

# ROMANTIC NATIONALISM IN EASTERN EUROPE

*Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian Political Imaginations*

SERHIY BILENKY



## **Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe**

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**Serhiy Bilenky**

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## Preface

This study explores the political imagination of the East European intelligentsia in the 1830s–1840s; in particular, the patterns by which intellectuals *imagined* communities known as nations or nationalities. Put another way, this book deals with the representation of nation-ness in Eastern Europe, a vision and division of geographic, symbolic, and social space, which eventually resulted in the unmaking of some national projects and the making of others. I will explore the ways in which the modern Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian nationalities were mapped during the Romantic period, the territory of present-day Ukraine being the geographical setting of their encounter.<sup>1</sup> Yet this territorial setting, however important it could be for the analysis of the spatial imagination of the East European intelligentsia, does not define the entire *national* imagination or identity politics of major Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian intellectuals. The focus of this book are the *visions* of national community by intellectuals from different lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the contemporary Russian Empire rather than any specific territory per se. This is to say, the Polish-Ukrainian-Russian encounter was not limited to a specific territory but took place in a rather symbolic space of nationalist discourses. The territory of the interaction is less important than its discursive content.

In a sense, my work is another effort to trace the national reconstruction of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within the framework of imperial Russia.<sup>2</sup> That reconstruction meant the making of the Ukrainian nationality (in imagined and institutional realms) and the

unmaking or refashioning of both the historic Polish and “all-Russian” national projects, even if contemporaries did not notice that at the time.

The general subject of my book is the mapping and representation of national communities in the political imagination of East European intellectuals—political thinkers, activists, literati, and scholars—who sought to carve out as much space and population for their nationalities as their imagination could embrace. Consequently, the making of one identity (for example, Ukrainian) inevitably resulted in the unmaking of others (Russian and Polish).<sup>3</sup> In the words of Aleksei Miller, the competing national projects reflected the superimposition of “Ideal Fatherlands” on each other.<sup>4</sup>

This study will address several questions: (1) What were the roles of language, religion, history, and institutions in shaping these national identities? (2) How did the presence of “neighboring” communities change the self-representation of a given community? (3) At which points did the imagined communities intersect, and where were their borders? (4) Finally, at which points were national communities “unmade”? I intend to explore the ways by which Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles, fuelled by the Romantic search for nation, mapped distinct but often overlapping identities.

In other words, I will analyze what the names “Ukraine,” “Poland,” and “Russia” (with their respective adjectives) meant for those who debated Romantic nationalism, and how the intelligentsia spoke about the communities it claimed to represent. The subject is not national identities per se (as reified objects) but only how they were imagined by the local intelligentsia. Hence, there were different versions of Russianness, Polishness, and Ukrainianness, constantly refashioned and negotiated under mutual interaction. I will not deal with personal identities but instead will focus on certain “fields” of political imagination where “imagined communities” were represented. The concept of a field of political imagination is understood to be a system of often unconscious “imaginings” or ideas about nation-ness and its boundaries, pertaining to a certain ideological circle within each national case—here, Russian, Polish, or Ukrainian.

With regard to methodology, this study covers several fields such as intellectual history, discourse analysis, and nationalism studies. I have used the methodological tools elaborated by Benedict Anderson, Pierre Bourdieu, and Rogers Brubaker. These include the concept of nationality as an “imagined community,” worked out by Benedict Anderson<sup>5</sup>; the concepts of “field” and the “struggle for representation” elaborated by Pierre Bourdieu<sup>6</sup>; and the idea of “nation-centered idioms,” or simply “idioms

of nationality,” borrowed from Rogers Brubaker.<sup>7</sup> The latter showed how certain cultural idioms—the ways of thinking and speaking about nationality—have shaped political/state interests in the realm of citizenship. In other words, the idea of nationality defined the perceptions of the “other” (minorities within an aspiring nation-state as well as neighboring nationalities). I have also used certain methodological tools and approaches developed by Andrzej Walicki, George Grabowicz, Roman Szporluk, and Paul Robert Magocsi. I owe the term *romantic nationalism* to Andrzej Walicki, who extensively studied the interaction of Romanticism and nationalism on the examples of Poland and Russia.<sup>8</sup> George Grabowicz successfully developed a comparative perspective on Ukrainian, Polish, and Russian literary developments which shaped the cultural expectations and identities of each other.<sup>9</sup> Roman Szporluk introduced the crucially important idea of competing national projects and showed how the making of one nationality meant the unmaking of others that treated the potential members of this “new” nationality as an integral part of their own, more established communities.<sup>10</sup> Finally, Paul Robert Magocsi pointed to the nineteenth-century mind-set trapped between exclusive national identities and a traditional hierarchy of multiple loyalties.<sup>11</sup>

Although of course there have been several studies that have explored aspects of Polish, Russian, or Ukrainian national thought, no other work—in English, Polish, Ukrainian, or Russian—has undertaken a comparative history of these respective national ideas during the Romantic period. My work explores precisely this comparative dimension, and especially analyzes how these three nationalisms were inextricably related to one another during this formative period. In some cases, I have specifically emphasized the difference of my views from those held by my senior colleagues (for example, in my polemics with Andrzej Walicki). One of the aforementioned scholars, Roman Szporluk, indeed placed the so-called “Ukrainian project” within a larger international framework of making and unmaking competing national projects<sup>12</sup>; his work, however important for my own argument, was an outline of stimulating ideas rather than a detailed account of a discursive exchange between Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian intelligentsias. The dynamics of that exchange was the main subject of my own research. The only other work which has purported to compare Russian, Ukrainian, and Polish Romantic sources was the doctoral thesis of George Grabowicz.<sup>13</sup> In his thesis and other writings, Grabowicz, a noted literary scholar, studied, quite exhaustively, the Romantic image of Ukrai-

nian Cossacks in three Slavic literary traditions; although I have shared the comparative focus with Professor Grabowicz, my goal in the present work has been to study the Romantic visions of nationality as they appeared in *nonliterary* sources, predominantly in political philosophy, literary criticism, political treatises, journalism, and so on.

I have dealt with the representation of imagined communities on two levels: first, in the realm of mental or philosophical geography; second, on the level of “nation-centered idioms.” I believe this is still a new approach in the field of nineteenth-century East European history, which has remained a quite conservative discipline. The focus on mental geography and nation-centered idioms allowed me to treat the three national cases as discursive formations rather than reified objects of traditional *essentialist* historiography. More simply put, I sought to address the question of how nationality was made in Eastern Europe. By comparing how “Russians,” “Ukrainians,” and “Poles” were imagined by Romantic intelligentsias, I have avoided a nationalist bias which tends to represent nationalities as somehow *preexisting* objects or as part of a natural order. What is more, by comparing three “national” cases, I prove that not only “nonhistoric” Ukrainians but also Russians and Poles themselves, who often boasted continuous national histories, were largely “constructed” during the nineteenth century. My research indeed has proved Szporluk’s point that the making of Ukrainians unmade the Russian and Polish historic nations, first at the level of imagination, then at political and institutional levels. Beyond this, I believe that my research has wider implications for students of modern Polish and Russian histories: the Ukrainian issue showcased the discursive nature of modern Russian and Polish identities as fields of competing visions of nationality, of various sociopolitical possibilities, and of lost opportunities. In my work I have tried to show how the geographic extent and ethnosocial content of nationality were changing depending on who was speaking on its behalf, and how the presence of the “other” influenced national self-representations. I also believe that my work will help scholars and the educated public to avoid unnecessary generalizations and stereotypes when dealing with modern Eastern Europe.

I would also like to clarify certain terms. Following Benedict Anderson, I consider nationality as an “imagined community,” imagined by its fellow-members “as both inherently limited and sovereign.”<sup>14</sup> With regard to the terms *nation* and *nationality* I prefer the latter when referring to a distinct ethnocultural community (with or without its own state). Many

sources, however, contain both words with different meanings: *nationality* often meant the essence or spiritual side of *nation* and referred to what made the people a really distinct community. In such cases I use both words. More often than not, the sources I consulted confuse the two words or use them interchangeably. I repeat the original terminology in direct quotations but use the word *nationality* in my comments. When sources use the word *nation* with reference to a state, I prefer the word *state* or *nation-state*; however, I use the word *nation* if it is part of a neologism, such as the “all-Russian nation” used by Aleksei Miller. Several omnipresent terms from primary sources are translated in direct quotations following Table 1.

Finally, nationality will not be treated as an “objective” or natural phenomenon but rather as a product of political imagination projected onto social and symbolic reality. In my own usage, *nationality* is rather a word than a thing, and it refers to an imagined community based on distinct linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and sociopolitical values. Those values distinguish nationality from such traditional entities as empire, caste, clan, social estate, and so on, which were differently imagined and institutionalized.

The time frame of this study encompasses the period of Romantic nationalism in Eastern Europe; that is, from the Polish November uprising of 1830–31 to the persecution of the Ukrainian Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood in 1847 (in the Russian case, the landmark is the political texts of Mikhail Bakunin from the same time). This study draws on a wide range of sources, such as journalistic articles, literary fiction, political philosophy, and political manifestos published or written during the 1830s–1840s in Polish, Russian, or Ukrainian. The sources reveal the geography or spatial dimension of imagined communities (their borders and intersections), their national and social “contents” including the extent of their *ex-* and *inclusiveness*, and the hierarchy of values that were entrenched in each case. The emphasis is on *primary* narrative sources; secondary literature is used only as an additional means, particularly when the primary

TABLE 1 Translations of key terms from primary sources

English	Polish	Russian	Ukrainian
nation	naród	narod, natsiia	narod, natsiia
nationality	narodowość, lud/ludy (pl.)	narodnost', natsional'nost'	narodnist', narod
people/folk	lud	narod, liud	liud, liudy

NOTE: The particular difficulty represents the Russian and Ukrainian word *narod*, which can be translated both as *nation* and as *people*. If it is provided with a clear political meaning, the term will be rendered in English as *nation*.

sources were unavailable or incomplete. Therefore, the bibliography and notes represent only the most important secondary sources.

All quotations are given in English translations, except when certain poetic works are quoted (in those cases, both original and English texts are provided). All translations are mine except for a few instances, where the translator is indicated in the note. Russian and Ukrainian personal names are transliterated from Cyrillic according to the Library of Congress system, with only minor changes. In addition, the spellings of personal names are rendered in the language of the nationality with which the person is usually associated. All place-names are transliterated into English according to the present-day phonetic spelling utilized in the countries where those geographical places are situated (unless there are common English equivalents, such as Dnieper River, Vistula River, Galicia, and Kyiv). In translated quotations, however, I leave the original spellings. For example, in sources written in Russian, Chernigov is used instead of Chernihiv; Peremyshl' instead of Przemyśl; or if the source is in Polish, Humań is used instead of Uman'.<sup>15</sup>

I want to thank my senior colleagues from the University of Toronto, where I was lucky to study and then teach: discussions with Paul Robert Magocsi, Wayne Dowler, and Piotr Wróbel helped me balance research material for the three “national” cases. Their expertise in Ukrainian, Russian, and Polish histories constantly encouraged me to question my own preconceived notions about East European history and to stay impartial. I thank Dr. Magocsi for his moral support and friendly advice ranging from nationalism issues in modern Europe to Mahler’s music and wine tasting. George Grabowicz of Harvard University not only was a diligent reader of my work but has also been my intellectual inspiration for years. I also owe a great deal to Taras Koznarsky of the University of Toronto, whose friendship and scholarly advice kept me going in the face of the many challenges of my new Canadian experience. Thanks to the Ukrainian Studies Fund and the Ihor and Oksana Humeniuk Ukrainian Fund I did part of my research at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute, where I spent one of the most intellectually satisfying years of my life and had the privilege of discussing the subject of this book with the historians Roman Szporluk, Lubomyr Hajda, and Tomasz Stryjek, and with the philologists Ihor Papusha and Amelia Glaser. I am grateful to the Columbia University Department of History, the Harriman Institute, and particularly the Ukrainian Studies Program, for giving me the oppor-

tunity to finish my book while teaching in such a stimulating academic and urban environment.

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
**MAP 1** The Ukrainian Cossack state within the borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth

SOURCE: P. R. Magocsi, *Ukraine: An Illustrated History* (Toronto, 2007), p. 94.



MAP 2 The partitions of Poland

SOURCE: P. R. Magosci, *Ukraine: An Illustrated History* (Toronto, 2007), p. 132.



MAP 3 Dnieper Ukraine, circa 1850

SOURCE: P. R. Magocsi, *Ukraine: An Illustrated History* (Toronto, 2007), p. 136.

## **Romantic Nationalism in Eastern Europe**



## Introduction

### Intellectual and Sociopolitical Background

The period of the 1830s–1840s was crucially important for national projects in Eastern Europe. This was a time when Romantic nationalism shaped the most persistent questions about national cohesion as well as about the relations of “imagined communities” to each other, especially in the region where ethnocultural identities were so intermixed. At that time, Romantic ideas penetrated the public debates in Eastern Europe and came to play a crucial role in how Ukrainians, Poles, and Russians began to see themselves and one another.

Romantic ideas of nationality came to Eastern Europe mostly from Germany, where philosophers associated community with the language its members spoke. In other words, German intellectuals began to *imagine* their nationality through the medium of language. These communities had their limits wherever the use of their respective vernaculars ended.<sup>1</sup> This vision took shape towards the end of the eighteenth century, when the thesis about language as the main marker of national community was elaborated. A (national) language came to manifest (national) identity. Since Germany at the time was not a united country with one dominant center of power, it was the German vernacular that took on the function of the main expression of German political and cultural identity. Such terms as *Sprachgeist* or *Genie der Sprache* (genius of the language) became increasingly connected with *Volksgeist* or *Nationalgeist* (genius of the nation), and the fate of a *Volk* (nationality) began to be bounded with that of *Sprache* (language).<sup>2</sup> Language was believed to reflect “the particular mindset [*individuellen Ansicht*] of the speaking nation.”<sup>3</sup>

For example, already in the late seventeenth century Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz identified German-speakers with the German national community, despite all the political, religious, and ideological differences that divided Germany.<sup>4</sup> One of the founders of linguistic philosophy, Johann Gottfried Herder, wrote during the late eighteenth century that “(only one) who was brought up in this language, who put his heart in it, who learnt how to express his soul in it, belongs to the nation of this language. [ . . . ] By means of this language the nation is educated and formed.”<sup>5</sup> For Herder, a vernacular-based nationality was as natural as a plant or family,<sup>6</sup> which led him to the conception of “the natural state” as “one nation with one national character.”<sup>7</sup>

German thinkers of the Romantic epoch further refined the idea of a language-based national community. Wilhelm von Humboldt sought to define the *national* character of language or *Genie der Sprache*. For him language was “the natural consequence of the permanent influence of the nation’s spiritual peculiarity [*geistigen Eigenthümlichkeit der Nation*].”<sup>8</sup> One could think about the spirit of the German or Chinese languages as the unity of mental, linguistic, cultural, and political elements. August Wilhelm Schlegel held that language reflected the historical character of a nationality since speech developed along with the nationality and accumulated the historical experiences of the language community.<sup>9</sup> Johann Gottlieb Fichte created a more exclusive program of German linguistic nationalism. He argued strongly against foreign borrowings in German (in particular from French) because language defined a community of speakers who “speak the same language, think and feel alike,” which differentiated them from other nationalities.<sup>10</sup> According to Fichte, a separate language meant a separate nationality that had rights to political self-determination.<sup>11</sup> The German Romantic association between the vernacular, ethnic culture, and community defined for generations the vision of an (exclusive) nationality and citizenship in Germany.<sup>12</sup>

By the 1830s, the German model of Romantic nationalism had spread throughout Eastern Europe, appealing both to stateless (“nonhistorical”) peoples and to social conservatives who sought to protect their respective national communities against modernization. Since Romantic nationalism overtly contradicted dynastic power, imperial governments in Habsburg Austria and tsarist Russia largely abstained from embracing nationalist policies, although they sometimes tolerated nationalist rhetoric, as the Russian case showed. Influenced by Friedrich Schlegel’s Romantic philoso-

phy of history, the tsarist minister of education Sergei Uvarov sought to combine Romantic nationalism with dynasticism, although in the end he predictably failed to transform the Russian Empire into a dynastic nation-state. Earlier in the century, Schlegel himself had sought to link nationalism to dynasty in Habsburg Austria but suffered an even stronger rejection in the epoch of Metternich's dynastic legitimism.

Russian and Polish radical democrats were not so much influenced by Romantic nationalism as by Hegel's rationalism and by French social theories that treated nationality not as an organic community but rather as the product of a social contract open to constant reform. For them linguistic and cultural unification was an appeal not to some kind of mystical nation's soul but rather to the principles of rational bureaucratic administration patterned on post-Napoleonic France or Prussian *Rechtsstaat*. In addition, Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian literati within the Russian Empire had to follow the norms of imperial "political correctness," according to which any form of nationalism (including Great Russian) had to be subordinate to dynastic loyalty. In this respect, Polish intellectuals who lived in Prussia or Austria or as émigrés in Western Europe had much more freedom to choose ideological influences and express their "national" views.

In the late eighteenth century the Russian Empire became a truly multinational state that came to encompass the three major Slavic nationalities—Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles. Those nationalities, however, were quite different from what they are now. One could hardly consider "Russians," "Poles," and "Ukrainians" of the turn of the nineteenth century the modern nationalities imagined "as both inherently limited and sovereign" communities. Yet even premodern identities and local nobilities posed a problem for Russia's imperial government. Catherine II set out to eliminate administrative differences all over European Russia, and her first major victim was the Hetmanate, the autonomous state of Ukrainian Cossacks on the left (eastern) bank of the Dnieper. Having abolished the office of hetman in 1764, and then the internal administrative structure based on the Cossack corps in the 1780s, by the turn of the nineteenth century the imperial authorities managed to integrate completely the lands of the Hetmanate—now reduced to two imperial provinces, Chernihiv and Poltava—into the Russian Empire.<sup>13</sup> Around the same time, following the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795, Russia acquired huge lands to the west of the Dnieper. Those lands (except for the Polish Kingdom on the banks of the Vistula River) were populated primarily by the Orthodox

and Uniate Ukrainians and Belarusians, Catholic Poles, and Jews. Within the territory of present-day Ukraine, former Polish lands, once called the “South-Eastern borderlands” (*Południowo-wschodnie kresy*) of the commonwealth, were now officially referred to as the “South-Western region” (*Jugo-Zapadni krai*) of Russia.

To its Polish citizens the imperial government applied different policies, which varied from the virtual cultural autonomy for Poles during the reign of Alexander I to the harsh repressive measures in the aftermath of the Polish November uprising of 1830–31.<sup>14</sup> In the 1830s–1840s, Russia’s Poles, while retaining social dominance in parts of present-day Ukraine, Lithuania, and Belarus, had lost much of their cultural privileges, including Wilno (Vilnius) University and Krzemieniec (Kremenets’) Lyceum. The founding of Kyiv University in 1834 became the symbol of Russian imperial reaction.<sup>15</sup> The Poles living in Austria (Galicia) and especially in Prussia (Poznania) after 1840 fared much better as a community, enjoying certain cultural freedoms, which anticipated the Spring of Nations. Unlike Prussia under the liberal king Frederick William IV (reign 1840–57), Russia under Nicholas I (reign 1825–55) became an increasingly despotic state in the 1840s. The persecution of the Ukrainian Slavophile Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius in 1847 symbolized the growing suspicion on the part of Russian authorities of an independent thought and of any kind of nationalism altogether.

Relations between the Russian government and the nascent Great Russian nationalism were quite complex. As already emphasized, such dynastic powers as Austria and Russia largely rejected nationalism, which they saw as incompatible with the traditional imperial order. Nicholas’s policies were based on social estates rather than on particular ethnicities. To a large extent, the Russian government was “color-blind” when it came to the ethnic origins of its servants.<sup>16</sup> The cultural policies of tsarist minister of education Sergei Uvarov (1833–49) seemed to emphasize Russian nationalism, but his primary goal was to strengthen the positions of Russian autocracy.<sup>17</sup> Orthodoxy was indeed a pillar of Russian imperial order, but so were other religions—Roman Catholicism, Lutheranism, Islam, and Buddhism—which as official institutions, had to preach obedience to the authorities. Although government sought to promote Orthodoxy whenever possible, by the 1850s it had become clear that other established religions, such as Islam in the Lower Volga region, or Lutheranism in the Baltic, could perfectly serve imperial goals by simply emphasizing autocracy and political loyalty.<sup>18</sup>

The imperial policies towards particular regions and ethnic groups were, however, varied, resulting partly from specific patterns of imperial expansion and partly from ethnohistorical visions of a ruling dynasty. In the region of Russian-Polish-Ukrainian encounter, the imperial government was the most active player. The government treated Orthodox Ukrainians (“Little Russians”), who originated from the medieval Kyivan Rus’, differently from the Poles, who became imperial subjects only at the end of the eighteenth century. By the 1830s most of present-day Ukraine had become an integral part of the empire, and Ukraine’s Orthodox population was allowed to join the ruling “Russian” community—later known as the “all-Russian nation.” The very terms *Ukraine* or *Little Russia* were lacking any official meaning, referring informally to certain parts of present-day Ukraine.

The predominantly Catholic Poles resided in Prussia, Austria, and Russia where in the latter they formed a semiautonomous Polish Kingdom (or Congress Kingdom), populating also large areas of present-day Lithuania, Belarus, and Right Bank Ukraine (that is, lands west of the Dnieper). In the aftermath of the November uprising, the Russian government sought to curb social and cultural influences of Catholic Poles by actively backing the interests of “Russian citizens” in southwestern and northwestern regions of the empire. Needless to say, in Right Bank Ukraine these “Russian citizens” consisted mostly of Ukrainian peasants, Orthodox clergy, and a few non-Polonized nobles.<sup>19</sup>

The 1830s–1840s also saw the rise of the intelligentsia in Eastern Europe. This new social stratum, which originated mostly from local nobilities and Orthodox clergy (in Russian and Ukrainian cases), had by the midnineteenth century formed a kind of intellectual class that very soon developed a strong social and national consciousness.<sup>20</sup> This group consisted largely of social deviants, although the nobility was the single biggest source of its formation in Russia, Poland, and Ukraine.

While the Russian intelligentsia as a whole included people of different ethnic and social backgrounds, its core consisted of Orthodox Russians (and a significant number of Ukrainians) of mostly noble and clerical origins.<sup>21</sup> The group is believed to have originated in the late eighteenth-century nobility but was open to talents from other social estates.<sup>22</sup> With the opening of new universities in the first decade of the nineteenth century, a large number of graduates of clerical background joined Russia’s newest stratum. During the 1830s–1840s the intellectual and social identity of the Russian intelligentsia was shaped considerably by the influence of

Hegel and by discussions between Slavophiles and Westernizers.<sup>23</sup> At the same time, several voices belonging to the previous generation of Decembrists (mainly those of Mikhail Lunin and Petr Viazemskii) were still influential, even if outside printed communication. The 1830s–1840s also saw a growing discord between the intelligentsia and the government in Russia, resulting in the rejection of government-sponsored doctrines by Russian literati and the subsequent marginalization of the most conservative thinkers, such as Stepan Shevryev and Mikhail Pogodin.<sup>24</sup> Effectively, conservative thought in Russia was associated increasingly with bureaucrats, while *intelligentsia* per se became synonymous with liberal and populist ideas.

The Polish intellectual class at that time was better structured and institutionalized than the Russian and many other East and Central European intelligentsias.<sup>25</sup> In addition to intellectual life within the boundaries of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poles enjoyed a diverse public sphere in Western Europe—primarily in France, Belgium, and Britain—where they settled following their failed uprising in 1830–31. Unlike intense but censored Polish public life in Russia, and to a lesser degree in Austria and Prussia, the intellectual and political activities of Polish émigrés flourished both ideologically and institutionally.<sup>26</sup> It is in the West where emerged the most radical sociopolitical ideas both on the left and on the right of the Great Emigration. Not surprisingly, the Polish literati (such as Henryk Rzewuski or Michał Grabowski) residing in the Russian Empire, particularly in Right Bank Ukraine, exposed the most conservative and progovernmental views. Even in Russia, however, Poles maintained a separate public sphere, managing to publish a Polish-language newspaper (*Tygodnik Petersburski*) in Russia’s capital. In social background, the contemporary Polish intelligentsia belonged overwhelmingly to the gentry, although émigrés, even from the “aristocratic” Adam Czartoryski camp, either promoted social solidarism or dismissed nobility as a class altogether.

Noble origins characterized also the members of one of the most populist-oriented nationalist discourses—the Ukrainian. According to my own estimates, in the 1830s–1840s almost all leading members of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, conscious of national and cultural issues (with the prominent exception of poet Taras Shevchenko), belonged to upper social estates—those of the gentry and, in some cases, the aristocracy. Most natives of Ukraine who were engaged in Ukrainian intellectual or political discourses were at the same time members of the Russian imperial nobility and felt at home in the all-Russian public sphere. That was especially true about

Ukrainian academics such as Mykhailo Maksymovych, Osyp Bodians'kyi, or later Mykola Kostomarov, all of whom held chairs in different imperial universities. Despite their high social standing and access to the imperial public sphere—literary journals, publishing houses, and university chairs—a proper Ukrainian public sphere remained underdeveloped in terms of institutions and ideology. First, in the 1830s–1840s there was not a single Ukrainian-language periodical (with the exception of short-lived literary almanacs which were in fact bilingual Russian-Ukrainian). Second, few natives of Ukraine could associate themselves exclusively with a local—Ukrainian—public sphere without simultaneously placing themselves within Russian cultural or scholarly life. As a result, Ukrainian discourse was badly structured; that is, it lacked clear ideological stances and differences.

During the 1830s–1840s all three sides—Russians, Poles, and Ukrainians—produced the variety of “cultural” and “political” idioms of nationality. The analysis of those idioms is the main focus of my study. A comparative approach is essential, since these groups came to define themselves as a result of their mutual interactions within the Russian Empire (Russians, Ukrainians, and Poles)—my primary focus—and the Austrian Empire (Poles and Ukrainians). Austria's Galicia, the long-contested zone of East Slavic–Polish interactions, is dealt with only to the degree that it is included within the broader “Ideal Fatherlands” of Poles, Ukrainians, and Russians.

. . .

In this study, I explore the representation of “imagined communities” on two levels:

1. *Geography*, that is, how the shifting borders of these communities were reflected on mental maps (as reflected in literary fiction, literary criticism, political journalism, and philosophy)
2. *Idioms of nationality*, or *rhetoric of nationality*,<sup>27</sup> that is, an analysis of (mostly) political and ideological texts, which contain speculations about the basis of national cohesion: a common language, history, religion, political institutions and loyalty, and so on. “Size,” that is, the inclusivity and exclusivity of newly imagined communities, is also considered.

The book begins by identifying the geographical space where imagined communities were mapped. Part I (Chapters 1–3) deals with the territorial extension of imagined communities. The fluctuating boundaries of Poland,

Russia, and Ukraine are shown through the prism of all three counterparts. Significantly, the terms *Ukraine*, *Russia*, and *Poland* used throughout the text belong not to the nineteenth-century geopolitical order but rather to the present-day division of political space. When used in the past, these terms (and in the Ukrainian case also *Little Russia* and *South Russia*) referred not only to established geographical realities but also to categories of mental or philosophical geography. These categories were constantly being defined and redefined in the minds of the East European intelligentsia in both spatial (quasi-geographical) and “national” terms. In the process, the very names were being contested and negotiated. Even *Russia*, which could be found on actual maps as a political entity, was an ambiguous category, as it embodied the confusion between (visible) empire and (hidden) nationality (ethnic Great Russia *per se*). Most important here are the dynamics of the Russo-Polish-Ukrainian encounter as reflected in mental geography.

With regard to midnineteenth-century geography, the primary focus of Polish-Ukrainian-Russian interaction was the “South-Western region” of the Russian Empire. This region, also known as Right Bank Ukraine, comprised the imperial provinces of Kyiv, Podolia, and Volhynia. At that time Poles considered those provinces to be the “South-Eastern borderlands” of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. If the Right Bank was a focal point for the Polish-Russian-Ukrainian encounter, the rest of present-day Ukraine (Left Bank Ukraine, Sloboda Ukraine, and New Russia) was of primary importance for the Ukrainian-Russian encounter. To be sure, the spatial dimension of all three communities greatly exceeded the above territories; therefore, other contested “national” regions (such as Galicia) are also taken into account.

I connect each imagined category to a particular set of issues. For Poles it was the quest to regain symbolic and political control over lost territories, in particular the “South-Eastern borderlands,” in order to return them to the framework of the “historical” and “natural” borders of Poland. By the same token, Poles understood the category “Russia” as an artificial entity without a dominant nationality. Among Polish authors, I included either those who came from the “South-Eastern borderlands” (Józef Ignacy Kraszewski and Michał Grabowski) or those who ascribed a prominent role to that region in their vision of Poland and Russia (for example, Maurycy Mochnacki and Joachim Lelewel).

The selection of Russian authors for Part I was determined by their Great Russian ethnic background, their attention to Russia’s western bor-

derlands (such as the space of Russo-Polish-Ukrainian encounter), and no less importantly their Great Russian ideological position within “national” debates. Their main concern was the “national-imperial complex,” that is, the challenge of how to reduce the gap between nationality and empire in Russia. Among their responses to that challenge was the confusion of spatial frontiers between imperial and national identities,<sup>28</sup> and the construction of a dominant nationality consisting of all Orthodox East Slavs of the empire. It was often impossible to show on real or on mental maps the point where the exclusive Russian national identity ended and a more inclusive imperial identity began. The concept of “Russia” might include the entire empire, or only territories populated by Orthodox East Slavs, or only Great Russia.

The Ukrainian case is presented as a search for a “national” territory, including its very name. The “Ukrainian” vision was that of East Slavic Orthodox observers who came from the lands of present-day Ukraine, and is irrespective of their ideological stance or identity. The most patriotic among them (whether of traditional Little Russian or more modern Ukrainian convictions) claimed the same territories that Poles and Russians assumed were part of their own mental geographies. Not only did Ukrainians have to justify the territorial unity of their “ideal Fatherland”; they also had to find a name for their country, which was situated in a space where historic Poland and the “all-Russian nation” intersected.<sup>29</sup>

After considering in Part I the patterns of mental geographies, where imagined communities were represented as *territorial* communities, in Part II (Chapters 4–6) I address how imagined communities were represented as *national* communities; how inclusive and exclusive they were; and most importantly, which idioms were used to represent them. These chapters thus deal with the structure of idioms used to delimit the “national” content of the imagined communities. This is not to say that all imagined communities were *national* in the contemporary sense. To the contrary, the idioms of nationality were coexisting and competing with more traditional ideas about collective bonds, such as loyalty to the ruler, dynasty, or religion, which often referred to prenational societies but could also be appropriated by the “builders” of nationalities.

First, I consider the general view of selected East European writers on nationality—its definition and idioms. What was the place of language, religion, history, political loyalties and institutions, and ethnography in those idioms? The basis for national (or supranational, that is, imperial) cohesion is analyzed for all three cases. Second, I look at the specific con-

texts in which idioms of nationality were applied: Russian and Ukrainian for Polish authors, Ukrainian and Polish for Russian authors, and Russian and Polish for Ukrainian authors. The treatment of neighbors (or even the rejection or ignorance of their existence) helps us analyze the changing self-representations of national communities under the influence of “others.” Finally, the inclusiveness or “size” of imagined communities is considered in each particular case. For example, on a general level, the dominant idiom of Russianness could be Orthodoxy, the respective Russian nationality encompassing all the Orthodox (and mostly East Slavic) inhabitants of the empire. Orthodoxy as an idiom of Russianness could be used to underscore the differences between (Orthodox) Russians and (Catholic) Poles. This configuration of imagined community could be called the “all-Russian nation.” Proponents of this national configuration could modify both the idiom and the “size” of nationality if they “noticed” the existence of Ukrainians. In this case, Orthodoxy could not be the idiom of Russianness since Ukrainians were also Orthodox, and therefore other idioms had to be emphasized such as language and ethnography. The size of “Russians” thus fluctuated, depending on who was included in that category—the entire “all-Russian nation” or the ethnic (Great) Russians only. As another example, some Polish democrats could emphasize political culture or history as idioms of Polishness in general, but could reluctantly point to Roman Catholicism as a pillar of Polishness to show their difference from “schismatic Russians.” Poles, however, largely rejected religion as an idiom in order to avoid “domestic” strife, mostly between the Catholic ethnic Poles and the Orthodox Ruthenians, who were considered to be part of a common “Polish nation.” A similar pattern worked in all three “national” cases.

The “nation-centered idioms,” or idioms of nationality, are analyzed in different ideological “circles,” roughly split into three conventional groups: (1) conservative, loyalist, or progovernmental; (2) liberal, centrist, or democrat; and (3) radical or leftist. The structure of circles for each of three cases roughly reflects the field of political imagination where idioms of nationality were utilized.

Idioms of nation-ness are divided into several main categories shown in Table 2, while Table 3 indicates major participants of the ideological fields in each national case. For example, in their efforts to map the new virtual Poland, Polish intellectuals adopted the discourse of historical legacy and were therefore reluctant to use ethnocultural and linguistic

arguments.<sup>30</sup> For their part, Russians often used pseudohistorical and legitimist arguments. There is an ongoing discussion about what constituted the basis of Russian national identity in different times. Was it the Orthodox religion (as argued by the Slavophiles),<sup>31</sup> the Russian language (for the enlightened bureaucrats),<sup>32</sup> or political loyalty to autocracy (for figures like Konstantin Leontiev and Mikhail Katkov)?<sup>33</sup> In their efforts to exclude the “other,” Russians espoused religion as an idiom of nationality when dealing with Poles, while emphasizing language and ethnography

TABLE 2 Types of nation-centered idioms

<i>ethnolinguistic</i>	<i>Types of Idioms</i>				
	<i>mental or spiritual</i>	<i>ethnic or natural</i>	<i>institutional or political</i>	<i>religious</i>	<i>social</i>
ethnography (clothing, customs, mores), folklore language/dialect, literature, (folk) history	“spirit”/ “idea” of nationality, “national character,” “substance,” “love for the fatherland,” common goals	ethnic origins, “race,” “tribe,” geography (land, territory), climate	loyalty to the ruler or autocracy, state, democracy, citizenship/ place of birth ( <i>jus soli</i> ), political culture/values, (state) history	Orthodoxy, Catholicism	nobility, commoners/ peasants

TABLE 3 Major participants of the ideological “fields”

<i>cases</i>	<i>conservatives, loyalists, progovernmentalists</i>	<i>liberals, centrists, democrats</i>	<i>radicals, leftists</i>
Polish	Adam Czartoryski’s émigré circle; Russian loyalists (Michał Grabowski, Henryk Rzewuski, et al.)	Polish Democratic Society; Joachim Lelewel’s groups; General Dwernicki’s groups; unaffiliated émigrés	Communes of the Polish People; Henryk Kamieński; Edward Dembowski
Russian	“official nationality” circle (Sergei Uvarov, Stepan Shevyrev, Mikhail Pogodin); “dynastic conservatives” (Count Benckendorff, Stepan Burachek, Fadei Bulgarin)	Slavophiles (Ivan Kireevskii, Aleksei Khomiakov, Konstantin Aksakov); Nikolai Polevoi; Nikolai Nadezhdin	the Decembrists (Pavel Pestel’, Nikita Muraviev, Mikhail Lunin); young Petr Viazemskii; Vissarion Belinskii; Valerian Maikov; Mikhail Bakunin
Ukrainian	“Little Russian patriots” (Stepan Burachek, Nikolai Gogol, Iurii Venelin); “all-Russian patriots”	“academic” circle (Mykhailo Maksymovych, Osyp Bodians’kyi, Amvrosii Metlyns’kyi)	Sts. Cyril and Methodius circle (Panteleimon Kulish, Mykola Kostomarov, Taras Shevchenko, et al.)

when addressing the Ukrainians. When, however, Russians ignored the existence of a distinct Ukrainian community or emphasized the idea of an all-Russian identity, they again used Orthodoxy as a dominant idiom of nationality. Depending on time and space, the limits of Russian imperial and national identities were changing. The exclusivity and inclusivity of any imagined community—that is, the place of “others” in it and the simple rejection or recognition of ethnonational differences—were modified by dominant idioms of Polishness, Russianness, and Ukrainianness used in every particular case. On the other hand, the presence of the “other” could itself influence the choice of those idioms and therefore could modify the spatial-national configuration of an imagined community.

This book traces the dynamics of “idiomatic” exchange between intellectuals who claimed to represent and speak on behalf of Poles, Russians, and Ukrainians. I show the interrelationship between the idioms of nationality and the presence of the “other,” whether as a minority within a given community or as a neighboring community that often influenced national self-representations. For the Poles, Ukrainians could be an internal “other,” while Russians were the neighboring nationality that often defined Polish self-representation (on the basis of Catholicism or democratic civic values versus Orthodoxy and autocratic Russia). There was also a struggle for the representation and naming of an imagined community, both among different ideological circles within the community and between the representatives of different nationalities. Put another way, different visions of nation-ness competed with each other within and beyond “national” boundaries. Thus, the Polish Democratic Society, in its struggle to represent Polishness, felt obliged to reject a Russian imperial vision as well as to impose its own “democratic” version of Polishness on all other Polish groups. An imagined community therefore could be represented either as a distinct nationality or as part of a larger community (the “all-Russian nation” or the historic “Polish nation”).

Sometimes representatives of one nationality claimed only a part (social or regional) of another. For example, Poles considered Orthodox “Ruthenian” peasants from Right Bank Ukraine as part of the Polish nationality, while some Ukrainian literati regarded “Polonized” Catholic nobles from the same region as potentially part of the Ukrainian nationality. To be sure, many Russians (among them the radical Pestel’ and the conservative Uvarov) considered both Little Russian peasants and Polish nobles residing in the “South-Western region” to be part of the “all-Russian na-

tion” (true, the nobles had yet to undergo some cultural Russification, but their peasants were already “Russian” enough). For most Russians and Ukrainians, however, the Orthodox religion defined the boundaries of their respective nationalities, so that Catholic Poles could not easily be considered part of their communities. By contrast, Poles generally welcomed all faiths within their inclusive nationality (although in this equation, Jews posed a special problem).

While analyzing “nation-centered idioms,” I also consider each “national” case in connection with certain specific issues (similar to the level of mental geography). In general, the “national” content of imagined communities was closely related to their geographical expression. The Polish challenge (dealt with in Chapter 4) consisted of an effort at reimagining Poland as a modern nationality within historical borders. The combination of historical legitimism (legal arguments) with Romantic nationalism (ethnolinguistic arguments) led to a painful disillusionment. The Poles, who were forced to exist as a “community of tradition and spirit” beyond existing political borders,<sup>34</sup> could not find an adequate “body” big enough to encompass an imagined community of “twenty million.” In the case of Russia (Chapter 5), particular attention is given to the “national-imperial complex”<sup>35</sup> in order to show how Russians grappled with imperial and national loyalties. The functions of the “all-Russian nation” are also studied. It was Ukraine (with brotherly Russian help, to be sure) that effectively deprived the Polish “spirit” of half its prospective twenty-million “body.” Represented as a Herderian nationality (ethnolinguistic arguments) in search of its social and symbolic space, Ukraine was instrumental in the “unmaking” of the Polish nationality (Chapter 6). Consequently, the unity of the “all-Russian nation” itself was put in danger, something that Russians noticed already by 1847.

Because of the institutional limits of political imagination, the three “national” cases are not entirely compatible. In contrast to Poles, with their émigré and Galician print shops, Ukrainians lacked a full-fledged public sphere. As a result, many important ideas could not be expressed, and their fields of political imagination were not clearly structured. The “incompleteness” of those fields corresponded to the “incompleteness” of the social structure of the Ukrainian/Little Russian community. Russians, too, could not boast of open public debates. They had only one prominent political émigré, Mikhail Bakunin, who could freely express his opinions. Others within Russia’s borders could do so only in private papers, secret manifestos, or from exile in Siberia (like the Decembrist Mikhail Lunin).

The selection of personalities and texts for Part II presented the greatest difficulty, one that legitimately raised a question about the representative value of my research. The final selection was based on several principles. First, I chose authors who were the most representative of a certain intellectual trend, or whose views were strikingly original. Therefore, it was not so important which part of the “Ideal Fatherlands” the authors and texts came from, and so émigrés are widely quoted here. Second, the selected authors, in addition to being major national thinkers, had to be perceptive about the Russo-Polish-Ukrainian encounter; that is, they had to deal with the presence of the “other,” whether they included it as a minority within their own national community or treated it as a neighboring nationality. In certain instances, however, people could not be easily squeezed into a particular national circle: such was the stance of Count Henryk Rzewuski, who doubted the persistence of the Polish nationality; or of some natives of Ukraine who rejected any distinctiveness of Ukrainians/Little Russians. In the latter case, a degree of arbitrariness could not be avoided, the decisive factor being a person’s ethnic background. Such an approach represents the political imagination of the time as a realm of constant struggle, negotiation, and possible alternatives with regard to national and other identities.

The authors were grouped into several “fields of political imagination” that roughly corresponded to the three main ideological stances within each “national” case, that is, rightist or progovernmental, centrist or liberal, and leftist or radical. These fields or circles of thought were often intermingled within a particular national case, and were sometimes incompatible with their counterparts from other national cases (for example, the Polish Democratic Society in their mainstream documents could arguably be placed in the center of Polish ideological debates, although the society was even more radical than the far left of the Russian intelligentsia).

Despite its insufficiencies, such a classification does allow us to compare effectively all three national cases, even if only emphasizing their structural differences. At any rate, the analysis of individual worldviews was not as important as the examination of certain paradigms of thinking about nation-ness. It is these paradigms that were at work in the fields of political imagination and were also responsible for the formation of nationalities as imagined and institutional communities.

**Part I Mapping Imagined Communities:  
Mental Geography**



# 1

## “From the Baltic to the Black Sea” Poland’s Borders

### The Polish Vision

After the final disappearance of “Poland” from the map of Europe in 1795, Poles were forced to reinterpret their historical understanding of a “gentry nation” as a “community of tradition and spirit” beyond existing political and social borders.<sup>1</sup> This redefinition of a nationality could have led to a similar redefinition (or at least to an initial confusion) of a traditional Polish geography. But this did not happen. Instead, Poles clung to the familiar patterns of geography, keeping in mind what had disappeared from political maps.

To designate the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Poles used such names as “Poland” (*Polska*), “our Fatherland” (*ojczyzna nasza*), “our provinces” (*nasze prowincje*), or simply “the country/our country” (*kraj/nasz kraj*) and “our land” (*ziemia nasza*). Even when the Poles used the vaguest of designations, like *kraj*, they seemed to know exactly the territorial extent of their virtual country. At the same time, there was an increasing tendency to identify a Poland proper with ethnic Polish territories (for writers Józef Korzeniowski and Józef Ignacy Kraszewski in the 1840s, “Poland” became synonymous with the Congress Kingdom),<sup>2</sup> reserving for other parts of historic Poland, especially for its eastern territories, the term *borderlands* (*kresy*).<sup>3</sup> Not everyone, however, was prepared to reduce “Poland” to its core, the Kingdom of Poland (known also as the Congress Kingdom), which had been created by Russia in 1815.

In the 1830s one of the leaders of the November uprising and later

radical émigré, Maurycy Mochnecki, stubbornly opposed this reductionist tendency and refused to identify “the Congress region” (*kraj kongresowy*), that is, the Congress Poland with Poland proper.<sup>4</sup> In the words of Mochnecki: “The Constitutional Kingdom between the rivers Prosna and Bug is one of those ephemeral creations [*jeden z tych efemerycznych utworów*] in politics that, as we see especially in contemporary history, emerge without an underlying ground [ . . . ], only as a result of protocols and conferences.”<sup>5</sup> Instead, he wrote, Poland was the “republic of all Crown [*koronnych*], Lithuanian, and Ruthenian lands,” adding that Poles “do not get it in a different shape!” (*W innym kształcie i dzisiaj jej nie pojmujemy!*).<sup>6</sup> Mochnecki alluded to the existence of several entities within the Russian Empire that seemingly had equal claims to the name of “Poland.” These were Vistula Poland (*Polska nadwiślańska*), Wilia Poland (*Polska nadwilejska*), Bug Poland (*Polska nadbużańska*), and Dnieper Poland (*Polska naddnieprowa*), all deriving their names from the major local rivers.<sup>7</sup> This taxonomy became popular with Polish émigrés, and as late as the 1850s Franciszek Duchiniński, once a student of Kyiv University, wrote about “Western Poland” or “Vistula Poland” (*Polska nadwiślańska*), along with “Eastern Poland,” consisting of “Dniester Poland” (*Polska naddniestrzańska*) and “Dnieper Poland” (*Polska naddnieprzańska*).<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, nineteenth-century Polish patriots never considered the restoration of a Polish state without the *kresy* (Lithuania, Belarus, and Right Bank Ukraine),<sup>9</sup> and as late as the 1840s they claimed to represent “twenty million” inhabitants of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.<sup>10</sup> The formulation “twenty million,” which became an almost cabalistic number in Polish nationalist demography, clearly referred to *all* the inhabitants of prepartitioned Poland regardless of ethnic background.<sup>11</sup> This inclusive tendency found its expression both in poetry and in politics among writers of all ideological spectrums.

The poetic geography, or *geografia serca* as it was then called, was best encapsulated by a Romantic poet from Galicia, Wincenty Pol, in his poem “Pieśń o ziemi naszej” (The song of our land, 1835), in which he provided a sociocultural description of the lands of prepartitioned Poland. The poet allotted much space to a description of Lithuania and Rus’ at the expense of the ethnically more “Polish” western and northern lands of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. He simply was not familiar with the idea of an ethnically based Poland.<sup>12</sup> Before elaborating on each land, Pol addressed the inhabitants of prepartitioned Poland, making sure that they knew the

full extent of their “native country” (*ziemia*). According to Pol, that country consisted of various ethnic groups that made up one Polish “tribe”:

Do you know, young brother?  
 Your tribes united by common blood?  
 Those Highlanders [from around Cracow] and Lithuanians?  
 And the holy Samogitians and Ruthenians?<sup>13</sup>

Those various Polish “tribes” (*rody*) lived on territory from the Oder River in the west (*Stara ziemia Piasta* or “the old Piast land”) to “Ukraine” and “old Kyiv” in the east, and from the shores of the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea coast, “where in the south flows the Dnieper” (*na południe Dniepr tam płynie!*). In an earlier poem, “Pieśń Janusza” (Janusz’s song), Pol expressed the idea of Poland’s borders “from sea to sea” even more clearly:

I was in Lithuania and in the Crown [Congress] Poland,  
 I was in this and that side,  
     I was here and there;  
 From Beskid [Carpathian] Mountains to the Baltic sea coast,  
 From Lithuania as far as to Zaporozhia [the Dnieper rapids]  
     I know the entire Poland.  
 I know this whole fair tribe,  
 Polish seas and Polish land,  
     And the Polish salt;  
 And I dream of all this, fantasize,  
 And all this is like mine,  
 As if I’m Polish king.<sup>14</sup>

When Polish Romantic poets such as Pol, Mickiewicz, Lenartowicz, or Józef-Bohdan Zaleski sang about their native regions, they did with the understanding that they represented *pars pro toto*; each land (like Ukraine) was only a part of the entire motherland—Poland.<sup>15</sup> They imagined their motherland as a single entity and identified their native land (Ukraine, Lithuania, Podolia) with an “ideological motherland”: the separate “lands” were not only geographical places but also the symbolical embodiment of a common motherland, which contained an entire nationality.<sup>16</sup>

Polish writers, even those who were quite apolitical, always had recourse to the mental geography of prepartitioned Poland. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, while rejecting “the Ukrainian fashion” in Polish literature, charted his own version of the poetic geography of historical Poland: “In

the land that was once Polish, the residents of Cracow, the Highlanders, the Red Ruthenians, the Great Poles, the Lithuanians do not have a peculiar and distinct poetry that is exclusively their own?"<sup>17</sup> Józef Korzeniowski, who lived in the 1830s–1840s in Kyiv and Kharkiv, presented in his novel *Emeryt* (The emeritus) a sort of chart of the provinces whose inhabitants did the most "reading." "In the first place stood Ukraine, then Lithuania, Podolia, followed by Galicia, and finally the Congress Kingdom and Volhynia."<sup>18</sup> As we see, one did not have to be a radical émigré in order to live in the virtual space of a historic Poland. However, Kharkiv, where Korzeniowski spent several years, was outside the boundaries of an imagined Poland. Gustav Olizar, once a leader of Polish gentry of the Kyiv province, while referring to the lands of prepartitioned Poland as "our motherland" (*ojczyzna nasza*), "native country" (*kraj nasz*), or "our provinces" (*nasze prowincye*), unambiguously called the eastern Ukrainian city of Kharkiv a "Muscovite city" (*moskiewskie miasto*).<sup>19</sup>

According to one of the best experts on Polish democratic thought, Sławomir Kalemka, there were no differences among the attitudes of Polish émigré groups on the question of Poland's borders. Their dominant idea was the restoration of Poland according to its 1772 borders, that is, from the Carpathians to the Dvina River and from the Baltic Sea to the lower Dnieper River.<sup>20</sup> The idea of the restoration of Poland's historical borders began to take shape right after the November uprising of 1830–31, especially among the Polish émigrés in France. Long before this, however, Poles had hoped for the union of the Kingdom of Poland—established after the Congress of Vienna in 1815—with eight provinces (*gubernias*) of Russia, several of which had been part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to the 1790s. At first, they placed their hopes in Russian monarchs themselves, particularly Alexander I.<sup>21</sup> Then, during the November uprising, the radicalized Polish diet, on May 5, 1831, proclaimed the incorporation of the "western *gubernias*" into the Polish state, its core being the Congress Kingdom.<sup>22</sup>

One of the first declarations concerning the borders of the future Poland comes from 1832, when the newly established Polish Democratic Society (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie or TDP) outlined its platform. According to the TDP's "Protestation Against Treatises from 1772 Until 1815 That Had Dismembered Poland," "We want the return of Poland's old borders"; in other words, the society hoped to restore Poland to its prepartitioned geographical shape.<sup>23</sup> Here, the eastern borders of Poland went as far as the Dnieper River, which was the border of the

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth prior to the 1790s.<sup>24</sup> In a subsequent “Manifesto” from 1836 the TDP went even beyond the concept of historical (prepartitioned) borders and fantasized about an uprising of those “twenty million” in Poland “from the Oder River and the Carpathians all the way to the Dnieper and the Dvina, and from the Baltic to the Black Sea” (*od Odry i Karpat aż poza Dniepr i Dźwińę, od Bałtyckiego do Czarnego Morza*).<sup>25</sup> TDP leaders like Wiktor Heltman could not imagine a future Polish uprising occurring in a space smaller than that which stretched “from the Oder to beyond the Dnieper and Dvina, from the Baltic to the Carpathians and the Black Sea.”<sup>26</sup>

Maurycy Mochnacki, who was not close to the TDP, also included the Black Sea shore within his “ideological fatherland.” He called for the “restoration of a part of our country that from the cape of Courland stretches to the Black Sea.”<sup>27</sup> The leaders of the TDP used economic arguments when they considered the possibility “of aspiring for a Poland larger than that before 1772”: a Poland “without the provinces adjacent to the Black Sea thus being deprived of a free delivery of its goods from this side, would be the entity not accomplished yet.”<sup>28</sup>

Moderate democrats from the circle of the most famous Polish historian, Joachim Lelewel, shared a territorial program similar to that of the TDP. As early as 1832 the Lelewelist group, known as The Revenge of the People (*Zemsta Ludu*), was preparing a constitution for a free Poland that was patterned on a federative constitution like that of the United States. According to the document, the borders of the new state would be “enveloped by the Black and Baltic Seas, and by the Oder, Dnieper, and Danube rivers.”<sup>29</sup> Each province should be given self-government, which would not, however, conflict with the federal laws.

It is worth noting that in 1836 another Lelewelist group countered the idea of “natural borders,” as advocated by partitioning powers with the idea of Polish historical borders from before 1772, condemning the “disgusting politics that sought deceitfully [*wymyślnie*] natural borders.”<sup>30</sup> It was, however, easy for the Poles to appropriate the idea of “natural” borders. One of the first uses of “natural” borders in political discourse came from Michał Wołłowicz, who perished in 1833 trying to organize another uprising. He elaborated the territorial shape of a new Poland: “We want to have an independent fatherland and to give it the old borders of the Baltic, the Dvina and Dnieper rivers, set against the shores of the Black Sea, the Carpathian Mountains, and the course of the Oder River.”<sup>31</sup>

In the mid-1830s the formula of Poland's "natural" borders began to dominate all ideological flanks, as reflected in a statement by yet another liberal group in 1837: "Poland [is] united and undivided [*Polska jedna i nierozdzielna*]. From the Oder to the Dnieper, and from the Baltic to the Black Sea [*po Euxyn od Bałtyku*], these are the borders of its mightiness. Such a Poland will respond with dignity to its calling and fulfill its high mission among the Slavs."<sup>32</sup> In 1847, the philosopher Bronisław Trentowski summed up the idea of Poland's natural borders from sea to sea using not only the arguments of nature per se but also those of race and civilization. The natural situation of Polish lands cried out for a distinct state separated by nature itself from Asian civilization and race:

The natural situation of Poland is such that it should and ought to become a separate state. Already its thousand-year old distinctiveness bears witness to this [ . . . ]. On the north Poland is surrounded by the Baltic, on the south the Tatra Mountains and the Black Sea make their appearance. From the Baltic but rather from the Courland haven to the Black Sea there spread out wide steppes, deserts, and swamps filtered by huge rivers, which create a deep semicircle and make entry difficult, beyond which the land and its inhabitants take on an absolutely different, Asiatic character, losing altogether the mark of a Caucasian race.<sup>33</sup>

A similar idea was expressed in the ideology of Prince Adam Czartoryski, who can be called the main geopolitical thinker among Polish émigrés. In an anonymous article in the French-language periodical *Le Polonaise*, he divided the Russian Empire into three "national" belts, the first of which included Poland stretching from the Baltic port of Palanga to the Black Sea port of Odessa ("*la Pologne . . . depuis Polangen jusqu' à Odessa*").<sup>34</sup> Czartoryski and his conservative circle, though initially invoking the spirit of the 1815 Congress of Vienna,<sup>35</sup> increasingly distanced themselves from any form of legitimism and advocated instead the prepartitioned or "natural" borders of Poland, including the Black Sea shore.<sup>36</sup>

Yet in his note to the English government from 1833, Czartoryski referred to the legality of the Vienna Congress when he demanded the incorporation of "Polish provinces" into the constitutional Congress Kingdom; in his words, the "unification of all Polish provinces with the Kingdom."<sup>37</sup> He called these provinces "Polish from all angles" and pointed to the "identity of the nation" as the main reason for the unification of the eastern lands of the former commonwealth.<sup>38</sup> In one of his letters from 1834, Prince Czartoryski called for the "brotherly union of all provinces that constitute

an old Poland.”<sup>39</sup> The prince called on Poles to develop mutual “action, feeling, and unity” throughout the entire extent of “Polish country” where the “Polish tribe” lived.<sup>40</sup>

The collaborators of Prince Adam Czartoryski developed the broadest territorial agenda for the future Poland. Michał Czajkowski, one of the most active members of the Paris-based Hôtel Lambert, envisioned the border between Poland and a prospective state of the Don Cossacks somewhere in the “steppes of Voronezh and Kharkiv, along the border that once separated Poland from Muscovy.”<sup>41</sup> The city of Kharkiv most probably was to appear on the Polish side. Another possibility, though not favored by Czajkowski, was the inclusion of the Don Cossacks in a federation with Poland.

Even for the extremely conservative ex-collaborator of Adam Czartoryski, Waclaw Jablonowski, who suddenly turned into a Romanov dynasty loyalist, the devotion to a separate Congress Poland was yet another “negation [*negacja*] of nationality and integrity of the country.”<sup>42</sup> Instead, Jablonowski wanted the restoration of a prepartitioned Poland under the Romanov dynasty.

The utopian socialists from the group called “The Polish People” (*Lud Polski*) also stood for the 1772 borders. In their programmatic documents, they stated that they wanted “a Poland of 20 million [people].”<sup>43</sup> Propagating the idea of a separate fatherland for the common people (*lud*) as opposed to the gentry, they argued against the independence of the Congress Kingdom alone:

it is only gentry that can desire [the preservation of] Congress Poland, because they know it is the only way they are able to preserve their privileges and power to oppress miserable folk. We found out at last that the Polish cause is a European one, and that the Poland we aspire for will be the bulwark of European civilization while the Congress Poland would be just another ally of a tsar of Russia.<sup>44</sup>

There was, however, one dissenting voice, that of the democratic émigré Michał Kubrakiewicz, who published the pro-Russian and fervently anti-German treatise *Uwagi polityczne i religijne* (Political and religious considerations, 1839). In it, he doubted the usefulness of the Polish advance into the east, and the union with Lithuania in particular, which in his view had weakened Poland and caused “religious and civil wars with the Orthodox, Cossacks, and Muscovites.”<sup>45</sup> Instead, the “cradle of Poland” was situated between the cities of Gniezno, Poznań, Wieliczka, Crakow, Tarnów, and Lviv, which were “in the hands of Germans,” the worst enemies of the Poles.

In the opinion of most democrats, however, only a Poland that was large enough, unified, and set in historical, or even better, “natural” borders could become a viable democratic state. Therefore, the Congress Kingdom—which Mochnacki called a “Vistula piece” (*kawałek nadwiślański*)—as the creation of aristocrats and legitimists, did not appeal to the democrats. At the same time, the unifying trend expressed itself also as the rejection of a multinational and federalist character for the future Poland, especially by those on the left (the TDP), who were influenced by the French Jacobin centralizing model.<sup>46</sup> The camp of Lelewel and especially Czartoryski’s Hôtel Lambert, through the “Society of Lithuania and the Lands of Rus’,” advocated a somewhat federated model of state.<sup>47</sup> The idea of centralization, however, corresponded to the general tendency of Polish émigré thought to connect the question of Poland’s borders with the unity of all ethnic groups living within the borders of historical Poland.<sup>48</sup>

What became obvious in poetry (as in Wincenty Pol’s poems) found even more explicit expression in political declarations. In other words, Poland encompassed all the lands where the inhabitants of a prepartitioned Poland lived, no matter their ethnicity. Around 1836 one émigré group defined the borders of Poland through the different regional groups of “Poles,” and even here the geography of an old republic shaped its ethnography: “A Ukrainian, Kashubian, Ruthenian, an inhabitant of Great and Little Poland, Lithuanian, Podolian, Samogitian [*Żmudzini*], Mazurian, Volhynian, and the son of any other land of an old Republic are Poles. This is the only name in which we see our unity.”<sup>49</sup>

There were even more-radical voices refuting regional differences within a presumably indivisible Poland. Such was the view of Józefat Bronisław Ostrowski, the editor of *Nowa Polska* (The new Poland), a periodical close to the TDP. In his radically united Poland, there was no place for any provinces and separate uprisings:

There is no Lithuania! There is no Rus’! There is no Mazovia! There is no Great and Little Poland! There are no local affairs and localities that could have their own life, own action, own uprisings, and own revolutions. There is only Poland [. . .]. You are the Poles! The History of our country will show that it is through the influence of Poland, through the adaptation of its civilization, and intellectual superiority, as well as through imitation of its rights and political democratic institutions, you are not the tsar’s slaves [. . .]. The dream about Lithuania and Ruthenia, which is based on a premise that among united and inseparable Poland, as is God, there could be notions of independent [political] existence, is either silliness or political crime.<sup>50</sup>

Unlike poets, who were always sensitive to linguistic, ethnic, and cultural differences within historical Poland and who managed to express the local colors in their works,<sup>51</sup> political thinkers and activists rejected any kind of federalist idea as detrimental to the unity of the nation and to democracy as well. In this case the democrats appealed to French revolutionary traditions, while at the same time rejecting the federalist model of the United States as not viable for a democratic Poland.<sup>52</sup> According to the TDP, federalism would undermine the unity of the nation by splitting it into pieces. To be granted equal civil rights, historic provinces (like Rus', Lithuania, or Samogitia) had to be deprived of any distinctiveness. Hence, the TDP periodical endorsed the idea of a unitary Polish nation-state: "A Pole from the region of Warta River or from that of Vistula, Nieman or Dniester, from the river Styr or San should be one and the same Pole [*jednym i tym samym Polakiem*]."<sup>53</sup>

In 1834, one of the most radical members of the TDP, Tadeusz Krępowiecki, strongly opposed any federalist ideas and provincial loyalties, condemning in particular the Society of Lithuania and the Lands of Rus' for the alleged restoration of "a feudal system":

Poland needs a dictatorial body, dictatorship of thought. The latter would erase the attributes of Lithuanian, Samogitian, Ruthenian because it is the unhappy thought to split into provinces. Those who establish the Lithuanian and Ruthenian societies argue that they do so to protest against Russia as those who united with Poland. When did Europe need to see that Lithuania and Rus' united with Poland? Europe does not see Poland other than in her old borders before 1772 [ . . . ]. In revolutionary times, to renew memories about feudal affairs is to sin against the unity and integrity of the country [ . . . ]. There is something about a federal system that is so harmful in practice. Its spirit is provincial and a mark of territorial egoism.<sup>54</sup>

Poles indeed believed, even if naively, that the population of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was somehow united, but what exactly could unite territory and population was left open to discussion. Some radicals, like Henryk Kamiński, thought that it was only the common folk (*lud*) that were "able to establish the unity of an entire Poland."<sup>55</sup> For the dissident member of the TDP, Piotr Semenenko, it was "the Ruthenian folk" (*lud ruski*), as "the strongest element" (*pierwiastek najpotężniejszy*) and "the heart of [the] Slavic body" (*serce sławiańskiego ciała*), that had to unite Polish nationality.<sup>56</sup> More realistic, however, was the view that Poland was the embodiment of its Polish-speaking gentry in all histori-

cal parts of the former state.<sup>57</sup> For example, the politically radical but socially conservative Maurycy Mochnacki thought that Poland (especially in its eastern borderlands) was represented primarily by the Polish-speaking gentry: “Ancient Poland in its ancient borders stands today on the masses in the Kingdom of Poland and on the gentry in the so-called annexed provinces [*zabrananych guberniach*].”<sup>58</sup> He was even more explicit in stating that in Ukraine (*na Rusi*) “it is the Polish gentry [*obywatele Polacy*] that constitutes Poland in that region.”<sup>59</sup>

Elsewhere Mochnacki suggested more passionately that the gentry “is the breathing air of our land, which safeguarded and still safeguards it after the partitions beyond the Bug and Wilia rivers, from the cape of Courland to Zaporozhia and the Carpathians.”<sup>60</sup> This view, although in a much less explicit form, could be expressed not only by a radical émigré but also by quite loyal authors, like Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, who lived in the Russian Empire. In his extremely popular novel *Latarnia czarnoksiężka* (The magic lantern, 1843), Kraszewski characterized the gentry inhabitants from different regions of historical Poland who gathered in Kyiv on the occasion of the city’s annual fair. He painted images of a Galicjanin (from the Austrian province of Galicia), a Koroniarz (from Russia’s Kingdom of Poland), a Wielkopolanin or Poznańczyk (from Prussia’s region of Great Poland or the Great Duchy of Poznań), a Litwin (from historical Lithuania, then part of Russia), a Podolanin, and a Ukrainiec (both from parts of today’s Ukraine).<sup>61</sup> There is no doubt that in Kraszewski’s mind these members of a gentry class symbolized the entire Poland, which at least once a year (during the January trade fair) could claim Kyiv as its eastern frontier.

When Polish observers did not find the Polish associations of a certain locality in the *contemporary* world, as was the case with Odessa and the Black Sea coast, or even with Kyiv, they sought them instead in the remote and often mythological past. These purposes served travelogues with rich “historical” replicas like those of Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, who sought to prove that Odessa, as part of historical Podole or Ukraina in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, belonged to the Polish crown.<sup>62</sup>

Some political émigrés looked for the Polish *space* in an even more remote and legendary past. For example, Piotr Semenenko found such a unifying moment at the time of the early medieval Polish king Bolesław the Brave (*Chrobry*), who supposedly ruled over a huge territory between the Saale River in the west and the Dnieper River in the east.<sup>63</sup>

The same historical figure attracted the attention of the Catholic democrat Józef Ordega, who wrote about the king's "Catholic army," which brought "the light of Christ to the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea."<sup>64</sup> An anonymous author of the periodical *Demokrata Polski* (The Polish democrat) called for the restoration of the ancient "Polish federation" (*federacja lechicka*) of Bolesław the Great (*Wielki*) "from the Oder River to the Dnieper, and from the Baltic to the Danube," including the lands of Silesia, Bohemia, and Moravia.<sup>65</sup> These were attempts to legitimize geographical fantasies and to make "natural" borders look more "historical."

Sławomir Kalembka aptly remarked that Polish émigrés aspired for historical borders in the east and for ethnic borders in the west.<sup>66</sup> This gave them a pretext to claim the ethnically non-Polish territories up to the Dnieper River in the east as part of "historical" Poland around 1772, and at the same time claim the ethnically Polish territories in the west (including the Baltic shore), which were not part of Poland on the eve of the partitions. However, the imagined geography of Poland "from sea to sea" clearly exceeded the borders of a repartitioned Poland and Polish ethnolinguistic settlement. The Polish claim to the Black Sea can hardly be considered a "historical" or "ethnic" border. This claim expressed rather the idea of a "natural" border, and was already a clear sign of a potentially expansionist tendency of Polish geopolitical thought. The idea of "natural" borders, which deemed the 1772 borders to be insufficient for a future Poland, became the dominant concept for Polish émigrés and led to painful tensions with the nascent Lithuanian and Ukrainian intelligentsias from the midnineteenth century. To the extent that the historical or natural borders of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth defined the geographical boundaries of the "Polish nation," it is possible to speak about *geographical legitimism* in Polish political imagination. In this sense, the idea of the Polish nationality was constructed out of the mental geography of Poland.<sup>67</sup> Put another way, geography led to ethnography.

## The Ukrainian Vision

The Ukrainian vision of Poland's boundaries was quite unformed and focused mainly on those parts of the Polish mental map which included Right Bank Ukraine or the territory claimed by Ukrainian literati for their own maps. One should also point to the anti-Polish aspect of Little Russian historical ideology, which for centuries had been a cornerstone of local

identities. The Ukrainian vision dismantled the Polish space and robbed the Polish imagined community of its significant “Ruthenian” population. To be sure, all those who wrote about Ukrainian territory from the Carpathians to the Caucasus automatically “unmade” Polish nationality, since no sensible Pole was ready to abandon Galicia and Right Bank Ukraine. For Ukrainians, Poland stopped somewhere in the Carpathians. There are only a few sources of the Ukrainian vision of Polish geography, except for those sources that reflected the mapping of Right Bank Ukraine or Galicia without directly confronting Polish maps.

One example of a geopolitical treatment of Polish borders can be found in the legacy of Iurii Venelin, a Slavic scholar who came from Transcarpathian Rus'. For him, “Southerners”—that is, Ukrainians and Belarusians—constituted a majority in almost all provinces that once were part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, including some portions of the Lublin palatinate of the Congress Kingdom.<sup>68</sup> Paradoxically, even such a patriot as Venelin could not help noticing strong Polish connections to Right Bank Ukraine. He had to admit that it was *only* Poles who perceived Rus' as their motherland, whereas local Ukrainians, ashamed of the very names Rus' and Ruthenian, did not address their native country by its name.<sup>69</sup> He therefore pointed to the struggle of the Ruthenians against the Poles for their “cradle.” He could not, however, imagine a situation in which Rus' had to be shared by two conflicting but consanguineous peoples, and he jumped to the conclusion that Poles were not Slavs but Germans by descent. Poles had no more right to call Rus' their motherland than Turks had with respect to Bulgaria and Greece. Despite adopting a Slavic identity, Poles “always were alien to Rus'.”<sup>70</sup> Venelin limited the eastern ethnographic frontier of Poles to the Vistula River, stressing that the southwestern borders of Rus' stretched “all the way to the Vistula” (*splosh do Visly*). While splitting Poles into several ethnic groups, Venelin once again emphasized their Germanic descent:

From the western shore of this river [Vistula] spreading to the west in the depth of Germany, the Polish tribe split into several branches such as Mazurs, Highlanders or Krakowians, and Silesians [Silesii]. This tribe had its natural strong and swelling boundaries: from Russia the Vistula, from the south and south-west the range of the Carpathians and Sudets, from the west the rivers Neisse and Oder. Therefore the cradle of Poles appears to be outside the boundaries of so-called Scythia and so-called Sarmatia, i.e. outside Russia; it was exclusively in Germany and the Poles are exclusively Germanic tribe by descent.<sup>71</sup>

By offering a concept of Poland's natural borders that did not go beyond the Carpathians, Venelin was refuting Polish historical myth about Sarmatian origins of its gentry. Venelin's Poland was also a far cry from the Poland from sea to sea of Polish émigrés since it seemed to be landlocked and deprived of direct access to any sea (even the Baltic). It was Venelin, however, who practically predicted the ethnic borders of present-day Poland, its core gravitating to the west close to Germany rather than to the east. No Pole in the 1830s–1840s was able to envision the borders of the present-day Polish state, deprived of its eastern borderlands yet equipped with long-lost western and southwestern lands, such as Silesia. Not surprisingly, Venelin's vision of Polish borders was shared by generations of Ukrainians and Russians, including the Bolsheviks, who eventually accomplished his territorial program for the Poles.

I was not able to find other comprehensive mental maps of Poland among Ukrainian sources, although a few other texts exist that reveal the Ukrainian-Polish geographical discord. The Polish November uprising with its claims to Right Bank Ukraine incited an angry response from the Russian government and public alike. Ukrainians sided with Russians in what can be called anti-Polish poetics. These events caused the creation of arguably the first Ukrainian-language novella—*Mykola Koval* (1832) by the second-rate writer Mykola (Nikolai) Venger.<sup>72</sup> The story is about a leader of a Ukrainian peasant community, situated somewhere in Right Bank Ukraine, who prevents his Polish master from joining the Polish uprising by having him hanged and then informing the authorities. The space in the novella is split between a rebellious Warsaw, which symbolized Poland, and a Ukrainian-populated countryside loyal to the tsar and hostile to the Poles. Mykola Venger made it clear that Poland had nothing to do with Right Bank Ukraine, which was associated with tsar-loving Ukrainian peasants rather than treacherous Polish lords.

An even more explicitly anti-Polish message can be found in Orest Somov's poetry dating from 1831, which revealed his understanding of a centuries-long Ukrainian-Polish conflict.<sup>73</sup> In a poetic cycle, "The Voice of a Ukrainian on the News About Seizure of Warsaw" (*Golos Ukraintsa pri vesti o vziatii Varshavy*), he condemned the Polish uprising and praised the victory of Russians and Ukrainians over the Poles. He interpreted the uprising and its suppression by the imperial army in terms of a historic struggle of Cossacks against Poland. The first poem, entitled "The Song on the Pacification of Warsaw," depicted the Polish uprising as just another attempt

of the Poles to invade Ukraine, while the subsequent suppression of this attempt was presented as the revenge of the Ukrainians. In Somov's vision, the Polish uprising was the "evil creation of Hell" and "the ulcer of an arrogant mind" that came to "Russian boundaries" from outside, presumably from Europe. He made it clear that there was no Poland inside the "Russian boundaries." In addition, he devoted much space to praising the deeds of Prince Ivan Paskevich, a Russian commander-in-chief of Ukrainian Cossack background, who protected "Holy Rus'" from the "ulcer" with his "Rus' chest" ("*I ot iazvy Rus' sviatuiu / Russkoi grud'iu otstoial*").<sup>74</sup> Paskevich appeared as "the son of Ukraine," above whom moved "a native [*sople-mennaia*] shadow of the great Bohdan [Khmelnys'kyi]." Bohdan's shadow professed supernatural help to its Ukrainian heir in the battle against Poles, who once again threatened Ukraine with a "foreign yoke." In a prophetic speech "from Heaven," Bohdan reminded Poles of the Cossack victory near Zhovti Vody and pointed to Paskevich's victory as the new revenge on Poles for Ukraine's "grievances":

Hey Poles! It is again that in a mighty palm  
 A sword from Zhovti Vody glittered:  
 My knight, the victor of the battle,  
 In a heroic way waved it.  
     How did you dare with a haughty voice  
     To scream blasphemously  
     And with a foreign yoke  
     To threaten Ukraine again?  
 The son of Ukraine the Nemesis  
 Broke again the audacious horn  
 And again for her [Ukraine's] grievances  
 [He] Quickly and menacingly revenged on you!<sup>75</sup>

In a Ukrainian-language poem "A Letter from a Ukrainian to the Poles" (*Lyst od ukraïntsia do liakhiv*), Somov further developed a vision of the Polish uprising and its suppression as a historical struggle of Ukrainians against Poles. He bluntly refuted any Polish claims to Ukraine and Kyiv, which Poles treated as their "property."<sup>76</sup> Once again Somov reminded Poles of Ukraine's grievances before Khmelnyts'kyi's uprising, linking the latter with the image of Prince Paskevich as "the son of Cossack glory" and "tsar's knight."<sup>77</sup> In Somov's poetry, Poland was noticeably absent: there was no place for historic Poland in Ukraine or anywhere else within Russia. In

his second poem, Warsaw served as a geographical metaphor for all of Poland, although the city appeared only to fall under the tsar's "heel" (*p'iata*).<sup>78</sup>

Generally, Ukrainians were not concerned with Polish geography, except when it encroached on Ukrainian ethnic territory, that is, Right Bank Ukraine. Despite a noticeable Polish presence there, Ukrainians never considered these lands as belonging to Poland and treated Polish-speaking and Catholic nobles residing in the three "South-Western" provinces of Russia as mere renegades of Ukrainian descent.<sup>79</sup> One of the students connected to the Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, Heorhii Andruz'kyi, even suggested the reconversion of local gentry to Orthodoxy.<sup>80</sup> Andruz'kyi also designed a utopian plan for the geopolitical reconstruction of Eastern Europe on the basis of national and historical entities, which he called "states" (*shtaty*).<sup>81</sup> One of the proposed states was to be Poland "with Poznań, Lithuania, and Samogitia [*Zhmud'*]" but deprived of Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia, territories that were to constitute a separate state. Andruz'kyi's mental map of Poland did not constitute a total rejection of historical geography for the sake of ethnography, since he imagined Poland as combined with historic Lithuania, including Lithuanian and Belarusian ethnic lands. What was remarkably Romantic nationalist here was the understanding that Poland in its prepartitioned shape had no place in a new national world based on nationalities and smaller geographical entities.

Ukrainian Romantics were preoccupied not so much with the geography of Poland as with the justification of its partitions, which were perceived as punishment for sins committed by the Poles. As one could expect, the ultimate victim of Poland was Ukraine. Paradoxically, this was also the vision of several Polish Romantics and political émigrés, such as Juliusz Słowacki and Tadeusz Krępowiecki. Such was also the vision of Mykola Kostomarov, a founder of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Society and the author of the political treatise *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People*. It is not Poland but Ukraine that was first "torn apart"—by the Poles and Russians.<sup>82</sup> Eventually, however, each Slavic nationality, whether Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenes, Illyrians-Serbs, or Bulgarians, would establish a separate republic in a common federation.<sup>83</sup> Kostomarov did not elaborate on the geographical shape of a future Poland within the proposed federation, but one could be sure that it would not have included Ukrainian-inhabited lands. Among the list of Slavic nationalities conspicuously absent were Belarusians, who perhaps had to remain within Polish borders or were expected to join the Russian republic.

There was a universal consensus among Ukrainians about the eastern borders of Poland. Quite simply, there was no place for Poland east of the Carpathians. In poetry, Poland was metaphorically reduced to Warsaw, although in political texts it could be as large and historic as to include ethnic Lithuanian and Belarusian lands. In the end, the Ukrainian attitude toward Poland was not exclusively Romantic and nationalist and allowed for a certain dose of geographical legitimism.

### The Russian Vision

Despite the best efforts of Russian ideologists, many Russians remained confused about the limits of Poland. While Poland was politically part of the Russian Empire, in ethnic and cultural terms it clearly exceeded the boundaries of the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland. Imperial Russia's highest governing circles, who often reflected an official, conservative mind-set, were themselves lacking a clear vision of Polish geography. As seen from the records of Count Benckendorff, a close aide to Nicholas I and the founding father of the Russian political police, there were those who chose not to notice any Poland at all. In their vision, the Kingdom of Poland (or Congress Kingdom) should be split into "Russian provinces," with the rich estates along the banks of the Vistula River going to Russian aristocrats, and a tsarist administration functioning in place of a local constitution.<sup>84</sup> Benckendorff himself was against these opinions, considering them as lacking "logical arguments." The curious thing, however, was that despite official efforts to prove the "Russian" character of Russia's South- and North-Western provinces, Benckendorff in his semiofficial records constantly attributed them to Poland. He referred to the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as either "Poland and its provinces" (*Pol'sha i ee provintsii*) or "the Kingdom" and "Polish provinces" (*pol'skie provintsii*)—that is, the Kingdom of Poland along with the South- and North-Western provinces of Russia populated mostly by East Slavs, Lithuanians, and Jews but dominated by the Polish nobles.<sup>85</sup> For him, these lands were not regular parts of Russia.

The Russian political dissident Mikhail Lunin would have agreed with the tsarist prosecutor Count Benckendorff as to the connection between Poland proper (or the Kingdom of Poland) and the nine "western" provinces of Russia. Lunin recognized that Poland was a much larger entity than the truncated and landlocked Congress Kingdom, the borders

of which “encompassed only one seventh part of Polish territory and one sixth [part] of its population.”<sup>86</sup> However, while being aware of the extension of Poland well beyond the borders of the kingdom, he argued against the official designation of former eastern Polish lands as “the provinces returned from Poland” (*vozvrashchennye ot Pol'shi gubernii*). According to Lunin, that official formulation was not “precise” because it also included lands that were never part of Russia (like Lithuania); the term was not “complete” since it did not include Smolensk and Little Russia (which were also “returned,” if somewhat earlier). The formulation—“the provinces returned from Poland”—was also “insulting,” reminding Russia of the epoch of its “humiliation.” Finally, the concept was not “political” because it “bred” hostile feelings among the Poles.<sup>87</sup> Lunin did not propose any better term, and instead referred to these lands interchangeably as “the provinces incorporated to Russia” (*prisoedinennye k Rossii provintsii*), “the Western provinces,” or simply “the Russian provinces.”<sup>88</sup>

Perhaps the most important expert on Polish affairs in imperial Russia was Prince Petr Viazemskii, who spent his youthful years (1817–21) in Warsaw as a Russian official and who remained all his life a lover of Polish culture. For Viazemskii “Poland” usually meant the Kingdom of Poland,<sup>89</sup> although he was acutely aware of other “Polish” lands, including Russia’s “Western provinces.” Like Count Benckendorff, Prince Viazemskii called these lands “Polish provinces”<sup>90</sup> and did not emphasize their ethnic links to Russia proper except for the fact that they were “regions stamped [*zapechatlennye*] for us with the blood of our fathers.”<sup>91</sup>

For many Russians, “Poland” was synonymous with the Kingdom of Poland, that is, territories inhabited primarily by ethnic Poles. Such a perception was reflected even in “poetic geography,” as in a poem by Nikolai Ogarev in which Warsaw was described as the capital of “Poland,” meaning the Kingdom of Poland.<sup>92</sup> Sometimes, in poetry, the concept of Poland was reduced even further to be synonymous with the city of Warsaw. This was the case with Alexander Pushkin. His notoriously famous poems “Borodinskaia godovshchina” (The Borodino anniversary) and “Klevetnikam Rossii” (To the slanderers of Russia) so vehemently condemned the 1830 Polish uprising that they evoked a critical reception even from the poet’s close friend Prince Viazemskii, who privately distanced himself from such “geographical fanfaronades.” “Our actions in Poland,” Viazemskii wrote, “will throw us back by 50 years behind the European civilization [*prosveshcheniia*]. Whether or not we pacified Poland does not matter: we

have lost our case.” For the poetically sensitive Viazemskii, the appointment of a good governor in Riazan’ or Vologda was a more appropriate subject for poetry than “the conquest of Warsaw.” “And from whom did we conquer it, what is this conquest?” reacted the prince in anger.<sup>93</sup>

Viazemskii did not see anything poetic in the suppression of the Polish uprising, and he argued against Pushkin’s comparison between the “conquest” of Warsaw and the battle of Borodino in 1812, or between the eighteenth-century military hero Suvorov and the conqueror of Warsaw, Prince Paskevich.<sup>94</sup> Viazemskii ironically questioned the Russian perception about Warsaw’s geopolitical place: if it belonged to Russia, why was it necessary to “conquer” it or refer to it as “their Warsaw.” With particular anger toward Pushkin, Viazemskii wrote, “Sometimes, Warsaw for you is the enemy city and sometimes—our suburbia [*nash posad*].”<sup>95</sup> Russia for Viazemskii was “a sick, tormented colossus.” He further criticized Russia’s imperial geography for being detrimental to the spread of thought: “I am so bored with these geographical fanfaronades of ours: *From Perm to Tauris* etc. What is good here? Should one be happy and proud about the fact that we are so spread out [*v rastiashku*], and that there are five thousand versts from one *thought* to another [in Russia]?”<sup>96</sup> Here, Viazemskii was alluding to Pushkin’s poem “To the Slanderers of Russia,” which presented a highly imperialistic view of geopolitics and geopoetics. The Polish uprising had given him the ideal opportunity to fashion himself as a national poet and to present Russia as a united, coherent nation vis-à-vis Europe.<sup>97</sup>

Pushkin’s reaction, however, summed up the negative attitude of a majority of the Russian public toward the Polish uprising.<sup>98</sup> For him Poland was a metageographical entity practically equal to Warsaw; moreover, both were doomed to fall:

So happened—and in the day of Borodino  
 Once again our flags invaded  
 The broken walls of Warsaw, fallen once again;  
 And Poland as a running squad,  
 In dust throws a bloodied flag--  
 And a crushed mutiny is silent<sup>99</sup>

Pushkin was also sensitive about geographical claims put forth by Polish nationalists for Right Bank Ukraine (“Bohdan’s legacy”) and historic Lithuania. He made sure that to the east of the Bug River, in Volhynia, and in Lithuania there was no place for Poland and that Kyiv, as “this ancestor

of Russian cities,” had nothing to do with “fierce Warsaw.” In other words, Poland simply lacked historical credentials to claim Ukraine<sup>100</sup>:

Tell, how fast will Warsaw  
Prescribe to us its proud law?

Where will we pull back the range of fortresses?  
Beyond the Bug, to the Vorskla, to the Dnieper delta?  
With whom will stay Volhynia?  
With whom Bohdan's legacy?  
Having recognized the rebellious rights,  
Will Lithuania secede from us?  
Our ancient, golden-domed Kyiv,  
This ancestor of Russian cities,  
Will it bring closer with a fierce Warsaw  
The holiness of all its coffins?<sup>101</sup>

Pushkin also was among those who rejected any idea of an autonomous Kingdom of Poland, calling instead for the creation of a Warsaw province.<sup>102</sup> During the uprising the poet followed closely the Russian-Polish conflict, carefully noting each advancement of tsarist troops.<sup>103</sup> In a letter to Viazemskii, Pushkin fervently desired “to strangle” Poles and considered “Poland's mutiny” a familial, ancient, and hereditary conflict.<sup>104</sup>

Another Russian writer and philologist, Vladimir Dal', in his novella *A Girl from Podolia* (Podolianka), also touched upon the sensitive issue of the Polish November uprising, which he used as a background for his lyrical narrative. Set in Right Bank Ukraine (in and around the towns of Kamianets' and Kremenets') and in the easternmost region of the Polish Kingdom, Dal's work represented this entire region as the space of a Polish-Russian-Ukrainian encounter, where nobles spoke Polish; military officers, mostly Russian; and local peasants (including *déclassé* nobles), Ukrainian and the “Mazurian dialect.”<sup>105</sup> On a symbolic level the region undoubtedly belonged to the Poles, among whom Russians appeared as intruders (even if Romantic ones).

In contrast to belletrists, geographers and statisticians did seem to know the precise borders of Poland. In 1831, tsarist authorities gave approval to publish a map of the Kingdom of Poland along with a guidebook on its history, geography, and statistics entitled *The Newest Description of the Kingdom of Poland*.<sup>106</sup> Its author, Ilarion Vasiliev, generally identified Poland with Russia's Polish Kingdom, emphasizing its multiethnic char-

acter.<sup>107</sup> It was not surprising that “Poland” did not include Right Bank Ukraine and historic Lithuania. Other scholars seemed to agree with Vasiliev’s view. The geographer Ievdokim Ziablovskii in his highly popular *Geography of the Russian Empire* (1831) treated the Kingdom of Poland (Tsarstvo Pol’skoe) along with Finland as two separate geographical and administrative entities attached to the empire proper.<sup>108</sup> Then he listed Poles after Russians among the “peoples of the Slavic tribe,” although he never suggested that Poland could somehow exist beyond the boundaries of the Russian-ruled Kingdom of Poland. A prominent statistician and ethnographer, Petr Keppen (Köppen), did not even include the Kingdom of Poland in his ethnographical map of European Russia, instead counting Poles in different imperial provinces.<sup>109</sup> The traveler Vadim Passek similarly omitted the Kingdom of Poland when he listed the most important parts of the Russian Empire. Instead he ascribed relative importance to “the provinces incorporated from Poland,” emphasizing their connection to “Little Russia” (in the case of Right Bank Ukraine).<sup>110</sup>

Yet another geographer and statistician, Konstantin Arseniev, considered the Kingdom of Poland along with Siberia, Transcaucasia, and Finland as countries “which ensure external security of the state” but “do not constitute the essence [*sushchestva*] of the empire.”<sup>111</sup> Similarly to others, he emphasized the separateness of the Kingdom of Poland: it was created in 1815 under the rule of the Russian emperor with a separate constitution but “did not constitute a properly indivisible part of the Empire and instead had to serve as a sort of observational camp from which Russian autocrats could have observed all actions and motions of European cabinets.”<sup>112</sup> Arseniev even suggested that the ideal natural borders of Poland stretched from the Baltic to the Dvina River, which if achieved, could have prolonged the existence of independent Poland until the present. “If Polish kings,” wrote Arseniev, “had bounded their lands with the Baltic shores, and from the Vistula had stretched their domains to the Narva or at least to the Dvina, then Poland would have been until now a strong and unpartitioned [*nerazdel’nym*] state.”<sup>113</sup>

At the same time, Arseniev never considered Right Bank Ukraine or historic Lithuania to be parts of Poland. For him Ukraine and Belarus, as the “inherited legacy of ancient Kiev princes,” were incorporated “for ever into the Russian state.”<sup>114</sup> Arseniev called these lands “the Western provinces” or “[provinces] returned from Poland.” He even used ethnographic arguments to justify the creation, in 1842, of a separate Kovno

(Kaunas) province detached from the Vilna province. The new Kovno province included an ethnically Lithuanian population, which differed from both Poles and polonized Lithuanians by “their distinct life, their own speech, and their own institutions,”<sup>115</sup> all of which further unmade a historical Polish nation. Finally, while splitting most of the empire into ten climatic and agricultural spaces, Arseniev left the Kingdom of Poland outside of his scheme, whereas other former Polish lands, like Lithuania, Belarus, and Right Bank Ukraine, were incorporated into two separate spaces—“Carpathian” (Ukraine) and “Lowland” (Lithuania and Belarus). However, the identity of “southwestern provinces” remained for decades an enigma in Russia.

Count Benckendorff still associated “Poland” with the Right (western) Bank of the Dnieper, and he was not the only one to do so. Different travelers and observers saw numerous associations of Right Bank Ukraine with the former Poland. The Russian memoirist Filip Vigel seemed to express a common misunderstanding about the region and was surprised at seeing in Kyiv province “everywhere Orthodox churches,” hearing “everywhere Little Russian speech,” and only rarely meeting Poles.<sup>116</sup> Then he confessed to sharing his ignorance with “all inhabitants of internal Russia,” who thought that “everything beyond our old border [with Poland] is and always was original [*nastoiashchaia*] Poland.”<sup>117</sup>

Iurii Venelin alluded to the same “ignorance” among Russians about Right Bank Ukraine and Belarus. “Another thing concerns Ruthenians [Rusaki] from Volhynia, Podolia, Grodno [provinces], Belostok and Lublin [palatinates] of the Kingdom of Poland,” wrote Venelin. “These Southerners, in the eyes of a Muscovite, can never be cleansed of Polishness [*Liakhizma*].”<sup>118</sup> A much earlier traveler, Prince Dolgorukov, was particularly confused about the borders of Poland. Once he described a portion of the Kyiv province from the town of Zlatopil to Kyiv as “a piece of old Poland.”<sup>119</sup> At the same time, he was trying to emphasize that the whole region was populated by “Russian citizens” or Ukrainians (he used the word *khokhly*), although he was dismayed to find that Polish was the language of administration and judiciary in the Kyiv province (as if he himself decided to write in German to a senior peasant in his Great Russian estate). He also remarked angrily that “Poles do not teach Russian to their children.”<sup>120</sup> While the strong Polish presence in Right Bank Ukraine did not automatically make the whole region part of Poland, it was enough to confuse the mental maps of Russians.

Enormous efforts on the part of the Russian government in the 1830s–1840s were used to prove that Russia had legitimate rights to rule over the eastern borderlands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For some, Russia's mental map referred to the possessions of the Kyivan grand prince, Iaroslav the Wise, in the first half of the eleventh century. The prominent Russian historian and nationalist journalist Mikhail Pogodin used the arguments of historical legitimism in promoting the cause of the imperial map. The geographical shape of Iaroslav's state suspiciously resembled the territorial gains of Russia after the partitions of Poland: "Iaroslav owned Kiev, Volhynia, Podolia, Galicia, Lithuania, the Baltic Sea coast, Novgorod, Dvina district, Volga district, Northern country [ . . . ]. The borders of Iaroslav's domains were the Baltic Sea, present-day Prussia, the Kingdom of Poland, the Carpathians, New Russian steppes, the Volga, the Ural Mountains, etc."<sup>121</sup> According to Pogodin, Russia took back from Poland only what had belonged to it in medieval times. Therefore, Russia did not conquer Poland, he wrote in 1831; it "only returned those countries that had belonged to her since antiquity by right of first occupancy [*po pravu pervago zaniatiia*], equally to her original domains, in the same way that France owns Paris and Austria owns Vienna."<sup>122</sup> By the same logic, Russia had no less rightful claims to Lithuania than England did to Wales or Ireland, and France to Brittany.<sup>123</sup> At another time (in 1839), Pogodin accepted ethnic principles when defining countries. Writing about the Austrian Empire, Pogodin concluded, "Silesia is a Polish land populated by pure Poles, in the same way that Galicia [is populated] by pure Russians [*chistymi Russkimi*]."<sup>124</sup>

By looking at geography through the prism of nationality, Pogodin deconstructed further the Polish traditional map, denying Poles any claims to the Russian-ruled western provinces and even to Austrian-controlled Galicia. As a kind of compensation, he was ready to recognize Polish claims to Silesia, which obviously was not of equal importance to Poles as were Galicia, Right Bank Ukraine, and Lithuania. Generally, Pogodin dismissed any Polish aspirations for independence.

There were instances, however, when Russians considered the possibility of an independent Poland, although a Poland without most of its eastern borderlands. These concessions came during the second quarter of the nineteenth century, at the time of collaboration between Russian aristocratic revolutionaries (the "Decembrists") and Polish patriots from the Kingdom of Poland and "Polish provinces." The otherwise politically centralist Southern Society, led by Pavel Pestel', made an exception for Poland as a former

political entity, allowing it to form a separate state, unlike other peoples of Russia who “never had and cannot have [their] own statehood.”<sup>125</sup> “According to the right of nationality,” wrote Pestel’ in a document entitled “The Russian Law,” “Russia should grant Poland an independent existence.”<sup>126</sup> Moreover, he was prepared to provide a future Poland with significant territorial gains, including the entire Polish Kingdom, the Grodno province, and the Białystok district. In addition, Russia would cede to Poland parts of the Vilna (Vilnius), Minsk, and Volhynia provinces.<sup>127</sup>

Generally, however, Russian Decembrists argued unambiguously against the inclusion of former eastern Polish lands, which now constituted several Russian provinces, into a new Polish state.<sup>128</sup> Instead, they were eager to identify Poland exclusively with the Congress Kingdom. Similar views were voiced by Prince Viazemskii, who was a close friend of many Decembrists and a staunch critic of Russia’s treatment of Polish lands. In his *Notebooks (1813–1848)*, Viazemskii was ready to recognize the independence of Poland, though without the so-called “Polish provinces.” As a young Russian serviceman in Warsaw in 1819, walking in the city’s beautiful Łazienki Park, Viazemskii exclaimed in a state of poetic agitation: “Here, for the first time Poland spoke to me through the voice of poetry. I was shocked! and was ready to exclaim: Oh, my Ruler [Alexander I], restore Poland!”<sup>129</sup>

The Polish November uprising in 1830, followed by its suppression and the anti-Polish sentiments of the Russian public, made Viazemskii increasingly sympathetic to the Poles and their desire for independence. “The partition of Poland,” he bluntly noted on December 4, 1830, “represents the original sin of politics [ . . . ]. It is impossible to avoid the fatal consequences of such a crime.”<sup>130</sup> This recognition, combined with repression against the Poles, prompted Viazemskii on September 14, 1831, in his private notebook to agree to the secession of Poland (meaning the Congress Kingdom):

It is impossible to shoot Poland, impossible to hang it, therefore it is impossible to do anything stable, anything decisive by force. On the occasion of any war, any commotion in Russia, Poland will stand up against us, or it will be necessary to have a Russian watchman for any Pole. There is one means—to drop the Kingdom of Poland . . . . Let Poland choose for itself the way of life. Until a victory we should not do this but after the victory [it would be] quite possible.<sup>131</sup>

The prince expressed a similar thought even earlier in a letter to his friend Alexander Bulgakov arguing for letting the Poles go: “If it is hard to rule

the Poles, then it is necessary to let go of these people.”<sup>132</sup> At the same time, Viazemskii, as many Decembrists before, argued strongly against the “secession from Russia of regions that were stamped for us with the blood of our fathers.”<sup>133</sup> He even considered the independence of the Kingdom of Poland as the “only means to retain [*sokhranit*]’ for us the Polish provinces.”<sup>134</sup>

Another famous Russian underwent a striking evolution in his treatment of Polish issues. Mikhail Bakunin, a radical and passionate sympathizer of the Polish cause since the 1840s, had been before then a supporter of the tsarist treatment of Polish issues. He also shared the government’s vision of the geography and ethnography of historic Poland. In 1835, while staying in historic Lithuania as a military officer, Bakunin revealed his understanding of “Polish” issues in a letter to his friend, which more resembled a succinct lecture in the history, ethnography, and geography of Poland’s eastern borderlands. His two main discoveries were that the local commoners were “Russians,” and that those territories (including Right Bank Ukraine) had been once annexed by Poland-Lithuania from Russia, to which they rightfully belonged:

Ancient chronicles and curious documents, [. . .] which speak about Russian churches in Grodno, in Brest, and other towns, and finally mores, customs, and language of the inhabitants of this region (i.e. commoners), which are completely identical with Russian, clearly prove that this people is Russian and not Polish. But different political disturbances that followed internal wars and other calamities disturbing Russia, having severed these lands from it, incorporated them into Lithuania and Poland. I speak here about Galicia acquired by Poland, about Volhynia, Podolia, and Belorussia (consisting of the Mogilev and Vitebsk provinces), and about the Minsk and Kiev provinces taken by Lithuania. Consequently, the Lithuanian principality had united with Poland and created with it one state in the middle of the 14th century.<sup>135</sup>

For Bakunin ethnic Poland did not extend eastward beyond the Carpathians, a vision that anticipated the present-day ethnographic map turned more or less into the political principle of nation-states. Thus, the unmaking of Poland by Russian imperialists indirectly paved the way for the geopolitical agenda of Little Russian patriots and future Ukrainian nationalists. Ukraine as we know it emerged following the unmaking of the “all-Russian nation” that before had unmade—in geopolitical and ideological senses—the historic “Polish nation” from the Baltic to the Black Sea. In other words, Russians completed the groundwork for an imagined and institutionalized Ukraine. Certainly, Bakunin could not predict these

grand transformations, whether on mental maps or in political reality, but in essence, already in 1848, he supported Ukrainian independence!

Only one Russian intellectual in the 1830s–1840s could be considered a rival to Viazemskii (and later to Bakunin) as an expert on Poland. This was Mikhail Lunin. One of the most prominent Decembrists, later exiled to Siberia, Lunin was “a unique and exceptionally important figure in the history of Russian-Polish cultural and social relations.”<sup>136</sup> Lunin can also be considered the most insightful Russian student of Polish geography and political history in the 1830s–1840s. Like Prince Viazemskii, he served in Warsaw, though slightly later, in 1822–26. Unlike most of the Russian intellectuals and artists, who vehemently condemned Polish aspirations, Lunin from his Siberian exile (1830s–1840s) was quite sympathetic to the Poles.<sup>137</sup> Still, he condemned the November uprising and regarded Poland's future to be one of union with Russia.<sup>138</sup>

First of all, Lunin considered Poles to be Russia's “natural allies” and “our advanced guards in terms of geographical situation.”<sup>139</sup> Paradoxically, his vision of the Kingdom of Poland was very similar to that of Polish émigré Maurycy Mochnacki. While for Mochnacki the Kingdom of Poland was “an ephemeral entity,” for Lunin it was “an empty ghost.”<sup>140</sup> Therefore, the “restoration of Poland in the guise of a kingdom attached to Russia is contrary to the welfare of both lands.”<sup>141</sup> The Kingdom of Poland had no natural borders or defensive lines, making it virtually impossible to defend. “Open from all sides,” wrote Lunin, “and possessing only two fortresses, from which one does not have any military significance, the Kingdom of Poland was squeezed [*stesmeno*], to such an extent tightened and deprived of natural defenses that in the case of war animosities had inevitably to start in the very suburbs of the capital.” In addition, the kingdom was completely dependent economically on Russia.<sup>142</sup> Again, like Mochnacki, Lunin ascribed to the eastern borderlands of Poland an exceptional geopolitical importance and a crucial role in ensuring “order” in the kingdom: “Indeed, due to their geographical situation, the number of people, material resources, and especially close contacts with Russians who are the basis and source of any might in this part of Europe the inhabitants of these provinces could establish order and peace in the Kingdom of Poland.”<sup>143</sup>

Interestingly enough, Lunin did not question the intimate relations between “the provinces incorporated into Russia” and the Kingdom of Poland. Although he emphasized the fact that the population of the borderlands did not support the uprising and rather looked at the insurgents

“with indifference and surprise,” he never mentioned an ethnic factor, in other words that these lands were populated mostly by non-Poles. The reasons for the failure of the Polish uprising were tactical and strategic rather than ethnodemographic. Unlike Mochnecki or Pestel’, however, Lunin did not advocate the secession of the “Western provinces” from Russia. Lunin’s attitude toward the Polish map and nationality could be best represented as a kind of vicious circle: an independent Kingdom of Poland could not be a viable state since it was landlocked and had no natural borders between it and Russia; at the same time, he never considered the incorporation of the “Western provinces” into the kingdom to make it more viable by providing it with “natural borders” and other geopolitical benefits.

Over and over again Lunin stressed that for a country to be viable it needed natural borders and, in particular, access to the sea. But no natural borders separated Poland from Russia. “There are neither mountains, nor rivers, no other geographical signs which could serve as the natural borders between two countries,” wrote Lunin. “Claims made by both sides for possession of the same localities are getting lost in the darkness of time. The climate, fruits of the land, branches of industry, and articles of trade are almost the same.”<sup>144</sup>

The incorporation of the “Western” or “Russian” provinces into the Congress Kingdom would not advance the idea of Poland because the country would still remain landlocked. According to this ex-Decembrist, Poland needed not so much those provinces as access to the Baltic Sea. The real decay of Poland started when it had lost the seashore. “This great nation needs the wet fogs of the Baltic as much as her older sister [Russia] needs the sweet-smelling [*blagoukhannye*] breezes of the Mediterranean Sea.”<sup>145</sup> Therefore, the only real alternative to the landlocked, rebellious semi-state was the union of Poles with Russians, which would allow them together to share the socioeconomic and geopolitical benefits of their connection. By the same token, the Polish mental geography from the Baltic to the Black Sea appeared to be significantly refashioned in the mind of the Russian dissident, who offered Poles to share the natural borders with Russians. Paradoxically, Russia was to be the only guarantor of Poland’s natural borders, although Poles could hardly put their trust in a Siberian exile who gave them “a positive guarantee of integrity of their territory”:

They have a positive guarantee of integrity of their territory and confidence about its steady extension, thanks to the basic principle of the Russians—to maintain and unite—as well as to all means they have to implement this principle in life. They

participate in those benefits, which are provided for the development of trade and industry by the deltas of the Dnieper, Bug, and Dniester, the access to the Baltic and the Black Sea as well as the Asian continent. They are protected from a foreign intervention in their internal affairs.<sup>146</sup>

It is easy to notice that even so free-minded an expert on Polish affairs as Lunin could not overcome an imperialistic attitude toward Poland. Paradoxically, he appeared even more imperialistic than the tsarist government itself, as he insisted on the abolition of a semiautonomous Kingdom of Poland because it was not a viable state. Lunin's vision was similar to what later became known as "cultural autonomy" for nationality irrespective of where members might reside. In the situation, however, when Polish culture and society were being persecuted in the aftermath of the failed uprising, Lunin's option seemed more appealing than official policies. His geopolitical thought also established a perilous precedent for Poles when Russia proclaimed itself the sole guarantor of Poland's territorial "integrity." Something similar occurred after World War II, when the Soviet Union turned out to be the sole guarantor of Poland's western borders. This time, as before, Poles had to be convinced that without a mighty neighbor in the east their country would not be a viable state and would remain in danger of "foreign intervention in their internal affairs." Russia, and later the Soviet Union, offered Poland protection and socioeconomic benefits, which Poles had to accept with gratitude.

## 2

### “Independent Part of the Universe”

#### Russia’s Borders

##### The Russian Vision

The Russian geography seemed to be less ambiguous than the Polish or Ukrainian maps simply because there was the Russian Empire with fixed borders and a population. However, this political fact could become an obstacle to the mental maps of Russians. It was not easy to differentiate between Russia as an empire—the home of numerous nationalities, tribes, and races—and Russia as the native country of Great Russians. The main question was where did Great Russia “stop” and give way to the empire? Did the Great Russians themselves understand the incongruity between imperial and national geographies? Were they able to look critically at the empire?

