

CHAPTER TEN

The Great Ukrainian Jacquerie

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IT IS THE central thesis of this study that if the events of 1918–1920 in the Ukraine are to be accurately interpreted, they must be viewed as parts of a vast and elemental social revolution in which agrarian rebellion played a predominant role. According to this thesis, urban social processes and the actions of intellectuals and political parties, which have long occupied the center of the historical stage in our analysis of these years, must share the limelight with the Ukrainian Jacquerie. More specifically, it is contended here that the political parties active in the Ukraine had, as their chief task, to engraft themselves somehow upon a torrential agrarian social upheaval whose complex manifestations and principal characteristics were not then and are not even now fully comprehended. Thus, whether consciously or not, the political parties clearly struggled to lead and organize a cataclysmic social process which they had little power to control; and, as a result, each of them failed until the Jacquerie had exhausted itself. The purpose of this essay is to examine the character of the agrarian upheaval, its influence on political events, and its relationships with the principal political parties active during this period in the Ukraine.

As a beginning, we must attempt at least a rough definition of the agrarian phenomenon that we wish to discuss. Subsequent pages will add concrete detail to the bare outline presented at this point. Briefly, the “agrarian upheaval” may be characterized as a peasant-Cossack Jacquerie, a series of bloody rebellions, expressing in the most violent terms the agrarian population’s protest at the conditions of its life. This Jacquerie was of immense proportions. It was led by no single group or class or party. Many of its local explosions were legitimized and sustained by traditions and cultural values with roots deep in the Ukrainian past, and its various manifestations

were complicated by the differing historical traditions, agrarian institutions, economic conditions, political experiences, and ethnic conflicts existing in the highly diversified regions of the Ukraine. Chronologically, the duration of the Jacquerie, through many months of swiftly evolving political and economic crises, of national awakening, and of military action against both domestic and foreign enemies, brought a complex series of intense pressures, first upon one local region, then upon another. The result was a social chaos so turbulent that it literally destroyed the best-laid plans of political parties and governments.¹

In studying events in the Ukraine after 1917, scholars customarily focus attention on the actions of a number of political leaders and parties, the governments they established, the armies they raised, and the negotiations or battles they carried on with other parties, governments, and armies. It is obvious, of course, that Ukrainian and Russian political parties and governments, as well as the military expeditions of Western nations, were vital factors in the determination of events during these years of revolution, civil war, and intervention. Equally obvious are the significant influences of Ukrainian Rada and Directory politics, and of the theories, deeds,

¹ The distinguished political scientist Chalmers Johnson defines a Jacquerie rather narrowly as a "mass rebellion of peasants with strictly limited aims—the restoration of lost rights or the removal of specific grievances." He recognizes, of course, that people other than peasants may be involved. The Ukrainian Jacquerie was more complex. While it fulfills the requirements of Johnson's definition, it was also, in part, a continuation of the processes of disorganization and breakdown that followed the collapse of the old regime in 1917; from then until 1920, various substructures of the old social system were seeking to achieve a variety of "new orders." In addition, the Ukrainian Jacquerie embraced a series of anarchistic rebellions by groups that idealized the traditions and supposedly absolute personal freedoms of the distant past. Moreover, intervention by foreigners (including Russian Bolsheviks and Denikin's White armies) provoked a variety of more or less conscious nationalistic responses. Finally, civil war and the chaotic rise and fall of governments further complicated the course of the Jacquerie, compelling partisan bands and leaders to identify their aims variously at different times. See Chalmers Johnson, *Revolution and the Social System*, Hoover Institution Studies, No. 3 (Stanford, California, 1964), pp. 31 ff.; and also his later work, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966), pp. 136 ff.

and schisms of the Social Democrats, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Socialist-Federalists, Progressivists, *Borotbists*, Bundists, Anarchists, and others. It is necessary, therefore, to emphasize that it is not our purpose either to denigrate the influence of these political organizations or to detract from the reputations of their often courageous and intelligent leaders.

Nonetheless, the roles of the political parties have often been so overemphasized as to give the impression that *all* the important forces at work in the Ukraine were concentrated in party centers and in the governments they established. Such overemphasis implies, erroneously, that one may gain complete understanding of the events of 1918–1920 by focusing on the activities of the political parties. Emphasis on a single influential factor to the exclusion of all others frequently weakens the analysis of complex historical processes, for, all too often, major historical events are determined variously—by the character of the actors, by economic, social, political, and cultural influences, or by a sometimes indecipherable procession of accidents or confluence of social forces. The period of the Ukraine's long agony, ending at last with the Bolsheviks' victory in 1920, is a fascinating and tragic example of man's tangled history. To be understood, it must be examined from many sides. Therefore, the very significant role of the rural population in Ukrainian history, which has too often been thrust into the wings of the historical stage, will be brought into focus here.

Any effort to identify the motives of the peasant rebellions of 1918–1920 must begin with a consideration of the most powerful and glorious of all Ukrainian traditions—that of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. No matter what the Zaporozhians may have been in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, whether the founders of a great Ukrainian state or treacherous, irresponsible marauders, their struggles against Polish kings and Russian tsars in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries left a dramatic and noble legacy for the Ukraine's agrarian folk. From the Zaporozhians came a genuine egalitarianism, an anarchistic love of personal freedom that expressed itself in a profound distrust of all authority, and a proud tradition that, when a true Cossack is oppressed, he will rebel and fight with a fine disregard for consequences. This tradition was diffused throughout the Ukraine by the dispersal of the Zaporozhians under Catherine the Great, and it was preserved by Cossack groups

that settled in the Kuban and in Turkish and western Ukrainian territories.²

To the Cossack tradition must be added that of the *haidamaks*, the peasant brigands whose history goes back at least to the seventeenth century. When Polish nobles tried to enslave free peasants on the Dnieper's Right Bank, those peasants rose with scythes and hayforks and massacred their oppressors without mercy. These uprisings were so extensive and bloody that only the brutal intervention of the Empress Catherine's armies brought the peasants under control.³

Events of the past have little significance as motivating forces in later times unless they are somehow transferred to succeeding generations. That the Cossack traditions remained an integral part of the Ukraine's culture at the beginning of the twentieth century is unquestioned. They came into the present century in several ways. The first was through the early development of Ukrainian patriotic and nationalist literature. Scarcely had Catherine succeeded in breaking up the Zaporozhian regiments and scattering them throughout the Ukraine than Ukrainian poets, publicists, and historical scholars began to write of the past with a romantic fervor that gathered force through the years of the nineteenth century. This writing both preserved and glorified Cossack traditions, making the ideals of the past the basis of Ukrainian political objectives in the twentieth century.⁴ Also, while students, professors, and Ukrainian publicists eulogized the Ukraine's past, the people themselves preserved the old traditions with a special devotion: although the Zaporozhian Host was dispersed, Cossack settlements (*stanytsi*) preserved the old military distinctions and organizational frame-

² Mykhailo Hrushevskyy, *A History of Ukraine* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1941), pp. 156-161, 178-179, 452-460; W. E. D. Allen, *The Ukraine: A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1941), pp. 229-232, 259-261; N. D. Polons'ka-Vasylenko, *The Settlement of the Southern Ukraine (1750-1775)* (New York: The Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., 1955), pp. 319-331.

