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## *PERSISTENT PATTERNS OF THE UKRAINIAN APPARATUS*

Legal dissolution of the Communist Parties in the former Soviet Union has not, and probably could not, mean that the *nomenklatura* or apparatus established by the Party in earlier decades has vanished. On the contrary, huge bureaucracies associated with the *nomenklatura* have continued to function during the transitional period following the abortive coup of August 1991. Although in many respects these relics of the Marxist-Leninist regime may impede progress toward a more efficient and democratic administration, it is hard to see how civil societies in any of the republics can provide substitutes for the administrative skills, skewed as they are, that these bureaucrats possess. Indeed, in all the ex-Soviet republics former apparatus members occupy top political positions as well as purely administrative posts. This is as true for Russia, headed by former *obkom* secretary turned reformer, Boris Yel'tsin, as it is for Central Asian republics like Uzbekistan, where the grip of the apparatus is almost undiminished.

Ukraine at present occupies an intermediate position. Non-apparatus elements like *Rukh* constitute prominent minorities in the national parliament. In the western provinces, resentment of Soviet rule is so strong that apparatus influence is vestigial except in fields like frontier controls and economic management. But the Ukrainian President, Leonid Kravchuk is a former republic Party secretary for ideological affairs, and the Prime Minister, Leonid Kuchma, was a top industrial director.<sup>1</sup> Kravchuk has repeatedly and volubly denounced the Marxist-Leninist indoctrination he once supervised, while Kuchma gropes for non-socialist ways of reorganizing the economy. It is difficult to predict whether consistent change will continue, even at the painfully slow rate of 1991-93, or whether official Ukrainian leaders, confronting pressures and near-disastrous domestic difficulties, will slip back toward Soviet administrative techniques.

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1. On Kravchuk, see especially Vladimir Ruban in *Moskovskie novosti*, 7 June 1992 (condensed in *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* [hereafter cited as *Current Digest*], 44, no. 22, pp. 17-18); on Kuchma, see Sergei Leskov, *Izvestiia*, 14 Jan. 1993 (condensed in *Current Digest*, 45, no. 2, p. 21), and the interview in *Ukrainian Quarterly*, 49 (Spring 1993), 5-13. Kuchma resigned in September 1993.

In either case, it is certain that the traditions, behavioral cues and role models inculcated in both men during their lengthy, successful apprenticeships in the pre-1991 apparatus will not be entirely obliterated. If archives of the Ukrainian Party are opened and interviews in depth of its veterans become feasible, we shall have far more evidence about the nature and persistence of apparatus indoctrination. But experience—in both Moscow and Kiev—suggests that, except on a highly selective basis, availability of the most relevant Party sources is years in the future, while former *apparatchiki* are unlikely to provide frank information on their earlier influences.

In the meantime, retrospective scrutiny of the Ukrainian apparatus, as it developed under Stalin and persisted under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, should offer important suggestions concerning the kinds of influences it may continue to exert upon former members. A great deal of the data for this scrutiny was collected nearly 40 years ago and was reported, from quite a different perspective, in my book, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (1959). Other information appeared during the early Brezhnev era and was reported by Joel Moses and to lesser extent in my own articles.<sup>2</sup> Toward the end of the Brezhnev era, I was able to obtain a limited amount of new data (notably on Mykhailo Burmystenko) from Soviet informants. At this stage of our continuing investigation of the background on which current Ukrainian leaders are building, it seems important to present significant elements of this data in an integrated interpretation, so that future investigators will have a starting-point (incomplete though it necessarily is) for more systematic research.

## UKRAINIAN APPARATUS AND ALL-UNION APPARATUS

Although the Ukrainian apparatus conformed in general to the centralized patterns of Soviet institutions, circumstances provided the former with several peculiar characteristics. In all parts of the USSR, the Great Purge of 1936-38 drastically altered earlier patterns of apparatus operations. "Old Bolshevik" attitudes and patterns of behavior were superseded, even when the men who held them had fervently sided with Stalin in the disputes of the 1920s. In Russian areas, a majority of the top and middle-level officials were dismissed, and usually were killed or incarcerated. In Ukraine, the carnage was far more extreme. By the end of 1938, all officials elected to the 1937 Party Central Committee there

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2. Joel C. Moses, *Regional Party Leadership and Policy-Making in the USSR* (New York: Praeger, 1974), and "Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk," *Soviet Union*, 3, no. 1 (1976); John A. Armstrong, "The 'Dnepropetrovtsy' as Young Men," *Problems of Communism*, 24 (1975), 86-88.

had been displaced except two — and one of those was an elderly army general irrelevant for our considerations.<sup>3</sup> Subsequent turnover was considerable, but there was enough continuity of personnel to permit the establishment of standard operating procedures and more subtle socialization mechanisms. Hence, our consideration can start with the apparatus as it existed on the eve of the traumatic events connected with World War II.

The men of '38 were all of humble social origin, i.e., in Marxist-Leninist terms were "exploited" rather than "exploiters."<sup>4</sup> In that respect they resembled the urban workers who had been most enthusiastic about agricultural collectivization nearly a decade earlier.<sup>5</sup> In Ukraine, however, two-thirds of the apparatus members indicated peasant origin in their biographies, in contrast to industrial-worker background. Given the fact that working-class families were usually only a generation removed from the village, the distinction may not be highly significant.

The outstanding example of an apparatus leader of "proletarian" background, republic second secretary Myhailo Burmystenko, had parents (see below) who began life in a village just after the abolition of serfdom, but who (by 1917) were completely identified with the urban working class and the Bolshevik Party.