Most Russian observers focused their attention on the empire, but unlike Poles, who castigated it, Russians adored their multinational state. To be sure, some Russians were able to see the detrimental effect of empire on nationality, but most of them did not suggest repudiating the former for the latter. In most cases, however, Russians on different ideological flanks sought to fill the gap between empire and nationality. This also coincided with the strategy of the imperial authorities. According to Benedict Anderson, nineteenth-century dynastic empires, including Russia, developed an ideology of “official nationalism” as a reaction to popular nationalism and as “a means for combining naturalization with retention of dynastic power.” The imperial goal was to merge nationality with empire. Accordingly, “official nationalism” represented an effort on the part of the govern-

ment to stretch “the short, tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the empire.”<sup>1</sup> Mental geography was the best reflection of this effort. In what follows, I study several main models of the imperial-national divide as it impinged on the mental maps of Russians.<sup>2</sup>

In the 1830s–1840s the leading Russian poets turned their attention to Russian geography. Arguably Russia’s greatest poet, Alexander Pushkin became very sensitive about the issue of imperial geography after the Polish uprising of 1830–31. While proclaiming the “Russian” victory over the Poles after centuries of rivalry, the poet depicted the imperial space as extending from Finland to China. It was obvious that Poland, too, was an integral part of Russian imperial geography. Remarkably for Pushkin, this vast imperial space appeared to be the “Russian land.” It was not the multiethnic empire that fought against Poles, but rather the “Russians” themselves. In one poem, he blurred the lines between empire and nationality:

Are we few? Or from Perm to Tauris,  
From Finnish cold rocks to heated Kolchis [Georgia],  
From a shocked Kremlin  
To the walls of immovable China,  
Glittering with steel bristles  
Will not the Russian land arise?<sup>3</sup>

Aleksei Khomiakov, a Slavophile scholar and poet, presented a no less anti-Polish vision of Russian imperial space. In his poem “Kiev” (1839), he depicted that city as Russia’s spiritual center. He imagined the empire as a gathering in Kyiv’s holy places of Orthodox pilgrims who came from all over Russia—from the Don region, the Siberian Ienisei River, the Black Sea coast, Altai, Pskov, Neva, Moscow, and so on.<sup>4</sup> Khomiakov also included in that space Volhynia and Galicia, while admitting that Poles “had burnt them.” In Khomiakov’s version, the Russian Empire looked more like Orthodox Great Russia in extended form, something that was especially emphasized by the strong anti-Polish message of the poem.

From the 1840s, Fedor Tiutchev took the lead in the poetic interpretation of Russian imperial geography. A professional diplomat, Tiutchev was the most sensitive of Russia’s poets when it came to the celebration of empire in the 1840s. His prophetic vision, however, was not so much the geography of a real empire as the mapping of an imagined space of a future Russian triumph. His poetics of empire was not limited to real boundar-

ies but pointed rather to historical and (pseudo-)biblical signs. The poet admitted that Russia's borders were not fixed yet:

Moscow and the city of Peter [Rome], as well as the city of Constantine—  
 These are the precious [*zavetnye*] capitals of the Russian Czardom . . .  
 But where is its limit? And where are its borders—  
 On the north, on the east, on the south, and on the west?  
 The upcoming times will reveal their fate . . .  
 Seven internal seas and seven great rivers . . .  
 From the Nile to the Neva, from the Elbe to China,  
 From the Volga to the Euphrates, from the Ganges to the Danube . . .  
 This is the Russian Czardom . . . and [it] will last forever,  
 As the Holy Spirit predicted it and Daniel professed.<sup>5</sup>

The natural borders of Russia were defined by great rivers, some of them belonging to the empire (like the Neva, Volga, and Danube) and some (like the Nile, Euphrates, or Ganges) being the dream of an imperialist. What matters here is the feeling of an infinite and limitless nature of the Russian Empire whose borders are open to constant enlargement. The main objects of this imperial enlargement, for Tiutchev, were the city of Constantinople, or Istanbul, in the south, and the Slavic lands in the west. In the poem "Rassvet" (The dawn), he called on Rus' "to arise" and "toll the bell in Constantinople," which quite explicitly meant the conquest of the Ottoman Empire by the "state colossus" (*ispolin derzhavnyi*).<sup>6</sup>

Tiutchev also promoted Slavophilism, the idea of the unity of all Slavs under Russian leadership. In a poetic address to the Czech scholar Václav Hanka (1841), Tiutchev lamented that the Slavs "had wandered aimlessly," like "the miserable blind," all over the edges disunited by "the foreigner" (he used the terms *inoverets*, *inozemets*, among whom he counted Germans and Turks). Suddenly, thanks to the activities of fellow Slavophiles like Hanka, Tiutchev was able to view "the entire Slavic land":

The mountains, steppes, and sea shores  
 A beautiful day illuminated,  
 From the Neva to the Montenegro,  
 From the Carpathians to beyond the Ural.<sup>7</sup>

This looks like a slightly improved and extended Russian imperial geography superimposed on a Slavic world. Tiutchev's map also included several urban names, such as Warsaw, Kyiv, Moscow, and Vyšegrad, three of which

were already in the Russian Empire, while the last one, Vyšegrad, might hope to get there in the future. Therefore, the main characteristic of imperial geography was its readiness to expand and include increasingly more lands, rivers, seas, and peoples.

It was difficult to break through the real and imaginary borders of the empire. One radical Russian thinker, the poet Nikolai Ograrev, managed to leave what for him was the land of despotism and the absence of freedom. In his case, the transition from despotism to freedom occurred when he crossed the border near the Polish city of Kalisz (still within the Russian Empire) into the Austrian province of Silesia. This simple geographical transition from “the Russian land” to Silesia, where “everything [was] alien,” paradoxically meant the existential and physical liberation of a hero. Nature itself seemed to change for the better: the hero smells roses, hears birds singing, and contemplates a blue sky. Having taken two steps beyond the border, he is immediately able to “breathe deeply” after years of being “a martyr” in Russia:

The border! In half an hour  
 I am in Silesia. And here, the uneasiness  
 Presses my chest. Meadows, woods,  
 And the smell of roses, and singing of birds,  
 And blue skies—  
 Everything is alien! One moment more,  
 And I will cry:  
 Here it is, non-Russian land!  
 What a strange feeling, my friend!  
 Of course, there is not any difference  
 In two steps, but somehow suddenly  
 I rested with my tired soul [ . . . ]  
 And I freely, widely breathed!  
     In the capital of the North, then  
     In the capital of Poland, by soul  
     I was just a martyr.<sup>8</sup>

The adoration of empire, while being more typical than such voices as Ograrev's, was not limited to conservative or Slavophile thinkers and poets. The radically minded literary critic Vissarion Belinskii, who disliked absolutism and despotism, was nonetheless an admirer of imperial culture and geography. In one of his seminal works, “The View on Russian Litera-

ture of 1846,” he rejected humility (*smirenje*) as a national feature of Great Russians and pointed to the growth and territorial expansion of Muscovy and then the Russian Empire, which managed to incorporate “as their legacy Siberia, Little Russia, White Russia, New Russia, Crimea, Bessarabia, Livland, Estland, Courland, Finland, the Caucasus etc.”<sup>9</sup> Clearly pointing to the national peripheries of the empire, Belinskii was well aware of a national-imperial divide but chose nonetheless to extol the empire. Belinskii was a Westernizer and a staunch admirer of Peter the Great, whom he credited with the beginnings of Russian literature and nationality; it was logical for him to support the tsar’s main creation—the “Empire.” However, on this point Belinskii did not seem to be consistent: he was an imperialist and nationalist as well as being a radical liberal, and yet he did not feel the incompatibility of his loyalties. He clearly identified himself with “the entire Russian people” or “the original [*korennoe*] Russian population,” which for him meant primarily Great Russians and sometimes the East Slavic inhabitants of the empire.<sup>10</sup>

It is probably from the position of a Russian nationalist that Belinskii doubted “the stable political and state existence” of peoples “deprived of nationality,” alluding to the Austrian Empire, “an artificial state glued together from many nationalities” (*isskustvennoe gosudarstvo skleennoe iz mnogikh natsional’nostei*). Instead, he praised “us, Russians,” supposedly a unified nationality with a complete “national life,” who managed to create a “strong and mighty state.”<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Poles used the same rhetoric when writing about the Austrian and Russian empires. Strangely, Belinskii did not notice the similarity between Metternich’s Austria and the Russia of Nicholas I. Unlike Austria, Russia for him had a dominant nationality that was powerful enough to rule over other lands and peoples. While Belinskii recognized the diverse, multiethnic character of the empire, he always made it clear that Russia belonged first of all to Russians as nation-builders.

For Belinskii, the territorial, climatic, and ethnic diversity of imperial Russia may have posed a cultural problem, but not a political one: he suggested that imperial diversity might become a cultural “melting pot.” He therefore called for travelogues, stories, and descriptions of different parts of “limitless and diverse Russia which contains in itself so many climates, so many peoples and tribes, so many faiths and customs,” and where even “the original Russian population” had diverse, contradictory, and motley “shadings [*ottenki*].”<sup>12</sup> Within this melting pot, however, he did differentiate between the “purely Russian element [*chisto russkii element*]” of Great

Russia and the “variety of other elements” that populated “enormous Russia.” For example, the Baltic province of Livland, populated by Latvians and Germans, was outside his native Rus’.<sup>13</sup> Conscious of geographic and ethnic differences, he called upon artists to use regional specifics in literature and mapped different regions of the empire, but once again he chose the position of a Great Russian. He enjoyed the empire as a Great Russian who was aware of his dominant national position:

And how much material there is for these kinds of works to depict this enormous Russia! Great Russia, Little Russia, White Russia, New Russia, Finland, Baltic provinces, Crimea, Caucasus, Siberia, these are whole worlds, original in terms of climate, nature, languages, dialects, habits, and customs; and especially, due to the mixture of purely Russian element with the variety of other elements, of whom some are related [to Russians], and others are completely alien to it [Russian element]. Moreover, how many shadings Great Russia itself mingles [*pestreet*] not only in climatic but also in social aspects! The northern regions of Russia are strikingly different from the middle, and the middle—from the southern ones. Going from Arkhangelsk to Astrakhan’, from the Caucasus to the Ural Mountains district, from Finland to Crimea is as if one goes from one world to another. Moscow and Saint Petersburg, Kazan and Kharkov, Arkhangelsk and Odessa—what a striking contrast! How much food for curious thought and humorous pen!<sup>14</sup>

Undoubtedly, it was Great Russia and the “purely Russian element” that were in the center of Belinskii’s imperial melting pot. On the fringes were numerous regions and peoples having various degrees of cultural and national distinctiveness and “relatedness” to Great Russians. Some lands, like “Little Russia,” were not different enough to form a separate national entity and did not have even a separate language (just a dialect), whereas Finland or the Crimea had more justifiable claims to such status. For some reason Belinskii did not delineate with precision the borders of Great Russia. Were Siberia, the Ural Mountains, and the city of Astrakhan’ parts of it?<sup>15</sup> The existence of the empire made it impossible to draw the precise map of ethnic Russia since the imperial borders had been in constant flux for centuries. Once again, as in the case of Tiutchev, the empire-nationality complex escaped precise mapping. Empire and nationality remained intermingled even if they were not the same. In Belinskii’s vision, empire and dominant nationality were quite compatible and both benefited from this connection.

There were several other important visions of this imperial-national divide: the “anti-assimilationist” vision of the liberal journalist Nikolai

Polevoi; the Slavophile “nationalist” vision as expressed by Dmitrii Valuev; and the somewhat mixed “statist”-“nationalist” model of the prominent literary critic and philosopher Nikolai Nadezhdin. Obviously there were other literati with their own geographic formulas of empire and nationality, but the ones mentioned were better developed and were more characteristic for certain patterns of mental geography.

In 1830, Nikolai Polevoi presented his vision of empire in a pro-Ukrainian review of Mykola Bantysh-Kamens’kyi’s *History of Little Russia*.<sup>16</sup> By stressing the separate identity and geography of Little Russia, Polevoi argued against the idea of the Russian Empire as an assimilationist melting pot, which was so close to radical Belinskii. Polevoi opposed the “zealous patriots” who considered Russia to be a unique state able “to melt into Russians, in one whole, everything that only stuck to it,” including Ukrainians. The fact that Russia consisted of “diverse parts” had to be considered.<sup>17</sup> Historically, Russia did not have “a miraculous force to melt together different peoples.” Polevoi offered his interpretation of Russia’s territorial expansion in terms of a “colonial-metropolitan” encounter. His main point was that Russia did not completely manage to assimilate its colonized peoples, many of whom preserved their unique nationalities.

In mapping a non-Russian Russia, Polevoi pointed to the lands conquered by Russians at different times, such as Siberia, the Volga region, the Crimea, the middle Dnieper, Volhynia, the Baltic coast, Lithuania, Finland, Little Russia, and to peoples such as the Germans, Gypsies, Tatars, Buriats, and so on. Despite the conquests and resulting abolition of political “sovereignty,” Russians had failed “to Russify the locals” (*obrusit’ tuzemtsev*). He emphasized that even though those nationalities belonged to “us” Russians, they did not become “us”: “they are ours but [they are] not us” (*oni nashi, no ne my*).<sup>18</sup> By this honest acknowledgment of Russian colonialism, Polevoi strictly separated empire from nationality, on the one hand, and the empire’s nationalities from ethnic Russians, on the other. He ascribed to ethnic Russians the leading role in the empire, but at the same time he recognized the cultural autonomy of the empire’s numerous nationalities.

Dmitrii Valuev, a young Slavophile, in 1845 edited a collection of articles entitled *A Collection of Historical and Statistical Data About Russia and Peoples of Common Faith and Descent with Her*, which became seminal for the entire Slavophile movement. In the introduction he revealed a vision of empire and nationality, which was paradoxically close to that of

his ideological enemy, Vissarion Belinskii. Like Belinskii, Valuev argued that Russia belonged only to “Russians and the Orthodox,” by whom the young Slavophile understood as all East Slavs.<sup>19</sup> However, unlike the more secular, French-oriented vision of Belinskii, with his melting pot of cultures, Valuev’s clung to a more ecstatic, even somewhat chauvinistic vision, depriving non-“Russians” of any claim to empire’s legacy: “It is neither the Buriat [a Buddhist], nor the Muslim who provides her [Russia] with character and definition; it is not they who raised and created the State. Therefore, any subject of the empire belongs to Russia but Russia belongs only to an Orthodox and Russian because it is only he to whom belongs and with whom is inseparable her [Russia’s] history, past, and future.”<sup>20</sup> Valuev and his Slavophile peers, who were slightly at odds with empire, were more preoccupied with Russians. Other nationalities mattered only to the degree that they reflected the generosity of Russians. An anonymous author from Valuev’s collection was trying “to Russify” the empire so that it looked less alienated, less the creation of governmental Saint Petersburg, and more like the extension of a “Russian land,” which he considered “a familial brotherhood” that “accepted anyone” who needed protection.<sup>21</sup> In contrast to Polevoi’s version, there was no hint of Russian conquests and colonization; instead, Russia, which supposedly “left her old enemy his privileges and exclusive rights,” was deemed unique in world history.

A dissenting Prince Viazemskii mocked the ideas of the Slavophiles and called them “Russo-idolizers” (*russoslavny*).<sup>22</sup> He could add ironically that “Mother Russia does not take forcefully but only voluntarily, stepping on one’s throat.”<sup>23</sup> Yet another Westernized liberal, Nikolai Nadezhdin, while admiring the size and might of the Russian Empire, was constantly aware of the negative consequences that the imperial expansion had for Russian nationality. Nonetheless, he praised the government for the tremendous gains from the expansion:

Adrianopole peace that gave us a key to the Dardanelles and pushed our borders into the depth of Asia, must open new ways for trade and start a new era of our national wellbeing for the southern regions of Russia. From the other side, intellectual education of Russian people receives new strengths and leads to the new successes [ . . . ]. Under the wings of a victorious Russian eagle, recently there were measured the heights of an unapproachable Ararat [ . . . ]. On the remote frontiers of the empire, in Odessa and Tbilisi, periodicals are published.<sup>24</sup>

Nadezhdin mapped Russia on a truly global scale. His Russia was unlimited and diverse, both geographically and ethnographically, stretching from the “icy tundra of Lapland” to “the heated heavens of Georgia [*Kolkhidy*],” and among its population there counted a wild tribesman and an “over-educated” prince.<sup>25</sup> Nadezhdin also defined Russian geography through the proliferation of the Russian language “from the Carpathians to the ranges of the Sayan Mountains, and from the White Sea to the Black Sea.”<sup>26</sup> He suggested jokingly that Russia be ascribed the status of a separate continent, “a particular, sovereign, and independent part of the Universe” along with Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Oceania.<sup>27</sup>

Imperial expansion, however, had negative consequences on two levels: it threatened the unity of Russian nationality, and also hampered its spiritual growth by reducing it to a pure “ethnographic” existence encapsulated within an ever-growing state that did not care much about its original nationality. The Russian nationality sacrificed itself for the sake of a map. It was only luck (or rather “the wise laws of Providence”) that the constant imperial expansion did not lead to “the complete destruction of national unity.” Paradoxically, it was the Tatar conquest that saved medieval Russians from looming dissolution by stopping their uncontrolled expansion, which subsequently led to the accession of Moscow.

Other consequences of imperial expansion were harder to avoid, however. “The Russian people,” wrote Nadezhdin, sounding quite like the pessimist Petr Chaadaev, “during seven hundred years had only extended physically, filled its land-map, compiled for itself that huge geography, which now amazes the universe.”<sup>28</sup> “The irresistible pursuit of expansion” even deprived Russians of their history that started just from Peter the Great. As a result, there was a “backwardness of national distinctiveness” and a laziness of mind: Russians “did not see yet a Russian mind in a distinct shape, a Russian thought in its independent development.”<sup>29</sup> Nadezhdin, however, was optimistic. He completely trusted the government “caring for our perfection and creating for us the most illustrious history.”<sup>30</sup> He seemed not to doubt the need for the territorial acquisitions made by such a caring government.

It was not literary critics and thinkers, however, who paid most attention to Russian geography but rather travelers, geographers, and statisticians. Unlike Polish and Ukrainian patriots who were deprived of their own institutional framework, Russians took advantage of the existing imperial institutions and bureaucratic needs to map the empire’s peoples and lands. Even the most serious and “objective” scholars, however, used clas-

sificatory schemes and nomenclature that had appeared on mental maps of poets, journalists, amateur researchers, and ideologues.

For example, Petr Keppen (Köppen), a prominent scholar in many different fields such as geography, statistics, bibliography, and ethnography, seemed to lose precision when he sorted out and mapped different peoples of European Russia on the first ethnographic map of the Russian Empire in 1851. His main ethnographic divide was between “Russians” and “non-Russian inhabitants of European Russia”—that is, simply “aliens” (*inorodtsy*), among whom he included Poles, Germans, Jews, Tatars, and Ugro-Finns.<sup>31</sup> While using a separate color for each of these peoples, Keppen left blank the space where “Great Russians, Little Russians, and White Russians live.”<sup>32</sup> He obviously did not recognize the existence of a separate Ukrainian or Belarusian nationality.

All “non-Russians” were categorized according to language into nine groups: Ugric peoples, Finnish peoples, Permian peoples, Volga peoples (or Bulgarians), Tatars, Mongols, Lithuanians, Moldavians, and Slavic peoples. In addition to these groups, Keppen listed separately the Germans, Armenians, Greeks, Swedes, Jews, and Gypsies. After he ethnographically “multiplied” the Russian population by lumping together all the East Slavs, “Russians” acquired a substantial numerical prevalence over the “aliens,” who now did not exceed 15 percent of the more than fifty-six million inhabitants of the Russian Empire.<sup>33</sup> Thus, the Russian Empire, unlike the Austrian, had a dominant nationality, which was visible even on the map. Keppen’s was just another way to show the peaceful coexistence between the empire which was nurturing its nationality and the nationality which was building its empire. People like Keppen made the “Russian” nationality not only visible but also compatible with empire. Thanks to such maps and statistics Russia did not look like “an artificial state” that forcefully kept its incompatible parts together; rather, it appeared like a natural extension of the Russian nationality.

The same approach was used in a highly popular textbook, *The Geography of the Russian Empire* (1831), by the respected scholar Ievdokim Zhablovskii. He divided the empire into three zones: the Russian Empire per se, with a population of 44 million; Finland, with 1.2 million; and the Kingdom of Poland, with 4.5 million.<sup>34</sup> Among the realm’s “ancient inhabitants” he listed Russians as “the dominant [*gospodstvuiushchii*] people in the Russian state”; Poles, who lived “everywhere in provinces that had been returned from Poland”; as well as Finns, Tatars, and others. Gener-

ally, there were three main language groups in Russia: Slavic, Germanic, and Finnic.<sup>35</sup> In line with Keppen, Ziablovskii formulated the idea of a dominant nationality in Russia, which also coincided with the entire East Slavic population of the empire.

Ziablovskii defined the Russian nationality through the Slavic language it spoke. The language in its turn contained two “dialects” (*narechiia*)—Great Russian and Little Russian (he never mentioned Belarusian). However, the author did not draw any far-reaching conclusions from the existence of these two East Slavic “dialects,” which did not refer to two separate Slavic nationalities. There were only “Russians,” whom he also called “natural Russians” (*prirodnye Rossiiane*) and who constituted the absolute majority of European Russia’s inhabitants. One could find “Russians” in the Vilna province as well as in the Enisei province of Siberia, and in both cases they topped the list of nationalities. It appeared that Poles were not Slavs, making “Russians” the only Slavic and dominant nationality in Russia. Despite the fact that Ziablovskii originally listed Poles along with Russians among “the peoples of a Slavic tribe,”<sup>36</sup> he later doubted the Slavic connection of the Polish language, which while “deriving from a Slavic root, had so much distanced [itself] from the latter that it constitutes not the dialect of Slavic language but [a] more separate language.”<sup>37</sup>

Defined in such a way, Russians were the dominant nationality surrounded by a number of smaller nationalities and tribes whom Ziablovskii listed separately for each province, starting with Poles, Germans, and Jews and ending with the least numerous Siberian natives. Both Ziablovskii’s and Keppen’s empire was a multinational state that had a dominant nationality consisting of all East Slavs spread from the westernmost to the easternmost edges of Russia.

The imperial-national complex was utilized by statistician Konstantin Arseniev in his seminal work, *The Statistical Sketches of Russia* (1848), which was, in part, similar to the much earlier vision presented by Polevoi. Arseniev allowed himself to look at Russia as a highly diverse multinational state stretching from “the farthest point in the west of the Kingdom of Poland [the city of Kalisz] to the edges of the Kamchatka peninsula.” This huge space encompassed “a variety of distinct peoples completely different from each other—peoples with European civilization and peoples with Asiatic habits, Asiatic facial features, and Asiatic way of life.”<sup>38</sup>

The empire showed no less diversity from north to south, from the Kola Peninsula and icy tundra of Lapland to the steppe frontiers with

Persia. "This extension," remarked the author, "must be the source of a great dissimilarity of climate and natural products."<sup>39</sup> Arseniev alluded to the detrimental effects of such a huge imperial territory on the economy and nationality: "excessive distance between regions frustrates the course of governmental affairs and hampers the unity of the nation's moral forces, which is so necessary for the promotion of industry and successes of civilization [*obrazovaniia*]."<sup>40</sup> He continued to characterize the imperial borders as populated mostly by non-Russians, such as the Baltic peoples, who were "alien to Russia proper," the "predatory many-tribal peoples" of the Caucasus, the "dubiously loyal" Siberian Tatars, the Kazakhs prone to "robbery," and the "crowds of Siberian nomadic aliens."<sup>41</sup>

Arseniev was acutely aware of an imperial-national divide in Russia and like Polevoi reflected on the empire in terms of its national core and non-Russian ethnic peripheries, which he called "Russian colonies." The ultimate colonies were Siberia and Transcaucasia—"separated from Russia proper"—although in "political-economic" regard important for the imperial core (*metropolii*).<sup>42</sup> To this list, as the least Russian lands, Arseniev added Finland and the Kingdom of Poland. He insightfully remarked on the relationship between the colonies and the imperial core, which consisted of "Russian lands proper" and was populated by the "ruling nationality":

Generally speaking, Siberia, Transcaucasia, Finland, and the Kingdom of Poland are countries which insure the external security of state without hindering internal administration. These lands, being important for Russia in military, political, and commercial terms, do not constitute the essence of the empire. Some of them through the difference of common advantages, others through the poverty of population, still others due to the lack of natural means to wellbeing or due to dissimilarity of peoples among themselves and with regard to the ruling nationality, should all be considered as auxiliary forces for the one main and great force that is contained in Russian lands proper.<sup>43</sup>

These "Russian lands proper" were in fact "the true motherland of Russians" and "the staunchest and the main basis of the Russian state." That basis was imagined by Arseniev as "a great circle" to which other parts of the empire were attached, like "radiuses in different directions, closer or farther," facilitating the unity of the empire. For Arseniev the imperial core could also include the southwestern and western domains of medieval Kyivan Rus' (including present-day Ukraine and Belarus), which had been detached from Russia-Muscovy for centuries. Therefore, according to Arseniev, the imperial core encompassed the space between the Dnieper

and the Ural Mountains.<sup>44</sup> At the same time, he systematically separated the “Russian provinces proper [*sobstvenno russkie gubernii*],” or “Great Russian provinces,” from other imperial gains such as Ukraine, Belarus, and the Baltic region (“Little Russian provinces,” “Western or returned from Poland [provinces],” and “Ostsee provinces”), not to mention Siberia, Bessarabia, the Caucasus, and so on.<sup>45</sup>

Probably the most original of Arseniev’s ideas was to split the empire into ten “spaces” based on climatic and agricultural criteria: Northern, Alaun, Baltic, Lowland, Carpathian, Steppe, Central (or Internal), Ural, Caucasian, and Siberian.<sup>46</sup> He did not take into account specifically ethnic characteristics, but some of these “spaces” unambiguously coincided with certain national and historical regions. For example, the Baltic space comprised three “Ostsee” or “Russian-German” provinces, that is, Estland, Livland, and Courland, which were united historically and culturally through the rule of German barons. The so-called Lowland space included the lands of historic Lithuania, that is, ethnic Lithuania and Belarus. Finally, the Carpathian space could be called the most homogenous one, since it contained the territory of present-day Ukraine excluding only the New Russian provinces of Kherson, Katerynoslav (Ekaterinoslav), and Tavria, which belonged to the Steppe space. Other spaces were mixed, like the Northern one, which consisted of Finland and the north Russian provinces of Novgorod, Vologda, and Olonet.

The ethnic, economic, and political core of the empire constituted the Central or Internal space. Arseniev called this space “the heart of empire, the true basis of its greatness, a real motherland of Russian nationality, the center of entire European Russia.”<sup>47</sup> This most populous and prominent space in Russia in “political-economic” and “administrative” regards included the ethnically Russian provinces of Iaroslavl’, Kostroma, Nizhnii Novgorod, Penza, Tambov, Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Kaluga, Tula, Moscow, Vladimir, and Riazan’. By introducing the idea of “spaces” and being generally sensitive about ethnic and regional differences, Arseniev clearly separated empire from nationality and in its turn the Great Russian nationality from other Slavic and non-Slavic peoples. However, similar to other Great Russian observers, he considered ethnic Russians to be the “ruling nationality” and ethnic Russia the “heart of the empire.”

Fellow Russian Vadim Passek, a traveler with a deep interest in geography, ethnography, and history, would have agreed with Arseniev as to the core of the Russian Empire. He shared with Arseniev the idea of the mul-

tinational and diverse character of Russia. He imagined Russia as “diverse layers of a common body” consisting of the different nationalities and tribes that spoke “language alien to us,” practiced their own religion, and had their own customs but nonetheless constituted Russia’s “body.”<sup>48</sup> Most of his travelogue was devoted to Ukraine, and he clearly separated “Little Russians” from “Russians proper.” He could not help stressing that “the spirit and customs of Little Russians and Russians proper are so essentially different.”<sup>49</sup> For Passek, the Russian Empire had three “knots” of nationality, which were analogous to Arseniev’s spaces, although they were based not on natural but rather on historical and ethnic principles. These “knots” included (1) Novgorod; (2) Little Russia, as “the main mass of our Southern tribes”; and (3) provinces of Moscow, Vladimir, Tver, Kostroma, Iaroslavl’, Riazan’, Tula, Kaluga, Orel, and Kursk.<sup>50</sup> This ethnic Russian territory was very similar to that described by Arseniev as his Central or Internal space. The rest of Russia for Passek was of secondary importance, since other parts “did not become a knot, from which there had developed an independent life” of Russia and had to be situated “on the loop [*na okruzhnosti*].” Among the most important “secondary” parts, he listed the Volga or “Lowland” provinces, Crimea, the Baltic region, Siberia, the Caucasus, and “the provinces that were incorporated from [*prisoedenennye ot*] Poland and Sweden.”<sup>51</sup> The empire for Passek was of lesser importance than the East Slavic ethnic territories (in particular, the Russian-Ukrainian connection) that were united by blood, culture, and history.

Most Russian observers agreed that the Russian Empire was geographically limitless and ethnographically diverse. Most also noticed the gap between Russian nationality and the empire. To lessen this gap, they multiplied the number of “Russians” by lumping together all East Slavs, accorded them a role of a dominant or ruling nationality, and emphasized a historical role of Great Russians as state-builders. In this respect, the geopolitical visions of the Russian public were compatible with “official nationalism” as analyzed by Benedict Anderson. Some also considered the negative consequences of the imperial map for Russian nationality, although they did not dare to criticize territorial expansion overtly, let alone reject the empire. Whereas in the Polish case the geographical boundaries of a prepartitioned state defined membership in the Polish nationality—that is, anyone residing within those borders (an Orthodox, Jew, or German) was or could become a “Pole”—in the Russian case, a geographical confusion between imperial and “national” territory only further confused Russian identity.<sup>52</sup>

## The Polish Vision

Poles were probably best positioned to notice the gap between the empire and nationality in Russia. The empire visibly did not coincide with the dominant nationality, which was clear to Russians themselves. However, unlike Russians, Poles tended to exacerbate the imperial-national divide. Even if the majority of Poles were not geopolitical thinkers, most of them agreed that ethnic Russia stopped where the lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth began.

Polish émigrés took a decisively anti-imperial look at Russia's geography. One of the most outstanding Polish geopolitical thinkers was Maurycy Mochnacki, who on many issues gravitated to Prince Czartoryski's ideological camp. Mochnacki was the author of the Romantic theory of nationalities, which rationalized the struggle for the Lithuanian and Ruthenian lands. For him Russia was "a geographical monster," which in order to remain an empire needed absolutism and despotism that dated back to the "Tatar times": "It is only the autocracy and universal power of Czarism as a fundamental law whose beginnings, essence, and organization date back to the Tatar times, since [the system] was established by the Tatar khans, that maintain the existence of this geographical monster bordering with Sweden and the United States, with Mexico and Prussia, with Austria and the Chinese empire, with Turkey and India."<sup>53</sup>

Hence, democracy would be detrimental to this "geographical monster": whoever manages to oppose the rule of law to despotism "will strike a lethal blow [*cios śmiertelny*] to this power."<sup>54</sup> Mochnacki's conclusion was merciless: Russia as a prison of nations must be dismantled. However, only changing the system of power (not just a ruler) could break the empire into "the minor atoms" (*zmiana natury rządu, rozbitaby natychmiast ten kolos na drobne atomy*).<sup>55</sup> The empire as such was based neither on geographical extension nor on its population but solely on its government: according to Mochnacki, it is "despotism that constitutes the enormity [*ogrom*] of this country."<sup>56</sup> Hence, he formulated the main duality of empire's nature: Russia was rather a government than the people or nationality, and as such it would not have a place in a future world, which would consist of separate nationalities. In other words, since Russia was lacking a distinctive nationality, it was completely identified with the tsars<sup>57</sup>: "Russia from Peter the Great until today was rather a government than the nation in Europe. Its territorial acquisitions emerged from the needs of the power and not from the spirit of its people [. . .]. When asked, what is Russia without czarism,

we would not be able to solve this puzzle. Moscow is the tsar, and tsar is Moscow.”<sup>58</sup> The very name that Mochnacki used for Russia, “Moskwa,” not only emphasized its difference from “Polish Ruthenias” (Rusi Polskich) but also pointed to its inalterability since the Tatar times.<sup>59</sup> It was not only the revolutionary émigrés but also the Polish citizens of Russia, like the writer Józef Korzeniowski, who differentiated between ethnic Russia (usually called Moskwa, Rosja, or Wielkorosja) and the Polish-dominated Ruthenia branded as generic Ruś or split into historical regions, such as Wołyń, Ukraina, Podole, and Czerwona Ruś.<sup>60</sup>

Mochnacki warned that unlike Austria or Prussia, Russia would not be able to maintain its imperial status if it were deprived of its territorial gains, in particular its “Polish” provinces. If Russia ever lost any of its territorial acquisitions or allowed any nationality to leave the empire, it would immediately “disappear as an entity.”<sup>61</sup> In addition, he thought that Russia’s despotic nature failed to permeate through its conquered lands.<sup>62</sup> Mochnacki accused some Western intellectuals and journalists (in particular from the French official *Journal des débats*) of unsubstantiated admiration for Russia. For the Polish émigré, these European observers did not understand the very nature of Russia: it was not a nation-state, since it consisted of numerous peoples without any organic bonds. The empire lacked “the unity of descent and spirit” among its “more than 60-million population.” Mochnacki sought to separate ethnic Russians (“the real Muscovite population”) living in the Great Russian provinces from the rest of the empire’s population. The Russians per se, whom Mochnacki estimated at no more than ten million people, were just a minority within the multiethnic empire and did not have anything in common with its other peoples:

Where does [*Journal des débats*] see in Russia that broad and deep nationality, where does it see that brotherhood, that unity of descent and spirit among more than 60-million population? In Russian schools children learn in [the textbook of] geography by mister Ziablovskii that Russia consists of several dozens of peoples which have nothing in common with each other. Who are the real Muscovites and how many are they? The ministerial organ [ . . . ] should know that real Muscovite population in the provinces of Moscow, Tula, Niznii Novgorod, Kaluga etc does not amount to more than 10 millions; the rest of the population under the rule of czars, which is 6 times as big, does not have anything in common [with Muscovites][ . . . ]. What as I ask you, does have in common with a Muscovite a Pole, a Ruthenian, a Lithuanian, a Latvian, an Estonian, a Finn, a Bashkir, Kirgis, a Tatar, a Persian, a Moldavian, a Kamchadal, a Jew, a German,

an Armenian, an Udmurt, a Kabardinian, a Cherkessian, etc? Who can count different languages in this country? Who among the czars was able ever to learn by heart at least the list of the tribes, peoples, hordes, which are so much different from one another as is a Black African from a European?<sup>63</sup>

A similar vision of a multinational empire as “Harlequin’s attire” and “the artificial creation” that lacked a dominant nationality can be found in the seminal work of the philosopher Bronisław Trentowski. In his *Wizerunki duszy narodowej* (Images of the national soul, 1847), even the Great Russians (Moskali), with their language, literature, history, and customs, were not a nationality but rather governmental slaves (Heloty).<sup>64</sup> His list of Russia’s different nationalities is another argument against the empire concept. What was Russia, he asked rhetorically:

What is she? She is a huge Harlequin’s attire, more motley than Austria itself; the artificial creation that rapes the inborn social rights and estates. In her embraces one sees Poles, Ruthenians, Cossacks, and Lithuanians; then Germans and Finns; then Tatars, Calmucks, Bashkirs, Kirgiz, Udmurts, and the masses of other Asiatic-Siberian tribes; then Cherkessians, Persians, finally real Muscovites. There are roughly 5 million Poles; there are 10 million Ruthenians, Cossacks, and Lithuanians; there are more than 3 million Germans; Finns are half a million; Kazan, Astrachan, and Crimean Tatars are 3 million, and the Siberian peoples are 12 million. Count with precision all those distinct peoples and you will see how few are the Muscovites. Under Peter the Great Russia was already diverse with the population somewhat 13 million. Those peoples are subjugated and hate Muscovites and curse the Tsar as we do.<sup>65</sup>

Perhaps Mochnacki’s and Trentowski’s descriptions of the Russian Empire as an impressively multiethnic and multicultural phenomenon would amaze the contemporary reader. In the context of the nineteenth-century democratic and liberal agendas, however, such a “geographical monster” and “artificial creation” was considered an anomaly that had to give way to national states. The underlying argument of both descriptions is that Russians in their own empire were a minority, and as such Russia was lacking a solid national majority. Therefore, Russia’s “minority government,” as all such governments, was doomed to fall. Russia had to be split along national lines.

Mochnacki repeatedly emphasized the multinational nature of Russia, a situation that was unacceptable to any patriotic Pole. Mochnacki called the situation an “unfortunate curiosity” where diverse peoples like Swedes, Baltic Germans, Russians, Cossacks, and Tatars, all living on a ter-

ritory from the Siberian river of Irtysh to the Caucasian rivers of Terek and Kuban', served the same master.<sup>66</sup> He was able to imagine Russia "from the shores of the Northern Ocean to the Crimea" without its western provinces: Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Ukraine. Lithuania and Ruthenia were essential both for the existence of Poland and for Russia's presence in Europe along the Baltic and Black Sea shores.<sup>67</sup>

As Andrzej Nowak, a contemporary expert on the Polish vision of Russia, has pointed out, Mochnacki, unlike Lelewel or some members of the TDP (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie, Polish Democratic Society) with their "great idea of the consolidation of a Slavic world," spoke for the great idea of "the partition of Russia" (*rozboru Wszzechrosji*). Mochnacki also envisioned the liberation of ethnic Russia itself, limited to the geographical and demographic shape of a medieval northeastern Rus' of ten million.<sup>68</sup> He opposed all multinational empires of his time, denying them the status of "social bodies" and "peoples." As a result, he predicted their eventual demise: "Those powers not being social bodies [*ciałami społecznymi*], nor being peoples [*ludami*] [. . .] will cease to exist in the case of any internal or external disturbances."<sup>69</sup> For him, there was no "Austrian nation," since Austria was just a "political system" and not a "people." The same held true for Russia and Prussia.

The idea of a "national" world and nationality-based diplomacy was also very dear to Prince Adam Czartoryski, who in an anonymous French-language *Essay on Diplomacy* predicted the disappearance of multiethnic states/empires and the coming of the age of nationalities.<sup>70</sup> He contrasted the idea of "the legitimism of thrones" with that of "the legitimism of nationalities," which presupposed the right of nationalities to state sovereignty, and he protested against intrusion in national life from outside. According to Czartoryski, Russia's strength was in its "old borders of national unity," that is, without the territories that once belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Hence, Russia as well as Austria had to become federative states.

Elsewhere, Czartoryski anonymously developed his vision of the partition of Russia into several ethnic and geographical entities.<sup>71</sup> The first and the most troublesome sphere for the tsars included all those countries and peoples which eventually would secede from Russia—Finland, Poland from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea (the main core of Czartoryski's system), Crimean Tatars, the peoples of the Caucasus, and all Muslim inhabitants of the empire. The second sphere encompassed

other ethnic peripheries such as Left Bank Little Russians, the Don Cossacks, and the Latvians and Estonians of the Baltic, which were slightly less ready to secede but who nevertheless would pose a serious problem for the imperial government. In any case, Russia was expected to lose all lands populated by non-Russians.

Unlike most Polish émigrés, who were focused predominantly on the lands of partitioned Poland, Czartoryski's camp prepared several insurrectionary projects for the peoples of the second sphere, the focal points being the Caucasus and the Cossacks of different backgrounds.<sup>72</sup> Some of the most active collaborators of Prince Adam, like Michał Czajkowski and Ludwik Bystrzonowski, dreamed of the partition of Russia and the creation of a state for the Don and Black Sea Cossacks in union with Poland. They also expected the restoration of independent states among Caucasian Christians (Georgians and Armenians), the emergence of a Muslim federation in the northeastern Caucasus, and the restoration of Crimean Tatar statehood.<sup>73</sup> In other words, Russia had to be reduced to its ethnic Great Russian core. Great Russia should also be deprived of its Cossack population, which according to Czajkowski was ethnically different from Russians: "This is not the same nation; these are not the same habits and feelings."<sup>74</sup> Czajkowski hoped that the Don Cossacks would secede from Russia and form a separate "Don Kingdom." That state was to be dependent on Poland, its territory stretching toward the Azov and Caspian Seas and encompassing the lands of all other Cossacks, including those from the Ural Mountains.<sup>75</sup>

The leading Polish democratic group, the TDP, did not have such an expert vision of Russia and did not seem to care much about the non-Polish population of the empire. However, they shared with Mochnacki the vision of Russia as a patchwork of different peoples, who were forcefully kept together. A typical example of this view was that of Jan Alcyato, a prominent member of the TDP. In 1843, in an article entitled "The Position of Poland Among the Slavs," he wrote that Russia was "a collection of pieces of the most diverse nationalities and wild hordes roaming the deserts, attached to the Slavic world only by one chunk of old Rus' that had been transformed into the state of Muscovy."<sup>76</sup>

This anti-Russian and generally anti-imperial tendency permeated the political discourse of Polish émigré poets like Adam Mickiewicz.<sup>77</sup> It was Zygmunt Krasieński, a passionately anti-Russian thinker, who in his socially conservative political writings, radically counterposed the ideal of

a national state to the multinational empire. In his seminal work, *O stanowisku Polski z bożych i ludzkich względów* (On the position of Poland from divine and human angles, 1841), Krasieński extolled the idea of the state as the realization of a “divine thought” represented only in nationalities. It was nationality that was “the essence and reality” of a state.<sup>78</sup> He predicted the dissolution of any state that was not based on nationality.<sup>79</sup> According to Krasieński, it was madness to believe in the possibility of a long-lasting and stable empire, which he called “a collage from several sliced nationalities” (*zlepek z kilku posiekanych narodów*).<sup>80</sup> Russia, as a mixture of “Byzantine deception [*obłudy*]” and “Mongol bestiality [*zwierzęctwa*],” was the ultimately diabolic creation.<sup>81</sup>

From the very beginning of the Polish emigration there was a common conviction that to the west of the Dvina and Dnieper Rivers there could be no place for Russia.<sup>82</sup> That was exactly what the editor of the conservative *Tygodnik Emigracji Polskiej* (Polish emigration weekly), Jan Słowaczyński, alluded to when criticizing the thesis of Jan Czyński’s book about Russia. The editor urged Czyński not to write about Russia, because its borders had to be a point of concern for any patriotic Pole. For such a Pole, Russia ended at the Dnieper River, whereas in reality it stretched west to the Nieman River. To choose the latter (the real border) would be to commit a “crime” of recognizing the partition of Poland, but to choose the former (the desirable Russian border on the Dnieper) would be “a deception of the readership.”<sup>83</sup> Słowaczyński advised the author to abandon his intention to write the book altogether.

The ultraliberal Czyński was somewhat of an exception among Polish émigrés in avoiding the prescription of Russia’s borders. The most pro-Russian position among the Polish émigrés was taken by Adam Gurowski, the founding member of the TDP and later the most famous renegade of the Polish cause. In 1846, after he had switched sides, Gurowski envisioned the borders of Russia as the new great Slavic civilization stretching from the “Ice Sea” (Arctic Ocean) to the Mediterranean and from the Vistula to the Pacific Ocean.<sup>84</sup>

For many Poles the border between Poland and Russia lay in Ukraine. It was the Ukrainian lands, or Ruś in general and the Dnieper in particular, that effectively separated Poland from Russia on Polish mental maps. The Polish historian Joachim Lelewel, while honoring Polish exiles in Siberia, pointed to the Dnieper among other rivers as the major natural marker of a Polish-Russian border. He recognized that those exiles were “far from

the shores of the Sozha and Dnieper that separate Poland from Russia, far from the Vistula and Volga.”<sup>85</sup>

The Society of Lithuania and the Lands of Rus’ sponsored by Prince Adam Czartoryski was very sensitive to the eastern borderlands of Poland and the western extension of Russia. In its statute the society made it clear that Rus’ (or so-called Polish Ruś) was not identical with Russia; instead, the historical connections of Rus’ with Poland were emphasized.<sup>86</sup> Lelewel’s student and yet another émigré, Leonard Chodźko, devoted much effort to prove the differences between Russia, which he called “Moskwa” (or “tataro-moscovite” for its people), and the Lithuanian-Ruthenian lands that were part of historical Poland.<sup>87</sup> Some argued that it was the Ruthenians, as ethnically the people closest to Poles (“since they emerged from the same elements”), who effectively separated Poland from Muscovy, while the latter’s “inclination” [*dążność*] was not only non-Polish [*nie Lechicka*] but also even non-Slavic and non-Christian.”<sup>88</sup>

The idea of the non-Slavic origins of Muscovy made it easier for Polish nationalists to separate Polish lands, populated predominantly by Christian Slavs, from the realm of the non-Slavic Muscovites, who appeared merely as conquerors of Slavic territories. It was obvious for the Poles that the Russian Empire was non-Slavic; rather, it was a multiethnic, multiracial, and polyreligious state. Moreover, the ethnic Russians (Great Russians) themselves did not appear Slavic enough. The already quoted Jan Alcyato remarked that Russia, unlike Poland, was “new and alien to the Slavs,” connected to them only through that “chunk of old Rus’,” which was more related to Poland than to Russia-Muscovy.<sup>89</sup> Several prominent Poles, such as the historian Joachim Lelewel, the philosopher Bronisław Trentowski, the poet Adam Mickiewicz, and the journalist and amateur scholar Franciszek Duchński, excluded Russians from the Slavic world by ascribing to them Asian Mongol or Tatar origins and traits.<sup>90</sup>

The Polish conception of Ruś, including Ukraine and Kyiv, being the watershed between Poland and Russia could also become a uniting point for these two historical powers. One of the most Slavophilic Polish émigrés, Joachim Lelewel, sought to reach out to Russians by pointing to the Ruthenians: “Brother Russians! We call you brothers because you are our brothers through the very name of our compatriots, Ruthenians.”<sup>91</sup> A similar idea was voiced by Piotr Semencko, then a member of the TDP, who was of Ruthenian (Belarusian-Ukrainian) descent. The Ruthenian people were “the real center” and “the real heart of the Slavic body,”

which was uniquely positioned between Poland and Russia-Muscovy, two competing but “unnatural” centers of the Slavic world. The Ruthenians constituted both the border and the uniting point between Poland and Russia: “Between two centers [ . . . ], between two hearts that wanted to beat unnaturally in one body, there was the real center, there was the real heart. Between Poland and Russia, along the rivers of Bug, Dniester, beyond the Dnieper to the very sources of it there live ten millions of Ruthenians. The Ruthenian people is that heart of a Slavic body.”<sup>92</sup> Hence, the Ruthenians “constitute everything in the Slavic world” and “insured power” to whomever they sided with in history. Semenenko also opposed the exclusion of Russia from Europe.<sup>93</sup> This fervently pro-Ruthenian and somewhat pro-Russian outlook brought down upon him the wrath of other émigré politicians. He was accused of being a Russian agent and was forced to leave the TDP.<sup>94</sup> The decisively anti-Russian mental geography, which focused on the contested Ruthenian lands, proved long-lasting. As late as 1848 it was the Polish claim to Ukraine, including Kyiv, that still defined the Polish vision of Russia’s geography and fueled Polish-Russian animosities within the Slavic world.<sup>95</sup> Paradoxically, while Poles managed to distinguish ethnic Russia from the Russian Empire, they could not admit the idea of an ethnic Poland.

### The Ukrainian Vision

The Ukrainian vision of Russian geography was that of insiders. There was no Ukrainian political emigration, and it was difficult for Ukrainians to look at Russia from a distance. The mental maps of Ukrainians in the 1830s–1840s did not necessarily reject Russian visions of both Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian and Russian geographies were to a large extent compatible. The Ukrainian gaze, however, emphasized an ethnically split empire rather than a national space dominated by Great Russians. For many generations of Ukrainians (or Little Russians), Russia had been the common legacy of two nationalities—Little Russians and Great Russians—united through the person of a ruler whose empire they had built together. This common motherland had a common name—Rus’—for both Russians and Ukrainians. Therefore, Rus’, or Russia (Rossiia), as a general name for a country and empire, included both ethnic Russia (Great Russia) and Ukraine (Little Russia or Southern Russia). This was the conception of Mykhailo Maksymovych, a Ukrainian ethnographer,

amateur historian, and literary critic, who liked to emphasize that Russia was the common legacy of Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians. Rus'/Russia was the union of three parts—Great Russia, Little Russia, and White Russia.

For Maksymovych the crucial event occurred in 1654 when Hetman Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi “united Little Russia with Great Russia.” “This was how took place the original merging of three long-severed parts of Rus’ into one political sovereignty [*gosudarstvennuu samobytnost’*] and unity,” he wrote in 1837.<sup>96</sup> Such an understanding was particularly apt whenever Rus’ or Russia was mentioned in opposition to foreign countries. An aspiring scholar, Osyp Bodians'kyi, in a letter to his father describing Slavic languages, opposed Rus’ as a country of his residence to other countries where he traveled.<sup>97</sup> For the conservative editor and army general Stepan Burachek, Rus’ was the motherland of “all Russians” from different lands of the former Kyivan Rus’.<sup>98</sup> His motherland consisted of “the Russian State” as well as Galicia and “Eastern Hungary.” Burachek emphasized that “a history of Galician, Carpathian, and Hungarian Rus’ must necessarily be included into a history of Russian people.”<sup>99</sup>

Even for the Ukrainophile Mykola Kostomarov, “Russia” was both the historic and present motherland, split into two halves since medieval times. When “Russia became divided,” he wrote, “its western and eastern parts began to live a life distinct from one another.”<sup>100</sup> He proceeded with the conception of a common empire where one half—Great Russia—was aspiring for cultural dominance at the expense of another. The latter, Little Russia, had its historic literary standard, the “Ruthenian language,” which had once influenced the “common Russian” culture. Kostomarov interpreted the struggle for the common legacy of Russia as one between two languages: when “Russia recovered its western and southern regions the Ruthenian language became useless, there was another common language, with Church-Slavonic and Great Russian idioms taken for its basis, which was formed according to all available foreign forms.” His intention was to reclaim the common Russian legacy and to prove that the “entirety of Russia” (*vsia Rossiia*) could not be reduced to the Great Russians alone. Kostomarov defended the right of the Little Russians to participate in the Romantic turn of Russian culture.<sup>101</sup>

In the more specific sense the name Rus’ or Russia (*Rossiia/Rosiia*) meant rather Great Russia (Muscovy), as was the case for the Ukrainian Romantic author Panteleimon Kulish. “I was educated in Kyiv University

but I did not happen to be in Holy Rus' [*na Sviatoi zhe Rusi*]," wrote Kulish in 1843, when he planned to go to Moscow: "therefore, I almost hallucinate about your Muscovy while studying Russian antiquity."<sup>102</sup> In his poetic-historical notes, however, Kulish was aware of the exclusive associations between Ukraine and Rus' in the past. "Ukraine itself in the old times was called Rus'," he wrote in a work published under the title "Ukraina. Vid Bat'ka Khmelnyts'koho . . ." <sup>103</sup>

For Gogol, too, the term *Russia* (Rossiia) referred to an ethnic Russia that bordered a Cossack-dominated "Ukraine" to the south.<sup>104</sup> For the Ukrainian writer and Black Sea Cossack officer Iakiv Kukharenko, Rus' also meant ethnic Russian lands, whereas his native Black Sea Land (Chornomoriia), today the Kuban' region of the Russian Federation, was part of a Ukrainian space.<sup>105</sup> Kukharenko's Ukrainian heroes left their native Black Sea Land for Rus', which started along the Don River, where some Russian insulted them with the pejorative ethnic name "*khokhly*." The exclusive association of Rus' with Great Russia was not universally accepted. Iurii Venelin, for example, noted the perception of Russia by common Ukrainians, or "Southerners," in whose opinion the "real Rus'" did not include ethnic Russia—"Muscovy": "Southerners in their turn do not allow Northerners to take part in Russianism. Despite the fact that he calls himself a Russian, he is still not Ruthenian [Rusin] but a Muscovite [Moskal'], a Lipovan, and a Katsap. According to the Southerners, real Rus' stretches only as far as where the Southerners live; the rest is the Muscovite land."<sup>106</sup> For a "Southerner," continued Venelin, it was only an inhabitant of the Ukrainian townships, such as Hlukhiv or Chernihiv, who was "a real Russian," whereas those coming from the Great Russian provinces of Iaroslavl' and Vladimir would be labeled as "Muscovites." This point of view was adopted by the Western nationalities, and it was only later (in 1812) that the Poles, Hungarians, and French started using the name Rus' for Muscovy as well.<sup>107</sup>

For many Ukrainians, especially for those with Little Russian identities, the Great Russia/Little Russia divide was reflected in two geographic metaphors. First, "South" and "North" became a common designation of Ukraine and Russia, respectively. Venelin himself drew an ethnic distinction between "Southerners" and "Northerners" from the perspective of a south/north geographical divide. Kulish, in his *Povest' ob Ukrainskom narode* (Tale of the Ukrainian people, 1846), split Russia into southern and northern provinces and, similar to Venelin, wrote about the "Southern Rus'

people.”<sup>108</sup> Gogol also used the south/north divide in his quasi-scholarly writings, such as “A Glimpse at the Formation of Little Russia” (*Vzgliad na sostavlenie Malorossii*). Mykhailo Maksymovych constantly used the metaphors of “South” and “North” in his publications and correspondence.<sup>109</sup>

Despite geographic and climatic evidence, for Maksymovych Kyiv was the mystical “South” that was able to improve his health and career. In lectures and scholarly works he interpreted the entire scope of Ukrainian and Russian cultural traditions as the dialectical development of the “South” and “North” of Rus’ united within Orthodox Christianity, “the basis of their Russian nationality.”<sup>110</sup> This metaphor became popular with Russians, one of whom praised Maksymovych’s journal, *Kievlianin*, for representing the “beautiful South of our fatherland” to the “unfortunate inhabitants of the cold North,” meaning obviously Great Russia.<sup>111</sup>

There was a second geographical metaphor competing for the designation of Russia and Ukraine among the educated public of the empire. The empire could also be split along a west/east line, Ukraine meaning “West” and Russia proper, “East.” Maksymovych endorsed such a geographical vision of Russia in his works. While “Western Rus” meant for him ethnic Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, “Eastern Rus” meant Great Russia or the historical Moscow tsardom.<sup>112</sup> Such was the geography in a highly politicized and very conservative Russian-language novel, *Emeritus*, by the second-rate writer and ex-ethnographer Ivan Kulzhinskii.<sup>113</sup> Both Kostomarov and Maksymovych saw Russia as the historic union of its “western” and “eastern” parts.<sup>114</sup> While it was not quite clear what “the West” of Russia meant, it was clear enough that “the East” referred to Great Russia or historical Muscovy.

Usually the terms *Muscovy* or *Muscovite land* (*Moskovshchyna*) with respect to ethnic Russia were preferable to Ukrainian artists and critics. Taras Shevchenko’s poetry can serve as an appropriate illustration. Almost exclusively, he used the terms *Muscovy* (*Moskovshchyna*) or *Moscow* (*Moskva*) to separate Ukraine from the ultimately alien, hostile, and dangerous (ethnic) Russia; only once in his poetry did he use the word *Russia*.<sup>115</sup> Shevchenko’s “Muscovy” was situated “on the edge of the world” (*na kraji svita*) and was populated by “an alien people” (*kruhomy chuzhi liudy*).<sup>116</sup> He imagined Russia as a multinational space where ethnic Russians residing even in what might be called Great Russia were surrounded by “peoples of different languages.”<sup>117</sup> Russia for Shevchenko, as for many Poles, was not just a multinational empire; it was a prison of nations. He best sum-

marized this prison-like imperial geography in his famous poem “Kavkaz” (The Caucasus):

We have a huge world for this matter—  
 There is Siberia, which one cannot traverse,  
 Not to mention prisons! And people! No need to count!  
     From a Moldavian to a Finn  
     In all languages everything keeps silence,  
     Because it is enjoying well-being!<sup>118</sup>

The split between Ukraine and Russia proper was often expressed not in geographical or geopolitical but in linguistic terms. Taras Shevchenko in his letters constantly opposed Ukraine to Russia, the land where the “Muscovite” language was spoken, asking his friends and relatives not to write to him “in a Muscovite tongue” (*po-moskovs'komu*).<sup>119</sup> The Russian Empire for him was also symbolically represented by Saint Petersburg, populated by “Muscovites and Germans.” “Everywhere there are Muscovites and Germans [*Kruhom Moskali ta nimota*],” he wrote in 1841 to Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko.<sup>120</sup> In his Ukrainian-language letters Shevchenko called Russians almost exclusively “Muscovites” (*moskali*) or “katsapy,” which sometimes had derogatory and sometimes simply informal connotations.

For Gogol, ethnic Russia was the “land of the katsapy” (*katsapiia*), as he wrote to Maksymovych, urging him to leave it for Ukraine or “the Land of Hetmans” (*hetmanshchyna*).<sup>121</sup> The Ukrainian Romantic Kvitka-Osnovianenko explained to his readers what he understood by the name “Muscovites”: “Muscovites are not those who live in Moscow but those who are not ours, but Russians.”<sup>122</sup> For him Russians were those people who spoke the Russian (or Great Russian) language, which was a vernacular of “only several provinces.”<sup>123</sup> Unfortunately, neither Kvitka nor Shevchenko elaborated further on the geography of ethnic or imperial Russia.

Ukrainian mental maps of Russia or Great Russia were virtually absent. The same holds true about the geopolitical treatment of Russia, perhaps because this proved to be very dangerous during the reign of Nicholas I (1825–55). The example of one political dissident is quite telling. Heorhii Andruz'kyi, an alleged member of the secret Society of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, left some notes that revealed his geopolitical imagination. In his project of geopolitical rearrangement of Eastern Europe Andruz'kyi envisioned a federation of seven “states” (*shtatov*), several of which comprised the ethnic borderlands of Russia. The federative state was supposed

to consist of: Ukraine, with the Black Sea Land, Galicia, and Crimea; Poland, with Poznania, Lithuania, and Samogitia; Bessarabia, with Moldavia and Valachia; the Baltic region (*Ostzeia*); Serbia; Bulgaria; and the Don region.<sup>124</sup> Clearly, he imagined Russia as a patchwork of different nationalities and distinct regions, and similarly to the Poles, he found this political structure abnormal. Like Mochnacki, who argued for the dissolution of Russia for the sake of Poland, Andruz'kyi bluntly remarked that "in order to create Ukraine, one should destroy Russia, which had strengthened itself for centuries."<sup>125</sup> The outspoken Andruz'kyi probably did not have enough time to elaborate on the geopolitics of Eastern Europe because the tsarist authorities discovered his papers and harshly punished him.

Ukrainian observers of the 1830s–1840s were aware of an imperial-national divide in Russia and were also able to differentiate sharply between Ukraine and Russia. Nonetheless, there were only a few critical treatments of Russian imperial geography and politics. These voices became increasingly vocal toward the end of the 1840s but were punished severely by imperial authorities. The Ukrainian public sphere was institutionally limited, which makes it hard to analyze the geopolitical and national imagination of Ukrainians.

# 3

## **“Russia’s Italy,” or “Between Poland and the Crimea” Ukraine’s Borders**

### **The Ukrainian Vision**

The Ukrainian vision of geography was to a large extent a rejection of the Polish geography. At the same time, Ukrainian mental maps were fairly congruent with Russian imperial (and national) geography. When Ukrainians mapped their imagined community, they automatically “unmade” a historic Poland that extended beyond the Carpathians as far as Kyiv.

Unlike the Poles, whose geographical nomenclature was well fixed, Ukrainians had problems with the very name of their country. Depending on the person, place, or language, the name and extent of the land populated by present-day Ukrainians could vary significantly. Here I focus on those persons living within the Russian Empire who originated predominantly from Left Bank Ukraine, or the territory of the former Hetman State (Het'manshchyna). In the 1830s–1840s most of those who could be referred to as the early Ukrainian intelligentsia came from Left Bank Ukraine, which since the early eighteenth century had been producing enlightened cadres for the Russian imperial bureaucracy. These Little Russian–born bureaucrats often combined loyalty to the empire with local patriotism. For a long time they had called their land “Little Russia” (Malorosiiia or Mala Rosiia, with different spellings), but by the first decades of the nineteenth century the name “Little Russia” had become an official label and symbol of Russian rule.<sup>1</sup> At the same time, “Little Russia” in a narrow sense referred to two Left Bank provinces of the empire (Poltava and Chernihiv) which had once formed the core of the Hetmanate.

As late as 1841, the Ukrainian writer Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko contrasted the inhabitants of the easternmost Kharkiv province (*slobozhane*) with “Little Russians” from the Hetmanate–Little Russia.<sup>2</sup> Elsewhere, he juxtaposed *slobozhane*, to whom he belonged himself, with the inhabitants of the ex-Hetmanate, whom he called “Hetmanians” (*hetmantsi*).<sup>3</sup>

Historically, the term *Ukraine* had a regional meaning, and Poles, Russians, and even Ukrainians used it with similar (narrow) meanings. In the Ukrainian context, “Ukraine” most commonly referred to the territory of the Kharkiv (Sloboda Ukraine) province in the northeast of present-day Ukraine.<sup>4</sup> But there was also another Ukraine, situated in the Dnieper basin, the city of Kyiv being its northern center. One of the most exhaustive geographical descriptions of this Dnieper Ukraine was made by Nikolai Gogol. According to the writer, Ukraine, which was bisected by the Dnieper River along a north-south line (all the way down to the famous rapids), was lacking natural borders and being thus unprotected could not become the basis for a viable state:

This land, which later became known as the Ukraine, stretching [north] no farther than 50° latitude is flat rather than hilly. Frequent small elevations are encountered, but no mountain ranges at all. The northern region contains forests here and there [ . . . ], the southern part is all wide, open steppeland [ . . . ]. From north to south flows the great Dniepr, flanked by a tangle of tributaries which flow into it. Its right bank is hilly and offers captivating, yet at the same time challenging countryside; the left bank is a mass of meadows strewn with flooded copses. Twelve rapids made by rocks jutting up from the river bed near to where it enters the sea impede the current [ . . . ]. Only one navigable river flows into the Dniepr. This is the Desna, which passes through the northern Ukraine [ . . . ]. In addition there is the Oster and part of the Seima in the north, the Sula in the south, the Psel, with its chain of views, the Chorol and others; but not one of them is navigable. There was absolutely no communication [ . . . ] and for this reason no trading nation could have arisen here. The rivers all branch out from the center; not a single one of them flows along the border or serves as a natural border with neighboring nations. If one considers the northern region, next to Russia, or the eastern, with the Kipchaisky Tatars, to the southern region with the Crimean Tatars, or the western region, next to Poland, one finds that everywhere her borders are formed by fields; there is nothing but plainland and open spaces on every side. Had there been a natural border of mountains or sea on one side, the people who settled here would have carried on their political way of life and would have formed a separate nation.<sup>5</sup>

In the first half of the nineteenth century it was common to write about two halves of Ukraine, the division being rather historical than geographical. There was “Western”/“Polish” or “Trans-Dnieper” Ukraine, from the Ros’ River to the Southern Bug River, with such major cities as Bila Tserkva, Lysianka, and Uman’.<sup>6</sup> There was also “Eastern” or “Russian”/“Little Russian” Ukraine centered on such towns as Pereiaslav and Romny.<sup>7</sup> As the main spiritual center of the entire Dnieper Ukraine,<sup>8</sup> Kyiv belonged geographically to “Western Ukraine,” though politically and administratively the city was rather part of Left Bank (“Eastern”) Ukraine and the Hetmanate. Panteleimon Kulish, a prominent writer and amateur scholar, felt the differences between the two parts of Ukraine and was even about to consider “the characteristics of the Trans-Dnieper people (*zadneprovskogo naroda*) as distinct from the Little Russian [people].”<sup>9</sup> This regional, landlocked Ukraine, lacking natural borders, had the potential to grow spatially on the mental maps of Ukrainian patriots.

The new Romantic generation of Ukrainians, while continuing to use the official term *Little Russia*, increasingly invested the term *Ukraine* with a much broader meaning. Some Ukrainians used both terms—*Ukraine* and *Little Russia*—interchangeably. Taras Shevchenko, for example, in a single letter to the Chernihiv governor P. I. Gesse, asking for the governor’s help in distributing his artworks, used several terms with respect to the same territory.<sup>10</sup> The poet started his letter with the name “Southern Russia,” whose history “amazes anyone with its events.” He continued with the name “Little Russia,” which “from the old times had had its own composers, painters, and poets.” He then mentioned “our country” with its “beautiful fields,” and finally reached the term *Ukraine* for whose “name’s glory” he served.

In fact, Shevchenko called his collection of graphics “The Picturesque Ukraine”; it covered geographical locations on both banks of the Dnieper. Similarly, Kulish, in a Russian-language letter from Saint Petersburg to a young Ukrainian, Opanas Markovych, used two names for the same territory: “I will not go to *Little Russia* this year. My domestic affairs turned in the desperate straits, obviously not here [in Saint Petersburg] but in *Ukraine*, so that I don’t have a desire to go there.”<sup>11</sup> It is worth noting that in Ukrainian-language letters, Shevchenko and his peers predominantly used the term *Ukraine*, whereas in their Russian correspondence and literary works they often used the more conventional terms *Little Russia* or *Southern Russia*. In his Ukrainian letters to his Ukrainian-speaking

addressees (like Osyp Bodians'kyi or Hryhorii Tarnovs'kyi), Shevchenko used such expressions as “our beloved Ukraine” and simply “our Ukraine,” but in a letter to the Russian lady Varvara Repnina he was planning “to come to *Little Russia*.”<sup>12</sup>

Ukrainians, whether with predominantly all-Russian or more exclusively Ukrainian identities, had the awareness of belonging to a population that lived on a huge territory stretching from the Don River in the east to the Carpathian Mountains in the west. This region basically corresponded to the territory of present-day Ukraine. This vision of geography directly confronted Polish mental maps that included territory between the Carpathians and the Dnieper into the prospective Polish nation-state. At the same time, Ukrainians and Russians agreed that “Little Russia,” or “Southern/South-Western Russia,” extended all the way to the Carpathians. The idea of Ukraine (Little Russia, Southern Russia) reaching from the Carpathians to the Don River dominated all shades of geographical thought, including that of conservative loyalists, like the editor of the ultraconservative periodical *Maiak* (The lighthouse), and radicals from the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. The very conservative editor of *Maiak*, S. O. Burachek, while refuting the vision of Ukrainian history by the Russian liberal Nikolai Polevoi, developed in 1842 one of the most eccentric visions of East European geography.

In Burachek's rather bizarre view, Ukraine, or Little Russia in his terminology, contained during Cossack times ten million people throughout “the whole extent of the South from the Volga River to the Danube.”<sup>13</sup> Further on, Burachek made increasingly eccentric comments about the boundaries of Little Russia. While meditating on Scythian times, he wrote that Little Russia extended from the Ural Mountains to the Danube!<sup>14</sup> If that did not look convincing enough, Burachek identified the entire Khazar Empire with Little Russia: “Khazars rule over the entire country from the delta of the Volga to the Azov and the Black Sea, Phanagoria, the Bosphorus, and the larger part of Taurida which later, for several centuries, had been called Khazaria [ . . . ]. (Do you hear? Here, there is an entire Little Russia in an extended version).”<sup>15</sup>

In addition to this pro-Ukrainian vision of geography, he called different ancient and medieval peoples (including Scythians, Attila's Huns, Rus'-Varangians, East Slavic tribes, and so on) “Cossacks” and “Little Russians,” although the latter were closely related to Great Russians: “If we give Little Russia a wider volume from the Urals to the Danube, then

without any doubt we should admit that all peoples flashing under the different names in ancient history B.C. and A.D. are the Cossacks, the Russians-Slavs.”<sup>16</sup>

After this, one is not surprised to learn that the Kyivan Rus' prince Mstyslav, the son of Saint Vladimir, “was perhaps the first Hetman of Little Russia and New Russia,” and that the Scandinavian name “Roerik” (or Riurik of an Old Rus' chronicle) was just the Germanic form of the Ukrainian “Iurko.”<sup>17</sup> This inflated extent of Ukraine corresponded to the inflated importance of Ukrainians–Little Russians–Cossacks in East European history. Burachek's bizarre Little Russian patriotism did not contradict his conservative and loyalist views. His geography of Ukraine could well serve the goals of the Russian government by countering the Polish nationalist geographies that claimed at least half of Burachek's Ukraine. His imperial servilism notwithstanding, the very existence of such a map pointed to the possibility of Ukraine (or Little Russia) as a mental and geographical reality and a distinctive entity in Eastern Europe.

Similarly loyal to the Russian emperor while still remaining a patriotic “southern Russian” was Iurii Venelin. A native of Transcarpathian Rus', he also had a broad view of Ukrainian geography. His Ukraine, or “Southern Rus',” extended from the Vistula River in the west to the Dnieper rapids in the southeast and was populated by “the Southern Rusaks” (singular *Iuzhnyi Rusak*), or the “Southern-Rus' tribe.” He referred to them simply as “Southerners” (*Iuzhane*).<sup>18</sup> Venelin defined the geography of Southern Rus' through the proliferation of the “Southern-Rus'” dialect of a common Russian language, warning that the generic term *Southern Rus'* not be confused with *Little Russian* and *Ukrainian*, which had narrower meanings.<sup>19</sup> In charting his “linguistic” map, Venelin encroached on the Polish territory as far as Lublin and Zamość:

To the Southern-Rus' (incorrectly called Little Russian) idiom in Russia, the Kingdom of Poland, Galicia, and northern Hungary belong up to 20 million people; (to the Northern Rus' [idiom] up to 22 million). There is no such a solidly huge people in any other country of Europe. The great benefit comes from the uniformity of idiom, the song compiled in Lublin or in Zamosť is native to [an inhabitant of] Khar'kov; what is sung around Peremyshl' in Galicia is understood in Glukhov; what is compiled at Kamianets-Podol'skii can belong to the residents of Voronezh as well as to those of the Black sea coast. Therefore, “The Ukrainian Popular Songs” compiled by Mr. Maksymovych belong not only to the Ukrainians but also to the entire Southern Rus'.<sup>20</sup>

Apparently, for Venelin, “Southern Rus’” was larger than conventional “Little Russia” and regional “Ukraine,” since it also included Belarusian provinces and the East Slavic population of Congress Poland. Venelin was aware of the unclear and complicated nature of the terminology: “What is Ukraine, who are the Cossacks, what is Little Russia, who are Little Russians? These questions seem to be familiar to everyone, but the fact of the matter is that no one has a precise or clear idea of them.”<sup>21</sup> He insisted on the generic terms *Rusyns* (*rusiny*) or *southerners* (*iuzhane*), counting fifteen million in the Russian Empire, who lived in the provinces of Podolia, Volhynia, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Minsk, Hrodna, Mogilev, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Sloboda Ukraine (or Kharkiv), Tauria, Vitsiebsk [Vitsyebsk], Voronezh, Kursk, Vilna/Vilnius, the Białystok district, as well as in the land of the Black Sea Cossacks, Bessarabia, and the Lublin palatinate of Congress Poland.<sup>22</sup> In a special table Venelin enumerated the number of the “Southern Rus’,” Poles, Lithuanians, and Jews in all western provinces of the Russian Empire, joining together contemporary Ukrainians and Belarusians as Southern Rus’ and opposing them to the rest of the population. He added 800,000 Ruthenians from the Chełm/Kholm Uniate eparchy in Congress Poland, separating them from the local Polish lords.<sup>23</sup>

It is worth noting that according to more reasonable estimates, including those by the Slovak scholar Pavel Josef Šafárik, Ukrainians (or Little Russians) in both empires in the 1830s–1840s numbered slightly more than 13 million people as opposed to 35 million Russians and 9 million Poles.<sup>24</sup> The Ukrainian writer Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko counted 10 million Ukrainian-speakers in the Russian Empire.<sup>25</sup> All such estimates, however, robbed Poles of a large portion of their putative conationals (since Poles imagined themselves as a 20-million-strong nationality that included Ukrainians from the right bank of the Dnieper and Austrian Galicia).

Venelin did not see Ukraine as it is shaped today; instead, he adhered to the early modern concept of Rus’ (Ruthenia and Ruthenians) formed in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This concept encompassed the East Slavic Orthodox and later also the Greek Catholic population of the multi-ethnic state. The Ruthenians were increasingly defined as such in opposition to primarily Catholic Poles and Lithuanians, Jews, and even the neighboring Muscovites. Venelin also alluded to the local Ukrainian perception of space: “In the opinion of the Southerners, the real Rus’ does not extend the territory where Southerners live, while all the rest is the Muscovite land.”<sup>26</sup> According to him, Europe had adapted the concept of Southerners and

called Rus' only that space located between the Carpathians in the west and the Ukrainian town of Hlukhiv or Belarusian Vitsyebk in the east. Europeans used to name the territories farther east as Muscovy, despite the protests of Tsars Ivan IV ("the Dread") and Aleksei Mikhailovich.

Venelin also sought to fight the Polish mental geography by rejecting Polish claims to Rus'. Yet he admitted that paradoxically it was the Poles and not the local Ruthenians who treated Rus' as their native country. For the local peasants the terms *Rus'* and *Rusyn* were pejorative: a peasant "does not call his Motherland by her name, he knows of her only through folklore."<sup>27</sup> Like a number of Little Russians, Venelin was obligated to envelop his Southern Rus' into the broader context of the Russian-Polish struggle.

Another expert on matters Ukrainian, the historian and ethnographer Mykola Markevych, defined the borders of Little Russia as stretching from the Carpathians to the Voronezh and Kursk provinces in the east and to the Dnieper rapids in the south:

Little Russia can be called the entire space from the borders of Hungarian Galicia, including only the Kamianets-Podolsk and Kiev provinces on that side of the Dnieper, to the borders of the Voronezh province, counting on this side of the Dnieper Poltava, Chernigov, and Khar'kov provinces, with some localities in the Kursk province. On the south it ends beyond the Dnieper rapids where once started the possessions of the Turkish Sultan.<sup>28</sup>

For some reason, Markevych did not include the province of Volhynia in his geographic version of Little Russia. Instead, he seemed to attach to his Little Russia the southern city of Kherson and Kyiv as two "major piers" of the Dnieper River.<sup>29</sup> Another early Ukrainophile, Panteleimon Kulish, wrote about the "Southern Rus', or Little Russian people" living in the Russian Empire as well as in Galicia and "several other lands" of the Austrian Empire.<sup>30</sup> Ukrainian (and Russian) observers included Polish-dominated and Austrian-controlled Galicia within the borders of Ukraine/Little Russia/Southern Rus'. For Kulish, "The Southern Rus' land" stretched as far as Galicia's cities of Lviv and Zamość.<sup>31</sup> Another Ukrainian intellectual, Oryp Bodians'kyi, called the inhabitants of Galicia "the kin of the Ukrainians."<sup>32</sup> Gogol defined his native space through the proliferation of the Rus' speech and faith as slightly beyond the Carpathians: "Until you get to the Carpathians you can hear the Rus' speech, and just beyond the mountains there are still here and there sounds of [our] native tongue; but further beyond the faith and speech is not quite the same."<sup>33</sup>

Thus, almost all districts of contemporary Ukraine appeared on the mental maps of the nineteenth-century insiders as more or less united. Nineteenth-century Little Russia/Ukraine/South Russia, with some reservations, equaled Ukraine as we know it. There were some doubts, however, whether to include the entire New Russia, a territory that once was contested between the East Slavs and the numerous Turkish-speaking peoples, until in the late eighteenth century it was acquired by Russia and populated by settlers of various ethnic backgrounds.

Since there was no Ukrainian state with clearly defined historical borders, cultural institutions, or even a common term for national self-designation, the real problem for the Romantic nationalists was to devise a principle of geographical and demographic unity. Despite the lack of a common signifier, they felt that the territory from the Carpathians to the Don River was populated by the same people. In the 1830s–1840s, many continued to use the term *Little Russians*, but because of its official if somewhat regional connotation (a Little Russian, first of all, was someone from Left Bank Ukraine, or an ex-Hetmanate) other terms were used as well.

For example, many Ukrainians from different regions of present-day Ukraine and residing in various parts of the empire used the ideologically neutral concept “countrymen” (in Ukrainian, *zemiaki*). Taras Shevchenko widely used the word *countryman/countrymen* when referring to Ukrainians, whether they were living in Kharkiv or Saint Petersburg.<sup>34</sup> He himself was called “the Cossack-countryman” (*kozak-zemliak*) by Bodians’kyi, who at the time resided in Moscow.<sup>35</sup> In Shevchenko’s Russian-language novella *The Robber* (Varnak), the main hero, who was born in Volhynia but was exiled to Russia’s interior, called his “countrymen” all those expatriates who came from Sloboda Ukraine, that is, from the Kursk and Kharkiv provinces.<sup>36</sup> The term *countrymen* was the most common (self-)designation for those coming from different parts of present-day Ukraine and residing anywhere in the empire.

In the first half of the nineteenth century the term *Ukrainian* referred predominantly to the regional identity of someone who came from Sloboda Ukraine, or Dnieper Ukraine.<sup>37</sup> Hence, the concept of the “Ukrainian people” used by Nikolai Gogol had the similarly regional and historically localized meaning of the Cossack population situated around the middle Dnieper.<sup>38</sup> In that sense, Volhynia and Galicia remained outside Gogol’s Ukraine. It is also remarkable that Shevchenko, neither in his

literary works nor in his correspondence, used the term *Ukrainians*. He did use the adjective *Ukrainian*, however, in other contexts, as when referring to his native language.

The language spoken mostly by common people was thought to be the most tangible symbol of geographical and demographic unity. As late as the 1830s–1840s, however, there was no single name for this language among Ukrainians themselves. Shevchenko himself did not seem to be certain as to what to call his native language. He once called it “our beloved Ukrainian language” (*nash liubyi ukrains'kyi iazyk*).<sup>39</sup> More often, he described his native language in a rather traditional way. In a letter to his brother, he asked him to reply “not in a Muscovite way but *in our own way*” (*ne po-moskovs'komu, a po-nashomu, po-svoiemu*).<sup>40</sup> This practice was reflected in different poetic and dramatic works of the time.

For example, the hero of Vasyl Hohol's vaudeville from the 1820s also referred to “speaking in our way” (*hovoryt' po-nashomu*) as opposed to the “Muscovite tongue.”<sup>41</sup> When addressing an educated audience in Russian, Kvitka referred to “the Little Russian dialect/language,” but when addressing peasants he used the expression “to write all in our way” (*pysaty, ta use po-nashomu*).<sup>42</sup> This uncertain manner of speaking about the Ukrainian language survived until the end of the nineteenth century but was often a playful imitation of a folk discourse by educated Ukrainians.<sup>43</sup> Kulish, however, widely used the term *Ukrainian language* in his letters to Shevchenko and Bodians'kyi, although he could also use the expression “Little Russian language” in a letter to a Russian addressee.<sup>44</sup> All these names were used to designate a community of speakers and language-sympathizers with different degrees of intimacy.

Only rarely did Shevchenko apply the adjective *Ukrainian* to the population of the Dnieper Ukraine. Perhaps in Gogol's sense, Shevchenko named one of his graphic drawings “Gifts to Bohdan [Khmelnys'kyi] and to the Ukrainian Nation” (*Dary Bohdanovi i ukrains'komu narodovi*), which was part of the series entitled “Picturesque Ukraine.”<sup>45</sup> At the same time, he characterized his Russian poem “Slepaia” (The blind) as something taken from the “Ukrainian simple life.”<sup>46</sup> Yet it is difficult to say with any certainty how inclusive Shevchenko's term *Ukrainian* was. It was really Panteleimon Kulish who started systematically using the term *Ukrainian* to designate the entire population of present-day Ukraine. In 1846, when confronting Mykola Kostomarov for his refusal to call himself a Ukrainian, Kulish revealed the semantic shift in the use of the adjective

*Ukrainian*. For Kulish, the term had acquired the meaning of a national signifier:

Why do you say that you are not a Ukrainian? Do you hang out with us only because of a humanist idea? We give you the rights of citizenship, and besides, your mother is a Ukrainian. I am not able to love you as much as I love you when I consider you a Ukrainian. Is it possible to reject the name that is so precious to us?<sup>47</sup>

In Kulish's works the formulation "Ukrainian nation" clearly exceeded the limits of regional identity and referred more or less to the population of present-day Ukraine. In his *Tale of the Ukrainian People*, Ukrainians are synonymous with the "Southern Russians" and have a long history dating back to old Rus': "Our Southern Russians, or Ukrainians, have a history filled with heroic deeds and most remarkable adventures. One can start from the times of Askold, Dyr, Oleh and Sviatoslav." Kulish's goal was to define "the role of Ukrainians in the spiritual development of the Slavic world."<sup>48</sup> Elsewhere Kulish, while using the paradigm of the legendary *Istoriia Rusov* (History of the Rus' people), compiled the first continuous, if poetic, history of Ukraine and the Ukrainian nation since the times of Vladimir the Great.<sup>49</sup> It was in this same vein that Bodians'kyi called Ukraine "the cradle of Rus'."<sup>50</sup>

The first political document of the Ukrainian Romantic generation, *Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People*, written by Mykola Kostomarov, featured "Ukraine" and not "Little Russia" as a historical and metahistorical entity. The treatise also represented the influence of Polish geographical sensitivity, since it contained a very interesting projection of the partitions of Poland onto the Ukrainian case.<sup>51</sup>

The partitions were treated as God's punishment for the earlier partition of Ukraine into two halves along the Dnieper River by the Poles and Russians.<sup>52</sup> "The partition of Ukraine" was called "the worst event that one can find in history." The partition of Poland occurred because she "did not listen to Ukraine and destroyed her sister."<sup>53</sup> Polish geopolitical influence was, however, limited, since Kostomarov neither clearly defined Ukraine's borders nor used them as an argument against Polish or Russian claims. An explicit example of the connections between geography and politics can be found in the papers of Heorhii Andruz'kyi, an alleged member of the Brotherhood of Sts. Cyril and Methodius. Andruz'kyi fantasized about an autonomous "state" consisting of "Ukraine with the Black Sea Land, Galicia, and Crimea" in federation with Poland, Serbia, and other

“states.”<sup>54</sup> Andruz'kyi, however, did not substantiate his claims as to which lands were to form the Ukrainian state. History simply could not provide Ukrainian geography with adequate boundaries. Kyivan Rus' was yet to be explored and “appropriated” by Ukrainians, while the Hetman state even in its extended shape was too small to encompass all lands inhabited by Ukrainians, such as Volhynia, Galicia, or New Russia.

Despite the fact that Ukrainian/Little Russian patriots used history as the evidence of the continuous existence of Ukraine from the medieval period, for Maksymovych, Kulish, or Bodians'kyi historical borders never became as strong an argument as they did for the Poles in their struggle to restore statehood. If the idea of historical borders was used at all, it rather boosted the imperial cause, as was the case with General Burachek. For Ukrainians writing about the geography of their country, it was primarily nationality with its ethnographic and linguistic criteria that defined the geographical boundaries of the Ukrainian imagined community. Put another way, the space was united not through an appeal to once existing political borders but through the visible ethnographic unity of the contemporary population. One could hardly rely on political institutions to define Ukraine's national borders. Therefore, the Ukrainian case was that of “geographical Romanticism,” where ethnography in its Romantic veil led to geography.

### The Polish Vision

The region of the Polish-Russian-Ukrainian encounter, which is now known as Right Bank Ukraine, was mapped differently in Polish and Russian mental geographies during the first half of the nineteenth century. In the official imperial discourse, this territory was called the “South-Western region” (*Iugo-Zapadnyi krai*) or the “South-Western provinces” (*Iugo-Zapadnye gubernii*), referring to its geographical placement within the Russian Empire. In the Polish mind of the midnineteenth century, this area still constituted “the south-eastern palatinates of the Polish Republic” (*województwa wschodnio-południowe Rzeczy Pospolitej*).<sup>55</sup> The radical émigré Maurycy Mochnacki referred to Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia as “Ruthenia” (Ruś), which was for him “the third main constitutive element of Poland.”<sup>56</sup> Another émigré called the same territory (in even a larger extent) “Polish Ruthenia,” the cradle of East Slavic civilization as opposed to despotic “Muscovy.”<sup>57</sup>

For both Russians and Poles, Right Bank Ukraine was an integral part of the two conflicting mental geographies that represented the Russian Empire and the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Even after the disappearance of their state from political maps, Poles continued to think in geographical terms of a prepartitioned Poland. Poles residing in Right Bank Ukraine usually treated it as a part of a larger Polish community (“a community of tradition and spirit,” in the words of Andrzej Walicki) beyond existing political and administrative borders. Right Bank Ukraine was just one big piece of a larger homeland that encompassed three partitioned parts.

One of the most telling Polish understandings of “Ukrainian” geography can be found in Wincenty Pol’s famous poem “Pieśń o ziemi naszej” (The song of our land). Pol described all the lands of a prepartitioned Poland and paid a special attention to Galicia and Right Bank Ukraine. He used the same subdivisions and terms that had been circulating in Polish geographical imagination for centuries, including Ruś (Galicia), Wołyń, Ukraina, Podole, and Pobereże, all of which are part of present-day Ukraine.<sup>58</sup> The term *Ukraine* covered little more than a segment of land situated along the right bank of the Dnieper River and adjacent to the city of Kyiv. The city itself belonged to Pol’s “our land.”<sup>59</sup> These ideas about geography were fully shared by other Poles.

The prominent nineteenth-century writer Józef Ignacy Kraszewski also enumerated Wołyń, Ukraina, Podole, and Pobereże, along with Litwa and Wielka Polska, as “the different parts of an old Poland.”<sup>60</sup> His conservative literary competitor, Alexander Przezdziecki, traveled through the lakes, ravines, and steppes of Wołyń, Ukraina, Podole, Pobereże, and Polesie.<sup>61</sup> For the radical literary critic Seweryn Goszczyński, Ukraine was “part of Poland” with its own “national” poets, such as Bohdan Zaleski. Another region, Podole, could boast its own “national” poet, Maurycy Gosławski.<sup>62</sup> To be sure, those poets could write both in Polish and in Ukrainian, though sharing Polish national consciousness.

In addition to these old regional divisions, regional identities became increasingly important for Poles throughout the nineteenth century.<sup>63</sup> Authors like Kraszewski even sought to compare and contrast specifically Polish “characters” from different regions, describing the images of a Galicjanin, Koroniarz, Poznańczyk, Litwin, Podolak, Ukrainiec, and Wołyniak.<sup>64</sup> Even the great Polish poet Juliusz Słowacki acknowledged his own regional identity. Coming from Volhynia, he called himself a

Volhynian (Wołyniak), an identity he maintained even while in emigration.<sup>65</sup> In contrast, Kraszewski, who resided in Volhynia, called it “a foreign land,” considering himself instead a Lithuanian (Litwin).<sup>66</sup> Even after years spent on his Volhynian estate, he admitted: “No, I am not yet a Volhynian, I still have a Lithuanian heart.”<sup>67</sup>

It is, therefore, not surprising that only those who were born and raised in “Ukraine,” such as Zaleski, Malczewski, and Goszczyński, could belong to the “Ukrainian school” in literature—and not the likes of Słowacki, Kraszewski, or Gosławski.<sup>68</sup> Kraszewski became even an outspoken critic of the “Ukrainian school,” referring to Ukrainomania as a moral disease of the nineteenth century and rejecting Ukrainian topics in works by those who did not stem from the region. Elsewhere, in condemning “the fashion of Ukraine,” he stated that “those who had never been to Ukraine, never crossed Ukraine, never lived its life, and who look for its lore only in books [ . . . ], when writing Ukrainian poetry they become the laughable slaves of fashion.”<sup>69</sup> Instead, he appealed to look for poetry in other lands of historical Poland, such as Great Poland, Ruś (Galicia), Mazovia, Polatsk, Smolensk, and so on, thus charting his own historical map.

Everybody who came from the eastern borderlands of historical Poland knew the borders of those lands. For example, the borders of Podole included the Zbruch and Dniester Rivers to the west, the Iahorlyk and Kodyma to the south, and the Ukrainian steppes to the northeast.<sup>70</sup> Ukraine, or “*polska Ukraina*,” as Seweryn Goszczynski put it, “is surrounded by the Dnieper River on the east, the Boh [Southern Bug] on the west, Volhynia in the north, and the Kherson steppes to the south.”<sup>71</sup> Another Polish observer simply identified Ukraine with Kyiv province of the Russian Empire, although he stated that at one time Ukraine also included areas adjacent to the Black Sea coast, areas such as New Russia and Bessarabia.<sup>72</sup> This “Ukraine” within the Russian Empire consisted of the two former palatinates of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, that is, Kyiv and part of Bratslav (Bracław, in Polish).

Despite subsequent changes in political and administrative boundaries, Polish mental geography has not changed much since the seventeenth century; even as late as the 1950s and 1960s Polish scholars used the names Wołyń, Ukraina, and Podole with respect to the contemporary Right Bank Ukraine, as if their readers were able to find them on an actual map.

As an addition to the fragmented territory of present-day Right Bank Ukraine, the sources alluded to the existence of two Ukraines; one was

called Polish or Trans-Dnieper Ukraine,<sup>73</sup> and the other, Russian/Eastern or again Trans-Dnieper Ukraine, depending on which bank of the Dnieper the observer lived.<sup>74</sup> The historical vision of these two Ukraines was summarized by the conservative critic Michał Grabowski: in the second half of the eighteenth century Ukraine “did not constitute one body. The part situated on the left bank of the Dnieper, after the abolition of the Hetmanate, was added to Great Russia. The Right Bank remained in Poland.”<sup>75</sup> Most often, however, the territory of the former Hetmanate on the left bank of the Dnieper River was called “Little Russia” (Małorossja, or *Hetmańszczyzna*, in Polish) as was the official name for this territory in Russia.

Polish émigrés in the circle of Prince Adam Czartoryski launched in the 1840s a number of projects that included the Left Bank “Little Russians” in different federations with Poland. One of them proposed the restoration of the Polish-Cossack Union at Hadiach concluded in 1658.<sup>76</sup> One prominent Czartoryski collaborator, Michał Czajkowski, sought out contacts with ethnic Ukrainians in Kyiv coming from “the Trans-Dnieper Ukraine and the lands of the former Kyiv and Bratslav palatinates [of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth].”<sup>77</sup>

The members of Czartoryski’s circle usually differentiated between the “Ruthenian” cause, which concerned the “Polish” lands of Right Bank Ukraine, and the “Cossack” cause, the latter title being reserved for the Left Bank Ukrainians, who resided outside Polish national borders.<sup>78</sup> They also divided present-day Ukrainian territory into “Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper River” (*Ukraina przeddnieprzańska*), Volhynia, Podolia, and “the Trans-Dnieper Ukraine” (*Ukraina zadnieprzańska*), which were to become more or less loosely federated with Poland.<sup>79</sup> For Czajkowski, Kyiv was to be a focal point in the armed uprising of Poles and Ukrainians against Russian rule.<sup>80</sup> Another collaborator of Prince Adam, Franciszek Duchiniński, defined “Little Russia” (Mała Ruś) in 1848 as three provinces of the Russian Empire—Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv—and suggested that Little Russia “must constitute a separate state.”<sup>81</sup>

Other regions of present-day Ukraine were also sometimes present in the Polish geographical imagination, depending on whether they played a role in Polish history or in contemporary everyday experience. For example, New Russia was linked historically to the domain of the Zaporozhian Cossacks and to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth that allegedly possessed those lands, including the city of Odessa (then Hadzhibej), once part of Ukraina or Podole.<sup>82</sup> There was yet another affiliation of the Right Bank

Polish nobles with Odessa: their economic well-being was directly linked to Odessa's banks and seaport. The city itself became a very popular destination for both the business and leisure trips of local Poles (as seen from Korzeniowski's and Kraszewski's writings). In a letter from 1843, Kraszewski described the multicultural spirit of the city and the presence of Poles there:

According to me, Odessa itself is on such a level that it can no longer be called Russian while not yet being European. This is a huge, beautifully built city along the very shore. It has everything that one finds abroad: an Italian theater, a French theater, a German theater, asphalt pavements, gas lighting etc. There is, however, only one small Catholic church, despite a number of Catholics; the stores and warehouses are superb, but the most beautiful is the port [ . . . ]. This year, the gathering to the sea baths was enormous, predominantly from our provinces, up to 300 families.<sup>83</sup>

It can be assumed that for Kraszewski contemporary Odessa was still situated in Ukraine or Podole. In a letter from Odessa he juxtaposed his current location "here in Ukraine and Podolia" to "my place [Volhynia]" when comparing the harvests in both regions.<sup>84</sup> For Czartoryski's circle, Odessa also had strategic importance: "Odessa for us is immensely important in case of blowing up the Russian fleet on the Black Sea," reported Michał Czajkowski, "otherwise it would become lost for us right away. There is money there."<sup>85</sup> By adding the Black Sea port of Odessa to their mental geography, Poles completed the concept of their country's "natural" borders from sea to sea. Paradoxically, it is due to the partitions and the incorporation into the Russian Empire that Poles not only received direct access to the Black Sea coast but also managed to place it on their mental maps.

A much more important question, however, was whether local Poles perceived the territory of present-day Ukraine (or at least its larger part) as a unified, contiguous area, and if so, what united it—its population, language, and history, or its political institutions? History itself united the right and left banks of the Dnieper River as the domain of Bohdan Khmelnytsky's Cossack state.<sup>86</sup> For Seweryn Goszczyński, this state included also the Kharkiv province.<sup>87</sup> For such an expert as Michał Grabowski, "Ukraine" was united with "Little Russia" and the Kharkiv region through folk traditions, which at the same time separated "the Little Russian from Great Russian tribes."<sup>88</sup> For some Poles, like Gustav Olizar from Kyiv, Kharkiv was not connected to Ukraine, being simply a "Muscovite city."<sup>89</sup> These lands (especially those on the Right Bank) were also united in the Polish mind through their Ruthenian heritage and were

called “the Ruthenian lands” (*ruskie kraje*) or “our Ruthenian provinces” (*nasze prowincje ruskie*).<sup>90</sup>

When it came to the population within the borders of present-day Ukraine, nineteenth-century Poles seemed to be confused. There was no certainty whether the entire population of Ukraine, Podole, Wołyń, Małorosja, Noworosja, and Galicja should be placed under the same name, and whether this population should be considered different from Poles, Belarusians, and Russians. For instance, the representative of the “Ukrainian school” in Polish literature, Seweryn Goszczyński, used a variety of terms without any hierarchical order, such as folk (*lud*), Cossack folk (*kozacki lud*), Ukrainian folk (*ukraiński lud*), Ruthenian commoners (*ruskie pospólstwo*), Ruthenians (Rusini), Ukrainians (Ukraińcy), and even the (Cossack, Ukrainian) nation (*naród*).<sup>91</sup> Characteristically, when Goszczyński spoke about the alleged aspirations of *haidamaks* to establish a separate state, he used the more generic “Ruthenians” (Rusini), adding that the westernmost boundary of the “separate Ruthenian state” had to be the river Sluch in Volhynia.<sup>92</sup>

Along with the traditional term *Rusini* another name, “Małorossjanie/Małorossyjski,” was used, whose meaning almost overlapped with today’s “Ukrainians/Ukrainian.”<sup>93</sup> Michał Grabowski wrote about the separate “Little Russian nation” (*naród Małorossyjski*) that originated among the Dnieper Cossacks.<sup>94</sup> The “Ukrainian peasants” (*chłopi Ukraińscy*) were therefore ethnically related to the “Little Russian nation,” since they also were the descendants of the Zaporozhians and Cossacks.<sup>95</sup> Thus, the Cossack history united Right Bank Ukrainian peasants with the Left Bank “Little Russian aristocracy.”<sup>96</sup>

There were examples when Poles from the *kresy* (borderlands) could also be called Rusini, or even Małorusini, as was the case with the ethnically Polish writer Ignacy Krasicki, whom Mickiewicz once called “a real Southern Ruthenian” with “Little Russian habits and appearance.”<sup>97</sup>

The term *Ukrainian* was even more ambiguous. Spyrydon Ostaszewski, a Pole from just outside the Right Bank Ukrainian city of Uman’, wrote in Ukrainian and manifested his belonging to Ukrainians (“We, Ukrainians . . .”). He hoped that “our Ukrainian people” would understand him.<sup>98</sup> Ostaszewski did not separate his regional identity as a Ukrainian (he could remain a Pole as well) from ethnic Ukrainians in his midst. The term *Ukrainian*, however, was more often used with respect to Polish nobles residing in Ukraine.<sup>99</sup> In some cases, however, the term designated

ethnic Ukrainians exclusively<sup>100</sup>: one could admire the “elegiac romances of a Ukrainian” or compare the “differences of temperament” of a Mazurian, Samogitian, and Ukrainian. In these examples “Ukrainians” referred to Orthodox peasants or Cossacks from a so-called Polish Ukraine, which effectively coincided with the Kyiv province of the Russian Empire.

Grabowski invested the name “Ukrainian” with a broader meaning: he called Gogol “the first Ukrainian writer” (*pierwszy Ukraiński pisarz*) and identified him with “Little Russian literature” (*Małorossyjska literatura*).<sup>101</sup> One might speculate about who had more right to be called Ukrainian, the Russian-Ukrainian Gogol or the Polish-Ukrainian Grabowski? Perhaps the concept “Ukrainian” in the nineteenth century was contested ground for people with different loyalties: being Ukrainian did not prevent them from being simultaneously Polish or Russian. Michał Grabowski became acutely aware of this dual meaning of Ukrainian identity. He was pleasantly surprised to discover in 1839 that “During my stay in Kyiv I just found out that Russian literature has a separate Ukrainian school as it is in ours. Now, I am getting acquainted with the superb writer from this school, Gogol; as I set out in my prospect, we will choose for translation the poetic works that illustrate the character and national physiognomy of different Rus’ countries [*rozmaitych Rusi*].”<sup>102</sup> Within both Polish and Russian cultures, “Ukrainians” developed separate literary schools and gained general acceptance. There was, however, a very small group of intelligentsia personified by Taras Shevchenko and Panteleimon Kulish who aspired for an exclusive representation of Ukraine, thus making Polish and Russian “Ukrainians” much less relevant. But even they did not sever the connections with competing Ukrainian projects on the Polish and Russian sides. Thus, Shevchenko and his peers had to conform to Russian culture; at the same time, they maintained links with fellow “Ukrainian” Poles (the best examples were Kulish’s friendship with Michał Grabowski, and Shevchenko’s appreciation of Bohdan Zaleski’s poetry).<sup>103</sup>

Polish émigré groups, both the conservative Hôtel Lambert and the democratic TDP (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie, Polish Democratic Society), were well aware of the unity of the population of present-day Ukraine. In his geopolitical plans, Michał Czajkowski united Galicia and Ruś (Russian Ukraine) into one strategic region, or “agency,” in an attempt to reach out to the “leaders of Galician Rus” and “Ruthenian society” in Kharkiv.<sup>104</sup> While characterizing the Ruthenian folk, the TDP members called Ukraine “the center of nationality” for Ruthenians.<sup>105</sup> One

of the regional sections of the TDP understood Ruthenian territory as stretching from Galicia to the Dnieper River; despite religious differences (Uniates versus Orthodox), it was populated by the same people: “The bigger part of Galicia and the parts of the old Moscow partition called Volhynia, Ukraine, and Podolia are populated by our country people known by the name of Ruthenians. The religion in that part of Galicia is Uniate, in Volhynia, Ukraine, and Podolia the majority is Orthodox, the rest are the Uniates.”<sup>106</sup> Simultaneously, TDP members “separated” the Belarusian lands from the Ruthenians and instead united the former with ethnic Lithuania, since “the long-lasting union with Lithuania made them [Belarusians] closer to her [Lithuania] than to Ruthenians.”<sup>107</sup> The members of the TDP Toulouse section presented an even larger “Ruthenian” space. Their territory of Ruthenian folk, this time consisting of Ukrainians and Belarusians, stretched from Congress Poland in the west to well beyond the Dnieper in the east, a concept that fit well with Iurii Venelin’s geography: “One must remember that this folk constitutes the mass of inhabitants of the provinces incorporated to Russia, such as: in Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Ukraine; that its kin not only constitutes the majority population in Galicia, not only has its branches in the Congress Poland but also stretches far beyond the Dnieper.”<sup>108</sup>

Poles also were aware of a particular language that was native to all Orthodox and Uniate (non-Polish) Ruthenians/Little Russians/Ukrainians. This language was often called the “Little Russian tongue” (*Małorossyjska mowa*),<sup>109</sup> the “Little Russian–Cossack language” (*Małorusko-kozacki język*),<sup>110</sup> or the Ruthenian (*ruski*) language, as opposed to the Muscovite governmental (*moskiewski rządowy*) idiom.<sup>111</sup> Finally, one could speak Ukrainian (*po ukraińsku*).<sup>112</sup>

Poles, however, seemed to be stuck between the recognition of the otherness of an exotic “Cossack nation” and the inclusion of Cossacks in Polish historical narratives. It seems that Poles divided Ukraine once again by their mental map: they could not help including the Right Bank Ukrainian peasants—as “our folk” or “our peasants”—into the hierarchical order of a prospective Polish nation-state, in which Polish-speaking Catholic nobles presided over the ethnically and religiously mixed peasant population. At the same time, they seemed to be ready to recognize a historical Cossack nation, especially its Little Russian incarnation, which managed to maintain its own state on the left bank of the Dnieper: the Hetmanate, with its own aristocracy. The Hetmanate’s political culture

and folklore were not part of historical Poland and could be left either to the Little Russians themselves or to their contemporary masters, the Great Russians.<sup>113</sup>

### The Russian Vision

Throughout much of the nineteenth century, the Russian government waged a discursive and sometimes actual war against the Polish nobles for dominance over an imagined and real space that included the territory of present-day Ukraine. Unfortunately for the Poles, a virtual Ukraine could be part only of a similarly virtual Poland, which had disappeared from political maps in 1795. Unlike Poland, the Russian Empire was quite real and the tsarist government had enough means to control both imagined and real space.

The *mapping* of imperial territory became an urgent task for Russian administrators, scholars, and educators, who conducted the work at different levels, as “scientific” enterprises, literary works, political strategies, and so on. In some imperial Romantic discourses, Ukraine was constructed as an exotic (remote) province and as an indivisible part of an all-Russian legacy. To understand the whole, one had to explore the individual parts. This meant that Russia as both an imagined and political category encompassed many localities and regions, which were to become comprehensible, or *readable* (to borrow the term from Marie Louise Pratt<sup>114</sup>). Moreover, in the Romantic worldview, one should explore the imperial peripheries in order to get to the empire’s past and understand its most authentic history. According to Romantic metaphysics, only remote regions could provide an imperial observer with the most genuine history, since the further historical traces were from the center, the more genuine and authentic they were.<sup>115</sup> The authenticity of Russia might be found only outside the ethnic, cultural, and political core of the empire. The same held true for Poland as well.<sup>116</sup> It was Ukraine that helped both Russians and Poles not only to arrive at their most authentic histories and folk traditions but also to strengthen their national identities.