³ Hrushevskyy, pp. 436-445; *Ukraine, A Concise Encyclopaedia*, Vol. I (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 660-661; *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, Vol. VII (St. Petersburg: Tipo-litografiia I. A. Efrona, 1894), pp. 871-873.

⁴ *Ukraine*, Vol. I, pp. 561-569, 960-966, 1007-1017, 1019-1030; Hrushevskyy, pp. 477-482, 484-485, 501-511; Allen, pp. 242-247, 254-255.

work; Cossack political ideas, pride in daring horsemanship and headstrong courage, and the distinctive love of freedom remained. Similarly, service in the Cossack regiments of the tsar's armies helped to keep the traditions vigorous.⁵

As for the *haidamaks*, we too often assume that violent peasant uprisings were over and done with in the eighteenth century. In fact, peasant uprisings continued up to the twentieth century, so that widespread peasant violence both preceded and accompanied the 1905 Revolution.⁶ In the Ukraine, peasant rebellions had never ceased.

Before the First World War, peasant land hunger, overpopulation, and an unstable economy created new reasons for dissatisfaction and drove hundreds of thousands into emigration.⁷ Through the war itself, particularly during the revolutionary year 1917, the old traditions found their counterparts in the loudly trumpeted slogans of revolutionary parties suddenly made bold by the tsar's abdication. Soldiers deserting from the western and southwestern fronts brought back to their villages the pent-up frustrations of defeat along with the exciting idea that reforms made by the people themselves could open up better ways of life. Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Rada proclaimed the ideals of national autonomy and social democracy and began to move toward political separation from the Russian state. The Bolsheviks at Petrograd and Moscow took power in early November and decreed that peasants everywhere should seize and redistribute the lands and farm implements of the nobility, the

⁵ *Entsiklopedicheskii slovar*, Vol. XIII, pp. 883–886; *Ukraine*, Vol. I, 362–364.

⁶ I. I. Ignatovich, *Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v pervoi chetverti XIX veka* (Moscow: Izd. sotsialno-ekonomicheskoi literatury, 1963), Chapters VI, VII, and VIII; N. N. Firsov, "Krestianskie volnenia do XIX veka," in A. K. Dzhivelegov *et al.* (eds.), *Velikaia reforma*, Vol. II (Moscow: Tipografia T-va I. D. Systina, 1911), pp. 48–49, 53, 55, 58–62; Geroid T. Robinson, *Rural Russia Under the Old Regime* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932, 1967), pp. 138–139, 152–155; see the documentary series, *Krestianskoe dvizhenie v Rossii v XIX-nachale XX veka* (Moscow: Izd. 'Nauka,' 1960–65) and also the series under the same title covering the years from 1900 through 1917.

⁷ Konstantyn Kononenko, *Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations between Ukraine and Russia (1654–1917)* (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 1958), pp. 86–88.

church, and the bourgeois farmer.⁸ All these influences added tinder to the flames of peasant rebellion that were to sweep the Ukraine.

By early 1918, the demoralizing processes of Russia's political revolution and military collapse and the breakdown of the Rada's authority definitely marked the end of the old order in the Ukraine. The defenders of the *ancien régime*, its police, its harsh laws, and heavy punishments were paralyzed. Legitimate central authority ceased to exist. Ukrainian Cossacks and peasants, their appetites whetted by disorder and the disappearance of external restraints, recalled with more than usual enthusiasm their traditional faith in freedom and violence. It was as if the old Zaporozhian and *haidamak* Ukraine was beginning to realize that it had the power to shake off the puny reins of the Rada and Bolshevik governments, and it began to think more earnestly than before of restoring old equalities and remembered freedoms.

Into the vacuum of power, where some 33 million people lived (approximately 75 percent of them engaged in agriculture), the Germans moved their occupation troops in February and March of 1918.⁹ By April, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi pushed aside the Rada government to establish his mockery of a Cossack government, supported by German bayonets.¹⁰ The Ukrainian agrarian folk—shocked into excited hope by revolution and the end of the imperial regime, by the land they had seized from wealthy proprietors and by the angry gangs of soldiers who had come home bearing stolen weapons—abruptly found themselves subjects of both the Germans and the Hetmanate government, whose chief missions were to force the countryside to give up its food and livestock to the foreign occupiers and to restore the former land relationships.¹¹

⁸ Allen, p. 279; John S. Reshetar, Jr., *The Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1920: A Study in Nationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 47–50, 60–63, 89; Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic System* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948), pp. 16–18.

⁹ *Ukraine*, Vol. I, pp. 169, 174.

¹⁰ V. Miakotin, "Iz nedalekogo proshlogo," in S. A. Alekseev (ed.), *Revoliutsiia na Ukraine po memuarom belykh* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izd., 1930), p. 222.

¹¹ Iwan Majstrenko, *Borotbism: A Chapter in the History of Ukrainian Communism* (New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1954), pp. 62–63; I. Kapulovskii, "Organizatsiia vosstaniia protiv getmana," *Letopis revoliutsii*, No. 4 (Kharkiv, 1923), pp. 95–102; Ia. Shelygin, "Partizanskaia

With German patrols and Skoropadskyi's collection units scouring the country for provisions, the peasant-Cossack village population began to express its fury in the only way open to it.

The swift burgeoning of rebellion from April through June 1918 is well documented. Numerous pitched battles between peasant rebels and German troops have often been described and need not be detailed here; yet it is useful to point out that within the space of a few weeks some 19,000 Germans lost their lives in the effort to suppress the *haidamaks*, and for a time whole regions were cut off from Hetmanate and German authority.¹² Spattering across the Ukraine, these uprisings provoked others, and rebellious acts grew steadily in numbers and seriousness from May through June. At this point, crushing German retaliations reduced the peasant action for a few weeks, but soon the uprisings increased. This was a hydra-headed monster that could be neither isolated nor suppressed.¹³

A pertinent question to be asked concerning these first months of the Jacquerie is what role the political parties played in fomenting, creating, or directing the fighting. The answer that must be given is that while many parties and local leaders were involved, and while political ideas of many sorts saturated the Ukrainian atmosphere, no single party or leader can legitimately claim to have led the movement. And no one group was ever to control it.