In any case, full-time occupations in the Party or state posts within the *nomenklatura* of the Ukrainian Party drastically altered opportunities and outlook on life. Although insecurity remained extreme even for the successful official (especially while Stalin lived), he had a reasonable chance of attaining very important posts. Consequently, his motivations were bound to differ from those of even the most ardent rank-and-file Party members. Officially, "careerism" was objectionable, indeed synonymous with personal aggrandizement. But it was commendable to take satisfaction in advancement to positions where one could be socially useful.

A renowned *obkom* secretary, Aleksei Fedorov, in a work intended for edification of the Communist Youth (*Komsomol*), wrote: "The Soviet person will find nothing particularly novel in my biography. It can be summed up in a few words: I was educated and led forward by the Party, by Soviet power. My mental horizon and my interests broadened hand in hand with the cultural development of the country."<sup>6</sup> Characteristic of this sort of memoir was the tinge of class resentment: "If not for the

3. Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 6.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

5. Lynne Viola, *The Best Sons of the Fatherland: Workers in the Vanguard of Soviet Collectivization* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987).

6. A. F. Fyodorov, *The Underground R. C. Carries On* (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1952), p. 37.

Revolution I would have had a bad time of it in my youth. No responsible girl would have married the likes of me — an illegitimate child.”<sup>7</sup> Taken together, these two motifs indicate keen appreciation of the *apparatchik*'s enhanced life chances — a most powerful motivation for supporting the system.

Superficially, the situation of the Ukrainian apparatus operating among a population four-fifths ethnically Ukrainian was different from that of Party apparatus members and activists in the Russian Republic. In both countries, however, after collectivization Party elements acted as urban garrisons dominating the surrounding peasants. Conversely (as I noticed during a visit in 1956 to the Kiev countryside), Russians or Russified elements sent from Kiev city or Khar'kiv often could not understand the peasants' speech. The cleavage was more pronounced in the western provinces. *Apparatchiki* from Russian regions perhaps remembered ancestral ties to ethnically similar villages more often than Ukrainian counterparts sent to the countryside. Ordinarily, though, the overriding cleavage was between peasants attracted to religion, traditional ways and private farming on the one hand, and urban men attracted by Party careers, a superficially rational ideology and the Utopian promises of “socialism,” on the other.<sup>8</sup>

The regime took advantage of this situation to recruit Ukrainians in constantly diminishing proportions as they ascended the elite pyramid. In 1933 the composition of the populations of the Ukrainian Republic was 80 percent Ukrainian, 9.2 percent Russian and 5.4 percent Jewish.<sup>9</sup> In the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian Republic that was elected in 1938, Ukrainians were only 61 percent, with Russians accounting for 27 percent.<sup>10</sup> In 1940 only 63.1 percent of Party members were Ukrainian, compared to 19.1 percent Russians and 13.4 percent Jews. The Party Congress elected in 1940 contained still fewer Ukrainians (55 percent) proportionately, whereas Russians (38 percent) replaced both Ukrainians and Jews. In a purely urban setting (the Kiev City Party Conference in 1940), Ukrainians were a clear minority (45.7 percent), compared to 26.2 percent Russians and 25.4 percent Jewish delegates.<sup>11</sup> Officially, as Fedorov (and later Khrushchev himself) insisted, the loyal *apparatchik* was to treat national origins as a decidedly secondary consideration.

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7. *Ibid.*

8. John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism* (New York: Random House, 1961), pp. 5-7.

9. *Bol'shuia Sovetskaia entsiklopediia*, 1st ed., vol. SSSR (Moscow: "Sovetskaia entsiklopediia," 1948), p. 60.

10. *Visti*, 26 June 1940.

11. *Kolhospyk Ukraïny* 17 May and 6 Feb. 1940.

## INDOCTRINATION: SYSTEM AND THEMES

In contrast to recruitment patterns, socialization patterns were closely linked to the Party's major mission: indoctrination of the masses. The topics listed in Table 1 suggest the relative importance of these concerns during the years just before Soviet involvement in World War II.<sup>12</sup>

Table 1.

## TOPICS AT PARTY MEETINGS, 1938-MAY 1941

	<i>Lenin Raikom Bureau, Khar'kov City</i>		<i>Central Committee, KPU</i>			
	1938	1939	1938	1939	1940	1941
Party work with masses	12	19	-	-	-	-
Agitation work in factories	1	24	-	-	-	-
Content of Party teaching and Propaganda	1	7	-	-	-	-
Supreme Soviet elections	-	-	2	-	-	-
SUBTOTAL FOR IDEOLOGY:	(14)	(50)	(2)	-	-	-
Internal Party activities (admissions, appointments)	44	97	3	1	1	-
Economic topics	5	27	6	7	2	5
Defense topics	-	-	-	1	-	-

The large total number of topics considered in the *Lenin Raikom* (Ward) Bureau are explained by the fact that those bureaus often met more than once a week, whereas Ukrainian Central Committee sessions occurred only ten times in three and one-half years. The proportionately large number of Central Committee economic topics arises from the high salience of agricultural and industrial questions for the Union Republic as a whole, whereas an urban *raikom* not only had no agricultural jurisdiction, but exerted very little influence on industrial organizations within its borders. It is harder to account for the notably greater attention

12. Data for the Ukrainian Central Committee are derived from *Ukrains'kyi Istorychnyi Zhurnal*, no. 3 (1958), 128-30. Data from the *Lenin raikom* are from Nikolai G. Korzhinskii, "Voprosy partiinogo stroitel'stva v predvoenneiu 1938-1941 gody," candidate diss. in history, Kiev University, 1952, pp. 133ff.

devoted to indoctrination in the *raikom*. Apparently it exercised close supervision of a range of questions which the Central Committee ordinarily left to its Politburo and its specialized sections.

