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SERHIY BILENKY

THE CLASH OF MENTAL GEOGRAPHIES: POLES ON UKRAINE, UKRAINIANS ON POLAND IN THE TIME OF ROMANTICISM¹

After the final disappearance of Poland from the map of Europe in 1795, Poles were forced to reinterpret their historical understanding of a “gentry nation” as a “community of tradition and spirit” beyond existing political and social borders.² This redefinition of a nationality could have led to a similar redefinition or at least to an initial confusion of a traditional Polish geography. But this did not happen. Instead, Poles clung to the familiar patterns of geography, keeping in mind what had disappeared from political maps. The most complicated part of post-partitioned Polish geography was the territory of present-day Ukraine, which was also the focal point of the Polish-Russian political encounter. In what follows I will explore the Polish mental map of Ukraine and the Ukrainian idea of Poland’s geography during the 1830s-1840s.³ Both maps appeared to be incompatible as both claimed the same territory. Despite the fact that Poles included the large portions of present-day Ukraine in their concept of a historical “Polish nation,” they often regarded the population living between the Carpathian Mountains and the Don River as united by ethno-linguistic, religious, and historical criteria. While the Polish vision of Ukraine’s geography reflected the concept of Poland’s historical borders, Ukrainian mental geography was based rather on the criteria of Romantic ethnography. I will also deal with the functions of the Ukrainian map in Polish political imagination and the Polish map in the Ukrainian Romantic mindset.

¹ The author thanks the anonymous reviewer for the valuable comments, which the author has tried to address in this revised version of his paper.

² Andrzej Walicki, *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood. Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1989), p. 103.

³ The chronological framework of this paper is defined by the Polish November uprising of 1830-1831 and by the events predating the Spring of the Peoples in 1848. The uprising constituted the turning point in the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian relations whereas the events of 1848 once again reconfigured the political conditions in Eastern Europe. Therefore, the latter developments are left outside the scope of this article.

THE POLISH VISION

The region of the Polish-Russian-Ukrainian encounter, which is now known as Right Bank Ukraine, was mapped differently in Polish and Russian mental geographies during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the official imperial discourse, this territory was called the South Western Region [*Юго-Западный край*] or the South Western provinces [*Юго-Западные губернии*], referring to the geographical placement within the Russian Empire. In the Polish mind of the mid-nineteenth century, this area still constituted *województwa wschodnio-południowe Rzeczy Pospolitej* [the south-eastern palatinates of the Polish Republic].⁴ The radical émigré Maurycy Mochnacki referred to Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia as *Ruś* [Ruthenia], which was for him “the third main constitutive element of Poland.”⁵ Another émigré called the same territory (even in a bigger volume) *Ruś lechicka* [Polish Ruthenia], the cradle of East Slavic civilization as opposed to despotic “Muscovy.”⁶

For both Russians and Poles, Right Bank Ukraine was an integral part of the two conflicting mental geographies that represented the Russian Empire and the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth respectively. Even after the disappearance of their state from political maps, Poles continued to think in geographical terms of a pre-partitioned Poland. Poles residing in Right Bank Ukraine usually treated it as a part of a larger Polish community (“a community of tradition and spirit” in the words of Andrzej Walicki) beyond existing political and administrative borders. Right Bank Ukraine was just one big piece of a larger homeland that encompassed three partitioned parts.

One of the most telling Polish understandings of “Ukrainian” geography can be found in Wincenty Pol’s famous poem, *Pieśń o ziemi naszej* [*The Song of Our Land*]. Pol described all the lands of a pre-partitioned Poland and paid a special attention to Galicia and Right Bank Ukraine. He used the same subdivisions and terms that had been circulating in the Polish geographical imagination for centuries, including *Ruś* (Galicia), *Wołyń*, *Ukraina*, *Podole*, and *Pobereże*, all of which are part of present-day

⁴ Gustav Olizar, *Pamiętniki 1798-1865* [Memoirs] (Lwów, 1892), p. 121.

⁵ Maurycy Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego 1830-1831* [*The Uprising of the Polish Nation, 1830-1831*] 2 vols. Vol. 2 (Warsaw, 1984), p. 454; compare the mental map of the most pro-Ukrainian associate of Adam Czartoryski Michał Czajkowski in his “Kilka słów o Rusinach w roku 1831” [*A Word or Two About the Ruthenians in 1831*] *Kraj i Emigracja* [*The Nation and the Emigration*], 9 (1839), p. 343.

⁶ Anon., “Zagajenie kursu literatury słowiańskiej przez pana Cypryana Roberta (22 grudnia 1846)” [*Remarks on the Course of Slavic Literature by Mr. Cypryan Robert (22 December 1846)*] in *Demokrata Polski* [*The Polish Democrat*] (Paris, 2 January 1847), p. 114.

Ukraine.⁷ The term *Ukraine* covered little more than a segment of land situated along the right bank of the Dnieper River and adjacent to the city of Kiev. The city itself belonged to Pol's "our land."⁸ These ideas about geography were fully shared by other Poles.

The prominent nineteenth-century writer Józef Ignacy Kraszewski also enumerated *Wołyń, Ukraina, Podole, and Pobereże*, along with *Litwa* and *Wielka Polska, as różne części dawniej Polski* [different parts of an old Poland].⁹ His conservative literary competitor Alexander Przędziecki traveled through the lakes, ravines, and steppes of *Wołyń, Ukraina, Podole, Pobereże, and Polesie*.¹⁰ For the radical literary critic Seweryn Goszczyński, Ukraine was "part of Poland" with its own "national" poets such as Bohdan Zaleski. Another region, *Podole*, could boast its own "national" poet Maurycy Gosławski.¹¹ To be sure, those poets could write both in Polish and in Ukrainian, though sharing Polish national consciousness.

In addition to these old regional divisions, regional identities became increasingly important for Poles throughout the nineteenth century.¹² The authors like Kraszewski even sought to compare and contrast specifically Polish "characters" from different regions, describing the images of a *Galicjanin, Koroniarz, Poznańczyk, Litwin, Podolak, Ukrainiec, and Wołyniak*.¹³ Even the great Polish poet Juliusz Słowacki acknowledged his own regional identity. Coming from Volhynia, he called himself a Volhynian

⁷ Wincenty Pol, *Pieśń o ziemi naszej*, in his *Wybór poezji* [Selected Poems] (Wrocław, 1963), pp. 181-183. The Polish literary and non-fictional sources dealing with Ukraine's mental geography are abundant; therefore I have selected those sources that represented certain geographical visions more explicitly and came from different discourses — political, poetic, critical, etc. Thus I discuss the views of Goszczyński and Pol rather than Słowacki or the "Ziewonia" group.

⁸ Pol, p. 193.

⁹ Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężka* [The Sorcerer's Lantern]. Series I (Kraków, 1964), pp. 320-325.

¹⁰ Alexander Przędziecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina. Obrazy miejsc i czasów* [Podole, Wołyń, Ukraine. Images of Places and Times] 2 vols. Vol. 2 (Wilno, 1841), pp. 10, 126.

¹¹ Seweryn Goszczyński, "Nowa epoka poezji polskiej" ["A New Age in Polish Poetry"] in his *Dzieła zbiorowe* [Collected Works], vol. III (Lwów, 1911), pp. 204, 219; idem, "Poezye Bohdana Zaleskiego" ["The Poetry of Bohdan Zaleski"] in his *Dzieła zbiorowe*, vol. III, p. 312.

¹² Tadeusz Łepkowski, "Poglądy na jedno- i wieloetniczność narodu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku" ["Early Nineteenth Century Views of the Unitary and Multiethnic Nature of the Polish Nation"] in Zofia Stefanowska, ed., *Swójskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej* [Familiarity and Foreignness in the History of Polish Culture] (Warsaw, 1973), p. 235.

