koho v budzhetovii komisii soimu,” *Dilo*, 6 February 1938, 7; “Vidpovid' pos. Volodymyra Tselevycha pos. Voitsiekhovskomu,” *Dilo*, 6 February 1938, 7–8.
188. Volodymyr Kuz'movych, “Z aktu formal'no-pravnoho—politychnyi (Z pryvodu dohovoru pro pouniini dobra),” *Meta*, 17 July 1938, 2.
189. Mysiek, *Kościół katolicki*, 112–13.
190. “Zi soimu,” *Dilo*, 3 July 1938, 13.
191. “Ostannii akt: Dohovir mizh Pol'shcheiu ta Vatykanom u spravi pouniats'kykh tserkovnykh zemel’,” *Dilo*, 9 July 1938, 1–2.
192. See “Udar v Pravoslavnu Tserkvu i ukrains'kyi narid,” *Dilo*, 10 July 1938, 4–6; and *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:212, 495–96, 499, 501.
193. Piotr Stawecki puts the number as high as 127, including 91 churches, 10 chapels, and 26 houses of prayer (*Następcy Komendanta*, 194). In this connection, see also “Interpeliiatsiia posla d-ra Stepana Barana do Pana Premiiera Rady Ministriv,” *Dilo*, 24 July 1938, 12–13.
194. The text of Sheptyts'kyi's letter is given in Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, 108–10.
195. Hryhorii Khomyshyn, “Vidozva do vsechesnoho dukhovenstva i virnykh Stanyslavivskoi eparkhii,” *Nova Zoria*, 27 October 1938, 1–2.

196. "Spil'ne Pastyr'ske Poslannia Epyskopatu Halyts'koï Provintsiï z nahody Iuvyleiu 950-littia Khreshchennia Rusy-Ukraïny," *Meta*, 7 August 1938, 1–2; and *Nova Zoria*, 4 August 1938, 1–2.
197. For details, see Budurowycz, "Poland and the Ukrainian Problem," 495–96.
198. "Zaiava," *Dilo*, 20 November 1938, 1.
199. "Pryvit i blahoslovennia Mytropolyta Kyr Andreia dlia Premiiera Karpats'koï Ukraïny," *Meta*, 4 December 1938, 1.
200. See "Poklyk Mytropolyta," *Dilo*, 5 November 1938, 1; and "'Potishyty kozhnoho z Vas—tse mii oboviazok . . .': Pastyr'skyi lyst Mytropolyta Sheptyts'koho v zviazku z ostannymy podiiamy," *Dilo*, 25 March 1939, 4.
201. For the text of Cortesi's appeal, see "Wizyta Nuncjusza Apostolskiego," *Sprawy Narodowosciowe* 12, no. 6 (1938): 637–38; and "Slovo nuntsiia Korteziia z nahody ioho pobutu u Lvovi," *Dilo*, 16 December 1938, 4.
202. See K., "Vidvidyny Apost. Nuntsiia i ioho 'slovo,'" *Dilo*, 16 December 1938, 4.
203. *Diariusz i teki Jana Szembeka*, 4:563.
204. *Ibid.*, 4:599.
205. *Ibid.*, 4:614.
206. *Ibid.*, 4:530–31 and 536.
207. See "Velyke Sviato na Sviatoiuers'kii Hori," *Dilo*, 20 June 1939, 1; and "'Slovo Narodove' pro sviato 40-lit'noho iepyskopstva mytropolyta A. Sheptyts'koho," *Dilo*, 23 June 1939, 3.
208. Thus, for example, laudatory articles about him were published annually on the occasion of his name day (13 December; i.e., 30 November according to the Julian calendar) not only by the archeparchial weekly *Meta*, but also by the secular Ukrainian press, and even routine references to him were couched in a reverential tone. After he had been criticized in the Polish Sejm, mass meetings and demonstrations were held in his defense by Galician Ukrainians as well as by some Orthodox Volhynians (see a series of reports in *Dilo* for February and March 1938 under the general title "V oboroni Tserkvy ta ii Holovy").
209. For details, see Myroslava M. Mudrak, "Sheptyts'kyi as Patron of the Arts," in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magocsi, 300.
210. One of these was the National Hospital (*Narodnia Lichnytsia*), which was originally intended to bear St. Josaphat's name ("Posviachennia Shpytalia im. Mytropolyta Andreia," *Meta*, 17 April 1938, 1).