Prominent in the attention of both the top Party body and the lower-level bureau, though, is concern for internal Party organization and for cadres. In mid-1935, following Stalin's lead, the Soviet press took up the slogan, "cadres decide everything."<sup>13</sup> But the wholesale bloodletting of the Great Purge delayed practical implementation of this objective. At the 18th All-Union Party Congress in 1939, however, the regime was ready to proceed with rebuilding its cadres. Special secretaries for cadres and for ideology were designated at all levels, from the *obkom* up. Both specialized secretaries, however, were directly subordinated to a higher secretary (usually the second secretary), who devoted most attention to personnel problems.

Ideology continued to be important, although linked to a crude instrument, Stalin's *History of the CPSU: A Short Course*.<sup>14</sup> But aspects particularly vital to cadre indoctrination were stressed. These included anti-religious propaganda and Russian-Ukrainian association, as expressed, for instance, in the Treaty of Periaslav in 1654. An entire scenario revolved around the "lesser evil" theory allegedly exemplified in this treaty — i.e., the contention that subjugation to a reactionary Tsar was preferable objectively to continued Ukrainian association with Polish feudalists.<sup>15</sup> Although both the Periaslav campaign and the anti-religious drive had begun earlier, they appeared to be especially suited to combat anti-Soviet attitudes originating in West Ukraine.

Lip service still was given to precedence in admitting those of worker or peasant background; in 1940 Second Secretary M. O. Burmystenko criticized their smaller proportion among new members. But nearly all regional summaries of admissions boasted of the number of specialists admitted — particularly engineers, agronomists and the like, who were hardly rank-and-file material in either urban or rural milieus. From 1938 on, the Party recognized its needs for members with above average education. Attaining that primary objective would have produced an apparatus with members normally educated at the secondary-school level. By 1939 that goal had been achieved for Ukrainian *obkom* secretaries (79.4 percent) and even, to considerable extent, for Ukrainian Republic Supreme Soviet delegates (41.3 percent), but was far from the norm for *gorkom* and *raikom* secretaries.<sup>16</sup>

13. *Pravda*, 6 May 1935.

14. (New York: International Publishers, 1939) and numerous versions in other languages.

15. See M. N. Petrov's'kyi, *Narysy z istorii Ukraïny* (Kiev: Akademiiia nauk URSR, 1940), p.

16. *Kolhospyk Ukraïny* 5 July 1939.

Naturally, the place to start encouraging enhanced formal training was the Communist Youth Organization. One of the few women highly vocal in the prewar apparatus, Ukrainian *Komsomol* Secretary Maria M. Pidtychenko, repeatedly emphasized this objective.<sup>17</sup> Considerably later, at the Ukrainian Party Congress preparatory to the 19th All-Union Congress, Pidtychenko advanced a proposal unprecedented and never repeated: “that a Communist must attain, at a minimum, a general secondary education.”<sup>18</sup> It is noteworthy that this striking amendment to the Party Statutes was proposed during Stalin’s final months — and that both it and its author shortly afterward disappeared from public view.<sup>19</sup>

When an administrative elite is unable (or unwilling) to establish fixed educational requirements for its recruits, the usual alternative is to provide supplementary in-service training.<sup>20</sup> The system of Party schooling was, in fact, well underway before World War II. Interesting details appear in a Soviet dissertation.<sup>21</sup> Just after the Great Purge ended, if conditions in Poltava Province were typical, an extensive network of Party schooling was in place, enrolling more than 9,000 students — about half the Party membership. But over a third of these were in the insipid *Short Course* circles, and virtually all the rest (except for a few hundred in “political schools for persons with slight literacy”) apparently did little to advance their general education.<sup>22</sup> Moreover, the author admits that in Poltava as well as in industrial *Stalino Oblast’*, even among the designated Party propagandists one-half had no specific preparation for their task. Still, 1,900 new members, probably a majority of those admitted in Poltava *Oblast’*, were in occupations such as engineer, agronomist and teacher, requiring education above the elementary level.<sup>23</sup> By the end of 1940, however, Evening Universities of Marxism-Leninism had been opened in at least five Ukrainian *oblast’* centers: Kiev, Khar’kiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Poltava and Stalino, as well as in eight large urban centers in the industrial *oblast’*s.<sup>24</sup> Although hardly “higher education,” the offerings of these Party schools obviously strengthened the education of members in urban centers, in contrast with rural areas.

17. *Stalinskoe plemia* (Kiev), 18 Sept. 1940.

18. *Pravda Ukrainy*, 24 Sept. 1952.

19. Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 41, 44, note 27.

20. John A. Armstrong, *The European Administrative Elite* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1973), esp. pp. 201-02.