¹³ Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężka*, p. 320.

[*Wołyniak*], an identity he maintained even while in emigration.¹⁴ In contrast, Kraszewski, who resided in Volhynia, called it “a foreign land,” considering himself instead a Lithuanian [*Litwin*].¹⁵ Even after years spent on his Volhynian estate, he admitted: *Nie, nie jestem jeszcze Wołyniakiem, mam serce litewskie* [No, I am not yet a Volhynian, I still have a Lithuanian heart].¹⁶

It is therefore not surprising that only those who were born and raised in *Ukraine*, such as Zaleski, Malczewski, and Goszczyński, could belong to the “Ukrainian school” in literature and not the likes of Słowacki, Kraszewski or Gosławski.¹⁷ Kraszewski even became an outspoken critic of the “Ukrainian school,” referring to Ukrainomania as a moral disease of the nineteenth century and rejecting Ukrainian topics in works of those who did not stem from the region. Elsewhere, by condemning the *moda Ukrainy* [Ukrainian fashion], he stated: *Bo ci co na Ukrainie nie byli, Ukrainą nie przeszli, jej życiem nie żyli, podań tylko w książkach szukają, [...] pisząc ukraińskie poezye, śmieszniemi się stają mody niewolnikami* [those who had never been to Ukraine, never crossed Ukraine, never lived its life, and who look for its lore only in books /.../, when writing Ukrainian poetry they become the laughable slaves of fashion].¹⁸ Instead, he appealed to look for poetry in other lands of historical Poland such as Great Poland, *Ruś* (Galicia), Mazovia, Polock, Smolensk, etc., thus charting his own historical map.

Everybody who came from the eastern borderlands of historical Poland knew the borders of those lands. For example, the borders of *Podole* included the Zbruch and Dniester Rivers to the west, the Iahorlyk and Kodyma to the south, and the Ukrainian steppes to the north-east.¹⁹ *Ukraina*, or *polska Ukraina* [Polish Ukraine], as Seweryn Goszczyński put it, was surrounded by the Dnieper River on the east, the Boh [Southern Bug] on the west, Volhynia in the north, and the Kherson steppes to the south.²⁰ Another

¹⁴ Juliusz Słowacki, *Dziela* [Works], vol. 11: *Listy do matki* [Letters to His Mother] (Wrocław, 1949), p. 204.

¹⁵ Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Listy do rodziny 1820-1863* [Letters to His Family 1820-1863]. Part I: *W kraju* [In Poland] (Kraków, 1982), p. 94.

¹⁶ Kraszewski, *Listy do rodziny 1820-1863*, p. 165.

¹⁷ Edward Dembowski, however, treated Gosławski as belonging to the “Ukrainian school.” See Edward Dembowski, “Myśli o rozwijaniu się piśmienności naszej w XIX stuleciu” [“Thoughts on the Development of Our Literature in the XIXth Century”] in his *Pisma* [Writings]. 5 vols. Vol. 3 (Warsaw, 1955), p. 5.

¹⁸ Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, “Studia literackie,” [“Literary Studies”] in his *Wybór Pism*. Section X (Warsaw, 1894), p. 238.

¹⁹ Przędziecki, *Podole*, p. 96.

²⁰ Seweryn Goszczyński, “Kilka słów o Ukrainie i rzezi humańskiej. Przedmowa do ‘Zamku Kaniowskiego’” [“A Few Words About Ukraine and the Human

Polish observer simply identified Ukraine with the Kiev province [*Kijowska Gubernia*] of the Russian Empire, although he stated that once Ukraine also included areas adjacent to the Black Sea coast, such as New Russia and Bessarabia.²¹

This “Ukraine”²² within the Russian Empire consisted of the two former provinces of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that is, Kiev and part of Bratslav (Braclaw in Polish). Despite subsequent changes in political and administrative boundaries, Polish mental geography has not changed much since the seventeenth century; even as late as the 1950s and 1960s Polish scholars used the names *Wołyń*, *Ukraina*, and *Podole* with respect to the contemporary Right Bank Ukraine, as if their readers were able to find them on an actual map.

As an addition to the fragmented territory of present-day Right Bank Ukraine, the sources alluded to the existence of two Ukraines; one was called Polish or Transdnieper Ukraine,²³ the other Russian/Eastern or again Transdnieper Ukraine, depending on which bank of the Dnieper the observer lived.²⁴ The historical vision of these two Ukraines was summarized by the conservative critic Michał Grabowski: In the second half of the eighteenth century Ukraine *nie tworzyła jedyngo ciała* [did not constitute one body], the part situated on the left bank of the Dnieper, after the abolition of the Hetmanate, was added to Great Russia, whereas the Right Bank remained in Poland.²⁵ Most often, however, the territory of the former Hetmanate on the left bank of the Dnieper River was called Little Russia (*Małorossja* or *Hetmańszczyzna* in Polish) as was the official name for this territory in Russia.

massacre. Foreword to Kaniowski Castle” in his *Dzieła zbiorowe* [Collected works], vol. III, p. 381.

²¹ Michał Grabowski, *Ukraina dawna i teraźniejsza* [Ukraine: Past and Present] (Kiev, 1850), p. 8.

²² This very term — Ukraine — is ambiguous, since it could refer to different entities of various sizes and meanings. Therefore, when I use this term without italics, quotation marks or regional predicates it will refer to present-day Ukraine’s territory. In all other cases “Ukraine” means some specific region within Polish, Ukrainian, or Russian mental geographies.

²³ Goszczyński, “Kilka słów o Ukrainie,” p. 381; Przedziecki, *Podole*, p. 41; compare the mental map of a Russian writer of Polish origins Fadei Bulgarin (Tadeusz Bułharyn) in his novel *Mazepa. Powesti* [Mazepa. Tales] (Moscow, 1994), p. 189.

²⁴ Bulgarin, *Mazepa*, p. 189; compare the view of a local Ukrainian expert, Mykhailo Maksymovych, in his *Pis'ma o Kieve i vospominanie o Tavride* [Writings on Kiev and Memories of Tavride] (Saint Petersburg, 1871), p. 50.

²⁵ Michał Grabowski, “O pieśniach ukraińskich,” [“On Ukrainian Songs”] in his *Literatura i krytyka* [Literature and Criticism]. 3 vols. Vol. 3 (Wilno, 1838), p. 64.

In the 1840s, Polish émigrés in the circle of Prince Adam Czartoryski launched a number of projects that included the Left Bank “Little Russians” in different federations with Poland. One of them proposed the restoration of the Polish-Cossack Union at Hadiach concluded in 1658.²⁶ One prominent Czartoryski collaborator, Michał Czajkowski, sought out contacts with ethnic Ukrainians in Kiev coming from “the Transdnier Ukraine and the lands of the former Kiev and Bratslav palatinates [of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth].”²⁷

The members of Czartoryski’s circle usually differentiated between the “Ruthenian” cause, which concerned the “Polish” lands of Right Bank Ukraine, and the “Cossack” cause, the latter title being reserved for the Left Bank Ukrainians who resided outside Polish national borders.²⁸ They also divided present-day Ukrainian territory into *Ukraina przeddnieprzańska* [Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper River], Volhynia, Podolia, and *Ukraina zadnieprzańska* [the Transdnier Ukraine], which were to become more or less loosely federated with Poland.²⁹ For Czajkowski, Kiev was to be a focal point in the armed uprising of Poles and Ukrainians against Russian rule.³⁰ Another collaborator of Prince Adam, Franciszek Duchński, defined Little Russia [*Mala Ruś*] in 1848 as three provinces of the Russian Empire — Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv — and suggested that Little Russia “must constitute a separate state [*osobne państwo*].”³¹

Other regions of present-day Ukraine were also sometimes present in the Polish geographical imagination, depending on whether they played a role in Polish history or in contemporary everyday experience. For example, New Russia was linked historically to the domain of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that allegedly possessed those lands, including the city of Odessa (then Hadzhibej), once

²⁶ Marcelli Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*. 2 vols. Vol. 1 (Warsaw, 1948), p. 303.