Recently, Oleksii Tolochko brilliantly analyzed the Russian “exploration” and “discovery” of Ukraine, highlighting as he did the crucial role of travelers from the north and the accounts they wrote.<sup>117</sup> For Russians living at the beginning of the nineteenth century, Ukraine meant primarily left-bank Little Russia, whose history began from the seventeenth-century

Cossack wars<sup>118</sup> and whose connection to Right Bank Ukraine was not clearly articulated. Observers sometimes perceived the latter as “a piece of old Poland,” to borrow a formulation from Prince Dolgorukov, as he described in 1810 the piece of land in the Kyiv province between Kyiv and the town of Zlatopil.<sup>119</sup>

Russian travelers felt that there were clear borders between ethnic Russia and the lands populated by present-day Ukrainians, even though the latter did not constitute any administrative unity in the nineteenth century. Russians used different names for Ukrainian lands, such as Ukraine, Little Russia, Southern Rus'/Russia, South-Western Rus'/Russia, or simply the South, all of which were often interchangeable. “Ukraine,” for Russians and Ukrainians alike, could mean both the Kharkiv region (the Sloboda Ukraine province) and the territory of Cossack dominance on both banks of the Dnieper. Prince Dolgorukov noticed the border between ethnic Russia and Ukraine when he entered the Kharkiv province. Clay huts and the natives symbolized the border: “Finally, we entered the borders of the Ukraine. Mister Khmel'nitskii and Mazepa immediately came to mind. Everywhere, without exception, were clay huts [*mazanki*], and there was no other accommodation. Here appeared the natives [*khokhly*].”<sup>120</sup> Dolgorukov became increasingly irritated, since he could not understand the local language and felt that he had arrived in “foreign lands”: “Here, I already considered myself to be in the foreign lands, due to the very simple but for me enough reason: I was ceasing to understand the language of people; an inhabitant talked to me, answered my question but did not quite get me. I needed the translation of three of every of his five words.”<sup>121</sup> He commented even on the idea of fatherland. For him, its borders were defined by language: “Whenever we cease to understand the idiom of people, this marks the borders of our native country, and in my opinion even of a fatherland [*otechestva*].” Ukraine was outside Dolgorukov’s “native country” as was Livland with its German-speaking inhabitants, even though they lived in the same state. Similarly to Dolgorukov, for Ivan Aksakov in the 1840s, the border between Great Russia and Little Russia lay somewhere between Kursk province and Kharkiv province; he added that “here they refer to [Kursk] as Russia and call people from Kursk Russians, that is Great Russians.” He also pointed out that the northern part of Chernihiv (Chernigov) province was rather Great Russian or Belarusian in character, while the southern part of the province was Little Russian, thus making the Desna River the actual border of Little Russia.<sup>122</sup>

For Vissarion Belinskii, "Ukraine" referred exclusively to the Kharkiv province, the city of Kharkiv being "in a sense, the capital of Ukraine, and therefore the capital of Ukrainian literature," which for him meant mainly provincial, tasteless poetry.<sup>123</sup> Some Russians, like the author of a review of *A History of Little Russia* by Dmytro Bantysh-Kamens'kyi, were confused as to what the name "Ukraine" meant. He made it clear that Ukraine was identical with the Kharkiv (or Sloboda Ukraine) province, but that Bantysh-Kamens'kyi had erred in using two terms, *Little Russia* and *Ukraine*, interchangeably.<sup>124</sup> He then concluded that in the past, "Ukraine comprised not the lands of contemporary Sloboda-Ukrainian province but the places that were situated from Kyiv beyond the Dnieper," that is, Right Bank Ukraine.<sup>125</sup>

Instead, "Little Russia" meant the lands of the left-bank Hetmanate and was split into the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces.<sup>126</sup> This also was the case for Nikolai Polevoi. In 1830 he found that the border between Ukraine (or rather Little Russia) and Russia appeared gradually as one moved from Moscow southward. It was beyond the rivers Desna and Seim that one clearly entered the realm of a different people, whose language, attire, and facial features were "completely different from us pure Russians."<sup>127</sup> He continued with the historical geography of Little Russia, which was situated on both banks of the Dnieper. Kyiv, however, was not the heart of Little Russia, since most of the latter lay on the left bank of the Dnieper, from the city of Putivl' in the Chernihiv province in the north to the southern edge of Poltava province in the south, including part of the Kharkiv province in the east.<sup>128</sup> Right-bank Little Russia included the territory between the city of Kyiv in the north, the river Dniester in the west, and the point where the Psel River flowed into the Dnieper in the south; in addition, Little Russia once included "the camp of the Zaporozhian Cossacks" in the southern steppes.

Polevoi also stressed that "half of Little Russia" with its core "in ancient times was not among the Russian districts," assuming as he did that during the times of Kyivan Rus' this country was populated by numerous Turkic tribes.<sup>129</sup> This comment antagonized the patriotic Little Russian general Burachek, who felt that Polevoi had robbed Ukrainians of their common legacy with Russians.<sup>130</sup> In fact, Polevoi emphasized the separateness of Ukrainian geography and history. Elsewhere, Polevoi assumed that "the original motherland of Little Russians" was "Trans-Dnieper Ukraine" (Zadneprovskaia Ukraina), that is, Right Bank Ukraine, where until present times common people spoke the "pure Little Russian language."<sup>131</sup>

For Polevoi, “Little Russians” lived on a huge territory that was very similar to present-day Ukraine. They lived in the provinces of Podolia, Kyiv, Volhynia, Poltava, Chernihiv, Kursk, Voronezh, Tambov, Kharkiv, Katerynoslav, Kherson, and Tavria, as well as on the lands of the Don Cossacks and the Black Sea Cossacks. He emphasized, however, that Little Russians who lived outside the original Little Russia (comprising mostly Chernihiv, Poltava, Kyiv, and a large part of Podolia provinces) “are the later settlers.”<sup>132</sup> Thus, Polevoi’s Little Russia proper equaled the Dnieper Ukraine of many Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian observers.

Among them was a Russian memoirist, Filip Vigel’, who had been raised in Kyiv in the late eighteenth century. Without defining the exact borders of Ukraine, he alluded to the existence of its two halves—Russian and Polish—set on opposite banks of the Dnieper River.<sup>133</sup> Subsequently, he dubbed as Ukrainians such figures as the writers Vasiliï (Vasyl’) Kapnist and Nikolai Gnedich (Mykola Hnidych) and the highly placed imperial bureaucrat Count P. V. Zavadovskii (Zavadov’skyi), who came from the lands of the former Hetmanate.<sup>134</sup> He also used the formulations “Ukrainian language” and “Little Russian dialect [*narechie*]” interchangeably. Alexander Pushkin, who started working on a French-language history of Ukraine, under the name “Ukraine” or “Little Russia” understood this to be a large territory consisting of the provinces of Chernihiv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Poltava, and Podolia, that is, historical Hetmanate on both banks of the Dnieper and Sloboda Ukraine.<sup>135</sup>

For the Russian writer of Polish descent Fadei Bulgarin (Tadeusz Bułharyn, in Polish), the terms *Ukraine* and *Little Russia* were not interchangeable. “At the present,” he remarked in the 1830s, “the enlightenment is more spread in Little Russia and Ukraine, as it was before.”<sup>136</sup> According to him, hetman Bohdan Khmelnyts’kyi ruled over “the entire people of Little Russia and Ukraine.”<sup>137</sup> It is possible to assume that “Little Russia” referred to the entire left-bank Cossack state, while “Ukraine” had the more regional meaning of the middle-Dnieper lands on both sides of the river. Ukraine was also split into two halves: Russian Ukraine under a Muscovite protectorate, and Polish Ukraine within the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.<sup>138</sup> In addition, in writing about the hostile attitude of Ukrainians and Little Russians toward Russians and Poles, Bulgarin used the term *Ukrainian* as limited spatially to the region of “Ukraine.”<sup>139</sup> He also alluded to the condescending nicknames used by Ukrainians and Russians toward each other: “Russians assault Little Russians with [the name of] *khokhly*

while Little Russians call Russians *katsapy*"; adding that *cap* in Polish meant a goat.<sup>140</sup> For him Ukraine was an ancient land that included Kyiv (he used the formula "Kyiv and entire/whole Ukraine").<sup>141</sup> The same held true for the Russian poet Vladimir Benediktov, for whom Kyiv was situated in "a golden-shored bright Ukraine" (*zolotobregaia svetlaia Ukraina*).<sup>142</sup>

For the statistician and geographer Konstantin Arseniev, there were two historical parts of Little Russia—"This-Side Dnieper" (Pridneprovskaia) and "Trans-Dnieper" (Zadneprovskaia)—which probably were analogous to contemporary Left Bank and Right Bank Ukraine, respectively.<sup>143</sup> At the same time, he mentioned Russian Ukraine along with "This-Side Dnieper Little Russia" as parts of the early eighteenth-century Kyiv province within the Russian Empire. Nineteenth-century Little Russia proper for Arseniev comprised two left-bank provinces: Chernihiv and Poltava.<sup>144</sup> He also recognized the existence of "Little Russia in its bigger image" bisected by the Dnieper into a western (or right-bank) and eastern (left-bank) half.<sup>145</sup> Western Little Russia consisted of the Kyiv (former "Polish Ukraine"), Volhynia, and Podolia provinces, which had been considered "the best constitutive part of the Polish Kingdom." Eastern Little Russia included the Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv provinces, the latter also being called Russian or Sloboda Ukraine.<sup>146</sup>

On the basis of climate and agriculture, Arseniev included most of present-day Ukraine in a bigger entity called "the Carpathian space" (see Chapter 2). It stretched from "the borders of Galicia through the Dnieper to the upper tributaries of the Dnieper: the Desna, Sula, Psel, and Vorskla on the north-east; on the south-east [it stretched] to the delta of different rivers which belong to the Don basin, such as the Oskol, Donets, etc." Therefore, he concluded, the Carpathian space included "Little Russia in its bigger image and the Ukraine."<sup>147</sup> Outside the Carpathian space there were more parts of present-day Ukraine, such as the provinces of Kherson, Katerynoslav, and Tavria, which were included in the "Steppe space." By splitting Ukrainian ethnic lands into two spaces, Arseniev disregarded ethnic criteria. Despite this, he noticed the Ukrainian connection of Kherson province by admitting that "the indigenous inhabitants, fierce Zaporozhians," once "ruled this country."<sup>148</sup>

Unlike Arseniev, the Russian folklorist Vladimir Dal', in an edited version of a fairy tale he received from the Ukrainian writer Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko, used ethnic criteria for mapping the Ukrainian space. This case also suggests that the vision of geography shared by Ukrainians could be quite compatible with the mental maps of Russians. First of all, Ukraine

for him was situated somewhere in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces, that is, in the Dnieper basin. The designation “Ukrainians” was reserved for the inhabitants of that region and not for those residing in Kyiv and Kharkiv provinces. The narrator even complained that the “Ukrainians” of Poltava and Chernihiv provinces monopolized the title and did not want to recognize those living in the Kharkiv, Kyiv, Kherson, and Katerynoslav provinces as their kin.<sup>149</sup> While charting the route of a flying witch, the storyteller mapped the geography of Ukrainians from the Carpathians to the Caucasus, including the New Russian provinces of Kherson and Katerynoslav populated by the descendants of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Dal’s ethnic Ukraine was even bigger than the present-day Ukrainian state, since he added Kuban’ (as “the Black Sea land,” or Chornomor’iia) to other Ukrainian ethnic lands<sup>150</sup>:

It is not the first time that our witch had to whirl back and forth [. . .]: from Kiev to the Carpathians, to the Rusnaks who are the kin of Ukrainians, then to Kamianets, after to Cherkasy, and perhaps to the Caucasus. On her way back [she got] to Kuban and Ekaterinoslav because there too live not the Catholics but baptized Cossacks despite the fact that the inhabitants of Poltava and Chernigov do not recognize them as their compatriots. However, I think that the inhabitants of Kherson and Ekaterinoslav say the truth—they never lied anyway—that in Poltava and Chernigov provinces there are few pure, real Ukrainians left: they left some time ago for Kuban’ and the Bug river, for Kherson and Ekaterinoslav provinces; they were natural born Zaporozhians; they had as many Cossack haircuts [oseledtsi, chuby] as they had grandfathers; but present-day inhabitants of Poltava and Chernigov all got Muscovized, all was perverted.<sup>151</sup>

Nikolai Nadezhdin was much more succinct when he offered his map of “Little Russia,” though his map appeared to be as large as the one charted by Dal’s witch. For Nadezhdin, Little Russia’s steppes were spreading under the “benign” southern sky between the rivers of Danube and Don, between the ranges of the Caucasus and Carpathians, and reached as far as the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea.<sup>152</sup> For the traveler N. S. Vsevolozhskii, who in 1836–37 traveled “through southern Russia, Crimea, and Odessa” to the Middle East, Northern Africa, and the Mediterranean, Little Russia started on the border between Belgorod province and Kharkiv province, which was otherwise called “Ukraine.”<sup>153</sup> “Little Russia” for him signified a change in nature and the population: “people are different, facial features are different, the soil, the landscapes, everything has taken another shape; women are not better but somewhat more cheerful.” He ascribed

to Little Russia the natural and civilizational traits of “the South,” with its indolence, hospitality, and relaxation. Here even climate was different: the traveler already started feeling “the influence of a moderate climate.” The term *South* was often used as a metaphorical designation of present-day Ukraine in opposition to “the North,” as Great Russia was then called.<sup>154</sup>

Filip Vigel’ experienced the same climatic transition during his trip south to Little Russia: “The farther we moved south, the more pure and warm the air became.”<sup>155</sup> Southern nature and climate “make local inhabitants cheerful and prone to games,” as one traveler remarked around 1816.<sup>156</sup> A later traveler, Vadim Passek, called Ukraine “the land of the Russian South,” where “the soil is poised in a sleep—like a peaceful baby cradle.”<sup>157</sup> He would have agreed with Aleksei Levshin that nature provided Ukrainians with “everything” in exchange for “little work”; therefore, they had “a lot of leisure time” and were ready “to seek other amusements.”<sup>158</sup> For the Orthodox “tourist” Andrei Muraviev, Kyiv was “our native Zion” and Ukrainians looked like “Arab boys and girls” from Palestine, while the Dnieper itself provoked Italian associations, reminding him of the Tiber.<sup>159</sup> Even the geographical position of Cossacks/Ukrainians, “the small people living among the steppes” who historically had been located “between Poland and Crimea,” pointed to the southern setting.<sup>160</sup> “The southern rivers,” such as the Desna, Pryp’at’, Dnieper, Bug, and Dniester, “opened for the ancient inhabitants of Little Russia the way to Greece, the land of Christianity and civilization,” while “the northern tribes,” that is, Russians, had access to the Baltic.<sup>161</sup> This “southern” placement of *historical* Ukraine could also have negative connotations: it allowed journalist and orientalist Osip Senkovskii (aka Józef Sękowski) to compare Ukrainian Cossacks with the Mamelukes of Egypt. In an overtly colonialist mode, he referred to the Zaporozhian Host as the “Algeria of the North.”<sup>162</sup>

Although the “southern” idyllic Ukraine was worthy of Virgil’s pen,<sup>163</sup> it was also a patriarchal and somewhat primitive country, where education and lifestyle were “close to the patriarchal rules.”<sup>164</sup> Ukraine was taken out of linear time because the accounts of the early nineteenth century were not so much different from those around 1850.

The metaphor of the “South” as applied to Ukraine had several facets, including colonialist discourse already explicit in Senkovskii’s writings but also present, although in much milder form, in works by other Russian authors (quoted and unquoted in this work). They saw the land and its population through the prism of specific spatial, gendered, and civi-

lizational stereotypes. Ukraine became a space for Russians' vivid imagination, ranging from pastoral landscapes to erotic images of Ukrainian women. In fact, travelers from the north sought in Ukraine their own "Old Russian" past, whereas the local Little Russians/Ukrainians were treated as a "young," modern people, without any direct connections to Kyivan Rus'.<sup>165</sup> Nadezhdin, for example, despite ascribing to the Ukrainians archetypal features of "Slavic physiognomy," paradoxically saw them as children, "still protected from foreign influence by childlike devotion to native antiquity."<sup>166</sup> So local patriotism was paradoxically both patriarchal and childlike, which made it incompatible with ("northern") modernity.

While the "southern" population was deemed childlike and primitive, Ukraine itself was viewed through the prism of a so-called *gendered geography*.<sup>167</sup> The image of geographical space reflected disproportional gender relations in which the feminine was conceived as inferior to the masculine. Some (nondominant) countries and peoples, in the imagination of privileged observers, acquired feminine features, while others were implicitly represented as masculine. Lands which were "discovered" and identified as feminine had to be explored and civilized (in some regions this exploration and civilization of the feminine lands more resembled their rape).<sup>168</sup> A vision of space that originally had been familiar only to privileged male outsiders obtained the status of universal recognition even among the oppressed social, cultural, or ethnic groups that were subjected to the discourse of femininity. In Europe it was the "feminine" South, and especially Italy, who needed "protection" that could be assured only by men from the North.<sup>169</sup> In Eastern Europe, the North found its image in Great Russia, while the South often became associated with Ukraine. Russia "discovered" its own Italy.

Indeed, from the late eighteenth and up to the middle of the nineteenth century Ukraine was Russia's Italy. Paradoxically, the metaphor of Italy as Ukraine was coined not by Russians but by the Ukrainian Iakiv Markovych, who in 1798 compared the love for music among Ukrainians and Italians: "Due to the innate aptitude of Little Russians for music their land in Russia is the same as Italy [is] in Europe."<sup>170</sup> It was the influence of sentimental and Romantic travel literature, such as *Puteshestvie v Poludennuiu Rossiiu* (A trip to Southern Russia, 1800–1802) by Vladimir Izmailov, but especially two trips to "Little Russia" (the second published in 1803) by Prince Shalikov, that led to the proliferation of the southern associations of Ukraine among the Russian public.

There were roughly twenty-three major Russian-language travelogues on Ukraine written in the first half of the nineteenth century<sup>171</sup>; yet the southern and Italian connections to Ukraine were by no means limited to the travelogues. Literary critics and scholars joined the fashion. As early as 1828, an anonymous author made a general statement describing “happy Little Russia” as “Russia’s Italy.”<sup>172</sup> In 1834, Ukrainian scholar Osyp Bodians’kyi called on “Northern Russians” to get acquainted with the poetic “Slavic-Russian Italy” (Slaviano-Ruskaia Italiia), that is, Ukraine.<sup>173</sup> A professor of philosophy at Kyiv University, Orest Novyts’kyi, while comparing the mentalities of Slavic and Western nationalities in the late 1830s, associated Ukrainians with Italians (Russians were a Slavic analogue of the English).<sup>174</sup> By the end of the decade a utopian image of the happy South was fully shaped: Ukraine, this “blessed country” under “the blessed sky,” was “rightfully called Russian Italy.”<sup>175</sup> Not surprisingly, Ukrainians themselves were called “Trans-Dnieper Italians” (as one Polish noble recalled).<sup>176</sup>

Since Italy in many European travelogues of the first half of the nineteenth century was personified by northern European males as a female,<sup>177</sup> Ukraine for many Russians was inevitably represented in feminine terms. The travelers from the north of the empire (from Saint Petersburg and Moscow) traveled south—that is, to Ukraine—in order to explore its “innocent virginity.” In many cases, the “natural” mores of the “uncultivated” local inhabitants of the South were opposed to the “enlightened” though morally corrupted ways of the North.<sup>178</sup> The negative side of this “natural” Ukrainian was his supposed indolence or carelessness.<sup>179</sup> Even the allegedly southern laziness was thought to be shared by Ukrainians and Italians.<sup>180</sup> In this lazy and ideal southern world, which was imagined as something akin to a rustic family ruled by love and faith, where wives loved and served their husbands,<sup>181</sup> it was the northerners themselves who were the symbolic husbands and lovers.

Such narratives treated Ukrainians as “Russian Italians” who lacked the mental or moral corruption of modern civilization, which in turn made them inferior to the northerners. The Romantic representation of an imperial periphery through the metaphor of the South or Italy eventually led to the socioeconomic and ideological exploitation of Ukraine. The primary function of such metaphors was not so much to boost the historical and cultural distinctiveness of Ukraine as to shape an ideal space in the minds of Russian observers where the pragmatic, ruling North could meet

the exotic and erotic South, the “lazy” and “primitive” “other”—Russia’s own Italy. Ukraine was conceived as a utopia taken out of time and history. Geography provided this utopian place with visibility.

Depending on territorial size and region, different criteria were used for mapping the Ukrainian space. For those who “noticed” smaller entities, like left-bank Little Russia or Kharkiv Ukraine, administrative bodies such as the Hetmanate or Kharkiv (Sloboda Ukraine) province could serve as markers of their borders. Nonetheless, in order to map larger entities, other criteria, mostly ethnographic, had to be used. In 1817, Prince Dolgorukov was puzzled by the identity of the population among which he traveled. Once, he stressed that the Kyiv province was populated by “Russian citizens.”<sup>182</sup> Both in 1810 and 1817 he was constantly struck by the distinctiveness of these “citizens” in Ukraine. What really united the right-bank Kyiv province with left-bank Little Russia and Kharkiv Ukraine, however, were the inhabitants of those lands which consisted of *Khokhly*.<sup>183</sup> Dolgorukov bluntly suggested that Ukrainians populated both the right-bank ex-Polish provinces and left-bank Little Russia. He also stressed the fact that the Kyiv province “from very antiquity constituted a common district with Little Russia and did not belong to Poland any more than it did to us.”<sup>184</sup>

Other names, such as Little Russia(ns), Southern Russia(ns), or Southern Ruthenia(ns), referring to the territory and population of present-day Ukraine, were more often in use. Sometimes these names were used interchangeably.<sup>185</sup> As pointed out earlier, Nikolai Polevoi perceived the geography of Little Russia, which almost coincided with present-day Ukraine, through the unity of its “Little Russian” inhabitants. The geographer Arseniev, while uniting most of present-day Ukraine in his “Carpathian space,” used climatic, agricultural, and historical criteria without mentioning ethnic bonds. Vladimir Dal’ would have well agreed with Ukrainians that their lands were united by the common ethnicity of the local populations living between the Carpathians and the Caucasus (the region of Kuban’).

In fact, all those who mapped this greater Ukraine stretching from the Carpathians to the Caucasus consciously or unconsciously had to use ethnographic criteria, since there were no administrative borders that encompassed this space, whether in the past or present. According to Oleksii Tolochko, it took Russians several decades to come up with a theory that united the different parts of present-day Ukraine into one contiguous space, on the one hand, and that united that space with Great Russia, on the other. Influenced by Polish ethnographic studies of Ukrainians, Rus-

sian scholarship invented the idea of a “South-Russian nationality” spread from the Carpathians in the west to the Kharkiv province in the east. This scheme fixed the historical and demographic relationship of the Little Russian “Cossack nation” to both the legacy of Kyivan Rus’ and the Great Russians.<sup>186</sup> Such an approach eventually allowed for both an all-Russian and a separatist Ukrainian interpretation of history.

Characteristically, while Russians could not agree on what exactly Ukraine or Little Russia meant and where their eastern and southern borders were, they could agree on their western borders. Perhaps this was possible because the western borders of Little (or Southern) Russia were congruent with the western borders of the “all-Russian nation” comprising Great, Little, and White Russians. The western borders spread along the Carpathians, which were situated in the Austrian Empire. Even a critic like Belinskii, who was unfriendly toward Ukrainians, could still stress that Red Rus’, or Galicia, historically “did not have anything in common with Northern [Rus’]”; instead, it gravitated to Southern (“Kyivan-Chernihiv”) Rus’, which “eventually turned into Little Russia.”<sup>187</sup> By this comment he implicitly recognized a distinct Ukrainian space stretching from the left bank of the Dnieper (including Kharkiv Ukraine) in the east, to Galicia in the west. A conservative critic from the periodical *Maiak* (Lighthouse), P. Korsakov, used “the Little Russian dialect” spoken by several millions in “Southern Russia and Galicia” as the criterion for the unity of these lands.<sup>188</sup>

A nationalist critic and scholar Mikhail Pogodin defended Russian claims to Galicia—and to Lviv in particular—by pointing to “a pure Little Russian dialect” spoken there and to the legacy of the “glorious king Daniil.”<sup>189</sup> Elsewhere he used clearly ethnolinguistic criteria in mapping a Little Russia populated by “Little Russians” or “Ruthenians,” from Poltava province in the east to Galicia and Transcarpathia in the west.<sup>190</sup> He emphasized even the Ukrainian connection of Galicia by pointing out that the ancient and contemporary inhabitants of Galicia were “the same people as present-day Little Russians from Chernigov, Poltava, and Pereiaslav’.”

Osip Senkovskii (Józef Sękowski), a critic and publisher of Polish descent, when comparing Galician (“Red Ruthenian”) and “Little Russian” folk songs, had to admit that “around Lemberg” one could see Rus’ and hear “our Russian song.”<sup>191</sup> Rus’ here obviously encompassed both Little and Great Russians. Thus, the western borders of Ukraine did not threaten to unmake in any way the unity of the “all-Russian nation.”

The mapping of Ukraine helped Russian imperial subjects better imagine themselves in national terms and visualize the boundaries of the empire. Having been “discovered,” represented as feminine, and mapped, Ukraine and Ukrainians became an integral and inseparable part of Russian cultural consciousness. Such attitudes also helped to maintain the imperial claims to former Polish lands and extend those claims to the Austrian province of Galicia. All these lands were now viewed as constituting Southern Rus’ or Little Russia, and as such they belonged to the historical legacy of the Romanov dynasty.

**Part II Representing Imagined Communities:  
Idioms of Nationality**



# 4

## Reconsidering Nationality

### Poland

Polish thinkers, politicians, and journalists residing in lands of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and Polish émigrés in France, Belgium, and Great Britain, expressed different—and often mutually exclusive—ideas about Polishness. The idioms of nation-ness they used ranged from a virtual rejection of the Polish nationality on the conservative side, to an emphasis on the absolute civilizational, racial, and cultural uniqueness of Poles, particularly in opposition to Russians. It was Russians and Ukrainians against whom Poles measured their nationality by including them in the Polish community (as was the case with Ukrainians), or distancing themselves from them (as was the case with Russians). In other words, the idioms of nationality depended on whether Polishness was defined through the inclusion of Ukrainians or by contrast to Russians. Polishness could be also defined in quite abstract terms, without any visible links to other communities.

By borrowing sociological apparatus from Pierre Bourdieu and Rogers Brubaker, I suggest a general scheme of the Polish case reflecting the fields of representation of the Polish imagined community in the 1830s–1840s. These fields consist of initial “positions,” or configurations of an imagined community; “idioms” of nationality used by the Polish intelligentsia with its range of ideological stances; and “oppositions,” which linked “positions” to respective “idioms.” The major task of this chapter is to define the *dominant* idioms of Polishness for every specific configuration of an imagined community, which allows us to draw an analytical model of the Polish national imagination of the 1830s–1840s (Table 4). By

TABLE 4 A general scheme of the Polish case

<i>positions</i>	federative and multicultural Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth restored; unitary Jacobin-style Polish civic nationality; traditional gentry-nation; Polish "ethnie"
<i>idioms</i>	language; political culture/institutions; historical legacy; ethnicity/folklore; "spirit"/mentality; loyalty to a dynasty
<i>oppositions</i>	Poland–Russia; Catholicism–Orthodoxy; Slavic world–Asia; federalism/feudalism–unitarism; democracy–despotism

analyzing the language intellectuals used when speaking about Polishness, that is, the variety of cultural and political idioms, I try to show how intellectuals imagined and represented Polish nationality, how inclusive it was, and whether it depended on different ideological stances.

Polish intellectual and political life was sufficiently developed and diverse in the 1830s–1840s as to allow us to split it into clear ideological camps. This is not to say that all intellectuals can easily be attributed to a certain political or ideological camp; several of those involved in Polish public life defied ideological lines. This was certainly the case for Maurycy Mochnacki, a prominent insurrectionist and strategist whose main passion was the restoration of Polish independence by means of a mass military movement. By defying the political status quo in Eastern Europe, he subscribed himself to a radical democratic camp; however, by considering socioeconomic issues as secondary to armed uprising, by advocating the leading role of the gentry, and by promoting the idea of social solidarism, he sided with social conservatives from the camp of Prince Adam Czartoryski.<sup>1</sup>

Prince Adam himself, as a promoter of a military action against Russia, broke away from the tradition of European diplomatic legitimism. The fact that he advocated a leading role for the Polish gentry and Roman Catholicism made his worldview quite conservative.<sup>2</sup> The same holds true for the great Polish Romantic poet Zygmunt Krasiński, who was an avid reader of Czartoryski's periodical *Trzeci Maj*.<sup>3</sup> The philosopher Bronisław Trentowski raised even more doubts as to his ideological allies. In most of his works he was a passionate critic of Roman Catholic exclusivity and obscurantism. Yet he advocated a leading cultural and political role for the gentry; in addition, in his later works he came to appreciate Roman Catholicism as the pillar of Polishness, influenced as he was by the Catholic ideas of Zygmunt Krasiński.

One might also question the reasons for separating the liberal/democratic circle from the utopian socialists, since elements of utopian socialism

permeated different Polish émigré groups, such as the TDP (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie, Polish Democratic Society) and “The Young Poland,” which I have ascribed to the liberals and democrats.<sup>4</sup> In addition, some activists, like Tadeusz Krępowiecki and Stanisław Worcell, at various times belonged to both democratic and more radical socialist groups. Despite these similarities, however, the utopian socialist group “The Polish People” (Lud Polski) was clearly on the left of any other Polish political grouping and deserves to be granted a separate status. My ideological model is not a reflection of reality as it was but rather a technical device, which helps to organize material and test the assumptions of my work. Furthermore, the ideological camps here are not clear-cut divides but rather certain “circles” of thought or ways of thinking that represent different discourses of nationality.

### Conservative Mind Between Paris and Saint Petersburg

Polish conservative circles did not have a common agenda and had different presumptions, values, and goals. Most of those who participated in the November uprising and then emigrated to the West were only “practical” conservatives, whose conservatism was related to means and not to goals.<sup>5</sup> They tried to subordinate their largely conservative values to the cause of Polish restoration. This group included political émigrés gathered around Prince Adam Czartoryski and Maurycy Mochnacki, who can be called “tactical-political conservatives,” lacking any dogmatism or utopianism.<sup>6</sup> National liberation for them came first, and social issues were of secondary importance. On the other hand, those who did not participate in the uprising and stayed at home were able to adjust their political and national imagination more easily to their conservative or absolute values ingrained in the status quo. The Polish historian Marcin Król calls this latter group the conservatives of “universal and trans-historical values,” whose conservatism was based on philosophical, religious, and ideological principles.<sup>7</sup> The group featured the most consistent conservative Russian loyalist, Count Henryk Rzewuski, and his literary peer, the critic and writer Michał Grabowski. Their group was formed around the Polish-language progovernmental newspaper *Tygodnik Petersburski* (The Saint Petersburg daily), published in that city.

There were also several intermediary positions, such as that of Romantic poet and conservative religious thinker Zygmunt Krasiński. Simi-

lar to Czartoryski, Krasieński adhered to the conservatism of means rather than of values or goals (like Rzewuski or Grabowski).<sup>8</sup> Unlike Czartoryski, however, who was interested in *values* proven by history, Krasieński was more interested in *means* proved by history. The conservatism of the latter was also grounded in historiosophy and social philosophy, which made his position somewhat close to the Russian loyalists Rzewuski and Grabowski, although Krasieński was a staunchly anti-Russian thinker.

What truly united conservative thinkers was their negative attitude toward social revolution, as well as their reliance on the Polish gentry as the pillar of Polishness and defender of traditional social values. Conservatives differed sharply, however, on the nature of nationality and political independence.<sup>9</sup> For the conservatives of “universal and trans-historical values” national identity was a secondary issue compared to Catholic universalism, social hierarchy, and discipline, which all topped their agenda. Nationality for them could be reduced to its material elements, which made it possible for a nationality to exist without political independence. Even more important was the fact that for conservatives of this type nationality ceased to exist when it seemed to contradict universal values. Contrary to the views of pro-Russian conservatives of universal values, Prince Adam Czartoryski’s circle defined nationality through the consciousness of its (noble) members during a long historical process. For the latter, nationality could not exist without independence or without a struggle for independence: “If we stop striving for it we will soon cease to be Poles,” wrote the prince in 1847.<sup>10</sup> They were reluctant to admit the geopolitical status quo of partitioned Poland. Therefore, the existence of nationality depended on the duration of national consciousness, and this necessitated the idea of a struggle for political independence. In what follows, I attempt to underline the differences between different conservatives in their visions of national cohesion and the inclusivity/exclusivity of a Polish imagined community, which depended not so much on their general philosophical worldview as on individual political choices.

### *“Practical conservatism”*

Hôtel Lambert

During the 1830s–1840s, Prince Adam Czartoryski was not a theoretician but rather a strategist.<sup>11</sup> From his Paris residence, the Hôtel Lambert, he planned geopolitical affairs yet did not develop a clear definition

of Polish nationality or national cohesion. Nevertheless, in his speeches, strategic plans, and addresses, he left traces of his vision of nation-ness. Prominent Polish scholars have unanimously agreed that the cornerstone of Polishness according to the prince and many of his collaborators was the Catholic faith.<sup>12</sup> In 1833, while in Paris, Prince Czartoryski founded the secret “Union of National Unity” (*Związek Jedności Narodowej*), whose statute emphasized the Catholic religion, language, and history as major pillars of Polishness. The preservation of “religious feelings, [ . . . ] an urgent and venerating preservation of language and Polish monuments, as well as everything that defines our exclusive nationality” were among the main goals of Czartoryski’s initial activity.<sup>13</sup> The defense of the Polish language, Catholic religion, and history meant for him a struggle against the “uprooting of the Polish nationality.”<sup>14</sup>

In annual speeches to the Polish emigration between the years 1838 and 1847, Czartoryski further elaborated on idioms of Polishness that were centered on the Catholic religion (“a holy faith of [our] fathers”) and the Polish language. Marian Kukiel noted that “religious affairs appear increasingly in his [Czartoryski’s] speeches and policies, and from the 1840s he uses more emphatically the language of a devout Christian.”<sup>15</sup> In Czartoryski’s own words, it was the “love of native speech” and the “remarkable devotion to the holy faith of fathers” that instilled a “rightful spirit of nationality” in all classes of society.<sup>16</sup> This could only mean that the Polish nationality was based on the (Polish) language and the (Catholic) religion. Over and over again Prince Adam repeated that Poland’s nationality was “based on faith.”<sup>17</sup> National unity was therefore based on “the most holy unity,” that is, on the “religion of [our] fathers,” which Poles (“we” in Czartoryski’s speech) should devotedly “love and preserve.”<sup>18</sup> In addition, nationality itself was sacred because it was “the first ground and incentive for the virtues and intellectual progress of any people,” as the prince wrote in 1847.<sup>19</sup> In its turn, the proliferation of Polish national consciousness was expected to save Poland from social conflicts.<sup>20</sup>

There was another specific context in which Prince Adam developed his idioms of Polishness. This was the opposition to Russia and Germany, which was cast in stark religious terms. For Czartoryski, the Catholic religion was the main idiom of the Polish nationality, as it effectively separated Poles from the Orthodox Russians/Muscovites and Protestant Germans. Catholicism was the national religion of Poles, and its loss would mean the loss of the very name of Poles and the eventual assimilation into Protestant

Germans or Orthodox Russians. "If we lose the faith of our forefathers," wrote the prince in 1840, "we would soon lose the name of Poles. A schism [Orthodoxy] will transform us into Muscovites, and Protestantism turn us into Germans."<sup>21</sup> Elsewhere he warned Poles about the danger of converting to Orthodoxy and becoming the "Muscovites."<sup>22</sup> He thought Protestant influence to be even more dangerous because it used philosophical persuasion, unlike the brutal force of Russian Orthodoxy.<sup>23</sup>

In effect, the struggle for Polish independence and the eventual establishment of a national government should reflect a prevalence of the Catholic church. Poles were expected to fight for the "faith of [their] fathers," and as a reward, a new Polish government "according to old rights and contemporary feelings of the people will always be genuinely Catholic."<sup>24</sup> The prince argued that the Roman Catholic clergy was "truly national for centuries." He expected that the future Poland would overcome religious differences and reach "eventually a happy unity of opinions and faiths" due to the benign influence of the Catholic clergy. For the time being, however, Czartoryski promoted religious tolerance, stressing that differences of religion and rites would not lead to differences of rights and civil occupations. Addressing the Catholic gentry in 1831, he reminded them that in the past, "difference in religions did not undermine the national unity" of Poland; he referred to the example of Prince Kostiantyn Ostroz'kyi, "a Polish hero" who was buried in Kyiv's Orthodox monastery.<sup>25</sup> The preservation of Catholicism for Prince Adam was also a condition for the prevalence of moral values within a nationality deprived of its own statehood.<sup>26</sup> Catholicism was thus the foundation of ideological values in the political system of the Hôtel Lambert as the most essential expression of the opposition between Poland and an Orthodox-Schismatic Russia.<sup>27</sup>

Franciszek Dzierżykraj Morawski, a close associate of Prince Adam, in 1847 refined the conservative vision of the Polish nationality by using the opposition between Catholic Poland and Orthodox Russia.<sup>28</sup> Along with religious faith, ethnography ("customs" and "speech" of the people), and history as idioms of nationality, Morawski mentioned Polish nobility, which contained for him "the most passionate element of nationality."<sup>29</sup> It was the Catholic religion, however, that provided Poland with its specific identity. Since for Czartoryski Poland was a deeply Catholic country, he did not separate the Catholic cause from the national one; therefore, he tried to promote and strengthen Catholic influences in lands such as Bosnia, Bulgaria, Albania, and Serbia (often through conversion to the Uniate

church). He was also preoccupied with the plight of the Uniate Church in historic Poland.<sup>30</sup> As a means to strengthen Western Christianity and to undermine Russia's influence, he suggested the creation of the Bulgarian Uniate church.<sup>31</sup>

Not surprisingly, Morawski also argued against separating Catholicism from the "Polish cause."<sup>32</sup> "Catholicism and Poland should never be divided," since "our" whole national civilization derived from Catholicism and both were intermingled. It is only Poland that on the east and north of Europe practiced and defended Catholicism. Western Christianity "alone supports her today."

The separate identity of Poland and its civilizational differences from Russia and Prussia were represented in religious terms. By attacking Roman Catholicism, Russian and Prussian authorities were attacking the "Polish nationality" itself. Morawski especially emphasized the civilizational contrasts between Poland and Russia, which derived from the dogmatic differences between Catholicism and Orthodoxy. "The pursuit [*dążność*] and direction of civilization of these two nations were absolutely different," commented Morawski. "Poland aspired all the time for greater freedom; the Muscovites instead designated as 'Great' the ruler who oppressed them the most."<sup>33</sup> The contrast between Poland and Russia was further strengthened by the opposition between "our" faith and "their" faith: "Our faith is independent of earthly powers; they [Russians] recognized the Tsar as head of their church. Our faith, while having immovable dogmas, is always capable of refashioning, of developing, and is always full of life and progress; theirs is motionless, stone-like, and dead."<sup>34</sup>

The leading periodicals of Czartoryski's circle, such as *Trzeci Maj* (The third of May) and *Młoda Polska* (Young Poland) sought to legitimize the exclusive rights of the Catholic church in Poland by criticizing democrats for their anti-Catholic treatment of Polish history.<sup>35</sup> Another émigré Catholic periodical, *Dziennik Narodowy* (The national daily), offered its own vision of Polish history as "the constant struggle between paganism and Catholicism, or between the falsehood and the faith that alone for all times and for all humankind will remain true and that alone has a right to be called universal."<sup>36</sup> It is on the pages of a pro-Czartoryski periodical, *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* (A chronicle of Polish emigration), that one of the most revealing conservative definitions of Polish nationality appeared. These were clearly ethnolinguistic and religious idioms of nationality treated as a natural phenomenon. Therefore, it was not the state/

political institution that created national specificity; on the contrary, it was the “natural distinctiveness of a nation” that led to political sovereignty:

According to us, nationality is the collection of all features, native and historical, sensual and intellectual, which separate one nation from another—a collection of conditions of national individuality; this is the natural distinctiveness of a nation, which is the basis, heart, and guarantee of political sovereignty. A common blood, religion, speech, literature, rights, habits, customs, monuments, finally the land and the graves of one’s forefathers—these are the elements of nationality.<sup>37</sup>

Yet another anonymous author also mentioned institutional, cultural, and historical idioms of nation-ness (like “rights,” literature, and monuments) but made it clear that it was the (Catholic) religion and language that were the pillars of Polishness. By “persecuting” the Catholic religion, “destroying” the Polish language, and “effacing” historical monuments and traces, the Russian emperor Nicholas I was attacking “everything that made one a Pole” (*wszystko, co jest Polakiem*).<sup>38</sup> It is unclear though, whether these idioms defined only ethnic Poles or could also include “Ruthenians.” At any rate, ethnolinguistic, ethnoracial, and religious idioms of Polishness referred rather to a closely knit community of ethnic Poles, separating them from other ethnic groups of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, such as Ruthenians and Lithuanians. Paradoxically, ethnic, linguistic, and religious idioms of nation-ness left enough space for the recognition of the multiethnic character of the historic commonwealth and its projected restoration in the future.

At the same time, in many of the propaganda and practical activities of the Hôtel Lambert, Czartoryski warned against the stereotype of “the Pole as Catholic” and opposed the intrusion of Jesuits in the “Polish-Ruthenian” struggle against the “Muscovites.”<sup>39</sup> The Hôtel Lambert circle was also able to change its vision of Catholicism over the course of time, depending on the region they were focused on. Jerzy Skowronek has noted that under the influence of the highly complicated ethnic and religious situation in the Balkans in the 1840s, Czartoryski and his collaborators increasingly treated religious issues in a “utilitarian-enlightenment” fashion, seeking to use the church for the sake of national movements.<sup>40</sup> In fact, Czartoryski’s camp soon came to the realization that Catholic missions in Serbia were to fail and instead regarded Catholic policies simply as a mission of civilization supported by France and Rome.<sup>41</sup> According to Kukiel, for Czartoryski it was not Catholicism that derived from patrio-

tism but rather patriotism that derived from the love of God. The defense of Catholicism was dictated by a Polish *raison d'être*, that is, by national self-defense.<sup>42</sup> In other words, Czartoryski subordinated religion to nationality and regarded the geopolitical rearrangement of Eastern Europe as more important than universal or trans-historical values. In the words of Czartoryski's associate, "the Prince wanted to exploit Catholic zeal for a political purpose."<sup>43</sup> By the end of the 1840s his zeal for Catholicism had visibly declined, and instead he supported Orthodoxy as a national religion of several Balkan peoples while criticizing the supranational universalist tendencies of the Catholic church, that is, its "Jesuitism."<sup>44</sup> In particular, Czartoryski opposed the negative attitude of the Jesuits toward Greek Catholicism among East Slavs. He argued that this rite was the only means through which Ruthenians could eventually drift to the Roman church.<sup>45</sup>

It was the Ukrainian/Ruthenian case that provided the truly defining context for idioms of the Polish nationality. In Czartoryski's speeches, the "Polish nation" appeared to be based on Catholicism, although this was a quite inclusive and nonethnic community. Czartoryski recognized the separate ethnicity of Ruthenians with their own religious rites (Greek Catholic or Orthodox), customs, and "their original language."<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless he denied them the status of a distinct nationality, separate from ethnic Poles.<sup>47</sup> "Ruthenians, like Lithuanians," wrote the prince in 1845, "are our brothers and common nationality."<sup>48</sup> History and political goals were those idioms which united a common Polish-Lithuanian-Ruthenian nationality situated above ethnic divides: "there are not any differences here, the cause is common, a brotherly feeling should be common, as well as a single-force pursuit of liberation for all. Our history for centuries has mixed us."<sup>49</sup>

Elsewhere, Czartoryski argued that despite the language differences, Ruthenians "are connected to Poland through their historical memories, as well as material and moral interests."<sup>50</sup> So, was it the Catholic faith or history that bound ethnic Poles and Ruthenians together in one nationality? This was an obvious paradox and a recurrent dilemma for all conservative federalists and Catholic-minded authors. According to Danuta Sosnowska, for federalists it was predominantly history that transformed different peoples into one political nationality (*naród*).<sup>51</sup>

Yet conservatives, and Czartoryski himself, were reluctant to reject the Roman Catholic faith and the Polish language as the pillars of modern Polishness. If Ruthenians were considered part of the "Polish nation," then

Roman Catholics could barely constitute half of the nation. How then could the religion of one segment of the population be the dominant idiom for the entire nationality without alienating minorities? Ideological adherence to the early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which could not solve the issues of ethnicity and religious rights, proved ill-fated for Prince Czartoryski. His ideal was the restoration of a somewhat reformed federative and multiethnic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which was also reflected in the ideology of the Society of Lithuania and the Lands of Rus', supported by Czartoryski.<sup>52</sup> It is from this ideal model that Czartoryski borrowed his vision of a future multiethnic "nation" of Poland. Nevertheless, while resurrecting the model, he was not always able to transform it into a genuinely multicultural political nation, which would have required the rejection of the Catholic centrality. At the same time, his aristocratic devotion to a "feudal" commonwealth prevented him from adopting a modern nationalist idea of a secular unitary Polish nationality, as advocated by many radical democrats.<sup>53</sup> His "middle" position was similar to Mickiewicz's poetic nostalgia for an early modern political "nation" that did not yet require exclusive national loyalties.<sup>54</sup> Czartoryski's stance also allowed for a radical rearrangement of Eastern Europe, based on different visions of nationality.

In the 1840s the policies of the Hôtel Lambert were increasingly occupied with Ruthenians and "Cossacks," that is, with Ukrainians. Left Bank Ukrainians, or "Cossacks" in the Hôtel's terminology, were accorded the biggest revolutionary potential among the non-Russian peoples of Russia.<sup>55</sup> In fact, members of the Hôtel Lambert usually differentiated between the "Ruthenian" cause, which referred to the "Polish" lands of Right Bank Ukraine, and the "Cossack" cause, which was a designation reserved for Left Bank Ukrainians, who resided outside Poland's national borders.<sup>56</sup>

One of the most active associates of Czartoryski from the late 1840s was Franciszek Duchiniński. He argued for "the complete independence" of "Little Russia" (consisting of the Chernihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv provinces of the Russian Empire), regarding it as a distinct nationality that possessed "all rights to such sovereignty."<sup>57</sup> In a report of 1846 to the Hôtel Lambert, he claimed that in the two Left Bank provinces Chernihiv and Poltava there was "a stronger hatred for Russia than in Poland itself," adding that at Kyiv University Ukrainian youth "expressed hatred towards Russians" while eagerly communicating with the Poles.<sup>58</sup> Duchiniński did not include Left Bank "Little Russians" in the Polish nationality, yet at the same time

he was trying to justify Polish claims to other parts of “Rus” such as Galicia, Belarus, and Right Bank Ukraine.<sup>59</sup> These lands were regarded as an internal problem of a future Poland, while Left Bank “Little Russians” were considered alongside the Polish nationality, but not within its borders.<sup>60</sup> Czartoryski’s camp attracted several men with dual Polish-Ukrainian loyalties (historically known as *gente Rutheni, natione Poloni*<sup>61</sup>), such as Duchński, the writer and activist Michał Czajkowski, and the Ruthenian priest Hipolit Terlecki, who recognized a separate Ukrainian ethnicity (customs, language, and faith) within a broader Polish national community.<sup>62</sup>

Michał Czajkowski was even planning to make contact with the “Ruthenian party” from Galicia and to organize the center of influence on “Ruthenian provinces.”<sup>63</sup> In addition, through Bohdan Zaleski, a famous Polish poet and expert on Ukraine, he wanted to get in touch with Ukrainian intellectuals from Russian-ruled Ukraine, such as Mykhailo Maksymovych and Petro Hulak-Artemovs’kyi.<sup>64</sup> Mistakenly, Czajkowski called Maksymovych one of “the leaders of Ruthenian society in Kharkiv.”<sup>65</sup> Perhaps Czajkowski hoped to infiltrate the Ukrainian gentry from Kharkiv province, as he enthusiastically informed Prince Czartoryski about the local “Cossack gentry,” who “participate in elections with sabres and dream about the Hetmanate and Hadiach treaties.”<sup>66</sup> He also planned to send his emissaries to different parts of Ukraine<sup>67</sup> and to make contact with Ruthenian priests who would propagate the idea of an anti-Russian uprising among peasants and Cossacks residing within and outside the Russian Empire.<sup>68</sup> It is for this purpose that Czajkowski wanted to make contacts with the Ruthenians from Galicia, who supposedly stood for the independence of Rus’ but “would have eagerly acted with the Poles against Moscow and against Austria.” He saw a direct connection between Galician Ruthenians and Ruthenian Cossacks who lived on the so-called Niż—around the Danube Delta—within the Ottoman Empire: “If it were possible to make an agreement with the Ruthenian party in Galicia, the Niż would gain a great momentum [acquire a great force] at the time of action.”<sup>69</sup> Czartoryski himself seemed to agree with Czajkowski’s assessment of the “Ruthenian” Cossacks from the Niż: “it is from the Niż alone that one can disrupt the Moscow tsardom.”<sup>70</sup>

The ethnolinguistic “Cossack” identity was fully recognized in Czartoryski’s camp to the extent that one of its members, Władysław Sabatyn, used to address his Polish colleagues in Ukrainian (*w narzeczu ruskim*).<sup>71</sup> He regarded an “old mother Poland” as his motherland and called Poles his

“brothers,” pointing to a common Polish-Cossack enemy—Russians. This “Cossack” identity could be further negotiated so as to reach the status of a separate nationality.

What truly united Poles and “Cossacks” (Ukrainians) was a projected common royal dynasty, to be headed by Adam Czartoryski, the prince who recognized his “Ruthenian” descent and who was declared *de facto* the Polish king by some of his supporters.<sup>72</sup> Emissaries to the “Cossacks-Ruthenians” and to “Polish Ukraine” were expected to propagate the idea of “brotherhood” with Poles and their subsequent “wellbeing” under the “government of the Polish king.”<sup>73</sup> The agitators had to explain to the Cossacks, “in the name of the Polish king,” the privileges they would be granted as a reward for their help to Poland.<sup>74</sup> Czajkowski planned to use the title “Polish king” to organize a popular uprising in Ukraine, and among the Cossacks living between the estuary of the Danube and the Caspian Sea.<sup>75</sup> He closely connected Cossacks to the idea of a king: “Cossacks will return to Poland a king and Poland itself to the Poles.”<sup>76</sup> Czajkowski strongly believed that only a king could unite Poland.<sup>77</sup>

In their geopolitical projects of the 1840s, the leaders of the Hôtel Lambert recognized the cultural independence of nationalities and were prepared to support an independent Left Bank Ukraine, its separate “Cossack nationality” connected to Poland in some way or another.<sup>78</sup> This loosely structured Eastern Europe of nationalities, protected by Poland, somewhat neutralized the Roman Catholic faith as the main pillar of Polishness.

Such flexibility with regard to religion allowed Czartoryski to include the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic Ruthenians in the Polish nationality. As such, the Catholic religion was important but not the only idiom of nation-ness in all contexts. History and loyalty to a common royal dynasty could also become idioms of nation-ness, especially when the nationality in question was inflated to include the Orthodox “Cossacks.” It was unclear, however, which role was assigned to the left-bank “Cossack nation” in Czartoryski’s new order. The Polish nationality according to Czartoryski and his circle was a resurrected federative and multiethnic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Ruthenians (mostly from Galicia and Right Bank Ukraine) being added as the third part of a *common* nationality. That nationality, however, was largely based on the religion and language of ethnic Poles, or rather of the Polish gentry; the Ruthenian (“Cossack”) identity could be added to it, perhaps, as picturesque local color. Czartoryski himself spoke out for the

preservation of the exclusively *Polish* language, Catholic religion, and Polish historical monuments. Moreover, Orthodoxy, the dominant “Ruthenian” religion, was supposed to give way to Greek Catholicism, which would eventually facilitate the ideological and cultural integration of Ruthenians into a single community.

It is completely another question whether it was practically possible to combine Roman Catholicism as an ever present idiom of Polishness with the inclusion of non-Catholics in the Polish nationality. Czartoryski, depending on the context of his discourse—namely, who the primary addressees of his speeches and policies were—emphasized different idioms of nationality. This ambiguity allowed for the creation of a loosely built Polish imagined community patterned on the multiethnic federative Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

#### Gentrification of Polishness: Maurycy Mochnacki

Maurycy Mochnacki was a prominent geopolitical thinker in the Polish émigré community and the most insightful student of the failed November uprising. He can be called a “conservative” with significant reservations, since his works radically attacked the political status quo in Eastern Europe. In his writings before emigration and after he settled in France, he developed a quite coherent vision of the Polish nationality. Here the concern is with his works written after 1831. Mochnacki was not an ideological conservative with elaborate philosophical principles; instead, his conservatism, like that of the Hôtel Lambert, related to means, not goals.<sup>79</sup> Mochnacki’s idea of social solidarism combined with the privileged position of the gentry can also be called “conservative,” although his revolutionary rhetoric and defiance of the status quo signaled the radical position of an émigré thinker. Mochnacki eventually chose the side of Adam Czartoryski, regarding him as a potential leader of nationality fighting for its liberation.<sup>80</sup>

To understand how Mochnacki viewed national cohesion, it is worth starting with his remarkable definition of nationality, which appeared in his seminal work *O literaturze polskiej w wieku dziewiętnastym* (On Polish literature in the nineteenth century, 1830). His dominant idiom of nationality belonged to the “subjective” or mental realm and corresponded to the Romantic notion of national “spirit,” or what was later transformed into *mentalité*. He did not ascribe any particular importance to the Catholic

religion, to political institutions, or to ethnographic features per se; these elements rather had to be reflected in the “imagination,” “notions,” and “feelings” of the people. No less remarkable was Mochnacki’s dismissal of geography as a marker or creator of nationality: “Nation is not just a collection of people living on a space defined by certain borders. Rather, the essence of nation is the collection of all its imaginings, all its notions, and feelings that correspond to religion, political institutions, legal system, habits and are in the close connection to geographical situation, climate, and other conditions of empirical existence.”<sup>81</sup> This quotation shows that Mochnacki’s subtle vision of national cohesion was different from that of other “conservatives.” His was closer to the democrats, who were reluctant to single out religion, language, or institutions as the dominant idioms of Polishness. Language, however, was important for “national self-knowledge” and was also considered to be a medium for national literature that had to express national individuality.<sup>82</sup> Contemporary civilization tended to efface national individuality by unifying national subjectivity.<sup>83</sup> Therefore, the promotion of an original literature, protected from foreign influences, would maintain national existence. In this defensive situation the preservation and restoration of the past with its traditions and institutions could boost literary originality while maintaining nationality. The Polish cause was thus the restoration or “resurrection” of nationality in which history played a major role. It was history and not pure theory that pulled together the lands of the former commonwealth and provided the partitioned Poles with an already proven geopolitical order. This was “the ancient monarchy of Bolesław or the Jagellonians.”<sup>84</sup> Here history was an idiom of Polishness. History also provided Poles with traditional “institutions,” “rights,” and “customs” which once “embellished a republican monarchy of the Polish nation.”<sup>85</sup> Paradoxically, the territorial restoration of the early modern commonwealth was intended to hasten the “collapse of the social order of a feudal Europe” by destroying the coalition of dynastic regimes that disregarded the rights of nationalities.<sup>86</sup>

Mochnacki did not, however, explain how the social order of the old commonwealth was different from the rest of “feudal” Europe. At the same time, as a Romantic thinker, he separated the (Polish) nationality from the (Polish) state. It was only the state that had disappeared as a result of the partitions, while nationality survived: “Poland ceased to be a political power in the system of European powers, but it did not cease to be a nation in the familial home of this part of the world.”<sup>87</sup> It was only in Poland where nation-

ality survived political death, staying alive in historical and social terms: “the nation has lost a political life [ . . . ] but has lost neither social [*społecznego*] bound nor civic [*towarzyskiego*] nature.”<sup>88</sup> If this was the case, then idioms of the Polish nationality could not be reduced to state or political institutions. Perhaps, a nationality did not even require a state in order to exist.<sup>89</sup> That is why Mochnacki emphasized the importance of “subjective” markers of nationality, which were independent of external forms. This was a purely Romantic stance. Yet he could not imagine a completely new Poland, one that “never existed in the world”; therefore, history had to provide contemporary Poles with a once existing national identity.<sup>90</sup> This also meant that old institutions and the state itself were to be “restored.” However, a project of institutional and territorial restoration of an old Poland within a framework of historical legitimism visibly conflicted with purely Romantic “subjective” idioms of nationality.

In a sense, Mochnacki was trapped between the “subjective” idioms of nationality that were independent of a state structure, and the “objective” institutions that existed in the past. The latter had to be restored along with an early modern Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. His appeal to the social and political order of the commonwealth resembled the adherence of Prince Adam Czartoryski to an early modern nationality. In both cases, it was the gentry as an old institution and the embodiment of nationality that provided a visible link between an “objective” but partitioned state and a “subjective” but living nationality. It is from this assumption that Mochnacki developed his idea of the gradual transition from a gentry-based nationality, or a gentry-as-nationality (the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth), to a gentrified nationality. Put another way, he demanded the gentrification of the rest of society by granting the privileges of the gentry to all classes, or as he put it, “through the proliferation of a noble estate.”<sup>91</sup> Mochnacki’s main idea was to “make the majority a nation, the whole nation one social estate.”<sup>92</sup> The concept of a “gentrified” nationality also meant the unity of institutional and mental/subjective idioms of nationality, which was a loose combination of Romantic nationalism and historical legitimism. In reality, however, for Mochnacki it was still the gentry that continued to embody the Polish nationality, in particular in the eastern borderlands of the former commonwealth.<sup>93</sup>

Mochnacki clearly understood that it was not a Romantic and ethnically diverse “folk” who embodied Polishness in the east but rather the culturally—if not ethnically—Polish gentry. He made it clear that in Russia’s

“Polish” provinces it was the petty gentry “speaking” and “feeling” in Polish who represented Polishness there.<sup>94</sup> Therefore, by “gentrifying” other classes, he would achieve a national unity based on traditional Polish culture and values. The Polish gentry were surrounded by peasants of Ruthenian descent who were to be acculturated in Polish culture. He emphasized the ethnic unity of nobles with the rest of the population in a “patriarchal Poland”<sup>95</sup> without specifying, however, which territory of a former state he was referring to. He bluntly proclaimed that “Poland” was ethnically homogeneous compared to ethnically mixed Western Europe: “Something different is in our patriarchal Poland! [ . . . ] Our entire stock is tribal, homogeneous [*jednogrodny*], without those sharp divides (a still undeleted trace of German conquerors), which everywhere else separated to such a degree certain social estates from the others [ . . . ], Poles are the native mass.”<sup>96</sup>

Elsewhere he underlined the close ethnic kinship among the Poles: “our tribe all over Poland has something familial, domestic.”<sup>97</sup> After losing its status as a “political power,” Poland instead found another way of life, which was “not known before in history”: Poland developed “a domestic, quite familial existence.”<sup>98</sup> He proceeded to describe his ideal of nationality as a “family,” which was not synonymous with a “country,” “state,” or “government.” True, “a native people” (*lud rodzimy*), unless it is a violent combination of “opposite tribes,” has two elements of its “force”—“social” and “political.” Unless a “country” or political form developed at the expense of a “family,” or society, nationality—even if it loses statehood—would not perish. Mochnacki again alluded to the example of Poland, where traditionally government/state was “nothing” while nationality was “everything.” Therefore, Poland had been and still was a “nationality” or “family” rather than a “government” or “country.”<sup>99</sup> He proudly declared the qualitative advantage of Poland as a united nationality: “a bred [*plciowa*] Poland, so to say, prevails by its strength over all [nations].”<sup>100</sup> One can only guess whether he meant here the community of ethnic Poles or the entire (Slavic?) population of the former commonwealth.

“Poles” looked even more ethnically homogeneous when compared to the mixed population of Russia, which represented an absolute opposition to Poland in metaphysical, geopolitical, and civilizational terms.<sup>101</sup> For Mochnacki, Russia (or “Moscow” in his terminology)—an evil and barbaric “geographical monster” since the time of Peter the Great—was not a nationality but a “government.” “Moscow is the tsar and the tsar is Moscow,” he wrote in 1833.<sup>102</sup> He also rejected the claim that Russia had a

dominant nationality, emphasizing as he did that ethnic Russians (Muscovites) did not exceed ten million people, while the rest of the population had nothing in common with them.<sup>103</sup> Among the rest of Russia's population, "Poles," according to Mochnacki, were "the most homogeneous mass" (*masa najwięcej jednorodna*) and numbered fifteen million people.<sup>104</sup> Obviously, this "homogeneous mass" included all inhabitants of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Orthodox Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belarusians) constituted a large part of the "homogeneous" Poles. More surprising, however, was the fact that Mochnacki mentioned the "Pole," the "Ruthenian" (Rusin), and the "Lithuanian" (Litwin) separately among the various nationalities of the empire, probably to underline the concept that Russia was a "chaos of nations."<sup>105</sup>

Against the background of opposition to Russia minor ethnic differences did not matter, as long as the numerically inflated "Poles" miraculously outnumbered "Russians." In this case, Mochnacki did not seem to perceive Ruthenians or Lithuanians so ethnically different as to be separate nationalities. His confusion about the Ruthenian identity and inclusiveness of the Polish nationality remained persistent. Over and over again he stressed that "beyond the Bug, the Neman, up to the Dvina and the Dnieper" there were many millions of "brothers." At the same time, he wrote about the Orthodox Rus' in Galicia, who could be lost to Russia, as if he was not sure about their "Polishness."<sup>106</sup>

Mochnacki's ideas about Polishness and its inclusive nature appear much clearer in his "Notes on Podolian-Volhynian Uprising," attached to his major work *Powstanie narodu polskiego 1830–1831* (The uprising of the Polish nation 1830–1831), published in Paris in 1833–34. His thoughts on Lithuania are especially revealing. Despite the fact that the Lithuanian language, spoken by both peasants and the gentry, was different from Polish, he rejected the existence of a separate Lithuanian nationality.<sup>107</sup> Lithuanian was not the language of high culture since it was not taught in schools and did not produce any literature; it was simply the "language of peasants." As such, Lithuanian could not "constitute any feature of a separate Lithuanian nationality." In addition, history, customs, the legal system, and the Catholic religion were more important features of a *common* (Polish) nationality than a distinct language of peasants could be for a separate (Lithuanian) nationality. Thus, the cultural and social Polonization of Lithuanians, expressed by Mochnacki in historical, ethnographic, and religious idioms of nation-ness, rendered the Lithuanian language obsolete

as a marker of nationality. He concluded that there were not any differences between Lithuanians and ethnic Poles.

With respect to the Ruthenians (Ukrainians from Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia as well as Belarusians), Mochnacki was not so sure. He stressed that Rus' was the third main component of Poland and had not been fully recognized by the elites of the defunct Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In addition, he admitted the total distinctiveness of the "Rus' kingdom" in Galicia. During the subsequent centuries of Polish dominance, the Ruthenian elite became "essentially Polonized."<sup>108</sup> Unlike the Lithuanian language, the pure Slavic Ruthenian language was the language of Holy Scriptures, old chronicles, and the "national" language of the Lithuanian state and "nation." Therefore, the historical Ruthenian nationality was based on three elements: language, religion, and law (*prawa*). Even if not "refined," that language was still capable of development, although "in the view of our political might in the future," Ruthenian was sentenced to "obliteration."

Mochnacki, however, treated Rus' differently from Lithuania: the former had a "separate Ruthenian nationality" that had to be taken seriously in the event of a possible uprising.<sup>109</sup> He also emphasized continuously that Rus' was populated predominantly by Ruthenians; Catholic "native Poles" were only a noble minority that had oppressed Ruthenian peasants for centuries. It was the Polish gentry that "constituted Poland there."<sup>110</sup> At the same time, he believed in the moral influence of "Polish citizens" who could presumably mobilize local peasants around the Polish cause versus the Russians. Mochnacki tried to be realistic and did not include Ruthenians in the Polish nationality without reservations. Moscow had failed to assimilate Ruthenians, who therefore "turned neutral," supporting neither Poland nor Moscow. Nevertheless, Mochnacki thought too optimistically that Ruthenians were more influenced by their Polish landlords than by Moscow: Ruthenians, who numbered four million people in Right Bank Ukraine, were different by language and religion from Poles but sided "silently" with Polish insurgents fighting "the despot."<sup>111</sup>

Perhaps Mochnacki regarded "Ruthenians" as a full-fledged nationality associated with Poles only by virtue of history and through the Polish landlords, who were presumably able to rally peasants against the Russians. He also never considered the inclusion of Left Bank Ukrainians in the Polish nationality, thus dividing "Ruthenians" along the Dnieper. It is clear, however, that a broadened Polish nationality was not based exclusively on the Polish language, Catholic religion, and ethnography; yet he seemed to

believe in the likelihood of a cultural assimilation of Ruthenians in the future. It is also evident that Mochnacki was inclined to recognize a distinct Ruthenian identity (at least historical) in his more practical considerations about the role of the eastern borderlands in the future Polish uprising. In his theoretical analysis of Polishness and East European geopolitics, however, he did not seem to deal with Ruthenians as a separate issue.

The Polish historian Tomasz Kizwalter suggests that Mochnacki's idea of an ethnically homogeneous national community belonged to nature rather than history.<sup>112</sup> Only history, however, could define the inclusiveness of Mochnacki's Polish nationality, whether the latter stretched all the way to the Dnieper or was reduced to ethnic Poland. That ethnic vision, however, was not clearly developed at the time. In addition, Mochnacki's emphasis on nationality as a "family" neutralized the importance of the state and institutions as idioms of Polish nationality. His treatment of the Ruthenians as a separate ethnicity, or perhaps even as a nationality associated with Poland through the "influence" of Polish gentry, suggested that the Polish national community was indeed *imagined* and belonged to the realm of perceptions rather than ethnography or (state) institutions. Yet he was never clear as to which idioms of nation-ness were the most important for his "Poles." He stressed explicitly the dominance of *subjective* features, or *mentalité*, although he often regarded "Poles" as a close-knit ethnic community of blood relatives, thus emphasizing the *objective* markers of ethnography. It was the noble estate, however—the most consciously, culturally Polish, and traditional institution—that truly united subjective, ethnographic, and political/institutional idioms by representing Polishness par excellence and linking the past with the present and future.

### *Religious and Social Conservatism as Nationalism*

#### The Religious Conservatism of Zygmunt Krasiński

Zygmunt Krasiński, along with Juliusz Słowacki and Adam Mickiewicz, is considered one of the greatest Polish Romantic poets. In their poetic and theoretical works they developed the ideas of Polish national and religious messianism.<sup>113</sup> Andrzej Walicki, a leading expert on Polish intellectual history, defined messianism as a historiosophic-religious concept that called for the radical and miraculous transformation of life on earth—a collective earthly redemption of humanity.<sup>114</sup> This combined the ideas of ethical politics and the Hegelian celebration of a (national) state as the most perfect

manifestation of an Absolute. The most general messianic concept of nationality defined it through the idea of a progressive spiritual reincarnation: a nationality was “the community of spirits with a common mission.”<sup>115</sup>

Unlike many Polish Romantics, Krasiński was a deeply conservative poet and thinker who strived to combine Roman Catholicism with politics while emphasizing the leading role of aristocracy in national life. For him, aristocracy represented “the superior souls,” and therefore the inherent social inequality was the result of unequal merits in previous reincarnations. Walicki defined the messianism of Krasiński as an “exalted Polonocentrism,” adding however that the poet’s “Polonocentrism” was only putative, since the Polish nationality was not so much a real existing community as a collection of spirits for the realization of a certain idea of Polishness.<sup>116</sup> Krasiński, a fervently anti-Russian thinker, extolled the idea of a nation-state as the realization of “divine thought” represented only in nationalities. Nationality was “the essence and reality” of a state.<sup>117</sup> Therefore, he predicted the dissolution of any state that was not based on nationality. In particular, all empires were doomed. He was obviously alluding to Russia and Austria-Hungary, in whose long-lasting and stable existence he did not believe, labeling them a “collage of several sliced nationalities.”<sup>118</sup> The Slavic community had to protect “the unalterable rights of national individualities.”<sup>119</sup>

Krasiński expressed his views on nationality in poetry, philosophy, and letters. Here my focus is on his philosophical and epistolary writings. Krasiński’s longest philosophical work, *O stanowisku Polski z bożych i ludzkich względów* (On the position of Poland from the divine and human perspectives), appeared in 1841. In it he developed the idea of national spiritual reincarnation and resurrection for Poland. According to Krasiński, everything in the world of nature, humanity, and eternity was a spirit. Humanity, as the “common work of all human individual spirits,” facilitates for individual spirits an entrance into “eternal life.” A nationality was thus as transcendental as humanity: each nationality was the “common work of spirits that were selected for that purpose and attached to each other by God’s mercy for ages” to become one of the organs of humanity. “Collective spirits,” such as nationalities and humanity, were the school for “individual spirits,” who after graduating from it, could enter “eternal life.”<sup>120</sup>

The development of nationality depended on the concord between “God’s will” and “free [human] will.” If they collided, a nationality would fail to develop as such: “because of their conflict [the nationality] does not

grow up, weakens [ . . . ] and becomes absorbed as part of other nations.”<sup>121</sup> Krasieński denied such a failed community even the name “nation,” since such a “folk” (*lud*) had only the theoretical possibility of “growing into a nation.” This remarkably Hegelian concept was reflected in the writings of other East European authors, among them the Russian radical critic Vissarion Belinskii.<sup>122</sup>

Krasieński was aware of the modernity of any nationality and placed it within the realm of creative consciousness rather than “objective” reality. Nationality was a community of only those “living spirits” who understood their common goal—that is, humanity.<sup>123</sup> Premodern communities, such as “hordes, tribes, some eastern monarchies, or ancient republican cities,” could not be called nationalities. They might have aspired to the status of “nationality,” but had not reached it and thus perished. For Krasieński, nationality was a “high level of the association of spirits,” and like Mochacki, he regarded it as being immune to “political death.” In effect, nationality meant the immortality of a “collective spirit,” which could not be lost.<sup>124</sup> Members of a nationality, or “individual spirits,” had their responsibilities before the “collective spirit” so that it “grew according to divine provisions,” while individuals had to be ready to become martyrs “for the fatherland, for the nationality, and for humanity.” Such martyrdom perfected nationality and prompted the coming of the “Divine Kingdom.” A nationality, as a “spiritual entity,” was a member of “the universal human church” and was permeated by the divine spirit. Nationality was therefore “holy” and “sacrosanct.” The “spirit” of nationality strove for the unity of its “body” (as expressed during history in the existence of a state) and its “soul” (as represented by self-conscious nationality), which waged “a long war” against each other.<sup>125</sup>

“States” existed before “nationalities,” but in the end each “roaming” soul-nationality would have to reunite with its corresponding body-state, which can be interpreted as the goal of any modern nationalism. Krasieński anticipated the coming of a nationalist epoch—“the epoch of nationality”—when the separation of a “soul” from its “body” (the existence of stateless nationalities) would come to an end and nationalities would reach “self-knowledge.” He stressed that the main rule of public law would be the “attainment of a state for any major nationality and the dismantling of any state not based on nationality,” which sounded as a death sentence to multinational empires. Nationality therefore was a “collective, living human being.”

Kraśiński then applied his national historiosophy to the case of Poland. After losing its “body”-state as the result of partitions, the “suffering, bleeding” Poland was preparing for its reincarnation, that is, the acquisition of a “new body” and its reappearance among other states. This would happen only if the Polish “soul,” while still in its “coffin,” underwent a religious transformation; in other words, became a devoutly Catholic country.<sup>126</sup> This would unite “knowledge” and “being,” “soul” and “body,” “nationality” and “state” under the influence of a “Christianized national spirit” (*Chrystusowość narodu*). That spirit meant in fact the merger of Roman Catholicism with Polish national policies.

Kraśiński’s treatment of Roman Catholicism as the pillar of Polishness corresponded well to his religious and social conservatism. In a letter to the philosopher Bronisław Trentowski, dated January 4, 1847, Kraśiński explicitly stated that the mission of Poland was “the merger of politics with religion”: “The true goal of Poland is the implementation of God’s Kingdom in reality as well as the merger of politics with religion and the establishment of the first stone of centuries on the basis of the universal church.”<sup>127</sup> Kraśiński’s “universal church” was obviously the Roman Catholic church, which he regarded as Poland’s national church. In his teaching, nationality was directly connected to the divine order: “in the nation [there] is a holy supreme rule,” since “nation” was “one of the senses in the organism of humanity.” The “holy formation” of humanity was, for Kraśiński, the goal and the end of earthly history, while at the same time the beginning of a “superior, more spiritual, alive, and eternal history.” The Catholic church thus emphasized the divinity and unity of nationality as a whole (in opposition to the monarch or common people). Kraśiński’s Poland would stand on the threshold of union with God if the country avoided “the abyss” of an “Asiatic pan-Slavism” (assimilation to Russia) and “the abyss” of a “Communist bestiality” (social revolution). In order to be resurrected, Poland must not reject Christ.<sup>128</sup>

In another letter to Trentowski, Kraśiński defined the civilizational differences between Poland and Russia through the opposition between Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy on a dogmatic level. Roman Catholicism in its dogmas declared “ideality in the world and the primacy of ideality over secular condition,” which presumably made Kraśiński’s faith “a huge defense of the oppressed.”<sup>129</sup> He interpreted the Russian-Polish conflict as a struggle between Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism: the Russian government persecuted the Catholic faith in order to replace

it with the “decay of a Greek schism,” as he preferred to call Eastern Christianity.<sup>130</sup>

In fact, the struggle between Poland and “Moscow” had been occurring since the beginning of creation as the conflict between “communal democracy” and “ugly autocracy,” between “the widest, most gracious religious tolerance” and “Byzantine deception/Mongol bestiality.”<sup>131</sup> The Polish-Russian conflict on a metaphysical level meant a struggle between Good and Evil.<sup>132</sup> According to the Catholic poet, Russian autocracy came directly from the Orthodox dogma of the Holy Trinity: “government is everything in Heaven as it is on earth; government gave birth to everything [ . . . ]; nation and humanity do not have a spirit.”<sup>133</sup> Krasieński certainly alluded here to the Orthodox interpretation of *filioque*, according to which the Holy Spirit descended from God the Father only. The poet interpreted this as the source of an autocratic rule in Russia where the hierarchy in Heaven corresponded to the autocratic oppression of “all spirituality” on earth.

Put another way, the Russian government was the “son” of “Byzantine stagnation” (its mother) and the “Tatar invasion” (its father).<sup>134</sup> He obviously regarded Ruthenians as part of the Polish nationality by virtue of their relationship to the early modern civilization of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the subsequent proliferation of the Uniate church.<sup>135</sup> An autocratic and Orthodox Russia was thus the ultimate opposition to gentry-ruled, Catholic Poland.<sup>136</sup> In this context, it was Roman Catholicism that became for Krasieński an absolute idiom of Polishness.

Krasieński’s conservatism was also expressed in his criticism of democrats and their selective appreciation of Polish traditions. He noted that no one aspired to “the universal and entire Poland encompassing its past, present, and the entire future, i.e. an absolute [Poland].”<sup>137</sup> Instead, émigrés “dissected Poland in thought worse than its enemies tore its body on earth,” and “everybody has in mind its [Poland’s] certain cut and regards this cut as a whole.”<sup>138</sup> Krasieński was fond of bodily metaphors, and the idea of the nation’s “body” and “soul” featured prominently in his religious outlook. The metaphor of Poland’s “body” and “soul” also appeared in his social definition of the Polish nationality as a very *real* imagined community, though with underlying spiritualistic and messianic connotations. In social terms, the “soul” of the Polish nationality was its gentry, whereas the rest of the population, the “folk” (*lud*), constituted its “body.” After the infamous Galician massacre of 1846, when the Polish-speaking Roman Catho-

lic peasants massacred Polish noble insurgents, the Polish nationality was in a state of “unheard division”: “the soul of a nation starts being afraid of the nation’s body, while the body [starts] not trusting the soul.”

Kraśiński argued passionately for the “union” of the nation’s body and soul, so that “there was only one harmonious national spirit.”<sup>139</sup> Using a slightly different metaphor, he was prepared to declare the gentry the main source of the Polish nationality: enemies sought “to de-nationalize the Polish people (*lud*) by cutting off its head from its shoulders, the head where alone the sense of nationality lives.” Deprived of its noble head, an obscure folk would be left without its history and would not find a future, while giving its present to any conqueror in exchange for its material “welfare.”<sup>140</sup> Elsewhere he declared the gentry as the “only stratum in which Polish national consciousness could develop in its entirety.”<sup>141</sup> “If the gentry perished, the very nationality would perish,” stressed Kraśiński in 1847, in a memorial to the French historian-turned-politician François Guizot.<sup>142</sup> It was only the gentry as the nation’s “soul” that could “reveal to the folk its historical past and its national goal.”<sup>143</sup> He extolled primarily landed gentry or aristocracy.<sup>144</sup> Therefore, it was only the gentry which could be considered the embodiment of the “great national unity.” One can say that for Kraśiński it was the Roman Catholic gentry that represented a major idiom of Polishness, since only Polish nobles could implement the idea of Polishness.

Kraśiński focused mostly on the spiritual nature of the Polish nationality. He defined Poland through the “spirit” of nation, which was a somewhat transcendental category; the Polish nationality was not so much a real as a spiritual community.<sup>145</sup> This spirit, however, was ultimately Catholic in nature, and therefore his Poland was first of all a Catholic nationality. Finally, the Polish nationality was represented in reality primarily by the “most perfect spirits,” the aristocrats. As a result, “spiritual,” religious, and social idioms of Polishness became almost indistinguishable in Kraśiński’s works.

#### The “conservative episode” of Bronisław Trentowski

Bronisław Trentowski was a rather liberal thinker throughout his philosophical career, but at some point he started advocating quite conservative ideas. The Polish historian Marcin Król called him “a short-lasting conservative.”<sup>146</sup> Influenced by Zygmunt Kraśiński, after the Galician massacre of 1846, Trentowski came to appreciate the Catholic religion and the

Polish-speaking gentry as pillars of Polishness. He presented his new views in the book *Wizerunki duszy narodowej* (The images of the national soul) published in 1847. Similar to his conservative guru Krasiński, Trentowski advocated the idea of the Polish gentry as the bearers of the Polish nationality.<sup>147</sup> As Trentowski put it, “a Pole should defend at least our gentry as the head and heart of our nation.”<sup>148</sup> His work was the expression of historical and social pessimism by a liberal philosopher who bitterly witnessed the collapse of an idealized social harmony in post-1846 Polish society. He commented that instead of finding unity, “folk” and “gentry” declared a “fierce war” on each other. Trentowski unambiguously sided with the gentry, regarding the noble class as the sole embodiment of nationality, its “brain,” “head,” and “heart.” Under the influence of Krasiński, Trentowski called the Polish gentry “our only and entire nation.”<sup>149</sup>

There was, however, nothing new in his “pro-gentry” attitude, which was a prominent feature of Trentowski’s philosophical essay “Czy można uczyć się filozofii narodowej od ludu i jakie cechy mieć powinna taż filozofia” [Whether it is possible to learn national philosophy from the common folk and which features this philosophy should have]. In this essay he stressed the primacy of the elite in the social and intellectual life of Poland.<sup>150</sup>

It was, however, Trentowski’s book *Images of the National Soul* that constituted the landmark of his conservative turn. Unlike Europe, where Catholic conservatism was detrimental and worthy of “bitter reprimand,” a stateless and partitioned Poland needed “restoration,” that is, a turn to “lost might and independence,” which meant conservatism with respect to national issues.<sup>151</sup> Trentowski’s national conservatism was similar to Mochnacki’s definition of the Polish cause as “restoration.” If Mochnacki’s conservatism was more geopolitical in nature, Trentowski’s conservatism had rather social and cultural overtones, which referred directly to his idioms of Polishness. Trentowski imagined a partitioned Poland as the sum of various historical provinces and regional types, such as the Great Pole (Wielkopolanin), the Cracowian (Krakowianin), the Galician (Galicyanin), the Lithuanian (Litwin), and the inhabitant of the Kingdom of Poland (Koroniarz or Królewczyk). This register of different regional and ethnographic groups of Poles was nothing new in Polish mental geography, although the way Trentowski used the regions of historic Poland to elaborate on the idea of Polishness was quite unique for the 1830s–1840s.

By describing the social and cultural situation of Polish lands ruled by Prussia, Trentowski showed the importance of traditional religious and

ethnolinguistic idioms of Polishness, emphasizing the protective role of the Polish-speaking Catholic gentry in Protestant and German-dominated territory.<sup>152</sup> He specifically pointed to the looming strife between peasants and the gentry as a result of Prussian policies: “The common folk is distancing itself from the gentry ever more visibly and starts tolerating a German teacher and pastor. The language of the enemy is encroaching on village huts.”<sup>153</sup> The author noted that the local peasants were becoming closer to the German bureaucracy than they were to the Polish gentry; the result was that a graduate of a German school often repudiated the Catholic religion and converted to Protestantism. Trentowski, of course, argued that the Catholic faith was “one of the strongest pillars and refuges of our nationality.”<sup>154</sup> This characteristically conservative stance was shared by only a few democrats. It was this anti-German context that allowed Trentowski to formulate his “conservative” vision of Polishness based on the Catholic religion, the Polish language, and the gentry as idioms of nation-ness.

Trentowski pointed out that the Germans did not manage to undermine the “three cornerstones of our nationality, [namely] a native language, the Catholic faith, and the Polish gentry.”<sup>155</sup> By the same token, the German language for him took on satanic qualities: local Poles regarded it as a “diabolic language” which “deprived [them] of salvation both in Heaven and on earth.” Over and over again he emphasized the Polish language, Catholic faith, and Polish gentry as three pillars of Polishness. For example, he praised the inhabitants of the Polish land of Żuławy for the preservation of “the Polish language, Catholic faith, and national gentry,” which protected the locals against Germanization. At the same time, he mourned the de-Polonization of Silesia, where Germans had already undermined “three last pillars of our nationality: a native language, the Catholic faith, and the Polish gentry.” He also castigated the democratic-oriented Polish periodical *Rok* (Year) from Poznan for its alleged attack on both the Catholic faith and “patriotic gentry” as “two ancient bulwarks of our nationality”; the periodical was then accused of spoiling the Polish language, this “third bulwark [*stupa*] of our nationality.”<sup>156</sup>

Trentowski went so far as to extol the anti-German and anti-Protestant “biases” (*przesady*) of Poles who were convinced that “Catholic and Polish is the same.” This stereotype, which became widespread in the Polish popular imagination toward the end of the nineteenth century, began to take shape in the 1840s.<sup>157</sup> The prominent Polish historian Tadeusz Łepkowski attributed the stereotype of the “Catholic Pole” to the Prussian-

controlled Poznan region, where Trentowski also made his observations about Catholicism and Polishness. According to Łepkowski, national differences were less important than socioeconomic and religious ones in the Poznan area in the first half of the nineteenth century; therefore, Catholicism became identified with Polishness while also facilitating the Polonization of local German Catholics. However, the stereotype of the “Pole the Catholic” did not dominate the national discourse of the time.<sup>158</sup>

In the 1840s Trentowski unequivocally praised the “bias” of those who professed the “love for nationality” by equating Catholicism with Poles and Protestantism with Germans. In the popular mind of local Poles “anyone who among them becomes a Protestant [Lutrem] is considered to be a German, a traitor of the Polish God and nation.”<sup>159</sup> This made Trentowski admit that although Catholicism, especially in its Jesuit form, was not at all a “progressive force,” it was still the most powerful force to preserve the Polish nationality. He regarded religion as a safer bulwark of national identity than language by pointing to the case of the Irish, who “had long since lost their native language and speak English” but retained the Catholic religion. His advice for the Poles under the rule of Protestantism and Orthodoxy (Schyzma) was to stick to the Catholic faith in order to preserve their nationality.<sup>160</sup>

Trentowski’s emphasis on the Catholic religion as the pillar of Polishness implicitly meant the exclusion of Orthodox Ruthenians and Jews from the Polish community. He regarded Poles as an ethnic community by specifically emphasizing ethnographic idioms of nation-ness and underlining the divide between ethnic Poles and Ruthenians. The philosopher revealed his ethnographic understanding of Polishness in a discussion of the Galician massacre of 1846, while comparing this infamous event with its bloody predecessor—the so-called Koliivshchyna (or Koliszczyzna in Polish) of 1768. This was a bloody rebellion of Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks against Catholics, Uniates, and Jews who supposedly oppressed the local Orthodox commoners. Trentowski interpreted it as an uprising against “Poles” in general. The events of 1768 were for him less horrific because they were committed not by ethnic Poles (as was the massacre of 1846) but by Ruthenians. He explicitly stated that the “nationality” of the latter was “not Polish but Ruthenian” and that they practiced “not the Catholic but the Schismatic” faith.<sup>161</sup> The Ruthenians fought “against language, religious, and political oppressors,” wrote Trentowski, implicitly recognizing the fundamental difference between Ruthenians and Poles.

Unlike the events of 1768, the Galician massacre had all the signs of a civil war, as it was perpetrated by a “fairly Polish, the most and by the highest right national folk” that spoke the “pure” and “beautiful” Polish language—the very source of a Polish literary culture. The most horrific thing for Trentowski was the fact that the “folk” who massacred the gentry was “as Polish and as Catholic as the gentry.” He could not understand how the “fairly Polish” and “purely Catholic” folk could massacre the “fairly Polish” and “purely Catholic” gentry. For him “Poles murdered Poles,”<sup>162</sup> and therefore local Ukrainians were not “Poles.”<sup>163</sup> Trentowski unconsciously ascribed his national outlook to peasants, who in fact still lived in a prenational world, where “Poles” were their oppressive lords. Religious and ethnolinguistic idioms of nation-ness did not allow him to understand the clearly prenational behavior of peasants. He felt, however, that ethnography itself did not make people a conscious nationality. For him, the Catholic and Polish-speaking peasants constituted ethnic material with some national features, but they did not completely belong to the Polish nationality.<sup>164</sup> At the same time, he clearly saw a national divide between “Poles” and “Ruthenians,” the latter who allegedly had waited only for the Austrian instigation to massacre the Poles, whom “they hated.”

The ethnic, national, and civilizational differences between Poles and Russians appeared to be even greater. Trentowski defined Russia as a multinational empire, where ethnic Russians constituted a minority and non-Russian Slavs and other minorities seemed to be in the majority.<sup>165</sup> Here again he clearly separated “Poles,” whom he numbered at five million, from the East Slavic and Baltic peoples—“Ruthenians,” “Cossacks,” and “Lithuanians”—who amounted to ten million. The term *Ruthenians* used here probably encompassed Right Bank Ukrainians and Belarusians, while “Cossacks” referred to Left Bank Ukrainians. Trentowski doubted the existence of the “Russian nationality,” whose language, literature, political history, customs, and traditions were branded by him as “governmental,” imposed from above. Therefore, Poles had nothing in common with Muscovites<sup>166</sup>; the two could never be merged in a single people since each represented the opposite pole of a binary opposition between Europe and Tatar, progress and reaction, enlightenment and obscurantism, freedom and captivity, (Catholic) truth and (Orthodox) lies, and so on.

Despite criticizing the Catholic (Jesuit) fanaticism that exposed cosmopolitan and antinational tendencies, Trentowski nevertheless regarded Catholicism as “the last, the most certain refuge” of the Polish nationality.

The latter was protected predominantly by the Roman Catholic gentry, which made the Polish cause into a religious mission.<sup>167</sup> Once again, he emphasized Catholicism as an idiom of Polishness in opposition to Orthodox (*schyzmatycka*) Russia. He called upon Europe to be more sensitive about religious differences, since it was Catholic Poland, not Orthodox Russia, that stood “as the guardian of Europe.”<sup>168</sup> Similar to Krasiński, Trentowski extolled a national state while regarding contemporary multinational states that “dismembered” nationalities as the reflections of a “dead governmental ideal.”<sup>169</sup>

Departing from the strained Polish-Russian relationships, Trentowski envisioned the creation of a new nation-state, which would include Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belarusians or, in his words, “three peoples: Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians.”<sup>170</sup> This entity was for him not entirely new, since he had seen its beginnings in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which he deceitfully regarded as the union of three free and equal nationalities. As any amateur Polish historian knew, the commonwealth had not treated Ruthenians as an equal constitutive part; therefore, Trentowski’s three-partite nationality “predestined for freedom and happiness” was rather a project for the future than a fact of history in the present. Nevertheless, he believed that geography itself tied Poles to Ukrainians, while at the same time it separated the latter from Muscovy and Tatar. He also called on his readers to awaken “the Polish spirit in Lithuania, Volhynia, Podolia, and Rus’ as well as among the Cossacks!”<sup>171</sup> Yet he was not confident about the perspectives of this “nation of 30 million” and envisioned a retreat in other directions, in particular toward the South and West Slavs, who as he fancifully believed could be assimilated into the “pure Poles.” “If Lithuanians and Ruthenians themselves severed historical bonds with Poland,” remarked he, “then we could broaden southward and make the Carpathians the heart of the fatherland.”<sup>172</sup> He staunchly believed in the capacity of Poles (in fact, the Polish gentry) to assimilate thirty to forty million people on a new territory into “pure, native Poles.” He thought that certain geographical spaces were predestined to be settled by a distinct nationality living in a sovereign state.

It was only logical that in a vein of messianic fervor, which became increasingly pervasive towards the end of his work, Trentowski found another ultimate idiom of Polishness, even more fundamental and transcendental than the Catholic religion or the Polish language. For him, as a geographical determinist, the “Polish land” itself was such an idiom. If the

Polish gentry and peasants were ever deported to Russia, the land itself would have produced a separate nationality with the same spirit as the Poles had

if our folk were deported to the depth of Russia and its place were settled by Samoeds, Calmucs, and Bashkirs, gentry would have polonized them. If the gentry were then destroyed and common people were deported, still nothing would have helped. From the coffin of Poland there would arise the spirit of revenge, the same as ours, which would create a separate and independent nation. Polish land has a distinct situation and evokes in the inhabitants a thought about separate existence.<sup>173</sup>

In Trentowski's opinion, the Polish land, because of its natural inborn characteristics, was predestined to be independent, no matter which ethnicity lived there. Yet he believed that Poles were to remain a distinct nationality whatever their geographic location. Poles were Poles because they were Roman Catholics, spoke Polish, and had the gentry as their primary representatives. At the same time, Polish land itself could produce the nationality which would have been Roman Catholic, spoken Polish, and had Polish gentry. Trentowski's leaning toward the right made his idea of Polishness more exclusive, as it was now based mostly on religious and ethnographic idioms of nation-ness. Paradoxically, this allowed him to recognize the ethnic differences between Poles and Ukrainians. He did not seem to think that at present Poles and Ruthenians were united in one nationality. This remained a desirable project, but for the future. Trentowski's position also signaled the future understanding of Polishness as an ethnicity-based community connected to a certain territory, with its core being around the Vistula River.

### *Russian Loyalism*

The Death of Nationality: Henryk Rzewuski

The main intellectual representatives of Russian loyalism resided in the Russian Empire, but there were also émigrés who became loyal to the Russian throne. One of the most consistent conservatives was Count Henryk Rzewuski, the descendant of a Polish aristocratic family from Ukraine. Andrzej Walicki attributed Rzewuski's vision of nationality to the European trend of "*traditionalist* nationalism" represented by such famous figures as de Maistre and de Bonald in France; Goerres and the Schlegel brothers in Germany; or the Slavophiles in Russia.<sup>174</sup> They all extolled the national

community as an organic product of history and opposed any rational or revolutionary changes in the political order in Europe, which was essentially a reaction to the French Revolution. All of them regarded a living, organic, “divinely constituted” nationality as the opposition to nations created rationally as a result of a revolutionary break from history. All traditionalists ascribed primary value to historical continuity and used the idea of national community in defense of the feudal national tradition, as a means of combating modernization. Rzewuski developed this vision in his essayistic prose “*Mieszaniny obyczajowe*” (Miscellanea of customs) written under the pseudonym Jarosz Bejła and published in two volumes in 1841–43.<sup>175</sup>

Nationality for Rzewuski was as organic as an individual human life, that is, being born, growing, maturing, weakening, and finally dying. “Nation,” he wrote, “as a collective person, is subjected to the same right.”<sup>176</sup> Similar to a person, a nationality has a soul or “spirit” and lives until the spirit leaves its “body,” which consisted of individuals and institutions. Rzewuski’s spiritualistic terminology was very similar to that used by another conservative, Zygmunt Krasiński, but in contrast, the Russian loyalist did not believe in the nation’s life after its death, or in a separate existence of its “soul” outside its “body,” that is, without its own state and native political institutions. As Rzewuski put it, for collective souls—for nations—there was no afterlife or eternity, and a nation’s soul died along with its body (state), albeit slightly later.<sup>177</sup> The spirit of a dying national community, “flying away from a social body,” exists for some time in the minds of several outstanding men and expresses itself in the sudden explosion of a remarkably rich literature—a clear sign of imminent death. For Rzewuski, “spirit”/“character,” or *mentalité*, was undoubtedly the dominant idiom of nation-ness. It was the “spirit” within a “collective man” or “nation” that was responsible for social stratification and provided the nation with a “separate physiognomy in history.”<sup>178</sup> This unique national character, which had to represent any separate nationality or even “province,” consisted to a large extent of perceptions, prejudices, and vices that were “firmly rooted in a native ground.” Rzewuski particularly advocated the existence of “prejudices,” which protected the “nation” against “cosmopolitanism” and assimilation:

Society developing in the space of a nation or even within more tightened frames of a province, if it lives a social life, then must show some peculiar features that would differentiate it from other societies. Cosmopolitanism can be too often a disease of individual souls but fortunately, there is no cosmopolitanism for the nations. Those separate features, which give nations some unique physiognomy, are the fruit of some perceptions

and innocent vices [ . . . ]. Among them there are certain prejudices, and it is only vile souls that dare to mock them because those prejudices are like external trenches that do not belong to the very structure of a fortress but defend the access to it.<sup>179</sup>

The mocking attack on prejudices and “old customs” from enlightened critics was another clear sign of the imminent decay of a nationality. Rzewuski stressed that “prejudices leave nations when they are in the state of decay.” It was exclusively the aristocracy, as the *Corpus Juris*, which guarded the nation’s “customs, perceptions, vices, prejudices, and public opinions” against modernization and foreign influences.<sup>180</sup> In this sense, the rich landed nobility or “great historical names” represented the national spirit and were in fact a “nation.” As Walicki put it, the common people for Rzewuski were doomed to be forever immature and passive, while the higher men should be organized into a closed estate or caste.<sup>181</sup> Rzewuski envisioned a nationality, in particular the Polish nationality, as a loose feudal federation of historic lands headed by the landed nobility and symbolized by a prereformed Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In a geopolitical sense, the nation for him was the sum of provinces. Nationality was best represented by a great poet, while national poetry could exist only within the framework of a feudal provincialism.<sup>182</sup>

States or political institutions, however, were important idioms of nation-ness to the extent that they were reflected in the “spirit” of a nation. While “spirit” or “unique physiognomy” *separated* one nationality (or nation-state) from the other, religion *created* the “nation”: a “crowd” became a “nation” only when a “religious idea” started developing inside it.<sup>183</sup> Christianity “educated modern nations” by giving them faith and developing the basis of all secular sciences.<sup>184</sup>

Since nationalities were created by God and were the most genuine and organic forms of human existence, national existence had to be based on divine (Christian) principles rather than on human reason, such as the sovereignty of the people. Instead, Rzewuski emphasized the ideal of the sovereignty of government headed by the aristocracy or absolute monarch. In his view, the social order, or *udzielność* in his term—both monarchy and aristocracy—could not be changed without lethal harm to the nationality (or nation-state).<sup>185</sup> Democracy for him was pure utopia, since even among the Ukrainian *haidamaks* in 1768 the Cossack “aristocracy” imposed a social stratification on their rank and file.<sup>186</sup>

Despite ascribing crucial importance to the “spirit” of nationality and religion, Rzewuski was not quite certain what constituted the basis of na-

tional cohesion and what therefore separated one nationality from another. Surely, commonality of faith, civilization, and perceptions, that is, national “spirit” or *mentalité* defined nationality. But what separated one nationality from another? He almost agreed that a “separate language constitutes a separate nation,” but right away he found objections: there were languages which were never able to create separate “nations”; there was Switzerland, with four languages but one nationality; and there were Germans, who spoke one language but had “several separate nations.”<sup>187</sup> Further, neither land nor institutions were the ultimate idioms of nation-ness. If it were land, then Rzewuski would have recognized a Jew as his conational; if it were institutions, then “fatherland” would have changed every time institutions changed. Even religion was not such an idiom. He admitted that it was difficult “to think about something that until now has been covered with mystery.” In this uncertain situation, it was only government that remained an “entirely concrete thing” (*rzeczą zupełnie szczegółową*), whereas “every science has some features of universality, generality.”<sup>188</sup>

Rzewuski, as a pessimistic conservative, devoted much space to the causes, conditions, and consequences of the demise and death of nations. According to natural laws, nationalities/states die like human beings, although domestic conflicts or “familial litigation” within a nationality facilitate its death. Particularly dangerous was the rejection of historical legacy, that is, the dismissal of “native opinions and legends.”<sup>189</sup> The demise of a national spirit coincides with the collapse of state and political institutions and vice versa: the impossibility of political existence refers to the demise of national spirit.<sup>190</sup> Nationality cannot exist without its state, since the collapse of the latter reflects a deadly disease of a nation’s spirit—nationality itself. Such a society falls prey to assimilation in another nationality, eventually losing its own language while enriching another culture. Such was the fate of Poland.

For Rzewuski, Poland ceased to be a nationality.<sup>191</sup> It had been best represented by its nobility, but could not survive the collapse of the traditional feudal order of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Therefore, it had to join an all-Russian culture and “nation” as a regional form. Polishness now was split into several elements of high and folk culture, all of which had to participate in the common imperial culture. While admitting that Poles had become part of the “mighty society of Russians,” Rzewuski called on his Polish peers “to contribute our provincial works to the common treasury” with Russians.<sup>192</sup> Being loyal to his conception of

national culture as an assortment of provincial “elements,” he expected that Russian culture would consist of different “elements”: “Ukrainian,” “Muscovite,” “Siverian” (*siewierskie*), “Volga” (*nadwołgańskie*), “Vollhynian,” “Lithuanian,” “Siberian,” and so on, each expressed in its own language (including perhaps Polish).<sup>193</sup>

He saw Russian culture, as he saw Polish culture before the reforms of the late eighteenth century, as multiethnic and multilingual, feudal and province-based. In fact, Russia was an improved Poland, with one minor difference: instead of the Polish aristocratic political system, Russia represented a monarchical system. There was, however, another cultural difference. While before the “death” of Poland several provincial “elements,” such as the Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and Vollhynian, referred to a national culture deemed “Polish,” now those same elements were part of the “Russian” treasury. The Polish nationality was indeed dead, but Polish culture survived in its provincial variants, which as ever before spoke different languages and represented different ethnicities.

Similar to Maurycy Mochnacki, Rzewuski hesitated between the “spiritual” (or “mental”) and institutional idioms of nationality. Indeed, it was the “spirit” that defined national essence; yet nationality was bound to its state, and both were sooner or later doomed to perish. Unlike Mochnacki and Krasiński, Rzewuski believed neither in the life of nationality without its own state nor in the restoration of national existence. Perhaps the discussion of Rzewuski’s idioms of Polishness is irrelevant, since Poland for him, whether “spirit” or “body,” never made it to the nineteenth century.

#### Michał Grabowski’s Compromise

Unlike Rzewuski, his friend and conservative literary critic Michał Grabowski did not go as far as to reject the existence of the Polish nationality. It existed as long as there were people who professed loyalty to universal values within the national culture. In particular, he criticized Rzewuski’s analogy between the human body and the nation’s body as subject to death.<sup>194</sup> He tried to correct Rzewuski and suggested the word *decay* instead of *death*: if one is to choose the latter, then one should admit that “it is only ghosts that walk in the world.”<sup>195</sup> For Grabowski, the dominant idiom of nation-ness was language: “According to me, the most precise definition of what a nation is would be language.” The life of nationality

was thus synonymous with the existence of national language, or as he put it, “Nothing else is identical with nation except for its language.”<sup>196</sup> The political death of historical nationalities did not mean their total disappearance from the world: they “exist, perhaps in the largest shadows, but still exist” if they speak their languages. The Polish state had disappeared, but the Polish nationality was still alive and able to produce a viable literature.<sup>197</sup> He expressed most of these thoughts in his letter to Rzewuski, dated December 6, 1841, before the latter refuted the validity of language as an idiom of nationality in his “Miscellanea of Customs.” Rzewuski’s work could be seen as a response to Grabowski’s linguistic nationalism.

Since Grabowski identified nationality with language, its literary history was as important and as real as its political history. In effect, the history of Poles became the history of Polish literature as represented by great writers who passionately clung to the Polish language.<sup>198</sup> For Grabowski, as well as for Rzewuski, reality was reduced to an abstract entity, based for Grabowski on language, while anything, including Orthodox Russia, could become the guarantor of conservative values such as the Catholic religion, morality (as opposed to materiality), social hierarchy, and loyalty to the authorities. When tsarism became the guarantor of values, it also became the guarantor of Polishness deprived of concreteness.<sup>199</sup> Marcin Król called this type of conservatism, “the conservatism of non-historical values.”

The real dilemma of Grabowski was to decide what was more important: national identity or universal values, choices which both depended on Russia. In the first case Poles had to get along with Russians because the only chance for survival of the Polish nationality was to follow the orders of the Russian authorities. In the second case national survival became subordinate to universal values, which for Grabowski meant that the population of the Polish lands obeyed law and order and respected the authorities.<sup>200</sup> In both cases Poles had to obey their Russian masters. Whatever side of this dilemma Grabowski might have chosen, he pursued the idea of Polish cultural autonomy without considering acute geopolitical issues, such as the geographical shape of an imagined Polish community or its “size.” He chose Kyiv as the center of cultural activities of pro-Russian Polish intellectuals for whom language and Roman Catholicism (however not in opposition to Russian Orthodoxy) were the primary idioms of Polishness.<sup>201</sup> Collaborating with Russian clerical dignitaries like Bishop Innokentii (Borisov), Grabowski and his circle sought to organize in Kyiv the Polish literary journal *Przeglądnik Literatury Rossyjskiej i Polskiej* (The

reviewer of Russian and Polish literature), which would center on a group of Polish literati from Ukraine of different generations, who permanently or occasionally resided in Kyiv.<sup>202</sup>

It was Grabowski's treatment of Ukrainian issues that highlighted his concept of the Polish nationality and its "size." He wrote about a separate and historical "Little Russian nation" (*naród Małorossyjski*) that had originated from the Dnieper Cossacks and developed its own aristocracy, presumably on the left bank of the Dnieper.<sup>203</sup> For him, as for many Ukrainians and Russians, Ukrainian history started after the demise of old Rus' principalities and with the origins of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. Ukrainian history was a "motley mix of Asia and Europe, nomadic and settled life, subjugation and independence, weakness and energy etc.," which resulted in the formation of the "[Ukrainian] nation [*naród*] and its separate, unique nationality [*narodowość*]." <sup>204</sup> The Ukrainian peasants were also the descendants of the Zaporozhians and Cossacks, and therefore were ethnically related to the "Little Russian nation." In effect, the Cossack history united the Right Bank Ukrainian peasants with the left-bank "Little Russian aristocracy"<sup>205</sup> and implicitly separated them from the Poles.