Evidence concerning the influence of political parties is fairly conclusive. While the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary Party—SR's (organized first in April, 1917)—was active during these months, its innumerable factional schisms, lack of bold and vigorous leadership, and ineffective organization prevented it from playing an effective role. The *Borotbists*, a radical, peasant-oriented faction

borba s getmanshchinoi i avstro-germanskoj okkupatsii," *ibid.*, No. 6 [33] (1928), p. 64; M. Gorkii, I. Mintz, and R. Eideman (eds.), *Krakh germanskoj okkupatsii na Ukraine (po dokumentam okkupantov)* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izd., 1936), pp. 28–29, 168–170.

¹² Reshetar, p. 174; *Krakh germanskoj*, p. 167; A. S. Bubnov, S. S. Kamenev, M. N. Tukhachevskii, and R. P. Eideman (eds.), *Grazhdanskaia voina, 1918–1921*, Vol. I (Moscow-Leningrad: Izd. Voennyi Vestnik, 1928–30), pp. 35–46.

¹³ *Krakh germanskoj*, pp. 170–171; V. Primakov, "Borba za sovetiskuui vlast na Ukraine," in *Piat let Krasnoi Armii: sbornik statei, 1918–1923* (Moscow, 1923), pp. 184–187.

of the SR's, was similarly too poorly organized and led to exert great influence. Nor did the important Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party direct the movement, for its main strength lay in the cities, and it had few agents among the peasants.¹⁴ Even the Bolsheviks, who since the event have argued that their influence was predominant, and that indeed they masterminded the rebellions, were in fact working in the dark. The universal uprising which their "Ukrainian" headquarters ordered for August 7, 1918, misfired and provoked retaliations that cost the lives of many Ukrainian partisan fighters who were not even aware that the order had been given. This fiasco so clearly demonstrated the weakness of Bolshevik organization and communications in the Ukraine that the careers of the men who had initiated it went into temporary eclipse.¹⁵

It must be concluded that angry villagers, sick of German agrarian policies and Skoropadskyi's military rule and stirred up by a wide variety of political ideas and local leaders, rose more or less spontaneously. This is not to imply that political leadership was lacking or that political ideas were not present. The point to be emphasized is that the rebels made use of whatever weapon, idea, or political organization fell to hand. They followed with almost equal enthusiasm any local leader or political group that promised to lead them against the enemy—the foreign despoiler and his collaborators.¹⁶ Thus, although each partisan band may have had its ideology, expressed in more or less conscious form, the peasants as a whole fought for objectives more elemental and deeply felt than those embedded in party programs. To generalize these peasant objectives, one might say that they fought for their land, for an end to military oppression, for the food that Skoropadskyi's troops tore from the mouths of their families, and for freedom to run their own affairs. As violence bred a taste for more violence, some of the *haidamak* gangs turned to plunder and rape and anti-Semitic pogroms. They fought to kill Germans, to raid, and to burn and carouse through a

¹⁴ Majstrenko, pp. 37–42, 64–69.

¹⁵ M. Ravich-Cherkasskii, *Istoriia Kommunisticheskoi partii (b-ov) Ukrainy* (Kharkiv: Gosudarstvennoe izd. Ukrainy, 1923), pp. 83–88.

¹⁶ I. Mazepa, *Ukraina v ohni i buri revoliutsii, 1917–1921*, Vol. I (2nd ed.; n.p.: Vyd. 'Prometei', 1950–51), pp. 55–56; Majstrenko, pp. 89–92; M. A. Rubach, "K istorii grazhdanskoi voiny na Ukraine (perekhod Gri-goreva k sovetkoi vlasti)," *Letopis revoliutsii*, No. 3 [8] (Kharkiv, 1924), p. 177.

countryside where the hated foreign order and authority were fast disappearing.

At its height the Jacquerie seemed to follow an evolutionary process that had its own innate laws and unseen ends. With the irresistible force of a tidal wave, it swept aside or crushed whatever stood in its way. These characteristics and their impact upon political developments are well illustrated by the swiftly changing relationships between the peasants and the Directory, which rose in late November 1918 to drive out Skoropadskyi.

Again the basic facts are well known. A Ukrainian National Union was formed by the nationalist parties in July and August to work for the establishment of an independent, democratic national state. On November 14, following the collapse of Germany, this Union, under the leadership of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, proclaimed a Directory of five nationalist leaders to be the legitimate political authority in the Ukraine. In its proclamation the Directory pledged itself to establish an independent Ukrainian National Republic (UNR). Simultaneously, Symon Petliura, a member of the Directory and its chief military figure, issued an appeal to the nation for arms and men, and in the space of a few days thousands upon thousands of peasants, Cossacks, and townfolk flocked to the Directory's blue and yellow banners.¹⁷

By mid-December, when Skoropadskyi abdicated and fled from Kiev disguised in a German uniform, the army of the Directory already embraced nearly 100,000 men, while new recruits continued to pour in, both from the cities and from the outlying areas.¹⁸ Cossack chiefs (*otamans*) at all levels, village elders, school teachers, sergeants, self-made captains, colonels, and citizens of every rank—all rushed to support the nationalist independence movement. Thus, for a brief moment in history, it appeared that the active majority of the Ukrainian peasant-Cossack population was pro-Directory, pro-UNR, and pro-Petliura—nationalist, democratic, and irredentist. The UNR's army appeared sufficiently strong to prevent Russia's Bolsheviks from making a successful invasion from the north, as well as to fight off the Russian (Monarchist) troops of the White General, Anton Denikin, who threatened the Ukraine from the

¹⁷ Reshetar, pp. 199–201.

¹⁸ Volodymyr Vynnychenko, *Vidrodzhennia natsii*, Vol. III (Kiev-Vienna: Vyd. Dzvyn, 1920), pp. 244–245.

southeast. At this moment of triumph the Ukrainian nationalist leaders were fully persuaded both that they were in command and that the Ukrainian people wanted a national republic governed by Ukrainians.

In reality, however, the peasants and Cossacks who poured into Petliura's formations had little or no comprehension of the Directory's political and social programs.¹⁹ They knew only that they were sick of the Germans and of Skoropadskyi's police. They rose to seize the lands Skoropadskyi had forced them to return to the big landowners, to rid themselves of armed food collectors, to attack and plunder withdrawing German units, to rob stores in the cities—in sum, to profit in any way possible from the chaos.