²⁷ Handelsman, vol. 2, p. 124.

²⁸ Andrzej Nowak, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Koncepcje polityczne i fantazje kręgu Adama Czartoryskiego (1832-1847)” [How to Break Apart the Russian Empire? Political Conceptions and Fantasies From the Circle of Adam Czartoryski (1832-1847)], *Studia Historyczne*, XXXIII, 2 (1990), p. 215.

²⁹ Nowak, p. 220; BC, rkps 5384 IV, p.104.

³⁰ BC, rkps 5384 IV, p. 155.

³¹ Duchński’s letter to Władysław Zamoyski is quoted in A.F. Grabski, “Na manowcach myśli historycznej. Historiografia Franciszka H. Duchńskiego” [In the Untracked Wilds of Historical Thought. The Historiography of Franciszek H. Duchński] in A.F. Grabski, *Perspektywy przeszłości. Studia i szkice historiograficzne* [Perspectives of the past. Historiographical Studies and Sketches] (Lublin, 1983), p. 244. In fact, this was one of the first statements in favor of Ukrainian independence (albeit limited regionally).

part of *Ukraina* or *Podole*.³² There was yet another affiliation of the Right-Bank Polish nobles with Odessa: their economic well-being was directly linked to Odessa's banks and seaport. The city itself became a very popular destination for both the business and leisure trips of local Poles (as seen from Korzeniowski's and Kraszewski's works). In a letter from 1843, Kraszewski described the multicultural spirit of the city and the presence of Poles there:

Sama Odessa, według mnie, jest na tym stopniu, że się już ruską zwać nie może, a jeszcze europejska nie jest. Ogromne, nad samym morzem ślicznie zbudowane miasto. Ma już wszystko, co za granicą mają: teatr włoski, francuski, niemiecki, asfaltowe trotuary, oświetlenie gazem itd. Jeden tylko kościół katolicki mały, choć katolików mnóstwo, magazyny i składy przepyszne, ale nad wszystko piękny port [...] Tego roku zjazd do kąpieli był niezmierny, najwięcej z naszych prowincji, do 300 familii...³³

[As I see it, Odessa itself is on such a level that it can no longer be called Russian though it is not yet European. This is a huge, beautifully built city along the very shore. It has everything that one finds abroad: an Italian theater, a French theater, a German theater, asphalt pavements, gas lighting etc. There is, however, only one small Catholic church, despite a great number of Catholics; the stores and warehouses are superb, but the most beautiful is the port /.../ This year, the number of bathers was enormous, predominantly from our provinces, up to 300 families].

It can be assumed that for Kraszewski contemporary Odessa was still situated in *Ukraina* or *Podole*. In a letter from Odessa he juxtaposed his current location, "here in Ukraine and Podolia," to "my place [Volhynia]," when comparing the harvests in both regions.³⁴ For Czartoryski's circle Odessa also had strategic importance. Odessa for them was immensely important in case of "blowing up" [*zburzenia*] the Russian fleet on the Black Sea, as Michał Czajkowski reported; otherwise the city would be lost for them right away. He also pointed to Odessa's financial resources: *tam są*

³² Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Wspomnienia Odessy, Jedysanu i Budżaku...* [*Memories of Odessa, Jedysan and Budżak*] 3 vols. Vol. 1 (Wilno, 1845), pp. 187-193; Grabowski, *Ukraina dawna* [*Old Ukraine*], p. 8.

³³ Kraszewski, *Listy do rodziny*, p. 114.

³⁴ Kraszewski, *Listy do rodziny*, p. 223.

pieniądze [there is money there].³⁵ By adding the Black Sea port of Odessa to their mental geography, Poles completed the conception of their country's "natural" borders from sea to sea. Paradoxically, it is due to the partitions and the incorporation into the Russian Empire that Poles not only received direct access to the Black Sea coast but also managed to place it on their mental maps.

A much more important question, however, was whether local Poles perceived the territory of present-day Ukraine (or at least its larger part) as a unified, contiguous area, and if so, what united it — its population, language, and history, or its political institutions? History itself united the right and left banks of the Dnieper River as the domain of Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi's Cossack State.³⁶ For Seweryn Goszczyński, this state included also the Kharkiv province.³⁷ For such an expert as Michał Grabowski, *Ukraine* was united with *Little Russia* and the Kharkiv region through folk traditions, which at the same time separated *plemiona małorossyjskie od wielkorossyjskich* [the Little Russian from Great Russian tribes].³⁸ For some Poles, like Gustav Olizar from Kiev, Kharkiv was not connected to Ukraine, being simply *moskiewskie miasto* [a Muscovite city].³⁹ These lands (especially those on the Right Bank) were also united in the Polish mind through their Ruthenian heritage and were called *ruskie kraje* [the Ruthenian lands] or *nasze prowincje ruskie* [our Ruthenian provinces].⁴⁰

When it came to the population within the borders of present-day Ukraine, nineteenth-century Poles seemed to be confused. There was no certainty whether the entire population of *Ukraina*, *Podole*, *Wołyń*, *Małorosja*, *Noworosja* and *Galicja* should be placed under the same name, and whether this population should be considered different from Poles, Belarusians, and Russians. For instance, the representative of the "Ukrainian school" in Polish literature, Seweryn Goszczyński, used a variety of terms without any hierarchical order, such as *lud* [folk], *kozacki lud* [Cossack folk], *ukraiński lud* [Ukrainian folk], *ruskie pospólstwo* [Ruthenian commoners], *Rusini* [Ruthenians], *Ukraińcy* [Ukrainians], and even *naród* [Cossack/Ukrainian nation].⁴¹ Characteristically, when Goszczyński spoke

³⁵ BC, rkps 5384 IV, p. 155.

³⁶ Goszczyński, "Kilka słów o Ukrainie," p. 382.

³⁷ Goszczyński, p. 382.

³⁸ Grabowski, "O pieśniach ukraińskich" ["On Ukrainian Songs"] pp. 108-109.

³⁹ Olizar, *Pamiętniki* [Memoirs], p. 37.

⁴⁰ Przewdziecki, *Podole*, p. 118; Grabowski, *Ukraina dawna*, p. 171. I translate the Polish term *ruski* as *Ruthenian* to avoid confusion with the Russian name *Rus'* (*Russian* in English) that referred to different lands and people.