Yet "Poles" (or rather the Polish gentry) in Ukraine differed from local Ukrainians only by their (Catholic) religion and their "devotion to Poland" while sharing with them language and ethnographic traits.<sup>206</sup> Thus, the boundaries between Poles and Ukrainians were blurred, religion being the only definitive idiom of Polishness in the Ukrainian context.

At the same time, Grabowski differentiated between Ukrainians and Russians. He pointed to ethnic and linguistic differences between the Ukrainian (Dnieper) and the Russian (Don) Cossacks, ascribing an "Asian element" to the latter while emphasizing "the blood of native Slavic tribes" of the former. Both the Dnieper and Don Cossacks, however, spoke the "Ruthenian language" and practiced the Orthodox religion, which they had inherited from old Rus' and its "nation."<sup>207</sup> By emphasizing the close ethnic unity of Poles and Ruthenians from the time of Slavic prehistory, he was able to explain the Polish expansion to the east.<sup>208</sup> The old Slavic tribe of Polanians was considered the founder of both Poland, where they migrated from the Dnieper basin and settled among Germanic tribes, and Rus', where Polanians later adopted the name "Ruthenians" (Rusini). "Both peoples are of a common blood," wrote Grabowski, adding that Polish Polanians (Polanie Lechiccy) remembered that they had come from the Dnieper "fatherland" and subsequently were "seeking to reclaim it."

Grabowski was also aware of the ethnic unity of present-day Ukrainian territory, from Galicia in the west to Sloboda Ukraine in the east (including the Kursk and Voronezh provinces of the Russian Empire), although he admitted that local Ukrainians did not have a common national self-designation. Instead, they expressed their distinctiveness through opposition to other nationalities: “we and the Poles,” “people and the Jews,” or “folk and the *katsapy* [Russians].”<sup>209</sup> In his view, “Cossack” was a more common self-designation of local populations than “Ruthenian” (unheard in Right Bank Ukraine), which implicitly provided Poles with even more rightful claims to Rus’ than the locals themselves. Those locals presumably did not feel a strong connection to Rus’ legacy. Despite emphasizing the common descent of Poles and Ukrainians, Grabowski nevertheless recognized the national distinctiveness of Ukrainians under the names “Ruthenians,” “Little Russians,” “Cossacks,” or even *khokhly*. He also held Ukrainian folklore, along with the “poetic character” of the Ukrainian language, in high regard, and he implicitly recognized Ukrainian folklore as contested ground for Poles and Ukrainians. Ukrainian folk poetry, as “one of the most vivid sources of poetry of the whole world,” was the inspiration for both Polish and “Little Russian” literature.<sup>210</sup>

The national identity of Ruthenian peasants from Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia remained unclear. In the 1840s Grabowski became increasingly sensitive about things Ukrainian, Ukrainian literature in particular, and planned to propagate the local folklore—“Little Russian Iliad”—among the Poles.<sup>211</sup> He rejected his earlier appreciation of Polish Ukrainophiles (Ukrainomanów), as represented in the poetry of Tymko Padurra, whose works were now considered to lack the “spirit and character of the real Ukrainian folk,” written as they were in an artificial blend of several languages (Polish, Russian, Church-Slavonic, and Ukrainian). Instead, Grabowski recognized that real ethnic Ukrainians—“Little Russian literati”—had to have symbolic power over the discourse on Ukraine.<sup>212</sup> Thus, he admitted the loss of Polish “Ukrainians” in the struggle for the representation of Ukraine. He also wanted to know more about “Little Russia and the literature of that language.” Yet he quite explicitly argued against the interpretation in national terms of a would-be national conflict in Galicia between Ruthenian peasants and Polish landlords, suggesting that “from the collision of classes one should not conclude there is a collision of nationalities.” Here he unambiguously refuted the claims of Galician Ruthenians to national separation from local Poles.

As a Russian loyalist and a friend of Ukrainian literati, Grabowski could not explicitly include the Galician Ruthenians, let alone Little Russians, within the Polish nationality. He gave the impression, however, that the Right Bank Ukrainian peasants—“our folk” (*nasz lud*) or “our peasants” (*nasz gmin*)—were by default part of the hierarchical order of the historical Polish nation in which Polish-speaking Catholic nobles ruled over Orthodox Ruthenian peasants. At the same time, Grabowski recognized the historical Cossack or “Little Russian nation” that had managed to maintain on the left bank of the Dnieper its own state, the Hetmanate, headed by its own aristocracy. After the demise of this state, Little Russians produced a rich folklore-based literature. Grabowski remained confused about the limits of Polishness: although the Polish and “Little Russian” nationalities were distinct, they continued to intermingle in Right Bank Ukraine and Galicia, where religion was the most effective idiom of Polishness.

#### Wacław Jabłonowski: Russian Loyalty Abroad

Wacław Jabłonowski was a rare example of an émigré Russian loyalist. A one-time collaborator of Prince Adam Czartoryski, he stood ideologically somewhere between Prince Adam and Henryk Rzewuski. In 1843, Jabłonowski addressed the Polish emigration with a conservative pro-Russian manifesto, which emphasized the Catholic religion and Polish language as the primary idioms of Polishness.<sup>213</sup> Paradoxically, the danger to Polishness from the West was even stronger than from Russia, since Poland would have become assimilated into German or French culture much faster than into the Russian. Similar to Rzewuski, Jabłonowski thought that “hatred for things foreign” was the main evidence of love for one’s own nationality.<sup>214</sup> Again, similar to Polish conservatives residing in Russia, Jabłonowski regarded Western revolutionary influences as more detrimental to Poland than Russian absolutism. He also thought that the contemporary “Slavic-Russian” nationality was oppressed by a foreign “German-Mongol” governmental bureaucracy, but if ever freed from that oppression the Russian nationality would easily fall under Polish cultural influences. For the time being, the pillars of Russianness, such as language and religion, were “under the influence of governmental tsarism” (which was a common vision of Russia among Polish émigrés). Jabłonowski strongly believed in the superiority of Polish culture and the Catholic religion as opposed to “the obscurantism and barbarity” of the Russian people and clergy. To be

sure, his version of pan-Slavism was based on “pure Catholicism” and Polish cultural leadership. In short, Poland’s mission was to bring enlightenment to the Romanov empire in order “to civilize the barbarians,” as Poles once did to Lithuania.<sup>215</sup>

Jabłonowski argued for the creation of a federation of sovereign Slavic nationalities under the rule of the Romanov dynasty that had to be “liberated from the influence of bureaucracy and Jesuits,” whom he treated as the most dangerous enemies of the Slavic world. For him, Poland must remain a Catholic country with traditional feudal—“liberal,” in his terminology—institutions.<sup>216</sup>

### *Poles, Ukrainians, Russians, and “conservative” Polishness*

Contrary to the opinion of the Polish historian Tadeusz Łepkowski,<sup>217</sup> it was conservatives, not the left, who imagined the Polish nationality as a loose federation of different ethnic and national groups united largely through history, political goals, or a ruling dynasty. In some cases, conservatives were ready to recognize the separateness of the Ruthenians/Cossacks at the expense of the “historic” unity of the Polish nationality. They were ready to refashion the traditional vision of Polishness based on the territorial extent of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Some conservatives, among them Prince Czartoryski, were trying to combine a premodern idea of the Polish “political nation” with the recognition of separate ethnicities of Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians. For Czartoryski’s circle, however, “Poles” remained the main point of reference and the highest level of national identification (even for people with the most obvious “dual identities” like Michał Czajkowski and Franciszek Duchiniński). For Czartoryski himself, the Catholic religion and the Polish language were among the dominant idioms of Polishness, which indirectly undermined a possibly inclusive Polish nationality. The “size” of that nationality and the status of Ruthenians also remained unclear and varied, depending on the context.

For some, modernity already had taken its toll; they were inclined to see the Polish nationality in exclusively nationalist terms, preferring not to notice other ethnicities or nationalities at all (these were the views of Krasiński and Trentowski). Trentowski, however, bluntly called the Ruthenians a separate “nationality.” Two authors—Krasiński and Mochacki—singled out national “spirit” along with the Catholic religion, Polish language, and gentry as the dominant markers of nation-ness, while the

role of the state and traditional institutions was contradictory. For them, a nationality could exist without its own state and was independent of political institutions. The state, however, was indispensable for *complete* national existence.

The restoration of the Polish state was not an option for pro-Russian authors. Strangely—or perhaps quite logically—Russian loyalists were eager to recognize the separate existence of Ruthenians within the framework of both the Polish and the Russian “nations.” This was particularly the case with the writer and literary critic Michał Grabowski, who was an accomplished expert on Ukrainian folklore and a friend of the Ukrainian writer Panteleimon Kulish. Perhaps the most consistent conservative was Henryk Rzewuski, who denied the persistence of the Polish nationality, reducing it to certain discrete elements of folk and high culture. Among these elements were those that could be called both Polish and Ukrainian, and which contributed to the formation of a common Russian culture and nationality. Russian loyalists paradoxically tended to emphasize the Catholic religion and the Polish language as pillars of Polishness. Russia, on the other hand, was in most cases associated with Orthodoxy and absolutism. That allowed Polish conservatives to imagine Polishness in opposition to Russia and Russians as the Catholic nationality represented by the traditional Polish-speaking gentry. In the opinion of pro-Russian conservatives, Poland’s mission was to civilize Russia and to enrich it with a superior Polish culture.

In the 1830s–1840s a conservative Pole usually held multiple national (and prenatal) loyalties, and hence could relate to all possible positions available for the representation of imagined communities. These positions did not exist separately; rather, they intermingled and intersected in people’s minds, or they constituted a hierarchy, with the Polish ethnic community on the bottom and the tripartite federative “nation” on the top. Those positions can also be interpreted as ideal types of imagined communities. Some Poles were aware of those positions, while others unconsciously chose one over another. In the present work, however, individual choices and loyalties are important to the extent they reflected the *dominant* idioms of Polishness and the configurations of imagined community linked to those idioms.

In general, the most dominant type of imagined community of Polish émigré conservatives (centered on the Hôtel Lambert) was a restored federative and multiethnic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth based on such

traditional idioms as loyalty to an aristocratic elite (to the Czartoryski family), political goals, and feudal institutions. Another conservative version of Polishness included an old-fashioned gentry nation based on more exclusive idioms like Catholicism, the Polish language, and gentry as a traditional social category. Among the proponents of this version were émigrés (Mochnacki, Krasieński) and prominent Russian loyalists, such as Henryk Rzewuski. Finally, an ethnic Polish community expressed in ethnographic and religious idioms became ever more noticeable, yet it remained on the margins of conservatives' political imagination.

### Democratic Unity Versus “feudal” Diversity

The liberal and democratic camp was as diverse as the conservative one. It is also difficult to find essential ideological differences within the liberal and democratic camp to justify its division into groupings or prominent individual positions. Perhaps the main divide within the democratic forces separated more socially radical initiatives, such as those of the Polish Democratic Society (Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie, TDP), from more moderate social positions advocated by the Lelewelists (Polish National Committee, Revenge of the People, Young Poland, and so on) and Józef Dwernicki's groups. The Lelewelists sometimes advocated no less radical social solutions than those of the most radical members of the TDP, and both groups shared the elements of utopian socialism.<sup>218</sup> In addition, founding members of the TDP, like Stanisław Worcell and Tadeusz Krępowiecki, became the leading members of the leftist group “The Polish People” (Lud Polski), a fact that makes ideological divides quite superfluous.

The central and largest émigré group was the Polish Democratic Society (TDP), founded in 1832 by a splinter group from the Polish National Committee headed by the historian-turned-politician Joachim Lelewel. On March 17, 1832, the group produced the “Act of Foundation” or “Small Manifesto,” which delineated both democratic and radical social agendas. The latter became the basis for the ideological development of The Polish People. In 1836, the ideologists of the TDP published the “Great Manifesto” (or “Poitiers Manifesto”), which became the group's political creed. Unlike the “Small Manifesto” of 1832, the “Great Manifesto” set forth a moderate agenda of social solidarity, which alienated the most radical members of the TDP. At any rate, the TDP can be called the first democratic political party in Eastern Europe.<sup>219</sup>

Perhaps the single most influential person among Polish émigrés in Europe was the historian Joachim Lelewel, at one time a professor at Wilna (Vilnius) University in Lithuania (then in the Russian Empire) and, after the November uprising, the founder of several political groups with a broad liberal-democratic agenda. Those groups, such as the Polish National Committee and the Union of Polish Emigration, represented the most moderate left within the emigration. Lelewel's influence as a historian, however, greatly exceeded the popularity of his organizations, and his writings shaped the visions of such radicals as Krępowiecki and Worcell.<sup>220</sup>

Between the TDP, Lelewelists, and radical Polish People were other groups and individuals with liberal and democratic views, who could not find their place in one of the established organizations. Most of the liberals, democrats, and utopian socialists shared a negative attitude toward the right wing of the emigration as represented by Prince Adam Czartoryski. Nevertheless, they included people like Jan Czyński, a passionate advocate of a civic Polish nationality and middle class, who drifted to the Hôtel Lambert. Despite strategic and ideological differences among the liberals and democrats, most of them shared similar visions of Polishness. These visions set them apart from most conservatives with their religious and social idioms of the Polish nationality. Not surprisingly, "size" and configurations of an imagined community appeared to be also quite different.

### *The TDP Mainstream*

The Polish Democratic Society (TDP) produced a number of texts, which dealt with political, socioeconomic, and national issues important for the future of Poland. Since Poland had ceased to exist as a state, the TDP launched an impressive program to redefine Polishness. What figured prominently in most TDP statements was the rejection of Catholicism and the adoration of Poland's "pagan antiquities."<sup>221</sup> Some conservative-minded critics accused democrats of a desire to create an entirely new nation along the banks of the Vistula.<sup>222</sup> These critics were largely right, since the aspiring nation-builders from the TDP sought to provide Poles with an entirely new model, a centralized and orderly republic based on the French Jacobin example. Andrzej Walicki has subsequently written—perhaps too optimistically—that Polish democrats, especially those from the TDP, represented *political* nationalism, since they stood for a future multilingual and multi-ethnic Poland, rejecting linguistic and ethnic criteria of Polishness (which

only later became the foundations of an exclusive *ethnic* nationalism).<sup>223</sup> In reality, however, radical democrats associated with the TDP cannot be so easily squeezed into the model of “political” nationalism that refuted the religious and ethnolinguistic idioms of Polishness. Some members of the TDP and some official statements quite clearly exposed elements of “ethnic” nationalism. Moreover, the rejection of ethnic nationalism did not automatically make nationality “multilingual” or “multiethnic”; therefore, Walicki’s idea of a “multilingual and multiethnic state,” presumably advocated by radical democrats, needs reexamination and redefinition. How did the TDP ideologists perceive the ethnic differences? Did they notice them at all? And if they did, did it affect their vision of a Polish imagined community (its idioms, configurations, and “size”)?

In their Foundation Act of 1832, the leaders of the TDP proclaimed indeed a fairly “political” and all-encompassing vision of the Polish nationality, which was based on neither ethnic nor religious criteria. All the inhabitants of the “Polish land” were considered Poles, regardless to which ethnicity or faith they belonged.<sup>224</sup> Ethnicity as such was disregarded. Precisely for this reason, “Poles” in this document could hardly be considered a *multiethnic* nationality. Instead, geographic and historical legitimacy defined the nationality above ethnocultural and religious lines. The same year, a radical member of the TDP, Tadeusz Krępowiecki, further emphasized the secular version of Polishness by attacking the role of Roman Catholicism in Poland’s history and justifying the Ukrainian rebellions.<sup>225</sup> It was Catholicism that established “slavery” and was responsible for the Khmelnyts’kyi uprising of 1648 and *haidamak* revolt of 1768. At the same time, Krępowiecki integrated Ukrainian Cossack and peasant movements into a common legacy of the “Polish revolution,”<sup>226</sup> implicitly denying their meaning outside an abstract community of Poles. Logically, he treated these events in exclusively social rather than national terms.

In 1836, the TDP’s “Great Manifesto” mitigated Jacobin political rhetoric—so characteristic of the radical Krępowiecki—and exposed more traditional ethnolinguistic idioms of Polishness in historical context. Poland represented the unity of “many generations” that were brought together by the “identity of ethnic origins [*rodu*], needs, language, and character,” and it defended Europe against Tatars, Turks, and Muscovites.<sup>227</sup> Still, the authors of the manifesto stubbornly believed in the existence of the “20-million nation” that supposedly lived on territory stretching from the Oder River and the Carpathians eastward “beyond the Dnieper,” and

from the Baltic to the Black Sea.<sup>228</sup> Similar to Krępowiecki, the authors of the “Great Manifesto” referred to Ukrainian Cossack rebellions and the *haidamak* uprising as the movements of “Polish people.”<sup>229</sup> There was no space for separate nationalities in this “20-million nation.”

In other official deliberations, unlike the “Great Manifesto,” the Polish Democratic Society usually avoided religious and ethnolinguistic definitions of Polishness. Wiktor Heltman, the leader of the society, was the author of comments that the TDP’s central body (Centralizacja) prepared in order to explain certain points of the “Great Manifesto.” Among other things, Heltman presented the society’s vision of Polishness, this time stripped of ethnic and linguistic elements. Instead, “nationality” was for him a “thought” or “idea” (*mysl*) that “constitutes the essence of nation.”<sup>230</sup> By refining and developing its idea, the “nation” lives and fulfills its mission. “Customs, language, and history are only an expression of this idea, not nationality itself,” commented Heltman.<sup>231</sup> Hence, nationality was a mental, emotional, or spiritual reality reflected in “objective” elements such as language or ethnography. This position was similar to Mochnacki’s, for whom spiritual or mental idioms of Polishness took precedence over “objective” ones like ethnography, which had to be reflected in the “imagination,” “notions,” and “feelings” of a nation. The national “idea” or “national principle” was once common to all Poles but was later usurped by the gentry, which proclaimed itself a “nation.” According to Heltman, Poles had to spread the national idea, which shaped the entire national character, among all classes, through the émigré political elite. That elite represented the national “idea.”<sup>232</sup>

In his polemical articles from the 1840s Heltman further elaborated on the “idea” of the “20-million nation,” stressing that “the native idea of Poland” was democracy.<sup>233</sup> He also started emphasizing the institutional framework of nationality, which could not exist “without some organization, good or evil,” adding that “it is impossible to consider an unorganized nation.”<sup>234</sup> Thus, a national society should have its rights, its government, its officials, police, army, and taxes. The nation for him was almost identical with the state. Heltman remained one of the most rationally minded Polish émigrés, for he increasingly used institutional idioms of nationness: “Without a government, without a treasury, without rights, without armed forces, without police [ . . . ] no nation can exist.”<sup>235</sup> While recognizing the need in the future for a single religion for Poles, Heltman strongly advocated religious tolerance so that “the difference of faith” did not sever “national unity.”<sup>236</sup> He proclaimed “civic, political, and religious equality”

for all Poles irrespective of their social and religious backgrounds, which was an echo of the French national model.

Heltman's colleague, Jan Niepomucen Janowski, in particular attacked Catholic claims to the exclusive representation of Polishness, stressing that for God all religions—Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, and Muslim—were equal. He strongly opposed any efforts to proclaim the Catholic church the “ruling” one for Poland.<sup>237</sup> Yet Janowski was not always consistent. For instance, he showed his bias against the “non-Polish” urban citizens that populated many “Polish” cities.<sup>238</sup> Alluding to Jews and Germans who had supposedly sold out to Poland's foes, Janowski clearly used religious and ethnolinguistic idioms of Polishness, which cast a shadow on the inclusivity of a Polish nation-state.

Such views were rather an aberration from the mainstream TDP agenda. To prove this, we should consider other programmatic materials, in particular the so-called “Questions” (*kwestii*) devoted to different socioeconomic, political, and ideological issues. Most of the Questions were compiled by two leading members of the TDP, Wiktor Darasz and Jan Niepomucen Janowski. Janowski passionately attacked Catholic fanaticism in Question No. 3 of 1839, in which he castigated the Polish gentry for the persecution of religious dissidents in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.<sup>239</sup> He also argued against the idea of a dominant religion in Poland, pointing to the fact that in old Poland there were “five main religious faiths” (Roman Catholics, Uniates, Orthodox, Protestants, and Jews), Roman Catholics being a minority. It would be inappropriate to rally a non-Catholic majority under the banner of a Roman Catholic minority. As a solution, he suggested a ban on all public religious ceremonies outside houses of worship. Instead, “love for fatherland” was to be the only rallying point for all citizens, irrespective of their religious and ethnic backgrounds.<sup>240</sup>

At the same time, in his famous political manifesto of 1834, entitled “A Short Political Catechism,” Janowski once again revealed inconsistency on the topic of Polishness. Here he defined the fatherland in terms of common language and ethnography. Fatherland for him was “a place of birth and residence of free people within boundaries that were shaped not by violence but by nature itself, [by] uniformity of language and customs.”<sup>241</sup>

The ethnic idioms of Polishness can also be found in the popular idea about the ethnic unity of the gentry and the “people” in Poland. Prominent Polish historians and political writers such as Wacław Maciejowski, Joachim Lelewel, Maurycy Mochnacki, and Tadeusz Krępowiecki stressed

that unlike in the West, where a ruling elite was created by foreign invaders, in Poland the gentry had emerged from the native Slavic population, and therefore the Polish nationality was ethnically unified.<sup>242</sup> This idea was reflected in the TDP's Question No. 5, which emphasized the ethnic unity of the Polish gentry and peasants in historical Poland.<sup>243</sup> This very idea visibly undermined the "multiethnic" character of the Polish nationality.

Sometimes democrats defined Polishness in terms of religion, ethnicity, and even race, particularly when Russia was concerned. One anonymous author confronted Russia in the semiofficial TDP periodical *Demokrata Polski* (Polish democrat). Stressing that Ruś (that is, Ukraine and Belarus) was originally a Polish land, he refuted the claims of "schismatic Moscow," adding that Russia was the biggest enemy of Catholic Poles and Uniate Ruthenians. He also emphasized the divide between the Catholic and Orthodox churches, calling the latter a "schism of the mind."<sup>244</sup> Poles and Ruthenians had common ethnic origins, while Russia was neither a Slavic nor a Christian power. Moreover, language was not a sufficient idiom of nationality with respect to Russians: "Language itself, without customs, without tradition, is not yet a nationality, and a Mongol will remain a Mongol whether he speaks Slavic or Chinese, and whether he is at church or at pagoda." The formulation of the anonymous author was a clear allusion to an assumed non-European racial origin of Russians.<sup>245</sup>

Race and ethnicity thus defined the national unity of Poles and Ukrainians while separating them from "Mongolian" Russians. Jan Alcyato, a prominent member of the TDP and a passionate critic of the Catholic church, expressed similar ideas in a more subtle way: instead of race he focused on language and history. While pointing to the civilizational difference between Poland and Russia, he emphasized language, laws, and historical legacy as "the main foundations of separate nationalities."<sup>246</sup> Elsewhere he refuted religion as an idiom of nation-ness: the national unity of Poland "was never based on the uniformity of religious rites."<sup>247</sup> Instead, he contrasted Poland's religious tolerance with Russia's Orthodox exclusivity.<sup>248</sup> Ultimately, the Polish nationality (as the common nationality of Poland and Rus') was based on shared values and rights, such as "love for the common fatherland," "religious freedom," and "equality of political freedoms."<sup>249</sup> Alcyato's stance reflected well the middle ground of TDP ideology.

In the TDP's most important, "introductory question," devoted to the socioeconomic and political situation of a contemporary "Polish" society, the organization's leadership explicitly recognized Poland's multiethnic

and multicultural nature by dividing society into a “[native] mass of nation” and “foreigners by descent, religion, and language.”<sup>250</sup> Ethnic and cultural diversity was not, however, celebrated and was thought to be an obstacle to “national unity.” Despite ethnic and cultural differences, both groups were considered “the elements that constitute Polish society”; social inequality (and not ethnic diversity) was the only reason for the decay of the nation. The *Centralizacja*, the governing body of the TDP, admitted that historically Poland had included smaller communities of “common descent” as well as societies of “different race.” This “mixing of common and different elements had been occurring during the entire course of national existence.”<sup>251</sup>

By the 1830s, Poland consisted of three types of inhabitants: native (*jednoplemiennych*), nonnative (*różnoplemiennych*) but already assimilated, and foreigners proper. The first group, otherwise called “a mass of our nation,” comprised all Slavs living within the borders of the old commonwealth. These Slavs were united both mentally (by the “common Polish idea”) and ethnolinguistically, since the Ruthenian language (as the language of the majority of Poland’s Slavs) was thought to be the closest to Polish among all Slavic “dialects.” The Slavic inhabitants, who constituted three quarters of Poland’s entire population (or fourteen out of twenty million), represented the “Polish nation” and were in fact the *nation*. Ethnic differences among Poland’s Slavs were deemed insignificant in view of “national unity.” In addition, a much bigger difference supposedly separated “Polish society” from “Muscovite society.” In contrast to “Moscow,” the TDP treated ethnic differences between Poles and Ukrainians as insignificant while using mental and ethnic idioms of Polish “national unity.”

When discussing a second group, that of assimilated peoples, the TDP leaders made it clear that language did not constitute a separate nationality. For instance, the Baltic peoples, such as the Lithuanians, Samogitians, Prussians, and Latvians, “had voluntarily joined Poland” and now constituted an “entity inseparable from it.” They were Poles even if they preserved the language of their “old nationality.” The same held true about other minorities, such as the old German urbanites, Armenians, and Tatars, who all “mingled with a common Polish family,” ceased to be foreigners, and even lost their language. It was not language, however, that separated “Poles” from “foreigners”—the third group of Poland’s population. Foreigners were those who were not yet “nationalized” (*znarodowioni*) and who lacked the “Polish national idea.” Among them the *Centralizacja* listed Jews, Germans, and Russians who had settled in Poland after the partitions. Jews

were the most problematic issue for Polish émigrés. Some regional émigré sections (Avignon, Montpellier) regarded Jews as a separate nationality, not assimilated and therefore harmful to Poles; while the section from Clermont called Jews “Poles of Mosaic faith” and positioned them along with the “peasant-townspeople estate.”<sup>252</sup>

The regional rank and file of the TDP regarded Ruthenians as part of the Polish *social* (not ethnic or national) makeup. Ruthenians were just the most colorful type of “Polish peasant” or “Polish folk” (*lud*), who best represented the struggle of the folk for social liberation from oppressive landlords.<sup>253</sup> The Montpellier section wrote that the Polish folk could be split “according to the origins of language and distinct features into three branches: the so-called Poles, Ruthenians, and Lithuanians,” who differed from each other by religion and mentality.<sup>254</sup> For example, the Poles populated the Congress Kingdom, the Prussian partition, and part of Galicia. They were Roman Catholics and were marked by “lively character” and “patriotism.” The Ruthenians, who were Orthodox and Greek Catholics, lived in Galicia and Right Bank Ukraine where their “monuments and folk songs strongly reflected the expression of freedom.” Despite these differences, the Montpellier section assured the *Centralizacja* that “our folk can never be anything but a Polish folk.”<sup>255</sup>

Other sections pointed as well to religious and ethnolinguistic differences among the “Polish folk,” although they sought to emphasize higher idioms of Polishness. The Bordeaux section singled out “the folk of the Congress Poland” as the most closely related to Poland by the “identity of origins, language, and faith.” Yet the “folk of Ukraine, Podolia, and Volhynia” was driven to Poland more than to Moscow and had the greatest potential “among Polish society” for social reform.<sup>256</sup> The Toulouse section also regarded Congress Poland as the core of Polishness where “almost all inhabitants speak the same language and almost all profess the same religion.” Nonetheless, the sections did not embrace an ethnographic definition of Polishness and did not seem to know the concept of *ethnic* Poland. Poles and Ruthenians together constituted the “Polish folk” and were able to understand each other, which was the “beautiful ground for national unity.”<sup>257</sup>

“Ruthenians,” “Poles,” and “Lithuanians” represented ethnographic types of Poles rather than separate nationalities, despite the fact that their differences were explained by religious, climatic, and external geopolitical factors. These “branches” of the Polish folk were united by their “ever alive idea of nationality” and “common love for freedom.” Once again, the TDP

leadership emphasized the democratic “idea of Poland” as the dominant idiom of nation-ness, which made Poles a nation/nationality.<sup>258</sup> Nationality was therefore both an ideal, subjective phenomenon and a real, objective one, since “for the nation to want [to be a nation] and to be [a nation] is the same.”<sup>259</sup> Nationality just needed to be awakened to self-consciousness through an “explanation of notions” such as freedom, brotherhood, and equality. The TDP wanted to cultivate nationality, that is, “to destroy, abolish, and neutralize the harmful elements while strengthening, developing weak elements, [and] widening, uniting useful ones, in order to set [them] in a single direction.” This national engineering was designed to ensure that Poles remained a peaceful, “agrarian nation.” A resultant nationality was not to be based on separate ethnic cultures, however. The *Centralizacja* declared that “the Polish nation is united. The differences of origins are only light shadings, which cannot harm national unity based on the happiness of all inhabitants without exception.”<sup>260</sup> This socially engineered “Polish nation” was not the sum of different ethnicities and cultures but rather a new nationality with a presumably common, “agrarian” culture, which émigrés hoped to cultivate.

To be sure, the Polish language or ethnicity per se did not define the “limits” of the Polish nationality. At the same time, Polishness was not reduced simply to an abstract “national idea.” It was obvious that the TDP leaders expected minorities not only to accept the Polish national idea but also to assimilate culturally into the common Polish nationality or “the mass of nation,” which suspiciously resembled a Polish *ethnic* community. This was the case simply because ethnic Poles, or Poles from the Congress Kingdom, were closer to this *imagined* nationality than were the others. In their official documents and opinions, the regional sections of the TDP did not endorse explicitly the idea of cultural assimilation for minorities, although there were many allusions to the Polish *ethnic* culture as a core and standard of Polishness. A new Polish nationality defied multiculturalism as well as ethnic minorities; instead, it had more in common with the French Jacobin model, as the TDP leaders bluntly recognized.<sup>261</sup> This became even clearer in the writings of Tadeusz Krępowiecki, as well as those of Józefat Bolesław Ostrowski, who at the time was a self-proclaimed mouthpiece of the TDP.

In 1834, Tadeusz Krępowiecki published his famous article “Narodowość. Centralizacja” (Nationality. Centralization), thereby initiating a debate on the nature of Polishness. He pointed to the lack of a full-fledged

nationality in Poland as the result of the failed centralization in the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Put another way, it was political centralization that formed nationality. He referred to France as the prime example of a successful national project, noting that peoples such as Basques, Bretons, and Germans, who spoke their own idioms, nonetheless called themselves French, “because they all have a common interest, [and . . . ] because they are united by a single social idea of common behavior.”<sup>262</sup> Clearly, for Krępowiecki language was not an important idiom of nation-ness. He made this clear while rejecting the traditional gentry conception of Polishness that included as its idioms religion, ethnography, and institutions:

These people [gentry] in their way understand nationality. According to them, nationality comprises religion, institutions, laws, customs, and traditions. Custom and tradition are the result of religion, institutions, laws, climate, locality etc; religion, institutions, and laws are the main thing. Therefore, according to these gentlemen, religion, which requires to bow a head before the authorities, without taking into account, what kind of authorities they are; which creates a new caste called clergy, whose centralization does not lie with the nation [ . . . ] is nationality. Institution that does not allow for non-gentry to own property is nationality. The right to own people as property is nationality. It is exactly this nationality that murdered Poland. This is the negation of nationality.<sup>263</sup>

Krępowiecki also acknowledged that unlike France, where eight peoples were made into one nationality, the old Poland failed to “nationalize” its two “peoples”—Poles and Ruthenians. In his opinion, the ethnically close Poles and Ruthenians were supposed to merge into one “great nationality” through the introduction of common schools and subsequent development of a common language and literature. However, the lack of political centralization as well as the socioeconomic and religious oppression of Ruthenian people hampered the formation of a common nationality. Whether Krępowiecki attested to ethnic differences between contemporary Ruthenians and Poles is not even important. This is because he generally rejected the idea of a multicultural or multiethnic nationality as the vestige of feudalism. He blamed the gentry for their failure to “nationalize” such historical provinces as Courland, Inflanty, and Prussia.<sup>264</sup> In this case, however, “nationalization” (*znarodowienie*) meant “centralization” rather than cultural and linguistic assimilation.

For Krępowiecki the ultimate idiom of Polishness was the “will/sovereignty of the people,” which referred to political culture rather than

to ethnic identity. Yet this common political culture had to replace ethnic, particular cultures and eventually would “erase the names of Lithuanian, Samogitian, and Ruthenian,” preserving only the name of “Poles.”<sup>265</sup> Even if this new culture was not based on the religion and ethnicity of ethnic Poles, it still spoke their language.<sup>266</sup>

Krępowiecki obviously could not express what Jürgen Habermas could many years later: an abstract political solidarity could not replace ethnic culture as a means of national cohesion, and in result, political culture has tended to merge with the culture of dominant ethnicity. In 1835, a scandalously famous journalist, J. B. Ostrowski, expressed more explicitly what Krępowiecki had said a year before. The Polish nationality as a political, historical, and cultural entity was incompatible with the distinct Lithuanian and Ruthenian nationalities. Poland had imposed its culture (“its language, then its spiritual essence”) on both Lithuanians and Ruthenians, who thus lost even the “shadings” of their distinctiveness. For Ostrowski, there was no Lithuanian or Ruthenian nationality; there was only Poland and the Poles.<sup>267</sup> Polishness was more than simply a political culture since it was based on the Polish language, legal institutions, and “civilization” in general.

One can see that the rejection of religious and ethnolinguistic idioms of Polishness did not mean that the Polish nationality was imagined as a multiethnic and multicultural community. There are at least three reasons why religious, linguistic, and ethnic differences did not in fact lead to the recognition of a multiethnic nationality. First, whatever the differences among the common people (particularly of Slavic origins), they still constituted the “Polish folk.” Second, the “Polish folk” was united by higher idioms of nation-ness, such as the “Polish national idea,” “love for the fatherland,” and “the will of the people.” Third, a Polish ethnic culture was perceived as a rallying point for all “Poles,” and Polish was the language of common political culture.

### *Democratic Mavericks and Liberals*

#### Piotr Semenenko’s Ruthenian Solution

Piotr Semenenko was perhaps the most original yet troubled associate of the TDP in the 1830s.<sup>268</sup> Born into a Ruthenian family, he went down in history as the founder of the ultra-Montanist Catholic order of the Resurrectionists (*Zmartwychwstańców*). In the meantime, however, he was an ac-

tive member of the TDP with unorthodox views on the Polish nationality. In 1834, he published an article, “O narodowości” (On nationality), which provoked a sharp reaction from many Polish émigrés. According to Semenenko, nationality was an inborn idea that united individual members.<sup>269</sup> That idea was in fact nationality itself, since there was no nation without its idea, which had an ability to evolve “through the unity of [nation’s] character, unity of notions, and unity of language.” The idea of the Polish nationality was supposedly shared by both ethnic Poles and Ruthenians, or by the “Vistula and Dnieper tribes,” who had developed “their common, united idea of nationality” consisting of such features as love for the fatherland, pursuit of freedom and equality, hospitality, and sociability.<sup>270</sup> Before the Polish Catholic nobles usurped the idea of nationality, it had boasted an all-Slavic democratic character and aspired to the fostering of a Slavic federation.

Thus, the democratic “idea” of nationality was the ultimate idiom of nation-ness for Semenenko, whose position was shared by many Poles from different ideological camps. This was also true about his harsh criticism of the Catholic church: its religious intolerance resulted in the failure of a common Polish-Ruthenian nationality: “The Catholic form spoiled everything,” bitterly commented the future conservative Catholic. Similar to Krępowiecki, but much more explicitly, Semenenko stressed that the Polish nationality was not yet formed. Sławomir Kalembka has correctly summed up Semenenko’s views: at present nothing but suffering united people from different parts of Poland; the Polish nationality was not formed yet because of the lack of centralization and because the gentry perverted the idea of nationality by transforming it into the nationality of landlords from all Polish lands.<sup>271</sup>

In Semenenko’s own words, “in Great Poland, Little Poland, Lithuania, Rus’, and everywhere the gentry was the same.”<sup>272</sup> The gentry hampered the “real national idea” and “real nationality,” which could be found only among the peasants. Instead, Poland had two opposing nationalities, one of them formed by the gentry, the other by peasants (the people). The latter, however, did not yet realize themselves in national terms. For Semenenko, this social conflict also alluded to an ethnic one: the Polish gentry historically oppressed the Ruthenian peasants, and therefore a common Polish (or rather Slavic) nationality represented by peasants was not yet developed, while the traditional Polish-gentry-based nationality was irreversibly compromised. Semenenko suggested a controversial solution: to

create a new nationality around Ruthenians (Ukrainians and Belarusians), who numbered ten million people and were the most numerous segment of the “folk” (*lud*) in historic Poland. In addition, the Ruthenians were “the real core” and “the real heart” of the Slavic “body,” thus prospectively uniting Poland with Russia in one democratic Slavic nationality.<sup>273</sup>

Semenenko completely reversed the positions of other Polish émigrés who were trying to build a new Polish nationality around ethnic Poles or at least around Polish ethnographic elements such as language. In the case of Semenenko, the dominant language and culture of the new nationality most likely had to be Ruthenian (perhaps as a blend of Ukrainian and Belarusian features).

Andrzej Walicki has provided the example of Piotr Semenenko to show how diverse and democratic were the views on Polishness by the TDP members. The respected Polish historian did not, however, inform his readers that Semenenko, after expressing unorthodox ideas, was ostracized by fellow democrats, proclaimed a Russian agent, and eventually forced to leave the TDP.<sup>274</sup>

#### Jan Czyński's Urban Nationality

Another émigré author, Jan Czyński, suffered a similar fate. He was a prominent speaker for the Polish middle class and a consistent opponent of Roman Catholicism who was also forced to leave the TDP as an alleged tsarist spy.<sup>275</sup> In 1834, on the pages of the émigré democratic periodical *Postęp* (The progress), Czyński became the staunchest proponent of a multireligious and diverse Polish nationality.<sup>276</sup> He passionately argued against Catholic dominance as well as against stereotypical identification of Poles with Roman Catholicism. Elsewhere he bluntly refuted the allegedly Jesuit claim that “one is not a Pole unless [one is] Catholic” by reversing the formula to read, “one who is a Jesuit is not a Pole.”<sup>277</sup> The Polish nationality was not Roman Catholic, since it existed before the Catholic conversion that introduced social inequality.<sup>278</sup> In historic Poland, eight million Catholics should not have had such “a harmful advantage over the twelve million Protestants, Orthodox, Muslims, and Jews.”<sup>279</sup> He called Poles “the victims of Catholicism,” which harmed relationships with Turkey and had alienated Protestants and Jews during the November uprising.

Instead, Czyński propagated the idea of a nonconfessional faith, which could unite Christians, Jews, and Muslims. For him, both Protestant Ger-

man colonists and Jews, who had lived in Poland for centuries, were part of the Polish nationality despite “the stupid arrogance” of the Polish gentry and “felonious attempts” of the Catholic clergy.<sup>280</sup> The Polish nationality, according to Czyński, had to be not only multireligious but also socially complete and not based on one class—whether the gentry or the peasants. Pushing his urban agenda, he sharply criticized Semenenko for his “invention” of a peasant nationality based on the “Ruthenian folk”: “Peasants are not the people [*lud*], they are part of the people.”<sup>281</sup> Similar to other Polish authors, he sought to recast an evidently ethnic/national discord into a social conflict, presenting the Cossack uprisings (including Khmelnyts’kyi’s) as “civil wars.” Czyński did not seem to regard Ruthenians (Ukrainians) as a separate ethnicity, let alone a nationality. Instead, he spoke about social and religious grievances of the Cossacks and the Orthodox population: Khmelnyts’kyi’s only demand was to allow an Orthodox bishop to “sit” in Poland’s Senate.<sup>282</sup>

When it came to Russia, Czyński never opposed Catholicism to Orthodoxy to define Polishness, even pointing to the historical possibility of union between Poland, Russia, and Sweden were it not for the detrimental influence of Jesuits. He explicitly stated that “Not Moscow, but the Papal influence destroyed us.”<sup>283</sup> He went on to blame poet Mickiewicz for “awakening sleeping, hiding Catholicism,” adding that Jesuits used him for the sake of spreading Catholicism.<sup>284</sup>

Czyński imagined the Polish nationality as a “blend of people of different origins and different faith,” that is, as a community of “all compatriots irrespective of differences of faiths, origin, and social class.”<sup>285</sup> He also exposed probably the most inclusive idiom of Polishness: place of birth or origins. While addressing inhabitants of Polish cities he wrote, “You are the Poles by virtue of residence in Poland, by virtue of origins [*ród*].”<sup>286</sup> He rejected the religious and ethnic idioms of Polishness, emphasizing instead the ethnoreligious brotherhood of all Poles: “Catholics, evangelists, the faithful of Luther and Calvin, Jews, Muslims, as long as you were born on Polish soil you are brothers; you are Poles because we are all the children of one God, the children of one mother Poland.”<sup>287</sup> Czyński, himself of Jewish descent, refuted the gentry’s traditional views that inhabitants of “German stock” and Jews “who comprised one third of town dwellers” were not Poles.<sup>288</sup>

Czyński’s vision of Polishness resembled a famous French postrevolutionary model of nationality and citizenship based on *jus soli*.<sup>289</sup> He urged his readers not to ask about the ethnic origins of their compatriots and instead to welcome anyone who was born in historic Poland into the com-

munity of Poles: “Today, a Pole and a citizen is not one who is noble and Catholic, but one who was born and raised on the shores of the Vistula” and who exhibits “devotion and skills.” Yet he proclaimed Polish to be the “national language,” and he urged urban dwellers of mixed backgrounds to learn it in order “to serve the fatherland.”<sup>290</sup> In this case, however, the Polish language was not a mysterious expression of the Polish soul; it was rather a means of public communication, which would advance the careers of urban youth.

Czyński’s projected nationality was perhaps the most inclusive and “complete” community among all other émigré visions. We should not overestimate, however, the multiethnicity of his imagined community since it was built *above* ethnic divides, without recognizing ethnic cultures as real values in their own right. He rejected any national idea based on ethnicity and religion, be it the primacy of the Russian, Polish, or Ukrainian element (compare Semenenko’s vision).<sup>291</sup> As in other democrats’ visions, a new Polish nationality was expressed in terms of Polish political values and in a language native to ethnic Poles.

#### Seweryn Goszczyński’s Galician Dilemma

The historian Andrzej Nowak has remarked that even such an experienced author as Seweryn Goszczyński, who did not lose touch with the Polish land, hoped to include Ruthenians in the future Polish nation-state, or at least in the next Polish uprising.<sup>292</sup> In a pragmatic report from Galicia to the TDP leadership, Goszczyński sought to present a realistic picture of socioeconomic and ethnic issues that a prospective Polish uprising would face in this Austrian province. The province seemed to be split along ethnic, religious, and cultural lines, which was exacerbated by the conflict between the Polish gentry and the Austrian government. The former represented Polishness in the region, while the latter was trying to discredit the gentry (and Polishness) in the eyes of peasants. Even the Polish-speaking, Roman Catholic Highlanders (Górale) did not perceive themselves as Poles; instead, they associated Polishness with the hated gentry.<sup>293</sup> The prominent Polish Romantic regarded the “Ruthenian people” as distinct with regard to ethnicity, language, faith, and social class: “The Ruthenian people hate Poles with the hatred of a [different] tribe, language, faith, and slave; the most oppressed, the most dehumanized.” Surprisingly, Goszczyński still hoped to mobilize Galicia’s population, not around socioeconomic libera-

tion but around “the Polish nationality,” which for the poet was “the only force that blows a counterstrike against the enemies of the Polish nation.”<sup>294</sup>

In his literary criticism Goszczyński was not sure about the identity of Ruthenians-Ukrainians. Once a representative of the “Ukrainian school” in Polish literature, Goszczyński used a variety of terms to designate present-day Ukrainians: a folk/people (*lud*), Cossack people (*kozacki lud*), Ukrainian people (*ukraiński lud*), Ruthenian commoners (*ruskie pospólstwo*), Ruthenians (Rusini), Ukrainians (Ukraińcy), and even a (Cossack, Ukrainian) nation (*naród*).<sup>295</sup> Some of these terms had regional, ethnic, or even national/political meanings. It is difficult to establish their contextual meanings, although the term *Ruthenians* (Rusini) seemed to be more generic and could have socioeconomic, ethnographic, and national/political senses.

While speaking about the alleged aspirations of the *haidamaks* to establish a separate state, Goszczyński spoke of a “separate Ruthenian state.”<sup>296</sup> He made it clear that Ukraine and the “Ukrainian people” were part of Poland and the “Polish people” since it was in Ukraine where “the spirit of freedom of Polish people made itself the most visible.”<sup>297</sup> In addition, while assessing Ukrainian folklore he exclaimed, “The spirit of Polish people felt the truth in the idea of Ukraine,” thus reclaiming Ukraine as the territory of “Polish people.” Goszczyński did not seem to know how different Ruthenians were from the Poles. Perhaps, like some other Polish writers, Goszczyński considered Ruthenians to be part of the Polish or “our” folk (*lud*), but at the same time regarded “Cossacks” as a historical nationality. The Cossacks were mostly based on the left bank of the Dnieper River and had reached the status of a “powerful nation” under Hetman Mazepa. After his demise, however, “the sovereignty [*samoistność*] of the Cossack people perished.”<sup>298</sup>

Goszczyński was much more certain about the irrelevance of Roman Catholicism as an idiom of Polishness. He made it clear that Catholicism, as the religion of only one segment of the historic Polish nation, could not represent Polishness. Instead, he suggested the idea of a Polish national church based on universal Christian principles and the Polish national tradition.<sup>299</sup> In addition, he regarded Roman Catholicism as an antinational, cosmopolitan force: “Catholicism is a cosmopolite, Catholicism knows only one nationality—Catholic, while it erases or ignores other [nationalities].”<sup>300</sup> In general, Catholicism aspired to create one universal nationality under the Pope, and therefore Goszczyński found it “inappropriate to be at the same time a good Catholic and a good Pole.”<sup>301</sup>

Goszczyński expressed Polishness through subjective and objective idioms of nation-ness. Put another way, “nationality, as considered from the inside of the nation, is its character, while from the outside it is its physiognomy [ . . . ]; nationality is thus a collection of more or less remarkable features and traits that are pertained exclusively to one’s own nation.” Similarly to Mochnecki and Rzewuski, Goszczyński ascribed nationality to the realm of imagination, interests, and stereotypes, although ethnography was also important as long as it was reflected in “certain inclinations in external relations,” as well as in “customs.”<sup>302</sup>

### The Radical Anti-Catholicism of Michał Kubrakiewicz

Barely known today is Michał Kubrakiewicz’s treatise *Uwagi polityczne i religijne* (Political and religious considerations), which was passionately anti-Catholic, anti-German, and pro-Russian.<sup>303</sup> According to the author, Catholicism was traditionally responsible for social oppression and economic backwardness: “The Papal religion creates only slaves and beggars,” and as such it was a deeply antidemocratic institution.<sup>304</sup> Religion in general could not be an idiom of nation-ness, since it was “a simple institution and a branch of internal politics of governments.” Instead, the dominant idioms of Polishness for Kubrakiewicz were language and citizenship. As with Czyński, language was not the mystical essence of the national soul but rather a medium of thoughts, education, and communication. Language was considered the most suitable medium; therefore, “Poles should first of all defend the native language because without the native language there is no popular education [ . . . ] and no freedom, and freedom is the result of moral equality.”<sup>305</sup> Finally, the community of Poles was defined by Kubrakiewicz as the participation of citizens in democratic institutions, “because any honest human can become a Pole and a citizen.” In other words, “any human who reaches a certain age of maturity” will be a Pole.<sup>306</sup> Again, like Czyński, Kubrakiewicz identified Polishness with citizenship.

### Adam Mickiewicz’s Christian Messianism

Adam Mickiewicz was arguably the greatest Polish Romantic poet, who also influenced a large part of the Polish émigré community as a messianic thinker. Yet his complex mixture of the Catholic religion and democratic ideas alienated many secular democrats. In his major prose work,<sup>307</sup> *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (The books of Polish people

and Polish pilgrims), he used biblical allusions to castigate dynastic legitimacy and the partitions of Poland.<sup>308</sup> His *Księgi* appeared between 1832 and 1834 in four editions (in ten thousand copies!), but aside from a handful of adherents and believers his teaching did not produce “a following, much less a movement.”<sup>309</sup>

According to Mickiewicz, slavery in the world originated from idolatry as God’s punishment. The two most ungodly states were the Roman Empire in antiquity and the Russian Empire in contemporary times, where the ultimate slavery ruled. It was only true Christianity that brought freedom into the world and united people into “one nation”—a Christian one.<sup>310</sup> For Mickiewicz the ideal Christian community was embodied in the medieval Europe of the Crusades. That had lasted until the “kings spoiled everything” by depriving people of freedom and by “making new gods” such as “honor,” “political influence,” and “political balance.”<sup>311</sup> While criticizing the entire political system of modernity, Mickiewicz explicitly referred to the political legitimacy that had led to the partitions of Poland by Russia, Prussia, and Austria. He called their rulers—Catherine of Russia, Frederick of Prussia, and Maria Theresa of Austria—a “satanic trinity opposing the Divine Trinity.”

The historic Poland and its people were an exception in a world dominated by selfish “interest.” “But the Polish nation did not bow to a new idol [ . . . ]. The Polish nation respected God” and remained always “devoted to the God of their ancestors.”<sup>312</sup> Put another way, Mickiewicz’s “Poles” were different from others by their true (that is, Catholic) religion. His vision of historic Poland was overtly idealized. He pointed out that Poles never invaded the neighboring lands but only “admitted nations to brotherhood,” offering them faith and liberty. The creation of a common Polish-Lithuanian state he considered the unprecedented example of the unity of the nations: Lithuania had united with Poland “as husband with the wife.” To emphasize the utopian liberty in the old commonwealth he greatly exaggerated the role of Polish gentry as the bearers of social freedom, while ascribing the fall of statehood exclusively to foreign forces, not to internal vices.<sup>313</sup> Characteristically, Mickiewicz mentioned mostly the Catholic Poles, Irish, and Belgians as exemplary Christian nations that opposed the old dynastic order. Similarly to most democrats, he disregarded ethnic differences between Poles and Lithuanians, stressing that they “have a common name: the name of Poles.”<sup>314</sup> In other words, the national unity of Poles, Lithuanians, and Ruthenians was much more real and important than any ethnic peculiari-

ties among the population of the old commonwealth. He also believed that its future borders would even exceed its historical borders. In the prophetic mood of *Księgi*, he cared little about sociopolitical and cultural issues facing Polish patriots, so it is hard to tell how inclusive the poet's nation was, or what his treatment of the Ruthenian issue might be.

In general, Mickiewicz's millenarian system presupposed the opposition between Polish virtues—nationality, morality, and religion—and Western materialistic and spiritless reason/self-interest. In effect, Polishness was viewed as a “peculiar manifestation of communitas, [ . . . ] an egalitarian, total, unmediated human society.”<sup>315</sup>

In his “political” articles of the period Mickiewicz was no more theoretical than in his messianic *Księgi*. What also remained unchanged was his religious (Catholic) and ethnographic treatment of Polishness.<sup>316</sup> Thus, in outlining a project of a French pro-Polish newspaper, he explicitly emphasized a need “to defend the national religion and ancient institutions, to show that it is the spirit of that religion and those institutions that reveals the urgent need for gradual proliferation of freedom among the entire nation.” He added that only “religious feelings” could secure a social peace in Poland, so necessary for the cause of national liberation.<sup>317</sup>

Probably the closest Mickiewicz came to the “theoretical” definition of nation-ness is his unfinished article “O duchu narodowym” (On national spirit, 1832). To describe Polishness the poet used several metaphors, like “internal domestic tradition,” “national instinct,” and “common national feeling and idea,” which most certainly referred to what we call today “mentality.” He mentioned that “opinions” and “feelings” of ancestors were preserved in an “internal domestic tradition” that alone could bring about Poland's independence and political order.<sup>318</sup> Reminding themselves of their native country, Poles had to “refresh in themselves the national instinct” to avoid pernicious influences of foreign political culture. In this quite circular argument, it was the “national instinct” that maintained one's Polishness. In refuting contemporary political theories, Mickiewicz stressed that the “forms of government” had to conform to the “needs and will of the masses” that in their turn were reflected in Polish history and “opinions.” Like the pro-Russian conservative Henryk Rzewuski, the anti-Russian émigré Mickiewicz adored the “common feelings” of Poles; and like his Ukraine-based peer, he continued to say that “nations live and grow as long as this [common] thought, this feeling enlivens everybody.” When that thought weakens, nations “fall ill” and eventually “die.” Mickiewicz,

however, was far less pessimistic than Rzewuski, who did not believe in the survival of Polishness into the nineteenth century. The “mystical politician” came to his quite optimistic conclusion by alluding to the example of Jews: “national feeling and thought could bind people at any place and any time.”<sup>319</sup> Unfortunately, the continuation of the article was lost, so we can only guess that for Mickiewicz the Polish “national feeling” was intermingled with the Catholic religion, for he went on to glorify the Christianized Poland and the Catholic piety of King John III Kazimir.

With respect to Russia and Russians Mickiewicz’s thought was also not always clear or consistent.<sup>320</sup> Similarly to the conservative poet Zygmunt Krasiński, Mickiewicz often regarded Poland and Moscow as two radically opposed forces—as an absolute Good and an absolute Evil. Unlike Krasiński, however, Mickiewicz’s version of Polishness presupposed the fight for freedom all over the world, *including* Russia.<sup>321</sup> Thus, in his project the “Appeal to Russians” (Projekt odezwy do Rosjan, 1832), Mickiewicz opposed nationalism and the (potential) Slavic brotherhood of Poles and Russians to the non-Slavic Russian Empire personified in the images of obedient imperial servants—Germans, Kirgiz, and Tatars. Paradoxically, some of Russia’s nationalities (like Poles and Russians) were defined as freedom-loving, while others, as the “blind instruments of despotism.”<sup>322</sup> To be able to unite Catholic Poles and Orthodox Russians in Slavic brotherhood, he had to oppose them to the Germans and ultimately alien Muslims (the Kirgiz and Tatars). Even if not explicit, religion was still present here in the background. One should also remember that among the contemporary Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian public who were critical of the tsar and imperial order, “Germans” became the omnipresent symbol of the nonnational, despotic empire—indeed, its main figurative representation. “The politics of your czars,” wrote Mickiewicz, “was always to unite with Germans for the sake of strengthening despotism.” He then accused the tsars of refusing to help other Slavs suffering under foreign yoke and of seeking alliances to “forge shackles for the entire Slavic world.”<sup>323</sup> In effect, when it came to Russians, religion might or might not be an idiom of Polishness.

When it came to Ruthenians (Ukrainians), however, the situation with religion was slightly different. While Roman Catholicism remained the pillar of Polishness, the Greek Catholic religion did not denote a separate Ruthenian (Ukrainian) nationality. That is how Mickiewicz seemed to perceive the situation in Galicia. He believed that an explicit social and

implicit national divide in Galicia between the nobility and peasantry was rather artificial, instigated by the Austrian authorities, who “had an interest to divide nation into magnates, nobles, and peasants.”<sup>324</sup> He then made the suggestion to unite all classes under “the great national interest” and “to remake everyone into a Pole.” Along with a great many Polish émigrés, Mickiewicz chose to see only religious differences, thus allowing for the existence not of *ethnic/national* but only of *religious* minorities within an otherwise united Polish nation. In this spirit he called for religious tolerance for “some classes of citizens,” such as the Christianized Jews and “the children of Greek priests,” that is, Greek Catholic Ukrainians.<sup>325</sup>

To sum up, the dominant idioms of Polishness in Mickiewicz’s quasi-political prose were political values (such as a somewhat ill-defined liberty), religion (Catholicism), and mentality (“national instinct” or “common national feeling”) that unambiguously referred to the Catholic religion. His Parisian lectures in Slavic literatures seemed to confirm this set of idioms, although they added an ever-stronger metaphysical element. Religion remained the dominant idiom of Polishness: “so religion [ . . . ] constitutes a substance of people; their politics, arts, and sciences are only its expressions. One cannot understand the people without considering their gods.”<sup>326</sup> According to Michał Kuziak, towards the end of Mickiewicz’s stay at the Collège de France (1840–44), he changed his concept of nationality from more historical/mental to more spiritual/metaphysical.<sup>327</sup> His broader definition of “national spirit” contained the elements of both historical mentality and transcendentalism. “By the concept, the national spirit, one should not understand only collection of popular imaginings and notions, but the very element from which they emerge,” he wrote. “In this sense, they tell often in Holy Scriptures about the spirits of the Church and peoples [ . . . ]. In this sense, the spirit of nation is what [is] the most real and concrete in the nation—[its] eternal individuality [*osobowość wieczna*].”<sup>328</sup> Therefore, nationalities seemed to be established in prehistoric times.

Increasingly, he linked “nationality” to Providence by defining the former as a national mission, that is, as a “group of people selected by God to accomplish [a] certain task.”<sup>329</sup> “Every people started its national life from revelation,” he wrote, and added that every nationality was based on “specific revelation,” that is, mission. Therefore, “every great nationality [ . . . ] emerged from one thought and lived only to realize this thought.”<sup>330</sup> This meant that “nationality” was a unique spiritual feature given to people by God.<sup>331</sup> Thus, for Mickiewicz in the 1840s, history, mentality, and lib-

erty became less important as markers of Polishness than “spirit,” which referred to both transcendental Providence and its earthly representative, (the Catholic) religion.

The slightly inconsistent set of idioms of Polishness in Mickiewicz’s “political” works reflected an uncertain position of the poet among Polish literati: a believer in all-European popular revolution, he was shunned by most democrats for his clericalism, while Catholic conservatives could not admit his radicalism. Democratic and conservative politicians alike were alienated by his mysticism and irrationality in sociopolitical matters.

### The Catholic Democracy of Józef Ordega

In contrast to Czyński, Goszczyński, and Kubrakiewicz, all of whom castigated the Catholic religion, Józef Ordega was an extraordinarily devoted Catholic among the TDP rank and file. Dissatisfied with the anti-Catholic trend of the TDP leadership, Ordega even parted ways with the organization. Similarly to Mickiewicz, he underlined the validity of the Catholic religion for the cause of Polish independence. Ordega stressed that the rejection of Christianity in the TDP’s manifesto was unacceptable since it was “faith that has made Poland a nation for ten centuries.” That rejection also meant the severance of a “single knot that united Poland with European society.”<sup>332</sup> He sought to combine Catholicism with democracy, a quite unusual mixture among Polish democrats of the 1830s–1840s. Catholic Poland promoted democracy in Eastern Europe, whereas Orthodox (“schismatic”) Russia imposed slavery and Protestant Prussia spread “English aristocracy.”<sup>333</sup> It was only Catholicism that preserved the tradition of God’s word, a true goal of humanity. Each nationality had a distinct mission, and therefore Poland (along with France) fulfilled the goal of humanity expressed through Catholicism.

Nationality was a common goal or idea (*mysł*) if it was adopted by the masses as such. In Ordega’s opinion, it was this “idea” rather than language, customs, or ethnic origins that was the dominant idiom of Polishness.<sup>334</sup> Catholicism created Poland and best represented the goal and idea of Polish society. As he put it, “Polish nationality is Catholicism.”<sup>335</sup> In 1845, when launching his own periodical, *Demokracja Polska XIX wieku* (Polish democracy in the nineteenth century), he was even more explicit about the Catholic religion as the dominant idiom of Polishness. Catholicism—“the faith of our fathers”—was the expression of a “single, com-

mon, ever developing idea, which constitutes national mission” and unites different generations; it was the “main element of the Polish nationality.”<sup>336</sup> Ordęga did not seem to notice ethnic divisions within his Polish nationality, but he did acknowledge the rights of religious minorities, such as the Orthodox, Jews, and Protestants, who would enjoy religious tolerance in the “Catholic air of freedom.”<sup>337</sup>

### The Federalist Project of Joachim Lelewel

Joachim Lelewel was associated with several émigré groups, some of which aspired to unite the democratic emigration. Perhaps the greatest Polish historian of the Romantic epoch, Lelewel was sensitive about ethnic and cultural differences in historic Poland. Unlike members of the TDP, he tended to support the idea of a federative nationality patterned upon the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which he regarded as the “union of *two* nations [emphasis mine].”<sup>338</sup> Lelewel’s views were an inspiration for the Society of Lithuania and the Lands of Rus’, which argued for a “federal” conception of a future Poland.<sup>339</sup> He also hoped to strengthen the national and religious consciousness of “Little Russia,” which was supposed to become an ally of Poland against Moscow.<sup>340</sup> In his political speeches, Lelewel treated the Cossacks—who once “had protected fatherland [Poland] from enemies” and then “left Poland” for the Russian tsar—as fellow victims of Russian despotism.<sup>341</sup> He also interpreted the Decembrist movement in the Russian Empire as the alliance of “a Russian, Pole, and Ruthenian” in the name of the “federation of Slavic peoples.”<sup>342</sup>

For Lelewel, the Polish people (*lud Polski*) consisted of different languages, classes, and religions—including Jews, about whom he declared: “Poles regard you not as foreigners but as compatriots.”<sup>343</sup> Elsewhere he described Jews along with Christians as children of Polish soil.<sup>344</sup> Language, however, did not signify a separate nationality, which was thought to unite all ethnographic and regional groups under the single name “Poles”: “A Ukrainian, Kashubian, Ruthenian, an inhabitant of Great and Little Poland, Lithuanian, Podolian, Samogitian, Mazurian, Volhynian, and the son of any other land of the old Republic are Poles, the only name in which we see our unity.”<sup>345</sup> The Lelewel-inspired address to the “Poles residing in Belgium” rejected these regional and ethnographic names as “legitimizing foreign robbery,” that is, the partitions. The image of the Polish nationality resembled here not so much a multicultural and multiethnic community

as a “melting pot,” where intermixed languages and religions ceased to delimit distinct ethnicities and religious groups:

Irrespective of difference of faith, irrespective of difference of language, every inhabitant will call himself a brother. Similarly, the Ruthenian, Polish, and Lithuanian languages have united already for centuries. There is no national divide between them. The German language, spread all over the country, has long since become native and brotherly. Centuries have passed since Muslims united with Christians in close brotherhood. Similarly, the faithful of Moses, looking for brotherhood, will find brotherly feelings among Christians.<sup>346</sup>

The real idiom of Polishness in this address was the “universal power of the people,” that is, democracy, which would ensure equality for every inhabitant. In yet another address to Poles residing in Brussels, Lelewel and his circle once more emphasized that the “Polish people” were united above languages, classes, and religions.<sup>347</sup> Every inhabitant, irrespective of language, class, or faith, would enjoy democratic citizenship.

The vision of Polishness according to Lelewel’s circle varied. An early émigré umbrella organization founded by the historian, called the Polish National Committee, revealed a rather traditional understanding of Polishness. In 1831, émigrés identified the Polish nationality with native language, customs, and religion, which together were personified in the image of a “free Pole.” Russia, meanwhile, was paradoxically represented by the “feet of a Bashkir.”<sup>348</sup> Lelewel was one of the few Polish émigrés who sought to reach out to Russians, emphasizing common Slavic roots and early democratic traditions. It was Ruthenians, however, who truly united Poles and Russians: “We call you brothers,” Lelewel addressed Russians, “because you are our brothers through the very name of our compatriots, Ruthenians.”<sup>349</sup> Throughout his long political and scholarly activity Lelewel sought to prove the existence of a sharp difference between Polish Rus’ (*Rusi polskich*) and Moscow by emphasizing the historical connection of Ukraine with Lithuania and Poland and refuting the views of Russian historiography about the identity of Rus’-Ukraine with Muscovy. In addition, Lelewel pointed to the non-Slavic character of Muscovy but held that Russians could reclaim their initial Slavic democratic legacy.<sup>350</sup>

In 1834, Young Poland, an organization inspired by Lelewel, adopted a very inclusive definition of Polishness. According to the organization, “the nation is one [*jeden*].” The “Polish nation” was understood as “the inhabitants of all lands that were property of the Polish Republic” prior

to the partitions.<sup>351</sup> Here citizenship and history functioned as the idioms of nation-ness. Another organization, the Union of Polish Emigration, revealed its goal to “unite Polish tribes with a single strong and national bond,” implicitly rejecting any ethnic and cultural divides within “a Polish population of 20 million.”<sup>352</sup> The Polish National Committee, in its address to the common people in 1844, joined the earlier tradition of Lelewelists when it rejected polyethnicity in the Polish nationality by reducing ethnic and national diversity to regional names/types of “Poles.” “The people of old Poland, our beloved Fatherland, are very numerous,” wrote Lelewel; “Lithuanian, Cracowian, Ruthenian, Mazur, Samogitian, Kaszub, Prussian, Ukrainian, Great Pole, all are Poles.”<sup>353</sup> He also called on people to ignore language and religion as markers of Polishness: “Do not differentiate between the children of Poland, whether they speak Ruthenian, Polish or Lithuanian, whatever their religion.”<sup>354</sup> Instead, such universal values as freedom, fatherland, and general faith in God were the primary instruments of national cohesion.

Among Polish liberal émigrés, the organizations associated with General Józef Dwernicki, who was ideologically between the Hôtel Lambert and Lelewel, exposed the most traditional ethnic and religious idioms of Polishness. According to the general, “Poles” in historical Poland were united by “common blood” into a single “family,” with differences introduced only by the partitioning powers.<sup>355</sup> In 1832, Dwernicki’s National Committee of Polish Emigration refuted the anti-Catholic and leftist agenda of Krępowiecki’s famous speech, which had praised Ukrainian Cossacks and harshly criticized the Catholic clergy. Instead, the National Committee blamed the Cossacks under Khmelnyts’kyi for the separation of “part of [our] native land,” and it accused Krępowiecki himself of denigrating “national honor.”<sup>356</sup> Dwernicki’s progeny and pro-Catholic stance was at odds with most of the émigrés from the center and from the left of Polish emigration.

### *Philosophers’ Politics*

#### Bronisław Trentowski’s Gentry Liberalism

As already shown, Bronisław Trentowski was a liberal thinker who experienced a conservative turn later in his career under the influence of the Galician massacre of 1846 and the views of the poet Zygmunt Krasiński. On the other hand, even earlier Trentowski exposed ideas that were more

suiting to Polish social conservatives, ideas such as social solidarism, appreciation of the gentry as the embodiment of Polishness, and “nobilitation” of masses. In contrast, most democrats argued for the liquidation of the gentry as a class. Trentowski adored gentry. For example, in a generally liberal work entitled “Rzecz o wyjarzmienu Ojczyzny” (On the liberation of the fatherland), he explicitly identified Polishness with the gentry, which could supposedly promote the Polish nationality among the peasants. The demise of Polish landlords would entail the collapse of the fatherland. “If there is no Polish landlord left in old Crown Poland and Lithuania, the fatherland will fall forever.”<sup>357</sup>

Trentowski also exposed a quite xenophobic conception of the Polish nationality, leaving Jewish and German townspeople outside the Polish community while emphasizing the role of urban ethnic Poles who “keep the cities by [their] nationality.” He called on the Polish gentry to enter the business world in order to replace Jews as financiers and industrialists.<sup>358</sup> Trentowski was not sure who was the “truest Pole”—a landlord or a peasant. It was the peasant who preserved most devotedly “the native language, old customs, and habits” and who hated Germans and Russians as deadly disease. This was one of the incongruities of the philosopher’s views that otherwise singled out the gentry as the bearers of Polishness.

At the same time, as a true liberal, Trentowski rejected Roman Catholicism as an idiom of Polishness, since a Pole, and a human being, was above social and religious divides.<sup>359</sup> He argued against the Roman papacy and suggested the establishment of a united Christian church. He stressed bluntly that “religious faith is not nationality at all,” because one nationality can have several *national* religions: “one can belong to the Catholic, Orthodox, Calvinist, Lutheran, and even Jewish or Muslim faith, while remaining a true national, i.e., a good Pole.”<sup>360</sup> He pointed to the example of the medieval West with its one religion and many separate nationalities. In addition, nationalities often changed their dominant religions and established new churches, as the English, Germans, Swedes, and others had done. Finally, he argued against the politicization of religion, which sought to declare one faith “exclusively national.” He refuted then the idea that the Catholic “West of old Poland” represented “the Polish nation” and, like Czyński, attacked the belief that “Polish and Catholic are the same.”<sup>361</sup> The liberal Trentowski also rejected ethnography and legal institutions as idioms of Polishness, since people “change them as they do clothes, without ceasing to remain a nation.”<sup>362</sup>

The nation, therefore, was a collection of *changing* characteristics, such as customs, religion, and language. “Nationality” (*narodowość*), however, was not identical with “nation” (*naród*) and was placed in the realm of spirituality or *mentalité*. Trentowski defined nationality as the “soul of a nation,” as the “sum of all moods, features, and characteristics of nation” set in motion. Put another way, nationality was the reflection of the changing nature of a nation in its “thinking, feelings, actions, and life.”<sup>363</sup> This meant that Trentowski, like most democrats, emphasized the “spiritual” or mental idioms of nation-ness, although other, “conservative” idioms appeared to play a bigger role in his national imagination. Unlike his later writings, in which he stressed that the native land could develop a separate nationality or refashion any group of people into “native Poles,” in 1845 Trentowski separated nationality from the land. “If nationality were inseparable from the native land, it [nationality] would have also been shared by its worst enemies living on the same land, such as Muscovites and Germans.”<sup>364</sup>

In this earlier version, a sense of Polish nationality was something that only *already existing* Poles could have. The ultimate idiom of Polishness, as the best expression of nationality, was for Trentowski the Polish language. “National language,” he wrote, “is the product of an entire national soul. National language is the soul of a nation in all places and times, and in all faiths, rights, customs, and habits.”<sup>365</sup> It is language, therefore, not ethnography that defined a Pole as a Pole. Contrary to most democrats, he almost completely identified nationality with language: “Whoever forgot the Polish language has ceased to be a Pole.” Not surprisingly, the inhabitants of ethnic Polish lands like the Congress Kingdom and Poznań, who spoke standard Polish, were better prepared for a national uprising than those speaking Ruthenian. Although he thought that the Ruthenian language was “also Polish,” it was not a literary standard.<sup>366</sup>

Trentowski was reluctant to separate ethnic Poles from ethnic Ruthenians on the basis of language, although after 1846, when he moved to the right of the political spectrum, he left Ruthenians outside the community of ethnic Poles defined in social, religious, and linguistic terms. In 1845 he suggested the following syllogism: There is no nation without nationality, and people form a nation only when they have a separate (national) language. The death of a language meant for Trentowski the death of a nationality.<sup>367</sup> Later, when Trentowski reconsidered his views on nation-ness and came to regard religion as the main pillar of nationality, he provided the example of Catholic Ireland, which remained a nationality even after

losing its language. In 1845, however, Ireland could not be considered a full-fledged nationality.

In general, during his liberal period, Trentowski used more inclusive “spiritual” idioms of nation-ness as well as the Polish language; whereas later he switched to the religious, social, and ethnographic idioms of Polishness. Although language remained for him an idiom of Polishness, he seemed to treat Polish in more exclusive terms as the language of ethnic Poles. Ruthenians spoke their own language. Consequently, when he moved to the right, his imagined community became more exclusive, more ethnically Polish. Paradoxically, this provided more space for ethnic and national diversity, including the recognition of a Ruthenian ethnolinguistic community alongside the Polish one. He even considered the possibility of Ruthenians’ separation.

#### Karol Libelt: Philosophy of Fatherland

Karol Libelt was another philosopher who paid significant attention to nationality. The subject of his political philosophy, however, was not nationality per se but the “love for the Fatherland,” which could be enhanced through spreading the national consciousness. He designed an elaborate “concept of Fatherland,” which consisted of several elements. He divided “Fatherland” into “material” (or the “body” of fatherland) and “spiritual” (or the “soul” of fatherland). The “material” fatherland consisted of the land and people, which together were best reflected in the nation’s political institutions and laws.<sup>368</sup> The “spiritual” fatherland consisted of “nationality” (in fact, folklore and ethnography) and language, which were represented in literature as the “complete reflection of the national spirit.”<sup>369</sup> In addition, there were “living” (*żywotne*) elements of the fatherland, such as politics (or state), religion, and history (national mission), which represented the unity of the “material” and “spiritual” elements.<sup>370</sup>

Although a liberal social philosopher, Libelt expressed unusually Romantic and conservative idioms of Polishness. He castigated “cosmopolitans” for their rejection of the (Polish) language, (Catholic) religion, and ethnography as the pillars of the Polish nationality. For him, land was not just an accommodation and the language was not just a means of communication. He also defended the presence of a ruling religion, which in the case of Poland was to be Roman Catholicism, the religion of “feeling.” For him the Catholic church, “which preserved the entire plasticity of reli-

gious notions [ . . . ] had intermingled with the Polish nationality”; while Protestantism, as the religion of “reason,” was alien to the Polish folk and was only “violently imposed by landlords” on the commoners.<sup>371</sup> Like the “conservative” Trentowski, Libelt regarded the land and climate as idioms of Polishness, able to unite people into a separate nationality. More or less homogeneous geographical conditions could facilitate national unity, while differences in climate could lead to the creation of separate nationalities. He provided the example of the Habsburg Empire, where Hungarians, Czechs, and Italians would never become “Austrians,” since “those lands have too contrasting physical characteristics.”<sup>372</sup> From the other side, the “affinity of land with the nation creates the affinity within the nation and awakens love [ . . . ] among the co-nationals.”

According to Libelt, “nationality” was an inborn “character” that transformed a folk (*lud*) into a nation (*naród*) and that was best reflected in customs and mores, that is, in ethnography. Defined as such, nationality was conceived as an inbred idea (*rodowa myśl*) that united “all provinces, neighborhoods, and generations, or even peoples” into a community of blood relatives.<sup>373</sup> No nation could exist without nationality as its “heart.” Nationality, however, pertained both to the “soul” and the “body” of peoples and was best preserved by the common people, or *lud*.<sup>374</sup>

Nationality defined through ethnography, however, was not the highest idiom of nation-ness. For Libelt, language as the “blood” of the nation was an even “higher spiritual force of fatherland than customs.” “The nation lives as long as its language lives, and there is no nation without a national language.” Apparently, for Libelt language (along with literature) and state/political institutions were more important pillars of national cohesion than land or ethnography.

The state and political institutions constituted the “material fatherland” and made a nation complete: “The notion of a nation is complete only when we add political institutions to land and people.”<sup>375</sup> A nation is bound to a state through institutions such as education, church, and parliament, and therefore the state represents “the consolidation of the material and spiritual fatherland into the life of the fatherland.” For Libelt, the state was the life of the nation. His attitude toward the state and political institutions was ambiguous, however. To be sure, the state made national existence complete. On the other hand, Libelt did not consider the state an indispensable idiom of nation-ness and stressed that the “nation” could exist even after losing its political institutions. He emphasized that

“nations” which had become incorporated into larger states and ceased developing their “political-national spirit” nonetheless “did not cease to be nations.”<sup>376</sup> Therefore, the idea of the fatherland was higher than that of the state, since the fatherland could survive without “political existence.”

In general, Libelt contrasted the “inbred idea” of nationality based on common origins of conationals with the abstract political idea reflected in the political solidarity of citizens. He commented that “the idea of nationality even among those belonging to different tribes refers to the idea of common origins/race, that is, to a much longer-lasting [idea] than political idea because it was transformed into the blood and body.”<sup>377</sup> If a political idea gets “severed,” the common nationality will survive. Moreover, despite the different mores in different Polish lands, such as Lithuania, Samogitia, Volhynia, Podolia, Ukraine, and Galicia, “there is a common national and native [*rodowa*] idea in this diversity,” shaped by common origins.

The “nation” was therefore the community of blood relatives rather than civic society bound only by political institutions and values. The resulting nationality was to be further united under the common name “Poles.”<sup>378</sup> Libelt regarded the early modern gentry in Poland, united through “familial connections” into “one nationality,” as the model for a future Polish cultural nationality that would combine different lands and “peoples” into “the unity of race/origins.” He understood that this racial or ethnic unity was not yet an anthropological fact. It was rather an “inbred idea” or the idea of nationality that could supposedly connect “all [Polish] lands, neighborhoods, generations, and even peoples.” It is difficult to ascertain what the primary idiom of nation-ness was—the *idea* of common origins, or the origins and race themselves reflected in the idea?

At any rate, Libelt stressed that ethnic origins of Rus', Lithuania, and Poland were indeed different, and only through history were they united into one “nation,” or one “race” (*ród*). By “nation,” he obviously meant the gentry. He was, however, able to recognize the obstacles to this unity, which limited the size and inclusivity of his imagined community. The obstacles came from the “Lithuanian commoner” and “Ruthenian peasant,” who “did not yet adopt this idea of common race/origins with the Polish nation” and did not yet know that they belonged to the common Polish nationality. This was because the idea of an early modern Polishness encompassed only the gentry, not the peoples (*ludy*).<sup>379</sup> Yet he was not interested in the opinions of Lithuanian and Ruthenian peasants and was already sure that they belonged to a common nationality with Poles.

### *The Democratic and Unitary Nation*

Polish democrats and liberals generally argued against the idea of a traditional “feudal,” multicultural, and multiethnic Polish nationality. Under the influence of the French Revolution they came up with a new idea of Polishness, one that was unitary, inclusive, and set above ethnic and cultural divides. This new concept of Polish nationality rejected diversity, which was perceived by many as the vestige of feudal provincialism. Unlike conservatives, who emphasized mostly the Catholic religion, ethnography, political institutions, and history as idioms of Polishness, democrats and liberals spoke about the “Polish national idea,” “love for the fatherland,” “the will of the people,” “interest,” “democracy,” and so on. Put another way, they preferred mentality, common political culture, and often citizenship as idioms of the new Polish nationality. Some of them, like J. B. Ostrowski, Józef Ordega, Bronisław Trentowski, and even prominent members of the Polish Democratic Society, also used the Catholic religion, Polish language, and ethnography as idioms of Polishness. For some, Polish nationality did not include Jews and Germans, labeled as “foreigners.” Somewhat unique was Mickiewicz’s millenarian version of Polishness, in which ethnography and sociopolitical issues were barely present.

For most democrats, however, a “democratic” model of nationality was quite inclusive and was largely patterned on the French Jacobin model so that little attention was paid to the Romantic *Volk* and ethnography. At the same time, Polish high culture, boosted by Romantic poets, was to become the major national culture of the “Poles.” Ethnic differences were reduced to the issue of religious rights and folklore that enriched Polish national culture. One could hardly call the resulting Polish nationality “multilingual” or “multiethnic” as long as diversity was considered to be detrimental. Semenenko’s suggestion to replace Polish culture with a more numerically predominant Ruthenian culture was seen as an aberration or perhaps even a diversion by a Russian agent. The dominant vision of Polish nationality set forth by democrats and liberals alike was that of a unitary community based on common political culture, mentality, and goals. This vision effectively reduced ethnic and cultural diversity to the recognition of mostly religious minorities under the general name of “Poles.” In addition, the awareness of linguistic differences (for example, by the Lelewelists) did not lead to the recognition of those who spoke differently as autonomous cultural-political entities.

Despite all the diversity of the Polish liberal-democratic field, one can discern a dominant vision of Polishness that can be labeled as “Polish civic nationality.” In its broader version, found in many TDP writings as well as in works of Piotr Semenenko and Jan Czyński, it was based on very inclusive idioms of nation-ness, such as the “idea” of nation, democratic political culture, citizenship, and to a lesser degree the Polish language as an instrument of spreading the democratic ideas. In its more narrow form, which often excluded “foreigners,” more emphasis was placed on the Polish language and even Catholic religion. Some members of the TDP, along with Adam Mickiewicz and Józef Ordega, contrasted Polish spirituality (expressed in Catholicism) with “alien” despotic and aristocratic traditions (reflected in Russian Orthodoxy and Anglo-German Protestantism). More exclusive Polishness based on linguistic, religious, and ethnic (even racial) idioms could also be found within the liberal-democratic field, particularly in writings of two philosophers, Karol Libelt and Bronisław Trentowski. Most democrats, however, opted for a more inclusive and modern civic version of Polishness.

### The Nationality of the Peasants

The most radical wing of Polish political activists and writers advocated the idea of a popular nationality rooted almost exclusively in peasants. The most characteristic representative of this trend was an organization called “The Communes of Polish People” (*Gromady Ludu Polskiego*), or simply “The Polish People” (*Lud Polski*). It was formed by former members of the Polish Democratic Society (TDP) and staffed by simple Polish soldiers of mostly peasant origins.<sup>380</sup> Among the most significant radical thinkers were the philosophers Henryk Kamieński and Edward Dembowski, the latter becoming a radical leader of the tragic Cracow uprising of 1846. They all shared agrarian socialism as the model of society and advocated social revolution, which would abolish gentry as a class. Although these radicals were only a marginal force, their ideas later influenced other political groups and individuals.

#### *Lud Polski*

In its manifesto of 1835, Commune Grudziąz, a branch of The Polish People, proclaimed the existence of two nationalities in historic Poland, one comprising the gentry as a “gang of criminals,” the other consisting

of “the Polish people.”<sup>381</sup> They ceased to constitute a common nationality. Although the leadership of The Polish People was more preoccupied with socioeconomic issues, leaving national ones aside, it is still possible to reconstruct their national imagination. Influenced by utopian socialism and partly by historical studies, the organization viewed the new Polish nationality as a brotherly community of Christian people based on absolute equality and communal landholding. That commune was clearly patterned upon the “Cossack republic” formed by the Zaporozhians. The real Christian goal of humanity was to replace a personal self with a social self. Therefore, it is not surprising that The Polish People often used Christianity as an idiom of Polishness by contrasting Catholic Poland with Orthodox Muscovy and the Muslim Turks. “We are the Poles pitted against Muscovy and against Orthodoxy [*schizma*], as were those Poles who defended the freedom of the Christian world against the Turks and Islam,” wrote Commune Grudziąz in 1836.<sup>382</sup> The commune also interpreted Islam as a danger to Christian civilization and praised the early modern Poles whose “calling” was to fight the Turks.

The radicals also rejected geographical and historical determinism, emphasizing instead Christian messianism as the creator of the Polish nationality. “It is neither the Oder nor the Dvina that are the pillars of a Polish house, since it is not the mountain or the lake that gave us the right to nationality.” This was an obvious allusion to historical and geographical legitimacy in the thought of most Polish émigrés, including the TDP. According to The Polish People, the “right to nationality” was given to Poles “from above,” by God’s providence.<sup>383</sup> In addition, radicals from The Polish People accused the TDP of being an enemy of Christianity and declared the primacy of Catholicism over Protestantism. While Catholicism “presupposes the authority of God,” Protestantism boosted “the authority of the human mind over God’s authority”; in social life this resulted in the “systematic exploitation” of common people by the lords.<sup>384</sup>

When assessing the emergence of Protestantism in early modern Poland, radicals stressed with satisfaction that “the Polish nation pushed away that faith and remained by its own fanatical calling of spirit toward ideas.” Unlike the treacherous gentry that converted to Protestantism, the Polish people (*lud*) “had God in their hearts and therefore did not reject the Catholic church.” Poles preserved “their nationality which originated in Christianity and was formed by Christianity,” that is, by Roman Catholicism.<sup>385</sup> Orthodoxy was identified with the tsar, and Russians were called “a

false brother in Christianity.” The Jews were thought to be capitalists who crucified “Christian Poland” and who represented just another “nationality” of exploiters along with the gentry. Therefore, Catholicism appeared to be an idiom of Polishness set against Protestant Germany, Orthodox Russians, and Jews—all enemies of the Polish people (*lud*). The latter were proclaimed by the communes as the only nationality in Poland.<sup>386</sup>

Catholicism, however, was not enough. As true socialists, the leaders of The Polish People, while rejecting the Polish “gentry nationality,” left it to the peasants to forge the “idea of a new nationality.” The radicals also refuted language, ethnography, territory, and history as the basis for the Polish nationality, since all these elements were “changing” and “superfluous.” Instead, the major idiom of new Polishness was to become social, cultural, and religious messianism, which included the introduction of “brotherhood” among all inhabitants of Poland, the propagation of “Christ’s teaching” among Slavs, and a “strong defense” of Christianity against non-Christian “wild nomads from the East.”<sup>387</sup> The Polish language was to become the major language of a utopian world community called the “Universal Church.”<sup>388</sup>

The Polish People groups were not consistent in their rejection of historical legitimism. The communes still called for the restoration of a “twenty-million” Polish nationality on the territory of the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Although the communes recognized the differences between “Polish” and “Ruthenian”/“Greek” (Orthodox) peoples, they expected, similarly to the TDP, that both peoples, which shared the common revolutionary tradition, would join the “union of the future,” that is, one united Poland.<sup>389</sup> Like some democrats, the communes argued against the “Slavic federation” and “pagan unfaith,” instead speaking for the common Polish nationality rooted in Christianity in its Catholic form.<sup>390</sup>

### *The Politics of Radical Philosophy on the Eve of 1846*

Henryk Kamiński was one of the most radical Polish political thinkers of the epoch. He envisioned the possibility of revolutionary terror as a means of achieving social equality. In his important work, *Katechizm demokratyczny* (The democratic catechism, 1845), he also revealed his vision of Polishness. As did almost all other democrats, he thought in terms of historical Poland: “the whole people of an entire old Poland” or the twenty million “Polish nation” was his point of reference. “To say, for example, the

Polish people [*lud*] or the Polish nation [*naród*] is all the same,” he commented. As a radical democrat, Kamiński defined the Polish nationality through the idea of citizenship above social and ethnic divides: “A citizen does not mean a certain class of the nation but every inhabitant, every son of the Fatherland.”<sup>391</sup> He also rejected history as the link between contemporary people and “old Poles,” who “did not know how to love the Fatherland” because the entire social order was based on oppression. A Poland of the gentry was prison for the people, not a fatherland.<sup>392</sup> At present, however, the Polish people had still to reach self-consciousness.

Kamiński seemed to ignore ethnic, religious, or cultural differences among the “Polish people.” He reduced these differences to those of patriotism in various “neighborhoods”: “The Polish people differ strongly among themselves with respect to patriotism in different neighborhoods.”<sup>393</sup> There were those who sang the Polish national anthem, “Poland Has Not Perished Yet” (*Jeszcze Polska nie zginęła*), but there were also those who were “completely indifferent” or even hostile to Poland. Kamiński hoped to overcome these “hostile feelings about the Polish nationality” by awakening among peasants the “love for independence.”<sup>394</sup> The Polish nationality was to be based on the “great and mighty idea”—that of the people and their “word,” as reflected in folklore.

Another prominent philosopher and literary critic of the time, Edward Dembowski, placed “nationality,” which he defined as a difference between “nations,” in the realm of ideas. Nationality for him was “the direction in which a nation develops its freedom,” whereas the difference between nations was measured by their progress on the way to social freedom.<sup>395</sup> The true goal of contemporary Polishness was to transform “the love for entire nation” into a quasi-religious democratic cult.<sup>396</sup> By the same token, an early modern gentry-nation in Poland was not “purely Polish,” for it was not socially complete. Dembowski tended to identify Polishness with peasants, specifying that gentry was not part of the Polish “nation.”<sup>397</sup> In 1846, as the ideological leader of the Cracow uprising, he was able to test his ideas of Polishness in practice.

In the revolutionary “Manifesto of the National Government” he addressed the “Poles,” who appeared to be Roman Catholic Polish-speakers. By alluding to the persecution of the Polish language and the Catholic religion in the Russian Empire, he underlined the danger that resulted from converting to a “foreign faith” and speaking a “foreign language.”<sup>398</sup> By calling other religions (Orthodox above all) and languages “foreign,”

he implicitly considered the Catholic religion and the Polish language to be the pillars of Polishness. Perhaps this idiom was dictated by the specific context of his address: the region around Cracow was populated mostly by Polish-speaking Roman Catholic peasants. In his address to the region's Jews, on February 23, 1846, Dembowski exposed a more inclusive idiom of Polishness: here he called the Jews "Poles" and "Poles the Israelis," thereby rejecting the view put forth by Poland's "enemies" that Jews were a "separate nation."<sup>399</sup> Here he clearly treated the Polish nationality as an inclusive but unitary community of all those who were born on the "common soil." In this context, it was *jus soli* (or citizenship) rather than religion and language that was the idiom of Polishness.

### *The Radical Community*

The Polish community as imagined by The Polish People communes and radical philosophers was not much different from the Polish nationality of more mainstream democrats. Polish radicals also adhered to two versions of Polish civic nationality with a clear utopian socialist flavor. Both versions were somewhat patterned on French models (Jacobin and socialist), with almost no reference to ethnic or cultural divides among the population. Unlike mainstream democrats, the communes of The Polish People tended to emphasize Christian (Catholic) messianism as an idiom of Polishness, although they combined it with the utopian socialist principle of "brotherhood." Yet this Christian-based Polishness was directed against traditional enemies of Catholic Poland—Muslim Turks and Orthodox Russians—a view which deprived the Polish imagined community of inclusivity, so characteristic of liberal democracy. The most radical Polish philosophers of the time—Henryk Kamieński and Edward Dembowski—revealed a more rational vision of Polishness based on inclusive citizenship and "the idea of the people." Dembowski could even test his ideas in practice, as a leader of a failed uprising.

### **The Polish Case: A Summary**

Polish conservatives, democrats, and liberals often had opposing visions of Polishness and exposed different idioms of nation-ness. The "size" and configuration of the Polish imagined community varied significantly. For instance, Polish conservatives who used religion, language, nobility,

and ethnography as dominant idioms of nation-ness opted (paradoxically) for a more inclusive, loosely structured Polish nation-state than put forward by outspoken democrats. In fact, a “conservative” imagined community, branded by democrats as “feudal,” was a replica of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, which *de facto* was multicultural and multireligious and, *de jure*, was multinational (when Poles recognized Ruthenians as a third “nation” of the commonwealth in the abortive Hadiach Treaty with the Cossacks in 1658). Among the conservative Polish émigrés, such associates of Adam Czartoryski as Michał Czajkowski and Franciszek Duchiniński adhered to the broadest version of Polishness and even recognized the national sovereignty of Ukrainians, particularly those living in Left Bank Ukraine.

Most democrats (with the noticeable exception of the historian Lelwel) chose another model of nation-building based on French Jacobin policies, which rejected “feudal provincialism.” Democrats who exposed ethnoreligious idioms as well as those who applied “civic” ones (institutional and mental) rejected the multiethnic commonwealth model as obsolete. Many conservatives and democrats shared one premise: either they treated the Christian inhabitants of the former Polish state as ethnically related, or if they noticed any ethnic and linguistic differences among the folk, they rejected ethnolinguistic criteria altogether as idioms of Polishness. They also sought to build a hierarchy of identities from the “local” Ruthenian or Lithuanian identity at the bottom level to the “national” Polish one at a higher level.<sup>400</sup> At any rate they emphasized the higher unity of “nation” based on common history, political values, mentality, loyalty to the dynasty, and so on, which prevented the division of Poles into several nationalities. For some, the Polish “idea,” which at first had to unite different peoples politically and spiritually, was later to facilitate the linguistic assimilation of minorities into Polishness.<sup>401</sup> According to Roman Wapiński, “the peculiarities of Lithuanians and the other inhabitants of the old Republic were acknowledged but even those who did it more consciously looked for the arguments for unity of the Republic’s political nation.”<sup>402</sup>

Andrzej Walicki has pointed out that “the Polish nation” during the Romantic epoch was not defined by ethnolinguistic criteria; therefore, the Polish case was for him the example of modern *political* nationalism of the Western type, that is, democratic and inclusive. He credited the legacy of the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with “the idea of a multilingual

and multiethnic political nation,” linking it to the model of “progressive romantic nationalism.”<sup>403</sup> One should not forget, however, that the rejection of ethnocultural and linguistic Polishness often also meant the rejection of any separate ethnic and cultural status for the Ruthenians. At the same time, the predominance of the Polish language as the sole medium of high culture and politics was never put into doubt. In addition, most democrats never thought about the *practical* realization of the Polish “multilingual and multiethnic political nation,” if they opted for it at all. Within a future Poland there had to be only one high or public culture. While claiming the historical territory of the old commonwealth and disregarding ethnic differences, many Polish authors automatically rejected the principles of Romantic nationalism. Instead, they adhered to historical and geographic legitimism, which they dismissed outright where the partitions of Poland were concerned. Given the fact that Lithuanians and East Slavs were denied the means for expressing their political and cultural identity, one can hardly call the national community as imagined by the Polish democrats “multilingual and multiethnic.”

Polish democratic émigrés in general did not regard “the Polish nation” as consisting of separate ethnicities or nationalities. The farthest they could go was to acknowledge the presence of different religions or so-called “dissidents” within a tightly knit Polish nationality. Since most Poles could not imagine a truly multinational state, a future Polish state had to coincide with the Polish nationality, one and indivisible—that is, a Polish nation-state. Therefore, Ruthenians and Lithuanians were expected to join both the Polish state and the Polish nationality.

Polish mental geography was closely connected to national imagination. It was the vision of geography that led to the adoption of a certain political-administrative and ideological system for a future Poland. The Polish democrats and radicals fully subscribed to the French model of “national” unification, treating federalist models—for example, the political system of the United States—as detrimental to democracy; accordingly, the abolition of a federalist principle was thought to facilitate democracy. In reality, this meant disregarding the traditional ethnic and provincial divisions of Poland. In other words, Poland did not have to be concerned about protecting national minority rights since it did not contain “nationalities” other than Polish. According to Henryk Żalinski, an authority on the TDP ideology, in all their considerations the TDP leaders were primarily concerned with the Polish ethnicity, disregarding any separate agendas on the part of other nationalities and believing that the equal

rights of the citizens would fully satisfy them.<sup>404</sup> In most cases, democrats recognized only religious minorities, whom they assured of religious tolerance, sometimes under the dominance of the Catholic church (as was the case with Józef Ordega and J. B. Ostrowski). The issue of the ruling church and the Catholic definition of Polishness was closely connected to Russia's presence. Many Poles thought that it was only *Catholic* Poland that could withstand Orthodox Russia, which was actively persecuting the Catholic and Uniate churches within its borders. Religion thus was used for the purposes of national liberation, setting Poles apart from the partitioning communities.<sup>405</sup>

Instead of ascribing the Polish national community to the model of "progressive Romantic nationalism," it is more appropriate to consider the ideological ambiguity of Polish national thought. When Polish authors used language and ethnography as idioms of Polishness, they clearly adhered to post-Herderian Romantic nationalism, which emphasized ethnolinguistic uniqueness. On the other hand, the rejection of ethnolinguistic idioms of Polishness did not necessarily undermine the Polish Herderian nationality. Even stripped of its visible ethnolinguistic features, when imposed on all inhabitants of a former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, it was projected as a common culture that had to assimilate the elements of other "ethnic"/folk cultures. Inevitably, this new national culture, particularly high culture, had to remain "Polish," often in linguistic and ethnographic sense.<sup>406</sup> At the same time, by denying others ethnolinguistic distinctiveness and political sovereignty, Poles defied Romantic principles of cultural diversity and national self-determination, instead clinging to historical legitimism modified by the French Jacobin model. Finally, from the mid-1840s onward some Polish commentators started using the argument of "historical" and "nonhistorical" nations—so popularized in Engels's writings—which further minimized the importance of non-Poles living on the territory of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

# 5

## “Stretching the Skin of the Nation”

### Russia’s Empire and Nationality

If in Part I of this study the “imperial-national complex” of Russia was treated on the level of geographical imagination, in this chapter I consider the relations between empire and nationality in the realm of nation-centered idioms, with particular emphasis on the Polish-Ukrainian context. In what follows I thus examine the tension between imperial loyalties and modern national idioms; the latter sometimes undermined but often buttressed the idioms of empire. In the 1830s–1840s, however, nationality was rather compatible with empire. In individuals, this was reflected as a hierarchy of loyalties.

There were three main configurations of an imagined community in Romantic Russia, which can be regarded as the “positions” in the field of political representation.<sup>1</sup> Two of these configurations—the “all-Russian nation” and Great Russia—were imagined communities par excellence since they existed almost exclusively in the imagination of Russian subjects, whereas a third one, the empire, was represented by real political institutions. The empire was the most legitimate and highly ranked imagined community in Russia. I borrow the term “all-Russian nation” from Aleksei Miller, who coined it to designate an imagined community that existed in the minds of many nineteenth-century Russians and that united all Eastern Slavs of the empire into a more or less complex nationality.<sup>2</sup> Some scholars have regarded the Russian Empire as a nation-state along with England and France,<sup>3</sup> but in this study the dynastic empire is differentiated from a nation-state, for the former represented a completely unique mode of political imagination and legitimization, which contradicted the nature

of nationalities.<sup>4</sup> This is not to say that empire and nationality in Russia did not intersect. Proponents of the empire sought to provide it with a dominant nationality, that is, to “nationalize” the imperial space so that it looked more like a nation-state. The famous formula of Sergei Uvarov, “Autocracy, Orthodoxy, Nationality,” was expected to fill the gap between the empire and nationality in Russia by creating the so-called “official nationality,” or dominant nationality, and by “marshalling a growing Great Russian nationalism behind the throne.”<sup>5</sup> At the same time, the Russian authorities in the first half of the nineteenth century were reluctant to embrace nationalism; instead, they defended the traditional dynastic nature of the political regime. As Aleksei Miller put it, it was possible to be a Russian imperialist without being a Russian nationalist.<sup>6</sup>

Russian society came up with its own ideas about nation-ness. Different circles elaborated different versions of Russianness, which also depended on the presence of “others” such as the Poles, Baltic Germans, or Ukrainians. The latter were the least “other” and were mostly welcomed in the “all-Russian nation” encompassing all the Orthodox Eastern Slavs. For the purpose of this work I split the Russian educated public into several circles in terms of their ideological agendas. First, I consider Russian conservatives—both those with more dynastic or imperialist views and those who already embraced Romantic nationalism. What really united them was not so much their social conservatism as their fundamental loyalty to the imperial government. For these progovernmental conservatives the state (or rather autocracy) was a decisive factor in shaping Russianness. Those who also shared conservative ideas but who were not very enthusiastic about the government are analyzed separately. Among them I consider the national “imaginings” of the Slavophiles and such important figures as Nikolai Nadezhdin and Nikolai Polevoi, for whom the Russian nationality was no less important than a prenatal dynastic empire. It is the members of this circle who were considered to be the “real” Russians, Russian “patriots,” or simply “Russaks.” They also came up with explicitly ethnolinguistic and religious definitions of Russianness.

Finally, the views of Russian radicals are considered. This last group would be incomplete without its ideological predecessors, the Decembrists from the 1820s, one of whom—Mikhail Lunin—was still a prolific political analyst while in exile in the 1830s and 1840s. The Russian radicals, like the Polish émigré radicals, often advocated the most advanced national model in the world—the one elaborated by the French Jacobins. This

TABLE 5 A general scheme of the Russian case

<i>positions</i>	empire; "all-Russian nation" (broad: East Slavs); "all-Russian nation" (narrow: Jacobin model); Great Russia (Russian "ethnie")
<i>idioms</i>	language; autocracy/loyalty to the dynasty; Orthodoxy; ethnography; "spirit"/mentality
<i>oppositions</i>	Russia—the West; Orthodoxy—Catholicism; Old—New; Gesellschaft—Gemeinschaft; empire—nationality

model presupposed the building of a unitary nationality (within a nation-state) on the basis of common mentality and political values that rejected both feudal empire and Herderian (ethnographic) nationality. For most Russian intellectuals of the 1830s–1840s, however, the empire remained an ever-present point of reference (Table 5).

### Multiethnic Empire or an Empire of the Russians?

As early as the 1830s, the Russian conservative circles were not monolithic and were split into several groups and individual figures. In what follows I use the classification of Russian progovernmental conservatives devised by Paul Bushkovitch.<sup>7</sup> The group of the dynastic conservatives included Baltic Germans and Poles devoted to the dynasty. Among them the most prominent were journalists such as Osip Senkovskii and Fadei Bulgarin (both Poles), and high-level bureaucrats such as Count Benckendorff (a Baltic German). They emphasized autocracy, social hierarchy, and religion (be it Orthodoxy, Protestantism, or Catholicism). Cynthia Whittaker gave a succinct characterization of their vision of Russianness: "For them, 'Russianness,' even for Baltic Germans and Poles, basically revolved around a subject's loyalty to the autocrat; in other words, they equated the nation with the state governed by the dynasty, which was seen as both the repository and the bearer of the national culture."<sup>8</sup> As would be shown, Whittaker was quite right. These conservatives, however, were not so much preoccupied with the Russian nationality as with the preservation of a feudal dynastic empire, and therefore the word *nation* perhaps should not have been used here at all.

Another group of conservatives—the proponents of the doctrine of "official nationality"—included the minister of education, Sergei Uvarov, and two leading scholars, Mikhail Pogodin and Stepan Shevyrev. They indeed shared the reverence for autocracy, social hierarchy, and religion but

added to them Russian nationalism. In the words of Paul Bushkovitch, for them the “Russian national tradition was to be the basis of a conservative ideology in Russia, not international legitimism.”<sup>9</sup> This group was in reality much broader, encompassing many university professors of the humanities, among them Uvarov’s protégés, who combined an ethnolinguistic and religious understanding of Russianness with the reverence for autocracy and empire.

### *Official Nationality*

The term *official nationality* (*ofitsial’naia narodnost’*) was coined in the late nineteenth century by the Russian liberal literary historian Alexander Pypin, who tried to label the type of national ideology designed by the minister, Uvarov, and reflected in official rhetoric of the time. One can argue that the term itself, as well as the very division of the Russian conservative camp into the two categories, is not precise. The purpose of this work, however, is not to give a new definition of Russian conservatism but to analyze the discourse of nation-ness across the Russian ideological spectrum. “Official nationality” conveys quite well the meaning and the intentions of Uvarov’s ideological construction, which was shared by several prominent intellectuals, such as the literary historian Stepan Shevyrev and his friend, the historian and journalist Mikhail Pogodin. To understand the principles of official nationality one should start with the opinions of Uvarov himself.

In 1832, Sergei Uvarov, then a deputy-minister of education, submitted to young emperor Nicholas I a proposal for what was to become the notorious doctrine known as Uvarov’s triad, or the “theory of official nationality.” Written in French, Uvarov’s draft was an explication of a proposed ideology of Russian government. It was a curious combination of contradictory elements: dynastic legitimism and modern nationalism. Andrei Zorin, a prominent student of Uvarov’s ideology, has correctly remarked that this ideology was doomed to fail precisely because it sought to reconcile nationalism, as the principle of European radicals, with dynastic legitimism, as the last resort of old-school conservatives.<sup>10</sup> Uvarov was aware that very similar efforts in the West proposed by the German conservative philosopher Friedrich Schlegel (who hoped to unite the German “nation” around the Catholic feudal empire of the Habsburgs) had failed. Yet Uvarov believed Russia was inherently different, and that would

allow the authorities to implement such an unusual synthesis more easily through educational policies.