211. See Kedryn, *Zhyttia—podii—liudy*, 318; and Ivan Nimchuk, *595 dnyv soviets'kym viaznem* (Toronto, 1950), 12.
212. *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 1939–1941, 145–46.
213. For details, see Bohdan Budurowycz, *Polish-Soviet Relations, 1932–1939* (New York, 1963).
214. An insightful discussion of this multifaceted process is given in Keith Sword, ed., *The Soviet Takeover of the Polish Eastern Provinces, 1939–41* (London, 1991).
215. For details, see B. M. Babii, *Vozz'iednannia Zakhidnoi Ukraïny z Ukraïns'koiu RSR* (Kyiv, 1954); and H. I. Lomov, *Narodni zbory Zakhidnoi Ukraïny* (Lviv, 1959).
216. See, for example, the article by F. Iastrebov, “Uniats'ke dukhivnytstvo na sluzhbi u pol'skoho panstva,” published in the Kyiv daily *Komunist* on 9 October 1939 and subsequently reprinted in the Western Ukrainian press, as quoted in “Bol'shevytska relihiina polityka v Zakhidnii Ukraïni,” in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy, IX. 1939–VI. 1941*, ed. Milena Rudnyts'ka, 117–18 (New York, 1958).
217. The text of the declaration is given in Bunchenko, *Pravda pro uniiu*, 291–93.
218. In this connection, see, for example, Andrei Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia Myropolyta Andreia z chasiv bol'shevyts'koi okupatsii* (Yorkton, Sask., 1961), 4; and Bunchenko, *Pravda pro uniiu*, 293. On the division and subsequent collectivization of Church lands, see “Bol'shevytska relihiina polityka,” 119.
219. “Bol'shevytska relihiina polityka,” 120; see also “Martyrolohiia ukraïns'koho dukhovenstva pid panuvanniam bol'shevykiv,” in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnyts'ka, 139. Sheptyts'kyi's appeal to Nikita Khrushchev (then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine) seems to have eased this situation (*ibid.*, 142).
220. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koi okupatsii*, 4–5 and 10.
221. *Ibid.*, 11 and 67. In order to alleviate this situation, Sheptyts'kyi tried to recruit new candidates for the priesthood and organized informal courses of instruction to train them for that purpose (*ibid.*, 13 and 17–18), but the response to his efforts was less than encouraging (see *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 440).
222. The ordeal of the Greek Catholic monks and monasteries in Galicia during the first Soviet occupation (September 1939–June 1941) is vividly described by Marko M. Dyrda (himself a Basilian monk) in “Shliakhom sviashchenyka: 1933–1946,” in *Na Khrystovii nyvi* (New York, 1978), 26–61.
223. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koi okupatsii*, 36–37.

Similar sentiments were also expressed in the metropolitan's message of 19 March 1940 to all Greek Catholic nuns in Galicia (ibid., 39–40).