⁴¹ Goszczyński, *Dziela zbiorowe*, vol. 3 (in particular his "Kilka słów o Ukrainie").

about the alleged aspirations of Haidamaks to establish a separate state, he used the more generic term *Rusini*, adding that the westernmost boundary of *udzielnego ruskiego państwa* [separate Ruthenian state] had to be the river Sluch in Volhynia.⁴²

Along with the traditional term *Rusini* another name, *Malorossjanie/Malorossyjski*, was used and almost overlapped with the meaning of today's "Ukrainians/Ukrainian."⁴³ Michał Grabowski wrote about the separate *naród Malorossyjski* [Little Russian nation] that originated among the Dnieper Cossacks.⁴⁴ The *chłopi Ukraińscy* [Ukrainian peasants] were therefore ethnically related to the "Little Russian nation," since they also were the descendants of the Zaporozhians and Cossacks.⁴⁵ Thus, the Cossack history united Right Bank Ukrainian peasants with the Left Bank "Little Russian aristocracy."⁴⁶

There were examples when Poles from the *kresy* could also be called *Rusini*, or even *Malorusini*, as was the case with the ethnically Polish writer Ignacy Krasicki whom Mickiewicz once called *z przyrodzenia prawdziwym Rusinem południowym* [a real Southern Ruthenian] who was *Malorusin w obyczajach, w powierzchowności* [a Little Russian in habits and appearance].⁴⁷

The term *Ukrainian* was even more ambiguous. Spyrydon Ostaszewski, a Pole from just outside the Right Bank Ukrainian city of Uman', wrote in Ukrainian and manifested his belonging to Ukrainians ("We, Ukrainians..."). He hoped that "our Ukrainian people" would understand him.⁴⁸ Ostaszewski did not separate his regional identity as a Ukrainian (he could remain a Pole as well) from ethnic Ukrainians in his midst. The term *Ukrainian*, however, was more often used with respect to Polish nobles residing in Ukraine.⁴⁹ In some cases, however, the term *Ukrainian* designated ethnic Ukrainians exclusively: one could admire

⁴² Goszczyński, "Kilka słów o Ukrainie," p. 384.

⁴³ Kraszewski, *Wspomniena Odessy*, pp. 42, 44.

⁴⁴ Grabowski, "O pieśniach ukraińskich," pp. 25-29.

⁴⁵ Grabowski, p. 64.

⁴⁶ Grabowski, p. 30.

⁴⁷ Quoted from: Stanisław Lempicki, "Dlaczego Mickiewicz nazwał Krasickiego Rusinem?" ["Why did Mickiewicz call Krasicki a Ruthenian?"] *Pamiętnik Literacki*, XXXIII (Lwów, 1936), p. 378.

⁴⁸ See Ostaszewski's introduction to his collection of fairy tales "Pivkupy kazok" ["Bunch of Fairytales"] (1850), published in Roman Kyrchiv, ed., *Ukrains'koiu muzoiu natkhneni* [Inspired by the Ukrainian Muse] (Kiev, 1971), pp. 174-175.

⁴⁹ Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężska*, pp. 321-322; Józef Korzeniowski, "Emeryt" ["In retirement"] *Dzieła Józefa Korzeniowskiego* [Works of Józef Korzeniowski], vol. 2 (Kraków, 1871), p. 428.

romanse elegijne Ukraińca [elegiac romances of a Ukrainian],⁵⁰ or compare *różnice charakteru* [differences of temperament] of a Mazurian, Samogitian, and Ukrainian. In these examples Ukrainians referred to Orthodox peasants or Cossacks from a so-called Polish Ukraine, which effectively coincided with the Kiev province of the Russian Empire.

Grabowski invested the name *Ukrainian* with a broader meaning: he called Gogol *pierwszy Ukraiński pisarz* [the first Ukrainian writer] and identified him with *Małorossyjska literatura* [Little Russian literature].⁵¹ One might speculate about who had more rights to be called Ukrainian, the Russian-Ukrainian Gogol or the Polish-Ukrainian Grabowski. Perhaps the concept *Ukrainian* in the nineteenth century was contested ground for people with different loyalties: being Ukrainian did not prevent them from being simultaneously Polish or Russian. Michał Grabowski became acutely aware of this dual meaning of Ukrainian identity. During his stay in Kiev in 1839 he was pleasantly surprised to discover that *w literaturze rosyjskiej jest osobna szkoła ukraińska, tak jak i u nas* [there is a separate Ukrainian school in Russian literature as there is in ours]. He added: *teraz właśnie poznaję się z doskonałym pisarzem tej szkoły Hoholem; jakoż w moim prospekcie dołożyłem, że wybierać będziemy do tłumaczeń płody poetyckie, wyjaśniające charakter i narodowe oblicze rozmaitych Rusi*. [Now, I am getting acquainted with the superb writer from this school, Gogol; as I set out in my prospect, we will choose for translation the poetic works that illustrate the character and national physiognomy of different Rus' countries].⁵²

Within both Polish and Russian cultures, "Ukrainians" developed separate literary schools and gained general acceptance. There was however, a very small group of intelligentsia personified by Taras Shevchenko and Panteleimon Kulish who aspired for an exclusive representation of Ukraine, thus making Polish and Russian "Ukrainians" much less relevant. But even they did not sever the connections with competing Ukrainian projects on the Polish and Russian sides. Thus, Shevchenko and his peers had to forcibly

⁵⁰ See Tadeusz Krępowiecki's speech on November 29, 1832 in W. Łukasiewicz, W. Lewandowski et al. eds., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna: Wybór źródeł* [Progressive Journalism in Emigration: a Choice of Source-Works] (Wrocław, 1961), p. 56; *Okólniki Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego. Od 13 listopada 1837r. do 25 grudnia 1838r.* [Circulars of the Polish Democratic Association, from November 13, 1837 to December 25, 1838] (Poitiers, 1838). *Okólnik* 8, p. 136.

⁵¹ Michał Grabowski, *O gminnych ukraińskich podaniach* [On Ukrainian folktales] (Wilno, 1845), pp. 183, 204.

⁵² Adam Bar, ed., *Michała Grabowskiego listy literackie* [The letters of Michał Grabowski on Literary Themes], in *Archiwum do dziejów literatury i oświaty w Polsce* [Archives for the History of Literature and Education in Poland] series II, vol. III (Kraków, 1934), p. 92.

conform to Russian culture; at the same time they maintained links with fellow “Ukrainian” Poles (the best example was Kulish’s friendship with Michał Grabowski, or Shevchenko’s appreciation of Bohdan Zaleski’s poetry).⁵³

Polish émigré groups, both the conservative Hôtel Lambert, and the democratic Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie (TDP), were well aware of the unity of the population of present-day Ukraine. In his geopolitical plans, Michał Czajkowski united Galicia and *Ruś* (Ukrainian lands within the Russian Empire) into one strategic region, or “agency,” trying to reach out to the “leaders of Galician Rus” and “Ruthenian society” in Kharkiv.⁵⁴ While characterizing *lud ruski* [the Ruthenian folk] the TDP members called Ukraine “the center of nationality” for Ruthenians.⁵⁵ One of the regional sections of the TDP understood Ruthenian territory as stretching from Galicia to the Dnieper River, which, despite religious differences (the Uniates versus the Orthodox), was populated by the same people:

Większa połowa Galicyi i część dawniejszego zaboru Moskwy pod imieniem Wołynia, Ukrainy i Podola, zamieszкана jest przez włościan znanych pod imieniem Rusinów. Religia w tej części Galicyi uniacka, na Wołyniu, Ukrainie i Podolu najwięcej schyzmatyków, reszta uniatów.⁵⁶

[The bigger part of Galicia and the parts of the old Moscow partition called Volhynia, Ukraine, and Podolia are populated by our peasants known by the name of Ruthenians. The religion in that part of Galicia is Uniate, in Volhynia, Ukraine, and Podolia there is the majority of the Orthodox, the rest are the Uniates].

Simultaneously, TDP members “separated” the Belarusian lands from the Ruthenians and, instead, united the former with ethnic Lithuania,

⁵³ Hrabovych, *Do istoriï ukrains’koï literatury* [For a History of Ukrainian Literature] (Kiev, 1997), p. 154; Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv* [Complete Works], vol. 6 (Kiev, 1966), p. 104.