21. Nikolai A. Boldyrev, “Bor’ba kommunisticheskoi partii za marksistsko-leninskoe vospitanie kadrov v gody tretei piatiletki (1938-1941 gg.),” candidate diss., Department of Marxism-Leninism, Kiev State University, 1955, pp. 195, 207.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 240. I assume that admissions in Poltava were about average in number for the Ukrainian Party during this time.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

Real efforts to improve the general education as well as the indoctrination of the great majority of the men of 1938 had to be postponed for many years. Once the war crisis and its immediate aftereffects had been surmounted, a significant portion of the survivors in high position were detached for up to two years of full-time retraining in new Higher Party Schools. Along with heavy doses of reindoctrination, these schools did convey, to men with sketchy formal education, advanced training in practical subjects such as Russian language, accounting and administrative technique.<sup>25</sup>

More important, perhaps, was the confidence and *esprit de corps* instilled by association with a select peer group of men who, lacking higher education, had pulled themselves to the top by their bootstraps. For a man like A. I. Haiiovoi, who had entered the Party in 1930, headed the state apparatus in Stalino and the Party in Voroshilovgrad before the war, played major roles in wartime production and reconstruction, and entered the Ukrainian Politburo, a diploma from the Higher Party School in 1952 might seem almost derisory. But Haiiovoi's superiors in the apparatus must have considered his detachment for full-time study a good investment. He rendered ten more years of service before his death.<sup>26</sup>

### ELITE REWARDS AND PRESSURES

The last remarks imply that assignments, even for very high officials, were justified exclusively by the good of the service or, in more ideological terms, by their utility for "constructing socialism." Considering the influence of patronage groups and favoritism, this would seem to be a gross exaggeration. Nevertheless, it is clear that (at least until the Brezhnev era) Party officials who got ahead were compelled to subordinate personal preferences, family concerns and even health to the crushing demands of the job.<sup>27</sup> The wartime emergency, requiring enormous human sacrifices everywhere, made such demands understandable. But the same disregard for personal needs appeared during the years before the war, and long thereafter. One can assume that not all successful *apparatchiki* fully internalized these requirements; but those clever enough to get ahead surely understood that unquestioned external conformity to them was the *sine qua non* for success in the apparatus.

The fact that material rewards (not inconsiderable by Soviet standards) for the apparatus elite also centered on their work status further

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25. Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 37-40.

26. Moses, "Regional Cohorts."

27. See Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 12, 23-24, and Vsevolod Kochetov, *Sekretar' Obkoma* (Moscow: "Molodaia Gvardiia," 1962), pp. 8-16, 98, 216.

enhanced job significance. Some privileges were justified as direct enhancement of job performance. Given the scarcity of automobiles and the difficulties of driving and maintaining them on the incredibly bad roads, a full-time chauffeur was a real necessity for important officials. Hunting, a restricted and relatively expensive sport, seems to have been widespread among members of the apparatus; its value as preparation for wartime duties, especially in partisan warfare, became evident.

Equally evident was the utility of highly trained aides for top officials bearing heavy responsibilities. P. N. Hapochka, Khrushchev's chief assistant immediately before the war and at his headquarters at the Ukrainian Front, was a Central Committee alternate with a doctor of philosophy degree — a very advanced attainment in the Soviet system. The importance of Hapochka's position is suggested by the fact that the Ukrainian Party secretaries gathered in his office to watch the German bombing of Kiev.<sup>28</sup>

Until the Brezhnev period and after, little was said about provision for the families of officials. Housing was probably the most important perquisite. In the Belorussian capital of Minsk at least one-fourth of the top apparatus officials resided (in 1956) in six new apartment buildings. Food and other material items were also provided for officials, and undoubtedly benefitted their dependents. In some cases, benefits to dependents were more direct. The elderly mother of M. O. Burmystenko moved from Penza to Kiev to live with him after her husband died. Unlike many ordinary civilians who became victims of Nazi persecution, she was evacuated to the Urals before Kiev was encircled. Later she was moved to Moscow to live with her second eldest son after the Soviet capital was no longer threatened.<sup>29</sup> The four Burmystenko sons, all active in Party, police or military bureaucracies, endeavored to keep in touch with each other. Similar anecdotes telling of brothers' concern for each other's welfare during the early days of the war are presented, approvingly, in a memoir of the Dnipropetrovsk apparatus.<sup>30</sup>

As decades passed, the men of '38 undoubtedly took an interest in furthering the careers of their children. In many cases, this interest (which the regime openly encouraged, at least for "worker dynasties" in skilled occupations) amounted to establishing inter-generational traditions of family service. In numerous instances, such as the prominent third-generation service of Burmystenkos to Soviet journalism, this encouragement was justified from the system's standpoint. In other cases (like

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28. K. S. Hrushevoi, *Togda, v sorok pervom...* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1974), p. 18.

29. *Penzenskaja Pravda*, 14 Sept. 1976 (from a photocopy sent me by A. I. Burmystenko).

30. *Ibid.*; Hrushevoi, *Togda, v sorok pervom*, p. 163.

the way in which Brezhnev's children turned unwarranted favoritism into protection of corruption), the systemic results were deplorable.

Even less savory were the family affairs of the Shchelokovs. USSR Minister of Internal Affairs N. A. Shchelokov was Brezhnev's classmate at the Dniprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute and later (in 1941) headed the Dnipropetrovsk city government. Charged in 1983 (after Brezhnev's death) with misappropriating valuable antiques, Shchelokov and his wife committed suicide after they had been expelled from their apartment in a building occupied by the Brezhnevs. Evidently Shchelokov's son Igor, a top *Komsomol* official, was implicated in the thefts.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, at least between 1938 and 1941 the power elite of the Party and police apparatuses were far from becoming an hereditary oligarchy.

Although top officials in the Ukraine constituted an elite in that they were indispensable instruments of Stalin's rule, they were at that time not yet even a single-generation oligarchy. Under Khrushchev, self-preservation taught the elite to reach agreement on eliminating terror. Eventually that solidarity proved so strong that the elite could unite to oust Khrushchev himself. Still later, tacit solidarity degenerated into a mutual-protection pact during Brezhnev's final years. But the incipient solidarity of 1938-41 afforded a modicum of security within the circle of Ukrainian officials — while doing little if anything for the multitudes outside that circle.