224. In this connection see, for example, John-Paul Himka, *The Greek Catholic Church and Ukrainian Society in Austrian Galicia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1986).
225. See Bohdan R. Bociurkiw, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church under the Soviet Occupation of 1939–1941," in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magocsi, 102 and 118n7.
226. Ibid., 102–3. Interestingly enough, Sheptyts'kyi used the same article, which also recognized freedom of conscience and guaranteed freedom of religious worship for all citizens, as his chief weapon in arguing, in his letter addressed to the provincial department of education in Lviv, that the spirit of the constitution was being violated by those who were turning schools into tools of atheistic propaganda and that this, in turn, was bound to impair the prestige of the Soviet regime (Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsii*, 44–46).
227. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsii*, 17.
228. See, for example, Dyrda, "Shliakhom sviashchenyka," 52 and 55.
229. Thus, for example, in one of the letters addressed to his clergy Sheptyts'kyi referred to the article "Glava uniiatov," published in the Moscow weekly *Bezbozhnik* of 11 April 1940, which contained a number of personal accusations against him—see his *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsii*, 60.
230. In this connection, see a detailed account of the attitude of the Soviet authorities toward Bishop Khomyshyn and his associates, the gradual seizure of the property of the Stanyslaviv eparchy, and the bishop's reaction to these developments, in Avksentii Boichuk (the rector of the Greek Catholic theological seminary in Stanyslaviv), "Moï perezhyvannia pid bol'shevykamy: 1939–1940," in *Na Khrystovii nyvi*, 105–56.
231. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsii*, 1–2.
232. Ibid., 75–76.
233. Ibid., 15.
234. Ibid., 16.
235. Boichuk, "Moï perezhyvannia," 115–18.
236. *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 424.
237. See Stepan Biliak, "V sitiakh NKVD," in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnytska, 415–16; and Olena Viter, "47 dopytiv Materi Ihumeni," ibid., 399–403.

238. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsiï*, 62 and 63.
239. See Sheptyts'kyi's letter of 26 December 1939 to Eugène Cardinal Tisserant, Secretary of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches, in *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 172.
240. Sheptyts'kyi refers to the pope's refusal to grant his request in his letter to Pope Pius XII of 29–31 August 1942 (*Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 629).
241. In this connection, see Budurowycz, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian National Movement," 60.
242. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsiï*, 6–8.
243. *Ibid.*, 61.
244. See pt. 3 of this article; and Senytsia, *Svityl'nyk istyny*, pt. 1, 198–99.
245. See pt. 4 of this article; *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 565–66; and Bociurkiw, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church," 108–9.
246. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsiï*, 12–13.
247. *Ibid.*, 43.
248. *Ibid.*, 19–20, 21–24, 43, 44–46, 53–54, 59–61.
249. *Ibid.*, 24 and 56.
250. This synod (2 May–20 December 1940), which developed from regular Thursday conferences of the clergy held at the metropolitan's residence, adopted thirty-one decrees as well as many rules and regulations; it was concerned primarily with theological, pastoral, and organizational problems (see Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsiï*, 33–36, 62–66, and 68–71). Another synod was convoked in the spring of 1941, but it was unable to complete its work because of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. The rules that it adopted are listed in Sheptyts'kyi's *Pys'ma-poslannia Mytropolyta Andreia Sheptyts'koho ChSVV z chasiv nimets'koï okupatsiï* (Yorkton, Sask., 1969), 106–117. For a more comprehensive discussion of both synods, see Bociurkiw, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church," 110–12.
251. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsiï*, 68 and 75. These figures increased dramatically on the eve and during the first days of the German-Soviet war, with some twelve priests murdered or presumed dead and thirty-three imprisoned and deported in the Lviv archeparchy alone, close to twenty victims among the clergy of the Przemyśl eparchy, while the Church's losses in the Stanyslaviv eparchy amounted to three priests killed and eight imprisoned and deported. See *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 425, 439, and 491.

252. Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv bol'shevyts'koï okupatsii*, 72–73.
253. Iaroslav S. Stets'ko, 30 chervnia 1941: *Proholoshennia vidnovlennia derzhavnosti Ukraïny* (Toronto, 1967), 186–87.
254. See Sheptyts'kyi's rather caustic comments in *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 492.
255. "Bol'shevyts'ka relihiina polityka," in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnyts'ka, 123.
256. Bociurkiw, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church," 105; see also Bishop Khomyshyn's statement that only 3 of over 500 priests in his eparchy abandoned the Catholic faith (*Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 424).
257. "Bol'shevyts'ka relihiina polityka," 123.
258. For details, see Vlasovs'kyi, *Narys istorii Ukraïns'koï Pravoslavnoi Tserkvy*, vol. 4, pt. 2 (1966), 196–98.
259. *Ibid.*, 198.
260. Bociurkiw, "Sheptyts'kyi and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church," 114–15 and 116; see also "Bol'shevyts'ka relihiina polityka," 133–35; and Dyrda, "Shliakhom sviashchentyka," 93.
261. See *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 424, 439, and 491–92; and "Martyrolohiia ukraïnskoho dukhovenstva," in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnyts'ka, 140–41.
262. For details, see Mykhailo Rosliak, "Masakra v tiurni 'Brygidky,'" in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnyts'ka, 441–44; M. P., "Tyzhden' chervonoho zhakhu u L'vovi," in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnyts'ka, 465–70; "Likvidatsiia verkhivky," in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnyts'ka, 471–76; and "Kryvavyi tanok," in *Zakhidnia Ukraïna pid bol'shevykamy*, ed. Rudnyts'ka, 477–92.
263. See, for example, Sheptyts'kyi's remarks about this situation in *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 492.
264. The text of Sheptyts'kyi's pastoral letter is given in Kost' Pan'kiv's'kyi, *Vid derzhavy do komitetu* (New York and Toronto, 1957), 112–13. The circumstances under which the metropolitan delegated Archbishop Slipyi to represent him during the meeting of the "National Assembly" on 30 June 1941 are discussed in Stets'ko, *30 chervnia 1941*, 186.
265. See "Blahoslovennia Iepyskopa Hryhoriia Khomyshyna samostiinii Ukraïns'kii Derzhavi vidnovlenni 30 chervnia 1941 r.," in *Al'manakh Stanyslavivs'koï zemli*, 2:7.

266. See Khomyshyn and Sheptyts'kyi's letters to Msgr. Angelo Rotta of 6 and 30 August 1941 in *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 1, 423–25 and 437–42.
267. In this connection, see, for example, Pan'kiv's'kyi, *Vid derzhavy do komitetu*, 87.
268. *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 627.
269. Pan'kiv's'kyi, *Vid derzhavy do komitetu*, 42; and Bunchenko, *Pravda pro uniiu*, 301–2.
270. On Sheptyts'kyi's role in this body, see Pan'kiv's'kyi, *Vid derzhavy do komitetu*, 73 and 86–87.
271. For the text of these letters, see Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv nimets'koï okupatsii*, 339–42; and Baran, *Mytropolyt Andrei Sheptyts'kyi*, 123–24, 127–28, and 130–31.
272. Germany, Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete, microcopy no. T-454, roll no. 92, doc. EAP 99/434. For a Ukrainian translation, see Taras Hunchak [Hunczak] and Roman Sol'chanyk [Solchanyk], eds., *Ukrains'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka v 20 stolitti: Dokumenty i materialy*, vol. 3 (n.p., 1983), 44–47.
273. *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 625–29.
274. See, for example, the article “Bozha kara,” *Meta*, 13 December 1936, 2, by Reverend Iosyf Ostashev's'kyi, a regular contributor to that paper and in 1943–1944 a professor at the Greek Catholic Theological Academy in Lviv.
275. *Chwila* (Lviv), 31 July 1935, as quoted in “Cholobytnia Zhydivs'koï Hromady u L'vovi Mytropolytovi Sheptyts'komu,” *Dilo*, 1 August 1935, 1; and “Zhydivs'ka Hromada u L'vovi—Mytropolytovi Andreievi Sheptyts'komu,” *Meta*, 11 August 1935, 1.
276. Shimon Redlich, “Sheptyts'kyi and the Jews during World War II,” in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magocsi, 156; and Kurt I. Lewin, “Metropolitan Andrei Sheptyts'kyi during the Years 1942–1944: Recollections of an Eyewitness,” in *Morality and Reality*, ed. Magocsi, 499.
277. While the actual text of this letter has not yet been found, Kost' Pan'kiv's'kyi gives its contents in *Roky nimets'koï okupatsii* (New York and Toronto, 1965), 29–30; and Sheptyts'kyi himself refers to it in his report to Pope Pius XII dated 29–31 August 1942 (*Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 628).
278. The text of this letter is given in Sheptyts'kyi's *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv nimets'koï okupatsii*, 222–31.
279. In this connection, see Poland, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, *Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne z Ziemi Wschodnich za pierwszy kwartał 1943 r.* (Sprawozdanie no. 5/43; London, 1943), 54.