⁵⁴ BC, rkps 5397, p. 54, 91; rkps 5490 II, p. 467. In this case *Ruś* refers to the Ukrainian lands within the Russian Empire. In general, Poles distinguished between Galicia (formerly known as the *Ruś* palatinate) and Russia’s Ukrainian lands but often, especially when speaking about the local Orthodox and Uniate population, they referred to both Galicia and Russia’s Ukraine as *Ruś* (in contrast to *Moskwa*).

⁵⁵ They wrote about *lud ruski, którego środkiem narodowości jest Ukraina*. See *Okólniki Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego. Okólnik 8*, p. 145.

⁵⁶ *Okólnik 8*, p. 139.

since the long-lasting union with Lithuania apparently made Belarusans closer to Lithuania than to Ruthenians.⁵⁷ The members of the TDP Toulouse section presented an even larger “Ruthenian” space. Their territory of Ruthenian folk, this time consisting of Ukrainians and Belarusans, stretched from Congress Poland in the west to well beyond the Dnieper in the east, a concept that fit well with Ukrainian vision of geography:

Pamiętać to należy, że lud ten [Rusini] składa masę mieszkańców w prowincjach wcielonych do Moskwy, jak oto: na Litwie, Wołyniu, Podolu i Ukrainie; że jego szczepek nie tylko stanowi większą część ludności Galicyi, nie tylko ma swoje gałęzie w królestwie kongresowym, ale jeszcze się daleko po za Dniepr rozciąga.⁵⁸

[One must remember that this folk constitutes the mass of inhabitants of the provinces incorporated to Russia, such as: in Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Ukraine; that its kin not only constitutes the majority population in Galicia, not only has its branches in the Congress Poland but also stretches far beyond the Dnieper].

Poles also were aware of a particular language that was native to all Orthodox and Uniate (non-Polish) Ruthenians/Little Russians/Ukrainians. This language was often called *malorossyjska mowa* [the Little Russian tongue],⁵⁹ *malorusko-kozacki język* [the Little Russian-Cossack language],⁶⁰ or *ruski* [the Ruthenian language], as opposed to *moskiewski rządowy* [the Muscovite governmental] idiom.⁶¹ Finally, one could speak *po ukraińsku* [in Ukrainian].⁶²

Poles, however, seemed to be stuck between the recognition of the Otherness of an exotic “Cossack nation” and the inclusion of Cossacks in Polish historical narratives. It seems that Poles divided Ukraine once again on their mental map: they could not help including the right-bank Ukrainian peasants, as *nasz lud* [our people] or *nasz gmin* [our peasants], into the hierarchical order of a prospective Polish nation-state, in which Polish-speaking Catholic nobles presided over the ethnically and religiously mixed peasant population. At the same time, they seemed to be ready to recognize a historical Cossack nation, especially its Little Russian incarnation that

⁵⁷ *Okólnik* 8, p. 140.

⁵⁸ *Okólnik* 8, p. 145.

⁵⁹ Grabowski, *O gminnych*, p. 193.

⁶⁰ Goszczyński, “Nowa epoka poezji Polskiej,” p. 208.

⁶¹ Olizar, *Pamiętniki*, p. 177.

⁶² Grabowski, “O pieśniach ukraińskich,” p. 117.

managed to maintain its own state on the left bank of the Dnieper, the Hetmanate, with its own aristocracy. The Hetmanate's political culture and folklore were not part of historical Poland and could be left either to the Little Russians themselves or to their contemporary masters, the Great Russians.⁶³

One of the main functions of Ukraine's map in the Polish geographical imagination was to separate historical Poland from the Russian Empire (often perceived as a monstrous entity ruled by the German dynasty of despots).⁶⁴ Geographical and historical legitimism seemed to confirm that separation. For example, the famous Catholic democrat Józef Ordega alluded to the times of the early medieval Polish king Bolesław Chrobry [the Brave] whose "Catholic army" supposedly brought "the light of Christ to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea [*do Bałtyku i Euxynu*]."⁶⁵ An anonymous author of the periodical *Demokrata Polski* [The Polish Democrat] called for the restoration of the ancient *federacja lechicka* [Polish federation] of Bolesław "Wielki" [the Great] *od Odry do Dniepra, od Bałtyku do Dunaju* [from the Oder River to the Dnieper, and from the Baltic to the Danube], including the lands of Silesia, Bohemia, and Moravia.⁶⁶ These were the attempts to legitimize geographical fantasies and to make "natural" borders look more "historical." In addition, these views emphasized the Polish connection of Ukraine (as Polish *Ruś*) while separating it from Russia.

Sometimes, however, separation gave way to connection. Put another way, the Polish conception of *Ruś* including Right Bank Ukraine and Kiev, being the watershed between Poland and Russia, could also become a uniting point of these two historical powers. Often sympathetic to Russia, Joachim Lelewel, sought to reach out to Russians by pointing to the Ruthenians: *Bracia Rosjanie! Braćmi Was zowiemy, boście braćmi z imienia samego ziomków naszych Rusinów* [Brother Russians! We call you brothers because you are our brothers through the very name of our compatriots,

⁶³ Michał Czajkowski, however, obsessed with Ukrainian Cossacks, still hoped to include Little Russia's "Cossack nation" in a federation with Poland.

⁶⁴ This topic has been extensively explored by Andrzej Nowak. See his *Między carem a rewolucją* [Between the Tsar and Revolution] and *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1733-1921)* [How to Break Apart the Russian Empire? The Ideas of Polish Eastern Politics (1733-1921)] (Warsaw, 1995.)

⁶⁵ Józef Ordega, *O narodowości Polskiej z punktu widzenia katolicyzmu i postępu* [On Polish Nationalism From the Perspective of Catholicism and Progress] (Paris, 1840), p. 78.

⁶⁶ Anon., "Zagajenie kursu literatury słowiańskiej przez Pana Cypryana Roberta (22 grudnia 1846)," *Demokrata Polski* (Paris, 9.01.1847), pp. 117-118.

Ruthenians].⁶⁷ A similar idea was voiced by Piotr Semenenko, then a member of the TDP, who was of Ruthenian (Belarusan-Ukrainian) descent. The Ruthenian people were *środek prawdziwy* [the real center] and *serce prawdziwe słowiańskiego ciała* [the real heart of the Slavic body], which were uniquely positioned between Poland and Russia-Muscovy, two competing but “unnatural” centers of the Slavic world. The Ruthenians constituted both the border and the uniting point between Poland and Russia:

Między dwoma środkami, [...] między dwoma sercami, chcąciami nienaturalnie w jednym bić ciele, był prawdziwy środek, było prawdziwe serce. Między Polską a Rosyją, przez Bug, Dniestr, ponad Dniepr aż do źródeł jego mieszka dziesięć milionów Rusinów. Lud ruski jest owym sercem [ciała] sławiańskiego.⁶⁸

[Between two centers [...], between two hearts that wanted to beat unnaturally in one body, there was the real center, there was the real heart. Between Poland and Russia, along the rivers of Bug, Dniester, beyond the Dnieper to the very sources of it there live ten millions of Ruthenians. Ruthenian folk is that heart of a Slavic body].

Hence, the Ruthenians are *wszystko w Słowiańszczyźnie* [everything in the Slavic world] and insured power to whomever they sided with in history. Semenenko also opposed the exclusion of Russia from Europe.⁶⁹

In general, the Polish vision of Ukrainian geography (in both fictional and non-fictional sources) could be called “geographical legitimism,” since the historical/natural borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth defined the geographical boundaries of modern Polishness. In this sense, the idea of the Polish nationality was constructed out of the mental geography of pre-partitioned Poland.⁷⁰ It is surprising how little the

⁶⁷ In Joachim Lelewel, “Odezwa do Rosjan” [Appeal to the Russians] in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski et al. eds., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna: Wybór źródeł* (Wrocław, 1961), p. 50.