Uvarov drew heavily on Schlegel's vision of nation-ness in his own effort to define the Russian nationality. According to the German thinker, the nation was not the result of a social contract but rather the product of a continuous historical development.<sup>11</sup> Nation was based on a common ethnicity (race), common customs, and shared language, which made it easier for conationals to form an organic nation-state.<sup>12</sup> Russia, unlike Germany, was already a state, but again, unlike Germany, Russia as a multiethnic empire could not boast an ethnicity-based "nation." Zorin commented that Schlegel's Romantic nationality could not be applied even to a Great Russian part of the empire due to the social and cultural gap between the Russian elite, which often spoke French and claimed foreign origins, and the deprived peasantry.<sup>13</sup> Uvarov thus had to redefine "nationality."

In a French-language project, Uvarov presented three principles of the new state ideology: "national religion," autocracy, and nationality.<sup>14</sup> Almost ten years later he repeated this earlier definition almost literally, although he replaced the very secular term *national religion* with the more traditional term *Orthodoxy*.<sup>15</sup> If in 1832 Uvarov called his triad the "three great state principles," in 1843 he was more explicitly nationalistic as he sought to define a "distinctive character of Russia" by pulling together "sacred remnants of its nationality."<sup>16</sup> Orthodoxy was defined as the "church of one's own fathers" and the "faith of [our] forefathers." Without love for them, "a nation as well as an individual would perish." Uvarov linked Russianness to Orthodoxy and autocracy: "A Russian, devoted to the fatherland, will as unlikely acquiesce to the loss of one of the dogmas of our Orthodoxy as to the stealing of one pearl from Monomakh's crown."<sup>17</sup>

The presence of Orthodoxy as the national religion best signified the turn to Russian nationalism and Uvarov's reference predominantly to the Orthodox "all-Russian nation." Outside Uvarov's official nationality remained all national minorities and religious dissidents, even from the Great Russian ethnic community, not to mention political dissidents. Autocracy was represented as the "main condition of Russia's political existence" and the "cornerstone" of Russia's might, which sustained and protected Russia. Nationality, however, was the least defined element of the triad and revealed a logical vicious circle: this element was defined through two previous elements, autocracy and Orthodoxy, which themselves were regarded as the characteristics of nationality.<sup>18</sup>

As an element of the triad, nationality<sup>19</sup> per se did not have any content beyond the institutions of autocracy and Orthodoxy. Uvarov's nationality was thus a subjective or psychological category—loyalty to autocracy and belief in Orthodoxy—which were proved by history and still could be found at present. In other words, Uvarov defined Russianness as both an “objective” and “subjective” category; that is, *real* autocracy and the dominant religion combined with emotional attachment to them. In Uvarov's case the “all-Russian nation” was based on *real* institutions and *imagined* loyalty to these institutions that were reflected in the nation's mind. As Zorin aptly put it, a Russian was someone who believed in his church and his tsar.<sup>20</sup>

In his most theoretical texts, Uvarov did not use linguistic and ethnographic idioms of Russianness, but in his more “practical” remarks, especially those related to his educational policies, he ascribed a primary role to the Russian language as the main symbol of Russianness and instrument of Russification. When confronted with the Polish and Baltic German communities, Uvarov's position appeared even more exclusivist and nationalist. He was clearly aware of the discord between nationality and empire and was ready to sacrifice the former for the sake of the latter. Yet, he strongly believed that the emphasis on the “all-Russian nation” would strengthen the empire. Uvarov's educational policies were undoubtedly nationalistic. While recognizing the multiethnic patchwork of the empire, he nonetheless sought “to introduce a native education that was predominantly original and a Russian education.”<sup>21</sup> Although his attitudes towards Poles and Baltic Germans differed significantly, Uvarov's ultimate goal was to abolish or at least to undermine both nationalities by introducing linguistic Russification and acculturation into Russian culture. The only difference was that the disloyal Poles had to undergo these policies immediately, while the loyal Baltic Germans would be given more time to enjoy their “putative” German nationality.

Uvarov interpreted Russo-Polish relations not as an “Empire versus [Polish] nationality” discord but rather as a centuries-long *national* conflict between Poles and Russians, with the result that “one of these tribes” became the subject of the other.<sup>22</sup> Such a national interpretation allowed Uvarov to treat the conflict in ethnolinguistic and religious terms as the “long-lasting, mutual hatred of one language for another, the Roman church for Orthodox, and Western civilization for Eastern.” The Russian nationality was declared an unconditional winner. Subsequently, Uvarov suggested the “in-

tellectual merger” of the two nationalities but with “the proper prevalence of Russian,” which had to become “the center of state existence and moral civilization.”<sup>23</sup> The Russian language was assigned the role of being both the discourse and the instrument of nationality, with the goal “to suppress [ . . . ] the idea of a particular [Polish] nationality” and “to convey” to Polish youth a “common spirit of the Russian people.”<sup>24</sup> Kyiv University, in particular, was assigned the task “to destroy the Polish nationality” in southwestern Russia. Uvarov overtly called the Russian language “the great engine of the Russian nationality.”<sup>25</sup>

Along with the Poles, the Baltic Germans defined the limits of the “all-Russian nation.” They were still outside it. Unlike the Poles, the German-speaking nobles of the Baltic were loyal to the Romanov dynasty and represented a traditional mode of political legitimacy, which referred to dynastic empire rather than nationality. In spite of this, for Uvarov such imperial loyalty was no longer sufficient: he ironically dismissed the nationality of Baltic Germans as putative (*mnimaia*) and hoped that in the future they would adopt Russian cultural identity, although he argued against any aggressive Russification of these loyal subjects.

Finally, in 1847, after the authorities persecuted the Ukrainian Sts. Cyril and Methodius Society, Uvarov issued a quite confusing circular to the curator of the Moscow educational district. The minister sought to exonerate Slavic studies, which the emperor held responsible for stirring up dissent. First, Uvarov placed Russians with their religion and language at the “center of the Slavic tribes.” Second, he praised the Slavophiles for their celebration of the Russian “national spirit” and Orthodoxy, but he added to these values autocracy, defining Russianness, as he had ten years ago, as loyalty to autocracy and Orthodoxy. He then identified the “Russian principle” and “Russian spirit” with Russia’s “state principle.” Finally, he rejected any pan-Slavic ideas, emphasizing instead the ethnolinguistic idioms of the Russian nationality: “We should [ . . . ] in our native element, in our national self, in our faith, in our devotion to the throne, and in our language and customs establish a vital element of the Russian mind, Russian virtues, and Russian feeling. Here is to be found the national element, not Slavic-Russian but purely Russian, unshakable in its foundation—our nationality proper.”<sup>26</sup> Uvarov concluded with a glorification of Russian nationalism, praising the “Russian people” (as opposed to other Slavs!) for the preservation of their nationality: it was only the Russians who “preserved the faith of [ . . . ] fathers, language, mores, customs—the

entire nationality.”<sup>27</sup> At the same time, the minister sent to the universities of Kharkiv and Kyiv circulars warning against the national aspirations of Ukrainians and Poles, respectively. In the case of Kharkiv, Uvarov warned against “all unthinking pursuits of provincial spirit.” In Kyiv the danger was greater. The ministry instructed teachers that “under the disguise of Slavophilism [*slavianstva*] there can easily be concealed a Polish rebellious spirit.” In both cases the minister called on professors and students to adopt “the name Russian,” which was “more glorious for us than any particular and separate name.”<sup>28</sup> Thus, Sergei Uvarov visibly evolved from stressing dynastic to ethnolinguistic idioms of Russianness, thereby closing the gap between the empire and Russian nationality.

Stepan Shevyrev was one of the first Russian academics to outline Uvarov's vision of Russianness in scholarly works and journalism. In an 1842 speech, “On the Relation of Family Education to State,” Shevyrev sought to combine the idea of official nationality with the promotion of state (or public) education as opposed to private boarding schools and foreign tutors. Elaborating on Uvarov's doctrine, Shevyrev argued that education had to support the Russian principle by affecting the body, soul, and spirit of a student.<sup>29</sup> Thus Russianness was both a spiritual and physiological feature. Along the lines of educational politics laid out by Sergei Uvarov, Shevyrev attacked private and domestic education in his attempt to represent education as an “instrument for state goals.”<sup>30</sup> Domestic education was thought to distort “the unity of Russian life” by introducing differences of thought and language that “threatened us with the loss of our nationality.” Hence, the Russian state must become the key guarantor of the Russian nationality.

By using the Hegelian triad, Shevyrev interpreted Russian history as the dialectical development of three types of nationality. First, in pre-Petrine times Russianness was represented in familial terms as an “exclusive nationality” where each family reflected the “spirit of [the] entire nation” and where the nation was indeed “one strong inseparable family.”<sup>31</sup> This nationality resembled what decades later the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies called *Gemeinschaft* (community), a concept also celebrated by contemporary Slavophiles as the utopian model of Russianness. Second, the antithesis to this “exclusive” Russianness was Peter's “dangerous” Westernization, which was responsible for “the disruption of national unity, discord of opinions, disunity of families, diversity of domestic mores, mixture of upbringings, methods of learning, languages, etc.”<sup>32</sup> Put another

way, modernization was the greatest threat to a community-based Russianness, and as a result, a Russian “easily began to transform himself into a Frenchman, German, Englishman, and so on.” Third, the nineteenth-century reign of Nicholas I was regarded as the ultimate synthesis of an exclusive pre-Petrine Russianness and European identity.

Shevyrev called this last period “European-Russian” and celebrated the unity of family and state in education. The new Russian was expected to represent a combination of three elements: Christianity, traditional Russianness, and educated Europe. The cornerstone (or idiom) of this new Russianness, supervised by the state, was to be the Russian language as the “invisible image of an entire Russian man.”<sup>33</sup>

In his scholarly works Shevyrev developed a vision of the Russian language and Orthodoxy as the pillars of Russianness. He thought the state to be crucial but not indispensable for national existence. It was the (Russian) language and Orthodoxy that represented the Russian nationality throughout history, when the state did not encompass an entire nationality. “In the very difficult times of Barbarian [Mongol] yoke,” wrote Shevyrev in 1838, “when Russia was deprived of political unity, [it was only] religion and language, being kept in purity, [that] supported the unity of a divided nation and state; Russia prayed to a Christian God and prayed already in one language.”<sup>34</sup>

For him, the Russian nationality developed both in the south (around Kyiv, Chernihiv, Ostroh, and L'viv) and in the north (in Moscow), two parts united by a common faith and language (Church Slavonic). Like his Little Russian friend Mykhailo Maksymovych, Shevyrev included Ukrainian early modern writers in the common literary canon, thus emphasizing the cultural unity of the “all-Russian nation.” Shevyrev was obsessed with the Russian language and regarded it as the major pillar of Russianness. He wrote that “language [was] our original property, inseparable from us; this is our essential feature, which is why we bear the name Russian; this is the expression of our entire life; this is the intangible image of an entire Russian man.”<sup>35</sup> The question of how to reconcile a “truly original nationality” with European civilization remained open, however.

It seems that later, in the 1840s, Shevyrev slightly modified his vision of Russianness by focusing mostly on religion (Orthodoxy). In 1846, in his *History of Predominantly Ancient Russian Literature*, Shevyrev related the issue of nation-ness to that of divinity. He defined nationality (*narodnost'*) as the “collection of all spiritual and physical forces given by Providence

to any nation, so that it could accomplish on earth its human mission." Without nationality, neither humanity nor divinity could arise.<sup>36</sup> Shevyrev expressed elements of exclusive nationalism when he argued against the adoption of national elements by one nation from another, adding that a nation could admit only universal human things—"common to all nations"—but "purified" in divinity. This conception paradoxically reminds us of Polish messianic philosophy, as expressed by Zygmunt Krasiński, who ascribed a crucial role to Western Christianity in the formation of Poland. Similarly, Shevyrev underlined the inherent connection between the Russian nationality and Orthodoxy. "Our Russian national differs from others by the fact that from the very beginning of its existence it was baptized and realized in Christ. We called ourselves from the outset the Christianized, Orthodox people," concluded Shevyrev, adding that Russians "closely linked Christianity with nationality."<sup>37</sup>

Shevyrev also remained a proponent of a loosely structured "all-Russian nation" and interpreted premodern Russian literary history (until the seventeenth century) as a dialectical coexistence of the "north" and "south" of Russia. During the first period (eleventh and twelfth centuries), "Southern" Kyiv was the "embodiment of Russian civilization." The second period (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) was called "Northern" since it was centered on Moscow. Finally, the third period represented the synthesis of the "Southern" and "Northern" periods, symbolizing a "great unity" of the two halves of Russia. In Shevyrev's words, this period "represents the transition to mutual communication of two cores of Russian life, which in the seventeenth century reached its highest point, so that the North and South of Russia mutually supplement and unite each other."<sup>38</sup> At the same time, he differentiated between the Great Russian and Ukrainian language and nationality, even making reference to statistical data. In this sense, the "Russian Slavs" for him meant all East Slavs who coexisted with "Eastern" ("Southern," in today's sense) and "Western" Slavic groups.<sup>39</sup> In addition, Ukraine, for Shevyrev as for many other Russian literati, was a "source of an innocent and sincere [ . . . ] humor" and folklore-based nationality,<sup>40</sup> and certainly not the dangerous "other" as depicted in some Polish writings.

Shevyrev's friend Mikhail Pogodin expressed similar ideas about Russianness, although he paid more attention to historical legacy and legitimacy in his vision of a Russian imagined community. In the 1830s, he was also one of the best experts in Polish affairs and the main promoter of pan-Slavism in Russia. Pogodin disregarded the gap between empire

and nationality in Russia by emphasizing the dominant language and religion as idioms of empire-nation. The Russian Empire, unlike other European states, was united by language and faith, and it was “populated mostly by the tribes that speak one language and therefore have uniform mindset, practice one religion [ . . . ], whereas all previous [empires] consisted of tribes of different languages, which did not understand and hated each other, and were only united temporarily, mechanically, by the force of weapon.”<sup>41</sup> He emphasized the “natural” unification of Russia. Like Shevryev, Pogodin designed a framework of Russian political history that took place both in the “South-West” and “North-East” following the Mongol invasion:

North-Eastern Russia increasingly differs from South-Western, which after being sacked by the Tatars had lost its population and soon fell under the Lithuanians. They were first our poor vassals, then dangerous neighbors, and finally ferocious enemies. Russian life was shining on its western edge, in Galich, but not for long; it found refuge for some time beyond the Dnieper rapids from where Cossacks would emerge with glory, the future liberators of Little Russia. This stage of history is being transferred North-East.<sup>42</sup>

Pogodin sought to “find” the roots of an alleged ethnic homogeneity of the Russian Empire in medieval history, in the legacy of Kyivan Rus’. This scheme represented “South-Western Russia,” or Ukraine, as a legitimate part of the Moscow patrimony. In characterizing the medieval population, he underlined its common origins: “Local people (Slavs) were very numerous and united by their origins, which no other country at that time could present, because Gaul, Britain, and Italy were settled earlier and received many diverse inhabitants.”<sup>43</sup> Moscow for Pogodin embodied the real “heart” of the Russian nationality, representing traditional values of faith, fatherland, and monarchy. He also emphasized historical legacy as an idiom of Russianness—of the “all-Russian nation” and the empire alike. This became particularly evident in the Polish context. The northwestern and southwestern provinces, that is, Belarusian and Ukrainian ethnic lands, were incorporated into Russia as its ancient property—“its own ancient materials.”<sup>44</sup>

Elsewhere, Pogodin stressed that Russia did not conquer Poland but only “returned to itself those lands which had belonged to it for ages by right of first occupation, on the same level with its original possessions, in the same way that France owns Paris and Austria [owns] Vienna.”<sup>45</sup> His-

tory itself provided Russia with the right to own numerous lands, whereby historical legacy became a fundamental idiom of the "all-Russian nation": "Volhynia, Podolia, and Belarus had belonged to Russian possessions for ages; there in the very earliest period of our history, lived Slavic tribes which entered the Russian State long before many others; for example, those living in Riazan' and Suzdal regions. Even more so, this was the core, so to speak, where our history from the time of Vladimir to the Mongols unfolded."<sup>46</sup>

Historical legitimism not only helped to shape the "all-Russian nation"; it also justified the incorporation of ethnic Polish lands. Pogodin suggested that for the Poles to have non-Polish kings was nothing new: Russian tsars were as natural in Poland as were Lithuanian, German, French, and Saxon dynasties. In addition, the incorporation into Russia was certainly a historically justified revenge against the Poles, who once spilled "Russian blood." Pogodin wondered with irony whether the "happiness" of Poland during the reigns of Alexander I and Nicholas I was, indeed, a retaliation for "the heavy sufferings of Russia; for example, in the epoch of the Catholic hegemony in Ukraine" or under False Dmitrii.<sup>47</sup> In 1831, quite contrary to his much later (1846) comment about the ethnic homogeneity of Russia, Pogodin proclaimed the superiority of a complex state over a nation-state in an effort to discard Polish claims to independence. "States are molded from different parts," commented the young historian. "To split these parts chemically with the desire to return their independence is generally a futile, impossible, and crazy effort."<sup>48</sup>

Language was no less important as a nation-builder and a national marker. A spoken Ukrainian, or "Little Russian dialect" in Galicia and Bukovina, was clear evidence of the historical presence of Russia in those lands. The "all-Russian nation" was defined here by language, even if it was split into different "dialects." The ethnolinguistic and historical idioms of Russianness were also used with respect to Belarus, although the broader context was still the refutation of Polish claims. Pogodin wrote about Belarus that "even now Russians comprise there the larger part of the population, while the [Russian] language until latest times was even ruling, civic, and written."<sup>49</sup> He added that Russia had as rightful a claim to Lithuania as England had to Wales and Ireland, or France to Brittany.

Language, however, was not the ultimate idiom of Russianness if set in opposition to the Poles. Language had to unite Poles with Russians through the gradual "mild" Russification of the former. Russians would

learn Polish, and Poles would learn Russian with the result that the two nationalities would become aware of their “kinship” and “brotherhood.”<sup>50</sup> Pogodin believed that language—in particular the Polish language—was indeed a natural symbol of nationality, and therefore Polish could not be easily replaced with Russian. On the other hand, Pogodin hoped that one day Russian would become a common Slavic literary medium. Pointing to the example of Latin, he argued: “The Russian language contains in itself [ . . . ] so many properties common to particular Slavic dialects that it will become sooner or later, without any special efforts, the literary Slavic language—as had been for quite some time the Bulgarian dialect to several tribes or Latin in the West.”<sup>51</sup>

The “all-Russian nation” was not unitary and was not reduced to Great Russia. This can be demonstrated in the Ukrainian context of Pogodin’s thought. Paul Bushkovitch regards Pogodin as one of the most pro-Ukrainian Russian intellectuals in the 1830s–1840s.<sup>52</sup> In 1843, Pogodin published a short commentary criticizing Senkovskii’s treatment of Ukraine; in it he made three important points. First, Pogodin emphasized the historical continuity between Kyivan Rus’ and contemporary Ukraine. Second, he pointed to a separate Ukrainian space stretching from Galicia and Transcarpathia in the west to Left Bank Ukraine in the east. Third, he used language, ethnicity, and history as the idioms of Ukrainianness, stressing that the Galicians, ever since the time of St. Vladimir, have resided on the same territory and have spoken the same language, which unites them with “Little Russians” from Chernihiv, Poltava, and Pereiaslav.<sup>53</sup> Pogodin nevertheless treated Ukrainian as a dialect of the “Russian language.”<sup>54</sup> Thus, common Russianness for Pogodin was shaped mostly by the idioms of language (Russian in a broad sense), historical legacy, and perhaps Orthodoxy.

### *Dynastic Conservatism*

The dynastic conservatives were imperial loyalists rather than Russian nationalists. Their main imagined community was the empire itself. In most cases, nation for them meant the Russian Empire, irrespective of ethnicity or faith. The leading proponents of this conservative ideology could not emphasize the idioms of nationality, such as Orthodoxy, ethnography, and even the Russian language, since people like Count Alexander Benckendorff, Fadei Bulgarin, or Osip Senkovskii were neither Orthodox nor

ethnic Russians. One can say that the ideology of dynastic conservatism best corresponded to the official policy of imperial dynasty, a policy that was not ready to embrace nationalism. The dynastic conservatives either avoided or directly criticized nationalist rhetoric, especially if it promoted a Great Russian agenda at the expense of state interests as understood by the imperialists.

#### Empire and “Russian patriots”

Count Alexander Benckendorff, himself of Baltic German descent, was the best example of dynastic loyalism. In his reports about the socio-political situation in Russia the count bluntly criticized “Russian patriots” for their radical anti-Polish and Russian nationalist views. He argued against the abolition of the Kingdom of Poland and its transformation into several Russian provinces, as some members of the Russian Senate suggested. He also implicitly refuted the opinions of “Russian patriots” who according to him, aspired to “the execution of a portion of the Polish nation and the complete enslavement of the rest.”<sup>55</sup> Finally, Benckendorff considered the most radical argument of Russian nationalists. They had mistakenly imagined that the “imperial family [was of] German origins” and dreamt about “senseless reforms in Russian spirit.”<sup>56</sup> He also alluded to the gap between empire and nation in Russia by pointing to the incorporation of Finland: “Russians are completely indifferent about this remote land that does not have any relations with Russia.” Yet, as a high imperial official, Benckendorff associated “nation” with its monarch: “Never [before] did the monarch possess so many means to attach to himself a nation.”<sup>57</sup>

The political imagination of the ruling elite was tested toward the end of the 1840s, when the imperial authorities discovered a quasi-political Ukrainian organization, the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Society, which also expressed general pan-Slavic ideas. Aleksei Miller has argued that the Third Department—the imperial punitive and investigative service—mistakenly perceived this Ukrainian society as an expression of local Slavophile patriotism and not as the beginning of modern Ukrainian nationalism.<sup>58</sup> Actually, the opposite seemed to be true: the authorities mistakenly interpreted the society’s ideas as nationalist, comparing them with Polish separatism.

The Third Department’s vision of Russia as a dynastic empire that paradoxically had a ruling nationality (Great Russian) is also revealing. Tsarist officials urged “scholars” and “teachers” in their books and classes

“to avoid those reminders about Little Russia, Poland, and other lands subject to Russia, which can be used in a dangerous way with respect to integrity and peace of Russia.” Instead, the “true loyalty of these tribes to Russia” had to be emphasized.<sup>59</sup> Loyalty to Russia as an empire was thought to be superior to local patriotism. At the same time, the political imagination of high imperial bureaucrats was already influenced by nationalism, as can be seen from the reaction of Count Orlov, head of the Third Department, to Slavophile and Ukrainian activities, in 1847. The count explicitly recognized the primacy of “proper Russians” in the empire by praising those Slavophiles who acted “in a truly Russian spirit”:

The Slavophiles, who are seeking to establish in our fatherland the language, mores, and the ways of thinking of proper Russians, and who hope to purge our nationality from superfluous foreign mixes, are highly useful. They are the engines of the state, the instruments of its independence and might, so that the government must use them and support those who act in a truly Russian spirit.<sup>60</sup>

Nationalism became inappropriate only when it threatened the international order of dynastic empires and began propagating the idea of the “incorporation of foreign Slavic tribes to Russia.” Another limit to nationalism was set by a threat to the integrity of Russia itself. Count Orlov thought that the allegedly Ukrainian idea about “the restoration of nationality of their native country” would prompt Ukrainians and other “subject nations” to “desire a sovereign existence.” Orlov understood well the danger of nationalism to the dynastic empire, especially where the nationalism of “subject tribes” was concerned. Great Russian nationalism, which otherwise was useful in the teaching of the Slavophiles, could become a negative example for national minorities: “as ruling tribes care about the restoration of their nationality, so do the subject tribes: Poles want to be Poles, Little Russians—Little Russians.” In this sense, the idea of nationality was incompatible with the idea of empire. It hardly occurred to the count that “proper Russians” could also develop such a *separatist* idea of nationality. In his view, the promotion of the Russian nationality was the promotion of the very empire. Russians for him were an imperial nation, a *Herrenvolk* par excellence, and therefore he did not separate a Herderian Russian nationality from a feudal empire.

Perhaps it was the first time in official rhetoric that Ukrainians were considered on the same level with Poles as a potential danger to the empire: Orlov attested to the ideas “about a separate existence” among young

Ukrainophiles but warned the authorities not to show Ukrainians that the “government had a reason to doubt” their loyalty. He also argued against harsh measures that were already applied in the Kingdom of Poland. At any rate, the “all-Russian nation” was conspicuously absent in his rhetoric. Instead, loyal “proper Russians” were surrounded by disloyal Poles and suspect Ukrainians. Orlov also pointed to the very curious concept of contradicting loyalties, which according to him, had to form a hierarchy instead of an opposition. In other words, empire as “fatherland” (*otechestvo*) was superior to any peripheral nationality, which was branded as “native country” (*rodina*). The Russian Empire was depicted as a higher unity in its own right set above separate nationalities that constituted the empire. The count specifically pointed to the example of “Little Russia” as one such “native country.” Here again, Little Russia appeared in the company of Poland rather than Great Russia. Orlov urged “scholars” to be sensitive about these issues:

So that they [scholars] debated as careful as possible when it concerns nationality or language of Little Russia and other subject tribes, without giving preference to the love for native country before the love for the fatherland and getting rid of everything that can harm this latter love, especially [ideas] of putative current sufferings and of their extraordinary happiness in the past; so that all conclusions of scholars and writers tended to elevate not Little Russia, Poland, and other countries separately but the Russian Empire in the complexity of its constitutive nations.<sup>61</sup>

The border between the rhetoric of dynastic conservatives and that of “official” nationalists was quite porous. Uvarov’s personal emphasis on the Russian nationality was reflected in numerous circulars of the Ministry of Popular Education. On the other hand, the most progovernmental journalists, such as Stepan Burachek, mixed a dynastic worldview with the celebration of the “all-Russian nation.”

#### Little Russia as Original Russia

Burachek’s case is especially revealing. He was the staunchest imperial loyalist, a Russian nationalist, and a passionate Little Russian patriot all at the same time, whom Ukrainian national poet Taras Shevchenko addressed in Ukrainian. The likes of Burachek combined the idioms of nation-ness with the idioms of empire. In 1841, he released two conservative manifestos entitled “The Russian Nationality” and “The Russian Nationality in Let-

ters.” He defined “nationality” through the conception of “national law”—treated as moral and social economy, or the division of labor, obligations, and property. As with many other conservative Romantics, nationality for Burachek was sacred and connected to divinity. As he put it, “each nation should preserve, as the life of a holy being, its nationality—and with all available for this forces and means perfect and develop this nationality.”<sup>62</sup> Nationality for him was a mystical obligation before God, “the expression of rights and gifts of God to the nation,” not something accidental or arbitrary. Therefore, nationality was not the product of a social contract but the creation of God, provided with unique characteristics, different from those of other nationalities. The adoption of “alien elements of nationality” was thus the rejection of both native nationality and God’s design. At the core of nationality Burachek saw the so-called “native” elements—innate and unalterable. Alongside were also “temporary” elements that could be perfected but could not contradict the “native” elements.

Burachek’s complex and somewhat confusing system can be reduced to the three dominant idioms of the Russian nationality, which placed his version of Russianness somewhere between Uvarov’s “official nationality” and prenatal imperial loyalty. Imperial dynasty, Orthodoxy, and the Russian language defined the “all-Russian nation” of Stepan Burachek. “Tsar, faith, and language: autocracy, Orthodoxy, and the word as the closest representative of nationality are truly three cornerstones of the Russian nationality,” he wrote; “all other elements [come] from them.”<sup>63</sup> According to Burachek, the tsar represented the “civil” category of a nationality’s “core,” which included elements such as laws and social relations between traditional estates. Faith represented the church, morals, customs, forefathers, and so on. Finally, the “language” category included a curious combination of literature, ethnography, and “way of life,” including the nation’s hygiene. Religion perhaps was a more important idiom of Russianness than language since Burachek argued for the Christianization of Russia’s “aliens” in their native languages.<sup>64</sup>

Loyalty to the dynasty was of course the main idiom of Russianness, as the ruler himself was proclaimed a guarantor of the nationality: “The time has come!” exclaimed Burachek: “Our paternal and wise government has already inaugurated the dawn of a true, native Russian light.” He urged his readers to respond adequately to the “sacred appeal of the father [ . . . ] and the guardian angel” of the Russian nationality.<sup>65</sup> Seeking the pure Russian nationality in language and literature, Burachek curi-

ously chose Ukraine as a model. For him, a patriarchal Little Russia was a conservative utopia where the purest Russianness could still be found, because the country itself was not contaminated by foreign influences. His Little Russia was just another Japan, isolated from the corruption of the contemporary world. To be sure, Little Russia better corresponded to an ideal Russia than did Great Russia:

Of all Russian regions, the character of the Russian language was preserved better and purer in Little Russia. The Little Russian language, by its spirit, grammar, and psychological construction, is much closer to original Rus' language than the contemporary Great Russian that is used in educated society, despite their significant difference in sounds. This is because only Little Russia until now has not experienced the invasion of "aliens."<sup>66</sup>

Burachek's Russian nation was big enough to encompass a Herderian Ukrainian (Little Russian) identity based on language, history, and social estate (nobles). This peripheral, but historical, nationality was represented by "the national high estate—the estate of nobles," which remained loyal to "their patriarchal life, language, and the state of things." According to Burachek, these patriarchal Little Russian gentry, the descendants of Cossacks, represented original Russianness—"the only vestige of Russian antiquity." He praised those numerous Little Russians, who "even in the capitals do not abandon their nationality." They managed to combine Europeanism with Ukrainian culture. In this sense, the Little Russian nationality did not contradict imperial loyalty, or even the "all-Russian nation," since Burachek's Little Russia was allegedly closer to the nationality of "our common forefathers" than was Great Russia, spoiled as it was by Westernization. Burachek sought to explain why Ukraine preserved its original Russianness. First, he pointed to the Kyiv Academy and Kharkiv University, which protected Little Russia from "false enlightenment." Second, Little Russia for ages was surrounded by Muscovites, Lithuanians, and Poles "whom she hated and from whom she could not borrow any fashion." Isolated unto itself, Little Russia was able to develop a unique folk poetry—much more numerous and valuable than the Great Russian.

Burachek passionately defended Ukrainian writers from critical attacks by Russian, Polish, and Lithuanian (sic!) writers, and he called on his readers to learn Ukrainian speech, study its grammar, and write in it. Finally, he urged educated Russians to send their children not to Europe but to Great Russian, Little Russian, Belarusian, and Lithuanian peasant huts

in order to learn their speech. Burachek's ultimate goal, however, was not the promotion of the Ukrainian language per se but the formation of "one native language" which would unite all of Rus'. Burachek concluded his manifesto by professing loyalty to the nation as based on "the Russian God, Russian church, Russian tsar, Russian law, Russian philosophy, and Russian life."<sup>67</sup> Imperial loyalty was smoothly transformed here into conservative nationalism (although centered on a loosely built "all-Russian nation").

Burachek's associate and *Maiak* coeditor, P. Korsakov, was similarly sympathetic to Ukraine. While reviewing Taras Shevchenko's *Kobzar*, he recognized Ukraine as a Herderian nationality based on a separate literary language. For Korsakov the *Kobzar* was written "completely in the national spirit" and belonged to "native literature." Ukrainian, as spoken by millions in "Southern Russia" and Galicia, was for him not an "illiterate jargon" or "patois of French provinces" but a literary language.<sup>68</sup> Korsakov obviously believed in a loosely structured Russianness that could encompass both Great and Little Russian ethnic cultures.

#### Empire Versus Province: Osip Senkovskii

Unlike Burachek and Korsakov, Senkovskii (or Sękowski in Polish circles) did not feel any sympathy for Ukraine. Instead of adoring the primitive, Romantic *Volk*, he focused on the civilizing mission of the state, whether Russian or even Polish. He chose the modern bureaucratic state over chaotic and uncivilized nationalities, despite the fact that the Ukrainian Cossacks were officially considered to be part of the "all-Russian nation." State, in general, for Senkovskii was superior to nationality. Senkovskii's vision of Ukraine represented another pole of imperial legitimacy and revealed its contradictions. If for someone like Burachek Ukraine (Little Russia) was at one and the same time a full-fledged Herderian nationality and original Russia, for Senkovskii Ukraine was a nonhistorical non-nationality. Paradoxically, the position of the conservative Senkovskii was almost identical with the stance of the radical Belinskii. The Polish-born Senkovskii unexpectedly appeared to be a Russian chauvinist, which perhaps represented for this born-again Russian the national façade of the Russian Empire.

Senkovskii bluntly discarded ethnic differences between Little Russia and "Russian Russia." As a result of imperial modernization, Ukrainians were losing their defining features while assimilating into ethnic Russians.

"In Little Russia," commented Senkovskii, an orientalist by training, "all local features that differ from a Russian Russia are gradually disappearing. The Cossack is already an anachronism. A Little Russian may still be shaving his beard, smoking his pipe, living in a hut, riding oxen, but he is already completely Russian and cannot be anything else."<sup>69</sup> He then compared the literary and antiquarian activities of the Ukrainian literati to the doomed efforts of Scottish Highland enthusiasts and Provençal-language works of the "French scholars," describing them as "a defeated difficulty, a toy, a dish of ancient coarse food of ancestors served on a luxurious table."

Elsewhere, Senkovskii called Ukraine simply the "southern part of our fatherland" that had lost its national sovereignty. He argued against admiration for the Ukrainian language, since contrary to the opinions of Ukrainian scholars, that language was relatively new and lacking a literary tradition. Senkovskii was perhaps the first to argue that Ukrainians were not the original inhabitants of the Dnieper basin at the time of Kyivan Rus' but later migrants from northwestern Ukraine—from Volhynia and Galicia.<sup>70</sup>

Finally, in his review of *A History of Little Russia* by Mykola Markevych, Senkovskii passionately attacked Ukrainian Cossack history, an approach that resembled the traditional treatment of the topic by some Polish literati. Contrary to imperial canon, Senkovskii dissociated the anarchic and disloyal Cossacks from Little Russia as a "Russian country."<sup>71</sup> For him, Ukrainian Cossacks were just an "armed and unruly horde of desperate villains," who ruled over Ukraine with a "knout" and kept its population "in slavery, squalor, and barbarity." Unprecedented in Russia was Senkovskii's justification of Polish reprisals against Cossack raids. He compared Cossack rule with the Mamluks in Egypt and called the Zaporozhian host the "Algeria of the North."<sup>72</sup> Nevertheless, according to imperial political correctness, he attributed the entire civilization of Ukraine (as best represented by the Kyiv and Kharkiv universities) to the efforts of the Russian government, which had managed to destroy the bloody rule of Cossacks. He urged Ukrainian historians not to glorify the criminals but rather to separate their native country from the "gang of Cossacks." His advice to Markevych revealed a condescending attitude toward Ukrainian history. If the Cossack Hetmanate had existed at present, the historian would not have written a history: "enjoying the great wellbeing of Little Russia under the rule of their majesties Hetmans, the author, perhaps, would not have known an alphabet to compile all this and present as a history."<sup>73</sup>

Such a negative treatment of Ukraine also revealed the fact that Russianness for Senkovskii meant the civilizational force of the empire. On this level the “all-Russian nation” equaled the imperial high culture, where all ethnic aspects were only decorative. Senkovskii’s imagined community paradoxically lay somewhere between the empire and Jacobin-style Russian nationality.

#### Polish Identity and Imperial Patriotism: Fadei Bulgarin

Another Pole-turned-imperial-patriot, Fadei Bulgarin (Tadeusz Bułharyn in Polish), epitomized the strength of imperial loyalty detached from Russian nationalism. As a Pole and an agent of the Third Department, he managed to combine imperial loyalism (even servilism) with a quite vibrant Polish nationalism. In his reports to the Third Department he urged authorities to recognize a separate Polish nationality within prepartitioned borders, and he even called on the government to annex Galicia from Austria and attach it to the Kingdom of Poland. His vision of the empire was the best example of dynastic conservatism. In his reports, Bulgarin did not reveal his idioms of Russian nationality; instead, he elaborated on the idioms of empire and Polishness. He justified autocracy as the only possible political system for a diverse multinational empire: “each country has its own elements for the way of government, and Russia, due to its enormous size, the diversity of its tribes, and the great difference in education among nobles of high class and middle [class], tradespeople, and peasants, cannot have another government but autocratic; hence, all [other] theories of government do not fit Russia.”<sup>74</sup>

It was only an autocratic empire that could unite all national minorities in one state. The imperial connection was situated above national divisions and conflicts. Bulgarin’s plan was “to tie all foreign tribes to the ruling house,” so that they became the “pillar of the throne on all occasions.”<sup>75</sup> The dynasty appeared to be the real beneficiary of Russia’s national diversity. Nationalities needed an autocrat, who in turn needed the nationalities. Separate nationalities, such as Poles and Baltic Germans, were therefore quite compatible with an empire based on dynastic loyalty. According to Bulgarin, the restoration of a prepartitioned Poland was only possible under the House of Romanov.<sup>76</sup> The appeal of a Russian tsar could unite against Austria the Galician Poles, who would recognize the Russian emperor as their “only legal tsar” and “Polish king.” After all, “Poles were

always famous for their loyalty to rulers,” such as Napoleon or Alexander I. “There is no other nation in the world which could be so easily, and so fast, tied to a ruling person and ruling house as the Poles.”<sup>77</sup> Therefore, Bulgarin insisted on the coronation of Nicholas I in Warsaw as king of Poland, since Poles “need to love a king as they breathe air.” As a result, Poles will show “devotion and loyalty to the dynasty” and will be ready to die for the king and fatherland.<sup>78</sup> He pointed to a similar dynastic loyalty among the Baltic Germans, who despite (or perhaps because of) their severe dislike for the “Russian nation” were “very strongly attached to the throne.” Baltic Germans were allegedly convinced that “their own wellbeing depends on the wellbeing of the ruling family and that they, with common efforts, should defend the throne”; they also regarded themselves as the “Guards defending the throne.”<sup>79</sup>

The glorification of a multinational empire by Bulgarin correlated with his increasing criticism of Russian ethnic nationalism. Like his “chief,” Benckendorff, Bulgarin was quite critical toward Russian nationalists, whom he called “Russian patriots,” “real Russians,” or pejoratively “Rus-saks” (*russaki*). He mentioned their opinions when they contradicted official decisions or when “Russians” were somehow insulted by “Germans” who were thought to rule over Russia. “Russian patriots” believed in the existence of a “German party” within the government and could not admit an empire that was nonnational (non-“Russian”) and that extensively employed Baltic Germans in the civil and military services. In all these conflicts Bulgarin sided with those “few well-intentioned people, not blinded by passions,” who defended “the law.”<sup>80</sup> All his life Bulgarin battled with the journalist Nikolai Polevoi, whom he also related to the party of “Russian patriots.” He also accused some “Russians” of instigating Polish hatred for the tsar, and he considered Russian “patriots” of mostly middle-class origins to be dangerous liberals who sought to undermine the autocratic empire. It was only logical that national minorities, not ethnic Russians, could be the main pillars of the Romanovs’ empire.

Bulgarin always underlined that Polishness and Germanness were compatible with imperial loyalty. This, however, did not exclude Polish (or German) hatred for ethnic Russians, which could be mitigated only by the ruler himself. For example, he recognized that Poles and Germans strongly disliked Russians but remained loyal to Russia’s rulers.<sup>81</sup> The conservative definition of nation-ness (including Polishness) could strengthen the dynastic empire and its ruler.

Bulgarin provided a comprehensive analysis of Polishness. He condemned the partitions, believed in the restoration of Poland under the Romanov dynasty, and even vindicated the Polish noble insurgents. “Who cannot be excused for longing for the unification of divided parts of a fatherland?” he wrote, referring to the Polish conspirators of the 1820s, whose alleged goal was “to attach the entire Poland to Russia and to give it for ages to the House of Romanovs.”<sup>82</sup> He praised the Congress of Vienna, which allegedly legitimized the national principle in politics and recognized the existence of a partitioned Polish nationality. “All three states that partitioned Poland agreed to support nationality [*nationalité*] in those provinces belonging to them and even to preserve [Polish] national customs, special administration, and national colors. [ . . . ] By acquiring the name of Poles and the right to nationality, they [Poles] considered themselves blessed: the joy was universal.”<sup>83</sup>

Since Bulgarin did not realize the contradiction between the national principle and dynastic loyalty, he somewhat mistakenly attributed to the Vienna Congress the legitimization of nationalities in politics. To stress his national convictions he pointed to the examples of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, which “proved the truth of political axiom that the existence of nations cannot be arbitrarily destroyed.” On the other hand, the example of the Hungarian, Bohemian, and Italian kingdoms within Austria showed that a dynastic empire could persist only if it guaranteed the right of nationality and autonomy to subject peoples. Bulgarin believed that these examples convinced politicians that “foreign nations can be quietly devoted to the throne only when they preserve their old name, laws, language and enjoy a decorative shadow, or ghost of national sovereignty.” National sovereignty was understood to be the autonomous status of provinces when they enjoyed “a special name, nationality and [ . . . ] internal administration.”<sup>84</sup> He expected the same treatment of Poland by the Russian government. Indeed, the Congress Kingdom was granted all those rights and was “the happiest of all Polish provinces.” But this had not lasted long. Bulgarin harshly criticized the repressive regime of Nikolai Novosiltsev, who treated Poland as if it were a “rebellious Catalonia” or “tumultuous Ireland,” that is, as a “conquered land.” Poland for him was a historical nationality that despite partitions could not be destroyed or deprived of its proper name:

History proves to us the truth of the political axiom that it is in no way possible to destroy completely the existence of a nation that has a separate language, literature, and history [ . . . ]. In vain did the governments that partitioned Poland attempt to in-

roduce to their subject nation the German language; in vain did they make Poles call themselves Russians, Austrians, and Prussians. Poles, deprived of a fatherland, called themselves everywhere "Poles."<sup>85</sup>

Repeatedly, Bulgarin emphasized that if nationality "has a history and literature, it will never forget [about] its existence." A prime example was Poland, which had the best literature among the Slavs.<sup>86</sup> Bulgarin's Romantic Polishness was based primarily on language, history, and institutions. Its conservative aspect was reinforced by the social idiom of nationness: Poles were a gentry-based nationality and as such were loyal to the Russian throne. They rejected democracy ("carbonarism") because it was "completely alien to the spirit of a military nation, to the aristocracy, to the rights of nobility, and to the Polish nationality" in general.<sup>87</sup> Unlike Russians, Poles had never spilled the blood of their kings; therefore, they were better subjects than Russians. Put another way, Polishness for Bulgarin was represented by the conservative, traditional, and loyal nobility and was quite compatible with Russia as the dynastic empire. The Polish nobility was, in essence, the Polish nationality.

Bulgarin was clearly aware of the limits of imagined communities. Neither Poles nor Baltic Germans were, or could become, "Russians." His comments about the Baltic Germans are especially revealing. "In my opinion," he wrote in 1846, "these provinces will never be made Russian since a cat cannot become a dog and vice versa, while forced, or perhaps hastened, efforts to impose Orthodoxy and the Russian language implanted only discord and hatred."<sup>88</sup> This was the bitter assessment of Uvarov's "official nationality." At the same time, unlike other Poles, Bulgarin regarded the Orthodox peasants of Russia's "Western" provinces as "Russians," and he treated Poles as a community of one language (Polish) and common religion (Roman Catholicism). In this last respect Bulgarin stood close to other Polish conservatives such as Krasieński and Rzewuski. Unlike the latter, however, who wrote in Polish but rejected the persistence of the Polish nationality, Bulgarin, who was a "national Russian writer" (his own words), was a passionate defender of the Polish nationality before imperial authorities. His version of Polish nationalism did not seem to contradict dynastic loyalism. For many Russians, however, the combination was inappropriate. While most of them could not admit his Polishness, liberals also abhorred his servility. Bulgarin's stance was obviously anachronistic.

For dynastic conservatives the primary community was either the empire itself centered on Romanov dynasty, or the "all-Russian nation"

closely connected to and defined by imperial dynasty. In the latter case, a nation was almost indistinguishable from the empire, where representative culture could either reflect the broadly conceived “all-Russian nation” or even resemble the French Jacobin model. Time increasingly demanded a compromise between a prenatal dynastic loyalty and some form of Russian nationalism. Toward the end of the 1840s the exclusive Polish, Ukrainian, or even German loyalties were becoming clearly incompatible with traditional “feudal” loyalty to the empire.

### *An Imagined Community of Russian Progovernmental Conservatives*

Russian conservatives were diverse and expressed sometimes incompatible views on nation-ness and empire. They all, however, regarded autocracy and dynastic loyalty as the cornerstone of both imperial and national community. Neither empire nor Russian nationality was possible without an autocrat. For both “official” nationalists and dynastic conservatives, autocracy was a far more important idiom of Russianness than ethnography or even religion. Autocracy also set the limits to their understanding of nationalism that otherwise contradicted dynastic legitimism. Uvarov’s position was the most precarious as he sought to merge traditional dynasty with Russian nationalism. At the same time, he failed to define “nationality” as distinct from autocracy and Orthodoxy. According to Andrei Zorin, this confusion revealed both the weakness and strength of Uvarov’s triad, for it left government more space in practical policies, which could emphasize either the nonethnic value of autocracy or ethnographic Russianness based on the Russian language and Orthodoxy.

Russian progovernmental conservatives operated on the level of the “all-Russian nation” that united all East Slavs in the community of “Russians.” This complex nation could vary in size, however, from a very broad, almost federative East Slavic group encompassing separate nationalities of Great Russians and Ukrainians (Little Russians), to a quite narrow Jacobin-style Russian nationality that almost equaled the Great Russian ethnic community. In some narratives (for example in Uvarov’s writings) these two meanings were mixed, and it is almost impossible to say what Uvarov meant when he used the term *Russian*—the traditional broad concept of Rus’, or the Great Russian ethnicity. Russianness was therefore interpreted differently: for Burachek the “original” Russianness was represented by

Ukrainians (Little Russians), while for Uvarov it was represented largely by Great Russians. For example, Uvarov's supporter Shevyrev regarded Moscow as the main representative of Russianness since the late medieval times.

Empire remained a major point of reference for Russian progovernmental conservatives who emphasized a ruling dynasty, history, and "fatherland" as its idioms. A modern imagined community—the "all-Russian nation"—was compatible with the empire but could be expressed in more "national" terms: the Russian (meaning East Slavic) language and "spirit" (in a broader version), or Great Russian ethnography (in a more exclusive version). Emphasis on autocracy, however, made all three positions ill-prepared to face the challenges of the modern age of egalitarian nationalism.

### Russia as an Orthodox *Gemeinschaft* and a Liberal Empire

There were no clear borders between different circles of the Russian intelligentsia in the 1830s and 1840s. Nevertheless, those who are remembered in history as Slavophiles did produce a certain cultural and sociopolitical agenda that differentiated them from others, especially from their main ideological counterparts, the Westernizers.<sup>89</sup> To separate the values of a traditional or organic community, which is based on religious solidarity and Romantic intuition, from the values of a modern rational society the Polish historian Andrzej Walicki applied the concepts of the German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. The social model of the Slavophiles corresponded to Tönnies's concept of *Gemeinschaft* (community), while social relations advocated by Westernizers were related more to the concept of *Gesellschaft* (society). In fact, the latter concept did not so much reflect the views of Russian Westernizers as it represented the antimodel for Slavophiles.

According to Tönnies, "community" was based on the "natural will" of people that led to organic development, which was opposed to the "rational will" of rational "society" based on social contract and planning. Therefore, the *Gemeinschaft* (community) of Slavophiles represented an organic unity (*Einheit*)—that is, familial spirit, common faith, and customs—while the *Gesellschaft* (society) was considered to be an artificial, rational creation lacking moral solidarity.<sup>90</sup> If *Gemeinschaft's* essence was religion (or the "dominant faith of the people," according to a leading Slavophile), in *Gesellschaft* it was public opinion expressing the collec-

tive will. If *Gesellschaft* was socially divided into the people and the elites, *Gemeinschaft* preserved the patriarchal family with its Russian extension, the peasant commune, which represented the “people” (*narod*). According to Walicki, Slavophilism was the ideology of an old Moscow nobility seeking to defend precapitalist society as unity and as the ideal of a “people’s” monarchy or paternal power in opposition to the modern state and bureaucracy.<sup>91</sup>

Although such prominent Russian intellectuals as Nikolai Nadezhdin and Nikolai Polevoi did not belong to the circle of Moscow Slavophiles, they often expressed similar ideas of Russian Orthodox nationalism. Unlike the Slavophiles, however, Nadezhdin and Polevoi also combined imperial loyalism with European liberalism. The vision of nation-ness depended on underlying values which were reflected in the opposition between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, or autocratic despotism and liberalism. In what follows I try to analyze different idioms and configurations of nationality among the representatives of Slavophile and liberal nationalist thought that combined traditionalism with modern nationalism.

### *A Slavophile Utopia*

With regard to the Slavophiles the focus here is on an older generation and is based on works written before 1847. Primary attention is given to three figures: Ivan Kireevskii, Konstantin Aksakov, and Aleksei Khomiakov. Each in his own way personified the entire movement.

#### From Europe to Russia: The Thought of Ivan Kireevskii

Ivan Kireevskii, one of the founders of the ideology, underwent a complicated spiritual evolution—from conservative Europeanism to Russian Orthodoxy. These paradoxes were already present in his first major work, “A Review of Russian Literature of 1829,” where he argued for the creation of a national literature and history, while at the same time emphasizing that Russian civilization was formed by the efforts of major European nations. In addition, while defending the continuity of national life, he stressed that everything in Russia began from Peter the Great, that is, from the violent break with historical continuity.<sup>92</sup> In all his works Kireevskii paid close attention to history, which for him had an immediate influence on contemporary Russia.<sup>93</sup> He viewed all important issues, including

religion, through the prism of history. In 1832, Kireevskii sought to define Russia's essence through religion, which he regarded as an all-national, unified body of thought, not just a ritual or personal conviction:

No, religion is not just a ritual and not only a conviction. For the full development of true and even false religion a uniform thinking of nation is indispensable, blessed by the vibrant reminiscences, developed in commonly comprehensible beliefs, congruent with the system of state, personified in rituals with one meaning and common to [the] entire nation [ . . . ]. Without these conditions there are convictions, there are rituals, but there is no religion proper.<sup>94</sup>

Religion thus had not only to reflect national unity but also to maintain it. Russia, however, did not yet reach the stage of national unity based on common "civilization" and religious practice. Instead, Russia revealed the disparity between a "civilization" borrowed from the West and the Russian nationality. This was in sharp contrast to Europe, where "civilization" did not contradict nationality but complemented it. As Kireevskii put it, "[in Russia] the external form [of civilization] still contradicts the form of our nationality." Since the church in Russia never played such a powerful role as it did in the West, it was not able to supervise the development of civilization. If Russia had inherited classical civilization, the church would have had greater "political force" to promote civilization and unity. The lack of spiritual unity paradoxically caused the "enormous geographical expanse of Russia."<sup>95</sup> Here, similarly to Nikolai Nadezhdin and Prince Viazemskii, Kireevskii saw the detrimental effect of imperial expansion on the Russian nationality. Deprived of spiritual unity, Russia aspired to material might, which led to autocracy and geographical enormity. According to Walicki, Kireevskii criticized Russia's imperial expansion under the influence of Petr Chaadaev and thought that the territorial enormity of Russia absorbed all forces of nationality, leading to the prevalence of matter over spirit.<sup>96</sup> Hence, European civilization contradicted the Russian nationality. He concluded that in Russia "to seek the national meant to seek the uneducated/uncivilized."<sup>97</sup>

Still, in 1832, he sought to reconcile European civilization with the Russian nationality that was "until today [ . . . ] uneducated, coarse, and motionless as in the Chinese manner."<sup>98</sup> A "truly Russian civilization" was possible only as the combination of universal European with particular Russian values. Kireevskii did not reject the Russian nationality rooted in Orthodox religion, "historical memories," geographical condi-

tions, and ethnography, which he regarded as the “sum of our existence.” While appreciating things foreign, he argued against the adoration of foreigners and set his own limits of Russianness. In this context the main idiom of Russianness was the Russian language. To be Russian, birth and residence in Russia were not enough. It was the (lack of) knowledge of the Russian language that separated foreigners from the “indigenous [*korennykh*] inhabitants.”<sup>99</sup> “Such ignorance of language naturally make them [foreigners] alien among Russians and create among them and the indigenous inhabitants highly special relations.” Thus, for the young Kireevskii the Russian language was the ultimate measure of an exclusive Russian nationality.

In the late 1830s, during his “Slavophile” period, Kireevskii cared not so much about catching up with European civilization as with developing Russian Orthodox spirituality as a prospective basis of Russianness. While recognizing that Christianity was a common source of nationality in Russia and the West, he thought that Western Christianity was, from the beginning, spoiled by the rationalism and formalism of Greco-Roman paganism. Russia, on the other hand, was under the influence of “pure Christianity.”<sup>100</sup> He imagined medieval Russia as a utopia-like assembly of small worlds united by a “network of churches, monasteries, dwellings of hermits, which were constantly and everywhere disseminating uniform notions about public and private relations.”<sup>101</sup> Thus, the Orthodox church maintained the unity of thought, opinion, aspirations, and a way of life; in other words, it was the guarantor of the Russian nationality. The modernization of religion and society that culminated in the reforms of Peter the Great destroyed the utopian unity of the Russian nationality by creating religious and social divides. Kireevskii hoped, however, that Russia would return to pure Orthodoxy as the basis of national cohesion. In his subsequent works Kireevskii insisted that religion defined the character of *any* culture and sought to prove that Orthodoxy was the main pillar of traditional Russianness, ensuring social cohesion without any written, formal, or rational regulations (in contrast to the West).<sup>102</sup> He never explicitly said that in order to be Russian one had to be Orthodox, but at the same time he always gave credit to Eastern Christianity.

In 1845, Kireevskii provided a complex definition of Russianness, in which the Orthodox religion, along with language and ethnography, reflected a seemingly higher unity through mentality or the “unity of convictions.” “And what is the nation,” he asked rhetorically, “if not the unity of

convictions, more or less developed in its mores, its customs, its language, its emotional and intellectual notions, and its religious, social, and private relations—in a word, in the fullness of its life?”<sup>103</sup> Orthodoxy was not opposed to European civilization but rather complemented it, being able to “purify it from the character of exclusive rationality.” In other words, Orthodoxy was compatible with European civilization, and both had to create a new Russianness that would include all social classes.

In 1852, Kireevskii summed up most of his previous statements and added some new points. Among them was an idea that very much resembled Mochnacki's view of an ethnically homogenous Poland. While the latter wrote that ancient Poland escaped foreign conquest and therefore preserved an ethnic and cultural unity among its inhabitants, Kireevskii noted that Russia alone “had not experienced conquest” and that the Russian nationality had developed independently. Russia's enemies, such as the Tatars, Poles, Hungarians, and Germans, always remained outside the Russian community and did not disrupt an organic development of Russia. Consequently, the Orthodox church maintained an organic national community based on the already mentioned “unity of convictions,” which descended from the “unity of belief in Church's laws.”<sup>104</sup> Kireevskii staunchly believed that the Russian nobility would embrace “pure sources of the ancient Orthodox faith of their nation” and implement new (in fact, *old*) Russianness based on the teaching of the “Holy Orthodox Church.”<sup>105</sup> The future Russia had to be an “Orthodox Russia.”

Surprisingly, Kireevskii used the example of Poland, not to oppose Russianness to Polishness but rather to show the similarities between the two cases and to warn Russians that social and cultural divisions could cause the death of nationality. Poland was simply the best example of social and cultural disparity, where a brilliantly educated elite with its “artificial civilization” was separated from the rest of society; therefore, Polish civilization had nothing to do with the “natural elements of a nation's intellectual life.” As a result of this duality, Polish civilization disappeared without leaving a mark on the universal civilization. This was a warning about the imitative nature of Russian literature. Kireevskii, however, could not help contrast the two nationalities and two religions: Polish Catholicism was responsible for the social and cultural isolation of the elite, while Russian Orthodoxy always aspired to national unity.<sup>106</sup>

It is worth noting that Kireevskii made reference almost exclusively to Great Russian history, omitting Kyivan Rus' before its feudal fragmen-

tation. Although he wrote about Kyivan Rus', he focused on such "Great Russian" city-states as Novgorod and Pskov. Yet it is difficult to say how "large" and inclusive was his "all-Russian nation." Perhaps he equated Great Russians with "Russians," for he never mentioned "Little Russians." While reviewing Gogol's works, he wrote only about "the force of the Russian nationality" and "Russian life" from which the writer borrowed his plots.<sup>107</sup> Perhaps his focus on Orthodoxy did not allow him to discern differences within the Orthodox community of Russia's East Slavs.

#### Orthodox Hegelianism: Konstantin Aksakov

Konstantin Aksakov was a younger contemporary of Ivan Kireevskii and the most fanatical of Slavophiles.<sup>108</sup> He wrote his most important works after 1850; here I limit myself to an analysis of two earlier works. Written in the 1840s, they reflect Aksakov's initial views on Russianness. Aksakov combined Hegelianism with Orthodoxy, which allowed some scholars to associate him with the "Orthodox Hegelians."<sup>109</sup> In a master's thesis, *Lomonosov in the History of Russian Literature and Russian Language* (1846), he applied Hegel's triad to Russian history. He distinguished three stages of national development in Russia, which corresponded to thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in Hegel's terms. Pre-Petrine times (the thesis) were depicted as the epoch of "exclusive nationality," whereas the epoch of Peter the Great—the antithesis—represented a rejection of "Russian history, literature, and even language."<sup>110</sup> Finally, the 1830s–1840s embodied the synthesis of European universalism with Russian "national life." An "exclusive nationality" was the most primitive stage of human development, best reflected in Russian folklore or "popular song." "A popular song reflects the life of the people, of people alone under exclusively national definition," wrote Aksakov. "There is no all-human content here, which was refuted by the very definition of people."<sup>111</sup>

Nationality had an unalterable "substance" in folklore as its literal reflection, and therefore national poetry expressed the "eternal and true nature of the people." In this respect, ethnography in its broadest sense was the best reservoir of Russianness. While popular song reflected an "exclusive nationality," Moscow symbolized the political body of Russia: "Moscow appears to us as the unity of the Russian state and land [community]." It thus represented Russia's exclusive nationality as the "true capital" of Russia and the center of its "national spirit." By contrast, Saint Petersburg

represented the “pure rejection of nationality” and the symbol of the alienation of Russians from themselves.

Russia’s “exclusive nationality” was endangered by the emergence of individuality as represented by Peter the Great, who rejected traditional Russianness. As Aksakov put it, “everything that only constituted the expression of national life, everything that was defined by nationality, [along with] the state system, bureaucracy, estates, administration, army, everything that defined people—everything suffered rejection.”<sup>112</sup> The Russian nationality, or “substance,” after Peter’s break with tradition was best preserved by the Russian common people, who kept their “Russian essence” and who could save Russia from the rejection of nationality. Aksakov envisioned a return to “complete nationality,” which he understood as the synthesis of the national and universal through the appreciation of common people and the recognition of Moscow as the capital of the Russian spirit. Although nationality per se was not identical with universal values, they nonetheless could be quite compatible in the Russia of Nicholas I.

Young Aksakov was an avid enthusiast of what he called the Russian “substance” along with a “common substantial feeling of a Russian,” as he wrote in his review of Gogol’s “epic poem” *Mertvye dushi* (Dead souls).<sup>113</sup> He also explicitly recognized the dominance of Great Russians in the empire and within the “all-Russian nation.” While recognizing ethnographic differences between Little Russians and Great Russians, he stressed that “Little Russia [was] that vivid part of Russia created by the mighty Great Russian spirit.” Russia could very well be called Great Russia if it were not for the danger of “one-sidedness.” As Paul Bushkovitch commented, Aksakov saw Great Russia and Russia as distinct entities, where “Russia” was the higher synthesis.<sup>114</sup> It was nonetheless Great Russians who provided Russia with unity and preserved a legitimate dominance as a head in Russia’s body. Great Russians, as the builders of universal empire, in a way represented a Hegelian universal spirit. Aksakov consciously identified the meaning of the term *Russian* (*russkii*) with “Great Russian”: “therefore this tribe [Great Russian] does not have a one-sidedness if it managed to create an entire state and mold in one living wholeness all [ . . . ] diverse, opposing members; the name *Russian* stuck with it and with Russia.”<sup>115</sup> Aksakov also seemed to disregard the gap between empire and nationality in Russia by attributing the Russian “spirit” to the empire.

## Theology of Russianness

Aleksei Khomiakov, considered a “theologian” among the Slavophiles, also defined Russianness predominantly through Orthodoxy. In his major historiosophical work *Semiramide* (also known as *Notes on World History*) Khomiakov touched upon the role of religion in world history. After dividing humanity according to “tribes,” “states,” and “faiths,” he regarded the latter as the most important division, as the “highest mark of [humanity’s] spiritual development.”<sup>116</sup> He then suggested that “forms of religion, to a certain extent, correspond to the division of races [*plemen*].”<sup>117</sup> For example, Christianity was spread only among “Indo-Germanic” nations and barely penetrated the Semitic and other nations. Islam belonged “exclusively to the nations of Semitic and Turkic origins,” while pantheism or Buddhism was the “unquestionable property of a yellow race.” Christianity was, according to him, the “highest form of monotheism,” which eventually would have to dominate the world.

Religion itself, however, could be formed by a nation’s history and mentality. In this sense, it is the initial socioeconomic order (rather than religion) that had formed the mentality of nationalities. Thus, “Russians” were from the beginning a peaceful, agricultural, and inclusive nationality able to tolerate and include “others.” “A Russian regards all nations residing within the limitless borders of the Northern Tsardom as his brothers,” he wrote, “and even the [Russian] inhabitants of Siberia during their evening talks often use the language of their nomadic neighbors—Yakuts and Buriats.”<sup>118</sup> He also pointed to the examples of intermarriage between Russians and the “others”—Chechens, Tatars, and “Finns” (Mordovians). “We will be, as we always were, democrats among the other families of Europe; we will be the representatives of a purely human element, blessing any tribe with free life and independent development.” Consequently, the Finns, Tatars, and Germans “on Russian soil keep their material life, their physiognomy, and their language.”<sup>119</sup> Clearly, Khomiakov distinguished the Russian nationality from the empire’s other nationalities, although he regarded the former as a ruling element in the empire (“on Russian soil”).

According to Walicki, Khomiakov, in contrast to the other Slavophiles, appreciated the Russian state and Peter’s reforms in particular, and he expressed his “imperial nationalism” through an interest in foreign Slavs.<sup>120</sup> In a famous article, “O starom i novom” (On the old and the new), he sought to reconcile the state with the Russian people by

emphasizing its creative role in eliminating the vices of customary and disorderly communal life. "The state has become stronger and has obtained the possibility of consciousness and gradual perfection without internal struggle," which led to the implementation of useful laws in place of evil customs.<sup>121</sup> "Without the renovation of the state," he continued, "everything would have perished; the state reawakened [ . . . ], and now all former [customary] elements can and should develop with their own undying force."

The real beginning of all-Russian national unity could be attributed to the rise of Moscow, the natural capital of Russians. In contrast, medieval Kyivan Rus' was a simple "federation of southern and northern tribes," which could not be united either by language or by religion (as the latter came from troubled Byzantine). Thus, the state was the quintessential idiom of Russianness by forging national unity (around Moscow) versus particularistic forces, while ethnicity, language, and religion/church seemed to fail to mold Russians into a political nationality.

Paradoxically, the religious (Orthodox) idiom of Russianness in Khomiakov's writings from the 1840s was not very pronounced, except in the pervasive opposition of (Orthodox) Russia to Catholic Poland. Generally, he regarded Catholicism as a religion that was not peculiar to Slavs. Moreover, Poland was the only consistent representative of Roman Catholicism among the Slavs: "Catholicism, alien to other Slavic families, found in Poland, or rather in its governmental cliques, a certain zealotry that at the same time fooled its proponents."<sup>122</sup> He even called the Polish historical orientation a "false and non-Slavic direction" defined by foreigners (Germans) and Roman popes, who used native Poles against other Slavs. According to Walicki, "aristocratic Poland," with its social strife and individualism, became the antithesis to Russia, which had preserved brotherhood and communal unity. During Russia's "Time of Troubles," the all-national uprising in 1612 drove away the Polish invaders. That victory symbolized the superiority of Russian moral principles.<sup>123</sup>

Khomiakov was not much preoccupied with the relationship of Great Russians to Little Russians or to the "all-Russian nation" and the Russian Empire in general. His younger colleague sought to tackle some of these issues. In 1845, the promising Slavophile Dmitrii Valuev offered an explicit definition of Russianness in the introduction to a collection of Slavophile scholarship. He sought to decide which idiom of nationness—religion or ethnicity—was the best criterion of national identity.

He came to the conclusion that unity of faith was superior as an idiom to common origins.

Before and above everything we put the unity of faith; although at first sight [ . . . ] common origins perhaps bind people and societies more strongly and have a greater importance in life. If we consider the history of humankind in the broader sense [ . . . ], we will see that common faith and spiritual convictions of people either split humanity into great historical masses, or unite states and nations into one common destiny.<sup>124</sup>

Thus, national religion was the highest point of social development and the main idiom of nation-ness. To prove this thesis he pointed to the example of Bosnian Muslims, who spoke a Slavic language but regarded themselves as Turks on the basis of their religion. Similarly, the Catholic Slavs, because of their religious orientation, had a limited understanding of the (mostly Orthodox) Slavic world. He defined Russia in terms of the “all-Russian nation” encompassing all Orthodox East Slavs living within the empire: “under Russia we understand only the Slavic tribe and Eastern Orthodox religion, before which all other nationalities and religions [ . . . ] pale in comparison.”<sup>125</sup> Valuev argued against understanding Russia as a multi-ethnic and multireligious land. Neither Buriat nor Muslim gave Russia its “character” and “definition.” Russia belonged to Orthodox “Russians” only: “and therefore any subject of the state belongs to Russia, but Russia belongs only to the Orthodox and Russian.” As the state-builders, Russians were a dominant or ruling nationality that defined the state’s character. Orthodoxy was the main idiom of Russianness, which included Great, Little, and White Russians: “Under Orthodox and Russian, of course, one should understand any Russian who is also Orthodox and belongs to Great, Little, or White Russia.”<sup>126</sup>

### *Between a Liberal Empire and Russian Nationalism*

Slavophiles were not the only group in Russia that sought to find a compromise between the traditional Orthodox community and modern society. If Slavophiles clearly gave preference to the former, other Russian intellectuals chose a more complex position. The ideas of such prominent figures as Nikolai Nadezhdin and Nikolai Polevoi included a curious combination of Russian nationalism, modern liberalism, and enlightened imperialism. The views of Nikolai Nadezhdin are worthy of primary attention.

## Geopolitics of Russianness: Nikolai Nadezhdin

Nadezhdin was one of the most famous victims of Russia's autocratic regime. When in 1836 the famous philosophical letter by Petr Chaadaev was published in the journal *Teleskop*, Nadezhdin, the editor, was exiled to the northern town of Ust'-Sysolsk (now Syktyvkar). In his numerous works ranging from the field of literary criticism to philosophy and geopolitics, Nadezhdin managed to combine dynastic loyalty and imperialism with vibrant Russian nationalism by applying such different idioms as language, race, ethnography, and autocracy. Also a brilliant expert on geopolitics, he placed Russia on mental maps as a separate continent and unique civilization. For Nadezhdin, Russianness was inseparable from the state, as he stressed in 1830 in his criticism of Polevoi's *History of the Russian People*, where the latter sought to detach nationality from the state in opposition to Nikolai Karamzin. By associating nationality with the monarchic state, Nadezhdin visibly sided with Karamzin:

Therefore, *A History of the Russian People* should start from the time when the [people] acquired social order and started to live a social life. But what is this social order if not the state? Can a people live a life other than that of the state? How did our author manage to separate the Russian people from the Russian state? This is just a swindle! Even if one understands by the state a monarchical form of national life, then the history of Russia cannot be anything else but the history of the Russian State. The very name *Rus'* was brought to our fatherland by the Varangians, from whom it began its monarchical life.<sup>127</sup>

Elsewhere, Nadezhdin was even more explicit: "according to our historical monuments, the Russian people never existed other than through the state; in other words, the very name of the Russian people is a mark of statehood that united the inhabitants of the North in one entity."<sup>128</sup> In a quite Hegelian fashion Nadezhdin stressed that no nationality could exist normally without its state. Put another way, no nationality could exist other than in "the famous form of social life, which cannot be anything else but a state." In Russia, particularly, where nationality for ages strove to be a state, one should not separate nationality from the state.

Thus, the role of the state in the development of Russianness was one of the main elements that contrasted Nadezhdin's position from that of later Slavophiles. It is possible to say that for Nadezhdin state, and more broadly, monarchy, was one of the main idioms of Russianness, for Russians were shaped by the state from the very beginning. Here,

Russianness and the Russian state are inseparable, and the latter is indispensable for the former. In addition, the early Slavs, in adopting a foreign state, did not take the nationality of the Varangians but assimilated foreigners. In 1831, Nadezhdin showed his imperial loyalty by celebrating the role of the imperial government in the life of the “fatherland” and nationality. He mentioned the “caring appeals of the government” and the “consolidating force of the government” which maintained the “entire existence of our fatherland” and cared about people with “paternal tenderness.”<sup>129</sup> At the same time, the “Russian people,” unlike other European nations, had their own *internal* resources for self-development. As Nadezhdin commented in 1832, “the Russian people [*narod*] differs from all new European peoples in a way that it created itself, not through the adaptation of antiquated elements by adding new ones, but independently and self-creatively.”<sup>130</sup>

Nadezhdin was aware of the negative consequences of imperial expansion for the Russian nationality. The Mongols had paradoxically saved Russians from demographic dispersion and self-dissolution by preventing the expansion of Rus’ in all directions. It was at this point that the Russian state contradicted the Russian nationality. Nevertheless, from the time of Peter the Great, from which point Nadezhdin saw the real beginnings of Russian history, Russia seemed to witness harmony between the empire and nationality.

Nadezhdin did not question the imperial acquisitions of Russian emperors.<sup>131</sup> Instead, in 1837 he elaborated a complex anthropological concept of nation-ness, which included mental, linguistic, ethnographic, and even racial idioms. National differences were represented by a so-called “national physiognomy” as the collection of “peculiar shadings of one and the same human nature.”<sup>132</sup> Whereas this term referred to nationality in general, a more narrow phrase, “national character,” was Nadezhdin’s formulation for “mentality,” as it included only “internal, spiritual properties” of conationals. In his classical work “Evropeizm i narodnost’ v otnoshenii k russkoi slovesnosti” (Europeanism and nationality with respect to Russian letters, 1836), Nadezhdin provided a definition for the term *nationality* (*narodnost’*), which was similar to his notion of “national physiognomy.” Nationality was the “totality of all properties, external and internal, physical and spiritual, mental and moral, which comprise the physiognomy of a Russian man and differentiate him from all other peoples, Europeans as well as Asians.” A Russian “in all social estates and in all stages of en-

lightenment and civilization has his own distinctive character" expressed through mentality, spirituality, and even facial features.<sup>133</sup>

As early as 1829, Nadezhdin focused on the "physiognomy of the Russian nation." He argued against exclusively ethnographic idioms of nation-ness, and instead pointed to the "spirit" of the nation and the "special characteristic physiognomy" which constituted nationality.<sup>134</sup> Russian "national character" was indeed reflected in folklore,<sup>135</sup> but Nadezhdin constantly argued against understanding nationality as an ethnography-based identity: "Many understand by nationality the external forms of Russian life, preserved now only among the common people, among the lowest classes of society." He mocked second-rate writers who glorified this "coarse, dirty, repulsive nationality," which he called a "commoner nationality" (*prostonarodnost'*).<sup>136</sup>

Later he agreed that language was the most common signifier of national differences: "the basis for the ethnographic division of people into nations is usually thought to be language, which indeed is the most striking and the most stable brand of national originality."<sup>137</sup> In addition, the Holy Scriptures practically identified nationality with language, since they regarded the mixing and division of languages as the reason for the origins of nationalities. "But language alone is not the distinctive feature of national physiognomy." Now he was using arguments of race and mentality: "nations are also different from each other by the peculiar form of the body, predominantly their face, by peculiar shadings of animal temper, and finally by the peculiar structure of the spiritual organism."<sup>138</sup>

At any rate, nationality for Nadezhdin was not only a cultural or spiritual entity but also an ethnic or racial one. With regard to race (facial coloring, proportions, physiology, and so on) and mentality, he divided nationalities into those which were more "alive," passionate, and "clever," and those which were "colder," more reserved, and "dumber." As a proponent of geographical and racial determinism, Nadezhdin believed that national differences originated from the influences of land ("geographical peculiarities of location") and race ("genealogical peculiarities of each nation's origins"). A human was a slave of nature, which shaped a peculiar national physiognomy and national character in particular. For example, a hot climate had inflamed the temper of Arabs, while the cold had frozen the mind and heart of Laplanders. Moreover, the better the nature, the lazier the nationality; therefore, whenever the nature was rude, the nationality living there was more vivid and innovative.

National differences (or physiognomies)—caused by the long-lasting residence of a nationality in a particular place and “under the influence of the same conditions”—were transmitted genetically from parents to children, becoming “an irreversible familial property.” Once shaped, a national physiognomy became inalterable in mental and physical respects: “whatever the influence of new, local, and other circumstances, national physiognomy, once shaped, when adopting some new shadings according to new conditions, remains unchangeable at the basis.”<sup>139</sup> To prove this Nadezhdin pointed to the examples of Russians and Kalmyks, who supposedly did not mix with others and kept their nationalities intact, despite their changing geographical locations and the influences of environment:

Thus the Russian, having settled on the frozen tundra of Siberia, preserves his nationality throughout centuries, mixing neither with the Ostiaks [Khantys] nor Tungus [Evenkies] who were formed under another sky, in another land, and under other conditions. In contrast, the Kalmyk roaming on the shores of the Volga and the Don, among alien tribes, across alien steppes, has for centuries preserved the same physiognomy and the same lore and mores, which he had brought from the deserts of Central Asia.<sup>140</sup>

Thus, nationality was ingrained in people. This was the result of inherited ethnic and racial differences—“the hereditary continuation of nationality”—which seemed to be stronger than geographic factors. One can also regard this statement as Nadezhdin’s disbelief in the Russification of national minorities and his recognition of the insurmountable gap between the empire and nationality in Russia. The Russians themselves were not yet fully formed. The more primitive or “patriarchal” the stage of national development, the more the similarities in mores and customs among otherwise quite different peoples like Bedouins and Scottish Highlanders. It is only civilization that had shaped a unique national physiognomy: “civilization puts the final and decisive stamp on the formation of nationality [ . . . ]. At this time a people becomes fully a nation and accomplishes its formation.”<sup>141</sup>

While recognizing certain restraining effects of the empire on nationality, Nadezhdin reinterpreted this into an advantage for Russians. Russianness had still to acquire its “distinctive form,” relying on faith and the “will of the state,” which cared about people’s “perfection.” Nadezhdin was no less optimistic about the perspectives for the Russian nationality. He refuted claims that Russia was lacking a “national physiognomy” and “distinctive character,” but he nonetheless admitted that features of this

character were still unclear and undeveloped.<sup>142</sup> He also noticed the contradictions between Russianness and European civilization but hoped that the government would help Russians mitigate this strife. Russianness was closely connected to the autocratic state, and Nadezhdin professed adherence to Uvarov's triad.

Nadezhdin's Russianness, based on ethnolinguistic, mental, and institutional idioms of nation-ness, referred sometimes to the "all-Russian nation" but mostly to ethnic Russians (Great Russians) exclusively. As in many other cases, Ukraine turned out to be the best yardstick to measure the "size" and inclusiveness of Russianness. He separated Kyivan Rus' from Muscovy and regarded the former as a mere introduction to the history of the Russian state and nationality.<sup>143</sup> Similarly, the legendary Scandinavian prince Riurik was for Kyivan Rus' what Ivan III was for the contemporary Russian state. In this regard, "Russian" meant "Great Russian," and "the inhabitants of the North," who formed the state around Moscow after the Mongol invasion, were undoubtedly Great Russians, or Muscovites. Nadezhdin explicitly wrote about the novelty of this nationality, which he called "Muscovite" and which developed around autocracy. "This is the Muscovite nation that inherited, in the right of force and prevalence, the familial name of its tribe [Russians]," proudly commented Nadezhdin. "It was formed from nonexistence [ . . . ] under the benign shadow of the stately heirs of [Ivan] Kalita, at the bottom of the Moscow throne. Here was born, raised, and strengthened this revered devotedness to the supreme power [ . . . ] forming until today the distinctive character of the nation that glorifies the Russian name."<sup>144</sup> Such "devotedness" to the ruler constituted, according to Nadezhdin, the "real spirit of the Russian nation and Tsardom." Moscow, as "our cradle," represented both the tsardom and nationality.

Ukraine was obviously outside this political and historical Russianness. While Nadezhdin never explicitly stated that Ukraine was outside the framework of the Russian nationality, he also never emphasized the "Russianness" of Ukraine beyond the medieval idea of Orthodox Rus'. Quite the contrary, he underlined Ukraine's exoticism. Ukraine for him was an exotic and patriarchal country, a "Slavic Ausonia," the land of Cossack freedom, and a symbolic antipode to autocratic Russia. The Ukraine of Nadezhdin, similarly to the Ukraine of Burachek, preserved "the most vivid features of Slavic physiognomy," since the national existence of Ukrainians was not spoiled by foreign influences.<sup>145</sup> Ukraine was indeed a historical Herderian nationality. Nadezhdin welcomed literary works in

the Ukrainian language, although he regarded them as the potential enrichment of the Russian language, which itself was yet to be formed, perhaps as a combination of high culture and folk elements.<sup>146</sup>

An exotic Ukraine was nonetheless compatible with a broadly conceived “all-Russian nation” defined as the space of the (common) Russian language and Orthodoxy.<sup>147</sup> Quite conventionally, Nadezhdin considered national differences between Ukraine and Russia as a temporary divide between southwestern and northeastern Rus’. The former, once “the most Russian,” after uniting with Lithuania temporarily “had lost its sovereignty,” although it preserved a vernacular speech that “sounded Russian.” In addition, Polish rule in Ukraine had not destroyed the “Orthodox Russian nationality.” As “the first element of the Russian nationality,” Orthodoxy eventually triumphed. Therefore, it was predominantly Orthodoxy and the Russian (East Slavic) language that united Nadezhdin’s “all-Russian nation.”

#### Exotic Ukraine in Russian Liberal Literary Criticism

In 1839, an anonymous critic from the liberal periodical *Otechestvennye zapiski* (Notes of the fatherland) also emphasized the imperial idioms of the Russo-Ukrainian connection, while at the same time recognizing a Herderian Ukrainian nationality. He praised Ukrainian Romantic poetry for its natural and original spirit that represented the patriarchal and idyllic nature of Ukraine, where people “remain almost motionless at the same point of intellectual development.”<sup>148</sup> Hence, the Ukrainian language reflected the natural—or rather, primitive—features of Ukrainians. Ukrainian supposedly was common to all social estates, not differentiating between oral and written speech, whereas literary Russian bore the “stamp of artificiality.” On the contrary, Ukrainian poetry was created by the people “unconsciously.” Moreover, Ukrainian was a separate *language* able to produce a full-fledged literature. The author even outlined the canon of a new Ukrainian literature personified by Gogol, Kvitka-Osnovianenko, and Hrebinka. The national differences between Ukrainians (“Southern Rus’”) and Russians (“Northern Rus’”) were represented by “national character,” which was a dominant idiom of nation-ness for many literary critics of the time.<sup>149</sup> The different national characters of the two nationalities were caused mostly by climatic and historical reasons. The emergence of the Ukrainian Cossacks and their alliance with townspeople ultimately gave a separate character to the Southern Rus’. Therefore, it was only the *political*

union of Ukrainians with Russians in 1654 that bound together the “all-Russian nation.”

A famous Russian literary critic, Petr Pletnev, in his review of *A History of Little Russia* by Mykola Markevych, reinterpreted the history of Ukraine as an integral part of Russian history. His main goal was the refutation of the Polish vision of Ukraine (reflected in the articles of Osip Senkovskii) as a Polish-Lithuanian colony and the Cossacks as Lithuanian and Polish fugitives. Pletnev argued that prior to 1320 Little Russia had been the “property of Great Russian Grand Princes” and subordinate to Moscow metropolitans. Ukrainian Cossacks, as “truly Russian knights,” defended Orthodoxy and belonged to the “Russian nationality”; their history constituted “an illustrious episode in the common history of Russia.”<sup>150</sup> The “temporary” separation from Russia, the “change of language,” and the ethnographic difference of Ukrainians were all caused by geography, history, and foreign influences; otherwise, no essential divide undermined the “all-Russian nation.” Instead, Pletnev emphasized the “constant relation of Little Russia to the center of its fatherland, i.e., to Moscow.”

#### A Colonial Perspective on Russianness: Nikolai Polevoi

Another influential Russian critic and journalist, Nikolai Polevoi, regarded Russianness from a colonial perspective as the relationship between an imperial Russian *Herrenvolk* and the colonized national peripheries. As pointed out in Chapter 3, Polevoi, by stressing the separate identity and geography of “Little Russia” in 1830, doubted the idea of the Russian Empire as an assimilationist “melting pot,” which was celebrated by many Great Russians, including the radical literary critic Belinskii. Polevoi stood against those “zealous patriots” who thought that Russia, as a unique state, was able “to melt into Russians, in one whole, everything that only stuck to it,” including Ukrainians. Instead, he recognized the fact that Russia consisted of “diverse parts” and did not have “a miraculous force to melt together different peoples.”<sup>151</sup> Polevoi offered his understanding of Russia’s territorial expansion in terms of the “colonial-metropolitan” encounter. He pointed out that Russia was not able to assimilate colonized peoples, many of whom preserved their historical nationality.

While mapping a non-Russian Russia, Polevoi mentioned different lands conquered by Russians at various times, such as Siberia, the Volga region, the Crimea, the middle Dnieper, Volhynia, the Baltic coast,

Lithuania, Finland, and Little Russia, which were populated by “local aboriginal peoples” like Germans, Gypsies, Tatars, and Buriats. The Russian-dominated empire sought to colonize diverse nationalities, but they did not become “Russians.” The basic principle of empire was the conquest and partial Russification of local aristocracies and laws. Despite the conquests and resulting abolition of local political “sovereignty,” Russians failed “to Russify [*obrusit*] the locals.” He bluntly emphasized that those nationalities belonged to “us” Russians even though they did not become “us”: “they are ours but [they are] not us.”<sup>152</sup>

Polevoi practically identified Russianness with Russian “statehood,” or the “state nationality” created by the government and expressed in laws, mores, and customs that constituted the “Russian independent spirit.”<sup>153</sup> Polevoi honestly acknowledged Russian colonialism as the ultimate pillar of the empire: “we did what winners usually do with colonized lands.”<sup>154</sup> This acknowledgment also meant the separation of empire from nationality, on the one hand, and the empire’s nationalities from the ruling ethnic Russians, on the other. Although he asserted the ruling status of the Great Russians, he also recognized the distinctiveness of the empire’s numerous nationalities that had lost their statehood similarly to Scottish Highlanders or Hungarians.

Ukrainians, a quite visible minority different from “pure Russians,” formed a separate Herderian nationality based on ethnography, language, history, and even physical anthropology<sup>155</sup>: “Go from Moscow southward and you will see, while constantly noticing changes, that beyond the Desna and the Seim rivers you reach a nation which is completely different from us pure Russians. Their language, clothing, facial appearance, everyday life, dwelling, attitudes, and lore are completely not ours! We say even more: they look at us until today unfriendly [ . . . ]. This is Little Russia.”<sup>156</sup> Ukrainians, who called themselves “Cossacks,” did not regard Russians (or Muscovites) as their “compatriots.” Polevoi blamed previous Russian historians, including Nikolai Karamzin, for their neglect of the fact that Ukraine had “decisively, not ours, but a separate nationality.”<sup>157</sup> He even blamed this neglect of the Ukrainian nationality on the Ukrainian intellectuals themselves. Authors like Saint Dmitrii (Tuptalo) of Rostov, Stephan Iavors’kyi, or Teofan Prokopovych were indeed Little Russians, but “Little Russia did not exist inside them.”<sup>158</sup> He wrote ironically that in the works of some Little Russians “Little Russia differs from the Moscow province as little as some Iaroslav or Vladimir province.” In other

words, the nationality of Ukrainians was not Russian, despite the fact that like Russians, they practiced the “Greek faith,” spoke “a special dialect of Russian [East Slavic] language,” and belonged to Russia’s “political system.”

Polevoi argued that Ukrainian was a separate language with a long literary tradition. Whereas some people mistakenly treated Ukrainian as “a distorted Russian-Polish dialect,” in reality it was “an ancient Slavic-Russian national [*narodnyi*] language” spoken in old Kyiv and Southern Rus’. The latter included Galicia, Bukovyna, and Transcarpathia in the Austrian Empire.<sup>159</sup> He stressed correctly that Ukrainian belonged to the “Eastern section” of a Slavic language family, from which Russian stemmed as well. He also admitted the strong influence of the “bookish and diplomatic language of Little Russians of the 16th–18th centuries” on Russian literature.

While trying to explain Ukrainian distinctiveness, Polevoi had to dissociate Ukrainians from Rus’/Russian history. “Little Russia, which has not become Rus’/Russia until now, was never a part of ancient Rus’, similar to Siberia and Crimea.”<sup>160</sup> He pointed out that half of present-day Ukraine—“the proper nest of Little Russia”—was never among the “Russian/Rus’ regions.” The land was populated by seminomadic Turkic peoples who gave rise to the Ukrainian Cossacks. The non-Russian/Rus’ history of native Ukrainian lands and the diverse character of Ukrainian Cossacks, who consisted of “Russians,” Cumans, Moldovans, Poles, and Lithuanians, were the best reasons for the national “otherness” of Ukrainians. Modern Ukrainians, in their “facial features and clothing,” were a mixture of Scythians, Slavs, and “Asians”—Turks. Ukraine, however, was a historical nationality represented by Cossacks who were its “knights” as well as a “civil and spiritual aristocracy” that managed to create their own state.

By 1839, Polevoi had ceased emphasizing the various elements of Ukrainian nationality except for its folklore. Nevertheless, Little Russia was “Russian,” not due to its national essence but “through the love of the tsar,” as the result of imperial conquest.<sup>161</sup> Earlier he showed more interest in Ukraine’s historical destiny, and like some Polish authors he adored the “Little Russian aristocracy” that contained in it “something knightly and scholarly.”<sup>162</sup> At the same time, Ukraine revealed lots of contrasts. The Little Russian aristocracy was surrounded by common Little Russians who exposed their “Lithuanian-Asiatic” features, thus presenting Ukraine as a “motley mixture of Asia and Europe, nomadic and settled life, obedience and independence.” It was only Russia that managed to normalize the chaotic nature of Ukraine.

Paradoxically, Polevoi, while describing the early modern “Cossack” nationality, was following eighteenth-century Ukrainian historians. Those historians had defined Ukrainians in opposition to Great Russians, inevitably dissociating the modern Ukrainian nationality from an older (common) Rus’ legacy. By emphasizing a separate Ukrainian nationality centered on an early modern Cossack identity, Polevoi inevitably refuted the claims of Ukrainians to the common Rus’ historical and cultural legacy. He disinherited the Little Russian elite by depriving them of what they cherished the most—their equal participation in Russianness and empire-building. Not surprisingly, this brought about a sharp response from such a Little Russian patriot as Stepan Burachek. In the 1850s, the Polevoi-like position of Mikhail Pogodin would cause a Burachek-style reaction from Mykhailo Maksymovych.<sup>163</sup> Thus, recognition came at the expense of inclusion. The hierarchy of Polevoi’s imagined communities can be represented in the following formula: Empire—Great Russians—Ukrainians/other nationalities.

### *The Gemeinschaft and Its Idioms*

Those Russian literati who distanced themselves from the government and those who sought to focus on Russianness as separate from the empire shared an idea about Orthodoxy as the basis of the “all-Russian nation.” For example, Kireevskii sought to define Russia’s essence through religion, which he regarded as an all-national unity of thought. In addition, the Russian language was the ultimate measure of exclusivity of the Russian nationality. In the late 1830s, during his “Slavophile” period, Kireevskii’s main concern was the development of Russian Orthodox spirituality, which was expected to become the basis of Russianness able to unite all social classes. In subsequent works, Kireevskii insisted that religion defined the character of any culture and sought to prove that Orthodoxy was the main pillar of traditional Russianness ensuring social cohesion without any written, formal, or rational regulations.

Unlike Kireevskii, who regarded medieval Rus’ as a utopian network of Orthodox establishments that united the entire nationality, Khomiakov was more skeptical about the historical role of the Orthodox church, pointing to the gradual evolution of religious faith along with the rise of the Muscovite state. In Khomiakov’s thought, the role of the state resembled its treatment in Pogodin’s works, whereas for other Slavophiles it was rather the “people” or “land” that was the main creative force in Russian history.<sup>164</sup>

For the young Aksakov, the dominant idiom of Russianness was a “substance” or “essence” reflected predominantly in folklore and ethnography. The Orthodox faith was part of that mental sphere. For all those who defined Russianness in terms of Orthodoxy, Poland was often the ultimate opposition, which set the limits to the Russian nationality. The Ukrainians presented a more subtle issue. Although the three major Slavophiles did not differentiate clearly between the “all-Russian nation” and the Great Russians, they discerned certain ethnographic differences between Russians and Ukrainians. Slavophiles did not treat them, however, as separate nationalities,<sup>165</sup> and the boundaries between them remained blurred.

Nikolai Polevoi treated the Russian state as a colonial power that failed to assimilate national minorities, among them Ukrainians. He seemingly identified Russianness with the Russian expanding state, although as the author of *A History of the Russian People* he was able to differentiate between nationality and the state. To show the distinctiveness of Ukrainians, Polevoi even sought to dissociate Ukrainian history from the Rus' legacy. Consequently, he saw Russians and Ukrainians as two distinct ethnolinguistic communities with their own histories.

Another influential Russian critic, Nikolai Nadezhdin, regarded Russianness (as did the Slavophiles) as based on the ethnolinguistic, mental, and institutional idioms of nation-ness, which referred sometimes to the “all-Russian nation” but mostly to ethnic Russians (Great Russians) exclusively. Nadezhdin ascribed crucial meaning in nation-building to the Russian state. He also pointed to the disparity between traditional Russian *Gemeinschaft* and modern imperial *Gesellschaft*, a joint venture of European civilization and the Russian government. Unlike the Slavophiles, however, he believed in universal modernity, which would help develop the unique Russian nationality. Yet he staunchly believed—similarly to Pogodin, Shevyrev, and the Slavophiles—in Orthodoxy and the Russian language as the two pillars of common Russianness. At the same time, he managed to notice the ethnocultural distinctiveness of Ukraine as a utopian “Slavic Ausonia.” Nadezhdin's position was therefore a compromise between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, between nationality and the imperial state, between common Russianness and the exoticism of the national periphery, and so on.

The “all-Russian nation” featured prominently in the political imagination of Slavophiles and of Nadezhdin, yet unlike a similar imagined community of progovernmental conservatives, it was expressed in reli-

gious and ethnographic idioms, often through opposition between (Slavic) *Gemeinschaft* and (imperial) *Gesellschaft*. The Great Russian community defined through linguistic, ethnographic, and historic idioms was becoming an increasingly important point of reference for Slavophiles and Russian liberals alike.

### Towards Radical *Gesellschaft*

The German term *Gesellschaft* (“society”) is used in opposition to the term *Gemeinschaft* (“community”) in the writings of sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies. Unlike the Slavophiles, who strove to achieve a cultural, organic community based on religious intuition and the peasant commune, the radically minded Westernizers and revolutionaries embraced a contemporary, rational Western society and socially progressive values (including revolution). The radicals and Westernizers hoped to adapt European social models in Russia, and they also borrowed from the West their vision of nationality. Unlike Uvarov’s idea of nationality, which was oddly combined with Orthodoxy and autocracy, the radicals sought to dissociate nationality from any dynastic policies and values. They also felt the incompatibility of nationality and empire in Russia and preferred the former to the latter.

According to the tradition established both in Russia and in the West, the Decembrists are widely regarded as the predecessors of radical social movement in Russia. Although the Decembrists acted in the 1820s, the vision of nation-ness within the Russian radical/Westernized community of the 1830s–1840s would be incomplete without an analysis of their national “imaginings.” In addition, one of the most prominent Decembrists, Mikhail Lunin, created important geopolitical texts already in the late 1830s to early 1840s, while in exile.

The single most important radical Westernizer in the 1830s–1840s was the literary critic Vissarion Belinskii, whom Soviet scholars labeled “revolutionary democrat.” Despite the massive volume of writings about his literary views, Belinskii’s vision of nation-ness, and in particular his treatment of Ukrainian literature that underlined his idea of Russianness, needs reexamination. Another radical literary critic whose views are relevant for this study is Valerian Maikov. He rejected the idea of “national” exclusivity of art and was often branded as “cosmopolitan” by his contemporaries.

Finally, radical philosophy-turned-politics is best represented by Mikhail Bakunin, who became involved in European revolutionary move-

ments in the late 1840s. In addition, Bakunin was among the very few Russian intellectuals who supported the idea of Polish and Ukrainian cultural and political sovereignty.

### *The Decembrist Predecessors*

There is consensus among scholars that the leader of the Southern Society of the Decembrists, Pavel Pestel', expressed radical Jacobin ideas about state and nationality in the society's manifesto "Russian Law" (*Russkaia Pravda*). To put it simply, his plan was to transform a feudal dynastic empire into a European nation-state patterned on the French Jacobin model. He defined nationality in terms of civil society based on popular sovereignty and universal well-being. "The nation [*narod*] is the association of all those people who belong to the same state and constitute a civil society whose goal of existence is a possible well-being of all and everyone."<sup>166</sup> Therefore, the "Russian nation" could not be the property of either a tsar or a dynasty.

Pestel' recognized the disparity between the empire and the "all-Russian nation" by emphasizing the enormity of imperial territory and the number of "subject" peoples all over the empire. He argued against the new imperial acquisitions and instead advocated the proliferation of well-being within the existing borders.<sup>167</sup> Ideally, each nationality had to create its own state based on the "right of nationality," but in reality every big state encompassed a number of smaller nationalities, and therefore a "ruling nation" had a natural "right of convenience" to protect its borders and limit the freedom of smaller nationalities. At this point Pestel' was envisioning the later conception of "historical" and "nonhistorical" nationalities, although he did not use these terms.

The "right of nationality" was reserved only for those nationalities which had the "possibility to preserve it," that is, only for large, ruling, or "historical" communities. As a result, all smaller nationalities, "subject to a Large State," could not "enjoy their political independence" and therefore had to remain within big neighboring states. The "right of nationality" did not exist for these unhappy nationalities. The only option reserved for nonhistorical nationalities was assimilation into the "ruling nation," so that they would "constitute only one nation."<sup>168</sup> In addition, the ruling nationality, according to the "right of convenience," could unilaterally decide on its borders by incorporating countries that could not "enjoy their real nationality" and had to enter "a new more impressive nationality."

Pestel' applied these theoretical principles of nation-ness to the imperial map of Russia. He split all subject nationalities of the empire into those which could be labeled as "nonhistorical" and those which could use the "right of nationality" (his term). In fact, all ethnic peripheries of Russia but Poland appeared to be "nonhistorical" and were doomed to dissolve into the ruling Russian nationality. Pestel' emphasized that such lands as Finland, Livland, Estland, Courland, Belarus, Little Russia, New Russia, Crimea, Georgia, and Caucasus "never enjoyed, and can never enjoy, sovereign independence and always belonged either to Russia itself or, at times, if not to Russia, then to Sweden, Denmark, Prussia, Poland, Turkey, Persia, and generally to a some strong state."<sup>169</sup> The lack of strong historical statehood was for him a sufficient reason to discard the multiethnic and multicultural character of a prospective Russian nation-state. According to Jacobin fashion, the subject nationalities "had to reject forever the right to a separate nationality." Poland, however, was considered worthy of a separate existence. This is because the right of (Polish) nationality had prevalence over the right of (Russian) convenience. As compensation for the eventual loss of Poland, Pestel' suggested that Russia incorporate Moldavia, the Northern Caucasus, Kazakhstan, and part of Mongolia.

After comparing two political systems—unitary, as instituted in revolutionary France, and federative—Pestel' rejected the latter as detrimental to Russia. Polish radical émigrés used the same arguments when they rejected the federative model for a future Poland. Pestel' explained his choice by stressing that federalism would deepen the differences within Russia, which would eventually lead to the breakup of the empire. Paradoxically, he recognized the existing ethnic diversity in Russia only to underline the need for unification:

Its [Russia's] districts are governed not only by different institutions and judged by different civil laws, but they speak completely different languages and practice completely different religions. Their inhabitants have different origins and once belonged to different states; therefore, if this diversity were more strengthened by a federative system of state, then it is easy to predict that these different districts will soon secede from original Russia.<sup>170</sup>

Pestel's "Russian Law" manifesto declared the country a unitary and indivisible state that repudiated any federal system. Like postrevolutionary France, Russia was to be split into ten bigger administrative regions that had nothing to do with historical lands or nationalities. For example, the

Kholm region included both ethnic Russian provinces, such as Novgorod, Tver', and Pskov, and the Baltic ones, populated by Latvians, Estonians, Lithuanians, and Baltic Germans. The Black Sea region with its capital in Kyiv included the Kyiv province, Podolia, part of Volhynia, Bessarabia, and the city of Odessa.

Similar to the Polish Democratic Society, which split the population of historical Poland into three categories, Pestel's Southern Society divided Russia's population into three groups. In line with most Russian geographical accounts, Pestel' provided the empire with a dominant or ruling nationality—the so-called “original Russian nation” (*korennoi narod Russkii*)—that consisted of all East Slavs. A second group included all the “tribes incorporated into Russia,” that is, all the autochthonous, non-Slavic peoples living within the borders of the Russian Empire. Finally, a third group consisted of a very diverse category of “foreigners.”

Gradual cultural Russification awaited all three groups of Russia's population. The assimilation of the first group consisting of the Eastern Slavs was already taken for granted. The unity of the “original Russian nation” was expressed in ethnolinguistic, religious, and institutional idioms. The ruling nationality was split into five regional groups, or “shadings,” which differed mostly in administrative terms as a result of the lack of centralization in Russia:

The Slavic tribe that constitutes the original Russian nation has five shadings: (1) proper *Russians* who populate the Great Russian provinces; (2) the *Little Russians* who populate the Chernigov and Poltava provinces; (3) the *Ukrainians* who populate the Khar'kov and Kursk provinces; (4) the inhabitants of the Kiev, Podolia, and Volhynia provinces who call themselves *Russnaks*, and (5) the *Belarusians* who populate Vitebsk and Mogilev provinces. The main difference between the first and subsequent shadings of the original Russian nation is that the Vitebsk, Mogilev, Poltava, Chernigov, Kiev, Volhynia, and Podolia provinces have at present special rights and differ from other Great Russian provinces by the system of government.<sup>171</sup>

According to Pestel', all “shadings” of the “original Russian nation” shared the same language, despite differences of “dialects” (even within the Great Russian provinces). They also shared the same Orthodox religion, as only an insignificant and decreasing number of the Uniates lived in “several places.” Their social structure was also identical. In addition, Pestel' used the arguments of historical legitimism, pointing to the fact that all the Ukrainian and Belarusian provinces “belonged to Russia in ancient times”

and Russia only “returned [. . .] her ancient legacy” (which was a rhetoric shared by all Russian imperialists). Therefore, the “Russian Law” declared all the East Slavs to be “Russians” and warned against “any special names” that could separate them from Great Russians.<sup>172</sup>

Since Pestel’s idea was to transform imperial Russia into a nation-state, all other nationalities and ethnic groups were expected to undergo institutional and cultural assimilation, or simply Russification. Gradually, all the autochthonous peoples of the Russian Empire, such as Finns, Moldavians, Latvians, and Tatars, were to become culturally part of the Russian state nationality. Pestel’ made an exception only for the Poles and the Jews—for whom he hoped to create a state in the Middle East. He also split “foreigners” into two groups: (1) permanent residents who were legal subjects of the emperor; and (2) temporary residents. In the first category, among those nationalities which did not consider themselves “Russians,” he listed Poles from the western provinces, Germans from the Baltic region, Armenians, and Greeks living everywhere in the empire. Pestel’ left them only one choice: they either would decide to become “completely Russians” or would be proclaimed “completely foreigners,” losing their rights to own real estate, enter social service, and take part in political life. Pestel’s ultimate goal was to mix all these nationalities and “tribes” into “only one Nation and all the different shadings [to] mold into one common mass, so that the inhabitants of the entire space of the Russian State are all Russians.”<sup>173</sup> For this purpose, the names of various peoples were to be abolished and replaced with “the common name of Russians.”

Linguistic Russification was the key to the formation of a homogeneous Russian nationality, which had to lead to the mental unity of the population. With the introduction of only one language in Russia “notions and ways of thinking will become more uniform” and the speakers of one language “will more unanimously comprise one and the same nation.” In other words, the Russian language was the real cornerstone of Russianness. The dominance of Russian, the ruling status of the Orthodox church, and administrative Russification were to instill in Russia “the unity of belief, shape, and thought” (*Edinoverie, Edinoobrazie i Edinomyslie*).<sup>174</sup> Pestel’s Jacobin model was the most radical plan for nation-building put forth in Russia in the first half of the nineteenth century. While the Jacobin national model was also adapted by radical Polish émigrés, it did not find much support in Russia, including other Decembrists.

For instance, the leader of the Northern Society of the Decembrists, Nikita Muraviev, in his project of the constitution, abstained from radical Jacobin visions of nation-building. He envisioned a semifederal system for Russia, consisting of fourteen states and two districts.<sup>175</sup> Those “states” were to be created not on a national but on a regional or geographic principle, which did not coincide with the national map of Russia. Hence, the Dnieper State was formed around Smolensk, while Kyiv was considered the capital of the River Bug State, and Kharkiv, of the Ukrainian State. The “states” were not full-fledged autonomous entities but rather semi-autonomous provinces enjoying mostly financial and fiscal competence, while all sociopolitical and international matters were left to the central government. In general, Muraviev borrowed more from the English model than from the French Jacobin. He was also much less preoccupied with national issues than his “Southern” peer Pestel’, although he also touched on that matter while dealing with the question of citizenship.