A salient aspect of solidarity, stressed by Joel C. Moses in his searching analyses of the later Ukrainian apparatus, was localism.<sup>32</sup> Transfers among *oblast's* were fairly frequent, and transfers out of the Ukrainian apparatus not uncommon. While Ukraine was under occupation by the Germans during World War II, the latter type of transfer was indispensable; even earlier transfers from eastern *oblast's* to newly-acquired Polish and Lithuanian territories were systematic. Otherwise, it was acceptable for a man to make his entire career, including his educational preparation, in a single *oblast'*. Naturally, this practice fostered the formation of solidarity groups on a territorial basis.

Those familiar with American politicians' appeal to home-state sentiment may find such attitudes self-explanatory. But many administrative organizations governing large countries have taken precisely the opposite position: high officials are transferred after brief (two-three year) tenures to avoid local favoritism and to avert solidarity that could

31. "The Young Heirs," by Evgenyi Dodolev in *Nedelia*, no. 29 (1988); abstracted in *Current Digest*, 60, no. 32, p. 14. A. Petrushov, "The Face and the Mask," *Pravda*, 15 Dec. 1989; excerpted in *Current Digest*, 61, no. 50, pp. 24-25. *The New York Times*, 14 Aug. 1983.

32. Moses, "Regional Cohorts," p. 73. Moses, *Regional Party Leadership*, pp. 143-45.

seriously threaten authority. Yet there is no evidence that the Soviet system, either under Stalin or under his successors, systematically practiced the turnover of officials for these reasons. Possibly the elite regard the overt and implicit sanctions available to the center sufficient to obviate the danger of localism. Further, they may have considered officials, especially in Ukraine, to be so isolated from the masses that centrifugal actions were impossible. During Brezhnev's later years such local connections brought about virtually autonomous machines in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Even earlier, in Ukraine and elsewhere, the potential for local connections permitted territorial solidarity to function as a basis for elite cleavages.

### APPARATUS CLEAVAGES

From the start, the post-Purge apparatus was divided in a manner peculiar to Ukraine. In many non-Russian territories, the Stalinist balancing system required a non-native second secretary to check a first secretary who was appointed (in a kind of virtual representative capacity) from among the indigenous majority. Superficially, the situation in Ukraine during 1938-41 fit this pattern. First Secretary Khrushchev was much older, had been a Party member longer and (as a member of the Politburo of the CPSU) was unquestionably senior in status to Second Secretary Burmystenko. On the other hand, Stalin from time to time treated Khrushchev like a buffoon; later, during the post-war years, Stalin displaced Khrushchev from his top Ukrainian post when things were not going well. Khrushchev had not been born in Ukraine and avowed that he did not speak the language well. Thirty years ago analysts found it difficult to compare him with Mykhailo O. Burmystenko, because so little was known about that "enigmatic" figure. Today we have almost as much information about Burmystenko as we have for Khrushchev and Brezhnev.

Earlier remarks about the solidarity of the Burmystenko family suggest part of their story. It was not quite an Old-Bolshevik family: the father, Aleksei Ivanovich, did not join the Party until the February Revolution. But he had been active in revolutionary and trade-union affairs, as he advanced from poor peasant to worker status in the ethnically mixed regions of Saratov and Penza *gubernii*. The name "Burmystenko," unlike "Khrushchev," quite probably was of Ukrainian origin; but the family apparently had long ago lost contact with Ukrainian culture. But Aleksei Ivanovich's close association with Mykola Skrypnyk, who directed his organizational work in the trade unions, may have

awakened some sense of ethnic ancestry.<sup>33</sup> Although an early Social Democrat, Skrypnyk became a leading exponent of cultural Ukrainism, as well as a supporter of Lenin. Whether this remote Ukrainian connection played any role in Mykhailo Burmystenko's appointment to the number two Party position in Kiev is uncertain. Still, it is likely that Moscow was glad to have such a trustworthy, experienced official in the Ukrainian capital — especially one with a Ukrainian name.

Probably it was M. O. Burmystenko's record and not his ethnic origin that decided his appointment. Like his father and at least one of his three brothers, Mykhailo in his youth had worked for the Cheka, shortly after joining the Party in 1919. But he also had served as a Red Army commissar and (like his brothers) had eagerly seized opportunities for education available to reliable working-class youths.<sup>34</sup> While his brothers chose technological studies or advanced Marxism-Leninism, Mykhailo (who had attended the Leningrad Communist University before military service) chose journalism.

After practical experience in the Volga German Autonomous Republic (apparently editing a Russian-language newspaper entitled *Trudovaia Pravda*), M. O. Burmystenko attended the Communist Institute of Journalism. Then he served briefly in other ethnically mixed areas of the southeastern RSFSR. His promotion to a key central position came just at the beginning of the Great Purge, when he became instructor, then director of the Section for Directing Party Organs. Apart from temporary field assignments (according to an emigre report in September 1937 he accompanied Ivan Serov to Ukraine to arrange the drastic purge of the apparatus there), Burmystenko remained in Moscow until January 1938.<sup>35</sup> Quite possibly he was being groomed for the second most important Ukrainian post, which he assumed as acting Second Secretary on 28 January, with regular "election" coming in June.<sup>36</sup>

Such rapid promotion at a critical moment in Soviet politics demonstrates that Burmystenko had not become too intimately involved with Nikolai Ezhov, the fading NKVD chieftain who had directed the most extreme phase of the Great Purge. Indeed, Burmystenko perhaps had become aligned with Malenkov, although there is no clear evidence on that point. In any case, the overall record leaves little doubt that the key figures under Stalin after Ezhov's removal — Malenkov, Zhdanov and Beria — regarded Burmystenko as exceptionally adept at organizational maneuvers. He was a fairly obvious counter-balance to Khrushchev,

33. *Penzenskaia Pravda*, 14 Sept. 1976.