With certain exceptions, the men who led the Directory's armies also failed to understand the real aims of the government they served. Thus the reactionary colonel, Petro Bolbochan, who acted as Petliura's chief commander on the Left Bank of the Dnieper, suppressed local urban workers' and peasants' assemblies, employed Russian officers in his units, and left Skoropadskyi's officials in place in the villages. In mid-January 1919, after losing Kharkiv to Bolshevik troops, Bolbochan moved to the province of Poltava, where he showed himself ruthlessly hostile to the peasants' social revolution.²⁰ In peasant eyes, his rule was only a continuation of the Hetmanate, now doubly infuriating because so much had been expected.

Other Directory commanders were reactionary Russian Officers, Cossack partisan adventurers, or local ruffians who hated Jews or saw in the Ukraine's chaos a splendid opportunity for sacking undefended villages and cities. Such men as *Otaman* Hryhoriiv, who led partisan bands in the central areas around Katerynoslav and Aleksandriia, Struk of Chernihiv province, Anhel and Ihnatiiev-Mysevra in Poltava province, and a host of lesser leaders were only nominally controlled by the Chief *Otaman* Petliura.²¹ All did very

¹⁹ Reshetar, pp. 200–201, 218–219; Vynnychenko, Vol. III, pp. 124–127.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 146–147, 181, 184–186.

²¹ Other *otamans* and partisan leaders who played significant roles during the *Jacquerie* were: Shepel, in Podillia province; Zelenyi, in Kiev and Poltava provinces; Shuba, in the Lubny district; Kotsur, a village school teacher; Sokolovskyi, in the Radomyshl region west of Kiev; Bozhko, in the territory between Bar and Mohyliv-Podilskyi, who proclaimed the restoration of the Zaporozhian Cossack state; Tiutiunnyk, Iatsenko, Klymenko, Popov, Holub, Mordylev, Volynets, Sokil, Diachenko, and, of

much as they wished, and, if any of them listened to a restraining voice, it was to that of the men who followed him, for any self-styled *otaman* who set himself at the head of a peasant or Cossack band had to be sensitive to its moods. Each of these leaders (with his band) represented but a single wave in the great sea of rebellion, though each regarded himself as independent, sovereign, and free. At a later date, Volodymyr Vynnychenko understandably evaluated this "*otamanshchyna*" with bitter words: "There was neither punishment, nor justice, nor trials, nor control over these criminals and enemies of the revolution and the national movement. The whole system of military authority was constructed and consciously based, by the chief and by the lesser *otamany*, on the principle that there would be no control."²²

Almost from the very day that the peasants and Cossacks rose to swell the ranks of Petliura's armies, they sensed that the Directory (so far as they were able to perceive its intentions) was not the agency that would lead them to freedom. Seeing only local military representatives like the brutal Bolbochan, those who had rushed to join the Directory armies began to have second thoughts.²³

Nor were the vacillations of the Directory government calculated to persuade the masses that the new utopia was about to be established on earth. The Marxian socialists of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Labor Party hesitated too long before implementing their goal—the establishment of a socialist workers' dictatorship in the Ukraine, the establishment of a *non-Bolshevik* people's government.²⁴ While they hesitated, new reasons for moderating their

course, the powerful Makhno, who was joined in the southeastern steppe by many less well-known men. Reshetar, pp. 251–252; Majstrenko, pp. 91–92, 235–236; William Henry Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917–1921*, Vol. II (New York and London: The Macmillan Co., 1935), pp. 223–225; Elias Heifetz, *Slaughter of the Jews in the Ukraine in 1919* (New York, 1921), pp. 65–66, 312, 338–347; B. V. Kozelskyi, *Shliakh zradnytstva i avantur (Petliuriuske povstanstvo)* (Kharkiv: Derzhavne vyd. Ukrainy, 1927), pp. 19–22, 28–29; P. Arshinov, *Istoriia makhnovskogo dvizheniia (1918–1921 gg.)* (Berlin: Izd. 'Gruppy russkikh anarkhistov v Germanii,' 1923), pp. 214–215.

²² Vynnychenko, Vol. III, p. 188.

²³ Pavlo Khrystiuk, *Zamitky i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii, 1917–1920 rr.*, Vol. IV (Vienna, 1921–22), pp. 27, 41, 77–78; Majstrenko, pp. 93–94; Reshetar, p. 257.

²⁴ Vynnychenko, Vol. III, pp. 131–138; Khrystiuk, Vol. IV, pp. 5.9.

radical social programs multiplied on every side. To advocate a Soviet government smacked of Great Russian Bolshevism, something no Ukrainian nationalist cared to associate himself with, since in January 1919 the Directory was at war with invading Bolshevik forces.

Similarly, the economic and social realities of the Ukrainian situation posed perplexing problems. For example, out of a population that, as noted earlier, probably approached 33 million, only some 300,000 could be classified as industrial workers,²⁵ and the majority of these were concentrated in a few highly industrialized areas in the eastern and southern regions of the Ukraine. Could a proletarian dictatorship be founded in such a society? In the minds of the most clearheaded Social Democrats, the new socialist order needed to establish economic and social equality for all workers—urban, agrarian, and intellectual; but strong democratic and conservative forces within the Directory raised stern objections to these ideas.²⁶ Individual party leaders, discussing these and similar issues, were brought to the realization that their utopian plans for the Ukraine were simply infeasible.²⁷ Meanwhile, both the parties and the administrative agencies of the Directory established only the most desultory contacts with the agrarian masses.²⁸

In January, with Bolshevik troops advancing from the northeast and with French troops at Sevastopol and Odessa supporting Denikin's agents, it was impossible to argue that the Directory's first task was daring social reform. There was no time for the development of reform programs or the establishment of efficient provincial and local administrative offices; there was no reason for disseminating in newspapers, manifestoes, and handbills information about programs that were not yet decided upon and that might never be implemented. There was time only for fighting, and this was work for Petliura. In varying degrees it became clear to all nationalist leaders that if the Directory was to keep itself alive, the radical as-

²⁵ Jurij Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine* (Stockholm, 1960), pp. 57–59, 61; *Ukraine*, pp. 169, 174.

²⁶ Khrystiuk, Vol. IV, pp. 50–55; Mazepa, *Ukraina*, Vol. I, pp. 78–81; Arnold Margolin, *Ukraina i politika Antanty* (Berlin: Izd. S. Efron, 1921), pp. 98–103.

²⁷ Mazepa, Vol. I, p. 95; Khrystiuk, Vol. IV, pp. 54–55.