By “citizens” Muraviev was ready to recognize all inhabitants of Russia who were granted basic civil and political rights (the conditions for granting those rights, however, were not clearly defined).<sup>176</sup> The foreigners were allowed to become Russian citizens if they had acquired a certain amount of property and applied for Russian citizenship by denouncing their previous citizenships. Otherwise, they were not allowed to enter either the civil or the military service, caveats which resembled some points of Pestel’s “Russian Law.” Russianness was practically equal to citizenship: “By Russians are recognized all the native inhabitants of Russia and the children of foreigners who were born in Russia and reached maturity, if they expressed the desire to stay in Russia.”<sup>177</sup> Some language competence was thought to be a prerequisite for the participation in citizenship/Russianness. “Who does not know Russian cannot be a Russian citizen” was written in the document’s margin. For those who did not master Russian the constitution reserved an option to be a “local” citizen (in a certain province).<sup>178</sup> Finally, Muraviev seemed to merge the terms *citizen* and *Russian* when he stressed that “the titles of one-farm dwellers, townspeople, nobles, renown citizens are all replaced with the title of Citizen or Russian.”<sup>179</sup>

Despite the lack of a clear definition in Muraviev’s constitution, Russianness was considered almost equal to citizenship (or *jus soli*) and was detached from a pressing cultural assimilation. Knowledge of Russian, however, was indispensable for participants in an all-Russian political and civic life.

### *The Legacy of Decembrists*

#### Lunin Versus Uvarov

Mikhail Lunin, a Decembrist himself, became one of the shrewdest students of East European geopolitics while in exile in the late 1830s and early 1840s. His vision of Russianness was often directly connected to an assessment of Polish affairs. Unlike his more unfortunate peer, Pavel Pestel' (who was hanged in July 1826), Lunin did not consider the possibility of restoring the Polish state, including its eastern borderlands constituting Russia's "South-Western" and "North-Western" provinces. Nonetheless, he remained sympathetic towards the Poles after the November uprising and regarded them as a "fraternal" nationality. Russia's connections with Poland revealed the more general relationship of the Russian nationality to the empire.

For Lunin, Russia was indeed a "nation,"<sup>180</sup> and he used the term in the contemporary French sense, which merged state and nationality. He was, however, able to dissociate nationality from empire, especially from the imperial government. It is in the Polish context that Lunin revealed the disparity between the Russian nationality and imperial government. He commented with bitterness that the hostilities in 1831 occurred between "brothers" and "fraternal nations." He also accused the Russian *government* of pretending to act "in the name of" the entire Russian nation while persecuting the Poles.<sup>181</sup>

Elsewhere he insisted that in 1831 Poles rebelled "not against the [Russian] nation but against the Russian government." This could be proved by the actions of the rebels: their deputation to Saint Petersburg, their public reverence for the fallen Russian Decembrists, their printed addresses to Russians with appeals to "brotherhood," and so on.<sup>182</sup> Finally, he stressed bluntly that the Russian government was lacking "national character" and therefore could not destroy the Polish nationality. Besides, governmental reprisals against the Poles were not supported by Russian society:

Since the government acts without the participation of the nation, the sphere of its moral influence is necessarily limited, if not negligible. A strange mistake is to think that it [government] can destroy the Polish nationality when it itself lacks national character, that it can exercise influence on Polish culture when it itself lacks enlightenment, that it can obliterate the religion of Poles when [ . . . ] following the deadly example of religious persecutions as given by Polish kings it shows that its own beliefs are infirm.<sup>183</sup>

Lunin sought to convince his ideal readers—or perhaps, quite real governmental agents inspecting his letters—that Russians never aspired to imperial expansion and “social or political dominance” over their “brothers.” He provided the example of “natural representatives of the Russian nation,” that is, the Decembrists, who offered a “union treaty” to the Poles.<sup>184</sup> He firmly believed in the possibility of Russo-Polish unity based on common ethnicity, proximity of religions, and geographical situation.<sup>185</sup> Lunin made it clear that Poles were for Russians their “brothers by origins,” their “advance guards in terms of geographical location, and [their] natural allies.”<sup>186</sup> He emphasized that the “mores, customs, and inclinations” of Poles and Russians were similar. In particular, he underlined the mutual comprehension of Polish and Russian—“both languages coming from the one source are understandable with the same ease in both countries.” Even their religions were “the most compatible with each other among various religions spread in the world.” Thus, unlike the majority of Russian and Polish observers, Lunin never opposed Russianness to Polishness. Instead, he defined Russianness in opposition to “official nationality.”

While blaming the government for the “denationalization” of Poles and the persecution of Catholic and Uniate priests, Lunin (a Catholic himself) passionately attacked the Ministry of Education for the policy of “official nationality.” “The Ministry of Popular Education, losing sight of its true goal, which is the proliferation of positive knowledge, intends to impose nationality, support teachings which do not need human support, and transform the very sciences into the pillars of autocracy. Here goes ignorance, a defining feature of [the] present time.”<sup>187</sup> Lunin’s criticism appeared in his famous “Letters from Siberia.” In a letter from 1838, Lunin thoroughly reviewed the elements of Uvarov’s triad and rejected them altogether. He started with Orthodoxy. First, he undermined the thesis about the alleged inherent connection between Orthodoxy and autocracy, stressing that Orthodoxy was “as inclined towards Autocracy as towards other types of government.”<sup>188</sup> Then, he stressed that Orthodoxy (as any religion) “obliterates nationality, as well as any difference among people, since it encompasses all humanity irrespective of the differences between a slave and a free man, a Jew and a pagan.” Finally, he argued against the use of religion for political purposes by secular authorities.

Lunin next turned to autocracy, arguing that it was not yet proved that autocracy was “better suited to Russians than some other political system.” He pointed to the more advanced societies that replaced autocracy

with “constitutional forms, more relevant for the development of their forces and success of knowledge.”<sup>189</sup> He envisioned that one day Russians would also face a similar transformation from autocracy to constitution.

No better defined was the last element of Uvarov’s triad, nationality: it was as ill-suited to be a pillar of Russianness as the two previous elements. Lunin pointed out that if defined as “the expression of customs, mores, [and] laws of the entire social order,” nationality would change with any new period of Russian history. “The legendary era of Riurik, the dominance of the Mongols, the power of the tsars, and the epochs of the emperors represent as many different nationalities,” argued Lunin, wondering which “nationality” the government intended to develop. He concluded that if the authorities were to develop “the last nationality,” that of the imperial epoch, it would be “more foreign than Russian.” Like many other Russian observers, Lunin regarded the imperial period of Russian history as the negation of traditional Russianness. Decembrists, for example, used to speak about the “German” empire, alluding to the significant number of Germans (mostly from the Baltic region) in Russian military and civil service.<sup>190</sup>

Lunin was one of the first Russians who convincingly proved the contradictory nature of Uvarov’s doctrine. He did not, however, provide his own positive definition of Russianness. He was sure though that autocracy (or loyalty to the imperial dynasty) and Orthodoxy (as imposed by the government) could not be idioms of Russianness. He was particularly outraged by the intrusion of the Ministry of Education into religious affairs and “preaching the Russian nationality in the non-Russian language.”<sup>191</sup> The “non-Russian language” could mean here that Lunin regarded both the content and the form of Uvarov’s triad as incompatible with his own vision of Russianness.<sup>192</sup>

#### Aristocratic Radicalism: Prince Petr Viazemskii

The first Russian to introduce the term *nationality* (*narodnost’*) into the Russian discourse was Prince Petr Viazemskii, who can be regarded as the most important successor to the liberal views of the Decembrists in the 1830s–1840s. Viazemskii did not produce an elaborate vision of Russianness at the time, although his scattered comments remained quite important for the discourse about nation-ness. As early as 1819, the young Viazemskii used the term *nationality* (*narodnost’*) to convey the meaning of the French

word *nationalité*, pointing to the example of Poles who translated the same word as *narodowość*.<sup>193</sup> The new term meant for him things that were specific to Russia—historical events, heroes, names, and so on, as reflected in literature. For Viazemskii, Russianness seemed to be a combination of ethnography, history, and language represented by high culture, although with strong elements of popular culture. At the same time, he recognized that the Russian terms for *nationality* (*narodnost'*) and *national* (*narodnyi*) confused two French words, *populaire* and *national*, and therefore merged two meanings (folkloric and sociopolitical, respectively).

Later in life, Viazemskii tried to dissociate “nationality” (*narodnost'*) from “commoners’ nationality” (*prostonarodnost'*).<sup>194</sup> He became increasingly skeptical about the meaning of the term *nationality* and the primacy of the national over the human. He admitted that he avoided the term as one with an arbitrary and elusive meaning. He also recognized the German Romantic roots and folkloric basis of nationality. Nevertheless, he defined nationality not through adherence to ethnography but rather as the “spiritual and moral personality of a nation.”<sup>195</sup> The Russian language was the best medium of this “spiritual” Russianness. According to the prince, “everything that is well said in Russian is [purely Russian] and purely national [*narodnoe*].”<sup>196</sup> The national/exclusive was for Viazemskii directly connected to universal/human, since it was impossible to separate the “purely national” from the “universally human.” As he aptly put it, “initially, we are human beings, and then [we are] compatriots.” He liked nationality as a feeling but rejected it as a system or an ideology of national exclusivity. For this reason he could not understand the ideological preference of the “Russian Volga” for the “German Rhine.”<sup>197</sup> For Viazemskii, as well as for the radical critic Belinskii, the national had to reflect universal values and be expressed in a universal language; that is, it had to be well written. Finally, in 1873 he bluntly stated that the highest moral and intelligent realms were above the “conditional barriers of parochial nationalities.”<sup>198</sup>

Similar to Slavophiles and Decembrists, Viazemskii dissociated the Russian Empire from nationality, especially when alluding to an alleged German dominance over Russians. He expressed this view in his “Notebooks” in 1830: “*Statistical views on Russia*. Russia was in the ancient times a Varangian colony and today it is German [colony] in which its two main cities are Saint Petersburg and Sarepta. Business is run in it in German, in higher social estate French is spoken, but everywhere Russian money is in circulation. The Russian language and Russian hands serve only for the

dirty work.”<sup>199</sup> Viazemskii’s critical attitude toward imperial policies was best expressed in his vision of Poland (as already shown in Chapter 1 of this book). If around 1830 he attested to strongly anti-Polish views of the Russian public, in particular those of Pushkin and Zhukovskii, by the early 1870s—in his assessment of the situation before the November uprising—he commented that at that time there was no “Polish question” in Russia yet. He interpreted the negative reaction of some Russians towards Poland not in ethnic/national but in political terms, as Russia’s *raison d’être*. “There was no tribal hostility here; there was only a political consideration on the part of the Russian state view.”<sup>200</sup> He did not, however, understand mixing Polish and Russian identities, as showed by his treatment of the writer Fadei Bulgarin, a Pole by origins who acquired notoriety as a conservative Russian journalist. By switching sides, Bulgarin did not automatically become “Russian” and instead lost his nation-ness in Viazemskii’s eyes: “it is strange that Bulgarin prints articles against his compatriots [Poles]; however, he is such a swindler that he is neither a Russian or Pole and not even a Jew. Then who is he?”<sup>201</sup>

Perhaps Poles had to remain Poles and should not have pretended to be Russians. He thought of the latter choice as hypocrisy. In general, Viazemskii abstained from opposing Russianness to Polishness and rather singled out “Germans” as the ultimate expression of non-Russianness. Somehow it was the Germans who symbolized the gap between the Russian nationality and the nonnational empire. In 1846, he repeated his earlier anti-German comments and comparisons between “today’s German dominance in Russia’s administration” and medieval Varangian rule in Rus’.<sup>202</sup> He pointed out, however, that the common people were not assimilated either under the Varangian rule or under the “German” dominance. “Official Russia is not Russian,” however, and since the time of Peter the Great it underwent a second Norman conquest. Viazemskii seemed to share with the Slavophiles the view about the alienation of Russia’s ruling class from the Russian nationality. That nationality was best preserved by the common people, and therefore “Russianness” was somewhat reduced to ethnography.

At any rate, the Russian nationality was for Prince Viazemskii not identical with the empire but rather surrounded by several other *historical* nationalities which together were comprised in the Russian Empire. Characteristic was the prince’s treatment of Ukrainians. In 1833, he demanded that Russian literature reflect the ethnic/national and cultural diversity of the empire, pointing to the British example. “In English novels a Scotsman,

Irishman, and Englishman all have their own physiognomy, and here [in Russia] Little Russian does not resemble a Lievlander and so on."<sup>203</sup> To enrich Russian literature, a writer had to turn to the previous century, that is, to the period from Peter the Great to Catherine the Great, when Russians had "military and political relations" with "neighboring nations." Among those that he listed were Swedes, Poles, Ukrainians, and Turks. Ukrainians had the same status as other historical nationalities and were therefore distinct from ethnic Russians. He also recognized the ethnocultural otherness of contemporary Ukrainians, even if only for literary purposes.

Although Viazemskii was mostly preoccupied with Russian culture, he remained true to his "antinationalist" convictions, stressing the presence of universal human features among particular "national" ones. His exclusive loyalty to Great Russia was always modified by universal humanist values that limited national claims. He never set out a Russian nationalist agenda, and in contrast to the Decembrists and later radicals like Belinskii, he did not confuse universalism with Russification and imperialism. All this made Viazemskii a unique figure in Russian intellectual life. Russian-ness was best preserved among common people as a spiritual-ethnographic category expressed in the Russian language and reflected in literature.

### *Nation-ness in Radical Criticism and Philosophy*

#### Critic as Russian Nationalist: Vissarion Belinskii

Unlike the aristocratic frondeur Prince Viazemskii, the middle-class radical Vissarion Belinskii elaborated an audacious Russian nationalist agenda by associating Hegelian universalism with Russification. Belinskii's national model was based on Russian high culture that used the Great Russian vernacular turned into a literary medium. Such an approach signified cultural Russification and the marginalization of all popular (non-Russian) cultures that contradicted the Russian literary standard and "universal" cultural values. Each cultural and social artifact had to have "world-historical" meaning; otherwise it was dispensable.

Belinskii borrowed many of his major ideas from Hegel, especially the pursuit of rationality and the emphasis on general phenomena over particular ones in culture, society, and politics.<sup>204</sup> Belinskii's vision of nation-ness also had Hegelian overtones, in both his use of the dialectical method and his association of nationality with "world-historical" statehood. In a truly Hegelian fashion Belinskii stated that humankind did not include just

any people, only those nationalities which expressed the idea of humankind,<sup>205</sup> that is, only “historical” nations in Hegelian and Marxist terms.

Some observers hold Belinskii’s Hegelianism responsible for his Russian chauvinism and, in particular, for his anti-Ukrainian bias.<sup>206</sup> His nationalism was, however, mitigated by the idea that all nationalities existed not for their own sake but to prepare people for a higher historical purpose—participation in the modern cultural community of all humankind, which was the realization of the absolute idea.<sup>207</sup> According to Andrea Rutherford, the author of a comprehensive study of Belinskii’s theory of nationhood, the Russian critic divided the history of humankind into three stages of sociopolitical organization: the people (*narod*) stage, the nation/nationality (*natsional’nost’*) stage, and the final stage of “organic unity.”<sup>208</sup> She only failed to mention the primal stage of sociopolitical organization—that of a “tribe” which expressed itself only through anonymous folk poetry.<sup>209</sup> Rutherford’s scheme is perhaps correct, although Belinskii in practice was not that systematic.

More important for the purpose of this book is that Belinskii indeed differentiated between “people” or “people-ness” (*narodnost’*) and “nation” or “nationality” (*natsional’nost’*) as two evolutionary epochs of a particular community.<sup>210</sup> “People-ness” was subordinated to “nationality”: “people-ness is related to nationality as species-like [*vidovoe*], an inferior notion to the genus-like [*rodovomu*], superior, a more generic notion.”<sup>211</sup> The former referred to the common people and was expressed in ethnography and folklore, while the latter was represented by high culture and reflected in mentality. In social terms, a nation encompassed all strata of society, including the “people” or lower classes.<sup>212</sup> “There is not yet a nation in people, but nation contains also a people [*narod*]”; in other words, a “nation” is only potentially present within a “people” as a “nation in possibility.”<sup>213</sup> Belinskii illustrated the point by choosing an example from the arts: folk songs compiled by Kirsha Danilov were the “work of the people,” whereas the poetry of Pushkin was “national” and, therefore, accessible only to the upper (educated) classes. “Nationality,” as based on high culture and universal/European values, contained in itself “people-ness” expressed through historical legacy, ethnography, folklore, and so on.

Nationality came with social and, most importantly, *cultural* stratification. Only certain select societies reached the stage of nationality because of their strong “substance,” while the majority of “tribes” or “peoples” never managed to develop into “world-historical” nations and thus disap-

peared from the world stage. Those losers, deprived of any “all-human meaning,” had to negate their nation-ness and assimilate into the civilization of other nations, thus acquiring the meaning of the “world-historical” people at the expense of their distinctiveness.<sup>214</sup> Russians (or rather, Great Russians) were among the luckiest, although only in the initial stages of national development.<sup>215</sup> Accordingly, Peter I was a “great man” and the initiator of the national stage in Russia.<sup>216</sup> Before Peter, Russia witnessed the complete dominance of “people-ness,” or the “patriarchal state,” lacking any cultural differences among the upper and lower classes. Peter I initiated cultural stratification: “common people separated from nobles and soldiers, but in the political sense a people [*narod*] was no more—a nation [*natsiia*] had come into being.”<sup>217</sup>

Belinskii was one of the first observers in Russia to understand that nationhood was a crucial feature of the modern world.<sup>218</sup> He stressed that “without nationalities humankind would have been a dead political abstraction.”<sup>219</sup> He thought that contemporary states and peoples had to be “national,” like the French, English, and Germans. Similarly, he did not believe in the future of states “deprived of nationality,” such as Austria.<sup>220</sup> In order to succeed, that is, to acquire a “world-historical” status, societies always had “to differ by the most striking nationality.” He staunchly believed that Russians were already a nation, assuring himself that “we have national life.” At the same time, he was not sure about the nature of the “Russian nationality.” “What does this Russian nationality consist of—this still cannot be defined,” he wrote in 1846. “It is enough for us now that its elements already begin to break through colorlessness and imitativeness given to us by the reform of Peter the Great.”<sup>221</sup> He was sure, though, that this Russianness could not be expressed through ethnography, which referred only to “commoner nationality.”<sup>222</sup> Ethnography, therefore, was not the idiom of modern Russian nationality. On the contrary, nationality belonged to the realm of high culture and could best be represented by an educated elite.<sup>223</sup>

Already in 1834 Belinskii offered the idea of a socially complete Russian nationality consisting of different classes. He admitted that the Russian “national physiognomy” was best preserved among the lower classes but added that the “commoners are not the entire people” and that “as the head is the most important part of [the] human body, so the middle and higher social estate constitute the nation par excellence.”<sup>224</sup>

Belinskii, like Benedict Anderson in our own times, quite clearly understood nationality as imagined, or in his own terms, an “ideal” community

created “by the mind of real people.”<sup>225</sup> The Russian critic regarded nationality as a collective person that differed from others even by facial features: “Every nation is different from any other by the type of face and therefore, with a few exceptions, it is not difficult to tell from the human face whether one is German, English, French, Italian [or] Russian.”<sup>226</sup> Belinskii also considered climate as one of the reasons for national differences and in particular for the preservation of Russian nationality, despite Western influences.<sup>227</sup>

Yet physical anthropology and climate were only auxiliary idioms (if any at all) of nation-ness. Another category, which he could not clearly name, was far more important. “People from one nationality,” he noted, “have some familial similarity in manners, in the way they see things, in the way of life, not to mention peculiarity of language.”<sup>228</sup> Elsewhere, he aptly remarked that “the mystery of nationality of any nation does not lie in its dress and cuisine but in, so to say, its manner to understand things.”<sup>229</sup> In another work, he referred to the same phenomenon as the “national spirit” and “spiritual physiognomy of one’s own nationality.”<sup>230</sup> What Belinskii here only alluded to is what we usually call “mentality.” He seemed to prefer the word “substance” of nation. Eternal and unalterable “substance” was indeed a central idiom of Russianness: “The essence of any nationality is its substance. Substance is something unalterable and eternal in the spirit of nation, which not changing itself survives all changes and goes wholly and unharmed through all stages of historical development. This is the grain that makes possible future development.”<sup>231</sup> Each nationality has its own substance, which contains its history and difference from other nationalities. In fact, “nationality” (as “the assembly of all spiritual forces of nation”) and the “substance” of nation were the same thing, since any substance contained in itself a potential nation/nationality. This “substance,” or “the spirit and direction of Russian activity,” appeared in literature as its “nationality” (*narodnost’*). While ethnographic characteristics were changing, mental or “substantial” features like courage, intelligence, shrewdness, cheerfulness, and so on were indeed eternal.<sup>232</sup>

Elsewhere he defined “nationality” in literature as “a [true] depiction of the mores, customs, and character of one or another nation, one or another country.”<sup>233</sup> Thus, the national poet like Pushkin was one who expressed in his works the “spirit of nation” in its entirety, with all its “substantial elements.”<sup>234</sup> According to Belinskii, there were communities with “great” and “paltry” substances that determined the transition from the people stage to the national stage of social development. The substance also could provide

a given society with a “world-historical” meaning. Only a “great substance,” however, could ensure people a place in humankind and complete the transition from “people-ness” to “nationality.”<sup>235</sup> The “paltry” substance was easily breakable, out of which no nation could emerge. Russians were, of course, provided with a “great” substance that was allegedly visible from the very beginning of Russian history. History itself separated ethnic Russians (Great Russians) from other peoples having “paltry” substances.

For Belinskii, Russian history started on Great Russian lands (such as Novgorod) and culminated in the epoch of Peter I, who transformed a Great Russian people/people-ness into a modern Russian nation. Peter could have indeed attacked Russian “people-ness,” but he never aspired to destroy the “substantial spirit” or “nationality” of Russians.<sup>236</sup> Neither “substance” nor religion separated Russians from Europe. Rather, Russia, as a “Christian country,” belonged to Europe and was opposed to Asia.<sup>237</sup> While abroad in 1847, Belinskii addressed an open letter to Gogol, in which he bluntly rejected the official idioms of Russianness, such as Orthodoxy and autocracy, stressing that Russians “in their nature [were] a profoundly atheistic nation.”<sup>238</sup> He also never juxtaposed Orthodoxy to Roman Catholicism (or Orthodox Russia to Catholic Poland, for that matter). It was, however, obvious that Poles were outside the Russian nationality defined by mental (*not* religious) idioms of nation-ness. Similarly, such Baltic cities as Revel (Tallinn) and Riga contained a “foreign population” and were placed outside the mental map of Russianness.<sup>239</sup> On the other hand, one’s birth in *ethnic* Russia could practically assure membership in the Russian nationality.

Language alone was not a sufficient idiom of Russianness. Hence, foreigners who spoke Russian still remained outside the Russian nation, since people not born in Russia could not acquire the Russian “substance.”<sup>240</sup> Fadei Bulgarin (born in Poland as Tadeusz Bułharyn) could not become a true Russian in Belinskii’s eyes, even if he might declare his loyalty to “the Russian faith,” that is, Orthodoxy.<sup>241</sup> On the other hand, a lot of Russian nobles used French while remaining ardent Russian patriots.<sup>242</sup> Even in literature, the Russian language did not provide a work with “nationality” if the language did not express the “Russian spirit.”<sup>243</sup> Elsewhere, Belinskii more explicitly rejected language as an idiom of nation-ness: “Nationality lies not in a dialect or language spoken by the common people but in the spirit and character of [the] entire nation.”<sup>244</sup>

Contrary to the opinion of Paul Bushkovich,<sup>245</sup> “nationality” for Belinskii did not contradict the universal spirit; it rather reflected uni-

versalism and rejected ethnic particularity. Moreover, only “national” phenomena could truly be considered “world-historical” and universal.<sup>246</sup> The love for things native was for Belinskii impossible without love for humankind in general; Russianness was therefore compatible with humankind.<sup>247</sup> What really contradicted “universal notions of culture” was any ethnic community (of Yakuts and Ukrainians alike) that did not reach the stage of “nationality” and therefore did not comply with universal values. Among “ethnic” prenational cultures, which expressed themselves mainly in folklore, were Ukrainians, or rather Little Russian peasants and a handful of Little Russian literati who did not understand the benefits of cultural Russification. The case of Ukraine tested the “size” and inclusivity of Belinskii’s Russian nationality.

Ukraine was not a nationality in either the Herderian or Hegelian sense. Since Belinskii did not use language and ethnography as idioms of nation-ness, he did not think much of the ethnolinguistic nationality of Romantics. In Hegelian terms, Ukraine was not a nation, since according to Belinskii, it was not connected to its own historical, let alone contemporary statehood. Ukrainian history was just an episode of Russian history, and therefore Ukrainians were only a “tribe”:

Little Russia was never a state, and therefore it did not have a history in a strict sense of the word. The history of Little Russia is nothing more than an episode from the reign of Aleksei Mikhailovich [. . .]. The history of Little Russia is like a tributary entering the main river of Russian history. Little Russians were always a tribe and never a people and still less—a state.<sup>248</sup>

Belinskii’s depiction of Ukrainian Cossack history—beyond Cossack times Ukraine certainly did not have a separate history—paradoxically resembled contemporary Polish visions of Ukrainian Cossacks as a chaotic, disorderly mass of people who were not able to organize a viable state with rational government. According to Belinskii, the Hetmanate and Zaporozhian Sich were not states but rather a “weird commune in Asian manner.” Ukrainians themselves were born to murder and to be murdered. If for many Poles Ukrainians were indeed primitive and anarchic, they were at the same time freedom-loving knights and defenders of Christianity. For Belinskii, however, Ukrainians were only a historical mistake—a nonhistorical tribe provided with “paltry” substance. In fact, Ukrainians barely existed in history, and by the 1840s they had certainly ceased to be a distinct community. It is their “paltry” substance that prevented Ukrai-

nians from forming a viable nationality. They were “patriarchally simple-minded and incapable of moral movement and development.”<sup>249</sup> In general, the Ukrainian substance was incapable of supporting civilization.<sup>250</sup> Only after merging with “consanguineous” Russia, that is, at the expense of its distinctiveness, could Ukraine enter civilization.<sup>251</sup>

But even in Herderian terms Ukraine could not be considered a nationality by Belinskii. The Ukrainian language did not mark a separate identity, since it was little more than a “provincial dialect of the commoners.”<sup>252</sup> Ukrainian upper classes, he noted, rejected traditional culture by joining the superior Russian nation, while the rest of Ukrainians could not become a world-historical nation. The return to a folklore-based ethnicity preserved by the commoners would have meant, for the upper classes, the fall from (Russian) civilization into (Ukrainian) barbarity.<sup>253</sup> Certainly, neither ethnography nor a dialect spoken by peasants could become the basis for a separate Ukrainian nationality, because the latter could be shaped only by the elite. Hence, Belinskii rejected Romantic Ukrainian literature as “boorish.”<sup>254</sup>

Ukrainians were unable to challenge the Russian nationality, which was expressed in a high culture and the Great Russian language already spread among the upper classes in Ukraine. This is not to say that Belinskii did not notice any ethnic differences between Ukrainian and Russian peasants (he even commented that the latter appeared “worse and filthier than the pigs” compared to the “cleanliness and beauty” of Ukrainian peasant huts).<sup>255</sup> Minor ethnographic differences among the commoners did not undermine an almost Jacobin-like unity of the Russian nationality. Belinskii practically equated civilization with the post-Petrine Russian “substance” that became a real idiom of a Russo-Ukrainian connection. This connection was of course not equal, since Ukrainians were not real partners. To become “civilized” meant for an ex-Ukrainian both to become “Russian” and to acquire “nationality.” For Belinskii, it was Gogol who best symbolized the transition from a nonhistorical, *prenational* Little Russia to a “world-historical” *national* Russia.<sup>256</sup>

With regard to an imagined community, Belinskii situated Russianness somewhere between a unitary Russian nationality in the Jacobin style and a narrow “all-Russian nation” closely centered on Great Russian culture. Despite the fact that folklore and ethnography were not important idioms of nationality, modern Russian national culture used the Great Russian language; therefore, the resulting national community appeared

solidly Great Russian. Great Russians were a “world-historical” community, while Little Russians never reached the stage of “nationality” and were reduced to a provincial (Little Russian) variant of Russians.

#### Critic as Cosmopolite: Valerian Maikov

If Belinskii could be credited for being one of the founders of Russian liberal nationalism,<sup>257</sup> his contemporary Valerian Maikov was often regarded as the proponent of cultural cosmopolitanism. Belinskii, while strongly adhering to Western values, always emphasized adoration for the new Russian nationality, demanding that it be reflected in art. Contrary to this approach, Maikov argued that true art should not be associated with any one nationality; otherwise, an artist and his works would be mediocre. He added that a “man expressing by his person all the peculiarities of his nation is completely lacking abilities to be a great artist.” Such an artist should move beyond the confines of the “national worldview.”<sup>258</sup> In general, Maikov pointed to the contradiction between the universal and the national, especially since he regarded national peculiarism as an aberration from an “all-human character” or “human type.” He stressed that “humanity is in direct opposition to nationality,” and that all positive features found among different nations derived from the “all-human”; all vices, on the other hand, came directly from nationalities themselves.<sup>259</sup> Therefore, nationalities were only additional characteristics of the people: “We should remind ourselves that a man, no matter to which nation he belongs, and no matter to which circumstances he underwent at his conception, birth, and development, nonetheless belongs, by his nature, to the range of native creatures called people, not French, not Germans, not Russians, not English, etc.”<sup>260</sup>

Yet Maikov’s choice of a nation-centered idiom was very similar to that of Belinskii. For Maikov, national peculiarity was not expressed in ethnography or “the forms of everyday existence” but in national “character,” “spirit,” and “notions.”<sup>261</sup> It is only mentality that separated Russians from other nationalities, such as the French.<sup>262</sup> Maikov, who dealt predominantly with Great Russians, called them simply “Russians.”

#### Philosophy Versus Empire and the “all-Russian nation”: Mikhail Bakunin

Mikhail Bakunin became the first Russian thinker who, in the 1840s, radically and irreversibly separated the Russian nationality from the em-

pire and its government (both ruling dynasty and bureaucracy). In 1847, in a speech to a Polish gathering in Paris commemorating the seventeenth anniversary of the November uprising, he attacked the "official sense" of the name "Russian." "Due to the disgusting politics of our rulers, *Russian* in official sense of the word means a slave and an executioner."<sup>263</sup> Nevertheless, Bakunin was a deeply *national* Russian thinker who understood the place of nationality in the contemporary world. After emphasizing his Russianness, he stressed that "individual honor is inseparable from national honor" and that "without this close connection between nations and governments and between individuals and nations there could be neither a fatherland nor nation."<sup>264</sup> Precisely because Bakunin adhered to the new national principle in politics he was able to assess Russian reprisal policies towards the Poles as "antinational." "This war," he wrote, referring to the Russian pacification of Poland in 1831, "was started in the interests of despotism, not in the interests of the Russian nation, since these two categories of interests are completely opposing to each other." In general, Russia's government is "alien in its activities to all national aspirations, all vital interests and living forces of the country."<sup>265</sup>

Thus, "official Russia" was the enemy for both Poles and the Russians themselves: "Yes, precisely because you are the enemies of Emperor Nicholas, the enemies of official Russia," he proclaimed to the Polish émigrés, "you are, naturally, [ . . . ] the friends of the Russian people!"<sup>266</sup> As an alternative to the "official" nationality, Bakunin pointed to the "real Russian nation," a "new society" of revolutionary/democratic peasants and radical intelligentsia, who together were able to destroy the "monstrous mechanism of oppression and conquest called the Russian Empire."<sup>267</sup>

Personally, Bakunin sought to separate his Russianness from any link to the Russian state. As he stated in 1848, "by denying furiously the title of a Russian 'subject' [ . . . ] I leave for myself the honor of belonging to the Russian nation."<sup>268</sup> He credited himself with the idea of radical separation between the Russian state/government and the Russian nationality. In a letter to a German newspaper in 1848 he wrote that he had destroyed the illusion propagated by the Russian government that it "represents something in common with Russian people and acts and lives in accordance with a living national consciousness." Rather, he "had discovered a gap separating it from the people" and "had predicted a close downfall of this government and an emergence of a liberated Russian nation from the ruins of the Russian empire."<sup>269</sup>

To emphasize the insurmountable gap between nationality and autocracy in Russia, Bakunin pointed to the foreign (German) descent of Russia's ruling dynasty. Such views were also widespread among the Russian Decembrists, the early populists, and Polish émigrés. "We are also ruled by a foreign hand, for the monarch is German by descent," he said in 1847. The monarch "will never understand either the needs or the character of Russian people; his reign, representing a certain combination of Mongol cruelty with Prussian pedantry, completely excludes the national element."<sup>270</sup>

Bakunin was unable to define successfully the "national element," or the "Russian nation," since his definition remained within the vague realm of mental characteristics and political values, all of which referred to the revolutionary potential and democratic essence of the Russian peasantry. In 1845, he pointed to the "democratic instincts and inclinations" of the Russian "people," who also "spoke the same language."<sup>271</sup> The linguistic element here was, however, secondary to "instincts" and "inclinations." Later, he pointed to the humanity and love of freedom exhibited by Russians: "A character of this nation is spoiled only on the surface. Only if this strong, mighty, and young people destroys all impediments [ . . . ], will it express itself in its entire virginal beauty [ . . . ], in the name of all the noblest and holiest in the life of nation, in the name of humanity, in the name of liberty, the Russian people [will] demand for itself the right to existence."<sup>272</sup>

The vague and unarticulated character of the Russian nationality, largely based on the social idiom of nation-ness (such as peasants) and separated from the Russian state/government, is particularly seen when compared to Polishness, which Bakunin defined in much narrower terms. The Poles were indeed a separate, "neighbouring" nationality. He defined Polishness in rather traditional terms, referring to the Catholic religion, the Polish language, ethnography (customs), and legal institutions, all of which the Russian government allegedly sought to destroy while fighting against Poland's "nationality."<sup>273</sup> Bakunin did not oppose Polishness to Russianness, since both complemented each other as two revolutionary nationalities (in this case the Russians only *in potentio*). Both nationalities were equally oppressed: Poles mostly in the "national" sense (religion and language); and Russians in the social sense (since they were represented primarily by the oppressed peasantry).

The culmination of Bakunin's radical philosophy of the 1840s occurred in 1848, when he took part in Prague's Slavic Congress and subsequently in the street fights with Austrian soldiers. It was in 1848 (the year that exceeds

the chronological frame of this study) that Bakunin clearly formulated the demand for the unmaking of multinational empires and “large” nations containing more than one nationality. He also attacked the very idea of “artificial, monstrous borders, established with violence by the congresses of despots according to the so-called historical, geographical, commercial, and strategic demands!”<sup>274</sup> Bakunin chose not to notice that his Polish émigré friends themselves adopted the concept of historical and natural borders.

At any rate, the Russian Empire needed to be split up along national lines, which also meant the unmaking of the “all-Russian nation” into two *ethnohistorical*, self-sustained nationalities. In general, Bakunin predicted the liberation of “three different big Slavic nations: Great Russians, Little Russians, and the Polish nation, all three of which have completely different origins, a particular history, [and are] provided with all necessary conditions for independent existence.”<sup>275</sup> Bakunin was the first Russian who suggested the division of common Russianness into its Great Russian and Ukrainian parts, regarding ethnic Russians themselves as not the ruling but the oppressed nationality.

In other words, the Russian nationality ended where the Ukrainian and Polish began. Bakunin’s vision provided space for separate nationalities, as was envisioned by other proponents of Europe’s Spring of Nations, including the members of Ukrainian Sts. Cyril and Methodius Society. Their ultimate goal was the establishment of a Slavic, and later European, federation of nationalities.

### *Radical Russianness*

Those Russians who could be called radicals in the first decades of the nineteenth century belonged to different generations. They came almost exclusively from nobility, although they were not always as wealthy as the Slavophiles. The radicals were also united in their harsh criticism of despotism and autocracy in Russia, seeking to apply sociopolitical and cultural Western models to the Russian phenomena. Since they could not express all their ideas in published form, they left many of them in private notes and letters. Paradoxically, only one Siberian exile (Lunin) and one émigré (Bakunin) could express the Russian radical viewpoint openly.

The treatment of national issues by radicals varied considerably. The Decembrist Pestel’, in his “Russian Law,” and radical literary critic Belinskii envisioned nation-ness in French civic terms. They placed a consider-

able emphasis on the cultural assimilation of non-Russians into Russian culture. Both also disregarded the differences between ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, regarding them as ethnically, linguistically, and culturally united. They hoped to see a new Russian nation-state come into being that would be based on civic values, high culture, language, and mentality. They simply took for granted what Orthodox ideologues had elaborated during the previous centuries, without appreciating Romantic ethnonational diversity in its fullness. Both, however, generally recognized the right of Poles to separate nationality and sovereign culture, while avoiding defining Polishness and Russianness in religious terms.

Other Russian radicals treated Polishness with similar sympathy and abstained from contrasting it to Russianness. Unlike Pestel' or Belinskii, they imagined the Russian nationality in much broader terms, as detached from intensive acculturation into ethnolinguistic Russianness. Finally, Bakunin took the most radical step when he separated the Russian nationality not only from the empire but also from the Ukrainian nationality. These were not always clear-cut positions, since some figures (like Prince Viazemskii or Lunin) could be associated with more than one choice.

Those choices could be represented as a tripartite scheme with the two versions of the "all-Russian nation" (broad and narrow) and an ethnic Russian (Great Russian) community. Curiously, the narrow version of the "all-Russian nation" exposed by Pestel' and Belinskii resembled the French Jacobin model in that it was based on the Russian language, national "substance," and citizenship. Needless to say, all three radical versions of Russianness overtly or implicitly rejected traditional imperial idioms such as autocracy, dynasty, and religion, which meant that for radicals the empire and nationality were hardly compatible.

### The Russian Case: A Summary

The way Russians (Great Russians) understood nationality and empire in terms of nation-centered idioms was closely connected to their mental geographies. As a rule, the more extensive the Russian nationality appeared on the map, the more inclusive were the idioms of nation-ness applied to their imagined community. The more "imperialistic" the nationality looked, the less "national" were idioms, reaching a point where Russianness almost equaled the empire deprived of any ethnic content. In the 1830s–1840s, however, there was an increasing trend to provide Russia

with a dominant or ruling nationality, in order to prepare dynastic empire for life in the “nationalizing” world. This trend was even reflected on real maps and statistical works, where the “all-Russian nation,” consisting of all Orthodox East Slavs, became ever present. By making a *modern* nationality from all East Slavs, scholars and administrators sought to dissociate Russia from other dynastic empires like Austria and to relate it to European nation-states such as France.

For the conservatives, it was only logical to use a very inclusive definition of Russianness based on political and institutional idioms. For some, idioms of empire were more important than idioms of nationality, since empire for them was above ethnic and national divides. For Count Benckendorff and Fadei Bulgarin, the Russian Empire was a prenatal dynastic realm personified by the Romanov family. Their possible loyalties to Baltic German and Polish “nations,” respectively, were subordinate to their devotion to the dynasty. Thus, autocracy or political loyalty to the dynasty was the primary idiom of empire for such “dynastic conservatives.” Other conservatives, especially those represented by Sergei Uvarov, emphasized nation-ness in their treatment of Russianness. They argued not only that the Russian exclusive nationality did not contradict dynastic loyalty, but that the former strengthened the latter. Uvarov himself adhered to an ethnolinguistic and religious definition of Russianness, which ran counter to imperial Russianness as advocated by the cosmopolitan governing elite and its proponents in the public sphere (like Bulgarin).

Like Uvarov, the Slavophiles used religious, ethnographic, and mental idioms, but unlike him and the proponents of the “official nationality,” they did not ascribe to the state a prominent role in nation-building (with the noticeable exception of Khomiakov, who appreciated the role of the Moscow state in forging the Russian nationality). While adhering to an ethnoreligious definition of Russianness, the Slavophiles largely excluded non-Russian and non-Orthodox minorities from their version of the Russian nationality. That version, of course, included Ukrainians, whose ethnographic and linguistic differences Slavophiles recognized, but whom they nonetheless regarded as Russians due to a shared Orthodox faith and Rus’ legacy. Mentality, or national “substance,” became an important idiom of nation-ness for representatives of different ideological circles such as the radical Belinskii, the Slavophile Konstantin Aksakov, and the conservative Burachek. For all three of them, the national “substance” was an unalterable and unavoidable characteristic that was immune to external

political changes. The relation of this “substance” to the empire was, however, differently assessed.

The separation of the (Russian or non-Russian) empire from the Russian nationality was fully consummated only in the writings of Bakunin, the first among the Russians to separate clearly Ukrainians from Russians. Other radicals, like Pestel’ and Belinskii, sought to find a compromise between the empire and nationality in Russia by seeking to transform a pre-national, feudal empire into a modern nation-state based on the Russian language, political solidarity, and Russian high culture. If “others” wanted to participate in Russianness, they had to assimilate into the imperial (Russian) culture (Ukrainians, for example, did not even have a choice). Both Pestel’ and Belinskii recognized Poles as a separate nationality able to maintain a viable high culture.

The “size” and inclusiveness of the “all-Russian nation” were best measured by the treatment of Ukraine. The turn to Ukraine in the quest for authentic Russian history and optimal balance between nature and society helped Russian imperial subjects better imagine themselves in national terms and visualize the boundaries of the empire. Moreover, even the Romantic recognition of a separate Ukrainian (Cossack or Little Russian) identity based in history, ethnography, and language did not undermine a putative unity of the “all-Russian nation.” In fact, the inclusion of Ukrainians provided the Russian Empire with a dominant nationality that united all the Orthodox East Slavs.

Russians could use Ukrainian history in different ways. The history of Cossack Ukraine could provide Russian observers with an alternative history where freedom, not despotism, ruled. Ukrainian history could also show Russians another option: it could emphasize the mightiness of Russian rulers who were able to pacify and civilize the unruly South while crushing their historical enemies—Catholic Poles. Having been explored and represented as feminine, the South became an inseparable part of the Russian cultural consciousness. The loss of Ukrainians would have deprived Russia of the dominant nationality by widening the gap between ethnic Russians and the empire. In other words, the “all-Russian nation” maintained a direct link to the empire.<sup>276</sup> Most Russians simply were not ready to refashion their imagined community, so as to detach nationality completely from the empire (or at least from the historical Moscow state).

## 6

### **Making One Nationality Through the Unmaking of Others** Ukraine

The Ukrainian project was even more contradictory than those of its rivals—the Poles and Russians. The Ukrainian case illustrates a very important point in the theory of nationalism, as formulated by Roman Szporluk.<sup>1</sup> The making of a so-called “small nation” (in terms of Miroslav Hroch) meant the simultaneous unmaking or transformation of another, already existing, nation. During this process the old (“big”) nation is split into two or more new nations, which also included an old one. The latter, despite preserving the name of an “old,” “big,” or “historical” nation was in reality a new community. This approach allows us to treat the making of Ukraine, Slovakia, or Bohemia as an aspect of the transformation of the Polish, Russian, Hungarian, and German premodern “nations.”

According to Szporluk, the advocacy of a distinct Ukrainian cultural identity (one might call it a “Herderian nationality”) had from the very beginning a political meaning since it contradicted the official definition of Russianness centered on autocracy. This, however, was not exactly the case. Up until the late 1840s, the Russian government did not generally perceive the activities of Ukrainian Romantic literati as “political,” dangerous, or detrimental to the imperial unity. Most Ukrainians themselves did not see a possible political meaning in their scholarly or literary work; they also did not know that by creating “words,” they were creating “things.” In short, they were not conscious nation-builders equipped with a ready theory of nationalism. Moreover, Ukrainian identity remained more or less compatible with Russianness, not to mention imperial loyalty. It is only by 1846–47 that the Russian government itself, under the

influence of European events, started “politicizing” Ukrainian identity, associating it with Polish separatism. In reality the Ukrainian cause did not have much in common with the Polish one, genetically or typologically.

A new nationality first had to be *imagined* as distinct, though not necessarily as incompatible with empire or even with an “old,” “big,” or “historical” nationality. In this sense, the Ukrainian Romantic (Herderian) nationality could still be a part of the “all-Russian nation”—this is assuming that the latter really had to be all inclusive. It is on the level of political imagination that the unmaking of old nationalities occurred, although contemporary observers did not often notice that. For example, those who assumed that there was a separate Ukrainian language faced at least two choices: either the “all-Russian nation” could speak and write two languages, or there were two “Russian/Rus’ nationalities.” The first choice was popular among conservative and progovernmental figures, while the latter was the solution put forward by Mykola Kostomarov as a compromise between the traditional idea of Rus’ and an emerging Ukrainian identity.

Panteleimon Kulish and Taras Shevchenko, the most radical Ukrainian Romantics in the 1840s, avoided making reference to any common Russianness at all when speaking about the Ukrainian nationality. This last choice had become increasingly dangerous in Russia on the eve of the Spring of Nations.

The Ukrainian discursive field was quite diverse and included both an exotic *Volk* that was compatible with the “all-Russian nation” and the historical Ukrainian nationality (Hegelian sense). By the term *provincial (South-) Russian nationality*, I understand the position of those who rejected the existence of any separate ethnic/national community in Ukraine, even though they recognized certain provincial (or historical) characteristics of Ukrainians (Little or South Russians) (Table 6).

TABLE 6 A general scheme of the Ukrainian case

<i>positions</i>	traditional Little (South-) Russian nationality provincial (South-) Russian nationality modern (exclusive) Ukrainian nationality
<i>idioms</i>	language; historical legacy; autocracy/loyalty to the dynasty; Orthodoxy; ethnography; “spirit”/mentality
<i>oppositions</i>	Little (Southern) Russia—Great (Northern) Russia; Orthodoxy—Catholicism; empire—nationality; (Cossack) democracy/freedom—(Russian) autocracy/subjection

## Little Russian and All-Russian Options

The conservative circles connected to Ukraine, despite strong differences in their treatment of nation-ness, could be united around one point: they rejected Ukrainian/Little Russian identity if it was visibly dissociated from common Russianness and the imperial dynasty. Instead, the conservatives emphasized autocracy as an idiom of the historical Russo-Ukrainian connection. They could well profess their loyalty to Little Russia, which for them was the real, *original* Russia, but they also were devout imperial patriots. Perhaps, this attitude dated back to the traditional ideological stance of the Little Russian nobility since the mid-eighteenth century, which voluntarily adopted the idea of the Russian Empire as the common property of two consanguineous Orthodox nationalities—Little Russians and Great Russians. This view found its latest reflection in the articles of Stepan Burachek, editor of the progovernmental periodical *Maiak* (The lighthouse). Little Russians, even if a distinct ethnicity or nationality, were unimaginable without Great Russians with whom they competed for the dominant definition of Russianness. For the conservatives, however, this competition did not lead to the idea of Little Russian separatism. Two nationalities had to complement each other in a common Russianness. This idea could also be found in the writings of Mykhailo Maksymovych.

The other group of governmental loyalists from Ukraine (though not necessarily social conservatives) did not recognize any essential difference between Ukrainians and Russians, arguing for the dissolution of those differences in a common Russianness. This stance, which was often confused with “Little-Russianism” (*malorosiistvo*), was in fact an effort to overcome Little Russia as a premodern concept. Like Belinskii, they thought that the *only* nationality option for prenatal Little Russians was Russian, which therefore abolished Little Russian distinctiveness as an outdated particularity. Civilization spoke literary Russian. They obviously did not consider another option—to become Ukrainians. That perhaps was not so much different from the traditional Little Russian choice.

### *Little Russian Patriotism*

Ethnography and Sociology of “original Russia”

Stepan Burachek could be regarded as the last “old-school” Little Russian patriot who believed in the common Russian legacy. His ideologi-

cal stance was largely shared by Mykhailo Maksymovych, who combined his scholarly studies of Ukrainian history and ethnography with Moscow Slavophilism and “official nationality.” Burachek, however, was not a scholar but an amateur whose main agenda was dynastic loyalty. The main idiom of Russianness for Burachek was loyalty to autocracy, Orthodoxy, and language. His Russianness was broad enough to include a Herderian Ukrainian nationality, since he regarded Ukraine as original Rus’. Burachek’s Little Russian identity was based on language, history, and social estate (nobles), all of which made Little Russians an important historical nationality. While refuting the idea, according to which Ukrainian Cossacks came from “the band of homeless and unmarried fugitives and tramps,” Burachek argued that “this gang of tramps” could not transform itself into a settled historical nationality. Instead, he wrote how the “ten million of settled inhabitants of contemporary Little Russia” shared “the same language, mores, customs, legends, lore, everyday life, and faith.”<sup>2</sup> Unlike the Russian critic Belinskii, who thought that Little Russians had lost their elites, Burachek argued that Little Russia was predominantly represented by its “national upper estate—estate of nobles”: “What is the most surprising is that Little Russia preserved and multiplied a national upper estate—(Cossack) nobles—who are Europeans among Europeans while at home are mostly pure, original *khokhly*, only without an *oseledets*’ [a Cossack haircut]. Travelling Muscovites mock their love for and their passionate devotion to their patriarchal life, language, and the state of things.”<sup>3</sup>

Patterned on the Polish gentry-nation, Little Russians were a “nation” in both the Herderian and Hegelian sense, since their historical nobility remained loyal to “their patriarchal life, language, and the state of things.” Burachek’s noble Little Russians resembled the noble Poles of Trentowski, Mochnacki, and Rzewuski. For Burachek, this patriarchal Little Russian gentry—the descendants of Cossacks to whom he himself belonged—represented original Russianness, “the only vestige of Russian antiquity.” He then praised those numerous Little Russians like himself who “even in the capitals do not leave their nationality behind,” since they manage to combine European civilization with Ukrainian culture. In this sense, the Little Russian nationality was quite compatible with imperial loyalty and the “all-Russian nation.”

Burachek’s Little Russia stood closer to the nationality of “common forefathers” than the Great Russia that was already spoiled by Westernization. Burachek sought to explain why Ukraine preserved its original Rus-

sianness. His explanation was the isolation of Little Russia, which ensured both its historical nature and connection to old Rus'. He even reversed the traditional scheme of Russian history by pointing to Karamzin himself: "the history of contemporary Russia started with the history of Little Russia from time immemorial."<sup>4</sup> Moreover, he saw the direct continuity between Scythian farmers, Kyivan Rus' princes, and "contemporary Little Russians." The territory of Little Russia was united into one state since the Scythian times: "the name of Scythians and then Sarmatians is indistinguishable from the idea of unity of the state on all extension of Little Russia."<sup>5</sup>

Burachek formulated the idea of an organic, continuous history of Ukraine more explicitly than was done in *Istoriia Rusov* (History of the Rus' people) or in the histories of Little Russia by Bantysh-Kamens'kyi and Markevych. Different names of the population were changing, but the population itself had not changed much, expressing its unity in the idea of an "autocracy." "Just listen to the history," he wrote, "soon the single power in Little Russia will be expressed by the name of the Khazars; under Sviatoslav it will be replaced by the name of the Russians, and after the appanages it will appear under the name of Little Russia—Cossacks."<sup>6</sup> Little Russia was as old as Great Russia, since the very division of Rus' into Great and Little was known to the ancients who similarly divided Scythia into "Great" and "Little" parts.

Burachek specifically attacked the colonial concept of Russianness proposed by Nikolai Polevoi, countering it with the idea of the common Rus' legacy and historical primacy of Little Russia/Ukraine. Burachek refuted Polevoi's idea that Ukrainian history was something new that did not belong to the Rus' tradition. He mocked in particular Polevoi's assumption that the "life of Russia in the South [was] quite new" and started from Moscow. The Burachek-Polevoi debate resembled discussions from the 1850s between Maksymovych and Pogodin concerning the autochthonous population of Ukraine. Burachek and Maksymovych refuted, respectively, Polevoi's and Pogodin's idea about the immigration of Ukrainians (of mixed origins) in their homeland from abroad in late medieval times. Burachek even ironically proposed the candidacy of Prince Potemkin as the founder of Little Russia from scratch, along with New Russia, as if it were indeed "new":

Of course, quite new! Sviatoslav, Vladimir, Iaroslav were not the rulers of Russia! Perhaps it started in the south, with New Russian provinces, after Prince Potemkin, who, perhaps, found all of Little Russia to be barren and unpopulated steppes and commanded to populate entire country all at once.—"With whom?"—perhaps with Little

Russians! “From where did he take them?”—they just fell from the clouds! Ah, no, not like this: every riff raff came together from all over the place and started speaking and living in the Little Russian way! The prince was a strange man: he was up to all these transformations.<sup>7</sup>

Burachek sought to find the reasons for the historical originality of his beloved Little Russia. The Kyiv Academy and Kharkiv University protected Little Russia from “false enlightenment.” In addition, Little Russia had been surrounded for ages by Muscovites, Lithuanians, and Poles, “whom she hated and from whom could not borrow any fashion.”<sup>8</sup> Isolated as such, Little Russia managed to produce a unique folk poetry, which was much more numerous and valuable than the Great Russian. Thus, ethnography was a very remarkable idiom of Ukrainian distinctiveness.

Burachek also passionately refuted the critical attacks by foreign writers (among them Russian) on the emerging Ukrainian literature, and he called on his readers to learn the Ukrainian speech, study its grammar, and write in it. The “beautiful, picturesque, melodic [Ukrainian] language” was indispensable for the “enrichment” and “embellishment” of the Russian language.<sup>9</sup> However, the insistence of both Burachek and Maksymovych on the participation in *common* Russianness came at the expense of Ukrainian distinctiveness (what Oleksii Tolochko insightfully noticed in the case of Maksymovych). Ukrainians were also Russians, and their language was pure Russian; they were not a late medieval (or early modern) mixture of Slavs with Poles and nomadic Turks. Otherwise, the Little Russian connection to Rus’ would have been doubtful (what was indeed suggested by Polevoi and later Pogodin). Burachek remained loyal to the idea of Rus’ and staunchly believed in the ultimate unity of all East Slavs in one cultural/linguistic entity.

The literary critic from Burachek’s periodical *Maiak*, Mykola Tykhors’kyi, was another example of Little Russian patriotism, this time in the realm of literature. For Tykhors’kyi nation-ness, in particular the Little Russian nationality, was manifested through language and literature. Another important source of nationality for him was folklore: Shevchenko’s poetry expressed native “nationality” precisely because he managed to “convey” native songs. Tykhors’kyi believed in the existence of the Ukrainian language and a full-fledged Ukrainian literature represented by such writers as Ivan Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Petro Hulak-Artemovs’kyi, and Ievhen Hrebinka.<sup>10</sup> In a positive review of Shevchenko’s “Haidamaks” he refuted the “constant slanders” of Russian critics who denied Ukrainian the status of a separate

language.<sup>11</sup> He lightheartedly called on Ukrainian poets: “Down with Muscovites and their theories! Sing, sing so that the educated literati became envious, while the good and wise Muscovites begin to learn our language.”<sup>12</sup>

Tykhors’kyi also drew an interesting comparison between the Ukrainian and Russian languages: the former was to Russian as Italian was to French.<sup>13</sup> He believed that the Ukrainian language was elaborate enough to express higher emotions and be used in such a genre as tragedy. “For God’s sake, leave behind the false impression that in Ukrainian one should speak a crude language about boors, tramps, and pupils,” wrote Tykhors’kyi in 1842. “The Little Russian language is sound, flexible, and able to express the highest thoughts.”<sup>14</sup> His advice to Ukrainian literati was to “ennoble” the language by relocating its poetry from peasant huts to noble salons. He admitted that the Ukrainian language was not used by higher society in Ukraine anymore but nonetheless urged the literati to simulate the mind-set of the educated and to write about the common people in a style that could be appropriate to the upper classes. Tykhors’kyi pointed here to the persistent problem of how to make Ukrainian literature complete if the society itself was incomplete. Finally, the national-religious interpretation of the *haidamak* movement revealed the traditional setting of the Ukrainian nationality, which for Tykhors’kyi was defined through opposition of Ukrainians to Poles and Jews.<sup>15</sup>

The bilingual Polish-Russian periodical *Jutrzenka-Dennitsa* (The dawn) operated by the Ukrainian expatriates in Warsaw was an effort to overcome the traditional Ukrainian-Russian opposition to Poles. The outright Slavophile orientation of the periodical did not, however, prevent Fedir Ievc’kyi from publishing a critical attack on the Ukrainian poetry of the Polish poet Tymko Padura. With regard to language, Padura’s poetry was not really Ukrainian since it was filled with Church Slavonic, Polish, and Russian words and rather resembled the language of “Little Russian scholastics in the seventeenth century.”<sup>16</sup> More importantly, Padura’s poetry was too pro-Polish, which obviously contradicted the traditional Polish-Ukrainian relations. “The differences of faith, language, [and] national character” set the two nations apart. In other words, religious, linguistic, and mental idioms of nation-ness defined the boundary between Poles and Ukrainians, which could not be crossed over in poetry—even when a Pole wrote in Ukrainian.

Language alone did not make a person Ukrainian. One Ruthenian critic from Galicia illustrated this proposition by using the example of

Tymko Padura. “[Padura] wanted to compile something in national spirit and for that reason used the language of Ukrainians; he failed, however, to accomplish his goal because he lacked a Ukrainian heart.”<sup>17</sup> Thus, the “heart” (or mentality) was a more important idiom of nationality than language in the Ukrainian-Polish context. The same Ruthenian critic argued against the widespread misrepresentation of Ukrainian (which he called *język ruski* in Polish or *malorusskii iazyk* in Russian translation) as a dialect of Polish. To prove that Ukrainian was not a simple dialect of (Great) Russian was more difficult, but Little Russian patriots from Warsaw managed to do that.

Ukrainian (or Little Russian) literature appeared on pages of *Jutrzenka-Dennitsa* under a separate category alongside other Slavic literatures. Ukrainian language and literature implicitly set the borders between Ukrainians and Russians. Like Tykhors’kyi, Ievets’kyi, *Jutrzenka’s* main literary critic, refuted Russian claims that there could be neither Ukrainian literature nor language. Unlike Tykhors’kyi, however, the Warsaw-based critic allowed much more social space for the Ukrainian language. Ukrainian was still widespread among the middle class and even, in part, used by the upper classes:

First, it is not only the common people that speak the Little Russian dialect, it is also significantly used by the middle class of inhabitants; we must also confess that it can often be heard in those provinces even among the landlords and officials. Second, the gentlemen critics do not consider Galicia at all, where not only the common people speak Little Russian or Ruthenian (which is the same).<sup>18</sup>

In Galicia, where Ukrainian (or Ruthenian) was widely spoken, it was already elaborated as a literary medium. Finally, he argued that even if Ukrainian were only spoken by millions of common people, the language would have been worth developing. In the end, Ievets’kyi provided his version of the Ukrainian literary canon starting with Ivan Kotliarevs’kyi and continuing with Taras Shevchenko and Levko Borovykovs’kyi. The author did not even call Ukrainian a “language,” preferring to use “dialect” (*narechie*), but he undoubtedly imagined Ukrainians as a socially complete society, worthy of its own literature. This society, however, had lost its political dimension and could not be regarded as a nation in the Hegelian sense.

Characteristic is Ievets’kyi’s concept of Little Russia, which he gave in his review of *A History of Little Russia* by Dmytro Bantysh-Kamens’kyi and *A History of the New Sich* by Apolon Skalkovs’kyi. Ievets’kyi reduced Ukrainian history, or rather the history of Little Russia, to the history of the Cossacks as represented by two political formations—the Hetmanate and the

Zaporozhian Sich. In his opinion, “the words, the history of Little Russia, do not denote anything that existed either before the Hetmanate or after it.”<sup>19</sup> He admitted that the land of the Cossacks had its own name—Rus’ or Ukraine—although it was referred to by Russians and Poles as “Little Russia” or “Polish Rus’.” Nevertheless, Ievets’kyi did not recognize any continuous history of Ukraine or Rus’ from Kyivan Rus’ until the nineteenth century. For him, the history of Little Russia lasted only several centuries: from the emergence of the Dnieper Cossacks in the fifteenth century until the political death of the Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich in the late eighteenth century. All events that occurred in Ukraine before and after that time belonged to the histories of neighboring countries, whether Russia, Turkey, or Poland. Ievets’kyi’s vision represented the exaggerated principle of Little Russian historiography of the late seventeenth through early nineteenth centuries, which basically ignored the pre-Cossack history of Ukraine and focused exclusively on the Cossacks, who alone could provide Little Russian nobles with a separate identity vis-à-vis Russians.<sup>20</sup>

The *Maiak* and *Jutrzenka-Dennitsa* version of Little Russian patriotism was not unique in the 1830s–1840s and should not be regarded as the simple vestige of the past or an aberration from the “normal” and progressive Ukrainian exclusive identity.<sup>21</sup> Quite the contrary, most Ukrainian/Little Russian intellectuals of the time shared elements of “Little Russianism” that appeared as a certain compromise with the idea of the common Rus’ legacy and its representation, the “all-Russian nation.” One of the elements that was shared by all Ukrainians and that did not contradict the loyalty to Russia was glorification of the historical “Cossack nation.” The implications of this glorification could vary—depending on the ideological stance of intellectuals—from an explicit recognition of the irreversible political death of the Cossack nation (Fedir Ievets’kyi) to the implicit appeals for the restoration of its sovereignty (Panteleimon Kulish).

### Gogol’s Historical Cossack Nation

Nikolai Gogol (or Mykola Hohol in Ukrainian) was all his life a passionate propagator of the Cossack ethos. Yet at the same time he remained a loyal believer in the common Rus’/Russian legacy. During the period of intense Little Russian patriotism, in an article entitled “Vzgliad na sostavlenie Malorossii” (A glance at the formation of Little Russia, 1832), Gogol put forth a concept of the Cossack nation of Ukraine—somewhat

like an early modern Poland-Lithuania for Polish authors—as a bulwark of Christianity, *antemurale christianitatis*:

This crowd, after having grown and expanded, formed a whole nation that imposed its character and perhaps color to the entire Ukraine. It produced a miracle, i.e., it transformed peaceful Slavic tribes into a warlike nation known by the name of Cossacks, a nation that constituted one of the most remarkable phenomena in European history, which perhaps alone held back the disastrous flood of two Muslim nations threatening to overrun Europe.<sup>22</sup>

According to Gogol, the Cossack nationality lost its “political being” due to inhospitable geographical conditions; namely, Ukraine lacked natural borders like mountains or a sea. The Cossacks nevertheless managed to organize a political society in Ukraine. Gogol in fact recognized that the Cossacks were originally “a motley assortment of the most desperate people of bordering nations,” such as the “wild highlander” from the Caucasus, a “robbed Russian,” a “Polish serf,” and even a Tatar fugitive.<sup>23</sup> Yet Gogol believed that most Cossacks came from Ukraine (“Southern Russia” in his terms) and brought with them their Orthodox faith and language that had a “purely Slavic southern physiognomy,” despite a number of Tatar and Polish words.

Thus, the Cossacks received “one common character and nationality,” but because of the intermixing with Tatars their “physiognomy” began to look “more Asiatic” while their faith and location still belonged to Europe. “And so formed a nation that by faith and location belonged to Europe, but by the lifestyle, customs, costume was a completely Asiatic nation, in which clashed so strangely two opposing parts of the world,” wrote Gogol.<sup>24</sup> Even the mentality of the new nationality was split into European and Asiatic parts: the former included vigilance, intense activity, and the pursuit of perfection, while the latter consisted of carelessness, simple-mindedness, shrewdness, profound laziness, and a neglect for perfection of any kind. Unfortunately, Gogol did not elaborate on the historical fate of that “nationality,” but it is possible to say that his “Cossack” nationality was indeed new and quite distant from the common Russianness so celebrated by Stepan Burachek.

Indeed, Cossack history seemed to separate modern Ukrainians (half-Asiatic in their physical appearance, ethnography, lifestyle, and mentality) from Russians, with whom they shared only religion and literary language. On the other hand, those newly acquired “Asiatic” features were the real idioms of Ukrainian distinctiveness. Ukrainianness therefore was a coproduction of Europe and Asia. While the “original, native inhabitants

of southern Russia” gave Ukrainians their language and faith, Turks provided them with Asiatic physiognomy. In other words, it was “Asia” that made Ukrainians a unique nationality. Gogol himself did not explicitly draw these conclusions, but they logically derived from his observations.

#### Counting “Southerners”: Iurii Venelin’s Statistics

Others were able to discern the specificity of Ukrainians/Little Russians within more traditional linguistic and ethnographic elements, which did not involve Tatar or “Asiatic” influences. The famous scholar Iurii Venelin (who came from Transcarpathian Rus’) used language as the basis for differences between the two parts of the “all-Russian nation.” He did not explain how those differences appeared, but they perhaps dated back to early medieval times. Venelin’s “all-Russian nation” was divided into two “branches”; hence, the people were called Northerners and Southerners.<sup>25</sup> It was language that separated these two groups of Russians with the result that there existed two smaller nationalities based on their languages, or rather, “dialects” (*narechiia*). “The main condition for division of the same huge nation into two branches was the mutual, gradual diversion in language,” wrote Venelin in his seminal article, “O spore mezhd u iuzhanami i severianami na schet ikh rossizma” (On the debate between Southerners and Northerners on the account of their Russianism). “This diversion is called a dialect; hence there is a Northern dialect and a Southern dialect. This is the only way to understand both of them.”<sup>26</sup>

The differences between Southerners and Northerners were expressed not only in language but also in folklore and lifestyle.<sup>27</sup> “The Northerner is more like a Greek, the Southerner is more like a Roman.”<sup>28</sup> As was already emphasized in Chapter 3, Venelin’s Southerners were not identical with present-day Ukrainians, since he understood that group to include Ukrainians and Belarusians combined. The Southerners were rather analogous to an early modern Polish concept of *Rusini*, which united the East Slavic population of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. His Southerners numbered fifteen million in the Russian Empire, residing in the provinces of Podolia, Volhynia, Kyiv, Chernihiv, Poltava, Katerynoslav, Kherson, Sloboda Ukraine (or Kharkiv), Tauria, Voronezh, Kursk, Minsk, Grodno/Hrodna, Mogilev, Vitebsk/Vitsyebesk, Vilna/Vilnius, Białyostok district, as well as in the land of the Black Sea Cossacks, Bessarabia, and the Lublin palatinate of Congress Poland.

Thus, the population of present-day Ukraine did not constitute any distinct entity in the imagination of Venelin. Rather, he insisted on the historical unity of Rus' that "had remained within the same boundaries" since 860.<sup>29</sup> The two branches of the "all-Russian nation" just complemented each other as members of the same body: "the heart of the Russian nation is situated in the South, while the head is in the North."<sup>30</sup> The Southerners, however, were lacking their own "high society" (the "head") which consisted mostly of Poles. At the same time, he admitted that "Ukraine" and "New Russia" had managed to develop literature.

Venelin was also interested in the borders between the Russian and Polish nationalities.<sup>31</sup> He pointed out that Poles indeed had a connection to Rus', which they regarded as their fatherland, while for the native Ruthenians Rus' was an alien concept and symbol of their subjugation. Even more revealing was Venelin's recognition of Rus' as a competitive field between Ruthenians and Poles, since both treated Rus' as their cradle.<sup>32</sup> The limits between "Russians" and Poles were blurred also in another sense: among contemporary Poles there were "Russians [*rusaki*] by their native country, by their origins, by their blood," who chose to be Poles by their language, faith, and feelings.<sup>33</sup> Thus, neither land nor ethnicity was the idiom of nation-ness in the Polish context but rather traditionally language, faith, and mentality. This, however, allowed Poles who were of Ruthenian origins to return eventually to the community of "Russians."

### *Russia, not Little Russia*

There were also natives of Ukraine who rejected the idea of any difference between Ukraine (Little Russia or Southern Russia) and Great Russia. For them the traditional idea of Orthodox Rus', or of the modern Russian nationality, was more important than the ethnic distinctiveness of Ukraine's population. In the 1830s–1840s their views were not too different from those advocated by some Little Russian conservatives who also shared the devotion to a common Rus'/Russian legacy. It is only toward the middle of the century that the position of those rejecting Ukrainian distinctiveness became more pronounced, especially under the influence of an emerging Ukrainophile movement.

Among the most vocal Ukrainian-bashers of the 1860s was Ivan Kulzhinskii, who started his career in the 1820s as a pioneering student of Ukrainian ethnography. Kulzhinskii's transformation from an ethnogra-

pher into the mouthpiece of chauvinistic reaction was not typical, but it is instructive. In the 1830s he, like Maksymovych, was a passionate propagator of Uvarov's triad. In contrast to Maksymovych, however, Kulzhinskii found Ukrainian culture incompatible with an all-Russian loyalty. In 1836, in a highly ideological novel, *Emerit* (Emeritus), he described the figure of an extremely conservative ex-teacher, with whose views the author openly agreed. Therefore, I will assume that the ideas of the *Emeritus* character were in large part Kulzhinskii's own. In the spirit of "dynastic nationalism," emeritus/Kulzhinskii regarded the Russian-Ukrainian union as divine intervention: "God's arm united in one whole the torn parts of Russia."<sup>34</sup> Another similar idea concerned education (Kulzhinskii himself was a *gymnasium* teacher): "Let Russians be educated by Russians!—Let Russians educate even foreigners belonging to the Russian monarchy!"<sup>35</sup>

The Russian language, as the expression of "nation's spirit" and "nationality" in general, had to become the main means of communication in Russia. "In my opinion," wrote emeritus/Kulzhinskii, "every educated Russian should surely know foreign languages, should be able speak them but only in the case of urgency [ . . . ]. In all other cases he, with noble pride, should speak resolutely in Russian! There is everything in language: the spirit of nation, its mores, and everything dear and precious that is called the fatherland!" He concluded, "The pursuit of the Russian nationality was already awakened."<sup>36</sup>

While listening to the "local vernacular" in Right Bank Ukraine, the emeritus remarked that this was the mixture of Polish and some "Little Russian words," although he added that all peasants understood and even answered "in Russian." Finally, by using the (Russian) language and (Orthodox) faith as idioms of nation-ness, he asserted the Russianness of the natives: "In general, all the native inhabitants of Volhynia consist of natural Russians who, under the former Polish rule, were just about to forget completely their Russian language and exchange the faith of their forefathers for the Union."<sup>37</sup> Despite their Uniate (or even Catholic) faith, the locals were still "natural Russians," perhaps due to their ethnic origins and language. This was one of the few cases where Orthodoxy did not delimit the borders between "Russians" and "Poles."

Elsewhere, Kulzhinskii emphasized the importance of language as an idiom of Russianness. This time he spoke about the "Slavic" (Church Slavonic) language as the basis for Russian cultural identity. According to young Kulzhinskii, the "original Slavic language" was the primal expres-

sion of internal and external life of the nation as well as its character.<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the Russian secular language had to develop around the “Slavic” language instead of borrowing from French or German.

In 1840, he published an amateur geopolitical treatise, *O znachenii Rossii v semeistve europeiskikh narodov* (On the importance of Russia in the family of European nations), where he presented Russia as a family united by language, political system (autocracy), and religion which together constituted the “spirit of Russian nation.” Unlike the diverse Roman Empire, Russia was a familial union:

The first and the most visible trait of Russia’s character is its space, unprecedented in the annals of states and nations, with predominant unity of language and unity of interests of political existence. This is not the Roman *orbis terrarum* consisting of masters and slaves, victors and tribute-payers, enlightened metropolitan citizens and barbarians [ . . . ], this is one big family, happy under the rule of one Father-the Monarch; this is the special Slavic world; this is the Russian sea.<sup>39</sup>

Remarkably, Kulzhinskii chose not to notice the discrepancy between the metropolis and the provinces (at least within the East Slavic part of the empire), which excluded the recognition of any Ukrainian identity from his agenda. Instead, he emphasized the Orthodox religion as the “second characteristic feature of Russia” common to all Eastern Slavs of the empire.<sup>40</sup> Finally, along the lines of Uvarov’s triad, he pointed to autocracy, which Russia “renews in Europe” by its “beneficent example.”<sup>41</sup>

Whereas Kulzhinskii was rather an adept of the traditional idea of Rus’ and a “dynastic nationalist,” who did not in the 1830s–1840s overtly reject Ukrainian distinctiveness, others were more explicit and “modern” in their anti-Ukrainian views. Curiously, among those who expressed the latter views could be found a close relative and friend of Opanas Markovych, Ukrainian patriot and member of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood. K. I. Kersten, in several letters to her cousin Markovych, set forth an agenda that rejected the Ukrainian nationality on several levels. Many of her views reflected Russian official policies, for police authorities approved of them. First, she dismissed the status of Ukrainian as a separate language, calling it a “sub-dialect” and condemning those who wrote in it instead of in Russian (with the exception of Shevchenko, who in her opinion did not know enough Russian):

Second, I did not call Shevchenko a dreamer but granted this epithet [ . . . ] to those people who want to make from the Little Russian sub-dialect a language that does not

even have and is not able to have a grammar; and who, while dismissing Russian as an already developed language, start writing in Little Russian. If even the Little Russian dialect constitutes a midpoint between East and West Slavic dialects, it does not follow from here that one can write everything in it, from a simple letter to a scholarly dissertation. All said by me about this [ . . . ] could not refer to Shevchenko. He writes in Little Russian dialect from necessity as he is not strong in Russian.<sup>42</sup>

For her, Russian was the language of common sense, and therefore writing in Ukrainian was the sign of abnormality or the weird behavior of “dreamers” who “know wonderfully the Russian language, belong to the estate where Russian is common, and who always expressed their ideas in Russian, but suddenly, from some patriotism, began to treat Russian as inappropriate for themselves and started writing in Little Russian.” In another letter to Markovych she admitted that “a philologist and historian should know a sub-dialect,” that is, Ukrainian, but this did not mean that Ukrainian could be transformed into a language able to express “abstract ideas and thoughts.”<sup>43</sup> She then rejected the political distinctiveness of Ukraine in the past, depriving it of a Hegelian type of nation-ness: she wondered (alluding to the Cossack Hetmanate) whether a “handful of people ruled for some time by an oligarchy was an independent nation.” Ethnographic elements such as a subdialect or *jargon du peuple* and folk songs did not refer to the historical nation-ness of Ukraine; Kersten refused to call Ukraine’s “former accidental, ephemeral life an independent life.”<sup>44</sup> Thus, ethnography did not provide a sufficient basis to distinguish between Ukrainians and Russians in the present.

Instead, she suggested a hierarchy of loyalties in her definition of patriotism: “under patriotism I understand the love for the entire nation and state, but not only for one province.” This attitude was similar to the conception of the “fatherland” (Russia) and “native country” (Ukraine or any other “province”) as imperial officials saw them (such as the gendarme chief Aleksei Orlov). Indeed, the Third Department very positively assessed Kersten’s views, pointing to the “correctness of [her] judgements and true Russian patriotism.”<sup>45</sup>

Other natives of Little Russia rejected its distinctiveness from the perspective of cultural universalism. Markovych’s friend, Ievhen Zatyrykevych, opposed the idea of humankind to that of a separate Ukrainian nationality, regarding the latter as the vestige of the past that hampered the development of “human dignity.” For him human dignity meant the “equality of all people in the idea of humanity” and was more important than the noble

title or position in service hierarchy (*chin*). Human dignity was also more important than ethnic distinctiveness (such as Ukrainianness). It was only logical that he did not believe in the Ukrainian revival and reduced it to the collection of “national monuments,” which would reveal the “idea” of Ukraine’s past. That idea had somehow to acquire an “all-human meaning.”

At the same time, Zatyrykevych did not consider Ukrainians a separate nationality and instead suggested their assimilation into Russians. He considered the name Russia as “common” to all “nations of Slavic origins.” As for the Little Russians, they “are not a nation but a tribe and their language not a language but a dialect; by uniting with other tribes in one nation they will bring with themselves some rich elements of spiritual activity, but [they] do not have sufficient conditions for an independent development.”<sup>46</sup> Like Belinskii, Zatyrykevych regarded Russianness (or rather the “all-Russian nation”) as just another step to humanity and universal values. Ukrainianness was too provincial, tribal, and had to be sacrificed for the sake of universality; in other words, one had “so to say, to destroy it in the all-human idea.” “The private interests of Little Russia,” he wrote, “should get in touch with general interests of humankind.” Zatyrykevych, while refuting Little Russia as something private or particular for the sake of the general or universal (be it Russia or humanity), followed Hegel’s logic, which did not leave much space for “nonhistorical” nationalities.

From the middle of the 1840s, Hegel’s logic, inherited by Marxists, would fuel the chauvinism of different “historical” nations. In that regard, Ukrainians were to suffer dual rejection—by both Russians and Poles. In Russia, government would ever more actively become engaged in cultural (in particular ethnolinguistic) debates, culminating in 1863 with the implementation of the Valuev decree, which used linguistic arguments against Ukrainian national distinctiveness.

### *Between Little Russia and Russia*

Most social conservatives, as natives of Ukraine, were ardent local patriots. They used ethnolinguistic idioms of nation-ness to profess a devotion to their “native country.” At the same time, however, they were loyal to Russia, as a common legacy of Little and Great Russians. Ukrainianness, according to them, could be interpreted as a historical nationality with a glorious past and ethnolinguistic distinctiveness in the present but without a possibility of political restoration in the future. This position was indeed

ambiguous, since from those premises one could draw different conclusions, including democratic pan-Slavism and federalism. In other words, within one or two generations, ethnolinguistic and historical Ukrainian-ness evolved from the ardent imperial/Russian loyalty of Burachek to the 1848 type federalism of Kostomarov, Kulish, and Shevchenko. The proponents of the Little Russian nationality used the arguments of ethnography, language, and mentality, which all effectively separated Ukraine (as Little Russia or the South) from Great Russia (or the North).

Those who rejected the ethnocultural distinctiveness of Ukraine were not necessarily conservatives since they could reject it from the point of view of Hegelianism and universalism; for them the Ukrainian nationality was too provincial and “tribal” to be recognized as distinct. The latter circle preferred not to see any ethnolinguistic distinction between Ukrainians and Russians while regarding Russianness as a single ethnic, linguistic, and mental entity. In that case, all idioms of nation-ness pointed to common Russianness rather than to some separate community in Ukraine. For this reason, I refer to their community as the “provincial Russian nationality” or as a province-based “all-Russian nation” that did not differ much from a similar imagined community of (Great) Russians and likewise emphasized political loyalty, Orthodoxy, and the Russian language.

### **Romantic *Volk* Under Scholarly Gaze: Laboratory of Nationalism**

It is easy to notice that the views of such scholars as Mykhailo Maksymovych were not significantly different from those of more explicit Little Russian conservatives like Stepan Burachek. Unlike Burachek, however, Maksymovych alone epitomized an entire epoch in Ukrainian intellectual history, that is, a certain transition from Little Russian patriots devoted to the common Russian nation to a younger generation of Ukrainians, such as Panteleimon Kulish and Taras Shevchenko, for whom the “all-Russian nation” was already too inclusive. In contrast to Little Russian patriots like Burachek or Gogol, Maksymovych and his circle were actively engaged in scholarly discourse on Ukraine and even used Ukrainian in their literary experiments. But unlike Shevchenko, Maksymovych and his ideological peers were not radical Ukrainophiles, since for them Ukrainian identity belonged to the past. This heroic past was not directly connected to the present except when it provided the Little Russian gentry with a privi-

leged status in the legal and symbolic sense. This status, even if assured by history, could hardly be connected to exclusive national strategies. For Shevchenko, Kulish, and their ideological scions, the same past not only reified a myth about the Cossack Ukraine but also invoked their national feelings outside of any legal tradition. For them, the Romantic past implicitly entailed a vibrant nationality in the present.

Mykhailo Maksymovych, a literary critic, historian, and ethnographer, symbolized an entire circle of intellectuals trapped between traditional loyalty to the conception of Rus' and the Romantic idea of Ukraine. From 1834 to 1845 he was a professor of Russian letters in the newly established Kyiv St. Vladimir University. He and his colleagues, like the historian Osyp Bodians'kyi and the ethnographers Amvrosii Metlyn's'kyi and Opanas Markevych, consciously or unconsciously initiated a Romantic project of Ukrainian identity based on language, history, and ethnography. The Romanticism of the 1830s–1840s that made Ukraine an object of special scholarly, literary, and artistic interests of the Russian public not only invoked Great Russian or all-Russian national feelings but also created the very possibility for imagining Ukraine as a distinct cultural entity, by providing it with fundamental historical features.

The combination of culture and history imbued with conceptions of origins, continuity, and organic development made it possible for later generations of the Ukrainian intelligentsia to set forth a political agenda based on both historical legitimacy and the Romantic principle of national self-determination.<sup>47</sup> Romanticism, which came to be the dominant literary paradigm in Ukraine beginning from the late 1820s, especially in poetic and prose works of writers associated with Kharkiv University in Sloboda Ukraine,<sup>48</sup> helped to shape a modern Ukrainian national movement. The circle of Maksymovych, however, limited itself to cultural activities or what Miroslav Hroch classified as a phase A of national movements. Their work, whatever their intentions, made possible Ukraine as *nationality* in both the Herderian and Hegelian sense.

### *Ukraine as a Scholarly Project: The Case of Maksymovych*

Scholarly works were conspicuously absent among the sources discussed in previous chapters. The source basis was limited to journalism, political debates, political philosophy, and literary criticism. Only certain works by *amateur* scholars were considered. The Ukrainian case is, how-

ever, exceptional. As a result of the absence of a separate Ukrainian public sphere in the 1830s–1840s the discourse on Ukraine was occurring mostly on the pages of scholarly publications, not political periodicals. Even literary criticism was scarce as a result of the presumed insignificance of Ukrainian literature. In the center of this scholarly discourse on Ukraine stood Mykhailo Maksymovych, an amateur himself, who after graduating from Moscow University as a botanist, succeeded in Kyiv as a professor of the humanities. Although his official position was professor of Russian letters, he practically transformed it into the chair of Ukrainian studies. An analysis of his scholarly works is indispensable for the reconstruction of national “imaginings” of the Ukrainian intelligentsia.

Maksymovych defined Ukrainianness through history (in particular, literary history), language, ethnography, and mentality, the latter which he studied on the basis of folklore. Inevitably, Ukrainian distinctiveness emerged in opposition to Russianness—or rather Great Russianness, for he staunchly believed in the common Rus’/Russian legacy. The latter logically found a relevant place among the ideas of the Kyiv professor. During the ten years he taught at Kyiv University, Maksymovych wrote and spoke on a variety of subjects. He focused primarily on Right Bank Ukraine (the Kyiv region with surrounding areas, such as Volhynia and Podolia), as was the case with his published works. In his lectures he dealt with the entire East Slavic space within the Russian Empire. The objects of Maksymovych’s academic interests were even more scattered in terms of periods, beginning from the early medieval linguistic situation and continuing well into the eighteenth century. In lectures and in special seminars devoted to literary criticism, Maksymovych drew his students’ attention to the literary developments and ideological debates of the first half of the nineteenth century while critically reading, together with his students, prosaic and poetic works of his friends from Moscow and Saint Petersburg.

It was the *regional* objects of Maksymovych’s studies that made him so important in the context of Ukrainian scholarly and political discourses. The academic *regionalism* established by Maksymovych’s work eventually became a full-fledged Ukrainian scholarly and political *separatism*. Maksymovych himself, however, kept aloof from Ukrainian exclusivity; he was inspired by Romantic fashion on *locality*, on *region*. His Ukraine or Southern Rus’ was itself an assortment of smaller regions and communities. In addition, Ukraine was considered a region within Rus’ which symbolized the unity of its southern and northern parts.

History became key to the Kyiv region (the core of Ukraine), providing his scholarly gaze with numerous antiquities, which waited for him to be explored, classified, and perpetuated. Thus, Ukraine became inevitably *historicized*. As he recollected later in life, “In Moscow, my main concern was Natural Science, which was inseparably accompanied and devotedly assisted by philosophy; by contrast, in Kyiv I was devoted to Letters developing under the power of History that eventually won over the former.” He added that in Moscow he “was more in the future,” while in Kyiv, in Ukraine, he “looked mostly to the past.”<sup>49</sup> The dialectics also presupposed a shift in focus of Maksymovych’s gaze from an enlightened project of a quite abstract natural history to Romantic and concrete human history. There was another reason why history became so important for him. As Omelian Pritsak once noticed,<sup>50</sup> in Moscow Maksymovych was open to the predominant influence of the ideas of German philosopher F. W. Schelling about the “objective mind,” which provided a common basis for both the humanities and sciences. This led Maksymovych to the recognition of history as a basic discipline concerned with the unique spirit of people, best reflected in folkloric sources. Thus, history also became an important idiom of nation-ness in the Ukrainian-Russian context.

Maksymovych began to think about history while still in Moscow, working on his first collection of Ukrainian songs. It was predominantly sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Cossack history that attracted him. He was also interested in medieval literary history, and the so-called “Ihor’s Tale” in particular, supposedly written in the late twelfth century. Maksymovych’s interest in medieval history in Kyiv was influenced by his studies of literature.<sup>51</sup> It was only in Kyiv, however, that he began to explore more specific historical objects that clearly did not belong to the Russian history. He explored something that existed outside the conventional norm, what was later identified as *Ukrainian* history. Using the Romantic conception of continuity, Maksymovych managed to concentrate on different periods of Ukrainian history and present it as an organic whole.

The subjects of medieval history he was mostly concerned with included the historicity of “Ihor’s Tale,” as well as its relation to Ukrainian folk poetry. He also dealt with the origins of Rus’, insisting on the predominance of the Slavic factor in East European statehood; he also studied the historical origins of the Rus’/Russian identity.<sup>52</sup> Because this kind of history was considered to be an inseparable part of the common Russian legacy, Maksymovych’s academic intrusion into old Rus’ history placed his

works in the center of heated public debates. In many respects his views differed from those of other scholars. For example, he wrote that “*Ihor’s Tale* marks the beginning of the Southern Russian epic tradition that later resounded in *dumas* of *bandurists* and in various Ukrainian songs, and that the lament of the [old Rus’] princess Iaroslavna is the predominant topic of Ukrainian women’s songs that are full of love.”<sup>53</sup>

As far as Rus’ identity was concerned, Maksymovych explored its historical origins. For him Rus’ originally had three meanings: first, it referred to *all* peoples who lived under Rus’ hegemony; second, it was the name of territory around Kyiv; and third, it was the name of a people residing on the banks of the Dnieper River.<sup>54</sup> Maksymovych not only argued against the German and foreign origins of Rus’ statehood; he also related Rus’ to the local Ukrainian tradition. At the same time, the conception of Rus’ referred to the original ethnic unity of the East Slavs, which helped him to maintain his complex identity by allowing him to be both a local patriot and Russian (in the sense of the “all-Russian nation”).

As a student of early modern and later history, Maksymovych concentrated on regional Ukrainian history (mainly the Kyiv region and Volhynia) as well as Cossack history and the violent *haidamak* movement. Maksymovych devoted several articles to the history of Kyiv and paid special attention to it in his books. He placed Kyiv among the main cities of the Russian Empire, along with Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Before this, Kyiv hardly had a place in the cultural consciousness of Russians. He made historicity and spirituality the characteristic features of Kyiv, which defined its cultural image for years. Even today, in the popular consciousness, Kyiv is predominantly known for its antiquities and Orthodox holy places. While Moscow was labeled the capital of the Russian *nationality* and Saint Petersburg the center of the imperial power or *autocracy*, Kyiv was designated as the historical center of Russian spirituality or *Orthodoxy*.<sup>55</sup>

Along with the Russian minister of education Sergei Uvarov, Maksymovych can be regarded as a cocreator of the notorious formula, autocracy, Orthodoxy, and nationality, which was an effort on the part of progovernmental circles to define Russianness. According to the Kyiv professor, Rus’ was historically united by the Orthodox faith and the “Russian” language (even in historical Lithuania, “Russians,” that is, Orthodox Eastern Slavs, constituted a majority).<sup>56</sup> Elsewhere he stated explicitly that Orthodoxy was the basis of the “Russian nationality” in both Ukraine

(Little Russia) and Russia (Great Russia).<sup>57</sup> Therefore, Orthodoxy distinguished Ukraine and Russia from Catholic Poland.

Maksymovych also contributed to the concept of *translatio imperii* by stressing that the first capital of Russia was Kyiv, then Moscow, and finally, Saint Petersburg. Maksymovych's aim, however, was not so much to legitimize Russian power as to extol Kyiv and draw the attention of the government and public to its glory and problems. On the other hand, he tried to look at Kyiv in terms of Ukrainian national authenticity, which could be measured by the intensity of political developments. From 1654—the year of the Russo-Ukrainian Union at Pereiaslav—Kyiv, “for so long a severed part,” was incorporated into Russia, and in the eighteenth century became the main source of enlightenment there.<sup>58</sup> The city, however, ceased to be the source of a separate Ukrainian identity.

In lectures, where Maksymovych's judgments were more independent, he complained about the loss of Ukraine's “authenticity” after 1654.<sup>59</sup> “Authenticity” (*samobytnost'*) meant for him the political sovereignty of Ukraine rather than a Herderian (ethnolinguistic) nationality that outlived the Cossack state. Maksymovych felt that the political and cultural identity of the Little Russian gentry, largely based on Cossack myths and the ideological legacy of the Hetman state, was inescapably shaken. In contrast to Polish revivalist thought, Maksymovych did not believe in the sociopolitical revival of the Ukrainian Cossack state. New inspiration could come only from folklore (which also reflected the use of vernacular). Perhaps he did not realize that the Romantic adoration of folklore was something more than a tool to boost a traditional group loyalty of the local gentry. Instead, folklore created a new identity based on the culture of a Romantic *Volk*. Language for Maksymovych was an ambiguous idiom of nation-ness: if taken generally, as the Rus'/Russian language, it was an idiom of the “all-Russian nation,” but if split into smaller groups, it could designate the two “Rus' nationalities,” to use Kostomarov's terminology.

Maksymovych's treatment of language was related to his general Romantic metaphysics of the word as the expression of a nation's *soul*. The word, as a thought in representation, was the innate characteristic of humans. Language was given to the people as an inheritance from one generation to another. All diversity came from the One (God): “all species derive from a genus, and the diversity—from the One.”<sup>60</sup> In accord with such a Romantic mysticism Maksymovych often used bodily metaphors: the system of the human word was congruent with that of humankind;

consequently, a word/language was related to humankind/people as spirit to body. This meant that languages and peoples corresponded to species of organic nature, which were conceived as races and thought to have derived from one source (in the case of races, from Noah's sons). Thus, in his view, languages could not be independent from the history of nationality. Not surprisingly, Maksymovych related the history of the Rus' language to political history. His concept of the Rus' language can be well inscribed into the system of multiple loyalties competing with exclusive national identity.<sup>61</sup> Maksymovych's mind-set was also related to the phenomenon of *Little Russian consciousness* as analyzed by Zenon Kohut.<sup>62</sup>

In his book *Nachala russkoi slovesnosti* (The origins of Russian philology),<sup>63</sup> Maksymovych wrote about the different types of the "Rus'/Russian tongue" (*russkaia rech'*), that is, about Church Slavonic and all the dialects of Northern and Southern Rus'. Elsewhere he pointed to the separate East Slavic, or Rus' language group, which comprised the Northern-Rus' and Southern-Rus' classes of languages. The former included the Great Russian and White Russian languages with their dialects, while the latter encompassed the "Little Russian" (Ukrainian) and "Red Russian" (Galician) dialects of the Southern Russian/Rus' language.<sup>64</sup> In 1839, he explicitly identified nationality with a spoken vernacular and stressed that Ukrainian was more different from Russian than Polish was from Czech and Slovak:

These three kinds of the Rus', East Slavonic language belonging to the three kinds of the Rus' nation are so different from each other that they can be treated not as three dialects but rather as three distinct consanguineous languages along with other, West Slavic ones, although even with more right than Polish, Serbian, Czech and Slovak, because the latter are more similar to each other than Southern Russian is to Great Russian and even to White Russian.<sup>65</sup>

This theory ran counter to Maksymovych's idea of the common ethnic origins of East Slavs: if the latter indeed came from the Rus' people, how could the three East Slavic languages differ so much from each other? This issue visibly exceeded the boundaries of scholarly debates and could not be solved by academic means. Because of the ambiguity of Maksymovych's terminology, it is impossible to say whether he treated Ukrainians as a separate nationality or only as a type of the "all-Russian nation." Terminological confusion corresponded to underlying ideological confusion. The phenomenon of a complex Rus'/Russian nation seems to be just a scholarly abstraction or projection of Maksymovych's political unconsciousness

into the realm of scholarship. This allowed him to be both a Little Russian and Russian in the sense of an East Slav, or a subject of the Russian emperor. Perhaps *Russians* in his terminology were not a nationality in the Herderian/Romantic sense, but represented a pre- (or supra-) national level of identification similar to the twentieth-century meaning of the term *Soviet*. It is also possible that Rus' meant simply East Slavic as an abstract cultural unity of concrete historical nationalities.

In general, in Maksymovych's usage the Russian/Rus' language meant, first of all, an abstract East Slavic (Rus', Ruthenian) language community, and second, the Great Russian, or Russian, language in the modern sense. The latter developed from the Moscow dialect, absorbed the influences of Church Slavonic, and eventually became the Rus' language par excellence—"the main representative of not only Russian in particular but also Slavonic language in general."<sup>66</sup> According to Maksymovych, the Great Russian language, as a language of high imperial culture and court civilization, was the most balanced and refined of all Slavic languages.

Along with other scholars of the first half of the nineteenth century, Maksymovych sought to place Ukrainian, as well as the Rus'/Russian language, within the context of different Slavic and neighboring languages. Almost all scholars of the period, among them Josef Dobrovský, Pavel Šafárik, František Palacký, Jernej Kopitar, and others, singled out the separate Ukrainian (or Southern Rus') language within the complex Rus' (or East Slavic) group. Maksymovych himself divided the Slavic languages (and peoples) into two halves, along a west-east axis. An East Slavic (or Rus') group was opposed to the West Slavic group. Within both groups an internal division ran between the South and North (for example, Ukrainian as the Southern Rus' language was opposed to Russian as the Northern Rus' language; while Bulgarian as the Southwestern language was counterbalanced by Polish as the Northwestern language).<sup>67</sup> The spoken Rus' language existed long before the spread of the learned Church Slavonic medium and even penetrated literary texts written in the latter language. During the medieval period, the traditional Rus' language was not only a spoken but also a written means of communication in Ukraine, even if influenced by Church Slavonic and Polish. Maksymovych did not reject the influences of Greek, German/Scandinavian, Finnish, and Turkic on the old Rus' language but rather emphasized that the Rus' language derived from the relic Slavic language.<sup>68</sup> Ukrainian most corresponded to the ancient Slavic model and therefore should become the primary object

of historical linguistics. The future of the Ukrainian language remained uncertain for Maksymovych, even though it was the most consistent of all Rus' languages and was already formed by the late twelfth century on the basis of the Kyiv dialect.<sup>69</sup>

While ascribing to the Ukrainian vernacular an independent status, Maksymovych did not believe in the potential of Ukrainian as a full-fledged written communication. It was only active usage of language that could inspire letters. Ukrainian, however, by the beginning of the nineteenth century had lost its importance as a valid means of social communication. Though ceasing to be the language of high culture and a changing urban milieu, Ukrainian instead preserved many archaic traits and became interesting for a philologist as a treasured folk monument worthy of enriching the all-Russian legacy. Yet, as a spoken vernacular, Ukrainian was still an important idiom of Ukrainianness, and along with folklore/ethnography and mentality it effectively separated Little Russians/Ukrainians from Great Russians.

Folklore studies could imbue academic discourse with political implications: they made possible the contrast of one folklore-based community with another. Folklore provided Maksymovych with a good opportunity to emphasize the essential differences within the "all-Russian nation," and it allowed him to presuppose the existence of different Russian/Rus' "spirits," languages, and perhaps nationalities. It was precisely this which made an all-Russian identity mobile and inclusive. While studying folklore, which he thought was less open to external influences than literature, Maksymovych came to believe in the separateness of the Ukrainian (Southern Russian, Little Russian) language and culture. By studying popular songs, he tried to trace the "psychological" differences between Ukrainians and Russians back to the Cossack past.<sup>70</sup> Thus, folklore studies led to mentality as an idiom of nation-ness.

Folklore was an integral part of Maksymovych's lectures in the history of Russian letters. He speculated that Ukrainians were less active in external activities and careless with respect to property, aiming instead at the attainment of military glory. Russians, as more rational and practical people, were more apt to trade and amass property. Following the general Romantic prejudice against reason, property, and capitalism, Maksymovych praised Ukrainians for their passionate, irrational, and troublesome temper reflected in songs. Those songs showed Ukrainians as emotional, dramatic, and heroic. This free spirit first appeared in Ukrainian history with

the Cossacks “spreading all over Southern Rus’ from the 16th century and refreshing the whole national life, propagating their Cossack spirit.” While Russia saw the spreading of an autocratic spirit as the basis for its national authenticity, Ukraine enjoyed the freedom of the people.

On the basis of the criterion of “national authenticity,” Maksymovych suggested his own periodization for the Cossack movement in Ukraine from its very beginning in Zaporozhia until the union with Muscovy in 1654, when “circumstances violently ended the authentic development of Ukraine” and the country was introduced into the “common life of Russia.”<sup>71</sup> The Romantic concepts of authenticity and originality meant for Maksymovych, first of all, a political and cultural struggle for separate statehood. In this state of authenticity a “people’s spirit” found its fullest realization, which can be best seen in folk poetry. It is the passionate female songs reflecting grief, despair, and sadness that accompanied “the entrance of Ukraine into the common life with Russia,” which meant outrage for Zaporozhia, suffering in Right Bank Ukraine, and the end of the Hetman state.<sup>72</sup>

While studying folklore, Maksymovych shared with European Romantics the underlying ideas about the relation of a people’s poetry to its *Volkgeist* and *Volksthum*, which identified the common people, in particular the peasantry, with nationality in general. It was through folklore that nationality expressed itself. Maksymovych scorned *literature* as a foreign word that could not encompass everything created by people; he instead preferred another word for both written texts and oral folk culture—*letters* (*slovesnost’*). Unlike some Russian critics who rejected the Romantic concept of literary continuity, Maksymovych focused on the continuity of the common Russian (oral and written) culture, from medieval Kyivan Rus’ until the literary developments of the 1840s. A crucial metaphor used by Maksymovych in his analysis of literary developments to link historical narratives was that of “influence.” Influence appeared to be a driving force in the history of literature as it transmitted certain aesthetical and ideological values.

While the first period (until 1274) of the “Old Letters” was marked by “Greek-Eastern” influence, the rest of the developments until the reforms of Peter I were subject to a combined Greek-Latin-Slavic influence, Latin education being dominant in Ukraine and Greek-Slavic in Moscow. From the beginning of the eighteenth century through the 1820s was the period of “Europeanism,” or the imitation of Western aesthetic patterns. Maksymovych, however, praised the current period most—which almost

coincided with the rule of Nicholas I—when all oppositions and dilemmas were to be reconciled. Similarly, in Poland some expected that religion would be merged with politics.<sup>73</sup> Poetry had to be reintegrated into life, something that allegedly occurred in works of Goethe and Walter Scott.<sup>74</sup> Maksymovych expected the reign of Nicholas I to embody the synthesis of Romanticism and Classicism, objectivism and subjectivism, reason and sensibility, so that the second quarter of the nineteenth century could be seen as the period of “an authentic nationality and positiveness” and as a “return to nationality.”<sup>75</sup> Accordingly, during the reign of Nicholas, the human Self was to be reconciled with the objective world, on the one hand, and an artistic ideal with sociopolitical order, on the other. This was similar to the Hegelian position of Belinskii, who in the 1830s propagated what he called “the reconciliation with reality.” The idea of nationality, however, was not limited to the designs of Nicholas I and his ideologues.

In lectures in the history of Russian letters, Maksymovych revealed his vision of more specific Rus’ (Ukrainian and Russian) literary developments. His vision later was adopted by Stepan Shevyrev, a Russian friend of Maksymovych. From the outset, in Russian/Rus’ letters there were two distinct written and oral traditions—Ukrainian (Little Russian/Southern Russian) and Russian (Great Russian/Northern Russian)—which seemed to represent the two distinct Rus’/Russian nationalities and languages. During the second period in the history of letters, between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries, these two traditions—the Northern and Southern—reached their fullness and independence, especially in folk poetry. But beginning from the eighteenth century onward, it was the Great Russian tongue that acquired the role of all-Rus’/Russian written communication. Ukrainians, meanwhile, lost their full-fledged literary tradition and produced only a few literary works, such as those of Kvitka-Osnovianenko, Kotliarevs’kyi, and Hrebinka.

Maksymovych was rather skeptical regarding the potential for writing in the Ukrainian vernacular.<sup>76</sup> That did not, however, prevent him from studying the history of the Ukrainian language and culture. In fact, Maksymovych dealt with old Rus’ literature looking for its connections to Ukrainian folklore, which for him reflected the historicity of Ukraine, its spirit, or mentality. Thus, Maksymovych’s scholarly project of Ukraine provided a newly imagined community with its own history, language, ethnography, and mentality that separated it from its neighbors—the Poles and Russians.

### *Other Facets of “academic” Ukrainianness*

Maksymovych was not the only academic who set out to map Ukrainianness. While he undoubtedly was the patriarch of “Ukrainian studies” at the time, there were also younger academic colleagues inspired by his example. Perhaps the most important among them was Osyb Bodians’kyi, who later became an influential professor of history and a pioneering Slavist at Moscow University. Bodians’kyi’s initial interest was in Ukrainian folklore, language, and literature. He started his illustrious career as a passionate student of the emerging secular Ukrainian literature and the Ukrainian language, which he treated as a separate language among fourteen other dead and alive Slavic languages.<sup>77</sup> He also started propagating the Ukrainian publications in Russia’s main periodicals, describing Ukraine as a “Slavic-Russian Italy” and urging Russians to get acquainted with its language and literature.<sup>78</sup>

Reviewing Kvitka-Osnovianenko’s *Little Russian Novellas* in 1834, Bodians’kyi suggested an ethnographic (folklore-based) and historic treatment of Ukraine’s separate identity. The pursuit of “nationality” (*narodnost’*) meant for him predominantly the search for folklore, that is, “the collecting and bringing to fame of native fables.” He called Ukraine the “cradle of Rus’,” whose language and folk poetry had to take a relevant place “in the system of Slavic nations.” He also believed that “Ukrainians had lived and still lived an authentic, national life” where one could “dissolve in the world of musical sounds, national chants, national poetry.” In a word, Ukraine appeared as some Romantic, *national* utopia filled with historical sights, sounds, monuments, and folk poetry that mystically united the “cherished past” with “no less an exciting, interesting” present.<sup>79</sup> Ukraine was thus a triumphant example of a historico-ethnographic Herderian nationality.