34. *Ibid.* Also, *Visti*, 28 Jan. 1938.

35. A Tikhomirov ed., "Na sluzhbe u Stalina: Isповed' chekista" (MS 25, CPSU Archive, Columbia Univ. Libraries), p. 76.

36. *Vecherniaia Moskva*, 29 Jan. 1938.

whose limited education and blunt, folksy style may have repelled the manipulators in Moscow.

During the following years Burmystenko was almost as prominent in the Ukrainian press as Khrushchev. In addition, Burmystenko often wrote on Ukrainian themes for the Moscow Party press.<sup>37</sup> One reason for his popularity, no doubt, was his journalistic ability. But purely technical skill never has achieved continued prominence for an official of the apparatus unless powerful patrons have had reason to keep his name before the public. Although Burmystenko wrote and spoke on more general themes, such as the occupation of West Ukraine, he concentrated on Party affairs: appointments, admissions, internal organization and ideology — all vital in the considerations of Party bodies during this period.

Like other regional second secretaries, Burmystenko exercised supervision over both the ideological and the cadre sections. His personal interest obviously lay in the latter field, which he argued must be concentrated in a single hand.<sup>38</sup> Formally, that hand was not Burmystenko's, but that of the Central Committee Secretary for Cadres, Mosei Semenovich Spivak. Apparently relations between the two men were harmonious; in the late 1970s, when sympathy for Jews was unpopular in the Soviet Union, a member of the Burmystenko family described Spivak as "very bright, intelligent and energetic."<sup>39</sup> After Burmystenko was killed during the Soviet military retreat from Kiev — thereby becoming the highest-ranking Soviet Party official to die through enemy action during World War II — Spivak assumed many of the duties that might have been assigned to Burmystenko, had he survived. Unfortunately, Spivak could not survive in high positions during the more vicious anti-Semitic campaign of Stalin's final years.

There were yet other ways in which the men of '38 were divided into career interest groups. One example (pursued at length in *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*) was cleavage between ideological officials on one hand and line or territorial officials on the other. Since Andrei Zhdanov's death in 1948, this cleavage seems to have decreased, despite the actions in the CPSU Politburo of another ideologist, Mikhail Suslov. Hence, there is no ground for supposing that Leonid Kravchuk was involved in a cleavage with the territorial apparatus. Other cleavages (as the discus-

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37. Apart from his reported speeches, a highly incomplete selection of M. O. Burmystenko's publications includes "Smelee vydvigat' kadry," *Partiinoe stroitel'stvo*, March 1939; "O podbore i vydvizhenii kadrov," *ibid.*, Aug. 1939; "Vossoedinenie velikogo ukrainskogo naroda v edinom ukrainskom gosudarstve," *ibid.*, Nov. 1939; "Za individual'nyi pokhod k kommunistam," *ibid.*, 1 Feb. 1938; "Vybory rukovodiashchikh partiinykh organov na Ukraine," *Pravda*, 23 Apr. 1938.

38. *Kolhospyk Ukrainy*, 5 July 1939.

39. Personal communication.

sion of localism suggested) have revolved around regional patronage groups. These followings have tended to be strong in all major *oblast's*: Kiev, Khar'kiv, Odessa, Donets and Dnipropetrovsk. Although much might yet be learned from intensive research, there is now no evidence for tracing distinctive postures by the Kiev, Khar'kiv and Odessa apparatuses back to the 1938-41 period.

The condition of patronage in the Donbas *oblast's* (Stalino, now Donets; Voroshilovgrad, now Luhansk), which tend to act as a single unit in matters of personnel, was more pronounced in earlier times. Then, the importance of coal mining and steel production in the region made it crucial for the Soviet economy; today the political role of Donbas coal miners may decide the fate of independent Ukraine. With a population that is predominantly urban and ethnically mixed, the Donbas appeared to pose fewer special problems for the Soviet regime than did the rest of Ukraine. Prior to World War II, the Donbas seemed to be becoming part of G. M. Malenkov's sphere of influence. This appurtenance became evident as his authority grew during the war and he moved into the realm of economic administration.<sup>40</sup>

The importance of the Donbas as a conduit of Moscow's control became most pronounced when L. G. Mel'nikov replaced N. S. Khrushchev as first secretary in 1950. In many respects, Mel'nikov was a typical man of '38, born in 1906, a Party member since 1928. It is not clear that he had a higher education; perhaps it was not needed for his early duties of supervising coal mines as section chief, then as secretary (1939) of the Stalino *obkom*. After directing underground military activities in Stalino (from unoccupied areas), Mel'nikov rose quickly to second secretary of the Ukrainian Party in 1947 and to first secretary three years later. But he fell just as rapidly in June 1953, ostensibly for suppressing Ukrainian culture. What bizarre machinations were involved in this coup during Beria's brief ascendancy remain unknown. After Khrushchev suffered his own fall in 1964, however, Mel'nikov was partially rehabilitated.