⁶⁸ Piotr Semenenko, “O narodowości” [On Nationalism] *Postęp* [Progress], 4-5 (1834), p. 70.

⁶⁹ Semenenko, pp. 71, 73. Semenenko’s fervently pro-Ruthenian and somewhat pro-Russian outlook brought down upon him the wrath of other émigré politicians: he was accused of being a Russian agent and was forced to leave the TDP. See: Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 207.

⁷⁰ Compare Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe, dann müsste es erfunden werden.” *Die Entwicklung des polnischen Nationalbewußtseins im europäischen Kontext* [“If Poland Had Not Existed, Then It Would Have to Be Invented.” *The Development of Polish National Consciousness in the European Context*]

romantic notions of nationality changed the largely traditional vision of Polish geography. Put another way, geography for Poles mattered much more than ethnography.

THE UKRAINIAN VISION

The Ukrainian vision of Poland's boundaries was quite unformed and focused mainly on those parts of the Polish mental map which included Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia. One should also point to the anti-Polish aspect of Little Russian historical ideology, which for centuries had been a cornerstone of local identities. The Ukrainian vision dismantled the Polish space and robbed the Polish imagined community of its significant "Ruthenian" population. To be sure, all those who wrote about Ukrainian territory from the Carpathians to the Caucasus automatically "unmade" Polish nationality, since no sensible Pole was ready to abandon Galicia and Right Bank Ukraine. For Ukrainians, Poland stopped somewhere in the Carpathians. All Ukrainian (and Russian) observers included Polish-dominated and Austria-controlled Galicia within the borders of Ukraine/Little Russia/Southern Rus'. For Ukrainian Romantic writer Panteleimon Kulish, "The Southern Rus' land" stretched as far as Galicia's cities of Lwów and Zamość.⁷¹ Another Ukrainian intellectual, Osyp Bodians'kyi, called the inhabitants of Galicia *pidneiu ukrainciiv* [the kin of the Ukrainians].⁷² Nikolai Gogol, always sensitive about geography, defined his native space through the proliferation of the Rus' speech and faith slightly beyond the Carpathians: *Еще до Карпатских гор услышишь русскую мольвь, и за горами еще кой-где отзовется как-будто родное слово; а там уже и вера не та, и речь не та* [Until you get to the Carpathians you can hear the Rus' speech, and just beyond the mountains there are still here and there sounds of /our/ native tongue; but further beyond the faith and speech is not quite the same].⁷³

There are only a few sources of the Ukrainian vision of Polish geography *per se*. One example of a geopolitical treatment of Polish borders

(Wiesbaden, 2003), p. 273. It is worth noting that for Polish patriots *ethnographic* arguments (i.e. the idea of the distinct Ruthenian people) were inferior to *geographical* idea of a restored Polish state that would include ethnically diverse regions.

⁷¹ Panteleimon Kulish, *Povest' ob ukrainskom narode* [*The Tale About the Ukrainian Nation*] (Saint Petersburg, 1846), p. 43.

⁷² Osip Bodianskii [Bodians'kyi], "Pis'mo k izdatel'u po povodu izdaniia Pieśni Polskie i Ruskie ludu Galicyjskiego" ["Letter to the Editor on the Publication of the 'Polish and Ruthenian Songs of the Galician People'"] *Molva*, [*The Gossip*], VIII, 42 (Moscow, 1834), p. 256.

⁷³ N.V. Gogol', "Strashnaia mest," ["The Dreadful Revenge"] in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem* [*Complete Works and Letters*]. 23 vols. Vol. 1 (Moscow, 2001), p. 208.

can be found in the legacy of Iurii Venelin, a Slavic scholar who came from Transcarpathian Rus'. For him, "Southerners," i.e. Ukrainians and Belarusians, constituted a majority in almost all provinces that once were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth including some portions of the Lublin palatinate of the Congress Kingdom.⁷⁴ Paradoxically, even such a patriot as Venelin could not help noticing strong Polish connections to Right Bank Ukraine. He had to admit that it was *only* Poles who perceived Rus' as their motherland, whereas local Ukrainians, ashamed of the very names of *Rus'* and *Ruthenian*, did not address their native country by its name.⁷⁵ He therefore pointed to the struggle of the Ruthenians against the Poles for their "cradle." He could not, however, imagine a situation in which Rus' had to be shared by two conflicting but consanguineous peoples and jumped to the conclusion that Poles were not Slavs but Germans by descent. Poles had no more right to call Rus' their motherland than Turks had with respect to Bulgaria and Greece. Despite adopting a Slavic identity, Poles "always were alien to Rus'."⁷⁶ Venelin limited the eastern ethnographic frontier of Poles to the Vistula River, stressing that the south-western borders of Rus' stretched *сплошь до Вислы* [all the way to the Vistula]. While splitting Poles into several ethnic groups, Venelin once again emphasized their Germanic descent:

С западных берегов сей реки [Вислы] простиралось к западу, в глубь Германии, племя Л я ш с к о е, которое, по своим местностям, разделялось на несколько отраслей: на М а з у р о в, Г о р а л е й или К р а к у с о в и С л е з а к о в (Silesii). Это племя имело естественные свои сильные и выпуклые пределы: от России Висла, с Юга и Юго-Запада цепь Карпатов и Судетов, с Запада Ниша и Одра (Neisse и Oder) реки. Посему колыбель Ляхов выходит вне пределов так называемой Скифии, так называемой Сарматии, т.е. вне России; она исключительно была в Германии, и Ляхи, по происхождению, племя исключительно Германское.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ Iurii Venelin, "O spore mezhdru iuzhanami i severianami na schet ikh rossizma" ["On the Dispute Between the Southerners and Northerners Concerning Their Russianness"], *Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh* [Proceedings of the Society of Russian History and Antiquities], IV (Moscow, 1847), p. 3.

⁷⁵ Venelin, p. 7.

⁷⁶ Venelin, p. 8.

⁷⁷ Venelin, p. 8.

[From the western shore of this river /Vistula/ spreading to the west in the depth of Germany, the Polish tribe split into several branches such as Mazurs, Highlanders or Cracovians, and Silesians. This tribe had its natural strong and swelling boundaries: from Russia the Vistula, from the south and south-west the range of the Carpathians and Sudets, from the west the rivers Neisse and Oder. Therefore the cradle of Poles appears to be outside the boundaries of so-called Scythia and so-called Sarmatia, i.e. outside Russia; it was exclusively in Germany and the Poles are exclusively a German tribe by descent].

By offering a concept of Poland's natural borders that did not go beyond the Carpathians, Venelin was refuting Polish historical myth about the Sarmatian origins of its gentry. Venelin's Poland was also a far cry from the Poland from sea to sea of Polish émigrés since it seemed to be landlocked and deprived of a direct access to any sea (even the Baltic). It was Venelin, however, who practically predicted the ethnic borders of the present-day Poland, with its core gravitating rather to the west close to Germany than to the east. No Pole in the 1830s-1840s was able to envision the borders of present-day Polish state deprived of its eastern borderlands but equipped with long-lost western and south-western lands, such as Silesia. Not surprisingly, Venelin's vision of Polish borders was shared by generations of Ukrainians and Russians, including the Bolsheviks, who eventually accomplished his territorial program for the Poles.