²⁸ M. G. Rafes, *Dva goda revoliutsii na Ukraine: evoliutsiia i raskol "Bunda"* (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izd., 1920), pp. 144–148, 152.

pirations of the rampaging masses had to be ignored; the people had to be thrust away from direct participation in local government and prevented from exercising any kind of paralyzing parliamentary control while crucial defense efforts were underway.²⁹ The Directory's tragedy, in sum, was that it could not fight without the people and that it was forced to seek victory on the battlefield before it could devise and implement reforms that might have won it lasting popular support. Given this dilemma, the nationalists' great experiment was doomed.

What is especially pertinent to the present analysis is the fact that, despite the Directory's first successes and the apparent enthusiasm of the Ukrainian masses, its political parties and leaders failed to establish control over what was essentially but one phase of the Jacquerie. And, because of its inability to formulate and implement programs that would meet the demands of the agrarian population, the Directory lost peasant-Cossack support. The army that had burgeoned so rapidly in November and December 1918 began in January to melt away with equal rapidity until, by February 1919, Petliura's command had shrunk to about 21,000.³⁰ To put this within the framework of the thesis being argued here: the movement of the agrarian social revolution coincided for a few weeks with the fall of Skoropadskyi and the rise of the Directory. But, as the Directory faltered in its implementation of new programs, turning cautious and conservative in order to preserve its very life, the forces of the Jacquerie swept past it to embrace another, more radical political group, which seemed to promise a program that *would* suit peasant tastes. Specifically, even before the year 1918 had run its course, many of the Directory's peasant-Cossack supporters were already going over to the Bolsheviks.

What had been true for the Directory in the first weeks of its existence was also to be true for the Bolsheviks from late December 1918 until early March 1919. The small Military Revolutionary Committee that arrived at Kursk on November 20 to organize a "Red Army" for what came to be known as the Bolsheviks' "Second Campaign" in the Ukraine started its work under conditions that seemed to promise inevitable victory. Although it is generally as-

²⁹ Vynnychenko, Vol. III, pp. 184-185; Mazepa, Vol. I, pp. 74-76, 81, 94-95.

³⁰ Reshetar, p. 257.

sumed that a Russian Red Army came to conquer the Ukraine and defeat the Directory's forces in early 1919, nothing could be further from the truth. The Bolshevik military commander, Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko, received little help from Moscow. Supported by a military revolutionary committee, whose other members were Georgii Piatakov, Volodymyr Zatonskyi, and briefly, Stalin, and aided by the small Communist Party of the Ukraine (CP(b)U), Antonov-Ovseenko was to build his army out of the people of the Ukraine.³¹

The masses of armed peasantry that had supported the Directory in mid-December flowed into the Bolshevik camp in January and February. While this movement is sometimes referred to as a reversal of direction, it would seem more accurate to describe it as only a continuation of the peasants' movement toward radical solutions for their social and economic problems. Essentially, the agrarian masses shook off a political organization that could not satisfy their needs, and for a few months many thousands of peasants joined whatever new political group promised the most radical reforms.³²

It is important to remember that, while the Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks may have recognized in Bolshevik slogans the same radical-egalitarian utopianism that had long been the core of the Ukrainian folk's traditional culture, the hordes of peasants and partisans that joined Antonov-Ovseenko's Red Army formations were not and did not become members of the Communist Party. Nor do they appear to have been swayed to Bolshevism by the decidedly weak and inadequate propaganda and organizational efforts of the Bolsheviks in the first months of 1919.³³ To repeat: as with the Ukrainian nationalists, the Bolsheviks appeared to be moving in the same direction that the *Jacquerie* moved. For a few months in early 1919 there was an illusion that the two forces had joined for a common cause, and on the Bolshevik side there were fierce efforts to force the *Jacquerie* to serve the ends of the Communist Party. But the alliance was unnatural and temporary.

³¹ Arthur E. Adams, *Bolsheviks in the Ukraine: The Second Campaign, 1918–1919* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 25, 36–40, 50–53, 66–70.

³² Reshetar, pp. 258–259.

³³ A. G. Shlikhter, "Borba za khleb na Ukraine v 1919 godu," *Litopys revoliutsii*, No. 2 [29] (Kharkiv, 1928), pp. 102–105, 109–118, 128; Kh. Rakovskii, "Ilich i Ukraina," *Letopis revoliutsii*, No. 2 [11] (Kharkiv, 1925), pp. 9–10.

When the new Provisional Soviet government of the Ukraine sent its first units against Kharkiv in early January, Bolshevism was still something of an unknown quantity to the Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks of the Left Bank and the southern steppes. Consequently, there was a considerable store of passive good will for Bolshevism among the peasants. Although there had been shocking instances of Bolshevik brutality in the Ukraine in early 1918—as, for example, during the bloody occupation of Kiev carried out in February by the Red commander, Mikhail Muravev—there were also several reasons why it was possible for the peasant to be sympathetic to the Bolsheviks.³⁴ Many had met Bolsheviks under circumstances that placed them in an ideal light. Ukrainian soldiers on the western and southwestern fronts in 1917 had known Bolshevik agitators to be courageous advocates of a Soviet government, and Lenin himself had enunciated the slogan, “Peace, Land, and Bread.” Others had seen Red troops retiring eastward under German pressure in March and April of 1918, a fact that seemed to make the Bolsheviks defenders of the Ukrainian land against the foreign conquerors.

Thus, as the Red Army of the Ukraine moved westward from Kharkiv in early 1919, few Ukrainian peasants on the Left Bank were aware that the Bolshevik utopian ideals of pre-November 1917 and early 1918 had been superseded by Lenin’s obsessive determination to consolidate his power at all costs. Few could understand that the very possession of power had brought into prominence the Bolshevik leader’s exclusivist and elitist principles; few realized that despite its exciting slogans, the Bolshevik party had no immediate interest in the needs and desires of the Ukrainian populace. The thousands of peasants who joined the Bolshevik Army of the Ukraine did so because they believed they were joining to fight for the common cause—that is, for themselves. They adhered to ideals that they understood to be the ideals of the Bolsheviks, but they abhorred the party, ironically emphasizing this point by calling themselves “non-party Bolsheviks.”³⁵

By early February 1919, the characteristics of the peasant cause were clearly recognizable. Three main features appear to have had

³⁴ Vladimir A. Antonov-Ovseenko, *Zapiski o grazhdanskoi voine*, Vol. I (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe voennoe izd., 1924–33), pp. 143–155; Chamberlin, Vol. I, pp. 375–377.