In his master’s thesis from 1837, Bodians’kyi, who was only four years younger than Maksymovych, used folklore to show the differences in mentality of Slavic nationalities. Folk poetry, as the most basic, democratic, and original part of literature, was the best reflection of national character and constituted the dominant idiom of nation-ness. According to him, literature/folklore was the expression of the national idea—formed by a nation’s religion, philosophy, mores, customs, history, language, geographical situation, and so on. In the expression of this idea, nationality develops its unique “physiognomy.”<sup>80</sup> The idea itself found its best representation in *slovesnost’*. Folk songs, in particular, were considered *national*

par excellence: “the character of the songs should be, in general, the same as the character of the people who created them.”<sup>81</sup>

Bodians’kyi regarded Ukrainian folk songs as the only *dramatic* songs among the Slavs and therefore the best of all Slavic folk poetries.<sup>82</sup> Like Maksymovych, he used the “character” of Ukrainian and Russian folklore to compare the national characters of those who created folklore. For both scholars, folklore led to mentality. If two folk poetries were diametrically opposed, so too were the two nationalities themselves, despite their common name—Russians—which once belonged to other people:

It is quite another thing—this folk poetry of Southern Russians (Ukrainians, Little Russians)—a poetry, which by its entire internal and external content is diametrically opposed to the poetry of Northern Russians. And this could not be otherwise. Among all the Slavic tribes, Northern and Southern Russians are the most different from each other despite the sameness of their common name, taking into account their descent which was truly completely alien to both of them as it came to them from another people that once had been powerful in our South and ruled over local Slavs.<sup>83</sup>

Thus, folk poetry and mentality revealed much deeper differences of origins, history, and geography, which can be regarded as underlying idioms of nation-ness as they effectively separated Ukrainians from Russians. Bodians’kyi pointed to the contrast between the South and North to illustrate the differences between Ukrainians and Russians, alluding to the fact that their names (Southern and Northern “Russians”) well corresponded to ethnographic differences between them. “Such a discrepancy in the features of these Russians [*russov*] as well as in their poetry comes from their origins, location, and the lands they possessed, differences of their historical and everyday life,” explained the Moscow scholar.<sup>84</sup> Bodians’kyi never told us what in fact united “Southern” and “Northern” Russians except for their “common name,” which they inherited almost by accident from another people, allegedly Scandinavians. On the contrary, almost everything else divided two nationalities: folklore and mentality were the dominant idioms of national separation, sustained by ethnic origins, history, and geography, which made the Ukrainian-Russian connection a curious accident.

Another young scholar, Amvrosij Metlins’kyi, devised a similar academic agenda when he was at Kharkiv University in 1839. He defined Ukrainian distinctiveness in primarily linguistic terms, as a community of ten million speaking a separate (“Southern Russian”) language and living

on territory from the Vistula River in the west to the Kuban' River in the east.<sup>85</sup> The geographical space where the Ukrainian vernacular was spoken, within and outside Russia, defined the size of the Ukrainian imagined community, or as he described it, "more than ten million Slavs living in the south of Russia and to the south from Russia." Metlyns'kyi also sought to assert the historicity of Ukrainian, which he traced back to the times of Kyivan Rus', as the language of first chroniclers and princes. Automatically, Ukraine (or "Southern Rus'") became the cradle of the Russian tsardom:

The South Russian language spoken by our first chroniclers, who in the course of time transferred the legacy of forefathers of the Russian tsardom to the successors, the South Russian language in which our fathers sang in their *dumas* about the life and glory of Southern Rus', this holy cradle of the mighty tsardom, [this is] the language in which, possibly, sounded the speech of Kyivan princes, the forebears of our Orthodox tsars, the words of which until now sound in the Holy Scriptures.<sup>86</sup>

According to Metlyns'kyi, the Ukrainian language was suitable for all functions and was the language of high culture and administration throughout medieval and early modern times.<sup>87</sup>

Language became the major idiom of Ukrainianness for an entire generation of scholars and writers. One of the main tasks of the Ukrainian intelligentsia of the 1830s–1840s was to prove the dignity of Ukrainian. For example, in 1834 a promising young scholar of Russian descent, Izmail Sreznevs'kyi (Sreznevskii), passionately wrote that "the Ukrainian language (or what some prefer to call—Little Russian) is a language and not a dialect of Russian or Polish, as some tried to prove; and many are convinced that this language is one of the richest Slavic languages."<sup>88</sup> Then he added that Ukrainian was a "poetic, melodic, and picturesque language," which could compete with Czech, Polish, or Serb in different categories.

The prominent Romantic writer Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko in his letters to local and metropolitan publishers appeared as one of the most consistent defenders of linguistic *dignitas* of Ukrainian. Like Metlyns'kyi and others, he defined Ukraine as the space of the Ukrainian vernacular as opposed to the so-called "common language," that is, the Russian of high metropolitan culture.<sup>89</sup> In calling for a literature written in Ukrainian, he used language as the main idiom of the Ukrainian nationality defined as a community of ten million vernacular speakers. "We should humble and silence those with a weird idea, who are publicly preaching that one should not write in a language, which is spoken by 10 million people, has its

strength, its beauties illegible in other [language], its idioms, humor, irony, and everything that any solid language is likely to have.”<sup>90</sup> The existence of millions of people speaking a separate language implicitly pointed to the existence of a distinct nationality. Kvitka, however, was not concerned with extraliterary phenomena, which he reduced to the issue of a viable and recognized Ukrainian literature. In this euphemistic vein, he preferred to juxtapose the Ukrainian and Russian languages rather than the Ukrainian and Russian nationalities (for example, he treated Ukrainian as a much purer and more ancient language than Russian, which he accused of robbing Ukrainian and being infested with too many foreign borrowings).<sup>91</sup>

The examples of a thorough ethnolinguistic treatment of Ukrainian distinctiveness could also be found outside the community of professional scholars and writers. For example, the young Mykola Markevych, later a famous historian and ethnographer, in his study *Ukrainskie melodii* (Ukrainian melodies, 1831), used ethnography and language to map ethnic Little Russia (which appeared much bigger than any administrative or geographical entity under the same name):

Judging by customs, clothing, and speech, Little Russia can be defined as the entire space from the borders of Hungarian Galicia, including only the Kamianets-Podolsk and Kiev provinces on that side of the Dnieper, to the borders of the Voronezh province, counting on this side of the Dnieper Poltava, Chernigov, and Khar’kov provinces, with some localities in the Kursk province. On the south it ends beyond the Dnieper rapids where once started the possessions of the Turkish Sultan.<sup>92</sup>

To be sure, Markevych’s entire book was evidence of an ethnographic understanding of Ukraine, supplemented by historical legacy. Another such example was the criticism of Gogol’s early writings by Andrii Tsarynnyi (pseudonym of a later senator, Andrii Storozhenko), who questioned their authenticity. In 1832, Tsarynnyi published in the Saint Petersburg periodical *Syn Otechestva* (The son of the fatherland) his “Thoughts of a Little Russian After Reading the Tales of the Beekeeper the Red Pan’ko, Published in a Book Entitled: Evenings at the Farmstead Near Dikan’ka, as Well as Reviews of It.”<sup>93</sup> Taras Koznarsky rightfully called Tsarynnyi’s article “an extremely valuable resource for our understanding of Gogol’s reception from the Ukrainian angle,” adding that “the issue of Ukrainian cultural authenticity [ . . . ] constitutes the core of Tsarynnyi’s critical argument.”<sup>94</sup> Koznarsky points to the four main theses of Tsarynnyi’s critique.<sup>95</sup> First, Tsarynnyi showed a distorted Russian/metropolitan perception of a Ukrainian writer

(like the mistake in the writer's very name, or rather, pseudonym). Second, Tsarynnyi drew a clear distinction between the glorious Ukrainian-language *Eneïda* by Kotliarevs'kyi and the Russian-language works of Orest Somov and Gogol. Third, he rebutted Gogol's ironic attitude toward the provincial Ukrainian enlightenment and way of life. Finally, Tsarynnyi refused to identify much of the Russian-language *Ukrainica* as an authentic Ukrainian product, calling Ievhen Hrebinka (Greibenkin, in Russian), among others, a "Muscovite."

In Koznarsky's opinion, Tsarynnyi's critique provided a "remarkable set of criteria for Ukrainian authenticity" and emphasized the "distinction between metropolitan and Ukrainian cultural products."<sup>96</sup> It can be added that Tsarynnyi's critical remarks constituted a certain manifesto of ethnographic treatment of Ukrainianness. Not only authenticity but also Ukrainianness as such was defined through painstaking ethnographic arguments, in opposition to much of the Russian-language literature on Ukraine. Tsarynnyi professed his love for Ukraine through a love for its folklore: "I am Little Russian, I love my native land, I love to hear the tales of our blessed antiquity. Songs, fairy-tales, and sayings immerse me in pleasant reveries and then the imagination draws whiskered ancestors," he wrote, with reference to the facial hair of the Cossacks.<sup>97</sup> He also believed, as a true Romantic, that folk songs reflected the "character of a nation." Language was also an important idiom of Ukrainianness, hence he doubted the Ukrainian heritage of Russian-speaking writers such as Somov and Gogol. Ethnography, and folklore in particular, preserved unique "nation's characters" and linked them to the military past:

Each country has its customs and legends that are specific to it. One who considers them in Little Russia will find the characters of nation, once militant [ . . . ]; will find at the same time gloominess and careless joy, kindness and stubbornness, the lack of rapacity and hardheadedness [ . . . ], the respect for the older, - a strict observance of morals and simplicity of manners, reticence and talkativeness, candidness and shrewdness. The source of all these diverse qualities is concealed in different epochs of the once troublesome existence of Little Russia's inhabitants, who sometimes defended it with armed hands and sometimes bore a heavy yoke imposed on them by the stronger.<sup>98</sup>

Tsarynnyi's "ethnographic" research into the Ukrainian mentality was visibly a fake—a plain set of abstract features that was common to any other self-representation, or auto-ethnography (to use Marie Louise Pratt's term). The curious mix of mostly incompatible features had to emphasize the dra-

matic nature of Ukraine's history and the exotic/Romantic character of contemporary Ukrainians. Important here, of course, was the connection between ethnography (present) and history (past), which effectively separated the "honest and god-fearing native inhabitants of Little Russia" from all nonnatives through the act of auto-ethnography. Any external (metropolitan) description was biased and therefore had to be dismissed. Gogol's Russian-language literary account simply did not fit into the auto-ethnographic model with its possible slogan, "Little Russia is for Little Russians!"

### *Idioms of "academic" Ukrainianness*

Much of the self-representation of Ukraine in the 1830s–1840s occurred within an academic discourse, often within the universities. Almost always it was the university graduates who were involved in the discussions. The discourse was the result of a more or less thorough research into the ethnography, language, and history of Ukraine's "native inhabitants." The latter, labeled as Little Russians or Ukrainians, were defined as Ukrainian-speaking (and -singing) Orthodox Slavs, who had a definite set of mental characteristics that clearly set them apart from neighboring Russians and Poles. Since it was an academic discourse, the conclusions could not be very radical. Many of the participants regarded Ukraine as a finished project, a phenomenon of the past, which only needed to be "mapped" for the sake of scholarly scrutiny. At present, some argued, the Ukrainian language, literature, and history had to contribute to the *common* Russian culture, to make it richer, and to highlight certain possibilities of its development. A similar position with respect to Polishness was advocated by Henryk Rzewuski, whose stance, however, was unique among the Poles (see Chapter 4). In a word, this "academic" project of Ukrainianness, based as it was on ethnography, language, mentality, and (tamed) history, was not considered incompatible with the "all-Russian nation." The example of Maksymovych is revealing.

Maksymovych and a great many Little Russian nobles and academics stubbornly believed in the formula of the Russian Empire as a common legacy of Russians (Great Russians) and Ukrainians (Little Russians). They sought to prove it by showing in their works how much Ukrainians contributed to the cultural and political life of the empire. The very concept of the Rus' nation and language helped to sustain a mental structure of multiple loyalties and allowed one to be both Russian and Ukrainian/Little

Russian. For example, in his published and unpublished works, Maksymovych revealed his location within the system of all-Russian values and symbols. He consistently used the pronoun “our” when referring to all things Russian: *our* Russian language, *our* victorious war, and so on. He admired the empire and built his own academic empire and intellectual history within the Russian cultural codes, symbols, and political system. The Ukrainian Herderian nationality did not contradict the “all-Russian nation” that reflected the traditional idea of Orthodox Rus’. Orthodoxy was not an idiom of Ukrainianness in this context but remained in the background as an important link to Rus’, while Catholic Poles remained the antagonists of both Ukrainians and Russians. Unlike Maksymovych and his peers, the younger generation of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, while inheriting the premises of “academic” Ukrainianness, pushed it beyond the limits of the “all-Russian nation.” That was the generation of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood.

### The Birth of a (New) Nation: Ukrainians Challenge Little Russians

Young people who widened considerably the horizon of expectations of the Ukrainian intelligentsia (both loyalist and “academic”) were associated with the quasi-political Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood that functioned in 1846–47. The most prominent of those intellectuals—Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish, and Taras Shevchenko—were assumed to be members of the society. The American scholar Orest Pelech once coined an apt epithet for these three, “the Ukrainian Triumvirate,” but he refuted the well-established historiographical version regarding their membership in the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood.<sup>99</sup> According to Pelech, neither Kulish nor Shevchenko were members of the society, which was “an informal grouping of several individuals whose discussions took place almost exclusively in January and December of 1846” in Kyiv.<sup>100</sup>

Even if one were to agree with Pelech that Kulish and Shevchenko were not formal members of the society, they were nonetheless closely associated with members such as Kostomarov and Vasyl Bilozers’kyi (Kulish’s brother-in-law). They all shared certain ideas about the Ukrainian nationality, which they regarded as a key member of the prospective Slavic federation on the eve of Europe’s Spring of Nations. In accordance with the Czech cultural revival, the brotherhood set forth a pan-Slavic agenda,

which was incompatible with the existence of the Russian Empire and the “all-Russian nation.” These ideas could not be expressed in published form and therefore were not found among the mostly literary critical and historical works of the society’s formal and alleged members. The most radical ideas circulated in limited copies and as such became known to the Russian authorities. In order to reconstruct the idioms of Ukrainianness used by the radical circle of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, I will consider both the programmatic documents of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood and the writings (including letters) of those who were associated with it.

### *Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood*

Pointing to the Charter (Ustav) of the Brotherhood, Orest Pelech cited the basic points of its pan-Slavic agenda<sup>101</sup>:

1. The destiny of Slavs is their political and spiritual unity.
2. Each Slavic tribe should have its own independence.
3. Each tribe should have a governance based on complete equality.
4. Governance, laws, property rights, and education should be based on the teachings of Jesus Christ.
5. Education and morality should be the prerequisite of those governing.
6. There should be a general council of representatives of all Slavic lands.

As can easily be seen, the pan-Slavic project of the brotherhood was based on Christian morality and Romantic nationalism, which presupposed national self-determination for ethnolinguistic communities and the merger of religion with politics. The charter recognized several Slavic nationalities (*tribes* in its terminology) that “should have their independence”: Ukrainians, Russians combined with Belarusians (*severno-russys s belorussami*), Poles, Czechs combined with Slovaks (*chekhi s sloventsami*), Lusatians, Serbo-Croats combined with Slovenians (*illiro-serby s khorutanami*), and Bulgarians.<sup>102</sup> The list of nationalities was not very consistent, since it did not always follow strict ethnolinguistic arguments. It was not explained why Belarusians were to remain with Russians and Croats with Serbs, while Ukrainians were treated as a separate “tribe.” Elsewhere, Kostomarov enumerated Slavic nationalities that would create their own states in the federation, among them the Muscovites, Ukrainians, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians, Serbo-Croats (“Illirians-Serbs”), and Bulgarians.<sup>103</sup>

The two “official” documents of the brotherhood—the charter and *Knyhy buttia ukraïns’koho narodu* (Books of the genesis of the Ukrainian people), also known as *Zakon Bozhyi* (The law of God)—were mostly preoccupied with Christian millenarianism and social equality rather than with nationality issues. Yet, the issue of social equality was organically connected to that of national equality. According to *The Law of God*, Ukraine featured essentially as the most democratic and egalitarian nationality of Cossacks, and at the same time it appeared as the most victimized nationality in the history of humankind. Ukraine was considered a nationality equal to Poland and Russia, with whom it had voluntarily united but then suffered from their violent yoke. In other words, the democratic essence of Ukraine caused its national victimization because neither the Polish gentry with the Jesuits nor the tsars of Muscovy could tolerate Ukraine’s freedom, where “all were equal and free.”<sup>104</sup> The document provided a harsh assessment of the division of Ukraine into Russian and Polish parts in the second half of the seventeenth century, which was the culmination of Ukraine’s sufferings:

And Polish landlords with the Moscow tsar see that one cannot do anything with Ukraine and said to themselves: there will be no Ukraine either for you or for me, let’s tear it in half, as the Dnieper had divided it. The left bank will go to a Moscow tsar for nourishment and the right bank—to Polish landlords for plundering [. . .]. And Ukraine had fought for fifty years, which was the most holy and glorious war for freedom in history, whereas the division of Ukraine is the worst act that can be found in history.<sup>105</sup>

The division of Ukraine was interpreted as the predecessor of the partition of Poland in the late eighteenth century, itself a symbolic punishment for the sufferings of Poland’s “sister” Ukraine who once wanted to introduce social equality to Poland. Ukraine here was undoubtedly no less historical than Poland and Russia, yet its historicity was measured not by the existence of upper classes or monarchs but by the presence of freedom and equality.

*The Law of God* defined Ukrainianness in terms of social equality and Christian faith: “a true Ukrainian, no matter what his descent was, common or noble, should not love either tsar or landlord, but should love and remember the only God Jesus Christ.”<sup>106</sup> By the same token, Ukrainian landlords, supposedly established by Catherine II, were almost a contradiction in terms: the Ukrainian nationality was egalitarian par excellence and could not contain any nobility. Those nobles, however, did not even pretend to be Ukrainians, as they “did not spoil the Ukrainian language

with their disgusting lips.” Thus, ethnolinguistic Ukrainianness was spared alien social content. Ukrainianness, indeed, was based on language and ethnicity, but it was also a sociopolitical phenomenon, the embodiment of social equality and national principle in international relations.

Kostomarov, in his appeal to the “Brothers Ukrainians,” confirmed a prospective national order based on linguistic and social idioms of nationness: “so that every nation creates its own republic and administers itself without mixing with others, that every nation has its own language, own literature, and own social order [*spravu obshchestvennu*].”<sup>107</sup> In these documents Ukrainianness was radically incompatible with multinational empires or states that violated nationality rights. This was reinforced by the fact that the Russian emperor and his bureaucracy were thought to be not of Slavic but of German descent: “he [a tsar] is not a Slav but German, hence his officials are Germans.” The idea about the alien (Germanic) origins of the Russian ruling dynasty and high bureaucracy was widely shared by Russian nationalists, populists, and democrats alike (Decembrists, in particular) as well as by Polish émigrés. That idea helped them to differentiate between the Russian Empire and the Russian nationality. It also pointed to an emerging *national* mind-set, that is, a vision of the world as consisting of separate nationalities, where even dynasts had to belong to a certain nationality.

The worldview of young Ukrainian radicals was already “nationalized.” That was best reflected in the very idea of the division of Russia into several nation-states and regions. The “official” documents of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood suggested this prescription to Russia. Heorhii Andruz’kyi, an alleged member of the brotherhood, under cross-examination and in his private notes offered this idea in its most explicit form: “the private [ . . . ] Little Russian goal was to restore the Hetman State, if possible separately (a secret desire), if not possible—within the Slavic union.”<sup>108</sup> He also suggested the formation of a new federal state consisting of former Russian, Austrian, and Prussian provinces, which would include Ukraine with Kuban’, Crimea, and Galicia along with Poland, Romania (in its present-day borders but without its name), Serbia, the Baltic lands, and so on.<sup>109</sup> Finally, around 1850, Andruz’kyi overtly stated, “In order to create Ukraine, one should destroy Russia,” which strikingly resembled the anti-Russian vision of the Polish émigré Maurycy Mochnacki with his persistent idea of the “deconstruction of all-Russia” (*rozboru Wszecrossji*). Andruz’kyi, however, was exceptionally explicit in his statements, what some explained by his unstable mental

condition. Most participants in or sympathizers of the brotherhood, who came under interrogation, limited themselves in their testimonies and letters to the linguistic vision of Ukrainianness and did not enter the uncertain realm of geopolitics.

Several prominent figures associated with the brotherhood, such as Kulish, Markovych, Hulak, and Andruz'kyi himself, defined nationality predominantly through language. During the interrogation, Panteleimon Kulish gave his understanding of the Ukrainian nationality using ethno-linguistic idioms of nation-ness. When asked by an interrogator what he understood by the "tribal elements" of a nationality, he answered, "[These are] language, customs, and generally everything that characterizes Little Russians compared to other tribes."<sup>110</sup> These "elements" became an organic part of Ukrainian "individuality." "These elements," continued Kulish, "like a grain in the ground, became so deeply inbred with the individuality of Little Russians that, despite their close relations with the neighboring nations, they nonetheless retain their own distinctiveness."<sup>111</sup> Thus, for Kulish, national differences were of an almost physical nature, which could not be abolished even in nineteenth-century Russia.

For Opanas Markovych language was the key to nationality: "languages are alive flowers in God's garden and, if a nation speaks its language, then by studying the language one can study the nation speaking that language."<sup>112</sup> Mykola Hulak, one of the most radical but also rational members of the brotherhood, regarded the Ukrainian language as the basis for a Ukrainian scholarly project. The creation of a Ukrainian-language historical work "will open up a wide avenue for our letters, language will develop to such an extent that not only native and foreign history but even precise sciences will be taught in this language"; finally, "by aspiring constantly for this goal with common efforts the impossible will become possible."<sup>113</sup> Heorhii Andruz'kyi passionately defended the status of Ukrainian as a separate literary language, admitting that its status could not be determined by the language practice of the gentry: "True, our gentry speak Great Russian, but in the time of Poland it spoke Polish; however, back then no one denied there was a Little Russian language; they only referred to it as *to chłopski język* [that peasant language]."<sup>114</sup> Andruz'kyi also pointed to the existence of a Ukrainian literature supported by Russian-speaking Ukrainian gentry and praised by Russian periodicals. Like Kvitka-Osnovianenko, he argued that the democratic essence of the Ukrainian language reflected the democratic/egalitarian structure of the Ukrainian nationality that was

defined through its language—common and accessible to all classes (unlike Russian). Here the democratic and egalitarian Ukrainian language-cum-nationality was implicitly opposed to the elitist and imitative Russian language-cum-nationality:

They say that among us Russians a writer can have every hero speak his own particular language, i.e. style—a tsar in a tsar’s way, a landlord in a landlord’s way etc.—whereas for Little Russians there is one [language] common to all! It is better, more understandable and accessible among us: [this is] freedom, equality. They say that in the Little Russian language there are no words to express abstract, higher notions. And what are those words? Are they not those, which in Russian are actually French? What a pity! Who is to blame that Russians do not ransack among themselves, among the common people; and we have even more than they.<sup>115</sup>

Then he stated that Ukrainian was the language of the first translation of the Bible, filled with “abstract and higher notions,” which Russians later substituted with French. In general, he sought to prove that Ukrainian had sufficient *dignitas* to express thoughts in the highest spiritual spheres.

In the Ukrainian-Polish context, religion and ethnicity could be added to language as idioms of Ukrainianness. For example, Andruz’kyi proposed a rather strange idea about the reconversion to Orthodoxy of “about a million and a half” gentry residing in Right Bank Ukraine, who were of the “Polish [Catholic] faith” but of the “Ukrainian language.”<sup>116</sup> Another member of the brotherhood, Vasyl Bilozers’kyi, while traveling through Volhynia, informed his friend, not without a certain pride, that the Polish princely family of Czartoryskis were of “Ukrainian descent” (*ukraïns’koho rodu*) before converting to the Uniate rite.<sup>117</sup> Ukrainianness here was based on language, religion, and ethnicity, so that even the ex-Catholic gentry were allowed to join the Ukrainian nationality, although only after their return to Orthodoxy. Therefore, ethnic descent and language were not enough to define Ukrainians vis-à-vis Poles. Similarly, ethnicity and ethnic origins could not define Ukrainians in the Russian context. Other idioms of nation-ness, such as a folklore-based mentality, were often indispensable.

### *The Ukrainian Triumvirate Defines Modern Ukrainianness*

Published writings, in contrast to the handwritten texts of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, lacked one very important ele-

ment of contemporary nationalism: the aspiration for future political sovereignty (be it autonomy or independence).<sup>118</sup> Yet, those writings also revealed idioms of Ukrainianness, its “size,” and exclusivity. The “Triumvirate”—Kostomarov, Kulish, and Shevchenko—were indeed the most important Ukrainian intellectuals of the mid-nineteenth century; their influence would go well beyond the century. They were active in scholarship, literary criticism, prose, poetry, folk studies, painting, and so on. Here I will focus on their scholarly (as well as quasi-scholarly) and critical writings, including correspondence.

#### Academic Politics: Mykola Kostomarov

Mykola (Nikolai in Russian) Kostomarov was the most “academically” oriented among the triumvirate. In 1847 he was already an associate professor at Kyiv University, and eventually he became professor of Russian history at Saint Petersburg University. Kostomarov liked to emphasize his Russian descent (his father allegedly was descended from the Great Russian nobility) and often was rather skeptical about his Ukrainian identity. During the interrogation in connection to the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, Kostomarov’s testimony revealed an ambiguous attitude toward Ukrainianness in general and Ukrainian activities in particular. He believed that the Ukrainian nationality was decaying, since the “people” were exchanging their Ukrainian language for Russian. Like Henryk Rzewuski, Kostomarov thought that the symbol of national decay was the emergence of a national movement: “when nationality is disappearing, there always appears on its behalf a small movement,” such as Ukrainophiles. The movement was very small, however, and “did not take deep roots because the books written in Little Russian sell badly.”<sup>119</sup> Kostomarov spoke about the theory of “chosen nations,” such as Russians, and those deemed to disappear. He listed Ukrainians among the latter and pointed out that “if Providence has decided that the Little Russian nationality give way to Russian, then one should not strive to resurrect it.”<sup>120</sup> Such testimony only partially reflected the mind-set of Kostomarov, since it was expressed while under duress in jail.

In his master’s thesis from 1843 Kostomarov revealed his staunch belief in “national character,” which was best reflected in folklore. He defined “national character” as similar to personal character, that is, the immediate, unconscious expression of the collective (or individual) self. “Every

nation has in itself something definite that concerns more or less everyone of those persons who belong to the nation,” he wrote. “This is national character, according to which the entire mass [of people] can be considered as one person.”<sup>121</sup> Thus, Kostomarov perceived nationality as a person and transferred categories of individual psychology to the level of community. Nationality for him was a “single person.” The character of a nationality and of a person could be only studied on the basis of those sources “in which nation [and a person] would express itself unconsciously.”<sup>122</sup> It was the “folk song,” or folklore in general, that could serve as nation’s *unconsciousness*. According to Kostomarov’s Romantic vision, the “people” could not lie in their collective poetry, which represented the work of the “entire mass” of the people:

True poetry does not permit lie and simulation; the minutes of poetry are the minutes of creativity. The nation experiences them and leaves behind monuments through its songs; its feelings do not lie. They are born and formed when nation does not wear a mask [ . . . ]. Indeed, a folk song has the advantage above all other works, as it expresses unlearned feelings, natural emotions, and non-borrowed notions. The nation appears in it the way it is: the song is true [ . . . ]; it is only in these sounds of its soul that the nation appears as a single person; therefore, it does not reveal its character anywhere else.<sup>123</sup>

Kostomarov defined a “character” as a “special view of things, which every human and every nation has.”<sup>124</sup> Thus, a folklore-based mentality could be considered as a dominant idiom of nation-ness. In a seminal work of literary criticism, “Obzor sochinenii pisannykh na malorossiiskom iazyke” (A review of works written in the Little Russian language), Kostomarov developed his ethnographic-linguistic vision of Ukrainianness. Like other members of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, he noted that Ukrainian was a separate literary language which defined the geographical borders of the Ukrainian nationality. “The language, usually called Little Russian, and spoken in the South-Western provinces of Russia and in the Galician Kingdom, is not a recently formed dialect of the Russian language,” he wrote in 1843. “It has been around for a long time and now exists as a dialect of Slavic root.”<sup>125</sup> Kostomarov placed Ukrainian in the “middle between eastern and western dialects of the huge Slavic tribe,” that is, in the core of the Slavic world. He also treated Ukrainian as “correct, rich, harmonious, and able to develop literary culture.” Unlike the amateur linguist Andruz’kyi, who thought that the original literary language of Rus’ was Ukrainian (“an ancestral Little Russian language”), the

professional Kostomarov more conventionally regarded Church Slavonic as the common literary standard of Kyivan Rus' until that entity's political dissolution. But when "Russia split up, its western and eastern parts began to follow a separate life, as a result of which there formed two literary languages," one a mixture of Church Slavonic with Little Russian, the other a mixture of Church Slavonic with Great Russian. From then on, Ukraine had its own literary tradition based on the bookish Ruthenian (*rus'kyi*) language. Thus, Ukrainian in its written form (as Ruthenian) was an old literary standard in the South; then it influenced for a while literature in Muscovy; eventually, it survived only in Ukraine's church seminaries.

Like Maksymovych, Kostomarov regarded (Great) Russian as the new *common* literary language in Russia, which therefore rendered the Ruthenian language obsolete. "When Russia recovered its western and southern provinces, the Ruthenian language already became useless because there was another common language." He argued further that the "Church-Slavonic and Great Russian dialects were taken as its foundations, while it developed according to all possible foreign forms."<sup>126</sup> Ukrainian patriotism, as one of Kostomarov's multiple loyalties, did not prevent him from being also Great Russian and all-Russian, sharing a common Russian/Rus' culture. He was not very clear, however, about the relationship of the Ukrainian (Little Russian) nationality to (common) Russian. In his master's thesis he stressed that "the Russian nationality, despite the false views of some ethnographers, was always divided in two halves: Southern-Russian and Northern-Russian"; therefore, while analyzing "Russian folk poetry," he took into consideration the work of both "nationalities."<sup>127</sup> Ukrainians were indeed a "nationality," although they seemed to belong to a more complex "Russian nationality." Much later, Kostomarov sought to clarify his vision in the seminal article, "Two Rus' [Russian] Nationalities," in which he reached a compromise between the traditional idea of Rus' and the modern Ukrainian and (Great) Russian nationalities. He believed in the equality of Ukrainians and Russians, as they both descended from Rus' and shared its legacy.

It was only logical that the turn to "nationality" (*natsional'nost'*) and "people-ness" (*narodnost'*) awakened not only Great Russia but also other parts of the empire, since "all of Russia, rich in other elements, had right to it."<sup>128</sup> Kostomarov sought to emphasize the distinctiveness of Ukrainians without severing their connections to Russians. Although with regard to religion and ethnicity (ethnic origins or "tribe") they were united, in terms

of “nationality” they were different. Ukrainians were a “numerous [nation] united by faith and tribe with Great Russians,” but “the nationality of Little Russia is separate, different from the Great Russian nationality.”<sup>129</sup> Thus, religion and ethnicity could not be the idioms of Ukrainianness in the Russian context. What, then, did Kostomarov mean by “nationality”? For him “nationality” (*narodnost'*) was a vague combination of language, literature, “national character,” and perhaps history and ethnography. Repeatedly, he emphasized that Ukrainian was not a “distorted dialect of Russian” but a separate language “given by fate as property to a twelve million-strong nation.”<sup>130</sup>

This nationality could express itself in its own literature, which could prevent Ukrainians from assimilating into the Russian nationality.<sup>131</sup> Literature also reflected “the national character” of Ukrainians, who could be typified in certain literary images. Among these was Marusia, the heroine of Kvitka-Osnovianenko’s novella of the same name. Marusia symbolized Ukraine. Her sublime character arose from “the depths of a character of the Little Russian nation and, of course, from its historical life.” Marusia was a “Little Russian girl from ancient times who lives in the present” and who was depicted as ill, since “on the nation, in which she lives, lies the mark of a sickly frailty—this is the girl of a decaying Little Russia.”<sup>132</sup> Using her character as an example, Kostomarov presented his contrasted vision of Ukraine as that of an ancient but “virginal” country: “Little Russia, according to the level of its civilization, is a virginal, young country, [but] according to historical life, it experienced too much, fulfilled what Providence ordered, and became worn-out . . . Ancient life is dying in it, but a new one is just beginning to come out.”<sup>133</sup> Although idioms of Ukrainianness such as language, “national character,” literature, and history were intermixed in Kostomarov’s text, they effectively pointed to a distinct Ukrainian nationality.

#### Panteleimon Kulish’s “Ukrainian family” as Hegelian Nationality

The topos of a decaying Ukraine was a common metaphor, which many educated Ukrainians used to apply. Panteleimon Kulish himself, an ardent Ukrainian patriot, was sometimes skeptical about the future of the Ukrainian nationality. He never doubted, however, the historicity of his community. In 1843 he started writing a poetic history entitled *Knyha o*

*dilakh narodu ukrains'koho i slavnoho viis'ka zaporoz'koho* (A book about the deeds of the Ukrainian nation and the glorious Cossack Zaporozhian host). Although the work was never completed, it inspired his historical epic poem *Ukraine* (published in 1843). Ukraine was the most glorious and at the same time the most suffering country in the world: "Of all nations on earth, no one performed such brave and gracious exploits on behalf of Christianity and no one endured so many sufferings and different misfortunes for the faith and love of the fatherland as did the Little Russian nation."<sup>134</sup> Kulish presented Ukraine as the "best family on earth, the Ukrainian family."

Kulish's "Ukrainian family" project, based on history, folklore, and language, was predestined for the future revival. His vision of Ukraine most strikingly resembled the messianic visions of Poland by Polish émigrés. "The time will come," wrote Kulish in prophetic tone, "when Little Russians, turning to their antiquity, to their songs, and to their dense and splendid language, will prove to other nations that it was not in vain that their grandfathers basked in glory all over the world."<sup>135</sup> In his Ukrainian-language *Ukraine* Kulish developed the idea of the historicity of Ukraine by retrospectively "nationalizing" its past and showing continuity between Kyivan Rus' and Cossack Ukraine. In fact, he stated bluntly that "Ukraine itself in the ancient times was called Rus'."<sup>136</sup> He also presented the historic Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the voluntary union of the three independent nations, or "lands"—Poland, Lithuania, and Ukraine. This view also resembled the contemporary visions of émigré Poles. Unlike them, however, Kulish did not aspire to the restoration of that "union" in the future.

In his historico-political manifesto, *Povest' ob ukrainskom narode* (Tale of the Ukrainian people, 1846), which was used as incriminating evidence against him, Kulish accomplished his vision of the Ukrainian historic nationality by defining it through language, ethnography, and history. He wrote that "in [Russia's] southern provinces you will find a Slavic nation that differs from our Northern Russian commoners by language, clothing, customs, and mores. This is the Southern Russian or Ukrainian nation."<sup>137</sup> Ukrainians numbered thirteen million people and lived in Russia and Austria. They were a historical nationality since the early medieval times: "our Southern Russians or Ukrainians have their own history filled with heroic exploits and entertaining adventures. It dates from as early as the times of Askold, Dir, Oleg, and Sviatoslav."<sup>138</sup> The apogee of the historical

nationality came during the rule of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi and was measured by the democratic participation of conationals in Ukrainian political life and in elections, which made Ukraine a nation-state in the Hegelian sense:

Under Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi law was embodied in the mouths of the people who made decisions in small councils in villages and important ones in cities. Everyone knew that he was a real member of the nation, everyone had political ideas not limited only to one's home, one's village, or city. One's thoughts were as wide as Ukraine, and everything that was established in Ukraine was well known to everyone: the election of a hetman, war with neighbors, treaties with foreign states were known to all, penetrating in all souls. Therefore the *civilization* of the Ukrainian nation [ . . . ] was back then on a high level, and if such a situation established by Bohdan Khmelnyts'kyi continued, the civilization in Ukraine would have developed from its own elements as permanently as in western countries of Europe.<sup>139</sup>

The decline of participatory democracy (no matter how utopian it was in Kulish's version) meant the demise of a political nationality, that is, a nascent Ukrainian nation-state. When the hetmans, instead of being elected by the people, began to be appointed by the tsar, the history of the *nation* ceased to exist. In characterizing favorably hetman Mazepa's political views, Kulish stressed that the "nation [*natsiia*] can only be strengthened by the common free activity of the entire people [*naroda*] and that coerced activity never made a nation great."<sup>140</sup> Thus, nation-ness here was synonymous with democratic decision-making. Eventually, with the demise of democracy, the nobles "separated their interests from the interests of the people," and resulting social strife undermined the nationality.

Kulish, however, could not help but praise his own social group, the Cossacks, who by the middle of the nineteenth century constituted a certain middle class. They differed in the "purity of national type" both from nobles spoiled by foreign civilization and from the peasantry subjected to "constant oppression." Kulish was often skeptical about the future of the Ukrainian nationality. In a letter to the high-ranking Russian bureaucrat Mikhail Iuzefovich, dated September 10, 1844, Kulish admitted that the Ukrainian nationality, which he called "poetic"—for it expressed itself in "language, dress, customs, etc"—was losing its "distinctiveness."<sup>141</sup> Kulish perhaps exaggerated his skepticism as he asked for material help in launching his historico-ethnographic project. Nevertheless, he seemed to be genuinely concerned when he exclaimed: "Ah, if we only preserved our national

characteristic until now!” pointing to the Russification of Ukraine, where the native language and customs were preserved only by “boors.”

In a letter to Kostomarov, dated October 27, 1846, Kulish passionately defended the ethnographic-linguistic vision of Ukrainianness that did not contradict Orthodox Christianity, which Ukrainians shared with Russians: “Christianity should not in any way chill our aspiration for the development of our tribal elements. The loss of our language and customs is the worst that can happen,” continued Kulish, “and you say that if we are perfect Christians, all the rest is not a tragedy. Do not forget that our simple Ukrainian is Christian only as long as he preserves all his customs and beliefs.”<sup>142</sup> Then he pointed to the example of Peter’s reforms in Russia, stressing that only those who were not touched by the reforms remained close to the “idea of Christianity.” In general, Kulish in the 1840s was the staunchest propagator of modern Ukrainianness based on language, ethnography, and history, which reflected participatory democracy.

#### Ukraine as Nationality of “brothers”: Taras Shevchenko

His friend, the poet and painter Taras Shevchenko, shared a similar vision of Ukrainianness that was even more egalitarian in social terms. Unfortunately, Shevchenko did not leave any specific explication of his vision of the Ukrainian community, except for two short prefaces to his poems. In a preface to an unrealized edition of his poetry, Shevchenko, similar to other Ukrainian writers, opposed Ukrainians to Russians with regard to language by defending Ukrainian as a literary language and the very right of Ukrainians to write in their vernacular.<sup>143</sup> He explicitly identified nationality with language: “You should not take into account the Muscovites, let them write in their way and us in ours. They have a nation [*narod*] and language [*slovo*], and we have a nation and language. And which one is better? Let the people decide.”<sup>144</sup> His Ukrainianness was also defined in social terms as the nationality of proud commoners and the descendants of allegedly classless Cossacks.<sup>145</sup>

Shevchenko called on his readers to listen to the common people who were proud of their Cossack past and who were more original in their oral narratives than were the nobles in their artificial and imitative works. He pointed here to the travestied *Eneida* by the Ukrainian gentleman Ivan Kotliarevs’kyi, who composed it “in the Moscow manner.” Shevchenko passionately accused the nobles of assimilating into Russian

culture, and alluded that there was no place for them in his Ukrainian nationality: “Alas! Madness has befallen us through these disgusting and ungodly lords [ . . . ]. They changed their good native mother for a despicable drunkard, and in addition they added ‘v’ [to their last names]”; that is, they Russified their names.<sup>146</sup> Through the metaphors of the “mother” and the “drunkard,” Shevchenko represented Ukraine and Russia, associating the former with the commoners, “my beloved Ukrainian brothers” (*bratīia moia ukraīnskaia vozliublennaia*), and the latter with “these disgusting and ungodly lords” (*otym merzennym i bohuprotivnym panstvom*) who betrayed their mother Ukraine.

### *The Radical Ukrainianness*

The vision of Ukrainianness developed by the members and sympathizers of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood was not very different from the ethnolinguistic Herderian nationality envisioned by an older generation of Little Russian patriots and academics like Burachek, Maksymovych, and Bodians’kyi. The new element was the ideological independence of “radical” Ukrainianness from dynastic loyalty and elitism. If the upper classes ceased to use Ukrainian on a daily basis, they excluded themselves from the Ukrainian nationality both as Russian-speakers and as the gentry. The generation of Sts. Cyril and Methodius reinterpreted Ukrainianness in social terms as the nationality of commoners, and as such it was incompatible with the nobility, regardless which language the latter spoke. The young radicals turned a disadvantage into a virtue. For Maksymovych and his peers, the loss of the Ukrainian-speaking aristocracy was a national tragedy equal to the death of a distinct nationality, while for Shevchenko and his friends that loss was an important advantage. This is because for them Ukrainians were an exclusively egalitarian and democratic community. Deprived of an aristocracy, Ukraine appeared as a classless utopia, an example to imitate for autocratic Russia (defined by the despotic tsar) and oligarchic Poland (ruled by a parasitic aristocracy). This was a time when the myth about a classless Ukrainian society was born, a myth subsequently upheld by generations of Ukrainian populists, yet so criticized by Soviet historians. Probably, the most reserved member of the “Ukrainian Triumvirate,” Mykola Kostomarov, was unwilling to sever connections with the Great Russians since he believed that would mean a break with the Rus’ legacy.

As a result, in Kostomarov's scholarly and critical writings the Ukrainian community was visibly connected to the Rus'/Russian nationality and resembled the Little Russian nationality of pro-Russian loyalists. This was in contrast, however, to his anonymous political writings as a member of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood.

Modern Ukrainian nationality as envisioned by the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood was based on ethnography, language, history, and egalitarian sociopolitical values that sharply contrasted it with the dominant visions of Russianness.

### The Ukrainian Case: A Summary

The Ukrainian field was limited in an institutional sense. Because of the lack of a media, an underdeveloped public life, and the absence of Ukrainian emigration, many ideas could not emerge, let alone spread. The discursive field in which natives of Ukraine discussed issues related to Ukraine was at the same time diverse and narrow. It was diverse, since it included people with diametrically opposing ideologies who nonetheless regarded themselves as Ukrainian/Little Russian patriots. The field was narrow, since there were only a few Ukrainian/Little Russian literati engaged in the discourse on Ukraine; also, because most of those literati shared the same premise, that is, an ethnolinguistic vision of Ukrainianness.

The resulting Ukrainian community was quite exclusive and was often defined in religious terms. For instance, while Poles welcomed Orthodox into the Polish nationality, Ukrainians (from different circles) defined their community in strictly religious terms as an exclusively Orthodox nationality that largely excluded Catholics. The Catholic gentry residing in Right Bank Ukraine might have been Ukrainian by descent and even Ukrainian-speaking in the present, but to be considered fully Ukrainian they had to reconvert to Orthodoxy. In this respect the Polish imagined community was much more inclusive than the Ukrainian.

Religion was not an idiom of Ukrainianness when juxtaposed to Russianness. In general, an imagined community of the Ukrainian literati (Little Russian patriots and academics) was quite compatible with the empire and the "all-Russian nation," since it was rooted in the traditional idea of Orthodox Rus'. Adherence to the Rus' cultural legacy and the idea of common (Russian-Ukrainian) empire-building helped many Ukrainian literati to maintain a system of multiple loyalties in which they could be

both Little Russians/Ukrainians and Russians. The attempts of some Russians to stress the differences between Russians and Ukrainians by pointing to the discontinuity between Rus' and Cossack Ukraine caused trouble in the metropolitan public sphere.

Thus, the bluntly pro-Ukrainian vision of Nikolai Polevoi, who clearly separated Ukrainians from Russians, paradoxically invoked the wrath of the Little Russian patriot Stepan Burachek, who felt that Polevoi's interpretation deprived him and his loyal compatriots of the honor and recognition of being empire-builders and participants in common Russianness. Later Maksymovych conducted heated polemics with his friend Pogodin, who also ascribed to Ukrainians a separate cultural identity at the expense of a common Russian history. Burachek and Maksymovych shared the "all-Russian" identity, considered the Russian Empire a common Great Russian–Little Russian creation, and opposed any attempt at separating them from the ancient Rus'/Russian legacy. Ievets'kyi's position, which deprived Little Russia of a Kyivan Rus' legacy, was rather anachronistic at that time.

To understand the ideological shift within the Ukrainian field, it is worth comparing Maksymovych and Shevchenko as representatives of two generations or of two discourses. Maksymovych, a noble subject of the prenatal Russian Empire, shared with his fellows several identities, which sometimes competed with each other but mostly constituted a hierarchy. He managed to adopt several collective identities, being loyal to different imagined communities and regions of various sizes. He was simultaneously a *Ukrainian* and a *Little Russian*. He was Ukrainian, not in Shevchenko's sense, which was the closest to a present-day understanding of national identity, but rather in the traditional sense of attachment to a *local* homeland. He belonged to *Ukraine* as the specific geographical and mental reality of the time positioned in the Dnieper basin, around Kyiv and adjacent areas. That region was the core of medieval Kyivan Rus', where Maksymovych could find a lot of antiquities both above and under ground. Ukraine for him (as well as for Burachek) was the "original" Rus' and Kyiv, in the words of medieval chronicles, the "mother of Rus' cities." Maksymovych was also a Little Russian, since he stemmed from Left Bank Ukraine, the former territory of the Hetman State in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

It was Taras Shevchenko who provided the poetic *Ukraine*—appraised and imagined by Kharkiv Romantics—with a distinct political meaning

that finally replaced the term *Little Russia*.<sup>147</sup> Shevchenko's Ukrainian community, unlike that of Maksymovych, was strictly defined in social terms, as it included predominantly common people, leaving presumably the denationalized gentry outside it. For Maksymovych the gentry's network was the basis for a Ukrainian imagined community. With regard to his personal loyalties he remained also *Russian*, or belonging to all Rus', which was the opposition to exclusive Great Russian and Ukrainian perspectives. He could not admit a new (more exclusively "Ukrainian") configuration of imagined community and was comfortable enough with a number of identities. Nevertheless, he was *Ukrainian* enough to communicate with those like Shevchenko who shared a new concept of Ukrainianness, much broader and at the same time much more exclusive than that of Maksymovych. When they spoke about Ukraine, they understood each other and had at least something in common in their affinity with the native country. They shared a common past but differed in their interpretation of its role for the present and the future.

## Conclusion

The essence of this book could be summed up in one simple but provocative sentence: Russians “unmade” the historic “Polish nation,” and then Ukrainians “unmade” the “all-Russian nation.” The result was that the Ukrainian imagined community came to encompass both former Polish and former Russian territories. Ukrainians turned out to be the ultimate victors of the Russo-Polish conflict in the realm of geopolitics, imagination, and institutions. The historical record was more nuanced, however. Many Ukrainians were in the avant-garde of the Russian imperial struggle against the Poles, and therefore Ukrainians themselves (as Little or Southern Russians) were involved in the “unmaking” of the Polish historic nationality. On the other hand, many Ukrainians, in mapping the Ukrainian nationality, were *not* consciously unmaking the “all-Russian nation.” Quite the contrary: the project of a Ukrainian Romantic nationality, at least for its proponents, was *compatible* with a Russianness that encompassed all East Slavs in higher unity. Russians themselves were preoccupied with more general issues of nationality and empire, or of Russia and the West, rather than with the Polish nationality per se. In addition, the Russian government was lacking a consistent strategy in dealing with the Poles, even with those living on the territories claimed by the “all-Russian nation.”

On a grand historical scale, Ukrainians indeed greatly benefited from the geopolitical consequences of the Russo-Polish conflict. First, imperial Russia annexed Ukrainian-populated territories from the Polish-Lithuanian state (act I); this was followed by the Soviet Union’s annexation of western Ukraine in 1939 (act II). These “acts” provided Ukrainians in

the nineteenth and twentieth centuries with the symbolic and institutional means to imagine the entire space from the Carpathians in the west to the Don and Kuban' Rivers in the east as ethnically, linguistically, and at last, politically united. The Poles achieved unexpected and rather unpleasant results: in refuting Russian claims to ex-Polish lands, Poles started to emphasize the non-Russian character of the local population, arguments that helped Ukrainian literati better define their own imagined community vis-à-vis both Russians and Poles themselves. Consequently, the Poles had to recognize the unmaking of their "nation" already on the eve of the January uprising in 1863, although the attempts to avoid recognition of that unmaking continued well into the twentieth century.

Russians had more time to enjoy the large size of their ruling nationality that was thought to encompass all the Orthodox East Slavs. The Valuev circular of 1863, which banned Ukrainian publishing, revealed that some Russians were already concerned about the unity of the "all-Russian nation" as the main pillar of the empire. As early as 1847, some Russian officials had considered the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood as a sign of danger to common Russianness. They ascribed to Ukrainians ideas about independence, even though these ideas had remained in embryo for decades.

During the 1830s and 1840s Poles sought to refashion their historic "nation," so that it would continue to include Orthodox Ruthenians. Polishness in the eyes of both conservatives and democrats appeared to be quite inclusive, since most of them avoided using (the Catholic) religion as a dominant idiom of nationality. Even when they emphasized religion, they promised the widest tolerance to all religious minorities who, as expected, would join the future "Polish nation." In fact, most Poles did not question the existence of that nationality in the present. For many the Polish nationality included the Orthodox, Jews, and even Muslims. Nevertheless, recognition of the *multinational* character of a future Polish state was not on the Polish agenda. Most conservatives and democrats shared one premise: they desperately sought to represent Polishness as a single nationality that was above and beyond any ethnic or religious divisions. They often confused such terms as nation (*naród*), nationality (*narodowość*), people (*lud*), and tribe (*plemię*), but they were sure that whatever the generic term, Polishness had to unite all cultures and ethnicities in one national whole. By the same token, while often rejecting ethnolinguistic criteria as idioms of Polishness, the democrats and conservatives alike sought a higher national unity embodied in a common history, political

values, mentality, loyalty to the dynasty, and so on. Only few recognized the need for a total “makeover” of Polishness. At the time no sensible Pole rejected the idea of Poland’s “historical” or “natural” borders. To be able to imagine Polishness reduced in size, Poles needed to reconsider the very idioms of nationality. Put another way, they had to make their community more exclusive and more ethnically “Polish.” That happened only much later, in the ideology of the Polish National Democrats headed by Roman Dmowski. Nevertheless, even they never completely rejected the legacy of legitimism with its idea of “historical” or “natural” borders.

The Russian nationality—either in the form of the “all-Russian nation” or as ethnic Great Russia—was never as inclusive as the Polish nationality of most contemporary Polish intellectuals. Both versions of Russianness were based on Orthodoxy as the only religion of “Russians”—Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians. Only cosmopolitan dynastic loyalists, many of whom were not ethnic Russians, celebrated Russia as a nonnational empire that included different religions, cultures, ethnicities, separate nationalities, and even autonomous nation-states like Finland. Most intellectuals, however, did not uphold the voice of those imperialists, no matter how influential they were. It seemed that the imperial acquisitions did not change the religious and linguistic perception of Russianness in the 1830s and 1840s. Russian literati (even those close to the government) were more or less inclined to embrace Romantic nationalism as a means to reconcile empire with nationality. They did not dare to detach nationality from the empire, whether because of political danger or ideological choice. Even Russian nationalists, such as Slavophiles, emphasized the close links between the Russian nationality and the Moscow state. Moreover, they could not fail to notice that Peter’s empire had some connection to traditional Muscovy, even if only territorial and demographic.

The idea of the “all-Russian nation,” which had its origins in the ideological concepts of Ukrainian clerical authors from the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, served as the strongest link between the empire and nationality in Russia during the 1830s and 1840s. The proponents of that concept, by lumping together all Orthodox East Slavs, provided the empire with a dominant nationality which distinguished Russia from other empires, such as the Austrian and the Ottoman, neither of which had a numerically dominant nationality. The link between empire and the “all-Russian nation” became increasingly important for the government (including ethnically non-Russian imperialists), which actively supervised

the well-being of common Russianness, especially after the Polish January uprising of 1863. Poles had long since understood that imperial Russia, if deprived of its “grand” nationality, would not be able to refashion itself successfully. In the late 1840s, only one Russian, Bakunin, clearly realized (and enthusiastically suggested) that by “unmaking” the unity of the “all-Russian nation,” he was destroying the empire itself—at least in the imagination of his listeners and readers.

For most natives of Ukraine engaged in the discourse about Ukraine, the Ukrainian imagined community (with or without a *national* status) was compatible with Russianness. For most of the period, Ukrainian literati representing different ideological circles allied with the Russians in their anti-Polish policies. At the very least, no Ukrainian was able to express his alternative thoughts in print. The poetry of Shevchenko, however, pointed to a change in attitude: he seemed to sympathize with Poles and managed to “unmake” the empire in his works. Only one documented voice stressed explicitly the incompatibility of a Ukrainian identity with Russia. An alleged member of the Sts. Cyril and Methodius Brotherhood, Heorhii Andruz'kyi wrote that “in order to create Ukraine, one must destroy Russia.” Generally, Ukrainians remained the main beneficiaries of the Russo-Polish struggle. This is because that struggle reinforced Ukrainian identity by showing its proponents the example of active nationalism (Poles) and by providing it with a territorial and institutional base (Russians). The Romantic project of a separate Ukrainian nationality, based for the most part on history, language, and ethnography, proved to be the most successful. It marginalized its adversaries (“Little Russians” and “all-Russians”) and managed to survive, whereas the dominant projects—the “all-Russian nation” and historic “Polish nation”—were eventually unmade, which became evident in 1917. It also attested to the strength of the Ukrainian identity that Bolsheviks had to adopt the national vision of their ideological enemies. Perhaps Ukrainians, as a purely *national*, ethnolinguistic community without the burden of historical borders and empire, reflected best the nationalist fashion in the contemporary world. While Poles eventually managed to strip themselves of the burden of historical legitimacy and acquiesced to the loss of *kresy*, not least because of the role of the Paris-based *Kultura* journal, Russian political imagination still seems to be haunted by the specter of the “all-Russian nation” (often disguised in the concept of the “Russian world”), and voices are heard for building the “liberal empire.”

## Reference Matter



## Notes

### Preface

1. In spatial terms, this was also a struggle between the Russian Empire and the historic “Polish nation” to represent Right Bank Ukraine (understood as the “South Western region” for Russians and the “South Eastern borderlands” for Poles).

2. The previous major effort was Tim Snyder’s *Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, Conn., 2003). His focus was rather on socio-political factors than on visions of national intelligentsias.

3. Roman Szporluk, “Ukraine: From the Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State,” in his *Russia, Ukraine and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Calif., 2000), pp. 361–395.

4. Aleksei Miller, “*Ukrainskii vopros*” v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.) (Saint Petersburg, 2000), p. 36.

5. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991).

6. Pierre Bourdieu, *In Other Words: Essays Toward a Reflexive Sociology*, translated by M. Adamson (Stanford, Calif., 1990).

7. Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992); *idem*, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge [England] and New York, 1996).

8. Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland* (Oxford, 1982); *idem*, *The Slavophile Controversy: The History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth Century Russian Thought* (Oxford, 1975); *idem*, *Russia, Poland and Universal Regeneration: Studies on Russian and Polish Thought of the Romantic Epoch* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1991); *idem*, *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1989).

9. George Grabowicz, “The History and Myth of the Cossack Ukraine in Polish and Russian Romantic Literature” (Harvard University, Ph.D. thesis, 1975); *idem*, *Do istorii ukrains’koi literatury* (Kyiv, 1997).

10. Szporluk, “Ukraine: From the Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State.”

11. Paul Robert Magocsi, "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 16, nos. 1–2 (Charlottetown, P.E.I., 1989), pp. 45–63.

12. Szporluk, "Ukraine: From the Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," pp. 361–395.

13. Grabowicz, "History and Myth of the Cossack Ukraine," and also his *Do istorii ukrainskoï literatury*.

14. Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, p. 6.

15. Most geographical names are given according to spellings in Paul Robert Magocsi, *Historical Atlas of Central Europe* (Toronto, 2002), with the exception of the names to the east of the Dnieper, which are outside of the geographical focus of that atlas.

## Introduction

1. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), pp. 5–6.

2. Andreas Gardt, "Nation und Sprache in der Zeit der Aufklärung," in Andreas Gardt, ed., *Nation und Sprache. Die Diskussion ihres Verhältnisses in Geschichte und Gegenwart* (Berlin and New York, 2000), pp. 169–170, 176, 194. Compare Christiane Schlaps, "Das Konzept eines *deutschen Sprachgeists* in der Geschichte der Sprachtheorie," in *ibid.*, pp. 307, 323, 324–325.

3. Jochen Bär, "Nation und Sprache in der Sicht romantischer Schriftsteller und Sprachtheoretiker," in Gardt, *Nation und Sprache*, p. 207.

4. Gardt, "Nation und Sprache in der Zeit der Aufklärung," p. 179.

5. Cited in *ibid.*, p. 194.

6. Stephen May, *Language and Minority Rights* (Harlow, England, 2001), p. 57.

7. Gardt, "Nation und Sprache in der Zeit der Aufklärung," p. 194.

8. Cited in Schlaps, "Das Konzept eines *deutschen Sprachgeists*," pp. 323–324.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

10. Cited in Bär, "Nation und Sprache in der Sicht romantischer Schriftsteller," p. 217.

11. May, *Language and Minority Rights*, p. 58.

12. See Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

13. On the abolition of Ukrainian autonomous statehood see Zenon E. Kohut, *Russian Centralism and Ukrainian Autonomy: Imperial Absorption of the Hetmanate, 1760s–1830s* (Cambridge, Mass., 1988).

14. On the treatment of Poles in the 1830s–1840s see Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918*, fourth printing (Seattle and London, 1996), pp. 105–131.

15. Serhiy Bilenky, "Zasnuvannia Kyïvs'koho universytetu: spadkovist', pereryvchastist', impers'ka svavolia," *Shhid/Zakhid*, 7 (Kharkiv-Kyiv, 2005), pp. 188–213.

16. On a multiethnic character of Russian imperial elite see Dominic Lieven, *Empire: The Russian Empire and Its Rivals* (London, 2000), pp. 241–261; John Le Donne, "Ruling Families in the Russian Political Order," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique*, 28, nos. 3–4 (July–December, 1987), pp. 233–258, 295–322; and Stephen Velychenko, "Empire Loyalism and Minority Nationalism in Great Britain and Imperial Russia, 1707–1914: Imperial Insti-

tutions, Law, and Nationality in Scotland and Ukraine,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39, no. 3 (July 1997), pp. 413–441.

17. On a contradictory nature of Uvarov’s doctrine see Andrei Zorin, “Ideologiia ‘Pravoslaviia-Samoderzhaviia-Narodnosti’: opyt rekonstruktsii,” *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*, 26 (1997), pp. 71–104.

18. On the complexities of religious politics in different regions see Robert Geraci, *Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late Tsarist Russia* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2001); Wayne Dowler, *Classroom and Empire: The Politics of Schooling Russia’s Eastern Nationalities, 1860–1917* (Toronto, 2001); Edward C. Thaden, ed., *Russification in the Baltic Provinces and Finland, 1855–1914* (Princeton, 1981); and Theodore R. Weeks, “Religion and Russification: Russian Language in the Catholic Churches of the ‘Northwest Provinces’ After 1863,” *Kritika*, 2, no. 1 (Winter 2001), pp. 87–111.

19. On the Russo-Polish-Ukrainian relations in the nineteenth century see Daniel Beauvois, *Le Noble, le Serf et le Réviseur. La noblesse polonaise entre le tsarisme et les masses ukrainiennes (1831–1863)* (Lille, 1985). One of the first measures aimed at curbing the influence of the Polish landlords was the so-called “inventory reform” in 1847–48, which limited Polish landholding and restrained the power of Catholic landowners over their Ukrainian serfs.

20. The word *intelligentsia* as used in Russia was supposedly of Polish origins and became widespread in the Russian context as a name for a social group since the beginning of the 1860s. See an article by Jerzy Jedlicki on *Inteligencja* in Józef Bachórz and Alina Kowalczykowa, eds., *Słownik literatury polskiej XIX wieku* (Wrocław, Warsaw, and Crakow, 1997), pp. 373–377; see also Daniel Beauvois, “Pochodzenie a wiedza: szlachta a inteligencja polska w XYIII-XIX wieku,” in Jerzy Kłoczowski, ed., *Historia Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej*, vol. 2 (Lublin, 2000), pp. 119–138; and O. W. Müller, *Intelligentsia, Untersuchungen zur Geschichte eines politischen Schlagwortes* (Frankfurt am Main, 1991).

21. Liah Greenfeld has pointed to a large number of Ukrainians among the mideighteenth-century Russian intelligentsia (around 50 percent). See Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge [Mass.] and London, 1993), pp. 238–239, 531. In my study, however, the *Russian* intelligentsia is understood to be a class of literati—writers, critics, thinkers, and so on—who were of *ethnic* Russian (Great Russian) origins and who tackled sociopolitical and cultural issues primarily from a Great Russian or all-Russian perspective.

22. Greenfeld, *Nationalism*, p. 247; compare Marc Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia: The Eighteenth-Century Nobility* (New York, 1966).

23. Andrzej Walicki has shown how Hegel’s philosophy inspired both Westernizers (such as Vissarion Belinskii) and Slavophiles (like Ivan Kireevskii). See his *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought* (Oxford, 1975).

24. Nicholas Riasanovsky, *A Parting of Ways: Government and the Educated Public in Russia, 1802–1855* (Oxford, 1976).

25. For a comparative study of East European national movements see Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge, Mass., 1985). For the period after 1850

see Andreas Kappeler, ed., *The Formation of National Elites*, vol. 6 in *Comparative Studies on Governments and Non-dominant Ethnic Groups in Europe, 1850–1940* (Aldershot and New York, 1992).

26. A short but exhaustive survey of the main ideological currents of the Great Emigration is provided in Wandycz, *Lands of Partitioned Poland*, pp. 117–122; for more readings see the bibliographical essay in the end of Wandycz's book.

27. For the use of the term *rhetoric of nationality* see Grażyna Królikiewicz, “Tajemniczy jeździec czyli . . . o retoryce narodowości i uniwersalności w polskiej publicystyce literackiej doby romantyzmu,” in M. Cieśla-Korytowska, ed., *Narodowy i ponadnarodowy charakter literatury* (Cracow, 1996), pp. 115–125. Compare Michał Kuziak, *O prelekcjach paryskich Adama Mickiewicza* (Szupsk, 2007), p. 58.

28. Some of these responses are analyzed in Geracy, *Window on the East*; Mark Bassin, *Imperial Visions: Nationalist Imagination and Geographical Expansion in the Russian Far East, 1840–1865* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); and Theodore R. Weeks, *Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914* (Chicago, 1996).

29. A. I. Miller, *Ukraiński vopros v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoratai polovina XIX v.)* (Saint Petersburg, 2000), pp. 30–35.

30. Andrzej Walicki, *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1989), pp. 103, 119–120, 124.

31. Wayne Dowler, *Dostoevsky, Grigor'ev and Native Soil Conservatism* (Toronto, 1982); Weeks, *Nation and State*.

32. Geracy, *Window on the East*.

33. E. C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Seattle, Wash., 1964); Dowler, *Dostoevsky*. The figures of Leontiev and Katkov are left outside the focus of my study.

34. Walicki, *Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood*, p. 103.

35. Recently, this concept was applied to Nikolai Gogol, probably the most famous case of competing identities in midnineteenth-century Russia and Ukraine. See Edyta M. Bojanowska, *Nikolai Gogol: Between Ukrainian and Russian Nationalism* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006).

## Chapter 1

1. Andrzej Walicki, *The Enlightenment and the Birth of Modern Nationhood: Polish Political Thought from Noble Republicanism to Tadeusz Kosciuszko* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1989), p. 103.

2. Józef Korzeniowski, “Emeryt,” in his *Dzieła*, vol. 2 (Cracow, 1871), p. 238; Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Listy do rodziny 1820–1863*, part 1: *W kraju* (Cracow, 1982), p. 116.

3. Jacek Kołbuszewski, “Legenda kresów w literaturze polskiej XIX i XX w.,” in W. Wrzesiński, ed., *Między Polską etniczną a historyczną* (Wrocław, 1988), p. 54; Tadeusz Łepkowski, *Polska—narodziny nowoczesnego narodu, 1764–1870* (Warsaw, 1967), p. 244.

4. Maurycy Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego 1830–1831* [Paris, 2 vols., 1833–34], 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1984), vol. 1, pp. 59, 61. Mochnacki also could not admit the idea of ethnic

Poland or Polishness defined by the Polish language and ethnicity, hence his rejection of Congress Kingdom. See Andrzej Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza w perspektywie porównawczej* (Warsaw, 2006), pp. 130–131.

5. Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, p. 138.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

8. A. F. Grabski, “Na manowcach myśli historycznej. Historiografia Franciszka H. Duchnińskiego,” in his *Perspektywy przeszłości. Studia i szkice historiograficzne* (Lublin, 1983), p. 264.

9. Henryk Żaliński, *Kształt polityczny Polski w ideologii Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego (1832–1846)* (Wrocław, 1976), p. 82.

10. Tadeusz Łepkowski, “Poglądy na jedno- i wieloetniczność narodu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku,” in Zofia Stefanowska, ed., *Swójskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1973), p. 232.

11. Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 2, p. 398; “Komitet Narodowy Polski do Ludów Niemieckich, 30 kwietnia 1832 r.,” in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna: Wybór źródeł* (Wrocław, 1961), p. 25; “Komitet Narodowy Emigracji Polskiej [1832],” in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 154; “Zjednoczenie Emigracji Polskiej. Do ogółu Emigracji Polskiej Komisja Korespondencyjna w Poitiers [1837],” in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 317; Anon., “Co Polskę z upadku podniesie,” *Orzeł Biały*, 14 (Brussels, 25.V.1840), pp. 53–55, as quoted from W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 344; Jan Czyński, “Religia w Polsce,” *Orzeł Biały* (Brussels), no. 17, 20.VII.1843, pp. 69–70, no. 18, 31.VII.1843, pp. 73–75, as quoted from W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 394; “Komitet Narodowy Polski. Oświadczenie emigracji polskiej [1846],” in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 404; Jan Czyński, “Do mieszkańców miast polskich,” *Echo miast polskich*, 1 (Paris, 20.X.1843), pp. 1–4, as quoted from W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 417; “Ustawa Kościoła powszechnego,” in Nana Temkinowa, ed., *Lud Polski: Wybór dokumentów* (Warsaw, 1957), p. 335; “Manifest Rządu Narodowego,” in Henryk Katz, Witold Kula, et al., eds., *Wiosna Ludów: Teksty i materiały źródłowe* (Warsaw, 1953), p. 478.

12. See Maria Janion’s introduction to Wincenty Pol’s poems in Wincenty Pol, *Wybór poezji* (Wrocław, 1963), p. lv.

13. Pol, *Wybór poezji*, p. 168. [*A czy znasz ty, bracie młody, / Te pokrewne twoje rody? / Tych Górali i Litwinów, / I Zmudź świętą i Rusinów?*]

14. Quoted from Roman Wapiński, *Polska i małe ojczyzny Polaków. Z dziejów kształtowania się świadomości narodowej w XIX i XX wieku po wybuch II wojny światowej* (Wrocław, 1994), p. 57. [*Byłem w Litwie i w Koronie, / Byłem w tej i w owej stronie, / Byłem tu i tam; / Od Beskidów do Pomorza, / Z Litwy aż do Zaporozża / Całą Polskę znam. / Znam to całe szczerze plemię, / Polskie morza, polskie ziemie, / I tę polską sól; / I o wszystkim marzę, roję, / I to wszystko niby moje, / Nibym polski król*]

15. Cezary Rowiński, “Romantyczne wizje ojczyzny i narodu,” in Teresa Dąbek-Wirgowa

and Andrzej Makowiecki, eds., *Kategoria narodu w kulturach słowiańskich* (Warsaw, 1993), p. 78.

16. *Ibid.*, pp. 78–79.

17. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Wybór pism*, section 10: *Studia i szkice literackie* (Warsaw, 1894), p. 239.

18. Korzeniowski, “Emeryt,” p. 428.

19. Gustav Olizar, *Pamiętniki 1798–1865* (Lviv, 1892), pp. 20, 21, 37.

20. Stanisław Kalembka, *Prasa demokratyczna Wielkiej Emigracji: Dzieje i główne koncepcje polityczne (1832–1863)* (Toruń, 1977), p. 174; compare Alix Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe, dann müßte es erfunden werden”: *Die Entwicklung des polnischen Nationalbewußtseins im europäischen Kontext* (Wiesbaden, 2003), pp. 273–274. Landgrebe pointed out that the concept of Poland’s “natural borders” became embedded even in the consciousness of West European powers.

21. Włodzimierz Bortnowski, *Powstanie listopadowe w oczach Rosjan* (Warsaw, 1964), pp. 13, 18, 20; Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 2, p. 139.

22. W. H. Zawadzki, *A Man of Honor: Adam Czartoryski as a Statesman of Russia and Poland, 1795–1831* (Oxford, 1993), p. 312.

23. Quoted from Stanisław Pigoń, “Zręby nowej Polski w publicystyce Wielkiej Emigracji,” in J. Musiał, ed., *“Marchoń” (1934–1939). Antologia tekstów* (Cracow, 2002), p. 117.

24. Jan Nepomucen Janowski, “O początku demokracji polskiej,” in Wiktor Heltman and J. N. Janowski, *Demokracja polska na emigracji* (Warsaw, 1965), p. 320. Compare Henryk Żaliński, *Kształt polityczny Polski w ideologii Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego (1832–1846)* (Wrocław, 1976), p. 80.

25. B. Baczek, ed., *Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie: dokumenty i pisma* (Warsaw, 1954), p. 89.

26. Wiktor Heltman, “Powstanie 1830–1831 roku,” in Heltman and Janowski, *Demokracja polska*, p. 252.

27. Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 2, p. 78.

28. “bez prowincji Morza Czarnego dotykających, pozbawiona wolnego z tej strony zbywania płodów swoich, [Polska] byłaby całością niezupelną jeszcze.” Quoted from Stanisław Pigoń, “Zręby nowej Polski,” p. 117.

29. “Protokół zebrania organizacyjnego Zemsty Ludu [December 28, 1832],” in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 63.

30. “Manifest Polaków znajdujących się w Belgii, 29.XI.1836,” in Andrzej Walicki, ed., *Filozofia i myśl społeczna w latach 1831–1864*, vol. 5 in *700 lat myśli polskiej* (Warsaw, 1977), p. 789.

31. Quoted from Tadeusz Łepkowski, *Polska—narodziny nowoczesnego narodu, 1764–1870* (Warsaw, 1967), p. 313.

32. Anon., “Wiara polityczna ‘Polaka,’” *Polak*, art. 2 (Paris, 21.V.1837), pp. 9–12, as quoted in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka*, p. 304.

33. Bronisław Trentowski, *Wizerunki duszy narodowej, przez Ojczyźniaka* (Paris, 1847), p. 355. On the opposition “Poland–Asia” as well as the meaning of “race” in Polish sources, see Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe,” pp. 112–133, 190–199.

34. [Adam Czartoryski], "De l'avenir de la Russie et de l'Europe," *Le Polonais*, 4 (Paris, April 1835), p. 206.
35. Andrzej Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1733–1921)* (Warsaw, 1995), p. 56.
36. Marcei Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1948), vol. 1, p. 150; Żaliński, *Kształt polityczny Polski*, p. 83; S. Szostakowski, *Z kart Wielkiej Emigracji. Prasa obozu arystokratycznego w latach 1832–1848* (Olsztyn, 1974), p. 413. As a leader of a rebellious government in Warsaw, Czartoryski considered implementing the concept of Poland's "natural" borders, along the Black Sea shore. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 142–143.
37. "Tłomaczenie Noty podanej do Rządu Angielskiego," in BC, rkps 5281, p. 131.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
39. Adam Czartoryski, "Pisma do kraju," in BC, rkps 5320, pp. 201–215, as quoted from Andrzej Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?* p. 96.
40. Adam Czartoryski, "O zajęciach, zachowaniu się i obowiązkach Polaków pod rządem obcym," in BC, rkps 5285 IV, p. 146.
41. See the report of Michał Czajkowski to Prince Adam from 1839 in BC, rkps 5384 IV, p. 98.
42. Wacław Jabłonowski, *Do emigracji polskiej* (Paris, 1843), p. 17.
43. "Ustawa Kościoła Powszechnego," in *Lud Polski*, p. 335.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
45. Michał Kubrakiewicz, *Uwagi polityczne i religijne* (Bordeaux, 1839), p. 7.
46. Andrzej Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją. Studium politycznej wyobraźni i postaw Wielkiej Emigracji wobec Rosji 1831–49* (Warsaw, 1994), p. 206.
47. Andrzej Nowak, "Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Koncepcje polityczne i fantazje kręgu Adama Czartoryskiego (1832–1847)," *Studia Historyczne*, 33 (1990), pp. 213–214.
48. Sławomir Kalembka, "Koncepcje granic i ustroju politycznego Polski niepodległej, przedstawiane na łamach prasy demokratycznej Wielkiej Emigracji," *Acta Universitatis Nicolai Copernici, Historia*, 9 (1973), p. 205.
49. "Manifest Polaków znajdujących się w Belgii, 29.XI.1836," p. 788.
50. J. B. Ostrowski, "Czy jest jaka Litwa," *Nowa Polska*, 3 (1835), folios 28 and 29, pp. 349–350.
51. Jacek Kołbuszewski, "Legenda kresów w literaturze polskiej XIX i XX w.," p. 53. The most famous example of the local patriotism in literature was, of course, Adam Mickiewicz's "Litwo! Ojczyzno moja!" Mickiewicz was even the head of a literary section of the Society of Lithuania and Rus' Lands that emphasized the ethnography, history, and political importance of historic Lithuania and Rus'. See Alina Barszczewska-Krupa, *Emigracja i kraj: wokół modernizacji polskiej świadomości społecznej i narodowej 1831–1863* (Łódź, 1999), p. 92.
52. Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland* (Oxford, 1982), p. 4; Żaliński, *Kształt polityczny Polski*, p. 84.
53. As quoted from Żaliński, *Kształt polityczny Polski*, p. 84.
54. Tadeusz Krępowiecki, "Narodowość (Centralizacja)," *Postęp* (Paris, 1834), no. 6, pp. 81–88, no. 7, pp. 97–102, as quoted from Katz, Kula, et al., *Wiosna Ludów*, p. 78.

55. Henryk Kamieński, “Katechizm demokratyczny czyli opowiadanie słowa ludowego przez Filaleta Prawdowskiego [Paris, 1845],” in Katz, Kula, et al., *Wiosna Ludów*, p. 337.

56. Piotr Semenenko, “O narodowości,” *Postęp*, nos. 4–5 (Paris, 1834), pp. 70, 71, 73.

57. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 66.

58. Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 1, p. 61.

59. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 457.

60. Maurycy Mochnacki, “O rewolucji społecznej w Polsce,” in his *Dzieła*, vol. 4 (Poznań, 1863), p. 161.

61. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężska*, series 1 (Cracow, 1964), pp. 321–325.

62. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Wspomnienia Odessy, Jedysanu i Budżaku . . .*, vol. 1 (Vilnius, 1845), pp. 187–193.

63. Semenenko, “O narodowości,” p. 68.

64. Józef Ordęga, *O narodowości Polskiej z punktu widzenia katolicyzmu i postępu* (Paris, 1840), p. 78.

65. Anon., “Zagajenie kursu literatury słowiańskiej przez Pana Cypryana Roberta (22 grudnia 1846),” *Demokrata Polski* (Paris, January 2 and 9, 1847), pp. 117–118.

66. Kalembka, *Prasa demokratyczna Wielkiej Emigracji*, p. 175. What allowed the setting of claims on historical borders by simultaneously preserving the link between the old and future Poland was a national missionism, which was to prove the indispensability of Poland for the entire world. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 145–146.

67. Compare Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe,” p. 273.

68. Iurii Venelin, “O spore mezhd u iuzhanami i severianami na schet ikh rossizma,” *Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh*, 4 (Moscow, 1847), p. 3.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 7.

70. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

71. *Ibid.*

72. Mykola Venger, “Mykola Koval’,” *Kyiv’ska starovyna*, 3 (1999), pp. 84–86.

73. [Orest Somov], *Golos ukraintsa pri vesti o vziatii Varshavy* (Saint Petersburg, 1831).

74. *Ibid.*, p. 6.

75. *Ibid.*, pp. 6–7.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11.

78. *Ibid.*, p. 10.

79. See, for example, the historical articles by Mykhailo Maksymovych published in his almanac “A Kyivite” (Kievliańin) from 1840: “Volyn’ do XI veka,” “Dva piś'ma kniazia Ostrozhs'kogo,” “Rodoslovnye zapiski ‘Kievliańina,’” “O pamiatnikakh Luts'kogo Krestovozdvizhenskogo bratstva,” etc.

80. See the protocol of the interrogation of Andruz'kyi in the III Department, from April 14, 1847, in P. Sokhan' et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiiv's'ke tovarystvo*, 3 vols. (Kyiv, 1990), vol. 2, p. 502.

81. In his draft of the constitution that was seized from him in 1850 and that was also published in P. Sokhan' et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiiv's'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 570.

82. Mykola Kostomarov, *Knyhy buttia ukrainskoho narodu*, in P. Sokhan' et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivske tovarystvo*, vol. 1, pp. 167–169.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
84. “Graf A.Kh. Benkendorf o Rossii v 1827–1830 gg.,” *Krasnyi arkhiv*, 1, no. 38 (1930), p. III.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. III–II2.
86. Mikhail Lunin, “Vzgliad na pol'skie dela g-na Ivanova, chlena tainogo obshchestva soedinennykh slavian [1840],” in his *Sochineniia, pis'ma, dokumenty* (Irkutsk, 1988), p. 153.
87. Mikhail Lunin, “Pi's'ma iz Sibiri. Vtoraia seriia. No. 4. 17/5 November 1839,” in his *Sochineniia*, p. II2.
88. *Ibid.*, pp. 156, 162; *Idem*, “Razbor doneseniiia . . .,” in his *Sochineniia*, pp. 148–149.
89. P. A. Viazemskii, *Zapisnye knizhki (1813–1848)* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 144, 213, 329.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 103, 213.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
92. N. P. Ogarev, “Iumor,” in his *Stikhotvoreniia*, M. Ia. Gershenzon, ed. (Moscow, 1904), vol. 2, pp. 1–113.
93. Viazemskii, *Zapisnye knizhki*, p. 213.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*, p. 214.
97. Megan Dixon, “Repositioning Pushkin and the Poems of the Polish Uprising,” in David L. Ransel and Bozena Shallcross, eds., *Polish Encounters, Russian Identity* (Bloomington, Ind., 2005), p. 49.
98. Jerzy Orłowski, *Z dziejów antypolskich obsesji w literaturze rosyjskiej* (Warsaw, 1992), pp. 89–100; Dixon, “Repositioning Pushkin,” p. 61.
99. A. S. Pushkin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 17 vols. (Moscow, 1995), vol. 3, part 1, p. 274.
100. Dixon, “Repositioning Pushkin,” p. 59.
101. Pushkin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 3, part 1, pp. 274–275.
102. Orłowski, *Z dziejów antypolskich obsesji*, p. 98; Pushkin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 14, pp. 147–148 (for the Russian translation of his French letter see p. 423).
103. Pushkin, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 14, pp. 150, 157, 164, 174, 196–197, 200, 208, 221.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
105. V. I. Dal', “Podolianka,” in his *Sochineniia*, 8 vols. (Saint Petersburg and Moscow, 1884), vol. 7.
106. W. Bortnowski, *Powstanie listopadowe w oczach Rosjan* (Warsaw, 1964), p. 138.
107. Ilarion Vasiliev, *Noveishee opisanie Tsarstva Pol'skago* (Moscow, 1831).
108. Ievdokim Ziablovskii, *Geografiia Rossiiskoi imperii* (Saint Petersburg, 1831), p. 121.
109. P. I. Keppen, *Ob etnograficheskoi karte Rossii*, 2nd ed. (Saint Petersburg, 1853).
110. Vadim (Passek), *Putevye zapiski* (Moscow, 1834), p. 172.
111. K. Arseniev, *Statisticheskie ocherki Rossii* (Saint Petersburg, 1848), p. 26.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
113. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

114. *Ibid.*, p. 48.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
116. Filip Vigel', *Zapiski* (Moscow, 2000), p. 33.
117. *Ibid.*
118. Venelin, "O spore," p. 5.
119. I. M. Dolgorukov, Prince, "Slavny bubny za gorami, ili moe puteshestvie koe-kuda v 1810 g.," *Chteniiia v obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh*, 2 (Moscow, April–June 1869), p. 209.
120. *Ibid.*, pp. 150, 245.
121. Mikhail Pogodin, *Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki* (Moscow, 1846), p. 52.
122. *Idem*, "Istoricheskie razmyshleniia ob otnosheniakh Pol'shi k Rossii," *Teleskop*, 2, no. 7 (Saint Petersburg, 1831), p. 298.
123. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
124. *Idem*, *God v chuzhikh kraiaikh (1839): Dorozhnyi dnevniki*, 2 parts (Moscow, 1844), p. 100.
125. Marc Raeff, *The Decembrist Movement* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1966), pp. 15–20; Pavel Pestel', "Russkaia Pravda," in *Vostanie dekabristov. Dokumenty*, vol. 7: "Russkaia Pravda" Pestel'a i sochineniia, *iei predshestvuiuushchie* (Moscow, 1958), p. 122.
126. Pestel', "Russkaia Pravda," p. 123.
127. *Ibid.*, p. 126.
128. See Lunin, *Sochineniia*, p. 149, and editor's (Natan Eidelman's) comments, pp. 57–59, 457–458.
129. Viazemskii, *Zapisnye knizhki*, p. 45.
130. *Ibid.*, p. 207.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 329.
133. *Ibid.*, pp. 149–150.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
135. Mikhail Bakunin, *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem 1826–1876*, Iu. M. Steklov, ed., vol. 1: *Dogegel'anskii period 1828–1837* (Moscow, 1934), p. 165.
136. As Natan Eidelman, an expert on the topic, correctly remarked in his introduction to Lunin's *Sochineniia*, p. 45.
137. *Ibid.*, pp. 46–47.
138. Orłowski, *Z dziejów antypolskich obsesji*, p. 103.
139. Lunin, "Pis'ma iz Sibiri," p. 108.
140. *Idem*, "Vzgliad na pol'skie dela," p. 153.
141. *Idem*, "Vzgliad na russkoe tainoe obshchestvo s 1816 do 1826 goda [1838]," in his *Sochineniia*, p. 118.
142. *Idem*, "Vzgliad na pol'skie dela," p. 153.
143. *Ibid.*, p. 156.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 161.
145. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 163.

## Chapter 2

1. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), p. 86.
2. See the pioneering article by Leonid Gorizontov on Russian perception of imperial and “ethnic” geography in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries (centered largely on non-European Russia): “The ‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia: Representations of the Imperial Center in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” in Jane Burbank, Mark von Hagen, and Anatoly Remnev, eds., *Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930* (Bloomington and Indianapolis, Ind., 2007), pp. 67–93.
3. A. S. Pushkin, “Klevetnikam Rossii,” in his *Sochineniia*, 3 vols. (Moscow, 1985), vol. 1, p. 500.
4. A. S. Khomiakov, “Kiev,” in his *Stikhotvoreniia i dramy* (Leningrad, 1969), pp. 112–114.
5. F. I. Tiutchev, “Russkaia geografia,” in his *Polnoe sobranie stikhotvoreniia* (Leningrad, 1987), p. 152. [*Moskva, i grad Petrov, i Konstantinov grad—/Vot tsarstva russkogo zavetnye stolitsy . . . /No gde predel emu? I gde ego granitsy—/Na sever, na vostok, na iug i na zakat?/Griadushchim vremenam sud’by ikh oblichat . . . //Sem’ vnutrennikh morei i sem’ velikikh rek . . . /Ot Nila do Nevy, ot El’by do Kitaia, /Ot Volgi po Eufkrat, ot Ganga do Dunaia . . . /Vot tsarstvo russkoe . . . i ne preidet vovek, /Kak to providel Dukh i Daniil predrek*].
6. *Idem*, “Rassvet,” in his *Polnoe sobranie stikhotvoreniia*, p. 157.
7. *Idem*, “K Ganke,” in his *Polnoe sobranie stikhotvoreniia*, p. 148.
8. N. P. Ogarev, “Iumor,” in his *Stikhotvoreniia*, M. Ia. Gershenzon, ed., 2 vols. (Moscow, 1904), vol. 2, pp. 91–92.
9. V. G. Belinskii, “Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu 1846 goda,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 13 vols. (Moscow, 1956), vol. 10, p. 24.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 21; *idem*, “Vstuplenie k ‘Fiziologii Peterburga’ pod redaktsiei N. Nekrasova,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 8, p. 377. Many Russians in the nineteenth century managed to separate the so-called “interior Russia” (*vnutrennaia Rossiia*) or “native Russia” (*korennaia Rossiia*) from the more remote and alien imperial territories. “Interior Russia,” however, did not necessarily refer to *ethnic* Russia (Great Russia); it could also include Ukrainian and Belarusian lands, as well as the multiethnic Lower Volga region. In most cases, however, those lands (including Ukraine) were perceived as lying outside of Russia proper. “Interior” or “native” Russia usually included lands that were historically driven to Moscow as a political and spiritual center. See Gorizontov, “‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia,” pp. 67–68, 86–87.
11. Belinskii, “Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu 1846 goda,” pp. 20–21.
12. *Idem*, “Vstuplenie k ‘Fiziologii Peterburga,’” p. 377.
13. *Idem*, “Literaturnye mechtaniia,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1, pp. 50, 85.
14. *Idem*, “Vstuplenie k ‘Fiziologii Peterburga,’” p. 377.
15. Gorizontov specifically pointed to the vague meaning of the term *Great Russia*, which did not coincide with “interior Russia.” See Gorizontov, “‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia,” p. 87.
16. N. Polevoi’s review appeared in *Moskovskii telegraf*, 17 (Moscow, 1830), pp. 74–94.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 82, 84.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

19. Dmitrii Valuev, ed., *Sbornik istoricheskikh i statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii i narodakh ei edinovernykh i edinoplemennykh* (Moscow, 1845), p. 19.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, p. 251.
22. P. A. Viazemskii, *Zapisnye knizhki (1813–1848)* (Moscow, 1963), pp. 299–300.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
24. N. I. Nadezhdin, “Sovremennoe napravlenie prosveshcheniia,” in his *Sochineniia*, 2 vols., vol. 1: *Estetika* (Saint Petersburg, 2000), p. 740.
25. *Idem*, “Evropeizm i narodnost’, v otnoshenii k russkoi slovesnosti,” in his *Literaturnaia kritika. Estetika* (Moscow, 1972), pp. 442–443.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 405.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 442–443.
28. *Idem*, “V chem sostoit narodnaia gordost’? Iz pis’ma k NN,” in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 2: *Filosofia*, p. 798.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 799.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 800.
31. P. I. Keppen, *Ob etnograficheskoi karte Rossii*, 2nd ed. (Saint Petersburg, 1853), pp. 15–18. He worked on that map for many years, so we can attribute his final product to a previous decade.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
34. Ievdokim Ziablovskii, *Geografiia Rossiiskoi imperii* (Saint Petersburg, 1831), p. 121.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
37. “Pol’skii iazyk khotia est’ koren’ slavianskogo; no ot poslednego tak vo mnogom otdalilsia, chto sostavliaet ne narechie slavianskogo, a bolee osobennyi iazyk.” *Ibid.*, p. 136.
38. K. Arseniev, *Statisticheskie ocherki Rossii* (Saint Petersburg, 1848), p. 1. On him, see Susan Smith-Peter, “Defining the Russian People: Konstantin Arsen’ev and Russian Statistics before 1861,” *History of Science* 45, no. 1 (March 2007), pp. 125–136.
39. Arseniev, *Statisticheskie ocherki*, p. 2.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–21.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 106, 135–136, 144–145.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 204. Compare Gorizontov, “‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia,” p. 72.
48. Vadim (Passek), *Putevye zapiski* (Moscow, 1834), p. 17.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 170–171.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
52. Aleksei Miller, *Imperiia Romanovykh i natsionalizm* (Moscow, 2006), pp. 149–150;

compare David Rowley, "Imperial Versus National Discourse: The Case of Russia," *Nations and Nationalism*, 1 (2000), pp. 24–25.

53. Maurycy Mochnacki, "O charakterze zaborów moskiewskich," in his *Dzieła* (Poznań, 1863), vol. 4, pp. 227–228. Russia had a colony (Fort Ross) in Alta California in the first decades of the nineteenth century.

54. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

55. *Ibid.*

56. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

57. See Andrzej Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją. Studium politycznej wyobraźni i postaw Wielkiej Emigracji wobec Rosji 1831–49* (Warsaw, 1994), p. 39.

58. Mochnacki, "O charakterze zaborów moskiewskich," pp. 227–228.

59. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 138.

60. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężska*, series 1 (Cracow, 1964), p. 289.

61. Mochnacki, "O charakterze zaborów moskiewskich," p. 230.

62. Stanisław Eile, "The Image of Russia and the Russians in Polish Romanticism," in Michael Blanch, ed., *Finland and Poland in the Russian Empire* (London, 1995), p. 194.

63. Mochnacki, "O charakterze zaborów moskiewskich," p. 231.

64. Bronisław Trentowski, *Wizerunki duszy narodowej, przez Ojczyźniaka* (Paris, 1847), p. 401.

65. *Ibid.*

66. Maurycy Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego 1830–1831*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1984), vol. 1, p. 65.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 132; Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 67.

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 135–136.

69. Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 1, p. 218.

70. See Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, pp. 25–27.

71. [Adam Czartoryski], "De l'avenir de la Russe et de l'Europe," *Le Polonais*, 4 (Paris, 1835), pp. 206–211; Andrzej Nowak, "Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Koncepcje polityczne i fantazje kręgu Adama Czartoryskiego (1832–1847)," *Studia Historyczne*, 33 (1990), p. 206.

72. Andrzej Nowak, "Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?" pp. 211–212.

73. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

74. Michał Czajkowski, *Materiały dotyczące misji polskich do kozaków*, in BC rkps 5384 IV, p. 21.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 98.

76. Jan Alcyato, "Stanowisko Polski w Słowiańszczyźnie," *Pamiętnik TDP*, 3, no. 1 (Paris, 1843), p. 86.

77. Stanisław Eile, *Literature and Nationalism in Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918* (New York, 2000), pp. 51, 54–55, 60.

78. Zygmunt Krasiński, "O stanowisku Polski z bożych i ludzkich względów," in his *Pisma*, J. Czubek, ed., vol. 7: *Pisma filozoficzne i polityczne* (Cracow, 1912), p. 83.

79. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

81. *Ibid.*, p. 121.

82. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 92.
83. Jan Słowaczyński, "Do ziomka Jana Czyńskiego," *Tygodnik Emigracji Polskiej*, 12, no. 7 (Paris, 12.1836–02.1837), pp. 25–26.
84. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 232.
85. Joachim Lelewel, "Mowa na obchodzie ósmej rocznicy rewolucji listopadowej [29 November, 1838]," in his *Mowy i pisma polityczne* (Poznań, 1864), p. 278.
86. See *Protokoły posiedzeń Towarzystwa Litewskiego i Ziemi Ruskich* from February 12 and March 4, 1832, in BC, rkps 5356, pp. 37, 47, 59–60; Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 104.
87. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, pp. 67, 105.
88. Anon., "Zagajenie kursu literatury słowiańskiej przez pana Cypryana Roberta (22 grudnia 1846)," *Demokrata Polski* (Paris, January 2 and 9, 1847), p. 118.
89. Alcyato, "Stanowisko Polski," p. 86.
90. Andrzej Wierzbicki, *Historiografia polska doby romantyzmu* (Wrocław, 1999), pp. 154–161.
91. Joachim Lelewel, "Odezwa do Rosjan," in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al. eds., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna: Wybór źródeł* (Wrocław, 1961), p. 50.
92. Piotr Semenenko, "O narodowości," *Postęp*, 4–5 (1834), p. 70.
93. *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 73.
94. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 207.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 333.
96. Mikhail Maksimovich [Mykhailo Maksymovych], "Ob uchastii i znachenii Kieva v obshchei zhizni Rossii," in his "*Kiev iavilsia gradom velikim . . .*" *Vybrani ukrainoznavchi tvory* (Kyiv, 1994), p. 85.
97. *Pisma O.M. Bodianskogo k ottsu* (Moscow, 1893), p. 59.
98. See Burachek's review of *A History of the Russian People*, by Nikolai Polevoi, in *Maiak*, 5, nos. 9–10 (1842), section "Kritika," p. 59.
99. *Ibid.*
100. N. I. Kostomarov, "Obzor sochinenii, pisannykh na malorossiiskom iazyke," in his *Tvory*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1967), vol. 2, p. 376.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
102. Panteleimon Kulish, *Lysty*, vol. 1: 1841–1850 (Kyiv, 2005), p. 15.
103. P. Sokhan' et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivske tovarystvo*, 3 vols. (Kyiv, 1990), vol. 2, p. 69.
104. N. V. Gogol [M. V. Hohol'], "Vzgliad na sostavlenie Malorossii," in his *Arabeski* (Moscow, 1990), p. 142.
105. Iakiv Kukharenko, "Chornomors'kyi pobut [1836]," in V. Shubrav'skyi, ed., *Ukrain'ska dramaturhiia pershoi polovyny XIX st.* (Kyiv, 1958), p. 315.
106. Iurii Venelin, "O spore mezhdou iuzhanami i severianami na schet ikh rossizma," *Chtenie v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh*, 4 (1847), p. 5.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
108. P. Kulish, *Povest' ob ukrainskom narode* (Saint Petersburg, 1846), pp. 2, 6.
109. See Serhiy Bilenky and Viktor Korotkyi, *Mykhailo Maksymovych ta osviti ni praktyky na Pravoberezhnii Ukraini u pershii polovyni XIX stolittia* (Kyiv, 1999), pp. 180–184.

110. M. A. Maksimovich [M. O. Maksymovych], *Sobranie sochinenii*, 3 vols., vol. 3: *Oldely iazykoznanie, istoriia slovesnosti* (Moscow, 1880), pp. 353, 451.
111. NBU IR, f. III, spr. 5380, p. 1 reverse.
112. M. O. Maksymovych, "Skazanie o Koliivshchine," in his *"Kiev iavilsia gradom velikim,"* p. 249; Bilenky and Korotkyi, *Mykhailo Maksymovych*, p. 173.
113. Ivan Kul'zhinskii, *Emerit* (Moscow, 1836).
114. Kostomarov, "Obzor sochinenii," p. 376.
115. T. H. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, 6 vols., vol. 1: *Poezii 1837–1847* (Kyiv, 1964), pp. 21, 25, 63, 177, 248, 296, 305; *Slovyk movy Shevchenka*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1964), vol. 1: *A–P*, p. 422, vol. 2: *O–Ja*, p. 216.
116. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 1, pp. 25, 63.
117. *Idem*, *Povesti* (Kyiv, 1977), p. 85.
118. *Idem*, "Kavkaz [1845]," in his *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 1, p. 326.
119. *Idem*, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 6: *Lysty. Notatky, fol'klorni zapysy* (Kyiv, 1964), pp. 10, 11, 23.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
121. Bilenky and Korotkyi, *Mykhailo Maksymovych*, p. 120.
122. "bo i moskali—ne ti moskali, shcho zhyvut' u Moskvii, a taki, shcho ne z nashykh, a z nasieis'kykh." H. Kvitka-Osnovianenko, "Suplika do pana izdatel'a," in his *Tvory*, 8 vols. (Kyiv, 1970), vol. 8, p. 43.
123. *Idem*, *Tvory*, vol. 8, pp. 140, 273.
124. P. Sokhan' et al., eds., *Kyrylo-mefodiiv'ske tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 570.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 580.

### Chapter 3

1. Omeljan Pritsak and John Reshetar, "Ukraine and the Dialectics of Nation-Building," *Slavic Review*, 2 (1963), pp. 245–246.
2. Kvitka-Osnovianenko, *Tvory* (Kyiv, 1970), vol. 8, p. 272.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 43; compare Ivan Lysiak-Rudnycky, "Karazin i pochatky ukrains'koho natsional'noho vidrodzhennia," in his *Istorychni ese* (Kyiv, 1994), vol. 1, pp. 206–207.
4. Lysiak-Rudnycky, "Karazin," p. 206.
5. Nikolai Gogol, *Arabesques*, translated by Alexander Tulloch, introduction by Carl R. Proffer (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1982), pp. 103–104.
6. Apollon Skal'kovskii [Skal'kovs'kyi], *Naezdy gaidamak na Zapadnuiu Ukrainu v XVIII stoletii. 1733–1768* (Odessa, 1845), pp. 5, 34; Panteleimon Kulish, *Povest' ob ukrainskom narode* (Saint Petersburg, 1846), p. 82; Mikhail Maksimovich [Mykhailo Maksymovych], "Skazanie o Koliivshchine," in his *"Kiev iavilsia gradom velikim . . ." Vybrani ukrainoznavchi tvory* (Kiev, 1994), pp. 248, 254.
7. M. A. Maksimovich [M. O. Maksymovych], *Pis'ma o Kieve i vospominanie o Tavride* (Saint Petersburg, 1871), p. 50; *idem*, "Skazanie o Koliivshchine," pp. 245, 248.
8. *Idem*, "Ob uchastii i znachenii Kieva v obshchei zhizni Rossii: Rech v torzhestvennom sobranii imp. Universiteta sv. Vladimira . . . 2 oktiabria 1837 g.," in his *"Kiev iavilsia gradom velikim,"* pp. 82–84.

9. Panteleimon Kulish, *Lysty*, vol. 1: 1841–1850 (Kyiv, 2005), p. 32.
10. T. H. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, 6 vols., vol. 6: *Lysty, notatky, fol'klorni zapysy* (Kyiv, 1964), pp. 31–32.
11. Kulish, *Lysty*, p. 83 (emphasis added).
12. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, 13 vols. (Kyiv, 2003), vol. 6, p. 27 (emphasis added).
13. Burachek's review of Bantysh-Kamens'kyi's *History of Little Russia* with implicit polemics with Polevoi appeared in *Maiak*, 5, nos. 9–10 (1842), section "Kritika," pp. 21–47. The quotation comes from p. 23.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
18. Iurii Venelin, "Ob istochnike narodnoi poezii voobshche, i o iuzhno-russkoi v osobennosti," *Teleskop*, 21 (1834), section "Kritika," p. 555–560.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 566.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Idem*, Iurii Venelin, "O spore mezhdru iuzhanami i severianami na schet ikh rossizma," *Chtenie v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh*, 4 (1847), p. 2.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
23. Venelin, "Ob istochnike," pp. 566–567.
24. Šafárik's data were published in the Polish-Russian journal *Jutrzenka-Dennitsa*, run by Ukrainian expatriates in Warsaw, in 1842, p. 191. After listing the numbers of "Great Russians," "Little Russians," and "White Russians," a journal editor united them in the category of "Russians," which amounted to 51,184,000 people.
25. Kvitka-Osnovianenko, *Tvory*, vol. 8, pp. 155, 258.
26. Venelin, "O spore," p. 5.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
28. N. Markevich [M. Markevych], *Ukrainskie melodii* (Moscow, 1831), p. v.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
30. Kulish, *Povest' ob ukrainskom narode*, p. 2.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
32. Osip Bodianskii [Bodians'kyi], "Pis'mo k izdatel' u po povodu izdaniia Pieśni Polskie i Ruskie ludu Galicyjskiego . . .," *Molva*, 8, no. 42 (Moscow, 1834), p. 256.
33. "Eshche do Karpatskikh gor uslyshish russkuiu molv', i za gorami eshche koi-gde otzovetsia kak-budto rodnoe slovo; a tam uzhe i vera ne ta, i rech' ne ta." N. V. Gogol, "Strashnaia mest'," in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, 23 vols. (Moscow, 2001), vol. 1, p. 208.
34. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 6, pp. 19–20.
35. Ie. Kyryliuk, ed., *Lysty do T.H. Shevchenka* (Kyiv, 1962), p. 32; compare Bilenyk and Korotkyi, *Mykhailo Maksymovych*, p. 105.
36. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 3, p. 142.
37. Compare the usage in a vaudeville by V. Dmytrenko, "Kum-miroshnyk, abo satana

- u bochtsi,” in V. Shubrav’s’kyi, ed., *Ukraïns’ka dramaturhiia pershoï polovyny XIX st.* (Kyiv, 1958), p. 397; or in Skal’kovs’kyi, *Naezdy gaidamak*, p. 11.
38. Gogol, “Strashnaia mest’,” pp. 199, 202, 208.
39. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 6, p. 99.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 10–11, 29.
41. V. P. Gogol, “Prostak ili khitrost’ zhenshchiny, perekhitrennaia soldatom,” in V. Shubrav’s’kyi, ed., *Ukraïns’ka dramaturhiia*, pp. 49, 52.
42. Kvitka-Osnovianenko, *Tvory*, vol. 8, pp. 44, 140, 155, 314.
43. Ukrainian writers also imitated a “low” folk style in their Ukrainian-language letters. See Hryhorii Hrabovych, *Do istorii Ukraïns’koï literatury* (Kyiv, 1997), pp. 325–326.
44. Kulish, *Lysty*, pp. 98, 106–107, 131.
45. V. Iatsiuk, *Maliarstvo i hrafika Tarasa Shevchenka* (Kyiv, 2003), p. 127.
46. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 6, p. 15.
47. Kulish, *Lysty*, p. 93.
48. *Ibid.*; *idem*, *Povest’ ob Ukraïns’kom narode*, p. 2.
49. *Idem*, *Ukraïna. Vid baï’ka Tarasa . . .* (Kyiv, 1843).
50. See Bodians’kyi’s review (under pseudonym I. Mastak) of Osnovianenko’s “Malorosiiskie povesti,” in *Uchenye zapiski imp. Moskovskago universiteta*, 5 (1834), section “Kritika,” p. 290.
51. About the influence of Mickiewicz’s messianic vision on Ukrainians see Hrabovych, *Do istorii*, p. 155.
52. Mykola Kostomarov, *Knyhy buttia Ukraïns’koho narodu*, in P. Sokhan’ et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiïvs’ke tovarystvo*, vol. 1, p. 167.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
54. See his project of a so-called “Constitution of the republic” in P. Sokhan’ et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiïvs’ke tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 570.
55. Gustav Olizar, *Pamiętniki 1798–1865* (Lviv, 1892), p. 121.
56. Maurycy Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego 1830–1831*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1984), vol. 2, p. 454; compare the mental map of the most pro-Ukrainian associate of Adam Czartoryski, Michał Czajkowski, in his “Kilka słów o Rusinach w roku 1831,” *Kraj i Emigracja*, 9 (1839), p. 343.
57. Anon., “Zagajenie kursu literatury słowiańskiej przez pana Cypryana Roberta (22 grudnia 1846),” in *Demokrata Polski* (Paris, January 2 and 9, 1847), p. 114.
58. Wincenty Pol, “Pieśń o ziemi naszej,” in his *Wybór poezji* (Wrocław, 1963), pp. 181–183.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 193.
60. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężska*, series 1 (Cracow, 1964), pp. 320–325.
61. Alexander Przeddziecki, *Podole, Wołyń, Ukraina. Obrazy miejsc i czasów*, 2 vols. (Vilnius, 1841), vol. 2, pp. 10, 126.
62. Seweryn Goszczyński, “Nowa epoka poezji polskiej,” in his *Dzieła zbiorowe* (Lviv, 1911), vol. 3, pp. 204, 219; *idem*, “Poezje Bohdana Zaleskiego,” in his *Dzieła zbiorowe*, vol. 3, p. 312.