I was not able to find other comprehensive mental maps of Poland among Ukrainian sources, although there do exist a few other texts that reveal the Ukrainian-Polish geographical discord. The Polish November uprising with its claims to Right-Bank Ukraine incited an angry response from the Russian government and public alike. Ukrainians sided with Russians in what can be called anti-Polish poetics. These events caused the creation of arguably the first Ukrainian-language novella – *Mykola Koval* (1832) by Ukrainian-Russian second-rate writer Mykola (Nikolai) Venger.⁷⁸ This is a story about a leader of a Ukrainian peasant community situated somewhere in Right-Bank Ukraine, who prevents his Polish master from joining the Polish uprising by having him hanged and informing the authorities. The space in novella is split between a rebellious Warsaw that symbolized Poland and a Ukrainian-populated countryside loyal to the tsar and hostile to the Poles. Mykola Venger made it clear that Poland had nothing to do with Right-Bank Ukraine, which was associated with Ukrainian, tsar-loving peasants rather than with treacherous Polish lords.

⁷⁸ Mykola Venger, "Mykola Koval," *Kyivs'ka starovyna [Kiev's Antiquity]*, 3 (1999), pp. 84-86.

An even more explicitly anti-Polish message can be found in Orest Somov's poetry dating from 1831, which revealed his understanding of a centuries-long Ukrainian-Polish conflict.⁷⁹ In a poetic cycle, *Голос Украинца при вести о взятии Варшавы* [The voice of a Ukrainian on the news about the seizure of Warsaw], he condemned the Polish uprising and praised the victory of Russians and Ukrainians over the Poles. He interprets the uprising and its suppression by the imperial army in terms of a historic struggle of Cossacks against Poland. The first poem, entitled *Песня на умиротворение Варшавы* [The Song on the Pacification of Warsaw], depicted the Polish uprising as just another attempt of the Poles to invade Ukraine, while the subsequent suppression of this attempt was presented as the revenge of the Ukrainians. In Somov's vision, the Polish uprising was an evil [злое] creation of Hell and *язва гордого ума* [the ulcer of an arrogant mind] that came to Russian boundaries from the outside, presumably from Europe. He made it clear that there was no Poland inside the "Russian boundaries." In addition, he devoted much space to praising the deeds of Prince Ivan Paskevych, a Russian commander-in-chief of Ukrainian Cossack background, who protected "Holy Rus'" from the "ulcer" with his "Rus' chest" [*И от язвы Русь святую/Русской грудью отстоял*].⁸⁰ Paskevych appeared as *Украины сын* [the son of Ukraine] above whom moved *соплеменная тень великого Богдана* [a native shadow of the great Bohdan /Khmelnys'kyi/]. Bohdan's shadow professed supernatural help to its Ukrainian heir in the battle against Poles who once again threatened Ukraine with *иноземное иго* [a foreign yoke]. In a prophetic speech "from Heaven," Bohdan reminded Poles of the Cossack victory near Zhovti Vody and pointed to Paskevych's victory as the new revenge on Poles for Ukraine's "grievances:"

Ляхи! Снова в мощной длани
Желтоводский меч блеснул:
Витязь мой, решитель брани,
Богатырски им взмахнул.

Вам ли голосом надменным
Святотатственно вопить
И ярмом иноплеменным
Вновь Украине грозить?

Сын Украйны-Немезиды
Дерзкий рог опять сломил

⁷⁹ [Orest Somov], *Golos ukraintsa pri vesti o vziatii Varshavy* (Saint Petersburg, 1831).

⁸⁰ [Orest Somov], p. 6.

И опять ее обиды
Быстро, грозно вам отмстил!⁸¹

[Hey Poles! It is again that in a mighty palm/A sword from Zhovti Vody glittered:/My knight, the victor of the battle,/In a heroic way waved it./How did you dare with a haughty voice/To scream blasphemously/And with a foreign yoke/To threaten Ukraine again?/The son of Ukraine, the Nemesis/Broke again the audacious horn/And again for her (Ukraine's) grievances/(He) Quickly and menacingly revenged on you].

In a Ukrainian-language poem, *Лист од українця до ляхів* [A letter from a Ukrainian to the Poles], Somov further developed a vision of the Polish uprising and its suppression as a historical struggle of Ukrainians against Poles. He bluntly refuted any Polish claims to Ukraine and Kiev, which Poles treated as their property.⁸² Once again Somov reminded Poles of Ukraine's grievances before Khmelnyts'kyi's uprising, linking the latter with the image of Prince Paskevych as *син козацької слави* [the son of Cossack glory] and *царський лицар* [tsar's knight].⁸³ In Somov's poetry Poland was noticeably absent: there was no place for historic Poland in Ukraine or anywhere else within Russia. In his second poem, it was Warsaw that served as a geographical metaphor for all of Poland, although the city appeared only to fall under tsar's *п'ята* [heel].⁸⁴

Generally, Ukrainians were not concerned with Polish geography except when it encroached on Ukrainian ethnic territory, i.e. Right Bank Ukraine. Despite a noticeable Polish presence, Ukrainians never considered these lands as belonging to Poland and treated Polish-speaking and Catholic nobles residing in the three "South Western" provinces of Russia as mere renegades of Ukrainian descent.⁸⁵ One of the students connected to the Society of St. Cyril and Methodius in the mid-1840s, Heorhii Andruz'kyi,

⁸¹ [Orest Somov], pp. 6-7.

⁸² [Orest Somov], p. 9.

⁸³ [Orest Somov], pp. 10-11.

⁸⁴ [Orest Somov], p. 10.

⁸⁵ See, for example the historical articles by Mykhailo Maksymovych published in his almanac *Киевлянин* [A *Kievite*] from 1840: "Volyn' do XI veka" ["Volhynia until XIth Century"], "Dva pis'ma kniazia Ostrozhs'kogo" ["Two Letters of Prince Ostroz'kyi"], "Rodoslovnnye zapiski "Kievlianina" ["Genealogical Notes of the 'Kievan'"], "O pamiatnikakh Lutskogo Krestovozdvizhenskogo bratstva" ["On the Monuments of the Luts'k Brotherhood"], etc.

even suggested the re-conversion of local gentry to the Orthodoxy.⁸⁶ Andruz'kyi also designed a utopian plan for the geopolitical reconstruction of Eastern Europe on the basis of national and historical entities, which he called *штаты* [states].⁸⁷ One of the proposed states was to be Poland “with Poznania, Lithuania, and Samogitia [Жмудь]” but deprived of Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia, territories that were to constitute a separate state. Andruz'kyi's mental map of Poland did not constitute a total rejection of historical geography for the sake of ethnography, since he imagined Poland as combined with historic Lithuania, including both Lithuanian and Belarusan ethnic lands. What was remarkably romantic here was the understanding that Poland in its pre-partitioned shape had no place in a new national world based on nationalities and smaller geographical entities.

Ukrainian romantics were not so much preoccupied with the geography of Poland as with the justification of its partitions that were perceived as punishment for sins committed by Poles. As one could expect, the ultimate victim of Poland was Ukraine. Paradoxically, this was also the vision of several Polish Romantics and political émigrés such as Juliusz Słowacki and Tadeusz Krępowiecki. Such was also the vision of Mykola Kostomarov, a founder of the Society of St. Cyril and Methodius and the author of the political treatise, *Книги буття українського народу* [The books of Genesis of the Ukrainian people]. In effect, Kostomarov's work was a Ukrainian interpretation of Mickiewicz's messianic treatise *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* [Books of the Polish nation and Polish pilgrimage]. It is not Poland, however, but Ukraine that was first “torn apart” by the Poles and Russians.⁸⁸ The partitions of Poland were treated as God's punishment for the earlier partition of Ukraine into two halves along the Dnieper River by the Poles and Russians.⁸⁹ The partition of Ukraine was called *найпоганіше діло, яке тільки можна знайти в історії* [the worst event that one can find in history]. The partition of Poland occurred because she *не послухалась України й погубила свою сестру* [did not listen to Ukraine and destroyed her sister].⁹⁰ Polish geopolitical influence was, however, limited, since Kostomarov neither clearly defined Ukraine's borders nor used them as an argument against Polish or Russian claims. Eventually, however, each Slavic nationality, whether Russians, Ukrainians,

⁸⁶ See the protocol of the interrogation of Andruz'kyi in the III Department, from 14 April 1847 in *Kyrylo-Mefodiïvs'ke tovarystvo* [Society of St. Cyril and Methodius] 3 vols. Vol. 2 (Kiev, 1990), p. 502.