³⁵ Adams, p. 165.

more or less universal significance. Of these, the first was disillusionment with the Directory government, disillusionment that was particularly strong on the Left Bank, where it had turned to active hatred under the suppressive actions of Bolbochan and his reactionary officers. As it became evident that the Directory in action meant censorship, military suppression, and rule by a conservative middle class, the aroused peasantry turned against the Directory with a ferocity similar to that which it had shown the Germans and Skoropadskyi. At that moment the Bolsheviks appeared on the scene, promising to help drive out the Directory, to establish an agrarian utopia, to uphold the peasant's right to govern himself. "If our own peasantry had not risen against us," Vynnychenko declared later, "the Russian Soviet government would have been powerless against us."³⁶

The second characteristic of the peasant cause in 1919 was its primitive, egalitarian economic and political ideals. Among the peasants there was general agreement that the lands of the wealthy should be seized and divided in some just fashion among working farmers. This idea found its counterpart in Bolshevik promises.³⁷ Similarly, before there had been any extensive direct experience with the Bolsheviks, unsuspecting peasants and Cossacks could interpret the Bolsheviks' championing of soviets as a sincere effort to abolish all alien forms of government and to return political authority to the people themselves.

A third important feature of the peasant cause, less universal perhaps than the first two, but influential in the long run, was the presence of strong currents of *haidamak*-Cossack anarchism. There was a general readiness to march and fight for a variety of reasons other than political ideals and land reforms. Such motives ranged from a lust for plunder and killing to a thirst for glory. Surely, neither the Bolsheviks nor other parties consciously sought to enflame these currents; yet it is quite evident that the deepest strains of social anarchism—the desire to steal from the rich, to drink one's fill of vodka, to savor the wild pleasures of rape and murder—were strong among many partisan bands and influential in the determination of their conduct. As some of the Directory's *otamans* became

³⁶ Vynnychenko, Vol. III, p. 204.

³⁷ M. Kubanin, *Makhnovshchina: krestianskoe dvizhenie v stepnoi Ukraine v gody grazhdanskoï voïny* (Leningrad: Izd. 'Priboi,' 1927), pp. 55–56.

more and more violent, turning even to pogroms,³⁸ others rushed to join with the Bolshevik units as a way to legitimize their own will to violence. Thus, for a time, the Bolsheviks (as Petliura had done before them) accepted alliances with violent and ungovernable men whom they abominated, acting on the assumption that the ideal ends they worked for justified the use of any means.

Such support rendered the Bolshevik advance irresistible. In January, town after town on the Left Bank fell into their hands. Kiev, the Directory's capital, fell in the first days of February. At almost the same moment, in the central steppe regions, the powerful leader *Otaman* Hryhoriiv, Cossack and adventurer extraordinary, who called himself by Petliura's authority "*Otaman* of Zaporozhe," deserted the Directory and went over to the Bolsheviks. This act marked yet another decisive loss for the Directory, which retained only the fighting units of the Galician *Sich* Riflemen (*Sichovi Striltsi*) and some smaller partisan units.³⁹

Hryhoriiv was a typical representative of the Jacquerie in the sense that he was motivated by deep and contradictory passions and ideas—hatred of authority, arrogance, willful independence—as well as intense and insatiable thirsts for vodka, power, and military glory. Added to these incompatible personal characteristics was a peculiar relationship with the *Borotbist* Party (Left SR's), which apparently influenced his thinking only when he wished it to do so. Like so many other partisan chiefs, Hryhoriiv led a rabble of peasants and Cossacks in which the middle and upper levels of the peasantry predominated, but which also contained a fair share of political agitators, adventuresome ruffians, and out-and-out criminals.⁴⁰

Like the much more famous anarchist leader Nestor Makhno, whose band operated in the southeast, Hryhoriiv became for a few

³⁸ The kind of men involved is indicated in a list of more than thirty localities where pogroms took place during February and March 1919. A. I. Gukovskii, *Frantsuzskaia interventsiiia na Iuge Rossii, 1918–1919 g.* (Moscow-Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe izd., 1928), p. 81; see also Adams, pp. 152–155; Chamberlin, Vol. II, pp. 225–226.

³⁹ Rubach, pp. 178–183; Antonov-Ovseenko, Vol. III, pp. 166–167.

⁴⁰ Arshinov, pp. 108, 112–115; Rubach, p. 178; Antonov-Ovseenko, Vol. III, p. 223 and Vol. IV, pp. 68–69; Iu. Tiutiunnyk, "V borbe protiv okkupantov," in A. G. Shlikhter, *Chernaia kniga: Sbornik statei i materialov ob interventsii Antant'y na Ukraine v 1918–1919 gg.*, Vol. II (Ekaterinoslav: Gosudarstvennoe izd. Ukrainy, 1925), pp. 211–216.

weeks one of the Bolsheviks' most powerful and successful military leaders.⁴¹ It was Hryhoriiv, with his motley partisan "brigade" nominally under the command of Antonov-Ovseenko, who drove the French and Greek interventionist forces from Kherson, Mykolaiv, and finally, Odessa. It is a fascinating commentary on the role of the *Jacquerie* that one of the greatest "Red" fighters in the Ukraine during March and early April was no Bolshevik at all, but a twentieth century *haidamak*-Cossack who incessantly boasted of his total independence and of his indissoluble ties with the Zaporozhians.⁴²

Like the Directory, the Bolsheviks failed to win leadership over the diverse elements of the *Jacquerie*. Both political groups rose to power in the Ukraine on a wave of aroused peasants; both were then deserted because of the failure to satisfy peasant expectations, and both subsequently had to defend themselves against the very people they presumed to lead. In the case of the Bolsheviks, the revulsion began almost as soon as they appeared in the Ukraine, and to a very great extent Bolshevik programs and policies were to blame. Thus, while they came preaching committee or soviet government, the system that they established was at variance with popular concepts of self-government. Instead of permitting the formation by villagers of their own elected soviets, to be composed of whatever group held local leadership, the Communists decreed the formation of pro-Bolshevik soviets or *appointed revkomy* (local Communist action groups), thus making it clear from the start that local "soviets" would be controlled by the Communist government of the Ukraine and manned exclusively by Bolsheviks. No other groups or parties were to be allowed to participate unless they explicitly accepted Bolshevik precepts.

In addition, the Bolsheviks decreed the establishment of *bidniak* (poor peasant) committees in the villages. These committees, composed only of "pro-Bolshevik members" and representing the "proletariat of the villages," were to be given political predominance. Thus, the Bolsheviks disenfranchised the middle and wealthy peasants and declared them class enemies of the Soviet

⁴¹ Chamberlin, Vol. II, pp. 232–239; Arshinov, pp. 48–59, 215–220; Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 209–217.