The role of the Dnipropetrovtsy as a group remained significant as a balancing agent between Ukrainian apparatus sections close to Khrushchev (especially territorial secretaries stressing agricultural supervision) and industrial-mining administrators linked directly to Moscow. Much information on the Dnipropetrovsk apparatus appears in K. S. Hrushevoi's memoir, which is essentially an "old boy" memorial.<sup>41</sup> The volume on Dnipropetrovsk in the monumental *History of Cities and Villages of the Ukrainian SSR* is far more revealing than most volumes of that series. In addition, Joel Moses's systematic analyses treat earlier available data.<sup>42</sup> Hence, only salient issues require treatment here.

40. *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 67-68.

41. See Armstrong, "Dnepropetrovtsy," pp. 86-88.

42. Moses, "Regional Cohorts."

Within Ukraine, the Dnipropetrovsk region was second to the Donbas as a mineral source, with abundant hydroelectric power and extensive metallurgical and machinery production. The urban centers have been preeminent as training grounds for engineers. Elite graduates of the Dniprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute (DMI) are most prominent. Dnipropetrovsk State University and the Civil Engineering Institute led in mechanical engineering. The Dzerzhynskiy Chemical Technological Institute, the Institute of Railway Transportation Engineers, the Heavy Metallurgical Research Institute, the All-Union Institute for Pipeline Manufacture, the Institute of Geotechnical Mechanics and Dniprodzerzhinsk Industrial Institute all augment the concentration of training facilities in that region.<sup>43</sup> Indicators of trained personnel (which do not take into account movement of graduates out of the *oblast'*) also suggest the preeminence of Dnipropetrovsk *Oblast'*. With 488,000 industrial workers and white-collar employees in 1940, it was behind Stalino, Khar'kiv, Voroshilovgrad and Kiev (including Kiev city) *oblast'*s, and the proportion of all persons with higher education was greater in the old urban centers: Kiev, Khar'kiv and Odessa. The latter two cities even somewhat surpassed Dnipropetrovsk in the percentage of workers having specialized secondary education. But Dnipropetrovsk vastly exceeded the levels (in proportion to total workers) of the other great industrial concentrations in the two Donbas *oblast'*s, as Table 2 shows.

Table 2

NON-AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYMENT AND ADVANCED  
TRAINING IN SELECTED UKRAINIAN *OBLAST'*S<sup>44</sup>

<i>Oblast'</i>	Total Industrial and White-Collar Workers (Thousands)	Workers with Higher Education (Percentage)	Workers with Specialized Secondary Education (Percentage)
Stalino	971	1.8	3.1
Khar'kiv	632	5.0	4.2
Kiev (incl. city)	525	5.8	5.6
Voroshilovgrad	495	1.5	3.1
Dnipropetrovsk	488	3.6	4.8
Odessa	297	5.1	6.5

43. *Istoriia Mist i Sil URSR. Dnipropetrovs'ka Oblast'* (Kiev: Holovna Redaktsiia Ukraïns'koi Radians'koi Entsyklopedii, 1969), pp. 108-10.

44. Calculated from data in *Narodnoe Hospodarstvo Ukraïns'koi RSR* (Kiev: Derzhavne Statystychnye Vydavnytstvo, 1957), pp. 386, 389. The data on education is for 1 Jan. 1941.

Fragmentary information suggests that the Dnipropetrovsk officials felt a special affinity for the apparatus of the Donbas *oblast's*. The first secretary in Voroshilovgrad, A. I. Haiiovyi, seems to have been especially cordial to evacuees from Dnipropetrovsk during the dark days of late 1941.<sup>45</sup> S. B. Zadionchenko, then Dnipropetrovsk first secretary and at age 41 among the oldest men of '38, was transferred to the equivalent post in Stalino *Oblast'* after Dnipropetrovsk fell to the enemy.<sup>46</sup> Later Zadionchenko headed the Kemerovo (West Siberia) Party organization, but retained a strong interest in the retransfer of industrial plant to the Donbas. Still later, he became a CPSU Central Committee inspector prodding Stalino's miners and administration.

One factor seemingly uniting the two apparatus members was the almost equal division between men of nominal Ukrainian and Russian origin. Apparently both ethnic elements voluntarily adopted the regime's mandate to treat national origin as relatively insignificant. A high proportion of Dnipropetrovtsy police officials had Russian names. This is hardly surprising, given their sponsorship by Brezhnev, born to a Russian worker's family resident in the Dnipropetrovsk area. As an impoverished young student, his best subject, it is said, was Russian. Though evidently not close to Jews as a boy, Brezhnev did marry a Jewish woman.<sup>47</sup> After varied work and military experience, in 1935 Brezhnev completed the DMI, then attained minor state and Party positions. A Party member from 1931, Brezhnev became a Dnipropetrovsk *obkom* secretary in 1939. Unlike most Dnipropetrovtsy, from 1950 his career took him to other regions: to Moldavia as republic first secretary, to Moscow as deputy head of the Main Political Administration of the army, then to successively more important Party posts until he replaced Khrushchev in 1964. His amuensis, Hrushevoi, followed a somewhat similar career, physically divorced from the Ukrainian milieu after 1950.

Clearly, however, neither man lost touch with the Dnipropetrovtsy apparatus circle, which remained a source of strength and apparently real affection for them throughout the next three decades. Especially after 1964, this persistent link became a key factor in socializing younger recruits to the Dnipropetrovtsy group.

By far the most important of this younger element was V. V. Shcherbyts'kyi. Born in 1918, he was slightly older than the typical new recruit. He had just completed five years of study in the Dzerzhynskiyi

45. Hrushevoi, *Togda, v sorok pervom*, p. 174.

46. *Ibid.*, p. 148.