⁸⁷ In his draft of the constitution that was seized from him in 1850 and that was also published in *Kyrylo-Mefodiïvs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 570.

⁸⁸ Mykola Kostomarov, “Knyhy buttia ukraïns'koho narodu” [“The Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian people”], in *Kyrylo-Mefodiïvs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 1, pp. 167-169.

⁸⁹ Kostomarov, p. 167.

⁹⁰ Kostomarov, p. 169.

Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Illyrians-Serbs, or Bulgarians would establish a separate republic in a common federation.⁹¹ Kostomarov did not elaborate on the geographical shape of a future Poland within the proposed federation, but one could be sure that it would have not have included Ukrainian-inhabited lands. Among the list of Slavic nationalities conspicuously absent were Belarusians, who perhaps had to remain within Polish borders or were expected to join the Russian republic.

Despite the fact that Ukrainian/Little Russian patriots used history as the evidence of the continuous existence of Ukraine from the medieval period, for Ukrainian intellectuals like Mykhailo Maksymovych, Panteleimon Kulish or Osy Bodians'kyi, historical borders never became as strong an argument as they did for the Poles in their struggle to restore the statehood. If the idea of historical borders was used at all, it rather boosted the imperial cause. It comes as no surprise that the dismantling of the Polish historical map by ethnic Ukrainians promoted the cause of the "grand Russian nation" (Aleksi Miller's term).⁹² This was because the western borders of the Ukrainian imagined community (stretching along the Carpathians) coincided with the westernmost border of the "grand Russian nation."

Not surprisingly, Russian observers agreed with Ukrainian intellectuals that both Ukrainian (Little Russian) and "grand Russian" maps stretched all the way to the Carpathians, thus pushing the Polish map further west. Even as unfriendly a critic as Vissarion Belinskii was toward Ukrainians, he could still stress that Red Rus', or Galicia, historically gravitated to Southern — "Kievan-Chernihiv" — Rus' which "eventually turned into Little Russia."⁹³ A conservative critic from the *Maiak* [Lighthouse] periodical, Petr Korsakov, used *малороссийское наречие* [the Little Russian dialect] spoken by several millions in "Southern Russia and Galicia" as the criterion for the unity of these lands.⁹⁴ A nationalist critic and scholar Mikhail Pogodin defended Russian claims to Galicia — and to Lwów in particular — by pointing to *чистое малороссийское наречие* [a pure Little Russian dialect] spoken there and to the legacy of *славного*

⁹¹ Kostomarov, p. 170.

⁹² A.I. Miller, *Ukrainskii vopros v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)* [The Ukrainian Question in the Politics of the Authorities and in Russian Public Opinion (The Second Half of The Nineteenth Century)] (St. Petersburg, 2000), pp. 30-35. In Russian the term is *bol'shaia russkaia natsiia* that was to include all the Orthodox Eastern Slavs of the Russian Empire, as well as the Uniate Ruthenians of Austro-Hungary into a common nationality.

⁹³ V.G. Belinskii, "Stat'i o narodnoi poezii" ["Articles on the Folk Poetry"], in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii* [Complete Works], vol. 5, p. 407.

⁹⁴ *Maiak*, 6 (1840), p. 94.

короля Даниила [the glorious king Daniil].⁹⁵ Elsewhere, he used clearly ethno-linguistic criteria in mapping a Little Russia populated by “Little Russians” or “Ruthenians,” from Poltava province in the east to Galicia and Transcarpathia in the west.⁹⁶ He even emphasized the Ukrainian connection of Galicia by pointing out that the ancient and contemporary inhabitants of Galicia were *тем же народом* [the same people] as present-day Little Russians from Chernihiv, Poltava, and Pereiaslav.

One can assume that Ukrainian views of Poland’s geopolitical place were so implicated in the Russian imperial vision because Ukrainian (or Little Russian) intellectuals and statesmen were the active builders of the Russian Empire and its mental map. During the 1830s-1840s the Ukrainian mental map was largely compatible with imperial geography and both dismantled the Polish map. Such a vision also resulted from the traditional anti-Polish direction of Ukrainian (Little Russian) identity prior to the mid-nineteenth century.

For Ukrainians writing about the geography of their country, it was primarily nationality with its ethnographic and linguistic criteria that defined the geographical boundaries of the Ukrainian imagined community. Put another way, the space was united not through an appeal to once existing political borders but through the visible ethnographic unity of the contemporary population. One could hardly rely on political institutions to define Ukraine’s national borders. Therefore, the Ukrainian case was that of “geographical romanticism” where ethnography in its romantic veil led to geography.

There was a universal consensus among Ukrainians about the eastern borders of Poland. Quite simply, there was no place for Poland east of the Carpathians. In poetry, Poland was metaphorically reduced to Warsaw, although in political texts it could be as large and historic so as to include ethnic Lithuanian and Belarusan lands. In the end, the Ukrainian attitude toward Poland was not exclusively romantic and nationalist and allowed for a certain dose of geographical legitimism.

CONCLUSION

The quest to regain symbolic and political control over lost territories, in particular the “South Eastern borderlands,” defined the Polish vision of Ukraine in the 1830s-1840s. Poles of all ideological circles mapped Ukraine within the framework of the “historical” and “natural” borders of

⁹⁵ M. Pogodin, “Istoricheskie razmyshleniia ob otnosheniakh Pol’shi k Rossii” [“Historical Considerations on the Relations of Poland to Russia”], *Teleskop*, II, 7 (Moscow, 1831), p. 298.

⁹⁶ Pogodin, “Dva slova Biblioteke dl’a chteniia o proiskhozhdenii Malorossiian” [“Two Words to the Library for Reading on the Origins of Little Russians”], *Moskvitianin* [*The Muscovite*], 6 (1843), p. 534.

Poland. At the time no sensible Pole rejected this geographical and historical legitimism, despite the influence of Romantic nationalism with its emphasis on ethnographic and linguistic issues. To be able to refashion their mental map, Poles needed to reconsider the very idiom of nationality. Put another way, they had to make their community more exclusive and more ethnically "Polish." That happened only much later, in the ideology of Roman Dmowski's National Democrats. Nevertheless, even they never completely rejected the legacy of legitimism with its idea of "historical"/"natural" borders.

Paradoxically, while Poles managed to distinguish ethnic Russia from the Russian Empire they could not admit the idea of ethnic Poland. The decisively anti-Russian Polish mental geography, which focused on the contested Ruthenian lands, proved long-lasting. As late as 1848 it was the Polish claims to Ukraine, including Kiev, that still defined the Polish vision of Russia's geography and fueled Polish-Russian animosities within the Slavic world.⁹⁷

⁹⁷ Pogodin, "Dva slova" p. 333. On the Polish efforts to refashion the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth see: Tim Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, 1569-1999* (New Haven, Conn., 2003). On Polish-Ukrainian-Russian relations see: Peter J. Potichnyj, ed. *Poland and Ukraine, Past and Present* (Edmonton-Toronto, 1980), especially the articles by Ivan L. Rudnytsky, George G. Grabowicz, and Hugh Seton-Watson.