⁴² Gukovskii, pp. 205–206; Adams, pp. 150, 187–214.

regime. Such policies left the non-Bolshevik and influential middle and wealthy peasants no alternative but resistance, and resist they did, with characteristic stubbornness.⁴³

The Bolsheviks also decreed their own failure by supporting unpopular agrarian policies. Wedded to contradictory policies of propaganda and practice, they came to the Ukraine appealing to the peasants to seize and divide up the property of former landed proprietors, churches, monasteries, and rich peasants. But in practice the Bolsheviks were convinced that the land must be socialized, a term which, for them, meant the abolition of private farming (which had in the Ukraine far deeper roots than in the northern areas of Russia) and the establishment of communes—that is, one or another type of collective farm organization in which all members would work together and share the profits from land held in common.⁴⁴

In the Ukraine, where the *mir* (commune) had not developed the deep roots typical of it in Russia proper, and where the private farm was virtually a natural right of the peasant farmer and the Cossack, the decree ordering that the land be organized into communal farms was regarded as nothing short of a declaration of war against all free farmers.⁴⁵ Other agrarian policies exacerbated this response. There were, for example, great estates in the Ukraine, some of them involved in livestock breeding, others producing such industrial crops as sugar beets and grain for alcohol. Breaking these estates into many small farms meant not only the destruction of their productivity but also the dispersal of their real property—livestock, farm implements, and refinery machinery. For good economic reasons, therefore, the new government withdrew these farms from the expropriation process, reserving possession to itself; and thus, in the peasants' eyes, it reneged on the promise that all land would be divided. Worse, to encourage the creation of communal farms, the Bolsheviks needed land that could be given to poor peasant

⁴³ *Sobranie zakonov i rasporyazhenii raboche-krestianskogo pravitelstva Ukrainy* (1st ed.; Kiev, 1919), No. 1, Art. 3, pp. 6–8; No. 3, Art. 29, pp. 29–31; No. 4, Art. 47, p. 48; B. M. Babi, *Mistsevi orhany derzhavnoi vlady Ukrainskoi RSR v 1917–1920 rr.* (Kiev, 1956), pp. 143–148; Shlikhter, pp. 116–117.

⁴⁴ N. N. Popov, *Ocherk istorii Kommunisticheskoi partii (bolshevikov) Ukrainy* (2nd ed.; Simferopol: Izd. 'Proletarii,' 1929), p. 197; *Sobranie zakonov i rasporyazhenii*, No. 4, Art. 47: "Declaration of January 26," p. 47.

⁴⁵ Kubanin, pp. 55–59.

communes; moreover, they needed farm implements and livestock for such communes. To make such provisions, the Soviet government of the Ukraine decreed that approximately half of all land and all farm inventories would be retained by the state. Middle and rich peasants, who were hungry for more land themselves, saw this as further evidence of Bolshevik dishonesty.⁴⁶

Still other Bolshevik policies increased peasant hostility. A huge and well-organized effort was mounted to collect provisions in the Ukraine for shipment to other fronts of the civil war and to the cities of Russia. Forcible confiscations were undertaken by armed *Cheka* units, Russian food collection detachments, and military provisioning units of the Red Army of the Ukrainian front.⁴⁷ Such actions, combined with exclusivist party politics and policies offensive to Ukrainian national feelings, mobilized the peasants to armed resistance.

In the month of April, Khristiiian Rakovskii recounts that there were ninety-three separate armed uprisings against the Soviet Government of the Ukraine.⁴⁸ The memoirs of the Red Army commander Vladimir Antonov-Ovseenko reveal the desperation of his military situation, which forced him to deploy angry partisan forces not only against external enemies but also against other partisan forces that were raising the standard of rebellion. In mid-April, for example, Hryhoriiv defied Antonov's orders and withdrew his troops, now dubbed a "Red division," from Odessa to the "rest camps" around their home villages of Oleksandriia and Verbli-uzhka.⁴⁹ Further to the west, other partisan groups, led by Zelenyi,

⁴⁶ *Sobranie uzakonenii* (1st ed.), No. 6, Art. 77, pp. 80–81; No. 9, Art. 111, pp. 123–124; (2nd ed.), Art. 271, pp. 369–370, 377–379. See also Popov, *Ocherk istorii*, pp. 196–99; Kubanin, *Makhnovshchina*, pp. 53–55.

⁴⁷ Popov, pp. 197–199; Shlikhter, pp. 113, 117–118, 123–124; Khrystiuk, Vol. IV, pp. 175–176; *Sobranie uzakonenii* (1st ed.), No. 1, Art. 7, p. 10; No. 2, Art. 13, p. 19; Kolomiets, "Vospominaniia o revoliutsionnoi borbe v Elizavetgrade v 1917–19 gg.," *Letopis revoliutsii*, No. 1 (Kharkiv, 1922), pp. 200–201; see also Heifetz, pp. 8–9, 58–62, 64–65, 68–69. Heifetz, as chairman of the All-Ukrainian Relief Committee for victims of the pogroms, made investigations in the field in early 1919. He blames the anti-Jewish sentiment, at least in part, upon the Communist use of Jews as Soviet government officials.

⁴⁸ Shlikhter, p. 106.

⁴⁹ Antonov-Ovseenko, Vol. IV, pp. 78, 80–81.

actively prepared for rebellion against the Bolsheviks.⁵⁰ In the southeast, where partisans stolidly held a part of the Bolshevik line against Denikin, Makhno openly declared the right of his people to govern themselves, making it clear that he would choose his own time for dealing with the Bolshevik dictatorship.⁵¹

Hryhoriiv's decision to rebel openly in early May was well timed. His uprising was accompanied by sympathy rebellions among other bands of lesser strength and by the successful attacks of Denikin against Makhno's sector of the Bolsheviks' southern front.⁵² The Bolsheviks were badly shaken by the Hryhoriiv revolt and were compelled to take desperate measures, setting in motion the series of events that led to the collapse of the Soviet government of the Ukraine in August.⁵³

As a footnote to Hryhoriiv's uprising, it is interesting to note that in some rather startling ways the leaders of various partisan bands were themselves victims of the radical peasants whom they tried to lead. By trampling over all obstacles to gain their most deeply desired objectives, the peasants victimized not only the Directory's leaders and the Bolsheviks, but also the native leaders who so often appear to have been part and parcel of the Jacquerie. In the case of Hryhoriiv, for example, there is good reason to believe that he was the leader of his rebellion only in a limited sense. His "followers," undisciplined and angry at the agrarian policies of the Bolsheviks, indicated both by word and deed (pogroms, murders of Bolshevik *Chekists*, attacks upon towns, and grumbling about Bolshevik policies) that if he did not lead an uprising, they would move without him.⁵⁴ The peasants, not Hryhoriiv, dictated. There is evidence to support the hypothesis that when Trotsky handed

⁵⁰ Khrystiuk, Vol. IV, pp. 131-133; Antonov-Ovseenko, Vol. IV, pp. 160-161, 171-172; Ravich-Cherkasskii, p. 122; N. I. Podvoiskii, *Na Ukraine: stati N. I. Podvoiskogo* (Kiev, 1919), p. 19.