63. Tadeusz Łepkowski, "Poglądy na jedno- i wieloetniczność narodu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku," in Zofia Stefanowska, ed., *Swójskość i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1973), p. 235.
64. Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężska*, p. 320.
65. Juliusz Słowacki, *Dzieła*, vol. 11: *Listy do matki* (Wrocław, 1949), p. 204.
66. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Listy do rodziny 1820–1863*, part 1: *W kraju* (Cracow, 1982), p. 94.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 165.
68. Edward Dembowski, however, treated Gosławski as belonging to the "Ukrainian school." See Edward Dembowski, "Myśli o rozwijaniu się piśmienności naszej w XIX stuleciu," in his *Pisma*, 5 vols. (Warsaw, 1955), vol. 3, p. 5.
69. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, "Studia literackie," in his *Wybór pism*, section 10 (Warsaw, 1894), p. 238.
70. Przeddziecki, *Podole*, p. 96.
71. Seweryn Goszczyński, "Kilka słów o Ukrainie i rzezi humanśkiej. Przedmowa do 'Zamku Kaniowskiego,'" in his *Dzieła zbiorowe*, vol. 3, p. 381.
72. Michał Grabowski, *Ukraina dawna i teraźniejsza* (Kyiv, 1850), p. 8.
73. Goszczyński, "Kilka słów o Ukrainie," p. 381; Przeddziecki, *Podole*, p. 41; compare the mental map of a Russian writer of Polish origins, Fadei Bulgarin (Tadeusz Bułharyn), in his novel *Mazepa*, in his *Mazepa. Povesti* (Moscow, 1994), p. 189.
74. Bulgarin, *Mazepa*, p. 189; compare the view of a local Ukrainian expert, Mykhailo Maksymovych, in his *Pisma o Kiewie i wspomnienie o Tawryde* (Saint Petersburg, 1871), p. 50.
75. Michał Grabowski, "O pieśniach ukraińskich," in his *Literatura i krytyka*, 3 vols. (Vilnius, 1838), vol. 3, p. 64.
76. Marcei Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1948), vol. 1, p. 303.
77. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 124.
78. Andrzej Nowak, "Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Koncepcje polityczne i fantazje kręgu Adama Czartoryskiego (1832–1847)," *Studia Historyczne*, 33, no. 2 (1990), p. 215.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 220; BC, rkps 5384 IV, p.104.
80. BC, rkps 5384 IV, p. 155.
81. Duchiniński's letter to Władysław Zamoyski is quoted in A. F. Grabski, "Na manowcach myśli historycznej. Historiografia Franciszka H. Duchinińskiego," in his *Perspektywy przeszłości. Studia i szkice historiograficzne* (Lublin, 1983), p. 244.
82. Józef Ignacy Kraszewski, *Wspomnienia Odessy, Jedysanu i Budżaku . . .*, 3 vols. (Vilnius, 1845), vol. 1, pp. 187–193; Grabowski, *Ukraina dawna*, p. 8.
83. Kraszewski, *Listy do rodziny*, p. 114.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 223.
85. BC, rkps 5384 IV, p. 155.
86. Goszczyński, "Kilka słów o Ukrainie," p. 382.
87. *Ibid.*
88. Grabowski, "O pieśniach ukraińskich," pp. 108–109.
89. Olizar, *Pamiętniki*, p. 37.
90. Przeddziecki, *Podole*, p. 118; Grabowski, *Ukraina dawna*, p. 171. I translate the Polish

term *ruski* as “Ruthenian” to avoid confusion with the Russian name “ruskii” (“Russian” in English), as the names referred to different lands and people.

91. Goszczyński, *Dzieła zbiorowe*, vol. 3 (in particular his “Kilka słów o Ukrainie”).
92. *Idem*, “Kilka słów o Ukrainie,” p. 384.
93. Kraszewski, *Wspomnienia Odessy*, pp. 42, 44.
94. Grabowski, “O pieśniach ukraińskich,” pp. 25–29.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
96. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
97. “był z przyrodzenia prawdziwym Rusinem południowym [ . . . ], był to Małorusin w obyczajach, w powierzhowności.” Quoted in Stanisław Łempicki, “Dlaczego Mickiewicz nazwał Krasickiego Rusinem?” *Pamiętnik Literacki*, 33 (Lviv, 1936), p. 378.
98. See Ostaszewski’s introduction to his collection of fairy tales, “Pivkupy kazok” (1850), published in Roman Kyrchiv, ed., *Ukrains’koïu muzoiu natkhneni* (Kyiv, 1971), pp. 174–175.
99. Kraszewski, *Latarnia czarnoksiężska*, pp. 321–322; Józef Korzeniowski, “Emeryt,” in his *Dzieła Józefa Korzeniowskiego* (Cracow, 1871), vol. 2, p. 428.
100. See Tadeusz Krępowiecki’s speech on November 29, 1832, in W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępową publicystyką emigracyjną: Wybór źródeł* (Wrocław, 1961), p. 56; or *Okólniki Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego. Od 13 listopada 1837 r. do 25 grudnia 1838 r.* (Poitiers, 1838), *Okólnik* (Circular) 8, p. 136.
101. Michał Grabowski, *O gminnych ukraińskich podaniach* (Vilnius, 1845), pp. 183, 204.
102. Adam Bar, ed., *Michała Grabowskiego listy literackie*, in *Archiwum do dziejów literatury i oświaty w Polsce*, series 2 (Cracow, 1934), vol. 3, p. 92.
103. Hrabovych, *Do istoriï ukraińskoï literatury*, p. 154; Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 6, p. 104.
104. BC, rkps 5397, pp. 54, 91; rkps 5490 II, p. 467.
105. “Lud Ruski, którego środkiem narodowości jest Ukraina” in *Okólniki Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego, Okólnik* (Circular) 8, p. 145.
106. *Ibid.*, p. 139.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 145.
109. Grabowski, *O gminnych*, p. 193.
110. Goszczyński, “Nowa epoka poezji Polskiej,” p. 208.
111. Olizar, *Pamiętniki*, p. 177.
112. Grabowski, “O pieśniach ukraińskich,” p. 117.
113. Michał Czajkowski, however, who was obsessed with Ukrainian Cossacks, still hoped to include Little Russia’s “Cossacks nation” in a federation with Poland.
114. Marie Louise Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London and New York, 1997), p. 4.
115. Andreas Schönle, *Authenticity and Fiction in the Russian Literary Journey, 1790–1840* (Cambridge [Mass.] and London, 2000), p. 112.
116. Jacek Kolbuszewski, “Legenda kresów w literaturze polskiej XIX i XX w.,” in W. Wrzesiński, ed., *Między Polską etniczną a historyczną* (Wrocław, 1988), p. 53.

117. Oleksii Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna v istorychnii dumtsi Ukraïny pochatku XIX st.,” in V. F. Verstiuk, V. M. Horobets’, and O. P. Tolochko, *Ukraïns’ki proekty v Rosiïskii imperii* (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 250–350.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 275.

119. I. M. Dolgorukov, Prince, “Slavny bubny za gorami, ili moe puteshestvie koe-kuda v 1810 g.,” *Chteniia v obshchestve istorii i drevnosti Rossiiskikh*, 2, April–June (Moscow, 1869), p. 209; Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna,” p. 306.

120. Dolgorukov, “Slavny bubny za gorami,” p. 46.

121. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

122. As quoted in Gorizontov, “The ‘Great Circle’ of Interior Russia,” pp. 75–76.

123. See Belinskii’s review of the Ukrainian almanac “Molodyk” (1843) in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 13 vols. (Moscow, 1955), vol. 7, p. 87; also his review of another issue of “Molodyk” (1844) in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 8, p. 217.

124. *Moskovskii Telegraf*, 10 (1832), p. 261.

125. *Ibid.*

126. Aleksei Levshin, *Pis'ma iz Malorossii* (Kharkiv, 1816), p. 192.

127. See Polevoi’s review of Bantysh-Kamens’kyi’s *History of Little Russia* in *Moskovskii Telegraf*, 17 (1830), p. 70.

128. *Ibid.*, p. 87.

129. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

130. Burachek’s review of Bantysh-Kamens’kyi’s *History of Little Russia* (3rd ed. of 1842), *Maiak*, 5, nos. 9–10 (Saint Petersburg, 1842), section “Kritika,” pp. 36–40.

131. Polevoi’s review of “Chary. Sceny iz narodnykh bylei i rasskazov Malorossiiskikh,” in his *Ocherki russkoi literatury*, 2 parts (Saint Petersburg, 1839), part 2, p. 493.

132. *Moskovskii Telegraf*, 17 (1830), p. 252.

133. Filip Filipovich Vigel’, *Zapiski* (Moscow, 2000), p. 33.

134. *Ibid.*, pp. 108, 273.

135. *Literaturnoe nasledie*, 58 (Moscow and Leningrad, 1952), p. 214.

136. Bulgarin, “Mazepa,” pp. 5–6.

137. *Ibid.*, p. 8; compare also pp. 83, 195.

138. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

139. *Ibid.*, pp. 83, 107; *idem*, *Dmitrii Samozvanets* (Moscow, 1994), p. 171.

140. *Idem*, “Mazepa,” p. 208.

141. *Idem*, *Dmitrii Samozvanets*, p. 169.

142. V. Benediktov, “Kiev,” *Kievlianin*, 1 (Kyiv, 1840), p. 4.

143. K. Arseniev, *Statisticheskie ocherki Rossii* (Saint Petersburg, 1848), p. 55.

144. *Ibid.*, pp. 141–146.

145. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

146. *Ibid.*, pp. 185–186.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 182.

148. *Ibid.*, p. 189.

149. Vladimir Dal’ [Kazak Luganskii], “Ved'ma (Ukrainskaia skazka),” in his *Byli i nebylitsy Kazaka Luganskogo*, 4 vols. (Saint Petersburg, 1839), vol. 4, p. 176.

150. Compare Kukharenko, “Chornomors’kyi pobyt.” Iakiv Kukharenko was a high military official in the Black Sea Cossack Host (in Kuban’) and took an active part in Ukrainian literary life. He was also a close friend of Taras Shevchenko, who liked to address Kukharenko in a Zaporozhian manner.

151. Dal’, “Ved’ma,” p. 189.

152. Nadezhdin’s review of Gogol’s “Vechera na khutore bliz Dikan’ki,” in his *Literaturnaia kritika. Estetika* (Moscow, 1972), p. 281.

153. N. S. Vsevolozhskii, *Puteshestvie chrez Iuzhnuuiu Rossiiu, Krym i Odessu v Konstantinopol’, Maluiu Aziiu, Severnuuiu Afriku, Mal’tu, Sitsiliuu, Italiuu, Iuzhnuuiu Frantsiiu i Parizh v 1836 i 1837 godakh* (Moscow, 1839), vol. 1, p. 11.

154. S. P. Shevyrev, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti, preimushchestvenno drevnei* (Moscow, 1846), p. 19; Vladimir Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v Poludennuiu Rossiiu. V pis’makh*, part 1 (Moscow, 1800), p. 52; compare a letter to Maksymovych in which an inhabitant of Saint Petersburg speaking on behalf of the “poor residents of the cold North” (Great Russia) encouraged the Kyiv professor to explore historical monuments of the “beautiful South” (Ukraine). See NBU IR, f. III, spr. 5380, p. 1 (reverse). Compare the trip of V. Anastasevych in RNB, OR, F.18, “Zapiska iz Polotska v Krym i v Peterburg.”

155. Vigel’, *Zapiski*, p. 87.

156. Levshin, *Pis’mna iz Malorossii*, p. 69.

157. Vadim (Passek), *Putevyie zapiski*, p. 53.

158. Levshin, *Pis’mna iz Malorossii*, p. 119.

159. A. Muraviev, *Puteshestvie po sviatym mestam russkim. Kiev* (Saint Petersburg, 1844), pp. 123, 130.

160. Vsevolozhskii, *Puteshestvie*, p. 17.

161. Vadim (Passek), *Putevyie zapiski* (Moscow, 1834), p. 122.

162. Osip Senkovskii, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 9 vols. (Saint Petersburg, 1859), vol. 9, pp. 400–401.

163. See Nadezhdin’s review of A. Podolinskii’s novel *Barskii* in Nadezhdin, *Literaturnaia kritika*, p. 73.

164. Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v Poludennuiu Rossiiu*, pp. 164, 207, 210.

165. Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna,” pp. 278, 285, 296–297.

166. Nadezhdin’s review of Gogol’s “Vechera na khutore bliz Dikan’ki” in Nadezhdin, *Literaturnaia kritika*, p. 281.

167. On the concept of “gendered geography” see James Buzard, *The Beaten Track: European Tourism, Literature, and the Ways to Culture, 1800–1918* (Oxford, 1993), p. 130.

168. Anne Fausto-Sterling, “Gender, Race and Nation: The Contemporary Anatomy of Hottentot Women in Europe, 1815–1817,” in Jennifer Terry and Jacqueline Urla, eds., *Deviant Bodies: Critical Perspectives on Difference in Science and Popular Culture* (Bloomington, Ind., 1995), p. 22.

169. On the Italian case see Buzard, *Beaten Track*; Italian-Ukrainian parallels could be found in Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna,” pp. 280–281.

170. As quoted in Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna,” p. 303.

171. V. Sypovs’kyi, *Ukraina v rosiiskomu pysmenstvi*, part 1: 1801–1850 (Kyiv, 1928).

172. *Ibid.*, p. 372.
173. *Teleskop*, 21 (Saint Petersburg, 1834), section “Kritika,” p. 388.
174. See unpublished lectures of Orest Novyts’kyi in NBU, IR. F. 201, spr. 29, ark. 6.
175. *Otechestvennye zapiski*, 3, nos. 4–5 (Saint Petersburg, 1839), section “Kritika,” pp. 43, 46.
176. Olizar, *Pamiętniki*, p. 138.
177. Buzard, *Beaten Track*, p. 133.
178. Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna,” p. 294.
179. Dolgorukov, “Slavny bubny za gorami,” p. 243; Levshin, *Pis'ma iz Malorossii*, p. 71.
180. Hrabovych, *Do istorii*, p. 406; Sypovs’kyi, *Ukraina v rosiiskomu pysmenstvi*, p. 174.
181. Izmailov, *Puteshestvie v Poludennuiu Rossiiu*, p. 89; Levshin, *Pis'ma iz Malorossii*, p. 67.
182. See V. S. Ikonnikov, *Kiev v 1654–1855 gg. Istoricheskii ocherk* (Kyiv, 1904), p. 150.
183. Dolgorukov, “Slavny bubny za gorami,” pp. 46, 243.
184. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
185. P. Korsakov’s review of Taras Shevchenko’s “Kobzar” in *Maiaak*, 6 (1840), p. 94; compare *Otechestvennye zapiski*, 3, nos. 4–5 (Saint Petersburg, 1839), section “Kritika,” pp. 45, 48, 49.
186. Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna,” pp. 279, 309.
187. V. G. Belinskii, “Stat’i o narodnoi poezii,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 5, p. 407.
188. *Maiaak*, 6 (1840), p. 94.
189. M. Pogodin, “Istoricheskie razmyshleniia ob otnosheniakh Pol’shi k Rossii,” *Teleskop*, 2, no. 7 (Moscow, 1831), p. 298.
190. *Idem*, “Dva slova Biblioteky dl’a chteniia o proiskhozhdenii Malorossiian,” *Moskvitianin*, 6 (1843), p. 534.
191. See his review of a collection of Ukrainian folk songs in *Biblioteka dl’a chteniia*, 8 (1836), section “Literaturnaia letopis’,” p. 6.

## Chapter 4

1. Marcin Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość. Studia nad polską myślą konserwatywną XIX wieku* (Warsaw, 1985), pp. 72–74; Andrzej Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją. Studium polityczny wyobraźni i postaw Wielkiej Emigracji wobec Rosji 1831–1849* (Warsaw, 1994), pp. 129–131.
2. Andrzej Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Idee polskiej polityki wschodniej (1733–1921)* (Warsaw, 1995), pp. 47–54.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 128–135, 164.
4. See introduction to W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępową publicystyką emigracyjną: Wybór źródeł* (Wrocław, 1961), pp. xlviii–xlix.
5. Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, p. 79.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 267.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 58–62, 256, 267.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 100, 259–260.
10. Adam Czartoryski, “O zajęciach, zachowaniu się i obowiązkach Polaków pod rządem obcym,” in BC, rkps 5285 IV, p. 197.

ii. This subsection is based predominantly on primary sources as well as on major works on Prince Czartoryski and the Hôtel Lambert in the 1830s–1840s. Major secondary sources are: Marcei Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1948); *idem*, *Ukraińska polityka ks. Adama Czartoryskiego przed wojną krymską* (Warsaw, 1937); Marian Kukiel, *Książę Adam* (Warsaw, 1993); Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?*; *idem*, *Między carem a rewolucją*; *idem*, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Koncepcje polityczne i fantazje kręgu Adama Czartoryskiego (1832–1847),” *Studia Historyczne*, 33 (1990), pp. 197–224; Sławomir Kalembka, *Wielka Emigracja: 1831–1863* (Toruń, 2003), pp. 117–129, 211–227; Hans Henning Hahn, *Dyplomacja bez listów uwierzytelniających: polityka zagraniczna Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego 1830–1840* (Warsaw, 1987).

12. Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, pp. 71, 77; Marcei Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, vol. 2, pp. 130, 134, 156; Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?* pp. 48–50, 80–81, 94; *idem*, *Między carem a rewolucją*, pp. 285, 307; S. Szostakowski, *Z kart Wielkiej Emigracji. Prasa obozu arystokratycznego w latach 1832–1848* (Olsztyn, 1974), pp. 104, 216; Hahn, *Dyplomacja*, p. 182.

13. “Ustawa Związkowa w Paryżu dnia 23 stycznia 1833,” in BC, rkps 5281 IV, p. 284; compare Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, p. 71; Alina Barszczewska-Krupa, *Emigracja i kraj: Wokół modernizacji polskiej świadomości społecznej i narodowej 1831–1863* (Łódź, 1999), pp. 167–169.

14. Adam Czartoryski, “Tłumaczenie noty podanej do Rządu Angielskiego,” in BC, rkps 5281 IV, p. 147; compare Czartoryski, “O zajęciach,” p. 152.

15. Kukiel, *Książę Adam*, p. 132.

16. *Mowy xięcia Adama Czartoryskiego od roku 1838–1847* (Paris, 1847), p. 2. On these “speeches” see Kukiel, pp. 130–132.

17. *Mowy xięcia Adama Czartoryskiego*, p. 52.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 20; compare Barszczewska-Krupa, *Emigracja i kraj*, p. 184.

19. Czartoryski, “O zajęciach,” p. 145.

20. See his advice to Galicians from 1846, in BC, rkps 5285 IV, p. 120.

21. *Mowy xięcia Adama Czartoryskiego*, p. 20.

22. Adam Czartoryski, “Odezwa xięcia Adama Czartoryskiego Wojewody do Ziomków w kraju i na emigracji w celu ratowania Polski [Paris, 1847],” in BC, rkps. 5285 IV, p. 200.

23. *Mowy xięcia Adama Czartoryskiego*, p. 20.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

25. See Czartoryski’s address “Obywatele Litwy, Wołynia, Podola i Ukrainy,” in BC, rkps 5275 IV, p. 17.

26. Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, p. 77; Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?* p. 48.

27. Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?* p. 48.

28. Franciszek Dzierżykraj Morawski, *Odpowiedź na List szlachcica polskiego do Metternicha z daty 15 września 1846 r.* (Paris, 1847).

29. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

30. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, vol. 2, pp. 130, 134, 156; Antoni Cetnarowicz, *Tajna dyplomacja Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego na Bałkanach: Hotel Lambert a kryzys serbski 1840–1844* (Cracow, 1993), pp. 63, 89; Kukiel, p. 134.

31. Marian Kamil Dziewanowski, *Książę wielkich nadziei: Biografia księcia Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego* (Wrocław, 1998), pp. 166–167; Hahn, *Dyplomacja*, p. 328.
32. Morawski, *Odpowiedź na List*, p. 27.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
35. Szostakowski, *Z kart Wielkiej Emigracji*, pp. 104, 148; see also Maria Wierzbicka, “Myśl historyczna pisma ‘Trzeci Maj’ (1839–1848),” *Przegląd historyczny*, 82, nos. 3–4 (Warsaw, 1991), pp. 411–425.
36. As quoted in Szostakowski, *Z kart Wielkiej Emigracji*, p. 61.
37. Anon., “Kilka słów o narodowości,” *Kronika Emigracji Polskiej* (1837), p. 98.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
39. Andrzej Nowak, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?” p. 215.
40. Jerzy Skowronek, “Koncepcja narodu w ideologii Hotelu Lambert i jej konfrontacja z bałkańską rzeczywistością,” in Jerzy Goćkowski and Andrzej Walicki, eds., *Idee i koncepcje narodu w polskiej myśli politycznej czasów porozbiorowych* (Warsaw, 1977), p. 187; compare Rett R. Ludkowski, “Adam Czartoryski—‘liberalny’ przywódca emigracyjnej konserwy?” *Studia historyczne*, 25, nos. 3–4 (Cracow, 1982), pp. 390, 394. Ludkowski argues that Czartoryski understood religion as an integrating and consolidating force in society.
41. Cetnarowicz, *Tajna dyplomacja Adama Jerzego Czartoryskiego na Bałkanach*, p. 89.
42. Kukiel, *Książę Adam*, p. 133. German historian Hans Henning Hahn also remarked that religion for the Hôtel Lambert always had a political aspect (even though it was not simply a political instrument). See Hahn, *Dyplomacja*, p. 182.
43. BC, rkps. 5397, p. 5.
44. Skowronek, “Koncepcja narodu,” p. 187.
45. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, vol. 2, pp. 134–135.
46. *Mowy xięcia Adama Czartoryskiego*, p. 94.
47. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, vol. 1, p. 303. Another Czartoryski biographer, Marian Kukiel, suggested that the prince left the final solution of the national question for the future, “in the spirit of rationality and Christian love.” See Kukiel, *Książę Adam*, p. 132; compare Alix Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe, dann müßte es erfunden werden.” *Die Entwicklung des polnischen Nationalbewußtseins im europäischen Kontext* (Wiesbaden, 2003), pp. 274, 276.
48. *Mowy xięcia Adama Czartoryskiego*, p. 94.
49. *Ibid.*
50. As quoted in Handelsman, *Ukraińska polityka ks. Adama Czartoryskiego*, p. 27.
51. Danuta Sosnowska, “Jak z wielości zrobić jedność? O romantycznych kłopotach z wielokulturową koncepcją narodu,” in Teresa Dąbek-Wirgowa and Andrzej Makowiecki, eds., *Kategoria narodu w kulturach słowiańskich* (Warsaw, 1993), p. 93.
52. Nowak, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?” p. 214; on the society, see Barszczewska-Krupa, *Emigracja i kraj*, pp. 89–112. The leaders of the society emphasized that Rus’ and Lithuania were indeed “Poland” and were very different from Russia. See *ibid.*, pp. 103–104.
53. Sosnowska, “Jak z wielości zrobić jedność?” p. 88; Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe,” p. 277.

54. Tim Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus, 1569–1999* (New Haven, Conn., 2003), p. 30.

55. Nowak, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?” p. 213.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

57. Duchiniński’s letter to Władysław Zamoyski is quoted in A. F. Grabski, “Na manowcach myśli historycznej. Historiografia Franciszka H. Duchinińskiego,” in Grabski, *Perspektywy przeszłości. Studia i szkice historiograficzne* (Lublin, 1983), p. 244.

58. BC, rkps 5490 II, p. 503.

59. See A. F. Grabski, “Na manowcach myśli historycznej,” p. 244.

60. Nowak, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?” p. 215.

61. About this phenomenon see P. R. Magocsi, *A History of Ukraine* (Toronto, Buffalo, and London, 1996), pp. 149, 437; compare Landgrebe, “*Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe*,” pp. 272, 275. Landgrebe points out that in the nineteenth century the concept of a “gens Ruthenus” referred to a cultural difference of Ruthenians while confirming their “political and traditional membership” in the Polish nation.

62. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

63. BC, rkps 5397, pp. 54, 65.

64. *Ibid.*, rkps 5490 II, p. 467; compare Feodosii Steblii, “Do henezy ideï ukrains’koï nezalezhnosti v 40–kh rr. XIX st.,” in *Materialy zasidan’ istorichnoi ta arkhheografichnoi komisii NTS v Ukraini*, vol. 2: 1995–97 (Lviv, 1999).

65. BC, rkps 5490 II, p. 467.

66. *Ibid.*, rkps. 5384, p. 153.

67. Nowak, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?” p. 217; Czajkowski’s plan is in BC, rkps 5384 IV, pp. 101–104.

68. BC, rkps. 5397, p. 15.

69. *Ibid.*, rkps 5490 II, p. 467.

70. Kukiel, *Książę Adam*, p. 136. On the Danube Cossacks, or so-called “Niz” see Franciszek Rawita Gawroński, “Kozaczyzna za Dunajem. Kartka z działalności księcia Adama Czartoryskiego na emigracji,” *Ateneum Wileńskie*, 9 (Vilnius, 1933–34), pp. 158–199. These Cossacks were a curious mixture of former Zaporozhians and Don Cossacks (Old-Believers, or Nekrasovites) who had fled to the Ottoman-controlled lands in the end of the eighteenth century; see *ibid.*, pp. 160, 168.

71. See Sabatyn’s toasts on informal gatherings of Hôtel Lambert’s leadership in *Trzeci Maj*, 3 (Paris, 28.08.1844), pp. 9–13.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 9; compare Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, vol. 1, p. 303, vol. 2, pp. 124, 181. Czartoryski, however, was never officially proclaimed as a king. See Kukiel, *Książę Adam*, p. 129.

73. BC, rkps 5384 IV, p. 75.

74. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 83; 5490 II, pp. 179, 188.

76. *Ibid.*, 5490 II, p. 424.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 342; Michał Czajkowski, “Kilka słów o Rusinach w roku 1831,” *Kraj i emigracja*, 9 (1839), pp. 343–351.

78. Handelsman, *Adam Czartoryski*, vol. 2, pp. 155–156.

79. Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, p. 79. Some argue that Mochnacki came to share with Czartoryski the concept of Polish monarchy; see Dziewanowski, *Książę wielkich nadziei*, p. 155.

80. Kalemka, *Wielka Emigracja*, pp. 125–126; compare Hahn, *Dyplomacja*, pp. 165–166. Hahn, however, pointed to paradoxes of Mochnacki's political views, calling them "the mixture of conservatism and Jacobinism." Hahn also pointed out that Czartoryski's associates "falsified" or used Mochnacki's views in order to present the late revolutionary as a monarchist and conservative. Yet Mochnacki and Czartoryski influenced each other. See *ibid.*, pp. 166–167; compare B. Łagowski, *Filozofia polityczna Maurycego Mochnackiego* (Cracow, 1981).

81. Maurycy Mochnacki, *O literaturze polskiej* (Łódź, 1985), p. 66; compare Grażyna Królikiewicz, "Tajemnicy jeździec czyli . . . o retoryce *narodowości* i *uniwersalności* w polskiej publicystyce literackiej doby romantyzmu," in Maria Cieśla-Korytowska, ed., *Narodowy i ponadnarodowy charakter literatury* (Cracow, 1996), pp. 117–118.

82. Bronisław Łagowski, "Pojęcie samowiedzy narodowej w filozofii politycznej Maurycego Mochnackiego," in Goćkowski and Walicki, *Idee i koncepcje narodu*, p. 46; Tomasz Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu. Przypadek Polski* (Warsaw, 1999), p. 179. Kizwalter was first among Polish historians to apply the concept of Ernest Gellner to prove that the Polish nationality was indeed a totally new social and ideological creation, contrary to the opinions of many scholars who emphasized continuity between an early modern gentry-based Polishness and modern nationality.

83. Łagowski, "Pojęcie samowiedzy," p. 51. Andrzej Walicki also assumed that it was Polish literature and a "collection of imaginings" that defined Polishness for Mochnacki. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 137. However, as we will see, Mochnacki's "rhetoric of nationality" was far more complex and ambiguous.

84. Maurycy Mochnacki, "Restauracja Polski," in his *Dzieła* (Poznań, 1863), vol. 4, p. 55.

85. *Idem*, "Restauracja i rewolucja," in his *Dzieła*, vol. 4, p. 60; Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 209.

86. Mochnacki, "Restauracja i rewolucja," p. 62.

87. *Idem*, "O rewolucji społecznej w Polsce," in his *Dzieła*, vol. 4, p. 155; *idem*, *Powstanie narodu polskiego 1830–1831*, 2 vols. (Warsaw, 1984), vol. 1, p. 51.

88. *Idem*, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 1, pp. 51, 125, 215.

89. Łagowski, "Pojęcie samowiedzy," p. 55.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

91. Mochnacki, "O rewolucji społecznej w Polsce," p. 158.

92. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 162; Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 213.

94. Mochnacki, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 1, p. 86.

95. *Idem*, "O rewolucji społecznej w Polsce," p. 164.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

97. *Idem*, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 1, p. 212.

98. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

99. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 219.
101. Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 217; Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, pp. 131–137.
102. Maurycy Mochnacki, “O charakterze zaborów moskiewskich,” in his *Dziela*, vol. 4, p. 228. Walicki reminds us that Mochnacki passionately argued against the idea of an “original brotherhood” between Poland and Russia; the latter instead had to belong forever to Asia or “Asian steppes.” See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 134–135.
103. Mochnacki, “O charakterze zaborów moskiewskich,” p. 231.
104. *Ibid.*, p. 232.
105. *Ibid.*, pp. 231–232.
106. *Idem*, *Powstanie narodu polskiego*, vol. 1, pp. 131, 149.
107. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 454.
108. *Ibid.*, p. 455.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 456.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 457.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 470.
112. Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 217.
113. Andrzej Walicki, “Mesjanistyczne koncepcje narodu i późniejsze losy tej tradycji,” in Goćkowski and Walicki, *Idee i koncepcje narodu*, pp. 84–107.
114. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
115. *Ibid.*, pp. 88–90.
116. *Ibid.*, pp. 91–92, 95.
117. Zygmunt Krasiński, “O stanowisku Polski z bożych i ludzkich względów,” in his *Pisma*, vol. 7: *Pisma filozoficzne i polityczne* (Cracow, 1912), p. 83.
118. *Ibid.*, pp. 84, 87.
119. *Idem*, “Memoriał do Guizota,” in his *Pisma*, vol. 7, p. 438.
120. *Idem*, “O stanowisku Polski,” p. 86.
121. *Ibid.*, 71.
122. On Hegel and Krasiński see Andrzej Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism: The Case of Poland* (Oxford, 1982), p. 285.
123. Krasiński, “O stanowisku Polski,” p. 71.
124. *Ibid.*, pp. 72–73.
125. *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 84.
126. *Ibid.*, pp. 100–102.
127. *Idem*, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego, Edwarda Saroszyńskiego, Bronisława Trentowskiego* (Warsaw, 1988), vol. 2, p. 81; compare Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe,” p. 234. The German historian emphasizes that according to Krasiński, a “true” Pole had to be both Catholic and aristocratic.
128. Krasiński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, p. 81.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
130. *Idem*, “Memoriał do Guizota,” p. 433.
131. *Idem*, “O stanowisku Polski,” pp. 121–128.

132. Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 237.
133. Krasieński, "O stanowisku Polski," p. 122.
134. *Ibid.*, p. 124.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 129; compare Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?* pp. 128, 139.
136. Nowak, *Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium?* p. 94.
137. Krasieński, *Listy do Augusta Cieszkowskiego*, p. 99.
138. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
139. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
140. *Ibid.*
141. *Idem*, "Memoriał do Guizota," p. 427.
142. *Ibid.*, p. 429.
143. *Ibid.*, p. 440.
144. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, pp. 284, 291.
145. *Ibid.*, p. 291.
146. Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, p. 117.
147. *Ibid.*, p. 119. Apparently, after the Galician massacre of 1846 Trentowski decided to advocate nobility and Catholicism temporarily and for purely tactical reasons, so as not to hurt the feelings of many conservative Polish patriots. His main anticlerical and anti-Catholic works were published posthumously. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 110–111; compare Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 239.
148. Bronisław Trentowski, *Wizerunki duszy narodowej, przez Ojczyźniaka* (Paris, 1847), p. viii.
149. *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 34.
150. *Idem*, "Czy można uczyć się filozofii narodowej od ludu i jakie cechy mieć powinna taż filozofia," *Rok*, 3 (Poznań, 1845), as quoted in Andrzej Walicki, ed., *Filozofia i myśl społeczna w latach 1831–1864*, vol. 5 in *700 lat myśli polskiej* (Warsaw, 1977), pp. 272–280.
151. Trentowski, *Wizerunki duszy narodowej*, p. viii.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
153. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
154. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
155. *Ibid.*, p. 16; compare Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 241.
156. Trentowski, *Wizerunki duszy narodowej*, pp. 18 (on Żuławy), 19 (on Silesia), and 27 (on "Rok").
157. Tadeusz Łepkowski, "Poglądy na jedno- i wieloetniczność narodu polskiego w pierwszej połowie XIX wieku," in Zofia Stefanowska, ed., *Swójność i cudzoziemszczyzna w dziejach kultury polskiej* (Warsaw, 1973), p. 236.
158. *Ibid.*, pp. 240, 245.
159. Trentowski, *Wizerunki duszy narodowej*, p. 16.
160. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
161. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
162. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
163. Compare Kizwalter, *O nowoczesności narodu*, p. 241.
164. *Ibid.*, p. 243.

165. Trentowski, *Wizerunki duszy narodowej*, p. 401.
166. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
167. *Ibid.*, pp. 285–286, 341.
168. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
169. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
170. *Ibid.*, p. 357.
171. *Ibid.*, p. 438.
172. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
173. *Ibid.*, p. 359.
174. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, p. 235.
175. Henryk Rzewuski [Jarosz Bejła], *Mieszaniny obyczajowe*, 2 vols. (Vilnius, 1841–43).
176. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 18.
177. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
178. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
179. *Ibid.*, pp. 140–141.
180. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
181. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, p. 234.
182. *Ibid.*, pp. 233–234; Rzewuski, *Mieszaniny*, p. 234.
183. Rzewuski, *Mieszaniny*, vol. 1, p. 135.
184. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 142.
185. *Ibid.*, pp. 4–6; compare Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, pp. 232–233, and A. F. Grabski, “Prywatne wyznania ‘jakobina prawicy,’” in his *Troski i nadzieje. Z dziejów polskiej myśli społecznej i politycznej XIX wieku* (Łódź, 1981), pp. 158–208.
186. Rzewuski, *Mieszaniny*, vol. 2, p. 9.
187. *Ibid.*, p. 211.
188. *Ibid.*
189. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
190. *Ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 136, vol. 2, p. 59.
191. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, p. 230.
192. Rzewuski, *Mieszaniny*, vol. 1, p. 234.
193. *Ibid.*, p. 235.
194. Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, p. 56; see Grabowski’s critique of Rzewuski’s *Mieszaniny* in *Tygodnik Petersburski*, 12 (Saint Petersburg, 1841), no. 93, pp. 23–24, no. 94, pp. 526–528; 13 (1842), no. 3, pp. 16–18, no. 4, pp. 21–24, no. 12, pp. 64–66, no. 13, pp. 69–70. On his treatment of nationality see the last two issues.
195. See Grabowski’s letter to Rzewuski on December 6, 1841, in Adam Bar, ed., *Michała Grabowskiego listy literackie*, in *Archiwum do dziejów literatury i oświaty w Polsce*, series 2 (Cracow, 1934), vol. 3, p. 249.
196. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
197. *Tygodnik Petersburski*, 12, no. 94 (Saint Petersburg, 1841), p. 527.
198. *Michała Grabowskiego listy literackie*, p. 89.
199. Król, *Konserwatyści a niepodległość*, pp. 57–59.
200. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

201. Maria Straszewska, *Czasopisma literackie w Królestwie Polskim w latach 1832–1848*, 2 vols. (Wrocław, 1953), vol. 1, p. 228.

202. *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 230; on Kyiv's Polish literary milieu see Grabowski's letter to Kraszewski on February 6, 1841, in *Michała Grabowskiego listy literackie*, p. 187.

203. Michał Grabowski, "O pieśniach ukraińskich," in his *Literatura i krytyka*, 3 vols. (Vilnius, 1838), vol. 3, pp. 25–29.

204. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

205. *Ibid.*, pp. 30, 64.

206. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

207. *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 21–22.

208. *Idem*, *Ukraina dawna i teraźniejsza* (Kyiv, 1850), p. 39.

209. *Ibid.*, p. 171.

210. Grabowski, "O pieśniach ukraińskich," p. 112; *idem*, *O gminnych ukraińskich podaniach* (Vilnius, 1845), p. 204; compare his review of the Ukrainian-language poetry of Tymko Padurra in *Tygodnik Petersburski* (1833), p. 305, as quoted in Straszewska, *Czasopisma literackie*, vol. 1, p. 167.

211. *Michała Grabowskiego listy literackie*, pp. 326–328.

212. See Grabowski's review of the bilingual Russian-Polish pan-Slavic journal *Jutrzenka/Dennitsa* in *Tygodnik Petersburski*, 14, no. 52 (1843), p. 308.

213. Wacław Jabłonowski, *Do emigracji polskiej* (Paris, 1843), p. 2; compare Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 277.

214. Jabłonowski, *Do emigracji polskiej*, p. 3.

215. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

216. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

217. Łepkowski, "Poglądy na jedno-i wieloetniczność," p. 245.

218. See introduction to W. Łukaszewicz, W. Lewandowski, et al., eds., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna: Wybór źródeł* (Wrocław, 1961), p. xlix.

219. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, p. 35.

220. See introduction to Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, pp. liii–liv; compare Kalembka, *Wielka Emigracja*, pp. 198–210.

221. Catholicism was perceived as a negative point of reference: it was thought to introduce in Poland Western feudalism and monarchism, religious intolerance, and subordination to the Vatican; therefore, Catholicism had to be avoided as a political means. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza w perspektywie porównawczej* (Warsaw, 2006), pp. 71, 74.

222. *Idem*, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, pp. 36–37.

223. *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 71.

224. "Akt założenia TDP" in B. Baczek, ed., *Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie. Dokumenty i pisma* (Warsaw, 1954), pp. 4–5.

225. See "Przemówienie Tadeusza Krępowieckiego wygłoszone w Paryżu 29 listopada 1832 r. w rocznicę rewolucji polskiej," in Henryk Katz, Witold Kula, et al., eds., *Wiosna Ludów: Teksty i materiały źródłowe* (Warsaw, 1953), pp. 53–68.

226. *Ibid.*, p. 64; compare Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 207.

227. See TDP's manifesto in *Towarzystwo Demokratyczne Polskie*, p. 88.
228. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
229. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
230. [Wiktor Heltman], "Uwagi Centralizacji przy dyskusji nad Manifestem TDP," in Wiktor Heltman and J. N. Janowski, *Demokracja polska na emigracji* (Warsaw, 1965), p. 24.
231. *Ibid.*, p. 25.
232. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
233. *Idem*, "Demokracja na emigracji," in Heltman and Janowski, *Demokracja polska na emigracji*, p. 80.
234. *Idem*, "Szlachta na emigracji," in Heltman and Janowski, *Demokracja polska na emigracji*, p. 134.
235. *Ibid.*, p. 136.
236. *Idem*, "Uwagi Centralizacji," p. 25.
237. Janowski was the primary author of TDP's programmatic statement "Jak w czasie powstania podrzędne władze uorganizowane być winny." There he expressed his broad view on religion: Heltman and Janowski, *Demokracja polska na emigracji*, p. 341; see also his comments to TDP's manifesto and especially his article "O dniu 3 maja 1791 roku" in Heltman and Janowski, *Demokracja polska na emigracji*, pp. 535, 553–562 (particularly 559); compare Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 71–72.
238. Janowski, "Jak w czasie powstania podrzędne władze uorganizowane być winny," p. 346.
239. *Idem*, "Jakich praw używanie zawieszono być musi w czasie powstania?" in Heltman and Janowski, *Demokracja polska na emigracji*, p. 353.
240. *Ibid.*, pp. 354, 358.
241. J. N. Janowski, *Krótki katechizm polityczny* (Agen, 1834), p. 335.
242. Kizwalter, *Idea nowoczesności*, pp. 221–223; Andrzej Wierzbicki, *Historiografia polska doby romantyzmu* (Wrocław, 1999), pp. 293–298.
243. See Stanisław Pigoń, "Zręby nowej Polski w publicystyce Wielkiej Emigracji," in J. Musiał, ed., *"Marchoń" (1934–1939). Antologia tekstów* (Cracow, 2002), p. 136.
244. Anon., "Zagajenie kursu literatury słowiańskiej przez pana Cypryana Roberta (22 grudnia 1846)," *Demokrata Polski* (Paris, January 2 and 9, 1847), pp. 114, 119.
245. *Ibid.*, p. 119.
246. Jan Alcyato, "Stanowisko Polski w Słowiańszczyźnie," *Pamiętnik TDP*, 3, no. 1 (Paris, 1843), p. 85.
247. *Idem*, "O fanatyzmie religijnym ze względu na siły do powstania w Polsce," *Pismo TDP*, 2 (Paris, 1840/1842), p. 278.
248. *Idem*, "Stanowisko Polski w Słowiańszczyźnie," pp. 87–88.
249. *Idem*, "O fanatyzmie religijnym," p. 296.
250. "Rozbór kwestii polityczno-socjalnych. Kwestia przedwstępna: Jakie są wewnętrzne siły społeczeństwa polskiego, uważane pod względem socjalnym i politycznym," in *Okólniki Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego. Od 13 listopada 1837 do 25 grudnia 1838 r.* (Poitiers, 1838), *Okólnik* (Circular) 8, p. 41.
251. *Ibid.*, p. 159.

252. *Ibid.*, pp. 159–160.
253. Compare Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 207.
254. “Rozbór kwestii polityczno-socjalnych. Kwestia przedwstępna,” p. 139.
255. *Ibid.*, p. 140.
256. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
257. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
258. *Ibid.*, pp. 136, 143, 167.
259. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
260. *Ibid.*, pp. 169–170.
261. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
262. Krępowiecki, “Narodowość (Centralizacja),” in Katz, Kula, et al., *Wiosna Ludów*, p. 71. On the “national” debates of 1834 see Adam Sowiński, “Czy istnieje naród polski? Dyskusja na łamach paryskiego ‘Postępu’ w 1834 r.,” *Kwartalnik historyczny*, 1 (2006), pp. 85–103. On Krępowiecki’s French model and unitary Polishness see Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 166–167.
263. Krępowiecki, “Narodowość (Centralizacja),” in Katz, Kula, et al., *Wiosna Ludów*, p. 71.
264. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
265. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
266. Compare Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, p. 71.
267. J. B. Ostrowski, “Czy jest jaka Litwa,” *Nowa Polska*, 3, nos. 28 and 29 (Paris, 1835), p. 349.
268. Sławomir Kalembka, “Pojęcie narodu w publicystyce obozu demokratycznego Wielkiej Emigracji,” in Goćkowski and Walicki, *Idee i koncepcje narodu*, p. 165.
269. Piotr Semenenko, “O narodowości,” *Postęp*, 4–5 (Paris, 1834), p. 50; compare Sowiński, “Czy istnieje naród polski?” pp. 85–103.
270. Semenenko, “O narodowości,” pp. 51, 53, 68.
271. Kalembka, “Pojęcie narodu,” p. 165.
272. Semenenko, “O narodowości,” p. 55.
273. *Ibid.*, p. 73. Andrzej Walicki has correctly remarked that this new nationality of Semenenko had to be unitary rather than a federation of two nationalities. Unlike his fellow “unitarian” Krępowiecki, however, the Polonized Ruthenian Semenenko emphatically rejected Polonization. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 169.
274. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, p. 70; Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, pp. 206–207.
275. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 207; on Czyński see Adam Gałkowski, “Jan Czyński (1801–1867)—próba biografii w świetle dotychczasowych badań,” in N. Kasparek and M. Prokop, eds., *Polacy w cywilizacjach świata. Biografie emigrantów—portret zbiorowy* (Olsztyn, 1999), pp. 57–72.
276. *Ibid.*; on Czyński’s civic nationality see *Postęp*, 8 (Paris, 1834), pp. 117–127, reprinted in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, pp. 230–236.
277. Jan Czyński, “Religia w Polsce,” *Orzeł Biały*, 17 (Brussels, 20.VII.1843), pp. 69–70,

republished in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, pp. 382–388. On his assessment of Jesuits see pp. 383–384 of the latest publication.

278. *Ibid.*, pp. 384–385.

279. *Postęp*, 8 (Paris, 1834), pp. 117–127, as quoted from Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 230; compare Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 76.

280. Czyński, as quoted in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, pp. 233, 235.

281. *Ibid.*, p. 234.

282. *Idem*, “Religia w Polsce,” *Orzeł Biały*, 18 (Brussels, 31.VII.1843), pp. 73–75, republished in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, pp. 388–396 (on Khmelnyts’kyi, see p. 390).

283. Quoted from Walicki, *Mesjanizm Mickiewicza*, p. 77.

284. In fact, Czyński regarded Mickiewicz’s *Księgi narodu i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* as the very harmful attack on reason, which promoted superstition and maltreated Jews and Gypsies. Czyński also mocked Mickiewicz’s anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish fervor by wondering whether Poles had to start a new crusade against the Turks to ensure the triumph of Catholicism. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Mickiewicza*, pp. 77–78.

285. See Czyński’s comments republished in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 236.

286. *Idem*, “Do mieszkańców miast polskich,” *Echo miast polskich*, 1 (Paris, 20.X.1843), pp. 1–4, republished in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, pp. 415–424. Czyński’s statement can be found on p. 419 of the latest publication.

287. *Ibid.*, p. 420.

288. On his treatment of Jews see Adam Gałkowski, “Jan Czyński and the Question of Equality of Rights for All Religious Faiths in Poland,” *Polin: A Journal of Polish-Jewish Studies*, 7 (1992), pp. 32–56. On otherwise ambiguous treatment of Jews by Polish authors see Landgrebe, “Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe,” pp. 255–271; and Artur Eisenbach, *Wielka Emigracja wobec kwestii żydowskiej 1832–1849* (Warsaw, 1976).

289. On jus soli and national identity see the monograph of Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992).

290. Czyński, “Do mieszkańców miast polskich,” pp. 420, 421. Elsewhere, however, Czyński warned against the exclusive use of Polish in political propaganda. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 76.

291. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 124.

292. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

293. Seweryn Goszczyński, “Memoriał do Centralizacji TDP,” in Zygmunt Wasilewski, *Z życia poety romantycznego. Seweryn Goszczyński w Galicji. Nieznane pamiętniki, utwory i listy z lat 1832–1843* (Lviv, 1910), p. 114.

294. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

295. *Idem*, *Dzieła zbiorowe*, (Lviv, 1911), vol. 3, pp. 204, 206, 208, 313, 381.

296. *Ibid.*, p. 384.

297. *Ibid.*, p. 312.

298. *Ibid.*, p. 383.
299. *Idem*, “Memoriał do Centralizacji TDP,” pp. 137–138.
300. *Idem*, “Moralna podstawa sprawy polskiej. Katolicyzm czyli papizm,” *Pismo TDP*, 2 (1840/1841), p. 416. Andrzej Walicki has called this article of Seweryn Goszczyński, “the sharpest anti-Catholic statement that was ever published on pages of the TDP press.” See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 74.
301. Goszczyński, “Moralna podstawa sprawy polskiej,” p. 423.
302. *Ibid.*, pp. 416–417.
303. Michał Kubrakiewicz, *Uwagi polityczne i religijne* (Bordeaux, 1839); compare Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, pp. 273–274.
304. Kubrakiewicz, *Uwagi polityczne i religijne*, pp. 14, 31.
305. *Ibid.*, pp. 17, 24.
306. *Ibid.*, pp. 18, 38.
307. The literature on *Księgi* is abundant. Here I refer only to the most famous treatment of the material: Zofia Stefanowska, *Historia i profesja. Studium o “Księgach narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego” Adama Mickiewicza*, 2nd ed. (Cracow, 1998); Juliusz Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, rev. ed. (Lublin, 1998), vol. 2; and also the introduction by Stanisław Pigoń to the 1924 Cracow edition of *Księgi*. For a newer analysis see Roman Koropeczyk, *The Poetics of Revitalization. Adam Mickiewicz Between “Forefathers’ Eve, Part 3” and “Pan Tadeusz”* (Boulder [Colo.] and New York, 2001), particularly ch. 3.
308. Scholars had once assumed that this mixture of prophetic style with journalism and even demagogic pamphlet constituted the greatest weakness of Mickiewicz’s work. Others responded that this was the only way to combine historic synthesis with the style of biblical revelation. In other words, historical events corresponded to the divine history in a symbolic or figurative way, which was best represented by the parallelism between the partitions of Poland and the Passion of Christ. See Stefanowska, *Historia i profesja*, pp. 8–9, 46–48.
309. Koropeczyk, *Poetics of Revitalization*, p. 127. The same scholar has also stressed that Mickiewicz was criticized by both the left and the right, particularly for his “irrationality” and lack of a particular theory or political ideology. *Ibid.*, pp. 94, 134–135.
310. Adam Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego i pielgrzymstwa polskiego* (Cracow, 1924), p. 63. Zofia Stefanowska stressed that this interdependency between Christian faith and freedom was the “organizing force” in Mickiewicz’s work and at the same time the characteristic feature of Romantic political thought; see Stefanowska, *Historia i profesja*, p. 35. Juliusz Kleiner pointed out that the combination of a popular Catholic faith and democracy was also the ideology of French revolutionaries like Lamennais; see Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, pp. 20–22, 26, 28.
311. Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego*, pp. 64, 66. For Mickiewicz God/religion and freedom were opposed to rational politics of despotic rulers with their “godless” and selfish political philosophy. See Stefanowska, *Historia i profesja*, pp. 37–38.
312. Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego*, p. 75. In this and subsequent descriptions of Polish historical events, Mickiewicz sacrificed chronological sequence for the sake of biblical stylization of historical narrative. From the figurative-prophetic point of view, the

past resulted from the future, which was a clearly eschatological concept of history. See Stefanowska, *Historia i profecja*, pp. 56–58, 60–66; compare Koropeczyj, *Poetics of Revitalization*, p. 99. Kleiner, however, noted that the ideal past was to lead to the ideal future: for Mickiewicz it was precisely because Poland best preserved the features of the ideal primeval order that it could easily reclaim that “original perfection”; see Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, p. 42.

313. Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego*, pp. 75–77. This idealization of Polish history came from Lelewel’s ideas, which emphasized the absence of invasions, the presence of freedom, and gradual proliferation of liberties among citizens. Elsewhere, Mickiewicz sharply refuted Tadeusz Krępowiecki’s and Jan Czyński’s highly critical visions of Polish history, even pointing to the Jewish origins of these two émigré radical democrats. See Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, pp. 45, 144–146.

314. Mickiewicz, *Księgi narodu polskiego*, pp. 93, 107. For Mickiewicz it was especially important to emphasize the Polishness of his native Lithuania while staying in France where Lithuania’s Polish connection was often questioned. See Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, p. 24.

315. Koropeczyj, *Poetics of Revitalization*, p. 104. Mickiewicz’s discourse often exposed anti-Western, even xenophobic ideas by castigating major European nations, particularly the French and English. *Ibid.*, pp. 116–117; and Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, pp. 60–62.

316. For example, in his article “Konstytucja trzeciego Maja” (1833) Mickiewicz castigated those Poles who had mocked “national customs, national costume, [and] forefathers’ faith.” See his *Pisma* (Leipzig, 1899), vol. 5, p. 101.

317. *Ibid.*, p. 253. Wiktor Weintraub, an expert on Mickiewicz’s thought, stressed that the poet’s journalism was a continuation of his “political-religious doctrine” with its utopianism and fanaticism, as well as a “mystical belief in bloody sacrifice” for the sake of Poland’s redemption. See Wiktor Weintraub, *Poeta i prorok. Rzecz o profetyzmie Mickiewicza* (Warsaw, 1982), pp. 305–306. Elsewhere, Weintraub pointed out that Mickiewicz was unable to think in strict political categories, instead being a mystical or moral writer, who was forced “to play a role of a political writer.” Generally, political theories did not matter to Mickiewicz as long as Poland remained a Christian nation. See Wiktor Weintraub, *Mickiewicz—mistyczny polityk i inne studia o poecie* (Warsaw, 1998), pp. 24, 26–27.

318. Adam Mickiewicz, “O duchu narodowym,” in his *Dzieła*, 16 vols. (Warsaw, 1955), vol. 6, p. 66. For him it was this “domestic” tradition rather than foreign political ideas that had to forge Polishness. See Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, p. 103.

319. Mickiewicz, “O duchu narodowym,” p. 68. Mickiewicz stood close to Rzewuski in yet another aspect: eventually, he came to appreciate the conservative pro-Russian Targowica confederation simply because of their rejection of “rational,” Western-type reforms implemented by the last Polish king, Stanisław August. See Weintraub, *Mickiewicz—mistyczny polityk*, p. 32.

320. See Weintraub, *Mickiewicz—mistyczny polityk*, pp. 32–37. Focusing mostly on Mickiewicz’s Parisian lectures on Slavic literatures, Weintraub pointed to the poet’s Slavophilism and even adoration of Russia’s “communal” tradition. Similarly, the poet’s concept of *lud* (people) was not the *lud* of Polish democrats but rather the traditional and religious *narod* of Russian Slavophiles. His *lud* was not a social but spiritual category.

321. This vision of universal brotherhood, which Russia was also allowed to join, was

a logical consequence of Mickiewicz's Polish patriotism. See Weintraub, *Poeta i prorok*, pp. 309–310. In his Parisian lectures in Slavic literatures, however, he avoided the binary opposition of Poland and Russia altogether, stating instead that initially no Slavic culture was dominating in the Slavic world. Being as always contradictory, he then admitted that there were only two dominant ideas and separate nationalities among the Slavs—Polish and Russian. See Michał Kuziak, *O prelekcjach paryskich Adama Mickiewicza* (Ślupsk, 2007), pp. 22, 27.

322. Mickiewicz, “Projekt odezwy do Rosjan,” in his *Dziela*, vol. 6, p. 165. In his Parisian lectures he even stated that the West should be thankful to Russia for the protection against the Asiatic hordes. Thus, Russia and not Poland appeared to be *antemurale christiantatis*. See Weintraub, *Mickiewicz—mistyczny polityk*, p. 36.

323. Mickiewicz, “Projekt odezwy do Rosjan,” p. 166.

324. *Idem*, “Do przyjaciół galicyjskich,” in his *Dziela*, vol. 6, p. 183.

325. *Ibid.*, p. 184. Kleiner pointed out that in this article Mickiewicz called for “Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation”; see Kleiner, *Mickiewicz*, p. 136. It seems to me, however, that the idea of reconciliation was alien to Mickiewicz, who just did not regard Ruthenians as a separate community on a par with Poles. This was not a matter of *international* reconciliation but rather an internal artificial strife within the Polish nation. However, in the political science fiction “Historia przyszłości” (The history of the future), Mickiewicz specifically mentions a Ukrainian named Didko among the cruel leaders of the federalized nations; see his *Dziela*, vol. 6, pp. 193–205; compare Weintraub, *Mickiewicz—mistyczny polityk*, pp. 71–80.

326. Mickiewicz, “Prelekcje paryskie,” in his *Dziela*, vol. 11, p. 258. Mickiewicz's Catholicism, however, was far from orthodox, since unlike the official Church, the poet emphasized “terrestrial redemption,” that is, in earthly historical time. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 70.

327. Kuziak, *O prelekcjach paryskich*, pp. 30, 81. The same scholar also points out that the notion of nationality or “rhetoric of nationality” was a key organizing element in Mickiewicz's lectures; see *ibid.*, pp. 58, 74.

328. Mickiewicz, “Prelekcje paryskie,” in his *Dziela*, vol. 11, p. 481. Kuziak rightfully notes that Mickiewicz's “nationality” was a meeting point between history and metaphysics; see Kuziak, *O prelekcjach paryskich*, p. 79. Surprisingly, the idea about an eternal substance of nationality did not pertain only to messianic thinkers like Mickiewicz. A very similar idea, as we shall see later, could be found in the literary criticism of the Russian liberal and secular thinker Vissarion Belinskii.

329. See Mickiewicz, *Dziela*, vol. 10, p. 294. On Mickiewicz's “religious messianism” as compared to other types of Polish and European messianism, see Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 16–17, 24–45. Walicki, however, seems to hold an overtly idealized opinion of Mickiewicz's messianic Polishness as “non-ethnocentric, non-parochial, generous with respect to Russia, assimilating French revolutionary tradition, opposing to ‘governmental Church,’ deeply European in its sources, but far distanced from [. . .] bourgeois Europe”; *ibid.*, p. 12. For a more critical assessment of Mickiewicz's messianism see Weintraub, *Mickiewicz—mistyczny polityk*, pp. 32–50.

330. Mickiewicz, vol. 11, p. 19.

331. Compare Kuziak, *O prelekcjach paryskich*, p. 82. Kuziak adds that since “nationality” for Mickiewicz was a spiritual category, one could be born in one nation without possessing its “nationality,” instead sharing a “nationality” of another nation; *ibid.*, p. 84. Again, this thought of Mickiewicz was strikingly similar to that of Belinskii, who also held that birth in a certain country did not provide one with local “nationality.”

332. Józef Ordęga, *Deklaracja wystąpienia z Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego* (Paris, 1838), pp. 3, 7.

333. *Idem*, “Rzecz o powstaniu,” *Demokracja Polska XIX wieku*, 3 (Paris, 1845), pp. 9–12.

334. *Idem*, *O narodowości Polski z punktu widzenia katolicyzmu i postępu* (Paris, 1840), p. 67.

335. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

336. See his editorial in *Demokracja Polska XIX wieku*, 1 (Paris, 1845), p. 3.

337. *Idem*, “Rzecz o powstaniu,” p. 12.

338. Joachim Lelewel, *Mowy i pisma polityczne* (Poznań, 1864), p. 118 (emphasis mine).

339. Andrzej Nowak, “Jak rozbić rosyjskie imperium? Koncepcje polityczne i fantazje kręgu Adama Czartoryskiego (1832–1847),” *Studia Historyczne*, 33, no. 2 (1990), p. 213.

340. *Idem*, *Między carem a rewolucją*, p. 114.

341. Lelewel, *Mowy i pisma polityczne*, pp. 191–192.

342. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

343. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

344. “Komitet Narodowy Polski: Odezwa do Ludu Izraelskiego,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 48; compare Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 165.

345. “Manifest Polaków znajdujących się w Belgii, 29.XI.1836,” in Andrzej Walicki, ed., *Filozofia i myśl społeczna w latach 1831–1864*, vol. 5 in *700 lat myśli polskiej* (Warsaw, 1977), p. 788.

346. *Ibid.*, p. 789.

347. “Polacy w Brukseli do Rodaków,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 130. Lelewel strongly opposed the use of religion in politics, writing that “whoever creates a motherland from religion [ . . . ], repudiates citizenship, nationality, and political principles of one’s own kin; in a word—one’s own motherland”; as quoted in Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 79.

348. “Komitet Narodowy Polski w Paryżu do Wojowników Polskich,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 10.

349. “Odezwa do Rosjan,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 50. Sincerity of Lelewel’s religious tolerance, however, could be put into question by his comment about Orthodoxy in his private letter. He argued against Catholic dominance in Poland by alluding to the possibility of interethnic violence: as a result of those “slaughters,” Polish nobility would have been completely eliminated, because “the schism [Orthodoxy] is more prone to slaughtering and more able than Catholicism.” See *Listy emigracyjne Joachima Lelewela*, vol. 3: *1842–1848* (Cracow, 1952), p. 256. Both his term for Orthodoxy (*schizma*) and his description of Orthodox believers as particularly violent were quite stereotypical and “politically incorrect.”

350. Nowak, *Między carem a rewolucją*, pp. 101–104.
351. “Ustawa Młodej Polski,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 75.
352. “Zjednoczenie Emigracji Polskiej (1837–1846). Do ogółu Emigracji Polskiej Komisja Korespondencyjna w Poitiers,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, pp. 314, 317.
353. Lelewel, *Mowy i pisma polityczne*, pp. 437–438.
354. “Komitet Narodowy Polski do Ludu Polskiego,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 402.
355. “Akt tułaczów polskich będących we Francji . . .,” in Łukaszewicz, Lewandowski, et al., *Postępowa publicystyka emigracyjna*, p. 135.
356. *Ibid.*, pp. 142–143.
357. Bronisław Trentowski, “Rzecz o wyjarzmieniu Ojczyzny,” *Teraźniejszość i przyszłość*, 1, no. 4 (Paris, 1845), p. 432.
358. *Ibid.*, p. 435.
359. *Ibid.*, p. 455. Trentowski, for example, was furious about Adam Mickiewicz’s anti-rational and pro-Catholic position, calling it the expression of “Asiatic” obscurantism. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 109.
360. Trentowski, “Rzecz o wyjarzmieniu Ojczyzny,” p. 442.
361. *Ibid.*, p. 491.
362. *Ibid.*, p. 443.
363. *Ibid.*, pp. 440–441.
364. *Ibid.*, p. 441.
365. *Ibid.*, p. 443.
366. *Ibid.*, p. 492.
367. *Ibid.*, p. 444.
368. Karol Libelt, “O miłości Ojczyzny,” in his *Samowładztwo Rozumu i objawy filozofii słowiańskiej* (Warsaw, 1967), pp. 25–26, 104.
369. *Ibid.*, pp. 37, 104.
370. *Ibid.*, pp. 65, 96, 104.
371. *Idem*, “Samowładztwo rozumu i objawy filozofii słowiańskiej,” in his *Samowładztwo rozumu*, p. 242.
372. *Idem*, “O miłości Ojczyzny,” p. 12.
373. *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 42.
374. *Idem*, “Samowładztwo rozumu,” pp. 220, 231–232.
375. *Idem*, “O miłości Ojczyzny,” p. 25.
376. *Ibid.*, p. 38. For Libelt nationality (as Fatherland-*ojczyzna*) became a sort of substitute for political forms (state-*państwo*), which pointed to a common Romantic conviction that nation does not die with the death of its state and, therefore, the loss of spiritual bonds of collective memory was much more dangerous. Alternatively, state was less important than fatherland, territory, and borders, which all appear as substitutes of the state. See Królikiewicz, “Tajemnicy jeździec czyli . . .,” pp. 119–120.
377. Libelt, “O miłości Ojczyzny,” p. 40.

378. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
379. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
380. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, 49. Walicki calls the ideology of The Polish People “socialist millenarism,” pointing to the fact that the word “socialism” first entered the Polish language in 1835 in political writings of the Commune Grudziąż. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 83.
381. “Lud Polski. Gromada Grudziąż do Emigracji Polskiej [Manifest Gromady Grudziąż],” in *Lud Polski: Wybór dokumentów* (Warsaw, 1957), pp. 57–59. The Polish term they used was *lud*, which referred largely to peasantry.
382. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
383. See Commune’s vision of nation-ness in *Lud Polski*, p. 119.
384. *Ibid.*, p. 113.
385. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
386. *Ibid.*, pp. 168, 202, 374.
387. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
388. *Ibid.*, p. 252. About the so-called *Kościół Powszechny* as representing “revolutionary totalitarianism,” see Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 90–91.
389. *Lud Polski*, p. 103.
390. *Ibid.*, p. 373.
391. Henryk Kamiński [Filaret Prawdowski], *Katechizm demokratyczny czyli opowiadanie słowa ludowego przez Filaleta Prawdowskiego*, (Paris, 1845), republished in Katz, Kula, et al., *Wiosna Ludów*, pp. 278–344. The quotation can be found on p. 284.
392. *Ibid.*, p. 289.
393. *Ibid.*, p. 336.
394. *Ibid.*, p. 337.
395. Edward Dembowski, “Piśmiennictwo polskie w zarysie,” in his *Pisma*, 5 vols., vol. 4: *1844–1846* (Warsaw, 1955), pp. 105–106.
396. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
397. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, p. 220.
398. Katz, Kula, et al., *Wiosna Ludów*, p. 478.
399. “Rząd Narodowy do braci Izraelitów,” in Katz, Kula, et al., *Wiosna Ludów*, p. 481.
400. Compare Sosnowska’s views of “*coleur locale*” in Dąbek-Wirgowa and Makowiecki, *Kategoria narodu*, p. 94; see also the treatment of Lithuanian identity based on racial or “blood” relatedness in Landgrebe, “*Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe*,” pp. 276, 278.
401. Landgrebe, “*Wenn es Polen nicht gäbe*,” pp. 278–278. Grażyna Królikiewicz has noted that for Polish Romantics the very concept of “nation” (*naród*) was associated with an organicist perception of community, that is, as “an individuality comprised of body and soul that has its own *thoughts*, own *spirit*, *nature*, and *senses*”; see Królikiewicz, “Tajemnicy jeździec czyli . . .,” p. 116. Therefore, any separation of “nation” was perceived as a cutting of an “alive being.” It is thus difficult to agree with Walicki, who has stated that Polish Romantic missionaries did not seek “to impose the Polish language on ethnic minorities,” instead expecting the minorities to express their Polishness “through participation in the realization of historical mission of the multiethnic Polish nation”; see Walicki, *Mesjanizm*

*Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 172. Contrary to the opinion of the noted Polish historian, that Romantic “historical mission” was often perceived in explicit ethnocultural and imperialist terms by many Polish *Kulturtragers*.

402. Roman Wapiński, “Mit dawnej Rzeczypospolitej w epoce porozbiorowej,” in *Polskie mity polityczne XIX i XX wieku* (Wrocław, 1991), p. 83.

403. Walicki, *Philosophy and Romantic Nationalism*, pp. 4–5. Despite rejecting much of the early modern legacy, many Polish authors remained proponents of the Polish “political nation,” that is, the political/civic unity of people above ethnic and linguistic divides, on the territory of the former Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. This traditional vision gained new momentum in the 1840s under the influence of European liberal and socialist thought that argued against the reactionary “ethnic” nationalism of “nonhistorical” nationalities. Poles, however, were considered “historical” enough to seek independence. See Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, pp. 127–129, 170–172.

404. Henryk aliński, *Kształt polityczny Polski w ideologii Towarzystwa Demokratycznego Polskiego (1832–1846)* (Wrocław, 1976), p. 137.

405. As German scholar Alix Landgrebe has remarked, the Catholic religion for Poles served “*als Abgrenzungselement gegen alle anderen Nationen, [ . . . ] wenn Polen seine Identitat gegenuber den Unterdruckern behalten and verteidigen will.*” See Landgrebe, “*Wenn es Polen nicht gabe,*” p. 247.

406. Grażyna Królikiewicz convincingly shows how most prominent Romantic authors thought about nationality in terms of organic ethnicity—based on language, culture, and common history—and special mission or task; see Królikiewicz, “Tajemnicy jeździeć czyli . . .,” pp. 117–119. Even Andrzej Walicki, who used to emphasize the lack of ethno-linguistic nationalism and imperialism in Polish democratic thought, had to admit recently that the “politics of Polonization or at least some form of assimilation of ethnic minorities” could be a side effect of “political egalitarianism” that rejected ethnic and religious divides among “Polish citizens”; see Walicki, *Mesjanizm Adama Mickiewicza*, p. 176.

## Chapter 5

1. Compare the “ideal types” of Russianness in Andreas Kappeler, “*Great Russians*” and “*Little Russians*”: *Russian-Ukrainian Relations and Perceptions in Historical Perspective* (Seattle, 2003), p. 17.

2. Aleksei Miller, “*Ukrainskii vopros*” *v politike vlastei i russkom obshchestvennom mnenii (vtoraia polovina XIX v.)* (Saint Petersburg, 2000), p. 41. In the Russian original he used the phrase *bol’shaia russkaia natsiia* (literally, “large Russian nation”), thereby emphasizing its size and tripartite structure (Great, Little, and White Russia). In the English version of his book, he used the phrase “the all-Russian nation” (literally, *obshcherusskaia natsiia*). I use the latter term as a metaphor referring to Miller’s neologism *bol’shaia russkaia natsiia* rather than to *obshcherusskaia natsiia*, a sociopolitical category spread after 1863. See Aleksei Miller, *Imperiia Romanovykh i natsionalizm* (Moscow, 2006), pp. 87–91.

3. Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass., 1993).

4. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), pp. 83–86.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 88.

6. Miller, "Ukrainskii vopros," p. 34.
7. Paul Bushkovitch, "The Ukraine in Russian Culture 1790–1860: The Evidence of the Journals," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, Neue Folge, 39 (1991), Heft 3, pp. 350–351.
8. As quoted in Bushkovitch, "The Ukraine in Russian Culture," pp. 350–351.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 351.
10. Andrei Zorin, "Ideologiiia 'pravoslaviia, samoderzhaviia, narodnosti': Opyt rekonstruktsii" (Neizvestnyi avtograf memorandumuma S.S. Uvarova Nikolaiu I), *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*, 26 (Moscow, 1997), pp. 71–91.
11. On the views of Friedrich Schlegel and the formation of the conservative Romantic movement see Frederick C. Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution, and Romanticism: The Genesis of Modern German Political Thought, 1790–1800* (Cambridge [Mass.] and London, 1992), pp. 224–227, 232–263.
12. Zorin, "Ideologiiia," pp. 83, 88.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 88–89.
14. A French-language memorandum of Uvarov's is attached to the article by Zorin, "Ideologiiia 'pravoslaviia.'" The quotation can be found on p. 97.
15. S. S. Uvarov, *Desiatiletie Ministerstva narodnogo prosveshcheniia. 1833–1843* (Saint Petersburg, 1864), pp. 3–4.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 2; compare with the earlier version of Uvarov's triad, in Zorin, "Ideologiiia 'pravoslaviia,'" p. 97.
17. Uvarov, *Desiatiletie Ministerstva*, p. 4.
18. Zorin, "Ideologiiia 'pravoslaviia,'" p. 89.
19. The very term *narodnost'* was quite polysemantic and referred to politics, literature, ethnography, and so on. Moreover, that term was not an essentially political idea in the time of Romanticism. Therefore, the rhetoric of nationalism could not be reduced to the use of the *narodnost'*, which itself did not necessarily refer to national cohesion. On the meanings of the term, particularly in the 1820s, see Lauren G. Leighton, "Narodnost' as a Concept of Russian Romanticism," in her *Russian Romanticism: Two Essays* (The Hague and Paris, 1975), pp. 41–109.
20. *Ibid.*
21. Uvarov, *Desiatiletie Ministerstva*, p. 48.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 35–36.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
26. P. Sokhan' et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiiv's'ke tovarystvo* (Kyiv, 1990), vol. 3, p. 312.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
29. S. P. Shevryev, *Ob otoshenii semeinogo vospitaniia k gosudarstvennomu. Rech [ . . . ] v torzhestvennom sobranii imp. Moskovskogo universiteta 16 iiulia 1842* (Moscow, 1842), p. 5.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 71, 73.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 75.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
34. *Idem*, *Obshechee obozrenie razvitiia russkoi slovesnosti* (Moscow, 1838), p. 16.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
36. *Idem*, *Istoriia russkoi slovesnosti, preimushchestvenno drevnei* (Moscow, 1846), p. II.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 12.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 75–76, 92. His meaning of the term *Russian* corresponded to the fourth meaning of this term in the classification of Andreas Kappeler, encompassing “all East Slavs, in the spirit of traditional meaning of the idea of Rus’.” See Miller, *Ukrainskii vopros*, p. 34.
40. See Shevyrev’s review of Gogol’s “Mirgorod” in *Moskovskii nabliudatel’*, I (Moscow, 1835), pp. 396–411.
41. M. Pogodin, *Istoriko-kriticheskie otryvki* (Moscow, 1846), p. 2.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
44. *Idem*, *God v chuzhikh kraiaikh (1839). Dorozhnyi dnevnik*, 2 parts (Moscow, 1844), p. 59.
45. *Idem*, “Istoricheskie razmyshleniia ob otnosheniakh Pol’shi k Rossii,” *Teleskop*, 2, no. 7 (Saint Petersburg, 1831), p. 298.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 300–301.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 309.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
50. *Idem*, *God v chuzhikh kraiaikh*, p. 57.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
52. Bushkovitch, “Ukraine in Russian Culture,” p. 351.
53. M. Pogodin, “Dva slova Biblioteki dlia chteniia o proiskhozhdenii Malorossiian,” *Moskvitianin*, 6 (Moscow, 1843), p. 534.
54. *Idem*, *God v chuzhikh kraiaikh*, vol. 2, pp. 200–201.
55. “Graf A.Kh. Benkendorff o Rossii v 1827–1830 gg.,” *Krasnyi arkhiv*, I (1930), p. 139.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 137, 144.
58. Miller, *Ukrainskii vopros*, p. 58.
59. See the conclusion of the Third Department about the spreading of Slavophilism, in P. Sokhan’ et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiïvs’ke Bratstvo*, 3 vols. (Kyiv, 1990), vol. 3, p. 293.
60. See the project of the report of A. F. Orlov to Nicholas I about the Slavophiles, May 1847, in P. Sokhan’ et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiïvs’ke Bratstvo*, vol. 3, p. 307.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 308.
62. S. Burachek, “Russkaia narodnost’,” *Maiak*, 17–18, no. 4 (Saint Petersburg, 1841), p. 8.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
64. See his review of Polevoi’s “History of the Russian People” in *Maiak*, 5, nos. 9–10 (Saint Petersburg, 1842), p. 143.
65. *Idem*, “Russkaia narodnost’,” p. 23.
66. *Idem*, “Narodnost’ russkaia v slove,” *Maiak*, 17–18, no. 4 (Saint Petersburg, 1841), p. 34.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
68. *Maiak*, 6 (Saint Petersburg, 1840), p. 95.

69. See Senkovskii's review of a collection of Ukrainian folk songs in *Biblioteka dlia Chteniia*, 31, no. 8 (Saint Petersburg, 1836), p. 5.
70. See his review of "Dumky i pisni" by Amvrosii Metlyns'kyi, in *Biblioteka dlia Chteniia*, 34, no. 2 (Saint Petersburg, 1839), pp. 26–28.
71. Osip Senkovskii, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 9 vols. (Saint Petersburg, 1859), vol. 9, p. 399.
72. *Ibid.*, pp. 400–401.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 402.
74. Vidok Figliarin. *Pis'ma i agenturnye zapiski F.V. Bulgarina v III otdelenie*, A. I. Reitblat, ed. (Moscow, 1998), p. 202; compare pp. 110, 187.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 371.
76. *Ibid.*, pp. 146–147, 340.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 338.
78. *Ibid.*, pp. 370–371.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 187.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
81. *Ibid.*, pp. 187, 259.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 350.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 349.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 259.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 517.
89. See Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: The History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth Century Russian Thought* (Oxford, 1975). Slavophiles could indeed be considered conservatives, but because of their focus on Russian ethnic nationalism, their views are analyzed separately from those of progovernmental conservatives.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 169–173.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 177. Some scholars used to emphasize the proximity between Russian Slavophiles and Polish messianic poets like Adam Mickiewicz. Countering this opinion, Andrzej Walicki points to a fundamental difference between those two intellectual traditions: while Polish thinkers hoped for a "new revelation" and "religious progress," the Slavophiles adhered to communal traditionalism, the past, and a "conservative utopia." See Andrzej Walicki, *Mezjanizm Adama Mickiewicza w perspektywie porównawczej* (Warsaw, 2006), pp. 17–18.
92. *Idem*, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 125.
93. Compare Leighton, "Narodnost," pp. 85–87.
94. I. V. Kireevskii, "Deviatnadsatyi vek," in his *Izbrannye stat'i* (Moscow, 1984), p. 70.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
96. Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 128.
97. Kireevskii, "Deviatnadsatyi vek," p. 78.
98. *Idem*, "Gore ot uma na Moskovskom teatre," in his *Izbrannye stat'i*, p. 97.
99. *Ibid.*
100. *Idem*, "V otvet Khomiakovu," in his *Izbrannye stat'i*, p. 120.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

102. Compare Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, pp. 136–137.
103. I. V. Kireevskii, “Obozrenie sovremennogo sostoianiiia literatury,” in his *Izbrannye stat’i*, p. 153.
104. *Idem*, “O kharaktere evropeiskoi tsivilizatsii i ee otnoshenii k tsivilizatsii rossiiskoi,” in his *Izbrannye stat’i*, p. 222.
105. *Ibid.*, pp. 237–238.
106. *Idem*, “Obozrenie sovremennogo sostoianiiia literatury,” p. 148.
107. *Idem*, “Vvedenie k bibliografii,” in his *Izbrannye stat’i*, p. 179.
108. Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 238.
109. *Ibid.*, pp. 289–290.
110. K. Aksakov, *Lomonosov v istorii russkoi literatury i russkogo iazyka. Razsuzhdenie kandidata Moskovskogo universiteta Konstantina Aksakova na stepen’ magistra filosofskogo fakul’teta I otdeleniia* (Moscow, 1846), pp. 5–6.
111. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
112. *Ibid.*, p. 57.
113. *Idem*, *Neskol’ko slov o poeme Gogol’a “Pokhozhdeniia Chichikova ili Mertvyie dushi”* (Moscow, 1842), p. 10.
114. Bushkovitch, “Ukraine in Russian Culture,” p. 350. According to George Grabowicz, Aksakov explicitly opposed Ukraine (Ukrainian people) to Russia (Great Russian people), thus “nationalizing” the older opposition between Ukraine as a region and Russia as an empire. Grabowicz regarded this identification of Russia with Great Russian nationality as a century-long process of the transformation of an empire into an “empire-nation.” See Hrabovych, *Do istorii*, pp. 125–126.
115. Aksakov, *Neskol’ko slov*, p. 19.
116. A. S. Khomiakov, *Sochineniia*, 2 vols., vol. 1: *Raboty po filosofii* (Moscow, 1994), p. 30.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 31.
118. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
119. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
120. Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 224.
121. A. S. Khomiakov, “O starom i novom,” in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 1, p. 461.
122. *Ibid.*, p. 492.
123. Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, p. 221.
124. D. Valuev, ed., *Sbornik istoricheskikh i statisticheskikh svedenii o Rossii i narodakh ei edinovernykh i edinoplemennykh* (Moscow, 1845), p. 19.
125. *Ibid.*
126. *Ibid.*
127. N. I. Nadezhdin, *Sochineniia*, 2 vols., vol. 1: *Estetika* (Saint Petersburg, 2000), p. 718.
128. *Idem*, “Vsem sestram po ser’gam (Novaia pogudka na staryi lad),” in his *Literaturnaia kritika. Estetika* (Moscow, 1972), p. 110.
129. *Idem*, “Sovremennoe napravlenie prosveshcheniia,” in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 1, p. 747.
130. *Idem*, “Letopisi otechestvennoi slovesnosti,” in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 1, p. 756.
131. *Idem*, “Vsem sestram po ser’gam,” p. 108.
132. *Idem*, “Ob istoricheskoi istine i dostovernosti,” in his *Sochineniia*, vol. 2, p. 781.

133. *Idem*, “Evropeizm i narodnost’ v otnoshenii k russkoi slovesnosti,” in his *Literaturnaia kritika*, pp. 440–441.
134. See Nadezhdin’s review of “Ivan Vyzhigin” by Bulgarin in Nadezhdin, *Literaturnaia kritika*, p. 93.
135. See his review of “Novosel’e” in his *Literaturnaia kritika*, p. 344.
136. *Idem*, “Evropeizm i narodnost’,” p. 440.
137. *Idem*, “Ob istoricheskoi istine,” p. 781.
138. *Ibid.*
139. *Ibid.*, p. 783.
140. *Ibid.*
141. *Ibid.*, p. 786.
142. *Idem*, “Evropeizm i narodnost’,” p. 443.
143. *Idem*, “Vsem sestram po ser’gam,” p. 110.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
145. See his review of Gogol’s “Vechera na khutore bliz Dikan’ki” in his *Literaturnaia kritika*, pp. 280–282. He also treated Gogol as the representative of Ukrainian literature; see Hrabovych, *Do istorii*, pp. 103–104.
146. Nadezhdin, “Evropeizm i narodnost’,” p. 437.
147. *Ibid.*, pp. 405, 409–410, 417.
148. Anon., review of “‘Sava Chalyi’, dramaticheskie stseny na iuzhnorusskom iazyke. Sochinenie Ieremii Galki,” *Otechestvennye zapiski*, 3, nos. 4–5 (Saint Petersburg, 1839), section “Kritika,” p. 44.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
150. *Sovremennik*, 30, nos. 4–6 (Saint Petersburg, 1843), p. 346.
151. See Polevoi’s review of *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* by Bantysh-Kamenskii, in *Moskovskii telegraf*, 17 (Moscow, 1830), pp. 82, 84.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
153. See his review of “Chary, ili neskol’ko stsen iz narodnykh bylei i razskazov ukrain-skikh” by Kyrylo Topol’a, in his *Ocherki russkoi literatury* (Saint Petersburg, 1839), p. 485.
154. *Moskovskii telegraf*, 17 (Moscow, 1830), p. 86.
155. Compare Polevoi’s review of “Chary,” p. 488.
156. *Moskovskii telegraf*, 17 (Moscow, 1830), p. 77.
157. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
158. *Moskovskii telegraf*, 18 (Moscow, 1830), p. 246.
159. *Ibid.*, p. 254.
160. *Moskovskii telegraf*, 17 (Moscow, 1830), p. 87.
161. Polevoi’s review of “Chary,” p. 488.
162. *Moskovskii Telegraf*, 18 (Moscow, 1830), p. 242.
163. O. Tolochko, “Kyievo-rus’ka spadshchyna v istorychnii dumtsi Ukraïny pochatku XIX st,” in V. F. Verstiuk, V. M. Horobets’, and O. P. Tolochko, *Ukraïns’ki proekty v Rosiiskii imperii* (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 320–350.
164. Iu. Iankovskii, *Patriarkhal’no-dvorianskaia utopiia* (Moscow, 1981), p. 182.
165. *Ibid.*, pp. 121, 126–128.

166. P. Pestel', "Russkaia Pravda," in *Vosstanie dekabristov: Dokumenty*, vol. 7: "Russkaia Pravda" *P.I. Pestel'a i sochineniia, iei predshestvuiuushchie*, M. V. Nechkina, ed. (Moscow, 1958), p. 116. Compare Susanna Rabow-Edling, "The Decembrists and the Concept of a Civic Nation," *Nationalities Papers* 35 (May 2007), pp. 372–374.

167. Pestel', "Russkaia Pravda," p. 121.

168. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

169. *Ibid.*

170. *Ibid.*, p. 127. See Rabow-Edling, "The Decembrists," p. 375.

171. Pestel', "Russkaia Pravda," p. 138.

172. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

173. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

174. *Ibid.*

175. See appendix to N. Druzhinin, *Dekabrist Nikita Muraviev* (Moscow, 1933), p. 308.

176. *Ibid.*, pp. 304–305.

177. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

178. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

179. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

180. Mikhail Lunin, "Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nyneshnee tsarstvovanie. 1840," in his *Sochineniia, pis'ma, dokumenty* (Irkutsk, 1988), p. 164.

181. *Ibid.*, p. 168.

182. *Idem*, "Pis'ma iz Sibiri. Vtoraia seriia, No 4. 17/5 November 1839," in his *Sochineniia*, p. 106.

183. *Idem*, "Vzgliad na pol'skie dela g-na Ivanova, chlena tajnogo obshchestva soedinenykh slavian. 1840," in his *Sochineniia*, p. 159.

184. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

185. *Ibid.*; *idem*, "Pis'ma iz Sibiri," p. 108.

186. *Idem*, "Pis'ma iz Sibiri," p. 108.

187. *Idem*, "Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii," p. 179.

188. *Idem*, "Pis'ma iz Sibiri, no 14 [15]," p. 93.

189. *Ibid.*, p. 94.

190. K. Rogov, "Dekabristy i 'nemtsy,'" *Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie*, 26 (Moscow, 1997), pp. 105–126.

191. Lunin, "Pis'ma iz Sibiri, no 15 [16]," p. 96.

192. Lunin, however, was right when he spoke about the "non-Russian language" of Uvarov's triad. Minister Sergei Uvarov submitted the first draft of his doctrine to Nicholas I in French, in March 1832. See Zorin, "Ideologiiia 'pravoslavia,'" pp. 71–73. Curiously, Lunin himself wrote his works in French and sometimes translated them into Russian.

193. See introduction of L. V. Deriugina to P. A. Viazemskii, *Estetika i literaturnaia kritika* (Moscow, 1984), p. 23; compare Leighton, "Narodnost'," pp. 49–51, 63–65.

194. Deriugina, pp. 24–25; compare P. A. Viazemskii, *Zapisnye knizhki (1813–1848)* (Moscow, 1963), p. 297.

195. Viazemskii, *Estetika*, p. 168.

196. *Ibid.*

197. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

198. *Ibid.*, p. 277.
199. *Idem*, *Zapisnye knizhki*, p. 209.
200. Viazemskii, *Estetika*, p. 292.
201. *Idem*, *Zapisnye knizhki*, p. 329.
202. *Ibid.*, p. 298.
203. *Idem*, *Estetika*, p. 205.
204. See the works of Bowman and Terras: Herbert Bowman, *Vissarion Belinski, 1811–1849: A Study in the Origins of Social Criticism in Russia* (Cambridge, 1954); Victor Terras, *Belinskij and Russian Literary Criticism: The Heritage of Organic Aesthetics* (Madison, 1974).
205. V. G. Belinskii, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 13 vols. (Moscow, 1953–1959), vol. 5, p. 95.
206. Andrea Rutherford, “Vissarion Belinskii and the Ukrainian National Question,” *Russian Review*, 54, no. 4 (October, 1995), pp. 500–515.
207. *Ibid.*, pp. 500, 506.
208. *Ibid.*, p. 503.
209. V. G. Belinskii, “Stat’i o Puskine,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 7, p. 345.
210. Terras, *Belinskij*, pp. 94–95. Generally, the word *narodnost’* preceded the entry of the word *natsional’nost’* into Russian debates, which could partially explain much of the initial confusion over the two terms. See Leighton, “*Narodnost’*,” p. 44.
211. Belinskii, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” p. 123.
212. *Idem*, “Stat’i o Puskine,” p. 333.
213. *Idem*, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” p. 124; compare his review of “Sel’skoe chtenie” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 10, p. 369.
214. *Idem*, “Obshchee znachenie slova literatura,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 5, p. 634.
215. *Idem*, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” pp. 91–92; *idem*, “Obshchee znachenie slova literatura,” p. 649.
216. *Idem*, “Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu 1846 goda,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 10, pp. 8–13; *idem*, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” p. 124.
217. *Idem*, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” p. 123.
218. Rutherford, “Vissarion Belinskii,” p. 515.
219. Belinskii, “Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu,” p. 29.
220. *Ibid.*, pp. 20–21.
221. *Ibid.*, p. 21; compare his “Mysli i zametki o russkoi literature,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 9, p. 438.
222. *Idem*, “Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu,” pp. 23–26.
223. Compare Rutherford, “Vissarion Belinskii,” p. 505.
224. V. G. Belinskii, “Literaturnye mechtaniia,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1, p. 92.
225. *Idem*, “Obshchii vzgliad na narodnuiu poeziu i ee znachenie. Russkaia narodnaia poeziia,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 5, p. 657.
226. *Ibid.*
227. *Idem*, “Stat’i o Pushkine,” p. 436.

228. *Idem*, “Obshchii vzgliad na narodnuiu poeziu,” p. 657.
229. *Idem*, “Stat’i o Pushkine,” p. 443.
230. See his review of *Istoriia Malorossii* (History of Little Russia) by Mykola Markevych, in Belinskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 7, p. 46.
231. *Idem*, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” p. 123.
232. See his review of “Moskovskii literaturnyi i uchenyi sbornik na 1847 g.,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 10, p. 202.
233. *Idem*, “O russkoi povesti i povestiakh g. Gogol’a (‘Arabeski’ i ‘Mirgorod’),” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1, p. 295.
234. *Idem*, “Ivan Andreevich Krylov,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 8, pp. 569, 571.
235. Rutherford, “Vissarion Belinskii,” p. 505.
236. Belinskii, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” pp. 95, 124.
237. *Ibid.*, pp. 98–105.
238. *Idem*, “Pis’mo k N.V. Gogol’u,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 10, p. 215.
239. *Idem*, “Otvét ‘Moskvitianinu,’” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 10, p. 229.
240. *Idem*, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” p. 122.
241. See his review of “Vospominaniia Faddeia Bulgarina,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 9, p. 664.
242. Belinskii’s review of Markevych’s *History of Little Russia*, p. 47.
243. *Idem*, “Stat’i o narodnoi poezii,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 5, p. 298.
244. See his review of Ukrainian almanac “Molodyk na 1844 god,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 8, p. 105.
245. Bushkovitch, “Ukraine in Russian Culture,” p. 361.
246. Belinskii’s review of Markevych’s *History of Little Russia*, pp. 45–46; compare his “Vzgliad na russkuiu literaturu,” pp. 29–32.
247. *Idem*, “Rossiia do Petra Velikogo,” pp. 91–92; and “Stat’i o narodnoi poezii,” pp. 305–306.
248. See his review of Markevych’s history, p. 60.
249. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
250. Rutherford, “Vissarion Belinskii,” p. 510.
251. See Belinskii’s review of Markevych’s history, p. 65.
252. *Idem*, “Stat’i o narodnoi poezii,” p. 331; compare his review of Ukrainian almanac “Lastivka,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 5, pp. 176–178.
253. *Idem*, “Stat’i o narodnoi poezii,” p. 330; compare Hrabovych, *Do istoriï*, p. 118.
254. See Belinskii’s review of Ukrainian almanac “Snip,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 5, p. 287; compare his negative reviews of Shevchenko’s poetry in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 4, pp. 171–172, and vol. 6, pp. 172–174.
255. See his letter to his wife on June 14–15, 1846, in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 12, p. 288.
256. V. G. Belinskii, “Pokhozhdeniia Chichikova, ili Mertvye dushi,” in his *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 6, pp. 209–222; *idem*, “O russkoi povesti,” pp. 295–301; *idem*, “Stat’i o narodnoi poezii,” p. 331.

257. Rutherford, "Vissarion Belinskii," p. 515.
258. Valerian Maikov, *Kriticheskie opyty (1845–47)* (Saint Petersburg, 1891), pp. 62, 97–99.
259. *Ibid.*, pp. 76, 94.
260. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
261. *Ibid.*, pp. 595–596.
262. *Ibid.*, pp. 83–85.
263. M. A. Bakunin, *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem, 1828–1876*, 4 vols., vol. 3: *Period pervogo prebyvaniia za granitsej 1840–1849* (Moscow, 1935), p. 272.
264. *Ibid.*
265. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
266. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
267. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
268. See his letter to French internal minister on February 7, 1848, in his *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, vol. 3, p. 293.
269. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
270. See his speech at the gathering of Polish émigrés in Paris in his *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, vol. 3, p. 274.
271. Bakunin, *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, vol. 3, p. 242.
272. See his speech at the gathering of Polish émigrés in Paris, p. 275.
273. Bakunin's letter to a French liberal newspaper *La Reform* in his *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, vol. 3, pp. 258, 261.
274. See his appeal to the Slavic nations in his *Sobranie sochinenii i pisem*, vol. 3, p. 339.
275. *Ibid.*, p. 340.
276. See Kappeler, "Great Russians" and "Little Russians," p. 15.

## Chapter 6

1. Roman Szporluk, "Ukraine: From the Imperial Periphery to a Sovereign State," in his *Russia, Ukraine and the Breakup of the Soviet Union* (Hoover Institution, 2000), pp. 361–395.
2. See Burachek's review of Bantysh-Kamens'kyi's *Istoriia Maloi Rossii* (History of Little Russia) in *Maiak*, 5, nos. 9–10 (Saint Petersburg, 1842), section "Kritika," p. 23.
3. *Idem*, "Narodnost' russkaia v slove," *Maiak*, 17–18, no. 4 (Saint Petersburg, 1841), p. 35.
4. Burachek's review of Bantysh-Kamens'kyi's *History of Little Russia*, p. 24.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
8. *Idem*, "Narodnost' russkaia v slove," p. 35.
9. Burachek's review of Bantysh-Kamens'kyi's *History of Little Russia*, p. 47.
10. See his review of the Ukrainian almanac "Snip" in *Maiak*, 5, nos. 9–10 (Saint Petersburg, 1842), p. 1.
11. Tykhors'kyi's review of "Haidamaky" in *Maiak*, 4, nos. 7–8 (Saint Petersburg, 1842), p. 90.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 106.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 88.
14. See his review of "Snip," p. 20.
15. See his review of "Haidamaky," pp. 94–95.
16. *Jutrzenka/Dennitsa*, 3 (Warsaw, 1843), p. 201.
17. J. Czajkowski's review of "Pienia Tomasza Padurry" in *Jutrzenka/Dennitsa*, 19 (Warsaw, 1842), p. 242.
18. F. Ievetskii [Ivec'kyi], "Malorossiiskaia literatura," *Jutrzenka/Dennitsa*, 7 (1842), p. 86.
19. *Jutrzenka/Dennitsa*, 17 (Warsaw, 1842), p. 210.
20. See O. Tolochko, "Kyievo-rus'ka spadshchyna vistorychnii dumtsi Ukraïny pochatku XIX st.," in V. F. Verstiuk, V. M. Horobets', and O. P. Tolochko, *Ukraïns'ki proekty v Rosiiskii imperii* (Kyiv, 2004), pp. 314–315.
21. Compare P. R. Magocsi, "The Ukrainian National Revival: A New Analytical Framework," *Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism*, 16, nos. 1–2 (1989), pp. 45–63.
22. N. Gogol, "A Glance at the Formation of Little Russia," in his *Arabeski* (Moscow, 1990), p. 143.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
25. Iurii Venelin, "O spore mezhdū iuzhanami i severianami na schet ikh rossizma," *Chteniia v Obshchestve istorii i drevnostei Rossiiskikh* (Moscow, 1847), p. 3.
26. *Ibid.*
27. *Idem*, "Ob istochnike narodnoi poezii voobshche, i o iuzhno-russkoi v osobennosti," *Teleskop*, 21, no. 3 (Saint Petersburg, 1834), p. 568.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 569.
29. *Idem*, "O spore," p. 11.
30. *Idem*, "Ob istochnike," p. 572.
31. *Idem*, "O spore," pp. 7–8.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
34. Ivan Kulzhinskii, *Emerit* (Moscow, 1836), p. 41.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
36. *Ibid.*, pp. 57–58.
37. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
38. I. Kulzhinskii, *Rechi, proiznesennye v raznye vremena . . .* (Moscow, 1837), p. 69.
39. *Idem*, *O znachenii Rossii v semeistve evropeiskikh narodov* (Moscow, 1840), p. 18.
40. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
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43. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
47. Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyc'kyi wrote about the eventual transition of Ukrainian political culture throughout the nineteenth century from the consciousness based on historical/

judiciary legitimacy to that rooted in the principle of national self-definition: Ivan Lysiak-Rudnyts'kyi, *Istorychni esse*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1994), vol. 2, pp. 76-77.

48. S. Hordyns'kyj, "Die ukrainische Romantic und ihre Verbindungen mit der westlichen Welt," in J. Bojko-Blochyn, ed., *Ukrainische Romantic and Neuromantic vor dem Hintergrund der europäischen Literatur* (Heidelberg, 1988), pp. 35-36.

49. The autobiography of Maksymovych, written in 1855, is quoted from V. A. Korotkyi and S. H. Bilenky, *Mykhailo Maksymovych ta osvitni praktyky na Pravoberezhnii Ukraïni* (Kyiv, 1998), p. 185.

50. Omel'an Pritsak, *Istoriosofia ta istoriografïa Mykhaila Hrushevs'koho* (Kyiv and Cambridge [Mass.], 1991), p. 6.

51. I asserted this idea in my unpublished *kandydat* degree dissertation in Ukrainian studies from Kyiv National Shevchenko University, Ukraine: Serhiy Bilenky, *Rol' M.O. Maksymovycha u formuvanni ukrains'kykh akademichnykh tradytzii ta ukraïnoznavchykh dystsyplyn u Kyïvs'komu universtyeti (1834-1845 roky)* (Kyiv, 2001).

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 134-145.

53. As quoted in Korotkyi and Bilenky, *Mykhailo Maksymovych*, p. 182.

54. M. Maksimovich [Maksymovych], *Sobranie sochinenii*. 3 vols., vol. 1: *Otdel istoricheskii* (Kyiv, 1876), p. 48.

55. *Idem*, "O roli i znachenii Kieva v obshchei zhizni Rossii," in his *"I Kiev iavilsia gradom velikim . . ."* *Vybrani ukraïnoznavchi tvory* (Kyiv, 1994), p. 85.

56. *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

57. *Idem*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 3: *Otdely: iazykoznanie, istoriia slovesnosti* (Moscow, 1880), p. 353.

58. *Idem*, "O roli i znachenii," p. 87.

59. NBU IR, f. XXXII, spr. 393, p. 9 (reverse).

60. *Idem*, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 1, p. 73.

61. See Magocsi, "Ukrainian National Revival."

62. Zenon Kohut, "Zustrich Ukraïny z Rosieiu: Kul'turni tendetsii ta politychni pohliady v rannionovitnii Ukraïni," *Suchasnist'*, 9 (Kyiv, 1996), pp. 71-73.

63. Maksimovich, *Sobranie sochinenii*, vol. 3, p. 8.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

65. *Ibid.*

66. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 50.

68. *Ibid.*, p. 451.

69. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

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71. Bilenky, *Rol' M.O. Maksymovycha*, p. 111.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 115.

73. Marcin Król, *Romantyzm. Piekło i niebo Polaków* (Warsaw, 1998), pp. 108-109.

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77. *Pisma O.M. Bodianskogo k ottsu, 1821–1846 gg.* (Moscow, 1893), p. 59.

78. See Bodianskii's review (under pseudonym I. Mastak) of "Malorossiiske posloivitsy i pogovorki" in *Teleskop*, 21 (Saint Petersburg, 1834), section "Kritika," p. 338.

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93. Andrei Tsarinnyi, "Mysli malorossiianina, po prochtenii Povestei Pasichnika Rudogo Pan'ka, izdannyykh im v knizhke pod zaglaviiem 'Vechera na khutore bliz Dikan'ki' i retsenzii na onye," *Syn otechestva i Severnyi arkhiv*, 1 (1832), pp. 41–49, 101–115, 159–164, 223–242, 288–312.

94. Taras Koznarsky, "Kharkiv Literary Almanacs of the 1830s: The Shaping of Ukrainian Cultural Identity" (Harvard University, Ph.D. thesis, 2001), p. 217. Another treatment of the subject is in D. B. Saunders, "Contemporary Critics of Gogol's *Vechera* and the Debate about Russian *narodnost'* (1831–1832)," *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 5.1 (1981), pp. 66–82.

95. Koznarsky, "Kharkiv Literary Almanacs," pp. 217–219.

96. *Ibid.*, p. 219.

97. Tsarinnyi, "Mysli malorossiianina," p. 43.

98. *Ibid.*, pp. 107–108.

99. Orest Pelech, "Toward a Historical Sociology of Ukrainian Ideologies in the Russian Empire of the 1830s–1840s" (Princeton University, Ph.D. thesis, 1976), pp. 119–196, 207.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

101. *Ibid.*, p. 214.

102. P. Sokhan' et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, 3 vols. (Kyiv, 1990), vol. 1, pp. 150–151.
103. See Kostomarov's proclamation "The Brothers-Ukrainians," in P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 1, p. 170.
104. *Knyhy buttia ukrainskoho narodu*, in P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 1, pp. 166–167.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
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107. "Brothers-Ukrainians" in *ibid.*, vol. 1, p. 170.
108. P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 501.
109. *Ibid.*, p. 570.
110. *Ibid.*, p. 51.
111. *Ibid.*
112. See the interrogation of Markovych in P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 3, p. 114.
113. Hulak's letter to Markovych in P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 3, p. 86.
114. H. L. Andruz'kyi, "Zapysky pro poeziu i movu," in P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 429.
115. *Ibid.*, p. 430.
116. P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 502.
117. See the letter of Bilozers'kyi to Markovych in P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 3, p. 207.
118. However, as Paul Robert Magocsi convincingly proved, independence is not necessarily a goal of national movements. See his "Ukrainian National revival."
119. P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiivs'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 1, p. 298.
120. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
121. N. I. Kostomarov, *Ob istoricheskom znachenii russkoi narodnoi poezii* (Kharkiv, 1843), as quoted in P. M. Fedchenko, ed., *Istoriia ukrainskoï literaturnoi krytyky ta literaturoznavstva. Khrestomatiia* (Kyiv, 1996), part 1, p. 214.
122. *Ibid.*
123. *Ibid.*, p. 215.
124. *Ibid.*, p. 216.
125. *Idem*, "Obzor sochinenii, pisannykh na malorossiiskom iazyke," in his *Tvory*, 2 vols. (Kyiv, 1967), vol. 2, p. 375.
126. *Ibid.*, p. 376.
127. *Idem*, *Ob istoricheskom znachenii*, p. 216.
128. *Idem*, "Obzor sochinenii," p. 377.
129. *Ibid.*
130. *Ibid.*, p. 381.
131. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 384.

134. P. Sokhan', et al., eds., *Kyrylo-Mefodiïus'ke tovarystvo*, vol. 2, p. 66.
135. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
136. *Ibid.*, p. 69; compare Kulish, "Ukraïna. Od bat'ka Khmelnyts'koho . . ." (Kyiv, 1843).
137. *Idem*, *Povest' ob ukrainskom narode* (Saint Petersburg, 1846), p. 2.
138. *Ibid.*
139. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
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142. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
143. Taras Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, 6 vols., vol. 6: *Lysty, notatky, fol'klorni zapysy* (Kyiv, 1964), pp. 312–315.
144. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
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146. Shevchenko, *Povne zibrannia tvoriv*, vol. 6, pp. 314–315.
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*“Serhiy Bilenky greatly enriches our understanding of Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian political imaginations by examining them during their formative period, the age of Romantic nationalism. He distills the complex and contradictory visions held by intellectuals who took part in a Polish-Russian-Ukrainian encounter in the 1830s and 1840s, broadening our vision beyond the bounds of more standard and static treatments of national ideologies.”*

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This book explores the political imagination of Eastern Europe in the 1830s and 1840s, when Polish, Russian, and Ukrainian intellectuals came to identify themselves as belonging to communities known as nations or nationalities. Bilenky approaches this topic from a transnational perspective, revealing the ways in which modern Russian, Polish, and Ukrainian nationalities were formed and refashioned through the challenges they presented to one another, both as neighboring communities and as minorities within a given community. Further, all three nations defined themselves as a result of their interactions with the Russian and Austrian empires. Fueled by the Romantic search for national roots, they developed a number of separate, yet often overlapping and inclusive senses of national identity, thereby producing myriad versions of Russianness, Polishness, and Ukrainianness.

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