47. *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63. Moses, "Regional Cohorts." *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi entsiklopedii* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia," 1971). *Istoriia Mist i Sil. Dnipropetrovs'ka Oblast'*, p. 453. Nathan Kruglak, "How Brezhnev Got to the Top," *Parade Magazine* (21 May 1972): reminiscences of a Jewish classmate of Brezhnev.

Chemical Technological Institute (at Dnipropetrovsk) when war began. Apparently Shcherbyts'kyi, who already had entered the Party, had been very active in *Komsomol* affairs throughout his studies. After military service (1941-45), he worked in a Dniprodzerzhinsk factory for three years before starting his full-time Party apparatus work. During the following nine years, Shcherbyts'kyi rose to become Dnipropetrovsk *obkom* first secretary (in 1957). Over the next fourteen years, he interchanged this post with a Ukrainian Party secretaryship and stints as chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. Then, in 1971, Shcherbyts'kyi became first secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In spite of a decline of Dnipropetrovsk fortunes after Brezhnev's passing, Shcherbyts'kyi continued to head the Ukrainian Party organization until 28 September 1989 (he died the next year) and was replaced by a younger member of the Dnipropetrovsk apparatus.

### PROJECTIONS

Until the full-blown Soviet oligarchy of 1964-82 emerged, the men of '38 — as the experience of the Dnipropetrovsk testifies — controlled the cooptation process through which younger men became their successors. As a result, neither age nor date of Party entry was decisive. Cohort attachments, although also subject to interruptions caused by mortality, were more significant. The shared experience of intense political and personal peril arising from Stalin's ruthless suspicion produced a durable agreement that such a dictatorship should never again be risked. It must be remembered, too, that men still well below the top, like Shcherbyts'kyi, did experience a savage war and humiliating exposure to Stalin's last whims.

By the late 1960s Party officials were expected to meet the instrumental requirement of having a grasp of modern technology (that is, the heavy industrial technology already becoming obsolete in the West). Hence, throughout the years of oligarchic stagnation the majority of men of '38 (like Brezhnev) equipped with technological education, augmented by their younger coopted successors, remained dominant. But this instrumental requirement facilitated the addition of an additional, non-instrumental criterion: graduation from a technological institution like the DMI associated with older members of the elite. On the whole, this "old school tie" tended to fit in with cohort solidarity based upon regional groupings. Consequently, neither true corps traditions (as in the

French administrative elite) nor arbitrary reliance on sycophants (as under Stalin) prevailed.<sup>48</sup>

To project apparatus patterns into the immediate future is risky; one cannot even be sure that Ukraine will remain an independent republic. Nevertheless, these hypotheses seem worth advancing:

1) A considerable degree of solidarity can be expected among survivors in the apparatus.

2) Resentment of centralization by Moscow, especially as it was enforced by police methods even during the late Brezhnev period, tends to make surviving apparatus members willing to accept Ukrainian independence, along with the weighty baggage of nationalist symbols and slogans of the democratic-market economy, as long as the physical integrity of the apparatus (albeit with reduced but substantive powers) is preserved. These considerations apply especially to enterprise directors and managers.

3) The seemingly successful integration of men (and a very few women) of Ukrainian ethnic origin with Russians (usually long resident in Ukraine) in apparatus segments like the Dnipropetrovtsy establishes a potential link with parliamentary democratic elements like *Rukh*, which defend cultural rights and equal participation for Russian citizens in Ukraine. Today the formula of inter-ethnic association offers native Ukrainians only limited advantages, whereas Shcherbyts'kyi's formula for integration required them to minimize their linguistic and cultural distinctiveness. Probably both Russian and Ukrainian apparatus survivors can adjust to this change of emphasis, for they regard ethnicity as far less significant than retention of influence by the apparatus. Therefore they will not vigorously support Ukrainian independence, but they also might not welcome reunion with a Russia dominated by Panslav nationalists of the *Pamiat'* type. In this relatively "neutral" inclination, the surviving apparatus elite appear close to a significant non-elite group, the Donbas miners.

4) Limited though their technological training and administrative experience may be, apparatus holdovers for the time being may be

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48. One might well inquire whether "old school ties" or sympathy for family members led to outright corruption, in the form of nepotism or abuse of office for illegal monetary gain. Undoubtedly some corruption occurred in Ukraine, as elsewhere, during the late Brezhnev period; but it appears not to have reached the depths reported for Kazakhstan and Central Asia. Apart from the Brezhnev family itself, the most notorious instance involved the case of N. A. Shchelokov, a classmate of Brezhnev at the DMI and later chairman of the Dnipropetrovsk city executive committee, described above. It can be argued that Shchelokov's fall from grace was due to corrupt influences in the Moscow police milieu. It is true that Ukrainian apparatus officials were often prominent in MVD and KGB posts; but some were comparatively liberal in outlook. See Roman Solohanyk's prescient article, "Leadership Changes in the KGB and MVD in the Ukrainian S.S.R.," *Smolaskyp* (Summer 1982).

indispensable for performing major tasks, especially in the economy. As the stagnation of privatization and failure to cope with hyperinflation during the past few years indicate, however, the apparatus heritage is too concerned with maintaining the managerial *status quo* to take steps (as in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Estonia and Armenia) needed for transition to a productive economy able to satisfy pent-up consumer demands. As long as these demands remain unsatisfied, Ukrainian independence, which originally drew support from the widespread belief that a rich, independent Ukraine could do better for its inhabitants than Moscow's centralization, will remain fragile. It is therefore urgent that a new generation of young administrators, socialized to European and American models, be trained to cope with problems of a market economy. So far, measures to produce this new generation have hardly been apparent.

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