⁵¹ Arshinov, pp. 97-103, 109-110, 173.

⁵² Antonov-Ovseenko, Vol. IV, pp. 222, 252-254, 304; "Grigorevskaia avantiura (mai, 1919 goda)," *Letopis revoliutsii*, No. 3 (Kharkiv, 1923), pp. 152-154; *Grazhdanskaia voina*, Vol. I, p. 91; *Chervonoe kazachestvo: sbornik materialov po istorii chervonogo kazachestva* (Kharkiv: Izd. "Put prosveshcheniia," n.d.), pp. 52-53; Kubanin, pp. 77-78.

⁵³ "Grigorevskaia . . .," p. 153; Antonov-Ovseenko, Vol. IV, p. 304; Adams, pp. 358-373.

⁵⁴ Antonov-Ovseenko, Vol. IV, p. 80.

down an order to do so, in early June, Makhno submissively gave up the command of his brigade, because he had lost influence over the men he presumably commanded.⁵⁵

The Jacquerie continued under Denikin and into 1920, when the Bolsheviks returned in force.⁵⁶ Space does not permit detailed examination of the later stages of this history, but the meaning of the events of the last phase must at least be summarized. That the Bolsheviks ultimately managed to consolidate their political authority in the early months of 1920 can be explained in part by the lessons they had learned from an earlier attempt, the chief lesson being that the Jacquerie could not be controlled or redirected by half measures. To suppress it demanded a highly centralized army, a ruthlessly efficient political organization, and policies designed to disarm and please the peasants. These the Bolsheviks possessed when they returned. While winning on the battlefields, they made public concessions to private farming, to the middle peasants, and to national pride.⁵⁷

But there is another significant explanation for the Bolsheviks' ultimate victory. The Jacquerie, at least in its most influential and torrential phases, had burned itself out. With the exception of Makhno, its greatest leaders were dead or driven out of the Ukraine; thousands of brave men had died in the fighting—in the ranks of Ukrainian nationalist and Bolshevik and White Russian armies, and in independent partisan units. Ravaged by typhus, hunger, and cold, exhausted by years of campaigning, and anxious to return to the land and make it produce, the peasants and Cossacks simply went home. In 1920, the Jacquerie collapsed, and

⁵⁵ Kubanin, pp. 77–78.

⁵⁶ Kozelskyi, *Shliakh zradnytstva i avantur*; D. Kin, "Povstancheskie dvizhenie protiv denikinshchiny na Ukraine," *Letopis revoliutsii*, No. 3–4 [18–19] (Kharkiv, 1926), pp. 70–74 ff.

⁵⁷ V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniia*, Vol. XXIV (3rd ed.; Moscow: Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute, 1928–37), pp. 169–171, 552–554, 655–660, 811–813n.; *Vsesoiuznaia kommunisticheskaia partiia(b) v rezoliutsiakh ee sezdov i konferentsii* (1898–1926 gg.) (3rd ed.; Moscow-Leningrad, 1927), pp. 252–253; M. A. Rubach *et al.* (eds.), *Radianske budivnytstvo na Ukraini v roky hromadianskoi viiny, 1919–1920: zbirnyk dokumentiv i materialiv* (Kiev: Vyd. Akademii Nauk Ukrainskoi RSR, 1957), pp. 23–24, 26–30, 39–40, 47, 49, 55–56; S. Barannyk, Kh. Mishkis, and H. Slovodskii, *Istoriia KP(b)U v materialakh i dokumentakh (khrestomatiia 1917–1920 rr.)* (2nd ed.; Kiev: Partvydav TsK KP(b)U, 1934), pp. 497–501.

the Bolsheviks proceeded with the establishment of their "new order."

Although this was the end of the great rebellion, the ideals and traditions that had guided it did not disappear. Bolshevik troops were kept busy in the years immediately following 1920, hunting down and destroying groups of "bandits" that would not or could not give up. The conduct of the Ukrainian peasantry during the period of the New Economic Policy and through the era of collectivization provides good evidence that the rural folk were not readily giving up their basic ideals. And events during the Second World War—the quick dissolution of collective farms in some areas and the existence of some independent partisan groups—suggest that the forces that drove the rural masses of the Ukraine to rebellion between 1918 and 1920 were still alive.⁵⁸

Several significant conclusions are suggested by the evidence examined above. Most important is the obvious need for further detailed examination of the role that the social convulsion, here called a Jacquerie, played in Ukrainian events. It is quite evident that we are not at present able to define clearly and positively the aims and objectives of the peasant masses; nor can we accurately portray the levels of comprehension of political and social ideals that existed in the villages. The difficulty is that, while some partisan movements have been examined in considerable detail, it is extremely difficult to form completely reliable general statements concerning the common aims and drives of the steppe farmer, the Galician peasant, and the peasants of Poltava gubernia. So great indeed have been the variations of historical experience among the peasant-Cossack population of the several regions of the Ukraine that the very use of such terms as "peasants" and "Cossacks" might well be questioned, on the grounds that they have no well-defined meaning applicable to all separate groups. So too, such questions as the direct influence of historical traditions on the peasant population, and the degree to which party propaganda and general news penetrated to the village in 1918 and 1919, need much more thorough and objective investigation than they have received in the past.

⁵⁸ Chamberlin, Vol. II, p. 239; Kubanin, p. 161; John A. Armstrong, *Ukrainian Nationalism, 1939–1945* (2nd ed.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), pp. 98–100, 144, 150, 154, 165, 249–254.

Finally, the evidence considered here indicates that parties, political leaders, and governments, overconcerned with their own roles in these years, have largely failed to record their own weakness before the onrush of the *Jacquerie*. It cannot be said that during 1918–1920 any one party or group of parties determined events. All contributed to the vast panorama; but, fundamentally, the *Jacquerie* followed its own bloody course, until its human elements could fight no longer. To the question: "Who best represented the Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks?" the answer must be: "The peasants and Cossacks themselves." No party was quick enough or bold enough, no party possessed an organization that could win and hold intellectual authority or establish lasting control over these champions of agrarian social revolution. Instead, the peasants and Cossacks rose in anger, fought with a stubborn and unreasoning violence that overwhelmed every political group, and at last collapsed from sheer exhaustion.