280. Ibid., 55.
281. Ibid., 85.
282. Edward Prus, "Cerkiew greckokatolicka w okresie wojny i okupacji hitlerowskiej," *Śląskie Studia Historyczne* 1 (1975): 76.
283. See Poland, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, *Sprawozdanie Delegata Rządu za pierwszy kwartał 1942 r.*, pt. 2, no. 5/42 (Sprawozdanie no. 5/42; London, 1942), 263.
284. Prus, "Cerkiew greckokatolicka," 74.
285. Poland, Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych, *Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne z kraju od 26 sierpnia do 10 października 1942 r.* (Sprawozdanie no. 1-a/43; London, 1943), 23; and *Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne z Ziemi Wschodnich za pierwszy kwartał 1943 r.*, 100.
286. In this connection, see, for example, the statements made by the governor-general of occupied Poland, Hans Frank, in *Das Diensttagebuch des deutschen Generalgouverneurs in Polen 1939–1945*, ed. Werner Präg and Wolfgang Jacobmeyer (Stuttgart, 1975), 458 and 542.
287. See *Raport sytuacyjny okupacji niemieckiej za czas od 29. VII.–30. VIII. 40 r.* (London 1941), 20; *Materiał o sytuacji w kraju w okresie od 1 listopada 1941 roku do 15. I. 1942 roku* (London, 1942), 55; and *Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne z Ziemi Wschodnich za pierwszy kwartał 1943 r.*, 30.
288. The state of anarchy prevailing at that time in Volhynia and parts of Galicia is described in Sheptytskyi's letter to Cardinal Tisserant of 8 May 1943 (*Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 790–91).
289. See Pańkivskyi, *Roky nimets'koï okupatsii*, 224; and John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (New York, 1963), 173.
290. On Sheptytskyi's attitude to the Division, see Wolf-Dietrich Heike, *Sie wollten die Freiheit: Die Geschichte der Ukrainischen Division 1943–1945* (Dornheim/H., n.d.), 16; Roman Krokhamaliuk, *Zahrava na Skhodi: Spohady i dokumenty z pratsi u Viis'kovii Upravi "Halychyna" v 1943–1945 rokakh* (Toronto and New York, 1978), 24 and 278; and Budurowycz, "Sheptytskyi and the Ukrainian National Movement," 65–66 and 74nn102–3.
291. See Ivan Hryn'okh, *Sluha Bozhyi Andrei—blahovisnyk iednosty* (Munich, 1961), 23–24; and *Le Saint Siège*, pt. 2, 190–91.
292. Sheptytskyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv nimets'koï okupatsii*, 230.
293. For the text of this letter, see *ibid.*, 417–25.

294. Ibid., 440–43.
295. *Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne z Ziemi Wschodnich*, no. 5/44 (London, 1944), 33.
296. *Sprawozdanie sytuacyjne z Ziemi Wschodnich*, no. 10/44 (London, 1944), 50.
297. Ibid., 62.
298. Hryn'okh, *Sluha Bozhyi Andrei*, 23.
299. For the text of the declaration, see Hunchak and Sol'chanyk, eds., *Ukrains'ka suspil'no-politychna dumka*, 3:95–96.
300. “Obov'iazok dushpastyriv lyshatysia v parokhii i v naitiazhchykh khvylynakh,” in Sheptyts'kyi, *Pys'ma-poslannia . . . z chasiv nimets'koï okupatsii*, 433–35; see also Hryn'okh, *Sluha Bozhyi Andrei*, 22–23.